1Oliver Christian Belcher Department of GeographyUniversity of British Columbia

IntroductIon:

the occupIed palestInIan terrItorIes and late-Modern Wars

Every morning the war gets up from sleep, Afflicted with purifying fear, Leaving its memory in the mud of history Every morning the war arrives All is well. The slain fill the wilderness and the guns howl forever.

Excerpted from Fadhil al-Azzawi, Every Morning the War Gets Up From Sleep

Abstract: The essays collected in this special issue address the intersections between the late-colonial occupation of the Palestinian Territories by the state of Israel, and the conduct of late-modern warfare. Taking the summer 2010 attack on the Gaza Aid flotilla, the devastating late-2009 assault on Gaza, and the everyday occupation and appropriation of the West Bank that continues to stranglehold the Palestinians as cues, each essay critically evaluates the material conditions that facilitate Israels colonial project. As these essays attest, urbicide and infrastructural violenceinstitutionalized by the Israeli military most succinctly in the so-called Dahiya Doctrine play a critical role in Israeli military practice. As the authors, each in their own way, argue, it is only by taking on these infrastructural material conditions which facilitate the Israeli occupation that one can begin to hold an honest conversation on the prospects for a peaceful solution, and an end to the colonial occupation and manufactured humanitarian crisis which plagues the Palestinians.

Keywords: West Bank, Gaza, Israel, late-modern warfare, colonial occupation, infrastructural violence

Introduccin: Los Territorios Palestinos ocupados y las Guerras del Modernismo Tardo

Resumen: Los ensayos incluidos en este nmero especial versan sobre las intersecciones entre la ocupacin colonial tarda de los Territorios Palestinos por parte del estado de Israel, y la conduccin de guerras en el modernismo tardo (late-modern warfare). Tomando los casos del ataque a la flotilla Liberen a Gaza ocurrida en el verano boreal, la devastadora agresin sobre Gaza a fines del 2009, y la ocupacin cotidiana y apropiacin de Cisjordania (que contina con la dominacin del pueblo palestino), cada ensayo analiza las condiciones materiales que facilitan el proyecto colonial israel. Como estos ensayos demuestran, el urbicidio y la violencia infraestructural (institucionalizada ms sucintamente por los militares israeles en la Doctrina Dahiya) juegan un rol fundamental en las prcticas de los militares israeles. Tal como argumentan lxs autores, cada unx a su manera, solo considerando estas condiciones materiales infraestructurales que facilitan la ocupacin israel se puede comenzar a hablar honestamente de perspectivas de solucin pacfica y del fin de la ocupacin colonial y de la crisis humanitaria fabricada que plaga a lxs palestinxs.

Palabras clave: Cisjordania; Gaza; Israel; guerras del modernismo tardo; ocupacin colonial; violencia infraestructural

Introduction

Human Geography2

The essays in this special issue interrogate how Israels late-modern occupation of the Palestinian territories signals a subtle shift in the mechanisms and conduct of late-modern warfare. The Occupied Territories are one of the most intensely surveilled populations on earth, and one of the most frequently massacredfrom home demolitions to collective assaults on Palestinian cities. And it is for this reason, in the wake of the brazen Israeli assaults on the West Bank (2002), southern Lebanon (2006), and Gaza (2008), and in consideration of the type of quasi-state actors the Israelis have targeted (Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Authority), that it has become prescient among scholars, military officials, and poli-cymakers to revisit the ways in which contemporary warfare is characterized. The traditional conception of war, usually viewed through a mirror of associa-tion with state military forces meeting face-to-face on a battlefield, no longer seems to characterize the ways in which late-modern wars are fought.

This is especially true when considering that the four most violent late-colonial occupations of our time (Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kashmir) are typified by powerful state militaries occupying areas lacking a functional state apparatus (Afghanistan, Palestine), or where the extent of the state is limited (Iraq). For some military officials, this tenuous state presence means that wars are now fought primarily amongst the people, indicating a paradigmatic shift in the conduct of late-modern war (Kilcullen 2009; Marston and Malkasian 2008; Smith 2005). Part of the occupation process writ large, then, is not only to build a functional state along Western lines, but also to win the so-called hearts and minds of occupied populations through effective, Western-style liberal governance capacity and capitalist development, in order to marginalize illegitimate non-state group with different aims (e.g., Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Taliban). Therefore, within the problem of charac-terizing and representing late-modern wars, on local and global scales, the practices of occupation must be taken into account. Each of the essays gathered here aim to show how the occupation of Gaza and the West Bank provides a crucial valence for understanding the

processes and material conditions through which late-modern wars are fought.

If late-modern warfare cannot be understood without considering late-colonial occupation (Mbembe 2003), what significance then can be assigned to the modes or mechanisms through which late-modern wars are carried out, and occupations conducted? In many ways, the so-called new wars theorists have attempted to tackle this very problem (Duffield 2002; Kaldor 1999; Mnkler 2002). The new wars literature, in general, has proceeded by way of a traditional geopolitical account into the tenuous status of the modern state in the era of capi-talist globalization, calling into question the monopoly of legitimate violence that guaranteed territorially contiguous borders, expansion, and state development associated typically with modernity (Weber 1994: 316). Notwithstanding a broad diversity within the literature (cf. Balibar 2008; Bauman 2001), there is a relative consensus that what makes new wars new is a breakdown of this monopoly of violence costumarily held by the state. This is due, it is argued, to a prolif-eration of deterritorialized political subjects in the post-Cold War era, particularly in parts of the global South, where actors outside of formal state institutions have begun to assume powers to govern and wage wars in broad swaths of areas over and above the scope of any particular state, constituting a dispersion of claims of sovereignty both within and beyond the state. The decline of the state in the global Southcommonly referred to as weak, failed, or rogue statesis due to a sordid mix of colonial legacies, the arbitrary drawing of state boundaries by colonial powers (most particularly in Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East), and the failure of secular nationalist and communist parties to have effectively governed once colonial powers had left. The diffuse actors associated with this multicentric, post-Cold War picture of late-modern war have become well-known in everyday parlance: private security contractors, child soldiers, revolutionary forces, non-state actors, identity move-ments, religious fundamentalists, warlords, criminal networks, etc.

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This panoramic worldview has become a common stance among governments, NGOs, and militaries in the Global North, particularly when considering the new geographies of, and the imperial ambitions implicit within the so-called war on terror (cf. Elden 2009). For example, in a article published in the major establishment journal Foreign Affairs, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently penned (2010), the most lethal threats to safety and secu-rity [in the future] are likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure their territory. It is within these supposed hot spots (Barnett 2002; cf. Roberts et al. 2003) where liberal governance and market economies are least stable or non-existent, that Western militaries are preparing for future battles.1 In many of these places, such as Yemen, Pakistan, Somalia, and the Philippines, clan-destine battles have already begun.

Surprisingly, in their propensity towards general-izing principles on the status of the state and political subjectivity, new wars theorists have almost entirely overlooked the problem of late-colonial occupation within the calculus of contemporary war.2 And, even though the new wars literature does offer two clues the emergence of non-state actors and the focus on population for thinking about the question, the case should not be overstated. As Ron Smith writes within this issue, the Israeli expansion, for example, has always been war amongst the Palestinian people, and cannot be easily categorized as emblematic of a new era. As Smith writes cynically, much of this era-based analysis is designed to condition the reader to [accept] an over targeting of civilian papers, justified

1. The irony of this analysis should not be lost. For military officials and policymakers, who see the proliferation of non-state actors and terrorists as the imminent threat of our times, there is a characteristic forgetting that these very threats have historically been funded as proxies by imperial powers in the West. It is hard to find a dictator or terrorist network in the past fifty years that has not, at one point, been on the payroll of the CIA, including al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Saddam Hussein. The catastrophic strategic miscalculation of funding religious fundamentalists in order to neutralize various secular leftist and communist movements in the Third World has turned into a twisted version of reaping what you sow (cf. Zizek 2008).

2. For other critiques of the new wars literature, see Dexter 2007, Gregory 2010, Reyna 2009

through a claim that the war on terror will be fought in civilian spaces.

The Israeli military has been no stranger to conducting or sanctioning massacres in Palestine or Lebanon, refining the art of occupation in the mean-timethe ethnic cleansing of 1948; the episodes of Kafr Qassem and Qibya; the 1982 support of the Phalangists in Lebanon against the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, to name a few. It has, however, been argued convincingly, especially by geographers, that a tactical changed occurred in the Israeli Operation Defensive Shield which leveled Jenin, Netanya, and the Palestinian Authority headquarters in Ramallah during the Al-Aqsa Intifada in 2002 and 2003. Whereas the Israeli Defense Force had traditionally concentrated on destroying the Palestinian Authoritys paramilitary and police installations, commentators such Stephen Graham, Eyal Weizman, and Derek Gregory have argued that, the IDF [began targeting] the Palestinian Authoritys civilian infrastructure, the institutions and the record the very archive of Palestinian civil society [during the Al-Aqsa Intifada] (Gregory 2003: 310; cf. Graham 2003, 2004; Gregory 2004a, 2004b; Weizman 2002, 2004). The signifi-cance of this shift within the Occupied Territories has been to undermine the material conditions for a future Palestinian state, or worse, to cultivate particu-larly unsavory conditions for a future state.

If one were to trace a common thread running throughout the papers collected here, it is the detri-mental effects Israels occupation has had, and continues to have on Palestinian infrastructurefrom massive military and bulldozing operations, limited access to water resources, to the economic blockade. It is this focus on infrastructure which provides the indispensable clue into considering the link between late-modern occupation and war. The most prescient point made in Eyal Weizmans brilliant book, Hollow Land (2007), is that the occupation of Palestine has become more suffocating in correlation to innovations made in construction, weaponry, and surveillance technologies. Checkpoints, identification cards, biometrics, housing permits, privileged road access, loyalty oaths, containment walls, border barriers,

Introduction

Human Geography4

under- and over ground tunnels, barbwire and watch-towersthese technologies of rule have become the currency of late-modern occupation. As Omar Jabary Salamanca argues within this issue, colonial violence, in its discursive and material dimensions, is inscribed in physical space as well as in everyday life. By looking at infrastructural networks, the mediating mechanisms that support everyday life, [it can be] shown how Israeli policies of collective punishment remain even after they have disengaged.

Indeed, infrastructural violence has, in some form or another, become the key to Israels occupa-tion strategy in two respects. On the one hand, the IDF has adopted a specific policy of infrastructural destruction in Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon in order to deter what it determines to be threats to its highly particular understanding of sovereignty in the region. According to the Goldstone Report, this targeting infrastructure, the so-called Dahiya Doctrine, has become official policy. On the other hand, the occupation of Palestine has operated more or less along the model of an apartheid state. Israeli policy, especially in the West Bank, has worked to divide and fragment territory, hinder the mobility of the Palestinian population, facilitate the expansion of settlements, and cultivate the material conditions to implement a sophisticated surveillance regime. Let us consider both aspects in turn.

Targeting Infrastructure

While much of the media attention following the release of the Report of the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (2009), dubbed the Goldstone Report, focused on Israeli human rights violations during the 21-day Operation Cast Lead onslaught starting in late December 2008 (and the predictable rejection of these accusations by Isreali and American rejection of these accusations), a much more startling story threads throughout the 500+ page report. Operation Cast Lead resulted in over 1,100 casualties in a population largely living in slums and desperately strangled by an ideologically-infused Israeli economic blockade, a circumstance Tristan Sturm discusses in detail within this issue.

Aside from targeting government buildings and police installations controlled by Hamas, the IDF conducted several attacks on the foundations of civilian life in Gaza. As the Report soberly details, industrial infrastructure, food production, water installations, sewage treatment plants, and housing were singled out as legitimate military targets. In a part viscerally excruciating to read (2009: 21-22; 199-218), the U.N. Mission notes the destruction of several civilian instal-lations which provided the basic means of subsistence (aside from humanitarian aid) for the population within Gaza: the el-Bader flour mill (the only mill operation in Gaza at the time) destroyed in a matter of minutes; the demolition of the Sameh Sawafeary chicken farms, bulldozing 31,000 chickens; the delib-erate destruction of residential housing, as a revenge tactic during the last three days of the IDF presence in Gaza; strikes on a cement packaging plant; the Abu Eida factories for ready-mix concrete; the al-Wadiyah Groups food and drink factories; and the list goes on.

Source: 2009 Getty Images

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A particularly audacious strike on a wall harboring raw sewage at a Gazan water treatment plant caused more than 200,000 cubic meters of raw sewage [to flow] into neighbouring farmland (Goldstone Report 2009: 207). The circumstances of the strike, according to the U.N. Mission (22), suggest it was deliberate and premeditated. Targeting the plant echoes Salamancas point on how colonial violence is inscribed into the physical spaces of everyday life, since the sewage inhibits the production of food, a right mandated on occupying powers under inter-national law. Statements on Israels premeditated focus on infrastructure are peppered throughout the report, underscoring the severity of Israels breach of international law during the operation. Unlawful and wonton destruction which is not justified by military necessity amounts to a war crime, write the authors with regard civilian infrastructural violence (cf. Gregory 2006). As all of the authors note within this issue, these actions have contributed appreciably to the manufactured humanitarian crisis within Gaza.

Another significant aspect of the Report, and one that has not received nearly as much attention as it deserves, is the use of chemical weapons by the IDF during the 21-day siege, particularly white phos-phorus and (possibly) depleted uranium (see Figures 1 and 2). The use of white phosphorus, a munition manufactured within the United States and sold to Israel, has been claimed by the IDF to be used for marking, signaling, and obscuring tactical popula-tions. However, reports by the U.N. Mission and Human Rights Watch suggest otherwise. In their scathing critique on the use of white phosphorus over dense urban areas, HRW writes (2009: 5), the consistent use of air-burst white phosphorus instead of smoke projectiles, especially where no Israeli forces were on the ground, strongly suggests that the IDF was not using the munition for its obscurant qualities, but rather for its incendiary effect. The HRW report concludes that the IDF repeatedly exploded white phosphorus munitions in the air over populated areas, killing and injuring civilians, and damaging civilian structures, including a school, a market, a humani-tarian aid warehouse and a hospital, suggesting that

the IDF was mindful of the dangers of untreatable burns, the hallmark of white phosphorus, for the Palestinian population. The U.N. Mission draws a similar conclusion, finding that the Israeli armed forces were systematically reckless in their determina-tion to use white phosphorus in built-up areas, and in particular in and around areas of particular impor-tance to civilian health and safety (Goldstone Report 2009: 195). The U.N. Mission goes into useful detail on the use of the weapon during the operation:

The Mission understands the means of deploying these smoke projectiles was that they were fired as a canister shell by 155-mm howit-zers. The projectile was timed or programmed to air-burst over its designated targets. The canister shell then discharged a quantity of felt wedges impregnated with white phosphorus, usually in the order of 160 wedges in a fan-like dispersion earthwards. These wedges with white phos-phorus, which is a pyrophoric chemical (that is, self-igniting when in contact with the air), emit smoke and continue to do so until the chemical is exhausted or deprived of air. Wedges of white phosphorus therefore remain active and have done so in Gaza for up to 21 and 24 days after discharge. It is technically possible that there are still active white phosphorus wedges in Gazain water tanks or in sewage systems, for example. Children have subsequently been injured by coming into contact with such wedges (194-195).

The significance of this should not be lost on those who have followed recent developments on the use of chemical weapons in November 2004 by U.S. and U.K. forces in Fallujah, Iraq. While the furor over the release of the Wikileaks Afghan War Diary was making its rounds in editorial pages and foreign policy circles around the world, an important study on the deleterious effects of white phosphorus and depleted uranium use on the population of Fallujah was quietly published in a major public health journal (Busby et al., 2010). The authors of this incriminating and under-reported study substantiated claims that there had been a dramatic spike in cancer and infant mortality

Introduction

Human Geography6

rates following the use of chemical weapons by U.S. forces in Fallujah during Operation Phantom Fury. While this is not the place to delve deeply the findings by these public health officials, the magnitude of the carcinogenic effects should be briefly mentioned. Since the U.S use of white phosphorus, infant mortality rates in Fallujah have increased to roughly four times that of Egypt, and eight times of Kuwait in a span of just five years. Increases in rates of cancer among all age groups bear much of the same evidence. The report concludes, ominously, that it is clear that the 0-4 popula-tion, born in 2004-2008, after the fighting, is significantly 30% smaller than the 5-9, 10-14 and 15-19 populations (Busby et. al., 2010: 2834). Therefore, it is not a stretch to look at this study as a looking-glass darkly of what the carcinogenic landscape holds for the future of Gazansan ironically pernicious twist to the racist construction by Israeli nationalists to commonly depict the demographic problem of urban Palestinians as an evasive cancer within the Israeli body-politic (cf. Graham 2004; Makdisi 2008). Indeed, this sort of reckless infrastructural violence introduces a different sort of microscopic insurgent into the area (cf. Loyd 2009).

The punishment of Gaza from 2008 to the present (cf. Levy 2010) amounts to a dramatic expression of the Dahiya Doctrine adopted by the Israeli Defense Forces shortly after the 2006 invasion of Lebanon (cf. Ramadan 2009). The doctrine was named after an approach taken on the Haret Hreik neighborhood in Beiruts Dahiya district in the summer of 2006, a 34-day war that included more than 10,000 bomb-ings, 1,100 casualties, and 4,000 injuries (see Figure 3). Providing perhaps the most precise definition to Stephen Grahams concept of asymmetric urbicide (Graham 2002), Major General Gadi Eisenkot, the Israeli Northern Command chief, is cited in the Goldstone Report as saying: What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on We will apply disproportionate force on it and cause great damage

and destruction there. From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases This is not a recommendation. This is a plan. And it has been approved (Goldstone Report 2009: 254, my emphasis; cf. PCATI Report 2009: 20-29). Underlaying the thinking behind the strategy, Major General Giora Eiland is cited in the Report as arguing:

In the event of another war with Hizbullah, the target must not be the defeat of Hizbullah but the elimination of the Lebanese military, the destruction of the national infrastructure and intense suffering among the population Serious damage to the Republic of Lebanon, the destruction of homes and infrastructure, and the suffering of hundreds of thousands of people are consequences that can influence Hizbollahs

Source: 2009 Matthew McKinzie/Human Rights Watch

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behavior more than anything else (254; my emphasis).

A Col. (Ret.) Gabriel Siboni continues this line of thinking in relation to Gaza:

This approach is applicable to the Gaza Strip as well. There, the IDF will be required to strike hard at Hamas and to refrain from the cat and mouse games of searching for Qassam rocket laungers. The IDF should not be expected to stop the rocket and missle fire against the Israeli home front through attacks on the launchers them-selves, but by means of imposing a ceasefire on the enemy (255; my emphasis).

According to a report by the Independent Fact Finding Committee to the League of Arab States (2009: 3), over 3,000 homes were destroyed and over 11,000 damaged; 215 factories and 700 private businesses were seriously damaged or destroyed; 15 hospitals and 43 primary health care centers were destroyed or damaged; 28 government buildings and 60 police stations were destroyed or damaged; 30 mosques were destroyed and 28 damaged; 10 schools were destroyed and 168 damaged; three universities/colleges were destroyed and 14 damaged; and 53 United Nations properties were damaged. Unfortunately, as Craig James argues in his paper on the representation of Operation Cast Lead, little of this damage circulated in the global visual economy of the conflict. Nevertheless, as the papers within this special issue argue, it is this connection and tension between the arrant not-so-creative destruction of infrastructure, controlled imagery, and the imposition of the will of the occupying power that is the secret thereof driving the prac-tice of late-modern warfare, and succinctly captures the spirit behind the Israeli occu-pation, and more generally, contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine.

Occupying Infrastructure

Nevertheless, the bombings, white phos-phorus, and wholesale razing of infrastructure

only tell half the story. Achille Mbembe once described the colonial occupation of Palestine as the most accomplished form of necropower of our times (Mbembe 2003: 27). While this is a characteristic overstatement, he nevertheless opens up a clearing by which we can connect the potential and real-ized exposure to death in war, as in Gaza above, to the surveillance infrastructure within the Occupied Territories. The occupation of Palestine is intended to divide and fragment territory, police and hinder the mobility of the Palestinian populations in Gaza and the West Bank, and implement a sophisticated permit and surveillance regime, in order to facili-tate the broader Israeli project of expansion into the Occupied Territories. As Saree Makdisi has written (2010: 13), at heart, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is actually very simple. It is not about religion. It is not about security. It is not about terrorism. It is about land. Indeed, as of 2009, there are 450,000 Israeli citizens living in 149 settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem, all in violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Between 2007 and 2008, construction for Israeli housing units increased by a startling 3,728 per cent, to 1,761 housing units in 2008 compared to 46 in 2007 (Goldstone Report 2009: 52). According to the U.N. Mission, almost

Introduction

Human Geography8

40 per cent of the West Bank is now taken up by Israeli infrastructure associated with the settlements, including roads, barriers, buffer zones and military bases (Ibid.: 52). This Israeli settlement project of claiming land and, whenever possible, clearing it of Palestinianssuch as the illegal construction of the Wall, which encloses the West Bank and, in some cases, cuts off Palestinians from their farmlands and familiestakes place in an endless chain of small, invisible, almostbut not quitebanal episodes, the background music of the occupation, whose real significance only becomes apparent when it is cumu-latively assessed (Makdisi: 6).

As mentioned above, this background music consists of a Kafkaesque permit system which decides who constitutes a legal or illegal alien in ones own land; an impossible system of checkpoints and poor roads alongside privileged Jewish-only high-ways; a residency system that is arbitrarily enforced, privileging Israelis over Palestinians; a bifurcated building permit system; and the Israeli authoriza-tion of Palestinian movement within and without the Occupied Territoriesendless walls and checkpoints (cf. Zureik 2001). As Nigel Parsons and Mark Salter argue, state investment in bifurcated infrastruc-ture, checkpoints, identity documents and a permit system underlines the centrality of closure to occupa-tion (Nigel and Salter 2008: 702). Sandy Marshalls important essay within this special issue interrogates how this infrastructural surveillance system is uneven throughout Areas A, B, and C of the Occupied Territories.

In a couple of recently written and insightful essays (Harker 2009, forthcoming), geographer Chris Harker has cautioned against depicting an overly bleak picture of the Occupied Territories, one that can easily paint over the acts of resistance and ability to cope and make a living beyond the prerogatives Israeli state policy. Palestine, Harker argues, can easily become stereotyped as a place of violence and suffering, and in this process Palestinians themselves can become discursively erased as active subjects (Harker forth-coming: 3). Indeed, it is both mind-boggling and heartening that a population under strict control,

and a constant threat of punishment, can endure and maintain the spirit of resistance. However, the cautionary tale weaving its way through these essays is an important one: the infrastructural material condi-tions of occupation and warfare determine the course of life and death for Palestinians and other occupied populations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Kashmir. And, until the cavalier powers of occupation are confronted along those material lines, the fight for liberation will be in the offing for many years to come.

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