beni and theri

7/27/2019 Beni and Theri

1/10

E:\Sagaramati's Documents\BDSM\Articles\Sagaramati\The Beni Barua Episode (final final version).doc

The Strange Case of Beni Barua and the Ther Dhammadinn(Dharmacrin Sgaramati)

In his Survey of Buddhism,1Sangharakshita mentions that it was Mrs. Rhys Davids who first

drew attention to a little known yet highly important formula of conditioned-arising(prattya-samutpda), which unfolds as a progressive nidnasequence beginning withconfidence (in the Dharma) [saddh] arising from experiencing ordinary life as dukkha,culminating in knowledge of the destruction (of the savas) [khaye na], which arises independence upon liberation [vimutti].2 As she says in the Editorial Notes to her translationof the second volume of the Kindred Sayings[ Samyutta Nikya], which is where we find thisprogressive nidna sequence, How might it not have altered the whole face of Buddhism tothe West if that [progressive] sequence had been made the illustration of the causal law! [i.e.prattya-samutpda]. And she adds that the discovery of this progressive sequence in 1902came upon her like a flash of sunshine in a dark room.3

Here we can only wonder why, especially at least within the Theravda tradition, it took ascholar who wasnt even a Buddhist to notice this progressive formulation of prattya-

samutpda, and not only notice it but to recognize its spiritual value and importance.So having paid homage to Mrs. Rhys Davids for drawing attention to this progressive nidnasequence, Sangharakshita concludes that what this discovery implies is that within prattya-samutpdaitself there are two possible trends: there is a cyclical trend and there is aspiritually progressive trend. Thus at each causal stage [in the causal sequence] it should bepossible to speak, not only of the cessation of this or that condition making for rebirth, andhence for suffering, but also of the production of positive factors which progressivelyaugment one another until with the realization of sambodhithe whole process reaches itsclimax.4 And in this context Sangharakshita introduces us to an article by Dr. Beni MadhabBarua.

In his article, Buddhism as a Personal Religion,5Barua attempts to demonstrate that if within

prattya-samutpdathere are indeed these two trends, the cyclical and the progressive, thisraises the question as to the logical relation between Prattya-Samutpdaand Nirva;these, he continues, constituting the two main points of consideration in [the] Buddha'sreligion.6 This being so, Barua later asks whether or no, the abiding order of cosmic life

1 A Survey of Buddhism,p. 136, Seventh Edition, 1993 (hereafter, Survey).2This is the Upanisa-suttafrom the Samyutta Nikya [S ii. 29-32]. Here we find an unique formula of prattya-samutpdaconsisting of a sequence of twenty-three nidnas (loosely, causal conditions), beginning with asequence of conditionality in its cyclical form, which changes half-way through to sequence of conditionality in itsprogressive form. The cyclical form begins with spiritual ignorance [avijj], through to birth (no. 11), which inthe standard twelvefold cyclical formula is usually followed by old-age, disease and death, but is here replacedby dukkha(no. 12). These represent the standard cyclical order of prattya-samutpda, corresponding to theprocesses that constitute sasra, the round of birth and death. However, dukkhahere [which is also the firstNoble Truth] is ambiguous as it can be understood doctrinally as the inevitable end that all cyclical processeslead to, or it can also be understood as the first step in leaving the cyclical process behind. It can also be viewed asan intermediary state between the cyclical process and progressive or spiritual process that follows. I would putdukkhain the intermediate category between the cyclical and progressive processes as it possible to experiencethe unsatisfactoriness of worldly life [dukkha] without venturing onto a spiritual path for example, one canbecome a nihilist, (as some ramaasin the Buddhas day did). The progressive process would then begin withconfidence (in the Dharma) [saddh] (no. 13), which arises in dependence upon dukkha, followed respectivelyby joy [pmojja]- rapture [pti] - tranquillity [passaddhi]- bliss [sukha]- meditative concentration [samdhi] -knowing and seeing things as they really are [yath-bhta-a-dassana]- disentanglement [nibbid]- passionless[virga]- liberation [vimutti]- culminating in knowledge of the cessation [of the (savas)], (no. 23), the finalnidna. So we have eleven cyclical nidnas; one intermediary nidna, dukkha, which replaces old-age, diseaseand death, the usual final cyclical nidna; and eleven progressive nidnas.3 The Book of Kindred Sayings, Part II, London, 1922, p. ix.4 Survey, p.136.5 Maha Bodhi, 52 (1944), pp.54-68 (hereafter, BPR.).6ibid. p.54.


2/10

2

which is expressed by [the] Buddhas causal genesis [i.e. prattya-samutpda] is an all-inclusive reality? If so, does it or does it not include Nirvain it. 7Sangharakshita thenintroduces a caveatto Baruas question: the question at issue is not so much whether theprattya samutpdais an all-inclusive reality as whether it is an all-inclusive formulation ofreality.8 With this modification, the question now becomes: If prattya-samutpdais an all-inclusive formulation of reality, is nirvacontained within any such formulation? Is nirvacontained within any of the formulations of prattya-samutpda? Or is nirvaexcludedfrom all formulations of prattya-samutpda, nirvabeing something literallyunconditioned that stands outside all such formulations of conditioned-arising? After all,whatever arises in dependence upon conditions must, so it seems by definition, be said to beconditioned. Reformulating Baruas question we can ask: Can nirvabe said to arise independence upon conditions? If nirvadoes not arises in dependence upon conditions, if itis outside all formulations of prattya-samutpda, then the doctrine of prattya-samutpdacannot claim to be an all-inclusive formulationof reality. As Barua says, if prattya-samutpdais not all-inclusive, it does not deserve the name of reality at all. To be reality itmust be not only a fact but the whole of the fact, known or knowable, actual or potential.9

Barua then goes on to say that this very puzzle, as to whether nirvais included within the

doctrine of prattya-samutpdaor not, has divided the Buddhist teachers into two sharplyantagonistic schools of opinion, one maintaining that Nirvarepresenting the counter-process of cessation was logically excluded from the Buddha's Causal Genesis which isconcerned with the process of becoming.10 As to who these two antagonistic schools are,assuming that there were or are two such antagonistic schools, Barua leaves us to guess. And,for the sake of logical completion, we must assume that the other school or schools assumethat the counter-process of cessation [i.e. nirva] is logically contained within someformulation of prattya-samutpda.11

Now as far as I am aware, the view that nirvais excluded from any formulation of prattya-samutpdais held by the orthodox Theravda. For example, in The Questions of KingMilinda, Milinda asks Ngasena what there is in the world that is not produced [nibbatta] byeither kamma, cause [hetu], or natural physical change [utu].12Nagasena replies that there are

two such things: space [ksa] and nibbna. Milinda, whilst agreeing about space beingsuch, accuses Ngasena of soiling the words of the Conqueror [jinavacana makkhehi] indeclaring that nibbnahas no cause. The Buddha, he points out, did teach a path for therealization of nibbna, so how can nibbna not have a cause? Ngasena says this is true, but:

Whilst it is possible to teach a path (magga) for the realization [sacchikiriy] of nibbna,no cause [hetu] for its arising [uppdya] can be pointed to [dassetu]. [p.269]

The reason why one is able to declare a path for the realization of nibbna, but not its origin,is because nibbnais unconditioned [ asakhata], it is not created by anything. It cannot besaid to be produced, non-produced, or come into existence; that it is past, future, or present; itis not perceptible by the eye, ear, nose, tongue, or body. Yet nirvaexists [ atthinibbna], and is cognizable by the mind [mano-vieyya], but only by the purified mind

[visuddhena mnasena], which is exalted [ pata] upright [ujuka], unhindered [anvaraa],

7ibid. p.62.8Survey, p.138, italics mine. Sangharakshita adds this qualification to Baruas question because of the need fordistinguishing between thoughts and things. Thus we are referring to conceptual formulations of prattya-samutpda.9BPR, p.62.10ibid.11Barua says that The great Pali Scholiast Buddhaghosa has discussed this question, and in fn 13, p. 63, refersus to Buddhaghosas Visuddhimagga, Ch. xvii: Pa-bhmi-niddesa, (Description of the Soil in whichUnderstanding Grows, in amolis translation, The Path of Purification, Vol. II, pp.592-678). However, I can

find nothing in this chapter that remotely relates to this question.12Such as the changing of the seasons, day and night, the weather, temperature, mensuration, etc. This section iscalled Akammajdipaho, Questions on what is not born of kamma, etc., pp. 268-271.


3/10

3

and free from worldly desires [nirmisa]. It is only by rightly practicing [sammapaipanna]the Buddhas teaching that it becomes possible for one to see nirva[ nibbna passati].13

Thus according to the Questions of King Milinda, whilst the realization of nirva doesarise in dependence upon conditions, nirvaitself is must be outside of all causes andconditions. Therefore nirvacannot be contained within any formulation of prattya-

samutpda, as all that is contained in any of the formulations of prattya-samutpdaarises independence upon conditions. This seems to be the Theravdin position.14 But it does notseem to be the Buddhas.15But does Barua have anything to counter this view?

In order to put his case that nirvacan be understood as being contained within the formulaof prattya-samutpda, Barua then turns to a suttafrom the Majjhima Nikya, theCavedalla Suttaor Shorter Questions and Answers, where we find the bhikkhunDhammadinn answering questions put to her by Viskha, who is said elsewhere to be her ex-husband.16 And it is here, in this sutta, that Barua turns for an answer to his question.

Barua says:

The most welcome light on this point [i.e. whether nirvais contained within theformulation of prattya-samutpdaor not] comes from the intellectually gifted early

Buddhist sister Dhammadinn whose views were fully approved and endorsed by theBuddha, with the remark that he had nothing further to add to them. As interpreted by her,

13Mph 269-270.14One also finds this view in Buddhaghosas Visuddhimagga: see VM pp. 508-509 (xvi 70-76; p.580 ofamolis translation, The Path of Purification. For a modern version of the same, see p. 40 of Rahulas What theBuddha Taught (Paperback Edition, 1978).15However, this view does not accord very well with what the Buddha is said to have taught in the Pli suttas.There nirvais not some Unconditioned, Transcendent Other, but a process of an Awakened mind that hasbecome perpetually free from all conditions and causes whose effects could manifest within the round of sasra,i.e. as an unawakened mind. According to the Pli suttas, one of the main non-metaphorical definitions ofnibbna is the cessation of greed, hatred, and delusion, a mind perpetually free from and unconditioned by such

conditions [S iv. 251]. Being liberated from greed, hatred, and delusion is also the definition of other terms suchas unconditioned [asakhta; this definition is given 56 times at S iv. 359-369], arhantship [S iv. 252], the finalgoal of the spiritual life [brahmacariya-pariyosna;], as well for many of the metaphors for nibbna such as theDeathless [aanta; S iv. 370], the Uninclined [anata; S iv. 368], the Taintless [ansava; S iv. 369], theDestination [paryana; S iv. 378], etc. If one takes all these terms as being synonyms for the supreme goal ofBuddhism , then they all point to that goal in terms of the cessation of greed, hatred, and delusion. As onlyminds can be spoken of in terms of affects such as greed, hatred, delusion, etc., we are here talking about a levelof mindthat is free from, liberated from, and unconditioned by, greed, hatred, and delusion. Simply stated, this isan Awakened mind, which responds to being in the world in terms of generosity [dna], compassion [anukamp],transcendental insight [praj], and so on. But the view of nibbna we have above in the Milinda takes nibbna as something other than the state (or non-state) of being fully Awakened, i.e. of being a Buddha. Yet we find inthe Reverence Discourse [Grava Sutta, S i. 138f.], where the newly Awakened Buddha, finding no one orobject in the whole universe whom he could honour and revere, decides that it is only this very Dhamma to whichI have fully Awakened that he can honour, revere, and dwell depending on [upanissya]. Given the view in theMilinda, one might expect that it would be nibbna that was the object of the Buddhas reverence. But it here itis the Dhamma as revealed to an Awakened mind, a mind liberated from the influences of greed, hatred, anddelusion, what we could call a nibbnized mind. In the preceding sutta, the Petition of Brahm Sutta[S i. 136f. ], which also takes place at the foot of the Goatherds Banyan Tree just after the Buddhas Awakening,the Dhamma there is said to be deep, hard to see, hard to understand, peaceful and sublime, beyond the sphere ofreasoning, subtle, to be experienced only by the wise, and that this Dhamma is identified with prattya-samutpda. So it seems we have (1) the Theravdins saying that nibbna is beyond prattya-samutpdaand theAwakened mind; (2) sutta readings saying that nibbna is nothing other than the Awakened mind; (3) prattya-samutpdaas the Dhamma which is something beyond an Awakened mind (i.e. beyond nibbna) that theBuddha honours and reveres and dwell(s) depending on. Taking the Dhamma here as prattya-samutpdain itsReality [tathat] aspect, it would be strange to talk of this Dhamma or prattya-samutpdaas possessing suchqualities as non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion, etc. Can such qualities be said to belong to prattya-samutpda? Surely such qualities can only belong to a mind, in this case an Awakened mind. So here nibbna,rather than being beyond prattya-samutpda, is in fact the mind that reveres prattya-samutpdaas reality, as theDhamma!

16In the gamaversion of this sutta, now only extant in Chinese translation, it is Viskh , a female lay disciple,who puts these questions to Dhammadinn. My source here is The Chinese Madhyama gama and the PliMajjhima Nikya: a comparative study, by Thich Minh Chau, , Delhi (1991), pp. 269-278.


4/10

4

[the] Buddha's Causal genesis admits of two different trends of things in the whole ofreality. In one of them, the reaction (paibhga) takes place in a cyclical order betweentwo opposites (paccankas), such as, pleasure and pain (sukha-dukkha), virtue and vice(pua-ppa), good and evil (kusala-akusala). This is aptly termed by Buddhaghosa asvisabhga-paibhgas[sic]. In the other, the reaction takes place in a progressive orderbetween two counterparts or complements or between two things of the same genus thesucceeding factor augmenting the effect of the preceding one. This is what Buddhaghosaterms sadisa-paibhga. [BPR pp. 62-3]

He then goes on to say that what we call the world, i.e. sasra, represents only one trendof prattya-samutpda, the cyclical trend, whilst what we call nirvarepresents the otherprogressive trend, in which the course of reaction lies from strength to strength, good tofurther good, from that to still greater good, etc. and goes on to enumerate, more or less, witha couple of omissions and a couple of additions of his own, a list similar to the elevenfoldprogressive nidnasequence that, in 1902, lit up old Mrs Rhys Davids gloomy room. 17

Barua, having listed his version of a progressive nidnasequence, which he has culminatingin the fullest enjoyment of the bliss of Nirva, and which from then on he refers to simplyas nirva, then goes on to say that when Dhammadinn was asked by Viskha, what

follows by way of reaction from Nirva, in other words, what follows on from nirvainthis progressive nidnasequence, Dhammadinn wisely says that Nirvawas generallyregarded as the final step in the process in order to avoid an infinite regress, for the sake ofpariyantagahaamin her own language. 18 In other words, nirvais not really the finalstage in the progressive nidnasequence, but is included here for the sake ofpariyantagahaam, understanding the furthest limit, presumably the limits of questioningand inquiry. Nirva is therefore a boundary [ paryanta] term introduced to avoid an infiniteregress of stages of the Path, the implication being that further stages of the Path cannot beexcluded. This is clearly Baruas view, as he adds that Dhammadinn has not failed toindicate that even [if] there be any further reaction, that also takes place in line and whateverfollows therefrom will also appertain to Nirvaand, therefore, will partake of its nature. 19He then concludes:

If such be the correct interpretation of the philosophical position of [the] Buddha's CausalGenesis both Sasraand Nirvamay be consistently shown to be included in it, both aspossibilities in the one and the same reality. [p. 63].

Now these are extremely interesting and important points that Barua is bringing before us,both spiritually and philosophically speaking. This is probably why Sangharakshita gives himso much space in the Surveyand brings these points to our attention. And because of thisBaruas presentation has been taken up within the FWBO20and has come to be regardedalmost a traditional teaching. However, after checking out Baruas sources I can onlyconclude that his argument is based on sources that do not exist in the manner in which hepresents them. So let us have a look at some of them.

Firstly, some minor matters.

17This is the progressive formulation found in the Upanisa-sutta[S ii. 29f.]. Comparing the sutta list with Baruaslist, missing out the first few worldly [laukika] factors and comparing the transcendental [lokottara] factors, inBaruas we have in progressive order: from intuitional knowledge to (vijj) to the feeling of emancipation(vimutti), from that to self-mastery (vasbhva) and from that to the bliss of Nirva [p.63]. The Suttaversion goes from knowledge and vision of things are they really are [yath-bhta-a-dassana] todisenchantment [nibbid], to dispassion [virga], to liberation [vimutti], culminating in knowledge of thedestruction [of the savas]. I cannot find any reference to Baruas vasbhvaused in the suttas, but only in thelater commentaries. Even the transcendental factors, apart from the final one, cannot be fully identified withnirvabecause nirvais the finalgoal. One could call the progressive trend a nirvnictrend as it leads tonirva, but one would not call the road that must be travelled to get to Mount Everest Mount Everest.18BPR, p.63.19

ibid. Therefore nirvais here part of the Path, although it can be said to manifest a different order of the Path:as Barua says any further reaction will also appertain to Nirva... will partake of its nature.20Now called the Triratna Buddhist Community.


5/10

5

1.Barua claims that this puzzle, as he calls it with Sangharakshitas modification as towhether nirvawas logically included or excluded from the Buddha's formulation ofprattya-samutpda, and whether the doctrine of prattya-samutpdacan be said to be an all-inclusive reality or not, has been discussed by The Great Pali scholiast Buddhaghosa. Thereference Barua gives is chapter xvii of Buddhaghosas Visuddhimaggaor The Path ofPurification. But Im afraid, after reading through chapter xvii twice which is a long anddetailed analysis of the twelvefold cyclical nidnasequence, and covers some 86 pages inamolis translation I cannot find the slightest hint of the any such discussion byBuddhaghosa. Nor can I find any such discussion anywhere in the rest of the Visuddhimagga,which covers two volumes in the English translation. Perhaps Buddhaghosa discusses thissomewhere else, but it is certainly not to be found where Barua points us.

2.Another minor point is Baruas claim that Buddhaghosa uses the term visabhga-paibhgato define the relationship between the nidnasthat form the cyclical order of conditionality,and the term sadisa-paibhgato define the relationship between the nidnasthat form theprogressive order of conditionality. The term bhgameans part; paibhgameans counter-part. A visabhga-paibhgais a different or opposite-counterpart. The term sadisa-paibhgaliterally means similar or like-counterpart. The only reference Barua gives for

the use of these terms by Buddhaghosa is the Buddhas division of human types into degraded-elevated degraded-degraded elevated-degraded and elevated-elevatedin the Aguttara-Nikyaand the Puggala-paatti.21 However, neither of these two termsare found in these works. The only place I have been able to find these or similar terms is, notsurprisingly, in Buddhaghosas commentary on the Cavedalla Sutta,22 i.e. the suttawherewe find Dhammadinn discussing these knotty points of Dharma about the nature of nirva.But in his commentary on this sutta, we find Buddhaghosa using only one of the terms listedby Barua, the term visabhga-paibhgaor opposite-counterpart. Here it is used to describethe relation between terms that are literally opposites: dukkhaand sukha, avijjand vijj.23Obviously, the term visabhga-paibhgais not used here by Buddhaghosa to describe therelationship between the nidnasconstituting the cyclical process of conditionality, as Baruaclaims: avijjand vijj are opposite-counterparts, are visabhga-paibhga, and the context

of their relationship does not form any part of the cyclical nidnasequence as vijj,knowledge, is the goal of the Buddhist spiritual life. Visabhga-paibhgasare simplyterms that are opposites. The only other term used by Buddhaghosa in this commentary is notsadisa-paibhga, but sabhga-paibhga or similar-counterpart. He uses the termsabhga-paibhgato indicate, firstly, a similarity ( sabhga), as for example the similaritybetween indifference [upekkh], blindness [andhakr], obscureness [avibht],confusion [duddpan] and avijj; 24and secondly, to show that the terms vijj, vimuttiandnibbnaare similar in that they are all dhamm ansav lokottaror transcendental factorsfree from the biases.25There is nothing in any of these relationships that could be descriptiveof the augmenting relationship between the nidnasconstituting the progressive nidnasequence.

The term sadisa-paibhga, which Barua says is used by Buddhaghosa to describe the relationbetween the nidnasconstituting the progressive order, as far as my searching the ChahaSagyana Tipiaka CD-ROM, and the PTS editions of the appropriate texts reveals, does notactually appear anywhere in the whole Pli Canon, its commentaries, its sub-commentaries,and other works. The term sadisa-bhgadoes appear once in an Abhidhamma commentarial

21BPR, fn.14, p.63.22 Mlapasa-aakath, ii. 355f. [Cavedalla-sutta-vaan].23

ibid. p. 37024ibid.25ibid.


6/10

6

text, the Pacappakaraa-ahakath, but here it just says that the terms sadisa-bhgaandpai-bhgaare interchangeable. 26

Secondly, some important Points

Here there are three issues.

1.I mentioned that Barua presents us with what is clearly a list representing a progressivenidnasequence. But this list, although it contains some of the factors that go to make up theelevenfold progressive nidna sequence, is not one listed anywhere in the suttas. He has madeup his own, which, in principle, is fine. But one of the little additions Barua makes here is indescribing what would be the final nidnaas the fullest enjoyment of the bliss of Nirva,which, on the face of it seems an innocent enough remark. But what he is doing is taking thebliss of nirva as being synonymous with nirvaitself, thereby including nirvawithinhis own self-made formulation of the progressive nidnasequence. But we have to rememberthat the final stage in the progressive nidnasequence is in fact knowledge of the destruction[of the savas]. In other lists of progressive nidnasequences, the final stage is either one isliberated [vimuccati], or liberation through knowing and seeing [vimutti-a-dassana].27None of these texts actually list nirva or the bliss of nirva as the final stage. Thereason Im making this distinction is that his original question is whether nirvais containedwithin the doctrine of prattya-samutpdaor not. By adding nirvato the end of his ownprogressive nidnasequence Barua is thereby answered his own question: hes pre-emptedthe fundamental issue of whether nirvais contained with the doctrine of prattya-samutpdaor not by simply placing nirvawithin it! But the fact is that the real questionstill remains. The real question, which Barua, by sticking nirvaat the end of hisprogressive nidnasequence tries to side-step, is whether the final nidnalisted in the variousversions of the progressive nidnasequence, for example, knowledge of the destruction [ofthe savas], can be equated with nirvaor not. And as I mentioned, at least according toThe Questions of King Milinda, the answer is No, it cannot, because whilst knowledge andliberation do arise in dependence upon conditions, nirva, being neither produced norunproduced, cannot be said to arise in dependence upon conditions.28 The nub of the problem

seems to be that as it is said that all that arises in dependence upon conditions is dukkhaorunsatisfactory and aniccaor impermanent, whatever nirvais it certainly cannot be saidto be dukkhaor anicca!29 Barua, therefore, has not really answered this problem at all.

26p.107, sadisapuggalo hi paipuggalo sadisabhgo ca paibhgo ti vuccati:Here sadisabhga is calledpaibhga, just as a sadisapuggala is called a paipuggala.27For example, see D iii. 360, and A iii. 19 respectively.28Nevertheless, as we saw earlier, [fn 15] in the suttas nirvais also said to be the cessation of greed, hatred, anddelusion, which is synonymous with the cessation of the savas.29All that is subject to arising is subject to cessation ( ya kici samudayadhamma ya nirodhadhamma)[D.i.110, 148; M.i.380, and elsewhere]. Also: What is aniccathat is dukkha, that is anatt (yadanicca tadukkha; ya dukkha tadanatt) [S.iv.1 ff.]. So whatever arises in dependence upon conditions is aniccaand

dukkhaand anattan. How does this fit in with the progressive nidna sequence? For something to be dependentlyarisen it must therefore be a dependent or conditioned something. If nirvaarises in dependence uponconditions, then it too must be dependent and conditioned. This is a large topic that we cant full explore here,but I will make a few comments. The view of nirva presented in the Questions of King Milinda above, and isalso found in Rahulas What the Buddha Taughtand elsewhere, seems to be the standard Theravdin view. Rahulasays:

It is incorrect to think that Nirva is the natural result of the extinction of craving. Nirva is not the result ofanything. If it would be a result, then it would be an effect produced by a cause. It would be sakhataproduced and conditioned. Nirva is neither cause nor effect. It is beyond cause and effect. [p.40]

However, the predominant Pli sutta definition of both nirvaand the unconditioned is the cessation of greed,hatred, and delusion [See fn. 15]. Thus nirvais unconditioned only in the sense of being unconditioned by greed, hatred, and delusion; and we can add, the savas,kilesas , and all other states and ways of being thatconstitute sasra. Nirvais liberation from all such. And this is what the progressive nidna formulationsshow. The fact that these progressive formulations of prattya-samutpdaseem to have been lost until

rediscovered by the Pli text translator Mrs Rhys Davids over a century ago, makes one wonder what effect thishas had especially on the Theravdin tradition with its seemingly metaphysical absolutizing of the notion ofnirva.


7/10

7

2. Given the manner in which Barua introduces Dhammadinns statements from theCavedalla Sutta, it would be natural to assume that this is where we will find theprogressive order of prattya-samutpdalisted. After all, Barua, following on from hisenumerating what is a similar list to the elevenfold progressive nidnasequence which inhis list ends with nirva has Dhammadinn being asked by Viskha what is thecounterpart [paibhga] that follows on from nirva, i.e. the next step in the progressivenidnasequence. So it would be reasonable to assume that this question by Viskha comesafter Dhammadinn has given an account of a progressive nidnasequence culminating innirva. But this is not the case. Dhammadinn does not mention any such list. In heranswering some of Viskhas questions, a kind of list does appear but not one that in any waycorresponds to a progressive nidnasequence. The question and answer betweenDhammadinn and Viskha goes like this:

Lady, what is the counterpart [paibhga] of pleasant feeling [sukh vedan]?

Friend Viskha, painful feeling [dukkh vedan] is the counterpart of pleasant feeling.

What is the counterpart of painful feeling?

Pleasant feeling is the counterpart of painful feeling.

What is the counterpart of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling [adukkhamasukh vedan]?Ignorance [avijj] is the counterpart of neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling?

What is the counterpart of ignorance?

True Knowledge [vijj] is the counterpart of ignorance.

What is the counterpart of True Knowledge?

Liberation [vimutti] is the counterpart of True Knowledge.

What is the counterpart of Liberation?

Nibbna is the counterpart to Liberation.

Lady, what is the counterpart of Nibbna?

[That] question, friend Viskha, goes too far. One is not able to grasp the limit of [such]questions. Friend Viskha, the spiritual life is [for] plunging into nibbna, [has its] goal innibbna, [finds its] consummation in nibbna.

So this is what Dhammadinn actually says.30

What we have here is a list that tells us that pain and happiness are opposites, as are avijjandvijj. That somehow, not experiencing either pain or pleasure has a relationship in the form ofa counterpart, a paibhga, in avijj. What the relationship here is I fail to see. I fail to seewhy avijjhas any more of a special relationship with feelings that are neither painful norpleasurable than the other two feelings, i.e. pleasure and pain. Further, Dhammadinn saysthat vijj, vimutti, and nibbnaare also counterparts or paibhgas. But, in this context, theyseem to be more like synonyms rather counterparts. Indeed, as we saw above, this is how

Buddhaghosa interpreted this passage in his commentary: vijj, vimutti, and nibbnaaresabhga-paibhgasor similar counterparts as they are all dhamm ansav lokottar,transcendental factors free from the savas. Thus it seems obvious that, at least accordingto Buddhaghosa, the relations between vijj, vimutti, and nibbnacannot be said to constitutea progressive nidnasequence, certainly not the kind that Barua leads us to believe wasexpounded by Dhammadinn. Nor is there any such exposition by Buddhaghosa in hiscommentary on the Upanis Sutta, which is where we find the elevenfold progressive nidnasequence expounded.

30In the gamaversion, the question and answer series is the same as the Pli up to, What is the counterpart ofTrue Knowledge? [i.e. avijj]. Here the answer is nirva; the vimuttilink is missing. Dhammadinns answeralso appears to be different: You want to ask an unlimited question. But what you ask is not beyond my

(knowledge). Nirvahas no counterpart, nirvahas no defect of entanglement, all entanglements have beenremoved. Due to this meaning (purpose, aim), people practise the brahma-life under the World Honoured One[The Chinese gama and the Pli Majjhima Nikya, Bhiku Thich Minh Chau, Delhi (1991), pp. 269-278].


8/10

8

3.Finally, there is also a slightly more disconcerting point. According to Barua, whenDhammadinn was asked what follows by way of reaction from Nirva, Barua claims thatDhammadinn says:

that Nirvawas generally regarded as the final step in the process on order to avoid aninfinite regress.

He then goes on to say that Dhammadinn has not failed to indicate that even [if] there beany further reaction, that also takes place in line and whatever follows therefrom will alsoappertain to Nirvaand, therefore, will partake of its nature. But when Dhammadinn wasasked what the counterpart of nirvais, as we saw above, what she actually says is:

[That] question, friend Viskha, goes too far. One is not able to grasp the limit of [such]questions. Friend Viskha, the spiritual life is [for] plunging into nibbna, [has its] goal innibbna, [finds its] consummation in nibbna.

So here there is no reference to any infinite regress as Barua claims. Nor is there anyreference in Buddhaghosas commentary to this suttato avoiding an infinite regress. In hiscommentary, Buddhaghosa, or whoever wrote it, says: nibbna nmeta appaibhga:That which is called nibbna [has] no counterpart,31which makes the point unambiguously

clear: there are nocounterparts, whether opposite-counterparts or similar-counterparts tonibbnaaccording to Buddhaghosa. Therefore, at least according to this text, the idea of anyinfinite regress we should really say progress is in fact denied. As Dhammadinnactually says, the spiritual life, the brahmacariya, has its goal in nirva, finds itsconsummation or perfection in nirva. As to the question as to what may or may not happenafter attaining nirva, or whether there is or is not a counterpart of nirva, I would assumethat Dhammadinn, being well versed in the Dharma, would have considered the responsethat Barua puts in her mouth as simply going too far, which in fact is what she actually says.As other suttastell us again and again, such questions are avykata, unanswerable, notsusceptible to an either a positive or a negative answer, or any other kind of answer.

So what can we do about all this?

Well, I thought that my own experience of coming across the Dharma might provide a wayout of this seeming predicament. It was the writings of Alan Watts that first awakened myinterest in the Dharma. These days I would not recommend Alan Watts to someone as anintroduction to the Dharma. Yet, nevertheless, Im very grateful to Alan Watts for awakeningmy interest. So too with Barua. Baruas article is an extremely interesting and intelligentlywritten piece of work. He does raise some very important questions that need to beaddressed. And this is no doubt why Sangharakshita draws our attention to this in his Survey.His article points to pitfalls of having a one-sidedly negative view of prattya-samutpdaas aformulation of the path. He draws our attention to the fact that within the formulations ofprattya-samutpdathere are in fact two trends, the cyclical and the progressive. AsSangharakshita says in the Survey these two trends give us what he terms a binocularview:

The advantages of this binocular view of Reality are enormous. Instead of being a meredefecation of things evil the spiritual life becomes an enriching assimilation of ever greaterand greater goods. The Via Affirmativais no less valid an approach to the goal than theVia Negativa. [p.141]

The Buddha's Dharma is the Middle Way [majjhim paipad], and Barua has drawn ourattention to the fact that if the Buddhist path is solely identified with the Via Negativa,identified solely with the cyclical order of conditionality, then we have wandered away fromthis Middle Way. In a sense, we are no longer following the Dharma. But the other issueBarua raises, whether nirvacan be said to be contained within the doctrine of prattya-samutpdaor not remains unsolved. We cannot accept his argument. As an issue it remainsto be resolved. But what about Dhammadinn and the progressive order of conditionality?

31 Mlapasa-aakath, ii. 370.


9/10

9

Looking at the Cavedalla Sutta, Dhammadinn can at least be linked to the principle of theprogressive order of conditionality.

Viskha asks Dhammadinn, what latent tendency [anusaya] lies latent [anuseti] in pleasantfeeling ... in painful feeling ...and in feeling that is neither peasant nor painful?Dhammadinn replies that the latent tendency to sensual desire [rgnusaya] lies latent in

pleasant feeling; the latent tendency to anger or aversion [paighnusaya] lies latent in painfulfeeling; and the latent tendency to spiritual ignorance [avijjnusaya] lies latent in feelings thatare neither peasant nor painful.

Viskha then asks Dhammadinn whether these three latent tendencies are present in all casesof their corresponding feelings, and Dhammadinn replies that they are not. Viskha then askswhat is to be abandoned in these three feelings, and Dhammadinn replies that the latenttendency to sensual desire is to be abandoned in pleasant feeling, the latent tendency to angeror aversion is to be abandoned in painful feelings, and the latent tendency to spiritualignorance is to be abandoned in neither painful nor pleasant feeling. Then Viskha askswhether the latent tendency to sensual desire is to be abandoned in all pleasant feeling, thelatent tendency to anger or aversion is to be abandoned is all painful feelings, and the latenttendency to spiritual ignorance is to be abandoned in all neither painful nor pleasant feeling?

Dhammadinn replies this is not the case and gives an example: Here, friend Viskha, a bhikkhu, free from sense desires and unskilful mental states, entersinto and dwells in the first jhna, which is accompanied by applied and sustained thought[vitakkaand vicra], with rapture and bliss, born of seclusion [vivekaja]. In this way heabandons sensual desire [rga]. Here, no latent tendency to sensual desire lies latent.Here, friend Viskha, a bhikkhureflects: When shall I attain and dwell in that sphere thatthe Nobles Ones [ariyas], having attained, are now dwelling in? Setting up a desire [ pih]for that unsurpassed emancipation, there is born, by means of that desire, discontent[domanassa]. In this way, he eliminates aversion [paigha]. Here no latent tendency toaversion lies latent. Here, friend Viskha, a bhikkhu, by leaving behind both pleasant andpainful feelings, by the disappearance of former joy and discontent, [somanassaanddomanassa], having entered the fourth jhna, which is purified by mindfulness andequanimity, he dwells in it. In this way he gives up avijj. Here, there lies no latenttendency to avijj.

Now what is being said here isnt exactly transparent. But the main point that Dhammadinnis making is that there is no necessaryrelationship between pleasant feeling and sensualdesire, and between painful feeling and aversion or anger Ill leave the relationshipbetween neither pleasant nor painful feeling and spiritual ignorance out of the equations as Ido not understand the relationship. In other words, the relationship between pleasant feelingand sensual desire, and between painful feeling and aversion need not necessarily be of thecyclical order. There is the possibility of a creative response, i.e. a response belonging to theprogressive order, which, in Dhammadinns example, is symbolized by the jhnas.32 Thuswe can say that the essential point demonstrated by Dhammadinn is that there being no

necessary relationship between pleasant feeling and sensual desire, between painful feelingand aversion, there is therefore the possibility of choice and freedom. There is the possibilityof a creative response to pleasant and unpleasant feelings. And this links in to the pointwhere, in the suttawhere the elevenfold progressive nidnasequence is listed, the creativeresponse takes its leave from the twelvefold cyclical nidnasequence. In this sutta, thetwelvefold cyclical nidnasequence ends with dukkha, which replaces the more usual final

32According to the Pli suttas, all three kinds of feeling can also be either smisa, carnal, worldly , or nirmisa,spiritual, unworldly. In terms of the Buddhist path, the former is regressive, the later progressive and isrelated to renunciation, and the attainment of the jhnas. See A iii 412; D ii. 298; S iv. 235, and Anlayo,Satipahna: The Direct Path to Realization, p.158. In the Nirmisa Sutta [S iv. 235], rapture [pti],happiness [sukha], equanimity [upekkh], and deliverance [vimokkha] can be either smisa, nirmisa, or

nirmisa nirmisatara, which Bodhi translates as more spiritual than the spiritual. Smisarefers to experiencesthrough the five sense faculties; nirmisato jhnaexperiences; and nirmisa nirmisatarato the destruction of thesavas, and the minds liberation from greed, hatred, and delusion, i.e. nirva.


10/10

10

nidna, i.e. old age, disease and death. And here, rather than a reactive response to dukkha,i.e. aversion, we have saddharising, the first step on the progressive nidnasequence thatculminates in liberation. Thus we can say, in a sense, that in principle Dhammadinn isassociated with this distinction between the cyclical nidnasequence and the creative nidnasequence. As we saw, Dhammadinn pointed out that unpleasant feeling, dukkha, need notnecessarily give rise to aversion, but to an aspiration to become one of the Noble Ones, whichwe can say is certainly linked to saddh, the first nidnain the elevenfold creative nidnasequence. Thus we can say that, in a rather round-about way, Dhammadinn can, at least inprinciple, be associated with the progressive order of conditioned-arsing. But not so in themanner that Barua presents.

However, Baruas question could have been answered simply by referring to the UpanisSutta of the Samyutta Nikya, where the progressive sequence of prattya-samutpda33endswith the liberated mind, i.e. a mind liberated from, and unconditioned by, greed, hatred, anddelusion knowing that the savasare permanently destroyed. In other words, the attainmentof nibbna.

About the Author:

Since 2004 Sagaramati has been a tutor with Dharmapala College, the Triratna BuddhistCommunitys (once the FWBO) study centre located in Birmingham, UK. He is a seniorscholar in the Triratna Buddhist Order (once the WBO), and has given many seminars,workshops and courses, particularly on the subject of conditionality, in several countries. Hehas held a lecturing post at Cardiff University in Wales UK, and has been a Visiting NumataProfessor at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. His book Nietzsche and Buddhism: AStudy in Nihilism and Ironic Affinities was published by Oxford University Press in 1997.His article Three Cheers for Tah appears in vol. 2 of this Review (see Archives). Amonghis current interests is Greek Philosophy.

33It would perhaps be best to use the traditional term for what here is termed the progressive sequence of prattya-samutpda found in the Nettippakaraa, lokuttara paicca-samuppda, or transcendental conditioned-arising,

which is distinct from the mundane or worldly [lokiya] form. The Nettippakaraa, translated as The Guide byBhikkhu amoli, is a text said to be written by Kaccna Thera, one of the Buddhas disciples, as a guide toteaching the Dharma.