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Behind Closed Doors: Revisiting Air Command’s ‘Lack of Moral Fiber and Waverer Disposal Policy’ and its ‘Treatment’ of Neurotic Cases, 1941-1945

By Christopher Kingdon, University of Chicago

Part I: Introduction

“!e airman thereafter developed symptoms of an anxiety state and was treated in sick quarters for a month without improvement. In previous wars he would probably have been shot for coward-ice. Today he is a “medical case”, albeit a medical nuisance.”1

Edward Jewesbury MD, RAF Neuroses Specialist, 1943.

1 Edward Jewesbury, M.D., “Work and Progress Report” to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

Forced to accept the existence of combat neuroses, but wary that too lenient of a disposal policy might encour-age shirkers, Dr. Jewesbury’s quote reveals the quandary facing Royal Air Force (RAF) Command during the Second World War. As Air Command (Command) reacted to the perceived threat of mass noncompliance and a rapidly increasing neu-rotic wastage rate, it chose to institutionalize an uncommonly harsh disposal policy in September 1941: the Lack of Moral Fiber and Waverer Disposal Policy (hereafter LMFW policy). !is policy was designed to not only lower rates of neuroses, but also simultaneously to deter future cases of noncompliance through its harsh punishment of neuroses and malingering and by the stigmatization of such categorized cases. Considering recent accusations that Britain’s armed forces continue to at-tach stigma to neurotic disorders amongst its forces deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is pertinent to return to the LMFW

Wikipedia Commons

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policy to understand its causes and consequences, and then to explore its rami!cations. Indubitably, Britain had few alternatives than to rely heavily on the RAF to !ght its early defensive wars (Battles of France and Britain) and subsequent o"ensive war (Bomber Of-fensive) against the German Luftwa"e. But throughout these years, did Command actually understand the neuroses a#ict-ing its men? If so, how did it choose to treat wartime neuroses? Moreover, did the treatment e"ectively rehabilitate airmen, save lives or improve Command’s operational e$ciency?

During the war, as Britain’s infatuation with its airmen grew, the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, and the govern-ment launched an extraordinarily successful propaganda cam-paign evoking the heroic resistance and purported resilience of their young airmen. However, the reality of aviation combat told a di"erent story; indeed the lethality of air combat, espe-cially the bombing campaign, began to take its toll on RAF personnel from the outset of the war.2 3 It becomes painfully clear that RAF Command not only failed to understand and treat combat neuroses, but as a result LMFW policy failed to rehabilitate airmen. %is resulted in a reduction of combat ef-!ciency and an increase in air accidents. Indeed as volunteers grappled with an ever-increasing attrition rate (the highest of Britain’s three services) as well as increasingly harrowing com-bat experiences, the airmen began to succumb to neuroses at ever-higher rates.4 5 Psychiatric attrition rates in Bomber Com-mand increased from 1.5% in 1939 to 5.4% in 1943.6

LMFW policy demonstrates Command’s pervasive paranoia for mass outbreaks of noncompliance at squadron level – it feared that these outbreaks would render the service operational ine"ective, and simultaneously dismantle the ser-vice’s and nation’s stylized portrayal of its men’s formidable sto-icism.7 Above all, the policy was designed to swiftly remove men from their squadrons to Neurotic Centers in order to prevent the spread of noncompliance. Evidence demonstrates that Commanding O$cers (COs), Medical O$cers (MOs), o$cers and aircrew met Command’s disposal policy with con-

2 “At one point in 1942 RAF bomber crews had no more than 10 per-cent change of surviving a full tour of operations.” Martin Francis, !e Flyer: British Culture and the Royal Air Force 1939-1945, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 18-20.

3 Stephen Bungay, The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain (London: Aurum Press, 2000), 223.

4 Around 45% of all those who served Bomber Command died during the Second World War, 56,000 in total. Max Hastings, Bomber Command: !e Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing O"ensive 1939-1945, (New York: Dial Press, 1979), 1.

5 “To name, but a few - lack of oxygen in the stratosphere, anti-aircraft, lack of parachutes, planes that were impossible to escape as they fell, lynch mobs… incited by German propaganda”. Francis, !e Flyer, 108.

6 Mark Wells, Courage and Air Warfare: !e Allied Experience in the Second World War (London: Frank Cass, 1997), 129-133.

7 “LMF could go through a squadron like wild!re if it was unchecked”. Hastings, Bomber Command, 243.

siderable resistance due to its bluntness, harshness, and impact on operational performance.8 Yet, more often than not, COs and MOs acquiesced enacting Command’s disposal policy. Not only did Britain’s Secretary of State deem the harshness and class-orientated nature of the policy ‘indefensible in Parlia-ment’ as the war wound down in 1944, evidence reveals that it failed to stem psychiatric wastage, contributed to higher rates of air accidents, and perpetuated stigmas attached to neuroses.9 To explore this topic, primary documentation, com-plemented by secondary scholarship, !nally allows for histo-rians to fully recreate LMFW policy. %us, it is now possible to develop a fuller understanding of the severe consequences facing airmen. Aircrew faced the policy’s harshest consequences - transfer to combatant or ground duties.10 %ese airmen, the non-o$cer class, included pilots, navigator, wireless operator, bombardiers and air gunners; in fact NCOs included all trained aircrew who weren’t awarded the rank of o$cer upon gradua-tion from aviation school. On the other hand, the o$cer class in the RAF faced softer, yet still stigmatic consequences, such as demotion and isolative invaliding.11 Both LMFW o$cers and aircrew were met with the certainty of the squadron CO stripping the &ier of his coveted wings.12 To contextualize LMFW policy in the historiography, this paper examines the British experience with neuroses in the First World War; in particular, the harsh and ine"ective treat-ment of neuroses during the war and the Ministry of Pensions obsessive e"orts to reduce pensions for neurotics during the interwar period.13 %is paper then studies the development of aviation psychology in the interwar period by focusing on these sources: the Birley Report on Wartime Neuroses (1921), Bartlett Psychology and the Soldier (1927) and Gillespie’s Psychological E"ects of War on a Citizen and Soldier (1942). In light of this historiography, it becomes abundantly clear that RAF Command had an obsessive predilection, based upon Freudian concepts, that rises in neurotic rates were attrib-utable to the character de!ciencies of its wartime recruits, and not to the combined e"ects of prolonged exposure to combat stress and high attrition rates. Given the above, this paper endeavors to make three

8 Squadron Leader D. Reid to Air Command, September 14, 1942, AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

9 Minutes on “W” Procedure, October 20, 1944, AIR 19/632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Garden, London.

10 Air Command “Memorandum on the Disposal of All Members of Air Crews who Forfeit the Con!dence of their Commanding O$cers” to all Commanding O$cers, May 8, 1943, AIR 19:632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, paragraphs 14-16.

11 Ibid., paragraphs 14-16.12 Ibid., paragraph 17. 13 Joanna Burke, “E"eminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma:

%e Su"erings of ‘Shell-Shocked’ Men in Great Britain and Ireland, 1914-39,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 19 (Jan. 2000): 63.

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core arguments about LMFW policy. First, the totality of the RAF’s war contributed to a growing disconnect between operational expectations from the government and Command, and the reality of the war facing their airmen. During the Battle of Britain a legend of invin-cibility and bravery was born in the skies above Britain, wit-nessed in the nation’s cities and villages (Churchill himself was an avid nightly watcher). From these scenes, the British gov-ernment wrought a propaganda machine extolling the beauty and nobility of air warfare that gripped the public’s attention through the media of !lm, print and poster. "ese political and military expectations placed on the RAF, and, subsequently, its #iers, fostered a growing disconnect between Command’s ex-pectations of them and the reality of their experience. "is dis-connect contributed to the disposal policy in that Command used ‘transfer to combatant duty’ or ‘resignations’ to arti!cially lower psychological wastage rates conforming to the expecta-tions of British propaganda. Second, the interwar period, the dismantlement of the Royal Flying Corps (hereafter RFC) in 1917, and the rise of con#icting theories in academic aviation psychology during the interwar period, meant that lessons learned from the First World War, the RFC’s institutional memory, were lost or for-gotten by 1939. Indeed, the RFC had regarded neuroses with a considerable measure of sympathy – #iers were invalided to Britain. But the interwar discipline of academic psychology shrouds this memory, instead stressing that neuroses were the function of character de!ciency. "is becomes explicitly evi-dent in Freudian arguments of the late 1920s that berated the ‘vulnerability’ of those with ‘de!cient characters’ Combined with the Army and Royal Navy’s ‘treatment’ of neuroses, and the Ministry of Pension’s obsessive predilection with reducing pensions for neurotics in the early interwar period, it becomes evident that the RAF Command con#ated and punished neu-rotic cases with malingering due to their conviction that war-time psychoneurosis amongst #iers was a #aw of character, rather than result of ‘non-severe’ combat stress. Air Command’s psychoneurotic reports consistently rank “predisposition” as a major indicator of how to dispose of #ying stress cases.14 "ird, the policy embodies Command’s historical preference, evidenced in the historiography of the RFC and RAF, for #iers chosen from the upper classes to !ll its o$cer ranks. Consequently, Command had developed a deep mis-trust of the lower-class wartime volunteers that #ocked to join the ranks of its ‘meritocratic’ air service. To expand, Command had historically preferred upper class and middle-class ‘pub-lic school’ #iers since the inception of the Royal Flying Corps in the First World War. "is was present even in the interwar and wartime period despite depictions in British propaganda of the RAF as the ‘everyman’s service.’ In the Second World

14 “In diagnosing psychological disorders… their causes, particularly in relation to #ying duties, and predisposition to nervous breakdown”. Minutes, April 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

War, this culminated in the LMFW policy that, amongst other transgressions, punished NCOs far more harshly the o$cers. Primary evidence reveals that disposal policy punished aircrew more harshly than o$cers because Command viewed aircrew, mainly trained and recruited from the lower middle and work-ing classes, as innately more predisposed to psychoneuroses than their o$cer-class counterparts. "us, the disposal policy was intentionally designed to swiftly remove aircrew succumb-ing to #ying stress to combatant duties (thus, deterring future cases), while merely invaliding or discharging o$cers with the same symptoms. While this is a complex argument, it can ef-fectively explain both Command’s con#ation and punishment of neuroses and malingering amongst aircrew, and the provi-sion of a more considerate policy for the service’s o$cer class.

Part II: Historiography and Context of the RAF’s War, 1912-1945

"is historiographical section begins with the RAF’s defensive and o%ensive wars (1939-1945), then subsequently juxtaposes these wars to the experience of the RAF’s predeces-sor, the RFC, during the tumultuous second decade of the twentieth century (1912-1917), and concludes with an analy-sis of shifting attitudes toward neuroses in aviation psychology during the interwar period. During the Second World War, the British nation re-lied on the RAF as the !rst line of defense in the face of early German advances, after Operation Barbarossa, and Germany’s opening of a second front, the service assumed a new role as the nation’s primary means of striking back at the enemy. For this paper’s purposes, the RAF’s wartime experience will be clearly divided into two periods: the defensive total war (1939-1940) and the o%ensive total war (1940-1945).

On September 31st, 1939, Germany invaded Poland. "e RAF fought two defensive battles, the Battles of France and Britain, before their victory over the Luftwa%e in Septem-ber 1940. "e Battle of France is widely regarded as a swift and e%ective victory for the Luftwa%e despite their loss of 1,284 aircraft against RAF losses of 931.15 After the British defeat and evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) at Dunkirk on the May 26, 1940 and the French surrender on the June 13, 1940, the attention of the nation shifted from the Battle of France to the Battle of Britain.

"roughout the Battle of Britain, the RAF was the only service capable of defending the nation from a cross-Channel invasion; the BEF had most of their equipment in France, while the Royal Navy was incapable of defending the Chan-nel while subject to attack by German light bombers operating from Northern France. To Britain’s advantage, heavy German losses during the small naval invasion of Norway meant that the Kriegsmarine (Germany’s navy) was unwilling to attempt a cross-Channel invasion until the destruction of the RAF. "us,

15 Anthony Beevor, !e Second World War (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2012), 127.

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on July 6, 1939, Hitler issued “Directive No.16 for Prepara-tions of a Landing Operation against England.” !is document formed the basis of aviation strategy against Britain.16 Britain was utterly dependent on the RAF to defeat the German Luft-wa"e in order to prevent a German invasion. !is attitude can be encapsulated well in Churchill’s Finest Hour speech,

“Upon it (the RAF) depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our institutions and our Empire. !e whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon be turned on us. Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this island or lose the war. If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be freed and the life of the world may move forward into broad, sunlit uplands.”17

!e experience of RAF #ghter pilots during Britain’s defensive war would fundamentally alter national perceptions of its airmen. !ese airmen, greatly assisted by the invention of radar, rose multiple times a day to meet incoming Luftwa"e bombing raids. As rural and urban Britons alike witnessed the tiny RAF forces clash with the massed German bombers above, a legend of invincibility was born. Command and the British government began to exploit the legend of stoicism demon-strated by these #ghter pilots, a campaign best encapsulated in Churchill’s epithet, the Few.18

!e origins of the term the Few can be traced to a speech of Winston Churchill’s speech on August 20th, 1940, when he said:

“!e gratitude of every home in our Island, in our Empire, and indeed throughout the world, except in the abodes of the guilty, goes out to the Brit-ish airmen who, undaunted by odds, unwearied in their constant challenge and mortal danger, are turning the tide of the world war by their prowess and by their devotion. Never in the #eld of human con$ict was so much owed by so many to so few.”19

Evidently, the British government considered the RAF to be a national bellwether; if it demonstrated fortitude, the Brit-

16 Anthony Beevor, !e Second World War, 126. 17 ‘!e Finest Hour’, Churchill Center and Museum at the

Churchill War Rooms, accessed on March 15th, 2013, modi#ed July 13th, 2010, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/122-their-#nest-hour.

18 Allan English, Cream of the Crop: Canadian Aircrew 1939-1945 (London: McGill’s University Press, 1996), 72.

19 ‘!e Few’, Churchill Center and the Museum at the Churchill War Rooms, accessed on April 8th, 2013, modi#ed August 29th, 2008, http://www.winstonchurchill.org/learn/speeches/speeches-of-winston-churchill/113-the-few.

ish people would be inspired to hunker down and #ght out the war, yet if it displayed weakness, it could inspire defeatism amongst the people. However, RAF Command’s con#dence in Fighter Command would be shaken early on in the con$ict. In 1941 RAF posted a 1.2% attrition rate from neuroses; this con$icted with Air Command’s portrayal of its $iers as “un-wearied” and “undaunted”. !e truth was that their airmen were already beginning to show the strain of the aviation war’s stresses. Without special attention from Command, aviation combat had already introduced unique stresses to airmen that were remarkably di"erent than the stresses from ground or na-val combat. For example, the Dowding system--the use of radar to throw the closest squadron into to the air against incoming German attacks--meant that $iers were on call throughout the day, and could $y three or four missions in a single afternoon. Anthony Beevor describes the ‘dry mouth and metallic fear’ of the waiting period, followed by the stress of air combat, when pilots were required to keep their “eyes skinned for enemy #ghters.”20 Moreover, the nature of the con$ict itself was ter-rifying; pilots $ew at breakneck speeds in which reaction times to kill or be killed were miniscule. !ere are additional factors, which untrained military personnel would not even consider. !ese include the fact that fuel tanks were positioned in front of the pilot. If ignited, the fuel would cause horri#c facial and body burns. Or, for example, that the wheels of #ghter planes were liable to get stuck before landing. Additionally, Martin Francis records that the use of arti#cial mood-enhancers “Ben-zedrine” – “wakey-wakey” pills was proli#c, while Adam Tooze details the widespread use of methamphetamine – Pervitin – “pilot’s chocolate” amongst aircrew. 21 All these would contrib-ute to the service’s ever-growing number of neurotic cases.

!e RAF’s Bomber O"ensive would expose tens of thousands of lightly trained RAFVR volunteers to an excep-tionally terrifying and stressful form of aerial warfare. In con-trast to Command’s reliance on #ghter pilots in the defensive war, the RAF now relied on bomber crews to $y sorties into occupied Germany. For starters, this meant that the propor-tion of airmen entering the force with a substantive military background started to decrease as Command came to rely in-creasingly on the volunteer reserve to #ll its bombers. More-over, in contrast to the defensive war, Command now relied on bombers manned by crews: these crews consisted of a pilot, navigator, wireless-operator, bombardier, and a varying num-ber of air gunners. Signi#cantly, this meant that the control each individual exerted over the plane was reduced drastically, intensifying fear experienced by aircrew.

In addition to these added stresses, aircrew’s experi-ences were di"erent to #ghter pilots because bomber crews $ew for most of their sorties over either water, or enemy ter-ritory.22 Moreover, the cumbersome size of a bomber and its

20 Beever, Second World War, 135. 21 Francis, !e Flyer, 120. 22 Francis, !e Flyer, 121.

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payload made it especially vulnerable to accidents at takeo! and landing. In total, 8,305-bomber crew died from accidents that occurred during non-operational "ying.23 Compounding these stresses, the amount of fuel and explosives carried meant that lethal accidents often led to vaporizing explosions. As an explanation for these “vaporizations”, Command listed many RAF casualties as Missing in Action (MIA) during the Bomber O!ensive.24

David Sta!ord-Clark summarized the experience of an aircrew on a night raid over Germany. He writes,

“Danger from the enemy, from sudden blinding convergence of searchlights accompanied by heavy, accurate and torrential "ak, from packs of night #ghters seeking unceasingly to #nd and penetrate the bomber stream; of danger from collision, from ice in the cloud, from becoming lost or isolated, from a chance hit in a petrol tank leading to a loss of fuel and forced descent into the sea on the way back… there was no single moment of security from takeo! to touchdown.”25

$e terror of these raids as well as their high attrition rates pushed Bomber Command’s psychological wastage much higher than that of Fighter Command, sparking Command’s concerns.

As psychological casualties began to mount during the bomber o!ensive, Command and the government had no clear idea as to the reasons underlying the signi#cant increase of neuroses amongst their "iers. In its reaction, Command looked not to the reality of the "ying experience, but rather to assump-tions about the character of these men. To explain this shift in attitude, it is necessary to return to the RFC’s experience in the First World War, and to the emergence of new theories in avia-tion psychology during the interwar period.

King George V founded the RAF’s predecessor, the RFC, in April of 1912.26 $e service’s motto was “per ardua ad astra”, rendered as “through adversity to the stars.”27 $e service’s dream of becoming a permanent third service and to revolutionize the nature of war was put to the test in the fol-lowing decade.28

As the service’s motto insinuates, adversity was never

23 Ibid., 107. 24 Francis, !e Flyer, 108. 25 Ibid., 108. 26 “$e initial force was tiny; it consisted of two squadrons

of planes and a squadron of observation balloons”. Richard Cavendish, “Royal Flying Corps Founded,” History Today, (April, 2012): 1.

27 Ibid., 1. 28 HG Well’s novel depicts aviator’s dreams of revolutionizing

war. In the novel a British worker assists a German air attack on New York City; the novel stood as a foreboding warning of the imminent escalation of air warfare. HG Wells, War in the Air (London: Penguin Books, 1908).

far away. Tragically, the #rst fatalities in the service occurred within weeks of its inception during a training "ight over ru-ral Britain. In July of 1912, a pilot and his observer crashed and died on Salisbury Plain. Famously, RFC command issued the following statement, “"ying will continue this evening as usual.”29

Interestingly, the RFC’s recruitment screening process during the wartime years reveals that it relied almost entirely on upper-class individuals who privately "ew as a hobby. On both sides of the con"ict, aristocratic "yers, such as Albert Ball of Britain and Baron von Richthofen of Germany, found an out-let for their talents.30 $e RFC itself relied upon a tiny fraction of Britain’s elite who had joined a handful of "ight schools that sprung up in the early twentieth century.31 $ese schools pro-vided training for the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (FAI) license. $is short test consisted of, “taking o!, climbing to about #ve hundred feet, completing two successive #gures-of-eight, landing, again taking o! and climbing to about #ve hundred feet, making an approach with the engine o!.”32 It only required four hours of practice "ying time. Incredibly, the FAI was the only "ying quali#cation the RFC required of pro-spective military pilots.

After the war broke out in 1914, there was a gradual increase in the demand for trained pilots, and recruitment pro-grams were expanded to “college educated men.”33 Training was eventually revamped in 1915 to include basic "ight maneuvers, a consequence of the Gospert method’s success. $e Gospert method was, “the brainchild of Major Smith-Barry, a student of the theory of "ight who concluded that "ying could be ex-plained by relatively simple physical principles.”34 Basic con-cepts such as dual "ight control (up-down and left-right) were taught along with basic maneuvers. $is change in the training program did help to produce a somewhat better "yer, but de-#ciencies in instruction and training equipment perpetuated a tragically poor training program that harmed operational ef-#ciency at the front.35 For example, Eric Cockcroft joined the RFC in 1917 as a private. His family owned a cotton business and he had been a Joint Circuit Auditor. He attended train-ing at St. Leonard’s-on-Sea Sussex and was promoted to o%cer in late 1917. He writes of the, “twelve fatal crashes… during twelve weeks at Yatesbury,” that marred the training program.36 COs at the front constantly complained about the poor qual-ity of ‘trained’ pilots that perpetuated high casualty rates and unbelievable station turnover. Similarly, several squadrons in France su!ered from one hundred percent turnover rates in a

29 Cavendish, “Royal Flying Corps Founded”: 1. 30 English, Cream of the Crop, 22-23. 31 Ibid, 23. 32 Ibid., 43. 33 Ibid., 43. 34 Ibid., 45. 35 Ibid., 43-46. 36 Eric Cockcroft, “My Experiences as a RFC/ RAF Pilot,”

Aerospace Historian, vol. 27 (September 1980): 248.

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matter of weeks. After the outbreak of war, the demands on RFC air-

crew escalated. Defensive developments, including the integra-tion of anti-aircraft (Ack-Ack) and spotlights along the front, added new stresses to combat !ying. In combination with technological advances such as the ability to "ght at higher al-titudes, RFC !yers received their "rst taste of aviation combat stress. In total, nine thousand pilots and observers would die for the RFC and a further seven thousand were wounded.37 As one historian writes, “!yers often worked alone, and were under intense psychological pressure every time that they went aloft, whether to do battle or for a simple air test… His days consisted of “long spells of idleness punctuated by moments of intense fear,” and fear was the “most intense strain to which the human nervous system could be subjected.””38 Allan English de"ned the speci"c stresses facing RFC !iers as, “the sheer ef-fort in controlling poorly designed, temperamental aircraft… cold, anoxia (lack of oxygen), G-forces and unusual aircraft attitudes.”39As a result of these stresses, psychological wastage rates increased, and the RFC was forced to react.

Critically, RFC Command’s responses to these cases of psychological wastage demonstrate a much higher level of compassion and understanding in comparison to the RAF’s later LMFW policy. While blatant cases of malingering were court martialed, psychoneurotic cases faced softer options. #ese men were transferred to NYDN (Not Yet Diagnosed Nervous) Centers for primary treatment, and if they were not responsive, were returned to Britain and invalided in psychiat-ric hospitals.40

To understand why the RAF failed to repeat the RFC’s sympathetic treatment of its !iers, it is necessary to address the political vulnerability, and eventual dismantlement of the Ser-vice toward the end of WWI. Initially, the RFC was formed as the sole subsidiary of the army, but as of early 1914, the Royal Navy had secured the creation of a separate wing, referred to as the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS).41 Petty competitions between the Army and Navy for aviation resources, especially !yers and equipment, would cripple the e$ciency of the ser-vice throughout the war.42

In 1916, German Zeppelin attacks on London helped to bring matters to a head.43 #e RFC’s poor showing in the face of German aggression highlighted the impotence of a split service. #is enraged war-weary workers, newspapers and poli-

37 Cavendish, “Royal Flying Corps Founded”, 1. 38 English, !e Cream of the Crop, 63. 39 English, !e Cream of the Crop, 62. 40 Ibid., 62-5. 41 Malcolm Cooper, “Blueprint for Confusion: #e

Administrative Background to the Formation of the Royal Air Force, 1912-1919,” Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 22 (July 1987): 438-440.

42 Cooper, ‘Blueprint for Confusion’, 438-9. 43 Paul Phillips, “Decision and Dissension: Birth of the RAF,”

Aerospace Historian, vol. 18 (January, 1971): 33.

ticians who collectively touted the RFC’s impotence as clear evidence of the uselessness of the service in its current state.44 #ese complaints would eventually lead to its dismantlement, especially as German attacks increased during 1916-7.45 On July 11, 1917, the War Cabinet, in response to these protests, formed a special committee to consider both, “air defense and the broader and more signi"cant problem of air organization in general.”46 #e committee’s recommendation would form the basis of the founding of the RAF in early 1918.

In December 1917, the government passed the Air Force Bill that created a third military service, the Royal Air Force. However, the bill was riddled with problems, organized in a chaotic manner, and caused a collision of politics and mili-tary a%airs that would hamper the young Service’s e%orts to rebuild. #is caused a drain on the memory of the collective experience of its !yers, many left in protest to the government’s interference. Trenchard, appointed Chief of Sta% of the RAF in February, resigned by March 1918.47 #e next chief of sta%, F. Sykes, would also resign in mid-1918. #ese resignations were linked to government dismissals of Chiefs of General Sta%, such as Sir William Robertson, and Sir John Jellicoe.48 Evidently, the RAF was born from the political controversy surrounding the RFC’s inability to defend London from German air attacks.

Critically, the resignations of 1918-1920 meant that the RAF lost much of its institutional memory of its compas-sionate treatment of !iers during the First World War. Rather, as of 1939, the RAF was more likely to recall methods prac-ticed by the British government in the 1920s and the academic Freudian publications in aviation psychology from the inter-war period.

#e Birley Report of 1921, the "rst published report on aviation psychology during the interwar period, constitutes a remarkable document in its progressiveness. In his speech to the medical community, J. L. Birley, C.B.E., argues for the existence of the phenomenon ‘!ying stress’ or ‘strain’. Birley e%ectively dissects the phenomenon, and recommends the for-mation of a sympathetic policy to treat aviation stress. Birley divided every !ier’s experience into three periods: the period of inexperience, the period of experience, and the period of stress.49 Insightfully, Birley posited that, “it was absolutely certain that it [period of experience] cannot last inde"nitely; autumn, or

44 Ibid., 33.45 ‘By 1917 the German airships had been reed by twin-engined

Gotha bombers. While the German air raids were not very e%ective in destroying military targets, the disruption of production… was incalculable. #is, and the e%ect on the morale of Londoners… added fuel to the public debate.’ Ibid, 33-4.

46 Ibid., 33. 47 Philips, “Decision and Dissension,” 36. 48 Ibid., 37.49 John Birley, ‘#e Principles of Medical Science as Applied to

Military Aviation’ Lecture delivered before the Royal College of Physicians of London, !e Lancet vol. 1 iss. 5046 (May 29, 1920): 1149.

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the period of reaction, must supervene sooner or later.”50 !us, from Birley’s perspective, every pilot was vulnerable to "ying stress, regardless of character. Critically, Birley’s theory stated, “in dealing, therefore, with the reaction inevitable in war we are dealing #rst and foremost with the defense mechanisms developed by the individual for his natural instinct of self-preservation. When these mechanisms are weakened by shock or prolonged strain, and the instinctive tendency comes into con"ict with social standards, a condition of neurosis results.”51 !e most important aspect of Birley’s Report lies in his recom-mendations for treatment. He argued, “We have #rst to assist the patient su$ering from stress to understand his troubles, and then to appeal to his common sense and his character.”52 If Birley had published such an astute account in 1920 calling for sympathetic ‘therapy’ for patients su$ering from stress, then why did Command institute such a harsh policy in 1941? It is important to note Allan English’s claim that most COs seemed to agree with Birley’s postwar report as they had utilized hu-mane treatment methods for ‘stress’ cases, such as, posting, ‘af-fected aviators back to Britain.’53

First, it is essential to understand that during the in-terwar period the Ministry of Pensions obsessively fought to reduce its pension payouts to veterans of the First World War with neurotic problems.54 !e pension service felt that the number of ‘shell-shocked’ men from the war was a ‘gross exag-geration’ leading to absurd levels of payouts.55 !us, the Minis-try of Pensions ‘obsessively’ strove to ensure that it would not, in the future, have to pay out pensions to neurotics.

Second, the Board of Control’s earlier treatment of ‘insane serviceman’ from the Navy and Army draws a surpris-ing parallel to the abuse of airmen in the Second World War. Instead of following the recommendations of the psychiatrist to return these men ‘peaceable conditions’, ‘insane servicemen’ were incarcerated within civilian psychiatric centers along with psychotic civilians during the early 1920s.56 Moreover, incar-cerated Army and Navy personnel were ‘given the lowest pos-sible rations’ and made to work as hard as ‘navvies.’57 Inter-estingly, the language used to describe these incarcerated men in the interwar period strikes extraordinary similarities to the description of RAF Waverers in the Second World War. One commentator wrote, “‘shell-shock’ was simply an ‘excuse for crime’, made by men who were accelerated degenerates’ even before the war and were too ‘lazy’ to #nd employment.”58 !e stage was set for the RAF to institute a policy that would not be

50 Ibid., 1149. 51 Birley, “!e Principles of Medical Science as Applied to

Military Aviation,” 1150.52 Ibid., 1151.53 English, !e Cream of the Crop, 65. 54 Burke, “E$eminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma,” 63. 55 Burke, “E$eminacy, Ethnicity and the End of Trauma,” 63. 56 English, !e Cream of the Crop, 63. 57 Ibid., 63. 58 Ibid., 64.

based upon the RFC’s sympathetic treatment of airmen, but on the Ministry of Pension’s wishes, the Board of Control’s experi-ence, and the arrival of Freudian psychology in the late 1920s.

Unfortunately the combination of the political chaos that struck the RFC, the political decision to transform it into the RAF in 1917 and the ensuing resignations meant that RAF Command either forgot or decided to disregard Birley’s report along with a substantial portion of the RFC’s institutional memory by 1939.

Instead, modern, fashionable reports, based upon the writings of Sigmund Freud, came to dominate aviation psychol-ogy in the interwar period, including, for example, Frederick Bartlett’s Psychology and the Soldier (1927). Bartlett’s book #rst applied Freudian theory to military psychological disorders. Bartlett asserted in his book that, “success or failure was deter-mined mainly by one’s temperament… “Weaklings” [mentally un#t personnel] should not be allowed into the armed services, and that only men with the right kinds of temperament, the kind that gave men the strength of will to resist mental break-down, should be kept on.”59 !is in"uential report would serve as one of the foundations of Command’s attitude toward non-compliance. In particular, Command would focus on Bartlett’s claim that temperament was a key indicator of breakdown. For example, Bartlett wrote, “mental breakdown nearly always had a long history of psychological problems, no matter the rank,”60 a sentiment mirrored in an internal Command memo-randum. One report states that, “family history and environ-ment were important. !irty-one percent of 87 cases or war neurosis came from “broken homes” – where there had been death, divorce, desertion or separation.”61 It is interesting to note that as of 1939, Frederick Bartlett was granted a position on the RAF’s Flying Research Committee demonstrating the value RAF Command saw in him.62

Bartlett’s Freudian attitudes toward combat stress and character are referred to in Gillespie’s wartime tome, Psycho-logical E"ects of War on a Citizen and Soldier. Gillespie writes of the ‘a priori expectation’ that had come to dominate Air Command. Gillespie de#nes this ‘a priori expectation’ as the, “expectation that the poorer the economic status of a section of a given population, the greater the incidence of psychoneurotic conditions.”63 Gillespie believed that Command viewed the development of neuroses as more linked to an individual’s pre-disposition, than to the cumulative e$ects of his "ying stress. !us, Birley’s progressive report was shelved for the more fash-ionable, but more tenuous research of Freudian psychologists.

59 Ibid., 67. 60 Ibid, 67. 61 Symonds and Williams ‘Review of reports submitted to Air

Ministry since outbreak of war’, April 1942, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

62 Noel Sheehy, Fifty Key !inkers in Psychology (London: Routledge, 2004), 34.

63 R.D. Gillespie, Psychological E"ects of War on Citizen and Soldier (New York: WM Norton & Company, 1942), 69.

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!is can be evidenced in Pamphlet 100A, Orders for Medical O"cers, a document that Command sent to all branches in early 1939. !e pamphlet details instructions for MOs on what constituted a ‘debilitating mental illness.’ Com-mand wrote of its concern that MOs had a, “tendency to as-sume too readily that a lack of con#dence to $y or fear of $y-ing are necessarily symptomatic of nervous illness and justify exemption from $ying duty on medical grounds.”64 Attached to the pamphlet is a letter from Command that contains this directive to the MOs: “establish a prima facie case of illness before considering or reporting a man un#t to $y on medical grounds.”65 !is presents the infamous quandary, explored by Joseph Heller in his novel Catch 22, that airmen had to either exhibit multiple symptoms of combat stress and psychoneu-rotic disorders, or undergo extremely stressful scenarios, even crash landings were oft considered insu"cient, in order to be removed from combat duty honorably. But if they exhibited symptoms of combat stress without undergoing extremely stressful scenarios, they would be labeled as ‘lacking moral #-ber.’

Part III: Lack of Moral and Waverer Disposal Policy

Command’s LMFW disposal policy constituted a seemingly unconscionable solution to the RAF’s problems with wastage that mounted from the outset of the con$ict. As psy-chological casualties mounted in the early years of the war, an emergency meeting was called in March 1940. !e meeting dealt with those cases where, “there is no physical disability... nothing wrong except a lack of moral #ber.”66 As a result of this meeting, an o"cial Command policy was drafted that dictated precise orders to COs on disposal procedures for three categories of noncompliance. !e policy also dictated medical procedure to MOs for acceptable medical conditions to excuse a $ier. !is meant $iers had to be exposed to ‘exceptional $ying stress’ or exhibit a debilitating mental illness. While the policy allowed for the $ier to request a third opinion from a trained psychiatrist (MOs were not trained in psychiatry throughout the war), this was only exercised in a fraction of the cases. Be-tween 1943-4, only 34.1 per cent of all neurotic cases were a%orded the ‘luxury’ of an opinion from a trained Neuropsy-chiatric Specialist.67

Categories (see Table 1 on the follow page)

64 ‘Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Con#dence of !eir Commanding O"cers’, May 1939, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

65 Ibid. 66 Edgar Jones, “‘LMF’: !e Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the

Royal Air Force during the Second World War,” !e Journal of Military History, vol. 70 (2006): 443.

67 Flying Personnel Research Committee “!e Occurrence of Neuroses in RAF Air Crew, 1943-4”, 1944, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

Command divided refusals to $y--involuntary or vol-untary--into three categories.

Category i, (hereafter LMF cases), encompassed those men labeled as ‘lacking in moral #ber’. Command de#ned this category as,

“!ose who though medically #t (A1B or A3B, as appropriate) come to forfeit the con#dence of their Commanding O"cers without having been sub-jected to exceptional $ying stress.”68

Evidently, o"cers and aircrew who had not undergone ‘excep-tional $ying stress’, nor experienced a debilitating physical or neurotic injury, were categorized as LMF. Critically, Command deemed these men had clearly demonstrated that they lacked courage in the face of the enemy, thus they ‘lacked the moral #ber’ of men who continued to resist.COs categorized two types of ‘cowardly behavior’ as LMF cas-es. !e #rst group of airmen, “gave the impression of carrying out their duties, but …nevertheless had lost the con#dence of a commanding o"cer.”69 !is group of $iers were the infamous ‘fringe merchants’ or ‘boomerangs’ of Bomber Command. Fringe merchants skirted the edges of bombing raids and did not risk the plane in a direct attack on a target, and this was evident from cameras attached to the nose of the plane that were timed with the bomb release. Boomerangs were $iers that returned from combat early without engaging the enemy.70 !e second group of airmen, “openly admitted they did not intend to $y.”71 !ese types of LMF cases were simple refusals to $y without exposure to exceptional stress or a debilitating injury. !ese men would refuse to $y for a variety of reasons includ-ing malingering and objections to area bombing, although the reason quoted most often was ‘fear.’72

Category ii (hereafter Waverer cases) encompassed $i-ers that had strong symptoms of a psychoneurotic illness, yet had not undergone exceptional $ying stress. Command de-#ned Waverer cases as,

68 Air Command “Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Con#dence of !eir Commanding O"cers” to all Commanding O"cers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

69 ‘Rules for treatment of o"cer and airmen upon under the terms of Air Ministry Letter’, AIR 2/8591 Papers (35D), National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

70 Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 129. 71 “Rules for treatment of o"cer and airmen upon under the

terms of Air Ministry Letter”, AIR 2/8591 Papers (35D), National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

72 “An Airman’s Son,” BBC People’s Series, last modi#ed January 27, 2004, accessed April 1st, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/00/a2238400.shtml.

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“!ose who are given a permanent medical catego-ry lower than A1B or A3B, as appropriate, solely on account of nervous symptoms and without having been subjected to any exceptional "ying stress.”73

Command’s rationale was based on the presumption that al-though these "iers had displayed symptoms of psychoneurotic illnesses, they had not undergone severe "ying stress. !us, they must have had an innate weakness of constitution or lack of character that had made them uniquely susceptible to war-time stresses. If British women could survive the Blitz, mer-chantmen the submarine war, and children the evacuations, shouldn’t "iers be able to handle "ying stress? Category iii (Medical Cases) encompassed "iers who

73 Air Command “Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Con#dence of !eir Commanding O$cers” to all Commanding O$cers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

had developed a debilitating physiological or psychological in-jury. In very rare cases, excusals could be handed out solely based on exposure to ‘exceptional "ying stress.’ !ese men were hospitalized in twelve RAF Hospitals throughout Britain. Command de#ned medical cases as,

“!ose not included in (ii) above who are given a medical category lower than A1B or A3B, as appro-priate. (Disposal will follow normal “invaliding” or “retention for employment within the medical cat-egory” procedure.”74

To be categorized a “medical category lower than A1B or A3B” it was necessary to demonstrate prima facie symptoms of de-veloped psychoneuroses, or a debilitating physical injury. Evi-dence of prima facie symptoms required MOs to observe fully developed psychoneuroses: anxiety, hysteria and manic depres-sion. !us, men in the process of developing neuroses could not be legitimately excused on medical grounds

Consequences for Categories

!e consequences to LMF categorization were severe. O$cers were forced to resign and hospitalized, while aircrew were stripped of their rank and ‘remustered’ to ground or com-batant duties. Both o$cers and aircrew had their "ying badges stripped at a squadron parade or upon arrival at a NYDN cen-ter. Paragraph 14 of the disposal policy states,

“If… an individual must be categorized as lacking in moral #bre... In the case of an o$cer, his services will be dispensed with, either by terminating his commission… or by calling upon him to resign.”75

!is left little doubt as to the consequences for an o$cer cat-egorized LMF, while the stigma of such a punishment for an o$cer could be devastating; one Air Ministry o$cial likened it to signing the man’s career ‘death warrant’.76

Aircrew categorized as LMF faced harsher conse-quences. !ey were either to be transferred to ground duties within or remustered to combatant duties. Paragraph 14 of the policy states,

“Airmen so classi#ed will be in no circumstances to "y again as members of an air crew, and it must

74 Air Command ‘Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Con#dence of !eir Commanding O$cers” to all Commanding O$cers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

75 Ibid.76 COs demonstrated reluctance to ‘sign the “death warrant”

of airmen. Minutes, October 20 1944, AIR 2/8592 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London. .

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be made clear to them that they will be remustered and !nally removed from air crew duty.”77

If the aircrew had started his "ight training with a ‘transfer-able basic skill,’ he was retained within the RAF as Aircraft-man 2nd Class, and he would be forced to forfeit his aircrew badge.78 If the aircrew had no ‘transferable basic skill(s)’, he would be transferred to the Army of Navy for combatant du-ties “under the provisions of the National Service Armed Forces Act of 1941.” #is aircrew, too, would be forced to forfeit his air badges.79

Critically, the policy punished o$cers and aircrew of the Waverer category as well. O$cers deemed Waverers were invalided and forced to resign. Aircrews placed in the catego-ry were treated in the exact same manner as LMF aircrew. As Paragraph 15 of the policy states, “[a]irmen placed in this cat-egory, will, however be disposed of in the manner described in Paragraph 14 above.”80 It’s clear that Command treated aircrew demonstrating symptoms of neuroses, albeit without exposure to ‘exceptional "ying stress,’ in the exact same manner as LMF cases.

An o$cer categorized as a Waverer began a process of ‘invaliding’ that would lead to his transfer to an RAF neuropsy-chiatric hospital, and his forced resignation. It can be surmised that the intention of this was to rid the Ministry of Pensions of responsibility for the payment of postwar pensions for these o$cers. Paragraph 15 of the policy states,

“O$cers who are placed in the category (ii) men-tioned in paragraph 2 above will not be retained in the service for employment within their lowered medical category and they will be accordingly be required to relinquish their commissions on being invalided from the service.”81

O$cers faced harsh consequences for displaying ‘symptoms of neuroses’, but at least, to some extent, their psychological wounds were treated. At the very least, these men were in the presence of a trained psy-chiatrist. O$cers were not alone in invaliding, other

77 Air Command “Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Con!dence of #eir Commanding O$cers” to all Commanding O$cers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

78 Unknown to unknown, 1943, AIR 19/632 General Filing, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

79 Ibid. 80 Air Command ‘Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews

Who Forfeit the Con!dence of #eir Commanding O$cers” to all Commanding O$cers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

81 Air Command “Memorandum on the Disposal of Air Crews Who Forfeit the Con!dence of #eir Commanding O$cers” to all Commanding O$cers, September 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

‘fortunate’ aircrew and o$cers labeled Medical Cases could be sent for processing of ‘invaliding’.

After removal from the squadron, these airmen were transferred to Not Yet Diagnosed Centers (NYDN Centers) throughout Britain for processing. NYDN Centers had not improved much on their antecedents of the First World War.82 At NYDN Centers, airmen were treated in a harsh manner that in many ways mirrored the treatment of ‘shell-shock’ victims in early 1920s. It becomes clear that NYDN Centers were not de-signed for treatment, but to be an added deterrent to the men. #e evidence of one "ight sergeant stressed that the NYDN centers were far from treatment centers they were designed to appear. #e sheer number of combined LMF and psychoneu-rotic cases contributed to unprecedentedly long waits for beds in neurotic hospitals insu$ciently prepared to care for neurotic cases. Wells quotes the concerns of an anonymous tail-gunner,

“I spent three weeks at a station used for remus-tering aircrew, which included dealing with LMF personnel. I was and remain disgusted by the treat-ment of LMF charges. No sympathy was shown and they were treated like criminals. In one case I actually witnessed a pilot who had been decorated during his !rst tour but had lost his nerve during his second tour of operations. He was stripped of his rank and "ying brevet and was a broken man.”83

#e strong language of this account leaves little to the imagina-tion as to how cases were treated at these centers, which the research of Edgar Jones helps elucidate. He writes,

“NYDN centers… an atmosphere of shame and disgrace pervaded. Although the regimes softened during the war as the complexity of the situation became better understood, the system operated on the assumption that the man was a coward… At the NYDN Center in Brighton, for example, RAF per-sonnel were forced to march along the seafront dis-tinguished by uniforms, which had been stripped of their badges.”84

It’s likely NYDN centers were not organized to improve treat-ment, but rather to dissuade men from opting out of oper-ational con"ict. #e long waits at NYDN Centers were the most common complaint of "iers, especially those that awaited specialist opinions to reinforce their pleas for leniency to Com-mand.85 From these NYDN Centers, those ‘fortunate’ "iers undergoing the RAF’s ‘treatment’ regime faced transfer to RAF

82 Robert Ahrenfeldt, Psychiatry in the British Army, 1914-1915 (London: Routledge, 1958), 9.

83 Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 201. 84 Jones, “Use of Psychiatric Stigma,” 5. 85 Ibid., 5.

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Neuropsychiatric Hospitals. ‘Treatment’ at these hospitals was experimental and rudimentary. It was, for example, at the RAF Hospital Matlock, that Symonds conducted serious studies into !ying stress that were to lay the basis of postwar aviation psychology.86 While some progressive psychiatrists experi-mented with group communication sessions, deep-breathing exercises and appropriate medicines, other practitioners used electro-shock therapy or solitary con"nement to bring men back to ‘normality’.

To continue, it is important to return to additional punishments facing those labeled Waverers or LMF. #ese men faced another collective punishment: both LMF and Waverer cases had their employment forms, the Form 1580, marked with a red ‘W.’87 Command added this o$cial label to their employment papers, under the o$cial nomenclature ‘Waverer,’ to ensure that stigmatization would continue in the civilian lives of these soldiers.

Command used this infamous red ‘W’ to control the movement of these ‘de"cient characters’ throughout their sys-tems and the country. With this mark, the RAF would track their movement throughout the service’s hospitals and Not Yet Diagnosed Neurological centers.88 #e red ‘W’ explains how Command kept these men separated from medical cases, who were also to be treated at the RAF’s psychoneurotic hospitals. Moreover, the red ‘W’ was used to transmit information to the civil aviation authorities about the reasons for the discharge.89 Enclosed in previously censored material, the Air Minister as-sured his audience during a meeting that “we were doing our utmost to prevent the employment of these individuals by Air Tra$c Authorities and the Director of Personal Services agreed to arrange for a civil !ying "rms to impose a similar ban.”90 #is damning quote reveals that Air Command was invested in ensuring that its men deemed Waverers and LMF would face di$culties in "nding employment upon their return to the civ-il sector. In the case of aircrew, the red ‘W’ would be screened through the Ministry of Labour’s ‘Schedule for Reserved Oc-cupation’ before they returned to their industry jobs.91 #is was Command’s means of ensuring their LMF and W cases faced discrimination upon their return to civil employment.

A short article from 1945 helps to shine light on how this stigma followed soldiers into their civilian lives. On Jan 20th, 1945, the Manchester Guardian reported the following

86 Operation Log, “Royal Air Force Operations Record Book: RAF Matlock,” June 1945, AIR 29/764 Papers National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

87 Air Command “Memorandum on the Disposal of Members of Air Crews who Forfeit the Con"dence of #eir Commanding O$cers” to all COs, September 1941, AIR 19/632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

88 Edgar Jones, “LMF: #e Use of Psychiatric Stigma,” 2. 89 Minutes of Air Council, 23 July 1941, AIR 2/8591 Papers,

National Archives, Kew Gardens, London. 90 Ibid. 91 Unknown to unknown, 1943, AIR 19/632 Papers, National

Archives, Kew Gardens.

article.

“R.A.F. Discharges: Protests Against O%ensive PhraseologyMajor W. Drake-Brockman, non-party Nationalist candidate for Hestan and Isleworth, at a meeting at Hound-slow last night promised an ex-Service member of the audience that if elected he would do his best to get removed from the discharged cer-ti"cates of R.A.F. air crews “the damnable letters L.M.F., which mean a lack of moral "bre”. #e psy-chological e%ect on any prospective employer, he said, was to give him the impression that the man had no courage.”92

Clearly, Drake-Brockman believed that men in his borough were being unfairly discriminated against due to their claimed wartime conduct.

#e last, and perhaps most powerful, collective pun-ishment for LMF and Waverer cases was the, “removal of per-mission to wear air crew badges.”93 In other words, Command ordered that COs at the squadron, or the NYDN Center to strip LMF and Waverer cases of their wings or aircrew badges. One memo reads, ‘permission to wear the !ying badge, ob-server’s badge or air gunner’s badge may be withdrawn from o$cers or airmen who are removed from air crew duties.’94 #e evidence makes it clear that the British government sanctioned this activity, at least in the early years. As one memo reads, “permission to wear a !ying badge will be withdrawn by order of the Minister.”95

O$cers and aircrew labeled LMF or Waverer were stripped of their wings during either a squadron parade or upon arrival at a NYDN center. #ese coveted wings were the source of great pride to many, if not all, airmen.96 Martin Francis explains that wings and !ying badges attached to the enviable ‘deep blue of air uniforms’ became a symbol of honor, bravery, sacri"ce and national pride. He writes that the RAF’s blue uniforms were associated with both heroism and sexual magnetism, particularly if accompanied by a set of silvery white fabric wings sewn above the heart.97 With this understanding, it becomes clear why the stripping of wings was devastating as well as stigmatizing. Not only did it exclude airmen from the RAF’s brotherhood, but also the absence of wings on the airman’s uniform sent a clear signal to civilians that this man was out of favor. Indeed, both Category (i) and (ii) o$cers and aircrews had their wings stripped. Mark Wells provides an

92 “RAF Discharges: O%ensive Phraseology,” Manchester Guardian, January 20, 1941.

93 Regulations to all Commanding O$cers, 1942, AIR 19/632 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

94 Ibid. 95 Ibid. 96 Francis, !e Flyer, 24-5. 97 Ibid, 23.

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excellent description of the formal procedure for COs to strip wings, recalling,

“!e whole squadron was formed into a square, and this sergeant-pilot was brought in under guard, the verdict read, “Cowardice in the face of the enemy”, and his rank was ripped o" him there, by the #ight-sergeant, and he was then literally drummed out. I thought that was an awful thing. I’ve got to admit that I’d have sooner got killed than gone through that.”98

!e man’s punishment was designed to be an entirely public a"air. !e whole squadron was brought out to bear witness to the CO stripping the #ier of wings and rank. It is clear from this account that the disposal policy was designed to be stig-matic. In the hope this would dissuade further examples of noncompliance amongst the squadron’s remaining #iers.

While LMF allowed some COs to opt out of pursu-ing the harsher consequences, it also encouraged other COs to pursue harsher agendas according to their temperament. One CO wrote,

“I was ruthless with moral $ber cases, I had to be. We were airmen not psychiatrists. Of course we had concern for any individual whose internal tensions meant that he could no longer go on; but there was the worry that one really frightened man could af-fect others around him. !ere was no time to be compassionate as I would have liked to have been. I was #ying too, and we had to get on with the war.”99

!is particular CO clearly held little compassion for LMFW cases. In his mind, the totality of the con#ict necessitated an unsympathetic attitude toward cases of fearful airmen. !is understandable, but abused sentiment will be explored in the next section. As discussed above, consequences to being la-beled LMFW’s were not con$ned to the squadron, and the label LMF or W meant a long path through NYDN centers to hospitalization, retirement or ‘remustering’ to combat duties. !us, the stripping of wings was merely the $rst step in remov-ing the #iers from aviation brotherhood.

Case Examples

In 1945, RAF psychiatrist Richard Symonds pub-lished a report of over three hundred di"erent case examples of LMF, Waverer and medical cases. While Symonds continued to stress the need to prevent predisposed individuals from join-ing the military, he also articulately argued for better treatment of military personnel su"ering from neuroses to extend their

98 Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 199. 99 Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 200.

combat e"ectiveness. !e report helps contemporary audiences to comprehend the arbitrary nature of the distinction between Command’s three categories.

Case 225, a, ‘de$nite example of a LMF case,’ dem-onstrates the #uidity of Command’s categories. Symonds de-scribes,

“Case 225: A Sergeant Air gunner, aged 27, 120 hours, no operations, reported to the medical of-$cer at a Heavy Conversion Unit, having experi-enced an acute fear reaction while #ying. A Halifax went out of control, the patient had to abandon aircraft but at $rst could not open turret. He was very afraid. He did not #y for a week; when he did so he again experienced acute fear in the air… !e M.O.’s comment was “A good type who had made every e"ort to get over it. He might have been OK if he had #own soon after the incident, but I doubt if he could make much of ops...” He was conse-quently referred to executive disposal without refer-ence to a psychiatrist.” 100

!e station MO decided that the man had not experienced exceptional #ying stress, and therefore his refusal to #y and his symptoms, which including insomnia, vomiting on operations and nightmares, were not considered valid medical reasons for an excusal from #ying.101 Consequently, he was disposed of in accordance with LMFW guidelines: remustering to combat-ant duties. In Symond’s opinion, an opinion that AC clearly concurred with, the aforementioned #ier’s experience of being trapped in a plexi-glass turret falling from the stratosphere was not evidence of exceptional #ying stress. !us, in their mind, his subsequent refusal to #y was merely evident of a #awed character that should have been rejected during training Case 79 demonstrates a borderline Waverer case that was disposed of along LMF guidelines; however, Com-mand conceded that it could well have been a Category (iii), a genuine Medical Case. !e #ight sergeant, an air gunner, pre-sumably from the RAFVR, had completed eight bombing raids and had been shot down twice. On his third sortie, the plane was hit and the captain ordered the crew to bale out. One of his fellow crewmen, the rear gunner, had a broken parachute. Case 79 encouraged the man to cling to him and share his parachute. !ey fell in their tragic embrace, as Case 79 went to open the parachute the rear gunner’s grip slipped, the air gun-ner plummeted to his death. Symonds clearly states that the

100 Flying Personnel Research Committee ‘Investigation into psychological disorder in #ying personnel: !e occurrence of neurosis in Royal Air Force Aircrew 1944-1945’, 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

101 Flying Personnel Research Committee ‘Investigation into psychological disorder in #ying personnel: !e occurrence of neurosis in Royal Air Force Aircrew 1944-1945’, 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

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classi!cation of this case depended entirely on the judgment of the station CO. As the report opens, “the outcome of which depend party on the unit medical o"cer. #is was so in Case 79.”102 #e report states,

“Case 79: A Flight Sergeant, air gunner, aged 26, 200 hours $ying, 8 night bombing sorties in Lan-casters, reported to his unit medical o"cer with headaches, dizziness and insomnia. On his !rst sor-tie with a strange crew was shot up over Berlin. On his eight sortie both engines cut out over Munich, an order to abandon aircraft was given and coun-termanded; the aircraft went on to Corsica on 2 engines where it crash landed, the rear gunner was killed. #e patient’s wife and mother were opposed to continual $ying… (He was given rest, then...) He returned to operational $ying and the M.O. stated “Provided no untoward incidents occur he should !nish his tour with no further trouble”. On the 15th sortie the crew had to abandon aircraft, the rear-gunner’s parachute was U/S (broken) so he jumped clinging to the patient but was unable to maintain his hold as the parachute opened. Later the patient reported sick with depression and anxiety.”103

#is tragic report on Case 79’s wartime experience allows con-temporary readers to understand how bluntly LMFW policy was enacted. #is man had clearly undergone three separate scenarios that could have induced exceptional $ying stress. However, as it was up to the discretion of the $ier’s CO and MO, the man was not classi!ed as having undergone ‘excep-tional $ying stress,’ but rather he was labeled as an in-between case that was eventually categorized as a Waverer.

Evidently, the judge, jury and executioner were the squad-ron COs and MOs of RAF Fighter and Bomber Command. #ese executive o"cers governed modestly sized stations at the outbreak of the war when the average !ghter squadron was twenty planes. Yet as bomber squadrons grew, and !ght-er squadrons amalgamated in sprawling air bases, the size of squadrons under the purview of COs and MOs grew into the thousands of personnel. High attrition rates led to high squad-ron turnover rates which further prevented MOs and COs from being fully informed on an individual’s $ying experience or mental health. Moreover, divisions in o"cer and aircrew messes kept MOs and COs from socializing with aircrew – a possibly key factor in the lack of any sympathetic manner to-ward these men. Here, one of the most fundamental $aws of the policy becomes evident. One postwar report on neuroses claimed that of 5,000

102 Ibid.103 Flying Personnel Research Committee ‘Investigation into

psychological disorder in $ying personnel: #e occurrence of neurosis in Royal Air Force Aircrew 1944-1945’, 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

cases of $iers referred to two di%erent specialists that these specialists had an “even chance of agreeing upon the determi-nation of lack of con!dence.”104 #e rami!cations of this fact are profound; it means that the distinguishing line between noncompliance on account of ‘malingering and cowardice’ or ‘neuroses’ was arbitrary at best.

Stigma to LMFW Policy

Command intentionally attached stigmas to LMFW disposal policy that would ensure the expulsion of $iers from RAF brotherhood, the cessation of o"cers and aircrew’s mili-tary and civil careers, and a reduction of social standing in the civilian sphere.

Since the declassi!cation of a considerable amount of material on the LMFW policy in the early 1970s, a histori-cal debate has grown surrounding the harshness of the policy, and whether this harshness was warranted. From this debate, undertaken by a small handful of authors including Allan Eng-lish, Mark Wells and Martin Francis, it is possible to garner a large amount of evidence concerning the policy’s actual e%ects on $iers. Edgar Jones’ article argues that LMFW policy was intentionally designed to be inherently stigmatic and harsh.

Edgar Jones writes, “as a general deterrent, driven by the belief that anxiety was contagious, the RAF sent those sus-pected of LMF to assessment centers where they were shamed by the loss of rank and privileges.”105 It becomes clear that $i-ers not only lived in fear of death in the air, but also in fear of the harshness of LMFW. #e viciousness of LMF policy terri-!ed o"cers, and the social stigma after a sudden resignation or psychological hospitalization followed by discrimination in civil employment exacerbated the problem. #e rami!cations of LMFW policy wreaked havoc on a middle-/or upper-class individual’s future prospects for a job, a wife, or a position in the community. #e viciousness of the policy was even more apparent for aircrew, insofar as aircrew faced more severe con-sequences for noncompliance. A sudden transfer to combatant duty, industry, or hospital combined with the loss of the $ying badges could be at best be a shameful a%air, at worst a lethal one, for aircrew.

But did airmen themselves regard the label LMF seri-ously? To answer this question, it is important to turn to two cases of airmen LMF who committed suicide rather than re-ceive the RAF’s ‘treatment’ regime.

Primary evidence of a suicide within the operations log from RAF Matlock Hospital helps to expand this discus-sion. RAF Matlock was a psychoneurotic hospital founded in Derbyshire that treated o"cers that had been invalided either under the Waverer or Medical Case. On February 20th, 1942,

104 Allan English, !e Insubordinate and Noncompliant: Case Studies of Canadian Mutiny and Disobedience, 1920 to present eds. by Howard Coombs, (Toronto: #e Dundurn Group, 2007).

105 English, !e Insubordinate and Noncompliant, 439.

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the log records one entry. It reads that on February 20th, 1941, Sgt. Ellis S.C., “fell from a window at the hospital and sus-tained multiple injuries from which he died immediately.”106 Although this can only be conjecture, it is di!cult to charac-terize this event as an accident given its location and manner: ‘falling from a window.’

"e second suicide is found in the story of Squadron Leader Maurice Roy Skeet. After he discovered the story of his father’s suicide in his teens, Skeet’s son turned to investiga-tive research to determine the causes of the matter. According to his research, Squadron Leader Maurice Skeet served in the Middle East, where he #ew Wellington light-bombers from Habbaniya.107 Skeet’s son claims that upon his father’s return to Europe he learned of Command’s switch to the controversial tactic of ‘area bombing,’ or the total war tactic of bombing ci-vilian centers to paralyze industry and military movement. Al-legedly, motivated by profound disgust, the Squadron Leader refused to comply with the order and lead sorties. Skeet main-tains that Command labeled his father LMF because he would not comply with orders and had not experienced exceptional #ying stress. On the day he was labeled LMF, Squadron Leader Roy Skeet shot himself in the head at his air base at Linton-on-Ouse, York.108 Herein, it is possible to have some measure of just how greatly #iers feared the stigma attached to the label LMF.

In June 1943, Dr. Jewesbury submitted a re-port to Command from his psychoneurotic center. He writes,

“It is unfortunate therefore that the recent Air Min-istry Memorandum… makes no distinction be-tween the disposal of the “executive” cases… Cat-egory {i} of the memorandum and the “medical” cases… of Category {ii} of the memorandum)…One can only wonder, in passing, why, if the of-$cers are to be invalided, the airmen are normally “transferred to the Army for combatant duties”.”109

Dr. Jewesbury’s next comments are particularly infor-mative:

“"e present type of “blanket” disposal disregards

106 Operation Log, ‘Royal Air Force Operations Record Book: RAF Matlock,’ February 20 1942, AIR 29/764 Papers National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

107 “An Airman’s Son,” BBC People’s Series, last modi$ed January 27, 2004, accessed April 1st, 2013, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2peopleswar/stories/00/a2238400.shtml, 1.

108 “Secret shame of the forgotten casualties of war”, BBC Inside Out Series, last modi$ed 24 March, 2003, accessed 10 November, 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/presso!ce/pressreleases/stories/2003/02_february/24/inside_out.shtml.

109 Edward Jewesbury, “Work and Progress Report” to Air Command, July 1943, AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

all the issues upon which the unit medical o!cer, neuropsychiatric specialist and consultant in neu-ropsychiatry are asked to advise and it deals with all the cases who have not been exposed to exceptional #ying stress as if they are lacking in moral $ber. "is procedure not only ignores the work and e%orts of the medical branch, but it perpetuates injustices to their patients which it is their duty to prevent.”110

Evidently, Dr. Jewesbury viewed Command’s use of medical personnel as disingenuous. "is was not an uncommon view. Others have argued that MOs were super#uous as the real dif-ferentiating factor in LMF, Waverer and Medical Cases was the CO’s determination of ‘exposure to #ying stress.’ Jewesbury clearly resonates with Command’s orders for MOs to di%eren-tiate between legitimate and illegitimate psychoneuroses.

E!ects on Operational E"ciency

"is section expands upon the numerous failures of LMFW policy. In particular, how these failures contributed to the adversity that airmen and the RAF faced throughout the war.

"ere exists very little hard data on LMF policy. How-ever, a small section of one report is enlightening. It states that the neuroses attrition rate rose to 2,503 cases in 1942-3, fur-ther rising to 2,989 cases in 1943-4.111 During 1944-4, the rate plateaued at the high rate of 2,910 cases annually.112 "e policy evidently did not reduce psychological wastage rates, as it in-creased for two years after its implementation, and therefore it failed in its primary goal of preventing wastage that in turn would pose a threat to operational e!ciency.

More perturbingly, this paper claims that the fear of LMFW policy forced #iers su%ering from neuroses to stay in the air beyond the point at which they should have received medical treatment. "is contributed to the RAF’s inexplicably high level of air accidents during the Second World War, which led to 8,705 deaths.113 Arguably, these aforementioned fears of the policy not only forced #iers to don a mask of stoicism in face of innumerable dangers, but it also meant that simple palliative cures for psychoneurotic illnesses were not pursued. "us, #iers remained in the air and in danger out of a mis-placed sense of stoicism.

Mark Wells concludes that the problem of LMF was, ‘never big enough to a%ect the RAF’s combat e%ectiveness.’114 However, I would argue that LMF harmed operational e!-ciency. "ere is signi$cant evidence that LMFW policy kept

110 Ibid, 13. 111 Flying Personnel Research Committee “Investigations into

Psychological Disorder in Flying Personnel,” 1945, AIR 2/6252 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

112 Ibid. 113 Francis, #e Flyer, 107.114 Wells, Courage and Air Warfare, 187.

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volunteers vulnerable to sudden psychoneurotic attack in the air when they should have been grounded. If this man was a !ghter pilot, he was merely a danger to himself, but if a bomber pilot had a neurotic attack, then he was a danger not only to himself, but also to the rest of his six, seven, eight or nine-man crew, as well as the bomber formation. Intense air !ghts or terrifying scenarios could lead to enormous pressure on an individual that would later spark in-"ight hysteria, anxiety or paralysis, and this may have contributed to a signi!cant por-tion of air accident fatalities during the war.

One wartime report helps contextualize how air ac-cidents forced neurotics to keep "ying to the danger of them-selves and others. #e report describes the case of a tail-gunner who underwent severe mental strain. It should be noted that contemporary audiences would deem his experiences to be ‘ex-ceptional "ying stress,’ but to Command, his story held noth-ing particularly ‘exceptional.’ Jewesbury writes,

“His story… “He has completed 16 operational trips and a sea search. During the last 6 trips he has began to show signs of nerves. He has tried his best to !ght against this.”115

Herein it is possible to see that the CO acknowledged that the man showed ‘signs’ of nerves, symptoms, but also that he was !ghting to suppress them. Jewesbury continues,

“On his last sortie, his aircraft was attacked and badly damaged by an enemy aircraft. #is experi-ence was too much for him. His work and conduct prior to this lapse has been excellent.”116

Clearly, the man’s sudden refusal to "y was not a result of de-!ciency of character. He had not only volunteered for combat duties, but joined the RAF at the most dangerous position of tail-gunner. Tail-gunners had the highest death rate of all air-crew positions because they "ew alone at the rear section of the plane and were thus unable to bale out of the plane properly. Yet the case becomes even more interesting. Jewesbury writes,

“Once he had seen a man burnt to death on the sta-tion and he could not get this out his mind… Many machines were lost from his station and several of his close friends were missing… On one occasion he was attacked by a night !ghter. His machine was badly damaged, he made a safe return, but in a very nervous state.”117

115 Jewesbury, M.D., “Work and Progress Report” to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London

116 Ibidem. 117 Jewesbury, M.D., “Work and Progress Report” to Air

Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

#is passage clearly demonstrates that the man had undergone extraordinary combat stress in a variety of ways. #e next pas-sage elucidates on how his symptoms developed during his !-nal six missions.

“He was depressed, slept badly and sometimes dreamt of crashes. He was easily jumpy and often felt his heart thumping. When "ying he was shaky, !dgety and very sweaty and anxious while over the target area.”118

For six missions this air gunner "ew while unwell. At some point, he refused to "y and was deemed ‘un!t for any further "ying duties.’119 Clearly, this man was un!t to man a plane, and could very well have caused an air accident during the six sorties that he "ew unwell. Because he was forced to "y or face the consequences of the LMFW policy, it is certainly plausible that the LMFW policy indirectly caused air accidents by in-timidating un!t men to "y.

In 1942 Squadron Leader Reid submitted a report ti-tled “#e In"uence of Psychological Disorders in Operational Flying” to Command. In the report, Reid claims that LMFW had contributed to an untold number of air accidents. Reid stresses that the inherent ‘harshness’ of the policy was keep-ing "iers in the air when they were undergoing serious neu-rotic trauma. Furthermore, these "iers were causing numerous forms of operational ine$ciency, such as air accidents, early returns from action, reporting sick on ops, etc. Reid writes, ‘the employment of air crew su%ering from psychological disorders may conceivably be the cause of much operational ine$ciency and avoidably casualties.’ 120 Reid continues,

“(1) that 70-80% of accidents are due to the psy-chological or physical failure of the crew in a critical situation(2) that the failure of the pilot due to merely medi-cal reasons is rare.(3) that the psychological make-up of a pilot makes or mars his future and(4) the typical fact about "ying accidents due to psychological causes is that the same mistakes, the same failures, with their resultant consensus appear again and again and they are due to fear.”121

Not only did this CO believe that the policy was forcing "iers su%ering from psychological disorders to keep "ying, but he

118 Ibid. 119 Ibid. 120 Squadron Leader D. Reid to Air Command, ‘#e in"uence of

psychological disorders on e$ciency in operational "ying’, 14 September 1942, AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens.

121 Ibid.

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also believed these !iers were accounting for most of the RAF’s air accidents. Evidently, Command’s disposal policy forced !i-ers incapable of operational !ying to continue with their tour, despite evidence that these !iers were accounting for a con-siderable portion of air casualties. "e enclosure of this report in Command’s #les, and the lack of any response from Com-mand, is implicit evidence that Command read, discussed and ignored Reid’s theory. In sum, LMFW policy not only failed to reduce psy-chological wastage, but may also have contributed to untold numbers of air accident fatalities and the concomitant loss of vital men and war materials.

Prejudice in Policy

"is section attempts to grapple further with Dr. Jew-esbury’s question to his superiors at Command: “one can only wonder, in passing, why, if the o$cers are to be invalided, the airmen are normally to “transferred to the Army for combatant duties.””122 It asks whether there was intent within Command to bias the harsher consequences of this policy toward aircrew as opposed to o$cers. If so, and the policy was predicated upon punishing those with a predisposition, then did command believe that its aircrew were particularly more predisposed to psychoneuroses than its o$cers? If yes, then where did Com-mand’s presumptions about their aircrew originate from, and how were they perpetuated? "e disposal policy punished aircrew more harshly than o$cers because Command viewed aircrew, mainly trained and recruited from the lower and lower-middle classes, as in-nately more predisposed to psychoneuroses. Taken together with the knowledge that Command believed noncompliance to be as contagious as a ‘rot,’ it can be e%ectively posited that Command greatly feared that the reactions of the lower-mid-dle class aircrew were the cause of its psychoneurotic wastage. Command decided to enact a policy that harshly punished the originators of the problem, those aircrew so predisposed to !y-ing stress, while merely invaliding or discharging o$cers that had merely had their constitutions weakened through such ex-posure to predisposed aircrew.

"is argument can e%ectively explain why Command punished psychoneuroses and malingering amongst non-o$-cer aircrew as one and the same, while providing a more con-siderate policy for its o$cer class. Command’s presumptions about the aircrew’s greater predisposition lay in their historical preference for ‘public-school !iers,’ which led to an implicit prejudice against lower/ lower-middle class !iers that would join the service in droves when the RAFVR was established in 1936. Based on Command’s interpretation of aviation psy-chology, the policy was focused on those ‘predisposed’ to

122 Jewesbury, M.D., “Work and Progress Report” to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London

LMFW due to innate or learned character de#ciency. Hidden in a Command #le, a copy of "e Lancet published in 1941 contains an interesting speech.

“In taking a parting glance at the psychoneurotics of the RAF I cannot do better than to re!ect on them in Dr. Stephen Taylor’s words in the Lancet of March 6th, 1941: - “"e great majority are the weaker brethren who have started life with only half a talent. "ey are a burden which every community has to bear – the grumpy, the worrying, the nagging, the over-par-ticular, the sel#sh, the humourless, the unsatis#ed and the cowardly. In times of trouble, the unifor-mity of their behavior makes many of us see them for the #rst time as a coherent group. "ey !ood the services psychiatric hospitals. "ey crowd into the deepest shelters that they may live through the blitz to grumble at the peace. In quieter times, they #ll our outpatients halls; they drink medicines, they collect certi#cates; they cost the state a lot of money and society a lot of misery. We may occasionally be tempted to despise them, but it is not their fault they are what they are. We must pity them, but for their own sake we must not make out pity. As doc-tors, we can help a little, but less than we would.”123

Evidently, these psychiatrists believed that the segment of Brit-ish society that was vulnerable to ‘cowardice’ comprised those ‘weaker brethren’ who have started life with ‘only half a talent.’ Moreover, these men came from a segment of society that ‘cost the state a lot of money’ and ‘society a lot of misery.’ Indeed, Taylor insinuates that this group ‘collects certi#cates’, that is, bene#ts. Clearly, this stigma is associated with those lower down the socioeconomic scale, which informs contemporary audiences that AC viewed ‘psychoneurotics,’ who were in AC’s eyes predisposed to their condition, as originating from lower social ranks. "is assumption is referred to in the mid-war pub-lication of a RAF psychiatrist, when he writes, ‘the a priori ex-pectation is that the poorer the economic status of a section of a given population, the greater the incidence of psychoneurotic conditions.’124 Given what psychiatrists were publishing, it is easy to see why the RAF viewed those lower down the socio-economic scale as more predisposed to such conditions.

"e formation of the RAF Volunteer Reserve (1936) created a volunteer pool that for the #rst time in RAF’s his-tory opened the doors to ‘all classes.’ "e men that joined the RAFVR in droves, grammar school boys of the lower and middle classes, signed up to access technical training and al-

123 M.D., “Work and Progress Report” to Air Command, July 1943. AIR 49/357 Papers, National Archives, Kew Gardens, London.

124 Gillespie, Psychological E!ects of War on the Citizen and Soldier, 69.

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leged meritocratic promotion structure.125 !is suited the RAF in two senses: it allowed for good propaganda of the RAF as meritocratic, while it to built a pool of reservists for the ap-proaching war with Germany.

After the outbreak of war, the RAF became deeply un-happy with these men of the RAFVR bomber crews. Command felt that it had made the recruitment criteria too low, conse-quently letting in far too many cases with a ‘predisposition’ to combat stress. !e high attrition rates during the bomber o"ensive and relentless need for crews forced the RAF’s hand on whether or not to actually employ these RAFVR in combat. It did so with great reluctance, whilst retaining commissions for public-school boys hailing from the higher socio-economic order.126 At the same time as the RAF’s employment of these men, the intensity and danger of the bombing o"ensive had already begun to rise steeply.

!e RAF’s interpretation of aviation psychology dic-tated that although it would acknowledge heightened stress as a cause of fatigue for a #ier, his breakdown was far more contin-gent on his innate predisposition, than cumulative stress. !is, then, was why Command leveled such harsh consequences at aircrew. !e Service’s obsession with predisposition, and its be-lief that its wastage problems were primarily due to its recent in#ux of predisposed cases from the lower and lower-middle class recruits led to the design of a policy that reinforced a class bias counter to the logical conclusion that wastage inevitably increases with combat intensity. Command’s fears are perhaps best articulated in the words of one Command o$cial: ‘there are indications in a number of directions that we are not get-ting a reasonable percentage of the young men of the middle and upper classes, who are the backbone of this country, when they leave the public schools.’127

Evidently, Command has a clear distrust of aircrew. To return to Stephen Taylor’s speech in the Lancet one RAF report brutally concludes, “in a combatant service in wartime, the in-terest of the individual is overwhelmed by that of the group. Every e"ort must be made to make the individual into a useful component of the group, but if it becomes evident that this is impossible, then the individual must be discarded without further delay.”128 As Well states, ‘[d]espite the incredible skill and fortitude demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of airmen, there always seemed to be an undercurrent of doubt in the Air Ministry and even occasionally at the command level regarding morale and the discipline of #yers, especially NCOs.’129 !e next few p