USAWC PERSONAL EXPERIENCE MONOGRAPH

THE IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT:AN

EYEWITNESS ACCOUNT

By

LTC FRED L. HART JR.

Professor Doug JohnsonProject Advisor

The views expressed in this paper are those Of the author and do not necessarily reflect The views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

U.S. Army War CollegeCARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

ABSTRACT

Author: Fred L. Hart Jr. (LTC) USA

TITLE: The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait: An Eyewitness Account

FORMAT: Personal Experience Monograph

DATE: 1 May 1998 PAGES:56 CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED

This personal experience monograph (PEM) is based on the author's personal experience, first hand knowledge, and witnessing of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990. Assigned to Kuwait as an advisor to the Kuwaiti Land Forces on 1 August 1989, the author was involved in the events leading up, during, and after the invasion by Iraqi forces. This PEM provides an historical account of the experiences and actions taken by the United States Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK), which was based out the American Embassy Kuwait. It also documents our beleaguered status in Kuwait and Baghdad, Iraq, from August 1990 to 10 December 1990. The photograph of Iraqi Republican Guard T-72 on the title page was taken from Chief Dave Forties apartment which was located along Gulf Road in Kuwait City, Kuwait, note the date on the photograph: Aug 4 1990.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This purpose of this Personal Experience Monograph (PEM) is to provide an account of events leading up to the invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent ordeal that eleven military members and their families endured from 2 August 1990 to 10 December 1990. The account is based on my personal experience, notes, and diary that I maintained through the crisis. I want to acknowledge all the members of the United States Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK). They displayed the highest degree of courage, ingenuity, initiative, and dedication to duty. In my opinion USLOK was a major factor in the ability of U.S. embassies in Kuwait and Iraq to function smoothly and remain capable of executing their diplomatic mission throughout the crisis. I want to recognize Chief Warrant Officer 4 Dave Forties for his skill and courage in operating on the streets, alleyways and back roads of Kuwait and Baghdad searching for foodstocks. Chief Forties more than any other coordinated, procured, and arranged for all the foodstocks that allowed Ambassador Nathaniel Howell and his staff the capability to thwart the Iraqi siege on the embassy compound. He repeated this performance while detained in Baghdad. His cunning, initiative, and ingenuity ensured both embassy compounds had ample foodstocks in order to sustain themselves during the entire crisis. I would like to thank the members of the Individual Terrorist Awareness Course (INTAC) at Ft. Bragg, NC for their outstanding instruction that contributed significantly to my ability to deal with the hostage situation my family and I found ourselves in. The USLOK organization received two meritorious unit citations; one Army and one Joint for performance during the invasion and while detained in Kuwait and Iraq. This account will endeavor to tell the USLOK story and shed new insights on the events that occurred in Kuwait and Baghdad.

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BACKGROUNDOn 1 August 1989, my family and I arrived in Kuwait City. It

was over 104 degrees outside at 2100hrs. Leaving the modern air-

conditioned international terminal and walking outside was

literally like walking into a blast furnace. I had arrived to

begin serving a two year accompanied tour. My job was to be an

advisor (logistics, maintenance, and training) to the Kuwait Land

Forces and manage foreign military sales (FMS) cases.

I was assigned to a joint organization called United States

Liaison Office Kuwait (USLOK) which was based out of the U.S.

Embassy in Kuwait City. I worked Sunday through Thursday from an

office at the Kuwait Land Forces, Director of Technical Affairs.

Technical Affairs was essentially the Supply and Maintenance

Directorate for the Kuwait Army. Our joint office at the embassy

provided central management for all FMS cases, and International

Military Education and Training (IMET). The total organization

consisted of approximately 22 personnel, Army, Air Force, Navy,

Marine Corps, and a few DoD civilians. The Army members made up a

technical assistance field team (TAFT), and our Chief of USLOK

was an Army O-6.

The entire organization worked for U.S. Central Command

(USCENTCOM) based at MacDill AFB, FL. The Chief was part of the

embassy Country Team and worked for both CENTCOM and Ambassador

Nathaniel Howell. The USLOK office interfaced almost daily with

the CENTCOM J4/7 on matters concerning our mission of providing

security assistance and FMS management to the Government of

Kuwait.

The U.S. Army’s security assistance program was focused on

logistical support to the Kuwaiti Land Forces through several FMS

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cases, mainly for support of U.S. purchased equipment. We also

worked several active International Military Education Training

(IMET) cases. These programs were small in comparison to Saudi

Arabia, primarily because Kuwait maintained only three active

brigades, a small Air Force, and Navy. The Kuwaiti’s were

comfortable with this small force and felt they had no real cause

to have a large or modernized Armed Forces. Many of us had often

heard from Kuwaiti Army officers that the ruling family (Sabahs)

realized that a small poorly trained and equipped force was less

of a threat. Land Force officers also felt that the Air Force got

more defense dollars because you can’t occupy a palace with a

fighter jet. I speculate that there might have been some truth in

all this. The Kuwait Army also had a manpower problem and no true

Kuwaiti would ever be a NCO or worst yet an enlisted man. Without

exception all officers were genuine Kuwaiti’s and almost all

Colonels and above had ties to the royal family or members of

prominent families. The Warrant officer and Non Commissioned

Officer corps was non-full citizen Kuwaiti's or Bedouins.1

Enlisted personnel were a mixed bag of Bedouins, and third world

nationals. Interesting to note that many in the NCOs and enlisted

ranks were also of Iraqi origin and assisted the Iraqi Army as it

invaded Kuwait.

Prior to 2 August 1990, Kuwait was an obscure oil rich Gulf-

Arab state about the size of New Jersey. They were uncomfortably

sandwiched between Iraq and Iran. Prior to the Iraqi invasion,

most Americans had only a passing knowledge of Kuwait. Perhaps

their only frame of reference was in regards to the reflagging of

Kuwaiti Tankers under the US operation called “Earnest Will”

(1987-1988) during the Iran/Iraq War (1980-1988). Once that ended

both Kuwait and the U.S. had little interest in binding political

relationships with each other. Unfolding events in the former

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Soviet Union and the former Warsaw pact was overshadowing most

events occurring in the region (1989). After all, the Iran/Iraq

war had ended and the region was ready for peace.

Our observations in the region indicated in early 1990 that

storm clouds were gathering, but most in DoD and State Department

had little interest in the ensuing inter-Arab dispute between

Kuwait and Iraq. Even the CENTCOM J-2 threat update was focused

on Iran as the major regional threat. The embassy was focused on

monitoring the Russians in country and the extent of their

military programs with Kuwait. There was interest in the internal

Kuwaiti problems regarding a popular move to bring back the

National Assembly. The Amir had dissolved the assembly a few

years earlier when too much dissension was occurring. However, on

the surface everything appeared to be peaceful.

Prior to the Gulf War, Kuwaiti Armed Forces were generally

equipped and trained by the British. This was due to the long

historical ties between Kuwait and the British. By the late

eighties, the Kuwaitis had begun a modest program to upgrade

their three Land Force brigades. The United States and western

European nations had lost out when the Kuwaiti's decided, in

early 1988, to buy Russian BMP IIs and Yugoslavian M-84s, (T-72

variant). This was attributed to the inexpensive deals both

countries were offering in comparison to buying the more

expensive and sophisticated U.S. and Western European armaments.

Kuwait also had a tendency to engage several countries for arms

deals, their way of spreading the wealth around. Their Army

consisted of equipment from the U.S., Great Britain, France,

Russia, Yugoslavia, and many others. It was a strategy to

maintain friendship ties with many and show no favoritism towards

one particular country2. The result for their military was an

absolute nightmare for interoperability. The Kuwait Government

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also required that U.S. military personnel wear no uniforms or

openly acknowledge their presence, an arrangement that would pay

dividends for us during the Iraqi invasion.

In the months proceeding the invasion, USLOK team members began

monitoring the situation between Kuwait and Iraq. While working

out in the field with the various units and at the Land Forces

Headquarters, we began getting indicators as early as March 1990

that the relationship Kuwait shared with its neighbor to the

north (Iraq) was taking a turn for the worst. However, in most

diplomatic and military circles, it was felt that it was nothing

more than bellicose chest pounding and posturing by Saddam

Hussein. Many in the diplomatic circles felt the problem would

eventually go away by the Kuwaiti's throwing millions of dollars

at the disgruntled Iraqi leader, who had bankrupted his country

after eight years of war with the Iranians and had nothing to

show for it. At our Headquarters, CENTCOM J-2 and J-3 remained

focused on Iran, and felt Iraq was too disorganized after the war

with Iran to pose any near term threat in the region. Iranian

radical fundamentalism and support of terrorism was believed to

be far more threatening to the region. The Iran/Iraq war had cost

Saddam Hussein dearly and he felt he had done the Gulf oil

sheikdoms a favor by fighting the Iranians and stopping the

spread radical Shia Islam.3 In hindsight, it’s easy to see that

the war did nothing to improve Iraqi operational military

prowess. His country was broke, his oil production was too low to

get the economy back on its feet, and the Iraqi people had

suffered tremendously.

In early 1990, the Arab League held a summit in Baghdad and

Saddam initiated his political attacks against Kuwait and to a

lesser degree on other Gulf nations. Kuwait specifically was

accused of waging economic war against Iraq and slant drilling to

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steal oil from Iraqi fields along the border. When the summit

ended most Arab nations felt Kuwait and Iraq would reach some

type of monetary settlement. However, the problems continued to

fester in the coming months as Iraq stepped up its propaganda war

and launched significant personal attacks on the Kuwaitis and the

ruling family.

By early June 1990, several senior Kuwaiti officers told us of

the outlandish propaganda broadcast from Baghdad. They were

extremely concerned and agitated because the language used in the

broadcast was Arabic that one only uses when compromise is

unattainable and the only recourse is to fight. They openly

acknowledged that they were unprepared for any confrontation and

the Kuwait government seemed to be unwilling to take any

preparatory actions. Many also informed us that the Iraqi Army

was conducting an unusually high number of exercises in southern

Iraq. In mid-July 1990, the Kuwaiti military went on their first

and only alert status, but after one week and evidence of Iraqi

troop movements became clearer, the Kuwaiti's quickly called off

their haphazard alert for fear of provoking Saddam Hussein. On a

regional level President Hosni Mubarak (Egypt) and King Hussein

(Jordan) attempted to persuade Iraq to at least meet with the

Kuwaitis to discuss their problems. Both heads of state received

assurances from Iraq that a peaceful solution could be found. At

our embassy, there was interest in monitoring the situation, but

with President Mubarak, and King Hussein's assurances most felt

the problem would be settled, and Kuwait would reach a monetary

settlement with Iraq. The Kuwaitis genuinely felt they had a

chance to reach an agreement, but were bound and determine not to

give up territory or completely forgive the war debt Saddam owed

them. That essentially sealed their fate and made the meeting in

Jeddah an Iraqi ploy to demonstrate they had left no stone

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unturned in trying to settle a dispute in a Arab brotherly

fashion. Also, now known, was the fact that the U.S. Ambassador

to Iraq, April Glaspie had met with Saddam in mid-July and

essentially conveyed to him that the U.S. had no interest in his

dispute with Kuwait and no defense treaties. Department of State

(DOS) also conveyed this same message just weeks before the

invasion in congressional testimony.

Once it was realized that a compromise would not be reached,

and the Iraqi leader's demands were unyielding, (this timeframe

was the week prior to the invasion), Kuwaiti's began talking of

the Iraqi's seizing the contested northern (Rumaylla) oilfields

and the two tiny islands (Warba/Bubiyan) near the mouth of the

Shatt al Arab, entrance way into the Arabian Gulf. There had been

a historical precedent for this during a 1961 Kuwait/Iraq border

dispute that was quickly resolved when the British committed a

small force to stymie the Iraqi incursion. Now the situation was

different, Iraq at last had a sizable force, and Kuwait no longer

had any western defense pacts or treaties. In fact, the one

defense treaty that Kuwait participated in was the GCC (Gulf

Cooperation Council). However, the GCC would take virtually no

action to dissuade Saddam from his intentions. The purpose of the

GCC was to protect one another from precisely happening before

their very eyes. The United Arab Emirates acted on their own and

requested United States assistance’s in late July 1990 when

Saddam began including the U.A.E. in his threats. Nevertheless,

the GCC proved to be virtually paralyzed, unwilling, and unable

to deal with Saddam. During the weeks proceeding the invasion,

the GCC did not even meet in session. Even the Peninsular Shield

force, a GCC reaction force of roughly brigade size, was not

utilized or alerted during the entire crisis. The value of the

GCC as a defense pact proved to be worthless.

8

We watched knowing that something would happen and hoping

Kuwait would pay off Saddam Hussein. A week before the invasion a

former Kuwaiti officer and friend who worked at a Kuwaiti bank

informed me that the Kuwait government had to put a stop on all

overseas electronic fund transfers. The problem was as the crisis

unfolded; many Kuwaitis began transferring all their accounts to

banks in the U.S. and Great Britain out of fear of an Iraq

invasion. In addition, by the last week of July, all

international and regional domestic flights were sold out. The

panic within the populace had begun, but the government would not

acknowledge there was a growing problem. At our last official

embassy country team meeting, 29 July 1990, we were all cautioned

to stay close to home and insure our Motorola radios were working

properly. Our state department diplomats also assured us that

they would see to our hasty evacuation well before any

hostilities started. Our Chief had suggested that the women and

children go on to Saudi Arabia as a precaution, but the

Ambassador ruled that out, stating he felt the Kuwaiti’s would

resolve the problem at the Jeddah meeting scheduled for 1 August

1990. Before the meeting adjourned the Ambassador assured

everyone that this was typical Arab bluff and talk, he really

doubted the Iraqis would invade Kuwait.

CW4 Dave Forties and I managed to conducted one last check of

each Kuwaiti brigade the week preceding the invasion and found

them in their normal summertime routine (majority of the

leadership on summer leave) and little to no activity. In fact,

it was difficult to find anyone above the rank of major around.4

Since the stand down from alert status in mid July all units had

authorized personnel to continue with their normal summer leave

program.

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Now the stage was set. By the last week of July 1990, the

Iraqi's had placed their lead Republican Guard division along

Kuwait's northern frontier. Forties and I made our last trip to

the Land Forces Sixth brigade on 28 July 1990. The brigade

officers that were present reported that Iraqi formations were

within sight of the border. We were being told that well over

100,000 troops had massed in the southern region of Iraq and were

within minutes of the border.5 Still the Kuwait government was

unwilling to request U.S. Assistance and the U.S. had already

sent signals in late July 90 that we had no defense agreements

with Kuwait.

The bottomline was if Kuwait wanted assistance, they would have

to ask for it. CENTCOM did dispatch a courier with satellite

Intel photos to provide the Ambassador and the Kuwait government

with further proof that the Iraqi forces posed along their border

were ready to strike, noting the only missing piece of the puzzle

was that Iraqi Artillery had not been brought forward. The

Kuwaitis reviewed the data but made no commitment or request for

assistance.

INVASION Now Kuwait was completely on her own and a meeting was

scheduled with the Iraqis in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia on 31 July

1990. The evening of 1 August, we all watched the local English

news broadcast which showed the Kuwaiti Crown Prince return from

Jeddah with the news that Iraq walked out of the talks when

Kuwait was unwilling to meet Saddam Hussein's demands. The

Kuwaitis were hopeful that another meeting would be scheduled.

The Kuwaiti newspaper delivered to our villa 2 August had this

headline: Jeddah Talks end…more needed - US concerned but hopeful

of efforts to defuse crisis through diplomacy. 6

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We all knew that this was the turning point and short of a

miracle the Iraqi hordes would invade, an as a minimum capture

the northern oil fields, Warba and Bubiyan island.

By 2300 hours 1 August 1990, the Chief of USLOK Col. John

Mooneyham began receiving telephonic reports from U.S.

Westinghouse technicians manning a radar observation balloon

position just north of Mutla ridge. Their reports were very

pointed in that they described the radar paint as a mass armor

formation resembling an iron pipe several kilometers long and

rolling down hill. They were advised to cut the tether and move

out smartly. By 0100, 2 August 1990 the Iraqi formation was

rapidly moving south along the Abdaly highway totally unopposed.

I went up to the roof of our villa around 0030hrs and could see a

few flares on the northern horizon, but heard no distant sounds

of artillery. The royal families had received their advance

notification and were executing their plans for a hasty

departure. The sad note here is the fact that the ruling family

and top officials in the ministries never bothered to send out

any kind of notification or instructions to the armed forces. To

make matters worst, 2 August was on the Islamic equivalent of the

New Year and one the hottest days of the year. So most good

Kuwaitis that were still around during the sweltering heat of

August had no plans of going to work. By 0500hrs, 2 August the

Iraqi formation was on the outskirts of Doha and word had spread

quickly of the invasion. The Amir and his entourage were well on

their way to Saudi Arabia. A few officers from the western

brigade, 35th Bde about 10-15 kms from Ali Salem air base managed

to get a battalion (+/-) out the gate and headed towards Jahra.

From the vicinity of Jahra, Kuwaiti 35th Bde led by Col. Salem Al

Srour led his units in a futile delaying action along Jahra road

to just outside the gates of the Kuwait Armed Forces

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Headquarters, some 10 kms.7 His assembled battalion of old

British Chieftain tanks, engaged the Iraqis for several hours

until out of ammunition, and almost encircled. The Kuwaiti Air

Force did not fare much better, but they did manage to launch A-4

sorties out of Al Jaber Airbase. Once the airfield became

untenable, they generated sorties from the roadway near the

airbase. They too were eventually overwhelmed by the Iraqi

juggernaut and flew to Saudi Arabia.

Much has been said about the performance of the Kuwait

military. One thing is certain, the Kuwait government failed to

alert the military or take any preparatory actions. The

government instead chose to accept the fact that their tiny Armed

Forces were no match for the Iraqi Republican Guards. Instead,

they believed a diplomatic solution would be found and their

friends and allies would come quickly to their aid. They were

wrong about the diplomatic solution and unprepared to realize

that help would take many months of coalition building and

diplomatic wrangling.

1 Kuwaiti citizenship was based on a family's lineage; full citizenship was based on ancestry prior to Kuwait's independence. All others received citizenship in varying degrees. Bedouins or stateless nomadic peoples had the lowest form of citizenship and state sponsored amenities.

2 The Arabs have a saying,"Enemy of my enemy is my friend", and we often thought this drove much of their diplomacy.

3 All the oil rich Gulf states had growing minority Shiite populations that were influenced by radical Shia Fundamentalism which was often linked to Iran.

4 August is normally the hottest month of the year and the traditional vacation time for Kuwaitis, something the Iraqis were well attuned to.

5 Embassy and CENTCOM message traffic the week prior to the invasion provided estimates of the Iraqi troop build-up along the border area.

6 Arab Times (Kuwait City), 2-3 August 19907 Reuters news service, 12 January 1995, interview with Col.

Srour

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By 0500hrs we had all been notified telephonically or awakened

by low flying fighter bombers and the distinct sound of artillery

fire. At 0515hrs I went outside and immediately recognized the

smell of cordite in the air and could hear the sounds of war

getting closer. Looking to the southwest from my two-story villa

rooftop, I could see Kuwait international airport 5-7kms away

under bombardment by Iraqi fighter bombers. Strangely enough, the

main highway just to the rear of my quarters appeared normal,

complete with Kuwaiti bus service still operating. Now the whole

family was up and LTC Tom Funk had telephoned us and confirmed

our worst fears, Iraq had invaded. We closed all the curtains and

our maid came into our villa. I told my wife and children to

remain downstairs close to center of the villa near a interior

storage room for safety in the event of shelling, which was

growing louder and closer as each hour went by. LTC Funk had

informed me that he had been in touch with the embassy and they

were instructing all of us to remain put in our quarters and

monitor the embassy radio net. I could tell by monitoring my

radio that the embassy was in total panic and it was not the

place to be. At 0600hrs I called CW4 Dave Forties, to check out

his status, he informed me that the lead elements of the

Republican Guard invasion force were already streaming down the

Gulf road highway in direct view from his quarters along Gulf

road. CW4 Forties also told me his neighbors (foreigners) had

remarked to him they were really impressed how quickly the

Kuwaitis had mobilized, so he had to convince them that the

forces they were seeing were not Kuwaiti, but Iraqis.8 They

8 Kuwait had an extremely large expatriate work population; several hundred thousand would attempt to flee during the first week of the invasion. Unfortunately most were turned back at the Iraq and Saudi borders because their passports were retain by their Kuwaiti sponsors. This became a problematic for many Americans who were in Kuwait on work visas.

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quickly gathered their belongings and took off for the border to

Saudi.

We also considered loading up the families and making a dash

for the border. However, after checking with LTC Funk and

monitoring COL Mooneyham's request to the embassy for us to

convoy out, we learned that the Ambassador had denied his

request. Since all the military and their families held

diplomatic passports, the Ambassador informed COL Mooneyham that

we had to follow his orders. This became an area of contention

throughout the crisis. We went ahead and made plans and began pre

packing necessities and foodstuffs, just in case the order was

reversed and we were allowed to leave. In hindsight, we all know

now that the border along Kuwait/Saudi remained porous until 11

August and we probably could have made it out. On the morning of

12 August, the Iraqis sealed the border. They also shot and kill

a British citizen attempting to cross that day. The embassy's

decision was final and we followed the Ambassadors orders.

Apparently, when the Iraqi armor/mechanized forces made it to

Kuwait City, they decided to push their tanks and tracked

vehicles through the city, only to become bogged down and often

lost. This operational error of not bypassing Kuwait city

permitted the bulk of the Kuwaiti 15th Bde, located south of the

city near the Al Ahmadi oil fields to escape to Saudi Arabia. It

also bought time for the southern air base Ahmed al Jaber to

partially mobilize and actually launch sorties throughout the

day. By nightfall, all organized Kuwaiti military resistance had

come almost to a stand still.

Throughout the first day of the invasion, we stayed in

telephonic contact with each other. CW4 Dave Forties and I spoke

with disillusioned, confused and frustrated Kuwaiti officers who

were calling our homes and requesting help, advice and

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assistance. There wasn't much we could tell them, other than

destroy what they could, and get the hell out there. Even the

remnants of the Kuwait government contacted the US Embassy in the

early hours of the invasion and finally requested U.S. help; by

then it was far too late.

There was no doubt the pre dawn invasion of 2 August 1990 had

been calculated and coordinated well in advance. Nevertheless, by

no means was it a precision operation as suggested by some

analyst, Iraqi forces did have the advantage of surprise, only

because the Kuwait Government chose to ignore all the indicators.

From our perspective, it appeared as though they took the high-

speed avenue of approach, namely the Abdaly highway and rapidly

advanced south, completely bypassing and cutting off the northern

Kuwait 6th Brigade. Meeting only light resistance from the few

sparse elements of the Kuwait 35th Brigade and the Commando unit

located near Doha, they pressed the attack into Kuwait City only

to become bogged down. We figured they were in downtown Kuwait

City at approximately 0600hrs. They quickly became entangled for

several hours, before pushing south and consolidating their hold

on Kuwait. This gave the Kuwait airbases time to launch aircraft

and the southern 15th Brigade time to head for the Saudi border.

It is our belief that the perceived threat to Saudi Arabia was

largely due to Iraqi forces pursuing fleeing Kuwait army elements

into the neutral zone. We are lucky that Saddam Hussein and his

generals never realized the fact that the Saudi western province

was virtually defenseless. It would have been easy for him to

press the attack right into Dhahran since the Saudi Army only

lightly defended the area. Although he had probably reached his

culminating point at the Kuwait/Saudi border, several other facts

became apparent that indicated the lack of coordination required

to conduct an operation on this scale. First, radio and

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television remained operational until late evening 2 August.

Telephone communications, to include international calling also

remained operational and was never totally brought under Iraqi

control until late August. I placed several phone calls home on 2

August and received several international calls. Operationally,

attacks on the Amir's Bayan palace, Kuwaiti airfields, and other

key installations appeared to be uncoordinated and haphazard. We

were to find out later while detained in Baghdad that the

operation to seize the Amir of Kuwait had failed because Iraqi

planners failed to coordinate the one hour time difference

between Kuwait City and Baghdad, resulting in an uncoordinated

attack by Iraqi Special Forces units and Republican Guard ground

forces.

LTC Funk, Chief Forties, and I collectively had enough military

experience to make some observations of the vaunted Republican

Guard during the first week of the invasion. They by no means

reflected the discipline of a well-trained combat hardened army;

in fact during the first week they reflected the characteristics

of a motley force without orders and a total lack of basic

tactical tenants and discipline. For the most part Iraqi soldiers

milled around, scavenged for food and water, and seemed to be

generally at a loss for what to do next, often looting and

stealing bedding items for their hastily constructed fighting

position, complete with beach umbrellas for overhead protection

from the searing summer sun. Without a doubt, Saddam forces had

reached their logistics culminating point and his units would

have to live off the land. Fuel was not a problem, but food and

water would be scavenged from the locals. Within days of the

invasion, Iraqi forces occupied all the major supermarkets in

order to procure foodstocks. Kuwaitis where permitted entry, but

16

for males this could mean being taken into custody. This was

often true for westerners.

The first day of the invasion 2 August, our neighborhood

remained quiet until around 1300hrs when the Iraqis launched

their final assault on the Bayan palace just a few kilometers

from our quarters. Their artillery was positioned along Gulf road

and was now firing directly over our neighborhood. The Amiri

Guards at the Bayan palace put up a fight all morning. Their

return fire often landed in and around our neighborhood resulting

in many of our Kuwaiti neighbors fleeing the area. By 1400hrs,

Bayan Palace was captured, and I could see from my rooftop that

Iraqi armored forces had occupied the palace grounds. I spoke by

phone to COL Mooneyham several times while the assault on the

Palace was taking place. He had moved his family to the nearby

Japanese embassy to ensure their safehaven since his neighborhood

was being overrun with Iraqi forces. He was also instructed to go

to the Japanese embassy, but chose to remain in his quarters to

continue assisting other U.S. citizens via the telephone.

The day now seemed to creep by and we stayed glued to the radio

trying to listen to BBC and VOA. Both were broadcasting all the

Iraqi propaganda about turning Kuwait into a mass graveyard if

anyone intervened.

Meanwhile things at the embassy seemed to settle down a little,

but still an eerie tension was felt over the airwaves when

communicating or listening to the embassy. Everyone on the

outside began telephone networking with other Americans, trying

to calm fears, pass along factual information and compile

listings of Americans who were present in Kuwait.9

By the end of the day things began to quite down, but from my

rooftop I could observe that many of the Kuwaiti governmental

buildings were burning or smoldering. The highway (Fahaheel

17

expressway) was littered with wrecked or shot up cars. Occasional

gunfire could be heard and Iraqi mounted patrols were now

enforcing dusk to dawn curfew that had been broadcast both on

radio and television. The first TV broadcast the Iraqis began to

run was that the invasion was the result of a Kuwaiti coup that

had overthrown the ruling family for being corrupt and the new

government had requested the assistance of the Iraqi government.

Needless to say, the story did not wash.

By late afternoon, many Kuwait officers whom I had worked with

were still calling and asking for help. They were desperate and

at the national level, no command and control structure existed

any longer. Their hope was for members of USLOK to arrange for

U.S. military support. The Kuwait Land Force were by now gone or

nonfunctional as a coherent organization. If any resistance was

to be forthcoming, it was going to depend solely on individual

actions and initiatives.

The Iraqis slowly tighten their grip and continued the

propaganda campaign. As stated earlier, Chief Forties and LTC

Funk lived along Gulf road just south of the embassy and were

able to monitor the flow of troops and equipment as they headed

out of Kuwait City. On the third day of the invasion, Chief

Forties ventured out to the local Sultan center (a large western

style supermarket) which had been taken over by Iraqi soldiers.

He had heard from neighbors that the Iraqis were still allowing

controlled civilian access. The shoppers were in pandemonium and

staples were going fast. Chief returned to his quarters without

9 The US embassy maintained a Warden roster, similar to a military Non combatant evacuation (NEO) plan and had conducted a meeting with some of the Wardens the week prior to the invasion. Unfortunately in the rush to shred documents during the invasion the emergency evacuation plan was destroyed. In addition, the loss of the embassy phone lines by late evening 2 August complicated the situation.

18

incident but saw that the Iraqis were establishing check points

at all major road junctions. By this time the Kuwaitis and

westerners were all in a state of shock after seeing the country

fall so quickly and the international community at a stand off

with Saddam Hussein.

The embassy finally started responding to our radio calls. We

initiated procedures for daily call in checks and monitoring

windows. Through our monitoring of the embassy net we learned

that the Iraqi's had started systemic round up of westerners from

the major hotels and complexes that housed westerners. We also

learned that our British military counterparts had been rounded

up, specifically the ones that lived on a compound south of the

city near Fahaheel along the coast. Their senior officers

immediately went into hiding with Kuwaitis and managed to stay

hidden for four months. Two British Officers were seized by Iraqi

Secret Police; both were severely beaten, tortured, and interned

for several months. With this news, our situation, also being

military, became even more complicated. We all took measures to

hide our identities by destroying our identification cards,

military clothing, papers, or anything else that may link us to

the U.S. military. We felt we could rely on our diplomatic

passports and status to preclude us from arrest. This worked

initially because of several measures implemented for all

military personnel being assigned to high threat areas. We wore

civilian clothes on a daily basis, relaxed grooming standards and

we all lived scattered throughout Kuwait City (not lumped

together on a compound), and we were all assigned with diplomatic

passports and status. We also had a back-up means of

communications (portable radios) with the embassy. All this

contributed to our safety and the Iraqis inability to locate and

apprehended us.

19

My contact with a former Kuwaiti officer was a great help in

determining what was going on in and around the city. He would

come by our quarter's everyday bringing milk and diapers for our

children. Then he would tell me of the efforts underway within

Kuwaiti resistance. They had already begun to organize resistance

groups within neighborhoods. By 4 August, the Resistance had

started taking down street signs and house numbers to further

confuse the Iraqi special units that were canvassing

neighborhoods for westerners, high-ranking Kuwaiti officials, and

military officers. The Kuwaiti resistance groups were first

organized by groups of Shiite Kuwaitis. Since these Shiites

already had a somewhat underground bond and the Iraqis had

inadvertently freed the leading Shiite radicals from Kuwaiti

prison, they naturally banded together and immediately began

resisting the Iraqi invaders. The movement quickly caught on and

by mid-August, the Kuwaiti resistance was doing daily damage to

the Iraqi war machine. An interesting side note to this was the

fact that when the Iraqis deployed around the city, they were in

a perimeter facing outward toward the sea as if to thwart an

amphibious attack. However, after the resistance began their

drive by shooting and fire bombing campaign on the positions

facing outward, the Iraqis quickly reversed all the position so

that they now were facing inward towards the city with their

backs to the sea for self-protection.

By 5 August, we all realized we were stuck and no political

solution was going to change the current situation anytime soon.

Saddam Hussein was employing all the classic bluffs we have

become all too familiar with, and the world community was taken

in by the Iraqi smoke screen.

Telephone lines were either out or being monitored by the

Iraqis, so communications were becoming much more difficult and

20

risky. The U.S. embassy established a radio net by providing the

other embassies around town with spare radios it had on hand.

These established a somewhat secure means to exchange information

on the situation around town and maintain contact with us.

The flow of refugees and westerners to Saudi Arabia, either

through the border crossing or across the desert had all but

ceased by 11 August. The Iraqis began sealing the border,

trapping those who had not taken advantage of the early confusion

following the invasion. All embassies, Voice of America and BBC

radio broadcast were now advising all western nationals to stay

put in their homes. We all knew now that we were in for the long

haul. Being part of a military organization gave us the edge in

dealing with this situation; even our family members seemed

better prepared to deal the uncertainty and fear. They had now

experienced the horrors of war first hand, and had their baptism

of fire. I guess we all knew from tours in places like Germany

and Korea that war was a distinct possibility and you always had

that hidden thought process on what to do if the proverbial

balloon went up. Our challenge now was to help calm the fears of

the many American civilians we were now communicating with.

The USLOK organization kept a tight telephone network going

during that first week, but our contacts with each other dwindled

when the embassy staff ordered several of our members into the

Japanese embassy for safehaven. Our Chief of USLOK was ordered

there also but refused to go, opting to send his family, while he

remained home to continue the network with the trapped U.S.

citizens. Most of the embassy staff lived in close proximity to

the embassy and therefore the majority of the staff and their

families had relocated into the embassy compound for safehaven by

3 August. In addition, on 3 August we monitored via VOA radio

broadcast that Saddam Hussein had declared he would make the

21

Arabian Gulf "a graveyard for all those who think of committing

aggression, starting with these cowardly American navies." The

broadcast also applauded the "glorious national uprising in

Kuwait." I also noted in my diary a broadcast from 5 August

"Provisional Government of Kuwait warns outside countries to

remember that they have interest and nationals in Kuwait and if

they resort to punitive measures their nationals would suffer

gravely." This type of radio broadcast became particularly

troublesome for all the foreign nationals trapped in Kuwait. LTC

Tom Funk and I would spend many hours conversing with American

citizens on the phone trying to calm their fears and reassure

them that the U.S. would eventually come to our aid.

As word continued to spread of Iraqi soldiers looting and

rounding up westerners, we continued our escape planning and

actions should Iraqi officials show up at our door. A real morale

booster occurred when we heard on the short wave radio that the

Saudis had asked for U.S. help and an USAF Fighter Squadron and

the 82nd Airborne were now on the way.

Meanwhile we heard on Iraqi radio that Saddam had told the

U.S.Charge' in Baghdad that the occupation of Kuwait is

irreversible. Then we hear of UN Security Council Resolution 661

imposing mandatory economic sanctions against Iraq. This becomes

the "tic for tat" diplomacy that evolves in the upcoming months.

Usually good news followed by more bad news.

BELEAGUEREDNow the U.S. and British embassies were reporting over the

radio net that westerners were being rounded up and transported

to Baghdad, Iraq. Ambassador Howell made the decision for all of

us to prepare to relocate into the U.S. embassy compound for

diplomatic safehaven. On the evening of 6 August, LTC Funk

22

telephoned about how to handle breaking off the telephone network

with the U.S. citizens who have come to depend on us for

information and guidance. One US citizen whom I had been working

with decided to come to my villa, obtain one of the spare

Motorola radios I had so he could monitor the embassy, and keep

his American network informed. Once he arrives the next morning 7

August, I told him how to use the radio and briefed him on some

possible escape routes. LTC Funk also coordinates for another

citizen to send an itemized list of Americans over to me since

the family and I will be heading into the embassy ahead of him. I

had received a radio transmission the evening of 6 August and was

told to prepare to relocate into the embassy, and to bring all

the foodstuffs we could get into the car. My family and I

prepared for the potentially hazardous trip into the embassy,

which was some 12 kms from our quarters, right through downtown

Kuwait. We all knew there would be Iraqi roadblocks to traverse

and the embassy was encircled by Iraqi troops. We had also

monitored over the radio several other families drive into the

embassy and so far, they had all made it without incident. When

early morning 7 August came we received no instructions to leave,

so we continued our routine of inventorying our property. We

would only be allowed two pieces of luggage, so we had to decide

what we could carry out and what had to be left behind. This was

a difficult task and still impacts our lives today. We also heard

from VOA that Saddam vows to "pluck out the eyes" of anyone who

attacks Iraq, he went on to argue that the invasion was designed

to correct the flawed borders drawn by imperialist powers.

At approximately 1130hrs a civilian man, westerner in

appearance showed up at our villa gate, announced he is from the

U.S. Embassy, and had come to escort us in. I had been assigned

at the embassy for a year and I knew all the personnel assigned

23

to the post, and I did not recognize this individual. I

immediately radioed the embassy and they verified his identity. I

then recognized the foreign national driver who was with him, so

once we got that straighten out I called CW3 Gene Lord, a close

neighbor to coordinate a link-up with him and his family so that

we all could convoy in together. The USLOK administrative NCO,

who was a neighbor of ours, also joined in the trek into the

embassy. We began our journey into the embassy with great

trepidation of what was waiting for us. Our plan was to use the

foodstuffs, cigarettes, and alcohol as bribes to get through the

roadblock. I had also taken the precaution to hide the American

citizen listing that had been brought to me. The list contained

over 500 names and addresses of U.S. citizens living and working

in Kuwait. As we pulled out of the Salwa neighborhood, my wife

and children were shocked at the destruction that was so close to

our house, now they could understand all the shelling, booming

and rattling of windows for two days and most importantly why

they had to remain away from windows. As we rode in, almost every

official Kuwait government building along the route had been

shelled, torched, or destroyed. Wrecked and smoldering vehicles

littered the highway some with the charred remains present. The

once well manicured and green medians were now brown, dried up

and trashed. As we came to First ring road Iraqi soldiers and

tracked vehicles formed a checkpoint but our lead vehicle, with

the Palestinian foreign national who worked for the embassy,

spoke with what appeared to be an Iraqi officer. After the brief

stop and exchange, the Iraqi road guards waved us through. We

turned off First ring just short of the Kuwait International

hotel and down a back street to the embassy's rear entrance.

Iraqi soldiers and combat vehicles had the entire compound

surrounded. Strangely, the Iraqis were now manning the guard post

24

the Kuwaiti National Guard troops had previously occupied. Our

embassy foreign nationals told me that the Kuwaiti guards

literally stripped off their uniforms and fled when they spotted

the Iraqis on the morning of 2 August. We were allowed to proceed

and the anxiety did not subside until we crossed over the steel

barrier gate and into the enclosed parking lot. The embassy

security officer informed us that we would be billeted in the

Marine house. This was the small complex used as the living

compound for the five Marine guards stationed at the embassy.

They were now living and working full-time in the Chancellery

building, since some twenty families now occupied their quarters.

After unloading the car, we carried our bags to an athletic

storage room we had been assigned. I then proceeded to the

Chancellery building, specifically, the USLOK administrative

offices. The place was in a shambles, in the Chief's office an

U.S. CENTCOM messenger was asleep on the couch and the USLOK

administrative NCO was sitting behind the Chief’s desk eating a

MRE. I asked SFC Vellekoop who was in charge, and what was the

current situation. He started to answer, when a Navy LT.CDR

Schwarz, who was a TDY officer, came in and stated he was in

charge. Since he was not an actual member of USLOK, I challenged

his authority. He promptly went to the Deputy Charge of Mission

(DCM), second in charge after the ambassador. She immediately

summoned me to her office where she proceeded to tell me that the

military chain of command was no longer valid and I now worked

for the State Department and the USLOK organization was defunct.

I returned to the USLOK office where the CENTCOM courier and

the USN TDY officer informed me that the communications link with

CENTCOM was compartmentalized classification and no one from

USLOK would be permitted access. I have since learned from books

by Gen. Schwarzkopf's, "It Doesn't Take A Hero" and US News and

25

World Report, "Triumph Without Victory" that Maj. John Feeley

(CENTCOM courier) had used the communication link as a means to

report information in the context of first hand knowledge. They

were using the communications link to CENTCOM to send

intelligence reports that were collected by the USLOK team and

others. Interestingly enough, Maj. Feeley had never left the

embassy Chancellery building once he ran across the street from

the Kuwait International hotel in the early morning hours of 2

August 90. Nevertheless, he is quoted in the two referenced books

as being the sole source from inside Kuwait and was recognized by

Gen. Schwarzkopf as a hero and received an Army Legion of Merit

for his actions. This was unsettling to the members of USLOK who

knew that Maj. Feeley's actions were highly questionable and

based almost solely on the actions, information and risk taken by

the USLOK members and other embassy staff. We all recognize the

fact that Maj. Feeley did the right thing by contacting U.S.

CENTCOM, but what we object to, is he alone took credit or was

given credit for all intelligence gathering, when in fact he took

little to no risks and never ventured outside the compound during

our beleaguered status in Kuwaiti. The two referenced books give

a false picture of how the actual collecting of HUMINT was taking

place and leads the reader to believe that Feeley alone was the

sole source for vital intelligence.

Since we never saw the reports that Feeley and Schwarz sent,

there seems to be some question as to just what they reported and

who they attributed the collected information.10 Since we had

become disgusted with the actions of Feeley, we used an

alternative source to pass HUMINT, the embassy chief of station

(COS), who was much more receptive and knowledgeable of the real

situation. His office had begun continuous operations just prior

to the invasion and maintained this until ordered to leave the

26

embassy on 23 August. Moreover, we felt he would ensure vital

information was accurate and reached the appropriate intelligence

levels.

I briefed LTC Funk when he arrived on what was going on with

the situation in the USLOK office and with the DCM. He ran into

the same story that I did in his meeting with the DCM and Maj.

Feeley.

We still had half of our USLOK member's safehavened at the

Japanese embassy, to include our USLOK Chief. LTC Funk decided to

organize the group that was present. Using the offices not

occupied by Feeley, we began to assess the situation. The first

thing we noticed was that the USLOK Assistance Administrative NCO

had failed to destroy and shred all the USLOK classified files.

It was disturbing to find that all the personnel files complete

with strip maps to our quarters were still intact. If the embassy

had been taken, the Iraqis would have had a wealth of information

on our organization and the location of all USLOK personnel. We

immediately shredded all classified files contained in four

filing cabinets.

The evening of 8 August we got an ugly reminder that the Iraqis

had the compound surrounded. At 2045hrs automatic weapons fire

began arching over the embassy compound. The Marine guards

10 The intent is not self-serving, but merely an attempt to set the record straight. As stated, Feeley did the right thing in getting the intelligence to CENTCOM. However, in both books, he is identified as the sole source and this is a misrepresentation of the facts. Feeley merely reported the intelligence with his personal spin on it. This would also be the case once when we got to Baghdad. From our point of view Feeley and Schwatz had taken very little risk when compared to the USLOK team members. Another troubling piece of information cited in Triump without Victory, is the assertion that Feeley is the sole Middle Eastern expert at the embassy. The truth was Chief Forties had the most expertise, he spoke Arabic, and had been in Kuwait for over three years and had previous military tours to Morocco and Lebanon. In reality, Feeley had practically no Middle Eastern experience or expertise.

27

immediately alerted everyone to head for the Chancellery vault.

Apparently, the embassy was being caught in a crossfire between

Iraqis and Kuwaiti resistance fighters. However now the feeling

was the Iraqis were attempting to take the compound. Once in the

vault Chief Forties and I realized that there were no embassy or

USLOK personnel at the Marine house in which most of the women

and children were being housed. We asked the Ambassador for

permission to leave the vault and go to the Marine House. He

approved and we headed out of the Chancellery building. The

weapons firing had slacken but tracers were still criss-crossing

over the compound. We raced across the compound, once inside the

Marine house we noticed the wives had followed the instruction we

had given to them, turn off all lights and assemble everyone in

the game room for safety. Most had settled down; but several

Filipino maids were in a state of hysteria and it took several

minutes to calm them down, their fear was particularly unsettling

for the children.

Immediately following this event, the Ambassador ordered the

Marine Guards out of uniform and instructed the embassy security

officer Chip Bender to destroy all weapons and the USLOK secure

communications. The COS refused to destroy his secure

communications links, as was his right to do so, since secure

communications remain under the agency and not DOS. We were never

given a reason for this action, but speculated that the

Ambassador did not want to give the Iraqis any reason to take the

compound. As for the USLOK communications equipment, we suspected

the Ambassador was not pleased with information being sent out of

the embassy without his approval. It was also believed that if

the Iraqis were to enter the compound by force the Ambassador was

going to surrender, instead of making a futile attempt to defend

the embassy.

28

By 13 August the remainder of the USLOK team had made it to the

compound. We thought finally, COL Mooneyham would square away

Feeley and Schwarz and then get things in order again. I never

knew the whole story, but for some reason after COL Mooneyham

arrived the Ambassador would not permit him to do anything. So,

we continued at the task at hand to at least organize things

around the compound and continue our efforts to find and collect

food. USLOK followed the old military standards of continuously

improving on your defensive posture.

LOGISTICS Since we were now faced a potential food crisis within the

compound, we took it upon ourselves (USLOK) to get things

organized, since guidance was not forthcoming. This was not an

easy task since most of the DOS staff and family members had no

training or background experiences for dealing with crisis

situations, most of the male DOS staff did not even have prior

military experiences. This also carried over to the spouses; many

DOS spouse felt the military spouse would know what to do and how

to handle the situation. The embassy Security officer Chip Binder

was the most organized and experience DOS staff member but even

he was having a difficult time dealing with the Ambassador’s

immediate staff. Binder had done an exemplary job at controlling

the Marine guards and organizing the Chancellery for the worst

case scenario. However, outside the Chancellery the compound had

turned into a lose organization with no structure or plan for

surviving a potential assault or siege.

The initial compound occupants (2-7 August) had all but

exhausted what food was available from the embassy snack bar and

Marine MREs. LTC Funk, Chief Forties, and I met to discuss the

situation within the embassy compound on 8 August. LTC Funk,

29

Chief, and I first determined that we needed a structured

organization. LTC Funk would man the USLOK office and coordinate

actions with the embassy staff, Chief who had the most experience

in Kuwait and over three years knowledge of the city and country

would handle class I (food) supplies, I would assist Dave and do

operations and plans. We had three priorities right off:

First was to get the food stocks built. We were down to

virtually nothing and personnel were continuing to come into the

embassy grounds.

Second the buildings housing the families and children needed

to be fortified.

Third, we had to develop contingency plans for possible

rescue operations, evacuation, or exfiltration.

We all set out to accomplish various tasks in a coordinated

manner. The military personnel kept each other informed on the

projects we were working on a day to day basis. Chief Forties was

the only military besides LTC Funk who attended the Ambassador’s

country meetings. These meetings did not offer much in the way of

guidance, information, or comfort to community at large, but

primarily served as a means to let the Ambassador know that

something was being done for everyone. In fact, we all had to

demand that the Ambassador or his DCM tell us as a group what was

going on. On one occasion, the Ambassador told us that we knew as

much as he did because we were still able to watch CNN off the

satellite dish in the embassy compound.

As we began to organize things, the wives (majority military

spouses) took on the task of preparing meals and running the

living quarters. Two principle buildings were used to house all

the people present in the compound, but we literally had people

sleeping everywhere from offices, meeting rooms, and storage

rooms. Some 175 people with children and pets were occupying a

30

compound designed to only to quarter the Ambassador and a 6 man

Marine detachment. The COS wife ran the kitchen and meals for the

residence and personnel working 24-hour shifts in the Chancellery

and several military wives ran the operation in the Marine house.

Chief Forties and I would survey the two kitchens and the stocks

in the snack bar and make a list of what foodstocks we needed to

obtain when we went out on a foraging around the city for food

supplies. Chief knew his way around and I would ride shotgun for

him.

We had over 175 people to feed daily. Each morning Chief

Forties and I would set out in his Chevy Blazer to canvas Kuwait

City for foodstocks. Chief had several Kuwaiti contacts that

helped arrange a clandestine meeting with the Kuwaiti who owned

the largest supermarket chain in Kuwait, know as the Sultan

Center. The Kuwaiti owner had gone underground and was attempting

to get his assets out of Kuwait before the Iraqis could find

them. After several days, we finally managed to link up with him

at a discrete location. We then followed him to an underground

warehouse in the vicinity of the Kuwait International Airport.

Chief Forties struck a deal with him for credit payment via the

State Department, but we had to act quickly since it was only a

matter of a few days or a week at best before the Iraqis would

discover the warehouse. That evening, the Ambassador agreed to

Chief's plan and payment was arranged.11 We returned the next day

and surveyed the warehouse; the primary foodstocks consisted of

canned tuna and frozen turkeys. We also took everything he had in

the way of medical supplies, paper products, canned drinks, and

cereals. Most of the products where near the limit of there shelf

11 During the first day of the invasion, all US currency on hand in the Embassy was shredded. The Ambassador through cable message traffic had DOS transfer funds to Mr.Sultan's stateside banking account.

31

life or had recently expired dates. We spent several days hauling

the food stocks to the Embassy. During one of our last visits an

Iraqi patrol showed up at the underground entranceway, the

Kuwaitis quickly moved us to a back storage area, bribed the

patrol with Pepsi cola, and canned tuna. Shortly after our last

trip to the warehouse, the owner decided to abandon it and make

his way out of Kuwait. We had one day left to get all we could

from the warehouse. Chief Forties briefed the Ambassador on the

situation and we got the approval to make one last run using the

embassy's stake bed truck, which could haul three times the

amount of the Blazer. We rounded up tarps to cover the cargo and

made three trips. During our last trip back we were stopped at an

Iraqi checkpoint, we managed to convince the guards that this was

a relief mission to the Philippine Embassy, and handed them some

cigarettes, they agreed to let us pass. We did in fact make one

additional run for the Philippine embassy, since they had

literally several thousand Philippine nationals camped outside

their embassy compound. By the time of our departure for Baghdad

on 23 August we had sufficiently stocked the embassy with several

months worth of tuna and frozen turkeys. Chief had also managed

to acquire a dozen or so 50 lbs. bags of rice and some beef from

his contacts at various hotels. The wives prepared three meals a

day, light breakfast of cereals, and fruit juices, tuna salad for

lunch, and boiled turkey for evening meal. Children were fed

first and then adults, no food was thrown out. Adults ate all the

children's leftovers or it was used for the next meal. Fresh

vegetables and fruit were the hardest to find and usually only in

small quantities. We managed with what we had and many lost

weight due to the unbalanced meals and stress. I myself had lost

over 10 lbs. since 2 August.

32

With the approaching Iraqi deadline of 23 August to close all

foreign embassies in Kuwait, Chief Forties and I made our last

logistics run on 22 August. During that trip, we noticed the

Iraqis were in the process of withdrawing the Republican Guards

and replacing them with reserve units from Iraq. This swap out

occurred over a three-day period and we observed convoys headed

back to Iraq with the spoils of war. We saw hundreds of cars from

Kuwaiti car dealerships being transported on Iraqi HETs, T-72s

towing boats from the Kuwaiti yacht basin, and military trucks

loaded down with booty. In less than two weeks the Republican

Guards had collected their war booty and were now headed home

with the spoils of the crushing defeat of the Kuwaitis.

We made one last inventory of foodstocks and briefed the DCM on

where and how food was cached on the compound. We felt the stay

behinds; some 20-30 people would have enough food for at least

six months, not much variety, but at least subsistence. Since we

knew that on 23 August the Iraqis would cut off water and power,

the wives pre-cooked as many turkeys as time would permit. The

compound had a generator with a 500-gal tank and we managed to

scrounge a few 55-gal drums of diesel for extra fuel.

Just prior to our departure on 23 August, we also filled every

empty container with water. When the Iraqis eventually cut the

power and water lines, they missed an old water line so the

embassy was able to retain one small line of fresh water that

they could use for drinking. Pool water and stored water would

later be used for cooking, bathing and operating the toilets.

LTC Rhoi Maney and Chief Durmon anticipated the need for

additional refrigeration and went out to various USLOK quarters

and removed freezers and refrigerators, along with whatever food

was left in the homes. Chief Lord and MSGT Allen began working on

fortifying the buildings the families were all housed in. They

33

covered over windows, placed barricading materials near potential

entry ways, organized and designated an area were families could

move to in the event of shelling or gun fire into the compound.

They also began conducting motor stables on all vehicles in the

compound and cross leveling of tires, batteries, tools, and other

vehicle items in the event, we had to make a hasty escape

overland by automobile.

By now, all of the embassy staff and USLOK personnel had made

it to the embassy for safehaven. The compound had grown to some

175 personnel. Small quantities of American citizens were allowed

into the compound, primarily those with skills the embassy

thought were needed to sustain embassy operations. The largest

group permitted in was a number of Americans who had been

stranded at the Kuwait International Airport. All other Americans

who had been living and working in Kuwait were told to stay home

and stay tuned to their radios for information from Voice of

America and BBC broadcast. This was much the same story at the

other western embassy that had large populations living and

working in Kuwait.

On the political and diplomatic side, 8 August turned out to be

a watershed day; President Bush announced that "a line has been

drawn in the sand”, Iraq now has over 200,000 troops in Kuwait

and declares Kuwait is the 19th Providence…”eternal merger…will

be the pride of the Arabs." The UN also passes Resolution 662

null and voiding the Iraqi claim on Kuwait. Iraq also sends

notification to all embassies in Kuwait that the borders are

sealed and all diplomatic missions must close by 24 August 1990.

We now begin to realize that we are all truly beleaguered, so we

shifted our focus to sustaining the compound and protecting

ourselves from possible Iraqi seizure of the compound.

34

During all our foraging we would return each day and debrief

the embassy COS and provided CENTCOM with reports on what we had

seen and located. We also linked into the Kuwaiti underground via

our contacts with several Kuwaiti nationals. One in particular,

named Adel Safar, was brought into the embassy for debriefs.

Through Adel we also shared information and provided him with

techniques for sabotaging Iraqi equipment and positions. Kuwaiti

Resistance grew stronger everyday and by September, they were

well-organized and inflicting daily damage to the Iraqi war

machine. They also were key players in hiding and aiding many of

the trapped foreign nationals. I personally knew several British

Officers who were hidden by Kuwaiti Resistance for four months

and then secretly turned over when all trapped foreign nationals

were allowed to depart Kuwait and Iraq in mid December 1990.

On the lighter side, Chief Forties had been asked by the DCM to

go to her quarters just outside the compound and obtain some

additional clothing for her. While in her quarters he could see

were Iraqi soldiers had entered and attempted to make a meal in

the kitchen. A frying pan was on the stove and next to it was an

empty box of Gaines Burger dog patties. Apparently the Iraqis had

mistaken the Gaines burgers for hamburger patties and fried them

in the skillet for a quick meal.

Ambassador Howell notes in The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait:

American Reflections, "that the Kuwait embassy out lasted the

longest embassy siege on record "55 Days at Peking".12 I would

like to think that the food collection efforts of Dave Forties

and myself was the major contributing factor to sustaining the

Embassy during the Iraqi siege. No small task, after almost three 12 Richard P. Stevens, editor, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait:

American Reflections, International Education and Communications Group, Washington D.C. April 1993, a composite of various stories by Americans that were trapped in Kuwait and Iraq during the crisis.

35

weeks of foraging, scrounging and arranging food pick-ups, we

acquired hundreds of cases of tuna, rice, canned goods, and

medical supplies. Done at daily risk of avoiding Iraqi

checkpoints, roadblocks and roaming bands of Iraqi soldiers and

repeated the same feat while detained in Baghdad, Iraq.

THE ROAD TO BAGHDAD Ambassador Howell informed us that a deal was in the works to

get all nonessential personnel out by 24 August, but we would

have to go to Baghdad to obtain exit visas. We also learned on 20

August that President Bush had declared all trapped U.S. citizens

as "Hostages." He also issued a stern warning to Iraq "that the

U.S. Government will not tolerate any further mistreatment of

American citizens.” We knew from radio news reports that

Americans were being rounded up and the Iraqi Foreign Minister

Aziz stated that these were precautionary measures to prevent

attack on Iraq. At this point, the "Human Shield" episode began

and Iraq began systematically rounding up and placing foreign

nationals at various "strategic" sites throughout Iraq and

Kuwait. We all knew that at some point we would be required to

leave either in our vehicles or taken by the Iraqis. That being

the case USLOK took the lead for developing evacuation and convoy

plans. We immediately organized all the vehicles on the compound,

checked over each vehicle, and began making first aid kits and

food packages for each car. Water was a prime concern and we used

all available receptacles for water bottles and placed several

gallons in each car. We took one other measure by marking all the

roofs of the vehicles with an X made of a reflective type of duct

tape. We transmitted that back to Washington so that overhead

satellites could spot our vehicles along the congested route to

Baghdad. COL Mooneyham called a meeting for all military and we

36

discussed our duties and obligations as military officers in

regards to the Code of Conduct. He also issued guidance to all of

us regarding our status. His words were reassuring, but ominous

in a strange way, because we had no idea of what lay ahead.

By 22 August the British, Japanese, and French begin to

evacuate their nonessential personnel. Baghdad issued another

warning to the US embassy on 23 August stating "that failure to

close embassy will be considered and act of war." We also notice

an increase of Iraqi troops and tanks surrounding our embassy.

The Iraqis then inform the Ambassador that on the morning of 24

August they will cut off all power and water to the embassy.

On the evening of 22 August, LTC Funk and I briefed our plans

and convoy route to the Ambassador, after he approved it we

briefed each driver and arranged the cars for our early morning

departure. Everyone was rounded up around 0230hrs 23 August and

told prepare to leave. We were told an Iraqi official would come

to the embassy and provide escort to Baghdad. Finally around

0300hrs and Iraqi Army officer appeared at the back gate and told

the Ambassador that he had instructions to allow 57 personnel to

depart. That was incorrect and the Ambassador pointed out that it

was to be 57 diplomats and their dependents. The Iraqi official

would have no part of that - his orders said 57 and 57 was all he

would take. At that point, the Ambassador called off the convoy.

He communicated this to State Department and everyone went back

to bed. By 0600 hrs we got word that an U.S. diplomat from the

American embassy in Baghdad would be arriving to provide escort

for us to Baghdad. Around 0900hrs, he showed up and we hastily

gathered women, children and pets for a rapid departure before

the Iraqis change their minds. Ambassador Howell decided to

escort us to the border with Iraq. The Ambassador led the first

serial with his Black Cadillac complete with US flags flying. The

37

U.S. diplomat from Baghdad led the second serial. The others

followed, but the Ambassador had set to fast a pace and the

convoy was strung out. Now on the road to Baghdad, all 23

vehicles with families, food, and pets are headed for Baghdad,

Iraq. I might point that some of the pets did not survive the

ordeal and died from heat exhaustion. Ambassador Howell had

requested we take his dog, unfortunately it succumbed from the

extreme heat. One area we failed to brief everyone on was the

conditions outside the embassy. Most people had been inside the

compound since the first week of August and did see all the

destruction and large concentration of Iraqi soldiers and

equipment, therefore as they drove towards the border many

drivers did not focus on the convoy and attempted to view their

surroundings. This resulted in a terrible rear end collision as

the convoy "yo-yo" effect took hold. Three of our cars collided

with each other when our COS swerved to avoid hitting an Iraqi

soldier who had jump out into the roadway waving an AKM (rifle).

The car behind him immediately braked and was rear-ended by the

trailing car resulting in several injuries, one serious enough to

warrant immediate medical attention. LTC Tom Funk and Marine

Hudson got to the accident scene and treated the victims. Tom

realized that the seriously injured woman required immediate

medical attention. At that point Tom and the Marine made the

decision to load her in their car along with her husband and

headed back to the embassy where a doctor was present. The doctor

at the embassy diagnosed her to have a broken hip and told Tom

she would have to go to a Kuwaiti hospital, (which are now

occupied by Iraqis). They got her there and in to see a doctor,

at that point Tom and the Marine slipped out of the hospital and

drove to catch up with the convoy.

38

The rest of us finally made it to the border crossing at

Safwan, after four grueling hours of stop and go traffic, caused

by military convoys, which had priority on the roads. Once at the

border crossing Ambassador Howell was made to return to the

embassy. Iraqi officials met us and refused to allow us to park

our vehicles in the shaded area along side the customs building,

instead we all had to park on the huge asphalt parking lot with

no cover. Temperature that day was in excess of 120 degrees and

the black asphalt pavement made it soared well above 120 degrees.

Now we began another four-hour ordeal of checking passports,

cars, questions, and phone calls to Baghdad. We sat in the

parking lot with engines idling to keep the car air conditioners

running, but after an hour or so most cars began overheating and

we had to shut off all the cars. Our concern now was for the

women, children, babies, and pets that were with us. The heat was

oppressive and many were beginning to show signs of heat

exhaustion. Using our drinking water, we continuously poured

water on the children and babies to keep them cool. As this

situation began to worsen, we finally appealed to the Iraqis to

allow us to move under the shade area. It was interesting to note

that only Americans and third country nationals (TCN) were being

treated so harshly. While many of the European nationals

particularly the ones that had not yet committed to condemning

Iraq were permit quick passage and no harassment.

Finally, after four hours, we are permitted to depart for

Baghdad. As we left Safwan one embassy official decides to lead

his serial into a gas station a few kilometers from the border

crossing. They ended up getting stuck by Iraqi military vehicles.

The remaining convoy pulled off the road to wait for them. After

thirty minutes columns of Iraqi foot soldiers begin route

stepping by our vehicles parked along side the road and as they

39

passed, they begin banging on our cars. Fearing this situation

could get ugly myself and a few others walk back to the gas

station to tell the DOS person in charge that we are going to

drive further down the road and will wait for them at a

checkpoint we had established on our convoy maps. He reluctantly

agreed and half the convoy departed for a checkpoint just south

of Nasiryah. Nasiryah had been the planned first fuel stop so as

we waited we topped off all our vehicles. Almost two hours passed

and still no sign of the remaining convoy so we decide to press

on to the checkpoint outside of Nasiryah. While waiting outside

Nasiryah, droves of Iraqi citizen's start coming out of their

homes. They came up to our cars and start trying to look in the

cars, and tapping on windows. Finally some four hours later the

remaining convoy caught up with us. We had all now been up since

0300hrs and it is nearing 1800hrs. The traffic had thinned out

and as we passed several Iraqi military camps. It was easy to

tell they were all abandoned. We reached the next major city

Samawah around 2100 hrs and are stopped at the outskirts by Iraqi

military checkpoint. We wait an hour or so for them to get the OK

from Baghdad to allow us to proceed on. They escorted us through

the city and the convoy again got split up due to traffic. We

stopped outside of Samawah and waited another hour to reassemble

the convoy before heading on. We were still several hours from

Baghdad. Most drivers are near exhaustion from no sleep, and many

of us were operating on pure adrenaline. We stopped one more time

at Diwaniyah for fuel and a short rest, at that point I had my

wife take over driving, the children were asleep and I was at the

point to where I could no longer drive safely. Chris agreed and

drove the final 50 kms to Baghdad. As we neared the outskirts of

Baghdad (0130hrs 24 August) the road turned into a four-lane

highway. As we enter the highway, we see the Charge of the U.S.

40

embassy Iraq alongside the road. Charge Joe Wilson escorts us all

into the embassy compound in downtown Baghdad. His remaining

staff of 6-8 personnel help get all the vehicles lined up along

the street and quickly began getting people to the staff resident

quarters for sleep. The Embassy in Baghdad was a small three

story building without a wall or security fence around it, so our

vehicles with our belongings had to be left parked on the street

curb. The foreign nationals that worked for the U.S. embassy

guarded our vehicles until morning. The embassy collected our

passports and we all went to various quarters where everyone

literally crashed.

Around 0900hrs 24 August, we were all awakened and told the

news that there was a glitch and we might not be allowed to

proceed on to Jordan. With that news, everyone went back too

sleep, to exhausted to do anything else. The Charge made no

progress with the Iraqis all that day. Apparently, they informed

him that the US had reneged on the deal and was keeping the

embassy in Kuwait open, therefore we would not be allowed to

leave until the US closed the embassy in Kuwait. We all knew that

would never happen. That evening the Charge organized a get-

together at the empty Marine house. Once everyone was assembled,

there he informed us that DOS was working the problem, but to

hunker down and wait it out. Now everything seemed like deja vu,

except this time we were in Baghdad. Needless to say, we nearly

cleaned out the Marine House liquor locker and everyone let off a

little pressure.

WOMEN AND CHILDREN - FIRSTThe evening of 24 August almost seemed surreal. Families

gathered and discussed all the “what ifs” of the current

situation. We knew we were stuck again, except now we were all

41

trapped right in the heart of enemy territory, downtown Baghdad,

Iraq. We had not heard any news since leaving Kuwait on 23

August. The Charge had told us that so far, Ambassador Howell and

his stay-behind crew were still safe and the Iraqis had made no

overt moves to close the embassy. Several news reporters were

allowed into the Marine house and we all spent time talking with

them about conditions inside Kuwait and requested that they not

reveal that 11 of us were military personnel. We had already been

told that the Iraqis were requesting that all military be turned

over to them. Fortunately we all had diplomatic passports and

were on the accredited list of the Kuwait Ministry of Foreign

Affairs as US Embassy personnel. We did have a couple of military

TDY personnel whom we covered by preparing documentation

attesting to the loss of their diplomatic passports, so far it

had worked. The reporters by and large were very good about

protecting our status and as I recall, they never revealed our

presence in any news reports.

As dawn approached on the 26 August, COL Mooneyham met with

all of us and informed us that arrangements were underway to

allow the women and children to leave, but some of us may have to

drive them to the Iraqi border at Zakhu, Turkey. The Charge had

gotten word that the route to Jordan and the border area there

was a total shambles with thousands of refugees massed in the

border area. Safety being our prime concern, it was decided that

the Zakhu border crossing in Turkey was less threatening and a

safer place for exiting Iraq. We went to work preparing the cars

again and organizing another convoy. By late evening, 26 August,

the Charge informed us that the Iraqis had agreed to release the

women and children, but refused to provide escort or assistance

in getting to the border. They also refused to allow any of the

personnel from Kuwait (males) to accompany them. We had to brief

42

the women on driving and designated pairs to travel together. We

were permitted to have a few embassy foreign nationals lead the

convoy and assist at the border. We also decided to send the

stake bed truck to carry the luggage and some pets.

At 0230 hrs 27 August we all assembled at the embassy

compound to load cars, review the route and say our farewells.

That early morning farewell was the hardest good-bye I had ever

had with my family. To make matters worst it was our wedding

anniversary. Nevertheless, my wife, children, and I hugged and

kissed one another a last time before the signal to leave was

given. I was devastated, but had a sense of well being; knowing

they would make it home safely and I would not have worry about

them being stuck in Baghdad, Iraq. Although we all had tremendous

apprehension over their journey to the Turkish border, we all

felt a certain relief in knowing the women and children were

getting out. What we did not know was the ordeal they would

endure on their 18-hour drive to the border crossing.

Once they were underway, we all went back to raid the Marine

house liquor locker one last time. Their convoy endured an 18-

hour trek complete with Iraqi harassment and stall tactics. My

wife (Chris) related one humorous story from her ordeal. Our

youngest at the time still in diapers had to be changed while

driving, so our oldest daughter Natasha (7yrs) would change her

and then Chris took the soiled diaper and threw it out the window

of the car, Natasha complained to her mother that littering was

bad, Chris quickly retorted “ it was perfectly OK to litter in

this country (Iraq), but nowhere else.” It was remarkable how

these women meet every obstacle and completed their journey with

pride, dignity, and purpose. Three male teenagers who were 18 or

older were not allowed to cross and were returned to Baghdad.

43

Iraqi law considered them adults so they were not allowed to

leave.

We sat on pins and needles until we finally got the word that

they were under US control and on the way to the NATO base at

Diyarbakir, Turkey. They finally made it to the US on 29 August

on a specially chartered 747 out of Incirlick, Turkey and touched

down at Andrews Air Force Base the afternoon of 29 August. We

learned later that when they arrived at the border the Iraqis

detained them for 3 hours. While detained at the border the

Iraqis informed them that all vehicles without diplomatic plates

would not be allowed to cross. They then had to remove all

belongs from those vehicles and reload the cars with diplomatic

plates. They then drew straws among the women who could operate

standard shift to see who would drive the embassy stake bed truck

across the border, a daunting task considering the circumstances.

Once permitted to leave, they started towards the bridge across

no mans land, the Iraqis stop them one more time and made them

get out of the cars and line up along the bridge guardrail, some

women panic, thinking the Iraqis were going to shoot them or beat

them before they would transverse the last 100 meters to freedom.

Their fears were warranted since many Arab men viewed western

women as loose and dirty. Their treatment was appalling

considering they all were carrying diplomatic passports. Finally,

by 0300hrs, they crossed over into Turkey where officials from

the US Embassy Turkey had arranged bus transport to the NATO base

at Diyarbakir. Their ordeal was finally over and they were now

under US control.

After we celebrated their return to freedom, we took on the

task of operating an evacuation center at the embassy for any

other American citizens (women & children only) whom might be

interested in departing Iraq. We usually processed 30-40 women

44

and children a day, most of whom had US passports and were

married to Iraqi citizens. In addition, by this time over 350,000

refugees had fled Kuwait and Iraq, most were Arabs, and Asians

third country nationals.

Thieves of Baghdad

On the evening of 30 August, Reverend Jesse Jackson came to

the embassy to meet with the Charge. He also requested a meeting

with all of us to inform us that he was going to meet with Saddam

Hussein in attempt to secure our freedom. We informed the Rev.

Jackson we wanted no part of his release plan if it involve

compromising US principles, position, or any requirements by us

to make statements. Needless to say, no one from Baghdad gained

release under Rev. Jackson's deal with Saddam Hussein. Rev.

Jackson did manage to get a few out from the American Embassy

Kuwait and the woman whom was injured during our convoy to

Baghdad. Prior to Rev. Jackson's departure, he met with us one

last time in an attempt to get us to understand the Iraqi

position vis-a-vis the rich Gulf Arab states. We argued with him

for an hour or so, and his group decided we were a hopeless cause

and they left. This would become a typical drill in the months

ahead as various foreign dignitaries came to Baghdad to get their

nationals released. It became so common place we referred to it

as "Bargaining for Bodies". Generally Saddam would release a few

to each dignitary who would issue a statement prior to his/her

departure condemning the US and UN resolutions.

We were increasingly becoming part of the politics of

diplomacy as the US embassy in Baghdad became the focal point of

both the US and Iraqi government's exchange of demarches,

political barbs, and views on the crisis at hand. We maintained

an open phone with State Department 24 hours a day and

45

established a 24-hour watch officer shift to monitor the phone

line. We used the phone to keep Washington and ourselves

instantly appraised of events as they unfold in Baghdad,

Washington, and the UN. I often spoke with the former US

Ambassador April Glaspie when she would inquire on conditions in

Baghdad. Washington was pressing to obtain information on the

effects of the embargo. Chief Forties again was having good

success with slipping out of the embassy and obtaining food

stocks on the local economy. During his outings it became obvious

that Iraq had done a thorough job of pillaging Kuwait, Dave would

often return with food items clearly marked with Kuwaiti price

tags and marking from Kuwaiti shops. I went with Dave one

afternoon to a local souk (marketplace) where hundreds of vendors

were peddling everything from food to electronics all from

Kuwait. We even saw cars, furniture, and clothes from Kuwait. One

merchant even had a US Navy hat from the USS Reid, a Navy cruiser

which had visited Kuwait a few months early and allowed US

citizens in Kuwait to visit the ship, so without a doubt the hat

had come from an American’s home which had been looted by the

Iraqis. A fate which many of our homes in Kuwait would be

subjected to. We also learned from the foreign nationals that

worked at the embassy that the Iraqi government was issuing

visitation permits to the 19th Province. These were essentially

licenses to steal. On several occasions we saw where local Iraqis

who lived near the embassy would depart in old beat up cars and

return a few days latter with new Chevrolet Caprices with Kuwaiti

tags and loaded down with booty. It had become obvious to us that

it would be a long time coming before the embargo would take

hold. The Iraqis did implement food rationing in early September

with a stern warning that any violators would face capital

punishment. We even stood in a few bread lines and quickly

46

learned the bread they were handing out was not worth the wait.

By mid September food rationing was not the problem; blackmarket

and inflation became the primary concern. We had a limited amount

of Iraqi dinars and dealing on the blackmarket was punishable by

death. This made it extremely dangerous for Chief Forties to

find, purchase, and keep our food supplies adequate. He

nevertheless accomplished the task at great personal risk. We

also had to have him lay low for a few days at a time because the

Iraqi secret police had already attempted to arrest him.

As political and diplomatic barbs continued, the diplomatic

community just as in Kuwait, established a tight circle of

cooperation and met routinely to discuss how to handle the Iraqi

actions aimed at driving wedges in the building coalition. The

Iraqis also set up a protest group that would form outside the

embassy every other day. The same group would assemble and after

10 minutes buses would show up and discharge school children,

university students or factory workers all being led by

government cheerleaders chanting “Death to the US and down with

Bush”. The embassy’s information officer would go out and greet

the protesters, take their petitions and then stand back while

they shouted for 30 minutes.

We also invited the press to attend the morning country team

meetings, this allowed them to see the difficulties we faced in

dealing the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). In turn the

press would provide updates to us on the home front. Charge Joe

Wilson was a master at using the press to get our messages out

and he often leveraged them to pressure the Iraqis to allow us to

obtain food or make phone calls home. We learned that once you

are up front with the press, they will reciprocate and actually

become useful in your efforts to tell your story.

47

ARABIAN NIGHTS

As we approached the one-month mark in Baghdad we often

passed the evenings on the roof of our quarters, it offered a

grand view of Baghdad and a small respite from the long hot days.

We tuned the radio to a Iraqi propaganda broadcast called

“Flashes in the Gulf”, we recognized it for what it was, but it

did offer some news of the home front complete with contemporary

music. The rooftop evenings also gave us insights on the local

Iraqis living nearby. We knew the Iraqi secret police had moved

into the house across the street and we often saw them watching

us with binoculars. In the predawn hours, we would observe them

picking up our trash. We began a deception game of placing

crudely drawn maps with military symbols on them in an attempt to

deceive the Iraqis on the nature of the US forces buildup. After

several mornings of the neighbor coming over to pick up our

trash, Dewight Durmon a Hawk Missile Warrant decided to make his

job a little easier and began carrying the trash across the

street and depositing it at his doorstep. We would also

occasionally talk with the Iraqi guards who were young men that

appeared very nervous about their job. Sometimes we would

approached a guard, pause and begin looking up to the sky and

pointing, in our poor Arabic we would say “Shoof-Look” and the

guard would ask what are we looking at? We’d respond “Stealth

Plane”. After a few episodes of this, we would occasionally see

the guards walking their post and pausing every now and then, to

look skyward. We also knew that the phone calls we were permitted

to make were monitored and we all exercised utmost caution and

OPSEC when talking with our families. We knew if they discovered

we were military personnel with diplomatic passports they would

take us into custody.

48

By mid-September, President Bush and Saddam Hussein had

exchanged videotaped addresses to be aired on television. The US

tape arrived via diplomatic pouch courier and the Charge

delivered to the Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarqi Aziz. We watched it

the following evening on Iraqi television. They first introduced

the tape with a commentary, and then broadcasted it in its

entirety. They followed up with a closing commentary about how

the tape was not supported by any brotherly Arab nations which

were now being forced by the US to allow infidel soldiers to

enter holy Islamic sites and mosques. The day following the

videotape broadcast, Iraqi demonstrators showed up outside the

embassy compound for our routine demonstration. The situation

appeared to be in complete stalemate. Iraq was determined to stop

any coalition building and began offering free oil to any nation

that would stand with them against the US. King Hussein of Jordan

arrived in Baghdad and attempted to gain freedom for the hostages

as a personal favor to President Bush, his efforts failed. The

King of Jordan, with a huge Palestinian population to contend

with, reluctantly gave weak support to Saddam Hussein and

departed Baghdad. With prospects of release growing dimmer every

day we continued our programs of evacuating American citizens,

tracking the Americans who were brought to Baghdad for movement

to Iraqi Strategic sites, devising plans for escape and

continuous building of our foodstocks. Iraq announced on 18

September that any foreigners caught violating food rationing

would be hung. Our Charge was enraged at this pronouncement and

immediately prepared and delivered a demarche to the Iraqi

Foreign Ministry. Since the Iraqis were not providing their guest

with any food, the only alternative they had was to use the

blackmarket to obtain supplies. For us this meant it would become

much more dangerous to obtain food on the local economy.

49

On 21 September, Iraq declared persona non-gratis all western

Defense attaches. Our COS and COL Richie, the DAO, had two days

to get out of town. We helped them pack out their quarters and

took all their foodstocks. They also carried with them a wealth

of knowledge on our contingency plans and the situation around

Baghdad. We would attempt to fill the gap and continue efforts to

collect HUMINT. CENTCOM was not happy with any plans of escape

and had told us to wait out the situation, for fear that an

escape plan that went wrong would cost lives and impact any

diplomatic efforts. We ceased official plans but continued to

explore options in the event war did break out. Things also got a

little shaky after Iraq had violated the sovereignty of several

western embassies in Kuwait. We prepared for the possibility that

they might attempt to enter the embassy compound in Baghdad.

Again the Iraqis pressed the Charge for another listing with

occupation of all Kuwait embassy personnel whom were now being

housed in the American embassy Baghdad. We quickly devised a plan

to go to other western embassy compounds in Baghdad if they

decided to take us into custody. We still could not understand

why the Iraqis had not figured out that 11 of us were active duty

military, our cover continued to hold but we became increasingly

concerned that they would eventually figure it out and take us

into custody. Our President had already declared us "Hostages"

and the Iraqis called us "guests". All we knew was our situation

was tenuous as best, and we were not being treated like guests,

so our best option was to do our duty and look for a way out

should the inevitable occur.

TAKE THE LONG WAY HOME

By early October 1990, approximately seven UN Resolutions

were in place against Iraq. As always, there are ways around

50

embargoes, and sanctions. The Iraqis were very resourceful and

showing no signs of weakening. As much as we could observe, the

spoils being brought from Kuwait and the open highway with Jordan

were mitigating the effects of the embargo. We could see some

impact on the economy by the rapid rise in inflation and the

quality of food products. For example, fresh beef and poultry was

becoming harder to find but were still available, although the

quality was somewhat questionable. Many shop keepers told us that

Iraqi diary farms were slaughtering off their herds due to lack

grain and poultry farmers were also slaughtering off their laying

hens for the same reason.

We began sensing nervousness throughout the city. The US

buildup to "Desert Shield" was well underway and the GOI knew US

troop strength and the coalition was rapidly growing. Hence the

Iraqis began preparing the populace for air attacks by in placing

antiaircraft guns on many of the city's government buildings and

occasionally sounding the air raid sirens. The GOI efforts were

not new to the populace, they were quick to inform us they had

been through air, and missile attacks during the war with Iran.

The locals that we spoke with just would not believe that attacks

by the US would be far more devastating. They had a real mindset

that they would survive and somehow Saddam would protect them.

The GOI also began publicizing how their "Human Shields"

would help protect key strategic sites and ensure peace. Military

checkpoints already present began showing up randomly throughout

the city. Gasoline rationing went into effect, although there was

no shortage of gas, many felt it was a measure to keep the

populace from traveling very far from Baghdad. Often during the

evening hours, while on our rooftop, we would observe

antiaircraft fire and tracers arching upward in the night skies.

It was becoming more difficult to move about Baghdad and we could

51

tell the Iraqi secret police had doubled their efforts in

surveillance, and stepped up efforts to follow us around.

While performing watch officer duties on 12 October, I took a

call from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). They

requested the Charge immediately come down for a meeting. I

notified the Charge and he proceeded to the Iraqi MFA to inquire

as to why he was being summoned. He was informed by the MFA that

the Government of Iraqi (GOI) took exception to a Voice of

America broadcast which quoted a US diplomatic stating that

Saddam Hussein was insane and they wanted to know what the US

government was going to do about it. The Charge informed them

that he would inquire with DOS to see if the U.S. would issue a

demarche or position on Saddam's sanity. The Charge departed and

we heard nothing else from the GOI or the MFA.

On the diplomatic front pressure was mounting on the GOI to

release all hostages and all diplomats that were brought from

Kuwait and detained in Baghdad. Baghdad's responses was a demand

for all foreigners in Iraq and the 19th Providence (Kuwait) to

immediately come forward and register with the Iraqi MFA. Our

embassy in Baghdad was again requested to provide by diplomatic

note a listing of all personnel being housed in the embassy and

the resident quarters. They claimed a complete listing was needed

to properly process personnel for future release. The Charge

refused to comply, because a note had been previously provided in

September and he knew the Iraqis were attempting to identify

military personnel. Since the crisis began the GOI never really

appeared concern with UN Resolution until the diplomatic

community starting talking about "war crimes". Once word was

leaked to the GOI that UN Resolution 674, "war crimes" was in the

works and would soon be passed, they finally began to talk about

possible release of hostages. This started another round of

52

"Bargaining for Bodies", as former British Prime Minister Heath

came to Baghdad and other notables from Ramsey Clark to Cat

Stevens. We began working a releasable list of diplomats/US

citizens with medical problems or over age sixty. Finally by 23

October, the Charge was successful in obtaining release of 12

people from our group and two from the American citizen's

safehavened at Amb. Glaspie's residence.

As mid-October approached, a decision was made at the

national level to implement a plan to get some members of our

group out before hostilities began. I was told in early October

that I was being considered for participation in an exfiltration

operation out of Baghdad. I was concerned because the plan was

only for a handful of people and I did not want to leave my

comrades. I approached COL Mooneyham and asked him why I was

selected, he side stepped the question, but made it clear to me

that I must volunteer and go along with the plan.

Our Kuwait COS devised and coordinate the operation. The

mission was risky and dangerous but offered the first plan with a

reasonable high chance of success. I learned later that an Escape

Committee formed in Washington to review possible escape plans,

rescues, and other methods for retrieving the trapped diplomats

and key personnel. The committee approved our plan after several

meetings and detail reviews. The decision was finally made to

execute the planned escape.

We conducted hurried training and recons of the pick-up

location. The plan was simple, we would have papers, and

documents that indicated we had valid exit visas and had been

released to return home. This was not too irregular, since exit

visas were being granted on case by case bias.

Everything seemed in place. We would be permitted one small

type gym bag to carry a change of clothes, shaving kit,

53

toothpaste, etc. We also placed in each bag ample cigarettes, and

a few bottles of liquor to be used as pay off to any checkpoint

guards who became too suspicious. After a few trial runs, we

finally got the signal to go. We had setup a system to cover our

absence by staying in the embassy compound for several days

running. I was working a night shift so my absences from our

living quarters would be less obvious to the Iraqi secret police.

The embassy also implemented strict OPSEC and no other members of

our group knew who or when any of us would be leaving. They would

be told a few days after we left. COL Mooneyham had also

prohibited phone calls and DOS messages to be sent until we had

safely made it out of Iraq.

We departed on a cloudy evening with a slight drizzle coming

down. The first leg was our pick-up and trip to a safe house.

Pick-up went without a problem and we headed to a secure area.

Once there we met the people who would assist with our escape.

That night we were given our documents, discussed the route,

possible danger areas, and actions to be taken if we ran into

trouble. About 0500hrs the next morning, we refueled the car from

a 55-gal drum that was stored at secure area. Once out of

Baghdad, we hit our first military checkpoint. Our driver showed

our papers and we were waved through, one down and many more to

go. A lead vehicle had gone ahead of us by several hours to recon

checkpoints and position our refuel point on a barren stretch of

road. We made it to the refuel point by late afternoon and pulled

off the road several kilometers to make our final refuel. While

refueling, an Iraqi Bedouin walked up to our refuel operation. We

quickly began offering him cigarettes and liquor. After a few

minutes of small talk, he wondered off. We had to move quickly

out of fear that he would inform any Iraqi patrols about our

activities or our presence in the area. We headed down the road

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for several more miles when our lead vehicle came back and

signaled us to pull over. He had observed the next checkpoint and

noted that the Iraqis were being very tough on vehicles coming

through the checkpoint. We made the decision that everyone would

pretend to be asleep as we went through the checkpoint and let

our guide do all the talking if question. We took some of the

liquor and poured it on our clothes and around the car’s

interior. Our driver would explain that we had all passed out

from drinking too much in celebration of returning home. When we

reach the checkpoint, the guards took our papers. After five

minutes they returned and instructed our driver to get out of the

car. He broke out some cigarettes and started small talk in

Arabic with the guards, after a few laughs they told him he could

leave, but he should not allow drinking and driving. He thanked

them in the profusely Arabic manner and we quickly departed.

As we closed on the crossing area, our lead vehicle appeared

again. We pulled over and were told that the Iraqi customs agent

were being very thorough and confirming all exit visas with

Baghdad. This was a huge disappointment. Our friends had already

patterned the crossing area, but as always "Murphy" hits when

least expected. We had now gone too far to turn back. We knew our

papers and documentation were good and had worked through many

checkpoints, but this crossing area would be much tougher. We all

discussed the options and decided again to try pretending to have

drunk too much and let our escort do the all the talking. We

would act somewhat intoxicated and not respond if questioned. We

would wait for our escort to intervene and handle the situation.

As we pulled into the checkpoint area, we were instructed to

get out of the car and submit our bags for inspection. Since the

custom officials spoke little English, we pretended not to

understand them when they spoke to us. As expected they

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confiscated what cigarettes and liquor we had left and then moved

us to a building. As suspected, they wanted to confirm with the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in Baghdad that our exit visas

were still valid. The Iraqis all through this crisis would

sometimes issue exit visa and then revoke them at the last

minute. This perhaps was one of the most dangerous periods of our

journey, had the Iraqis decided to interrogate us we would have

been exposed and imprisoned. Furthermore, traveling under this

cover would probably have gotten us all a death sentence. Our

luck held and we endured the wait with extreme high anxiety. Our

guide handled all the talking and after almost an hour of waiting

they finally agreed to allow us to pass. We would have to walk

across no man's land. Our guide would have to leave and since he

was not allowed to escort us across. We picked up our bags and

headed across. About a fourth of the way into the no man's land,

an Iraqi guard called out for us to halt. We were not sure if

they had changed their minds. We thought about making a dash for

it, but we quickly realized we could not outrun their automatic

weapons. We halted and the Iraqi guard approached me and asked

for a cigarette, I more that willingly handed him a fresh pack

and gestured for him to keep it, he nodded and motioned us on.

We stepped into freedom after some 80 days of detention. Two

more guides linked up with us and would transport us to another

location. We would retain our cover and travel incognito. The

escape would not be publicized or revealed at anytime, so as not

to expose anyone that assisted us, and not spoil any other

planned exfiltrations.

Our next leg would be a journey to link-up with US officials.

After a three-days of travel, we finally left for the United

States aboard an USAF Gulfstream II jetliner. Once in the US we

were taken to Camp Peary near Williamsburg, Va. Upon arrival

56

there, our wives or family members were present to greet us.

After a few days at Camp Peary for debriefings, we were released

to go home.

I finally returned home without fanfare and just glad the

ordeal was done. I still had great apprehension over leaving

behind my friends and comrades. Nevertheless, our test of this

potential pipeline to get folks out had proved viable. Before any

others could be brought out via the same method, the GOI had a

change of heart and allowed all western hostages to begin

departing Iraq and Kuwait in early December. By mid-December, the

embassies in Kuwait, and Baghdad closed and all remaining

hostages were freed by the GOI. The Baghdad embassy remains

closed to this day and the American Embassy Kuwait was reopened

in early March 1991 shortly after the ground war ended.

As a military officer caught up in an invasion and hostage

situation the most difficult task was ensuring my family's safety

while duty bound to perform the task I had been trained to do.

Once family members were allowed to leave that conflict was

resolved. All that I served with during this crisis performed

with dedication, professionalism, and distinction, even when

caught between two masters, DOS, and DoD. It is my belief that

the military group serving at the U.S. Embassy Kuwait and

subsequently at the embassy in Baghdad had a direct and positive

influence in sustaining and maintaining the operations of those

compounds, perhaps more so than any other group detained within

those compounds. Our contributions to morale, welfare, logistics,

and day to day operations help to ensure the national goals and

objectives were meet in regards to operating a diplomatic post

during a time of crisis.

After everyone returned, we all faced the task of putting our

lives back together and dealing the total loss of our household

57

goods. The Army required that we go through the standard claims

procedure to account for our losses, this was a daunting task and

took us nearly a year to complete the paper work, only to realize

that almost everything we had was depreciated on the average of

40%. Most of us got duty stations of our choice and nearly 30

days of administrative leave to get our families and lives back

in order.

By January 1991, some of us were asked to return to Desert

Shield. Of the original group of 11 military 5 of us returned to

help the Kuwaitis reconstitute their Armed Forces, but that’s

another story. Prior to my return, my local hometown paper

interviewed me. During the interview I was asked how long a

ground war with Iraqi would last, I ponder the question for a few

seconds and then respond based on my first hand observations of

the vaunted Republican Guards. I first told the reporter that I

had no respect for the Iraqi Army, then provided this response:

"If war breaks out, I expect it to last about two weeks, I

think our Air power would be decisive enough to turn the Iraqis

around and convince them it's a hopeless cause. His Air Force

would be gone in a day or two…I think after our Air power

finished, they would largely begin to capitulate, to surrender,

or withdraw their forces. Our ground forces would then be in a

mop-up operation, not heavy combat actions. Either now or later

Saddam must be dealt with, I would think he would heed the lesson

for a while, but continue either clandestinely or however

obtaining nuclear, biological and chemical weapons…if he remains

in power… You will see him raise his ugly head again". (6 January

1991).13

This was what all of us had summarized after witnessing the

invasion and conduct of the Republican Guards. When we all 13 Columbus Ledger-Enquirer, interview with Major Fred Hart, 6

January 1990, section D-1.

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returned no one in the military intelligence community wanted to

hear that or believe that was true. We knew better from direct

observation and interaction with Iraqi military. Lastly, if

anyone had bothered to do any superficial research of the

performance of the Republican Guards during the Iran/Iraq war

they would quickly summarize that they were a large fourth rate

Army that was poorly led and trained.14

I hope that some useful insights can be gained from this

document and serve as a history of a small military organization

caught-up in a world crisis.

USLOK MEMBERS 15

2 August - 10 December 1990

Military

Col John Mooneyham

LTC Tom Funk

14 I read two books about the Iran/Iraq war prior to the invasion. What had prompted me to read up on the Iraqis was a Marine Colonel guest speaker while I was attending Air Command and Staff College, 1988-1989. He had made a few remarks about how the Iraqi Army was the only modern army in the last ten years to maneuver Corps and execute operational campaigns. He assessed correctly that the Iraqis were probably more of a threat than the Iranians. However, his assessment that they were well trained, equipped, and capable of complexed Corps level operations proved untrue. For further insights on the Iraqi Army I recommend the following two books: Dilip Hiro, The Longest War:The Iran-Iraq Conflict, New York: Routledge, 1991 and John Bulloch & Harvey Morris, The Gulf War: It's Orgins, History and Consequences, London: Methuen 1989.

15 The names listed are not inculsive, several USLOK members were out of country. The civilians include some TDYers who happen to be in country when the invasion occurred. I may have overlooked a few civilian names since my list of personnel is incomplete. Also Maj John Feeley was a CENTCOM courier and not a member of USLOK. One other individual was Navy LT CDR Mike Schwartz who was also a TDYer and not part of USLOK.

59

LTC Rhoi Maney

Maj Fred Hart

CPT Bill Schultz

CW4 Dave Forties

CW3 Dwight Durmon

CW3 Gene Lord

MSG Alfred Allen

SFC Laruen Vellekoop

CPO Ray Galles

USMC Embassy Detachment

GYSGT Jim Smith

SGT Gerald Andre

CPL Dan Hudson

CPL Paul Rodriguez

CPL Mark Royer

CPL Mark Ward

Civilians (DoD)

Veron Nored

Wayne Coyne

Bobby Higgins

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ENDNOTES

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