benor - meaning and reference in maim on ides' negative theology

8/2/2019 Benor - Meaning and Reference in Maim on Ides' Negative Theology

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Harvard Divinity School

Meaning and Reference in Maimonides' Negative TheologyAuthor(s): Ehud Z. BenorReviewed work(s):Source: The Harvard Theological Review, Vol. 88, No. 3 (Jul., 1995), pp. 339-360Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Harvard Divinity SchoolStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1510088 .Accessed: 20/03/2012 04:32

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M e a n in g a n d Refer ence in Maimonides 'N e g a t i v e T h e o l o g y

Ehud Z. BenorDartmouthCollege

The theory of religious languageadvocatedby the twelfth-century hi-l losopherjurist Moses Maimonides 1135-1204) contains an apparentparadox.Maimonides' adical stance regarding he absoluteunknowabilityof God leads him to an austere heology of negation,whichappears o beincongruouswith his representation f God as a moral agent or intellect.Throughanalysisof the functionsof meaningand reference n Maimonides'theory of language,as well as his explicit or implicit distinctionsbetweenliteral, metaphoric, nd symbolicuses of language n theologicaldiscourse,I argue that the purpose of the Maimonidean heology of negation is toestablish the referenceof the name "God," herebymakingpossible a ra-tionallydisciplined onstructivistheology.This articleshows howMaimoni-des sought to include a certain type of religious anthropomorphismn atheology that upholdsthe wholly other natureof God.lMaimonidespresents an extreme version of negative theology, goingbeyondboth his predecessorAlfarabiand his successorThomasAquinas ndenying even a relationof analogybetween attributes hat apply to humanlThe phrase"whollyother" s borrowed rom RudolfOtto'sdescription f themysteriousobject of the numinous xperience n The Idea of the Holy (trans.JohnW. Harvey;Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, 1926).

HTR 88:3 (1995) 339-60


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340 HARVARD THEOLOGICAL REVIEW

beings or the world and attributes hat apply to God.2Maimonidesdenti-fies termsthatare "completely quivocal"3;hey have nothing n common;they share only a name.AlthoughMaimonidesadmits that scriptureapplies amphibolousandmetaphorical erms to God, he does not allow them to be used in philo-sophicaldiscussion. Maimonidesclaims that the word "existence"appliespurelyequivocallyto God and humanbeings:

Similarlythe terms"knowledge," power,""will," and "life," as ap-plied to Him, may He be exalted, and to all those possessingknowl-edge, power, will and life, arepurelyequivocal,so that theirmeaningwhen they are predicatedof Him is in no way like their meaning notherapplication.Do not deemthat they areused amphibolously. orwhen termsare used amphibolouslyhey arepredicated f two thingsbetweenwhich there s a likeness n respectof some notion.4

Maimonidesexplains repeatedly hat we do not understandwhat ourfamiliarconceptsmean when theyare used as descriptions f God. Even ashe labors in the lexicographical haptersof the first part of the Guideto sort out the differentpossiblemeaningsof suchHebrew ermsas "high"(on), "rock" X5:), "standing";l:bng), nd to explain their figurativeuse in2See Alfarabi (Abu Na$r al-Farabi; ca. 870-950), Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Vir-tuous City 1.12; 2.5; translated in Al-Farabi on the Perfect State (trans. Richard Walzer;Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) 83, 99. In his introduction to the translation Walzer explains that"Al-Farabi does not share the uncompromising negative theology of the main trend of neo-Platonic teaching, that is, he does not describe God exclusively by what He is not" (p. 12).Alfarabi maintains(Commentaryon Aristotle 's "DeInterpretatione " [trans. F. W. Zimmermann;Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981] 120) that "One should, therefore, not say that Godmost high can be described negatively, but that he can be described by indefinite nouns. Inmany cases, their precise function is to signify a positive quality which is affirmed in such away as to distinguish its subject totally from the things of which the corresponding definitenoun is true, in which case they do not signify a privation." Although the relation between

negation and positive attribution in the theology of Avicenna (Ibn-Sina; 979-1037) defiessimple characterization, the mystical orientation of Avicennean negative theology suggestsinterpreting positive attributes as divine paradigms of absolute perfections. For discussion,see Ian Richard Netton, Allah Transcendent (London: Routledge, 1989) 153-62. ThomasAquinas argues against the negative interpretation of attributes of perfection like goodnessand wisdom and claims that they must be predicated analogically of God and of other beings:"the names said of God and creatures are predicated neither univocally nor equivocally butanalogically, that is, according to an order or reference to something one" (Summa ContraGentiles 1.34; ET On the Truth of the Catholic Faith [trans. Anton C. Pegis; New York:Doubleday, 1955] 147).3See Moses Maimonides Milot ha-Higayon (Treatise on Logic) (ed. and trans. Israel Efros)PAAJR8[1938]59.4Moses Maimonides The Guide of the Perplexed 1.56 (trans. Shlomo Pines; 2 vols.; Chi-cago: University of Chicago Press,1963). For a recent discussion, see ArthurHyman,"Maimonideson Religious Language," in Joel L. Kraemer, ed., Perspectives on Maimonides (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1991) 175-91.


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scripture,Maimonideswarns,"All the numerousattributivequalificationsindicatingany exaltationof Him and of His greatworth,power,perfection,bounty,and various other things, refer to one and the same notion. Thatnotion is His essence and nothing outside His essence.''SSince God'ses-sence is deemedunknowable, he meaningsof such terms must also beunknowable.Maimonides'heologicalausterity s informedby two majorprinciples:the metaphysicalhesis thatas a necessarybeingGod is whollyotherfromall dependentexistence and the religious thesis that whoever has a mis-takennotion of God worshipsa nonexistentbeing a figmentof his or herimagination.The later thesis leads to an unforgivingrejectionof religioussubjectivism:As for someone who thinks and frequentlymentions God, withoutknowledge, ollowinga mere imaginingor following a belief adoptedbecauseof his relianceon the authority f somebodyelse, he. . . doesnot in true realitymentionor thinkaboutGod.For that thing which isin his imagination nd whichhe mentions n his speech does not corre-spond o anybeing at all and has merelybeen inventedby his imagina-tion, as we haveexplained n our discourseconcerninghe attributes.6Maimonides eemsto thinkthat it is possibleto purifyour idea of Godandescapeerroneousnotions by negating, n thoughtand speech,whatGod isnot. His theory of attributeshas clear implications or religiousdevotionand the languageof prayer:

It has accordinglybecomemanifest o you thatin every case in whichthe demonstrationhat a certain hingshouldbe negatedwithreferenceto Him becomesclear to you, you become moreperfect,and that inevery case in which you affirm of Him an additional hing, you be-come one who likens Him to otherthings and you get furtherawayfromthe knowledgeof His truereality.7Given these concerns,it is surprising hat Maimonidespermits both at-tributesof action,which identifyGod as an agentwithoutdescribingwhatGod is, and attributesof charactersuch as "merciful,""gracious,"and"long-suffering," hich invokean imageof God as a moralpersonworthyof imitation.8What s more,in variousplaces Maimonides ven directsthe

sMaimonidesuide 1.20; ET47.6Ibid.,3.51; ET 620.7Ibid.,1.59; ET 139.8Maimonides'larificationhat"themeaninghere s not thatHe possessesmoralqualities,but thatHe performsactionsthatin us proceed rom moralqualities" Guide, 1.54; ET 124)does notchangethe fact thatGodis describedboth with attributes f actionand of characterthatareultimately educible o attributes f action.Attributes f character, ot action, nvokethe ideaof God as a moralperson.


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reader o understandGod's unity and incoxporeality y thinkingof God asan intellect.9Given his metaphysical nd religiousprinciplesand repeated ecommen-dationof silence aboutGod,l it seems thatMaimonides ithercontradictedhimself in allowing positive speech about God or failed to derive the se-mantic implicationsof his epistemologicalthesis, which maintainsthat,although t is possible to know that God is, we can only know what Godis not.ll In order to confrontthis paradox,I propose an interpretation fMaimonides' heology of negation hat liberatesreligious thought rom theausteredisciplineof trying to remainas faithful as possible to what a truedescriptionof God might be. In this article, therefore,I wish to explain

why Maimonidesmay have thought he semantic hesis that "we can mean-ingfully say only what God is not" does not follow from the epistemicthesis that "we can only know what God is not," and why he thought hatin some circumstances ositive descriptions f God need not be idolatrousprojectionsof the imagination. intend to show that Maimonides' ncom-promising doctrine of absolute homonymy between terms predicatedofabsoluteor divine being and these same termswhen predicated f mundaneor humanbeing led him to a daring conceptionof religious language asconstructing symbolicrepresentation r idea of God. I call this represen-tation "symbolic" o contrast t to literal and metaphoric epresentations.While descriptionsare literally or metaphorically rue if the object theydescribe shares most characteristics enotedby the descriptionor at leastone outstanding elevantcharacteristic, escriptions re symbolicwhen theyclaim no shared characteristic.Symbolic ideas thus stand for the objectwithout truly representing t. God could be described iterally as a moralagent if God were to deliberate,decide, and be moved to act. God couldbe describedmetaphorically s a moralagent if, for instance,God were toshare with humans a quality of mercy. Maimonidesemphaticallydeniesboth types of description.He justifies moral descriptionsas invoking anotion of perfectionthat God and humanbeings do not share. Symbolicdescriptions f this type are meant o be self-transcendingnd point beyondthe qualities they represent.

9See, for example, ibid., 1.1, 68; ET 22-23, 163.10See, for example, ibid., 1.50; ET 112: "But men ought rather to belong to the categoryof those who represent the truth [God] to themselves and apprehend it, even if they do not utterit, as the virtuous are commanded to do." See also 1.59; ET 140: "Accordingly, silence andlimiting oneself to the apprehensions of the intellects are more appropriate," and 2.5; ET 260(quoted below).llI follow here Joseph A. Buijs's instructive distinction between three theses of negativetheology ("The Negative Theology of Maimonides and Aquinas," Review of Metaphysics[1988] 723-38): a metaphysical thesis about the nature of God, an epistemological thesisabout what knowledge of God is possible, and a semantic thesis concerning the language weshould use to speak about God.


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This use of the term "symbolic" o designatethe way descriptions hatuse absolutelyhomonymousermsstand orGod'sunknownperfectionmustbe distinguishedromthe very differentsense in whichthe termis some-times used in the study of religion. In this regard,JuliusGuttmann,hegreathistorianof Jewishphilosophy, s exemplaryn his explanation f thestatusof Maimonides'positive statementsaboutGod. Consistentwith hisNeoplatonic interpretation f Maimonides'negative theology, Guttmannclaimedthat ethicalattributes"express he fact that hiddenwithinthe di-vine essence there [necessarily] ie the presupposition f such [moral]ac-tion; their value is merely symbolic.''l2Guttmann's otion of symbolismstressescontinuitybetweendomainsof meaning hat tendtowarda relationof analogy. In order for such symbolismto be possible, Guttmannmusthold thatGod really does act morallywith regard o humanbeings, ratherthanmerelyappearingo act in this way.Guttmann's eo-Kantianismmakeshim predisposed owardsuch a claim, whereasMaimonides s morecau-tious.l3Maimonides' pproacho the languageof being,or God-talk,makeshis work an important ackground nd a potentiallyvaluableresource ora postmodern onstructivism.The symbolicfunctionof God-talk s impor-tantfor accomplishedphilosopherswho realize that no conceptionof Godis possible, according o the Maimonidean ictumthat "Torah peaksthelanguageof humanbeings.''l4Intellectual overs of God are thereforenotbeyondthe realmof human-boundeligiouslanguage.Since the metaphysicaloundationof Maimonides'heologyof negationhas been studiedat length,ls I will only summarizet brieflyas backgroundfor my discussionof Maimonides'heoryof referenceand its relation o histheology of negation.Philosophicalarguments o prove the existence ofGod, whichare based on the natureof the worldas we know it, are likelyto influencethe way we thinkaboutGod. This seems to be the case withMaimonides,who held thata cosmologicalargumentdemonstrates eyondpossibledoubtthat God exists as a necessaryexistent.l6Fromthe meaningl2JuliusGuttmann,Philosophyof Judaism(trans.David W. Silverman;Northvale, J:Aronson,1988) 165.l3It s instructiveo notehowmuch loserGuttmann'siew sto Thomas'shan oMaimonides'.Thomascommentson Exod 33:18, "I will makeall my goodnesspassbefore thee,"that"theLordgave Mosesto understandhatthe fullnessof all goodnesswas in Him" SummaContraGentiles1.28.9;ET 137), while Maimonides xplainsthat the verserefersto "thedisplaytohim of all existing things" Guide1.54;ET 124).4MaimonidesGuide1.59.15For ystematicdiscussionof the medievaldebate,see David B. Burrell,Knowing heUnknowableGod (NotreDame,IN: Universityof Notre DamePress, 1986) esp. chaps.2-4.Seealso Hyman,"MaimonidesnReligiousLanguage";ndSeymourFeldman,"A ScholasticMisinterpretationf Maimonides'Doctrineof Divine Attributes," JS 19 (1968) 23-39 (re-printedn JosephA. Buijs,ed.,Maimonides:A Collectionof CriticalEssays [NotreDame,IN:Universityof Notre DamePress, 1988] 267-83).l6MaimonidesGuide,2.1; ET247-49.


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of "necessaryxistence"Maimonides oncludes hatGod is absolutely impleand incomparable.l7 his in turn leads to the furtherconclusionthat "weare only able to apprehend he fact thatHe is and cannotapprehendHisquiddity.''l8This incomparabilityhesis is radical and its implicationsarefar-reaching.t implies that God cannotbe represented s infinitelygreaterand moreperfectthan we but only as absolutely ncommensurable, hollyother.God'swholly othernatureas necessarybeing definesthe context fornegative theology to maintain hat since we have no knowledgeof whatGod is, we only know whatGod is not. What kind of knowledge s this,and what does it imply aboutthe languagewe should use to speak aboutGod?What do we know aboutGod when we only know what God is not?Either we apprehend,vaguely and momentarily, omethingof God thateludes conceptionin a way that does not amount to knowledge, or weapprehend othing. The first option may lead to rationalistmysticism andpreference or silence as the most adequateway to relate to God.l9 Thesecond may lead to devout agnosticism ntenton negatingpersistent llu-sions aboutwhat God is.20It is important o examinethese options brieflyprior to presentation f the Maimonidean lternative.The mysticaloption relies on elements of Neoplatonicmetaphysicsandepistemology that penetratedmedieval Aristotelian hought.21 ust as the7Ibid., 1.57; ET 132-33; 2.1; ET 243-52.Ibid., 1.58; ET 135.l9Julius Guttmannand Alexander Altmann may be cited in support of a Plotinean interpre-tation of Maimonides' way of negation. Guttmann (Philosophyof Judaism,164) stressed theNeoplatonic context of Maimonides' theory of divine attributes and argued that theologicalnegation is metaphysically oriented and involves much more than mere logical considerations.Guttmann ("Maimonides' Doctrine of God" in idem, Religion and Knowledge Jerusalem:Magnes, 1955] 107-11 [Hebrew]) held that Maimonidean theological negation is intended toindicate the presence in God's hidden essence of something parallel to that which is known tous. Alexander Altmann ("Maimonides on the Intellect and the Scope of Metaphysics," in idem,Von der mittelalterlichen zur modernen Aufklarung: Studien zur judischen Geistes-geschichte [Tubingen: Mohr/Siebeck, 1987] 121-22) developed this interpretation furtherwhen he drew attention to the similarity between Maimonides' advocacy of silence and thatof Plotinus. Charles H. Manekin ("Belief, Certainty and Divine Attributes in the Guide,"Maimonidean tudies1 [1990] 117-42) suggests a nonmystical interpretation of this optionclaiming that Maimonides' doctrine of attributes suggests the possibility of possessing certainbeliefs about God through the inditect device of "approaching an apprehension" by under-standing what possible perfections there are and gaining demonstrative knowledge that theycannot apply to God.20This is Isaac Franck's interpretation of negative theology ("Maimonides and Aquinas onMan's Knowledge of God: A Twentieth Century Perspective," Reviewof Metaphysics38[1985] 591-615).2lNeoplatonic ideas found theirway into Arabic philosophy through the apocryphalTheologiaAristotelis,which summarizes books four through six of Plotinus' Enneads,and LiberdeCausis,a synopsis of Proclus's Elementsof Theology,which was also attributed to Aristotle.For discussion of these books and their influence see Majid Fakhry, Historyof Islamic Phi-


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universeemanatesfrom the ineffable One in a process of differentiationandparticularizationhatincreasinglyobscures ts sublime source andtruebeing, the humanintellect approaches he intellectualoverflow that per-vades reality by overcomingveils of perceptionand conception,negatingall thatobscures ts vision until it can gaze, if only for a fleetingmoment,upon absolutebeing. Maimonidesmay have had this type of illuminationin mind when he likenedintellectualapprehensiono the flaming sword ofGen 3:24, explaining that "sometimes ruthflashes out to us so that wethink it is day, andthenmatterand habitin theirvariousformsconceal itso that we find ourselvesagain in an obscurenight,almost as we were atfirst."22The mode of religiousexpression hat seems most fitting for thistype of apprehensions silence, which limits the domain of linguisticar-ticulationto instruction or oneself or for others:

For he who praisesthroughspeech only makes knownwhat he hasrepresentedo himself.Now this veryrepresentations the truepraise,whereaswordsconcerning t are meantto instruct omeoneelse or tomake it clearconcerningoneself thatone has had the apprehensionnquestion.Thusit says, "Communewith yourheartuponyourbed, andbe still, Selah" Ps 4:5).23These suggestivestatementsneed not necessarilymanifest the attitudeofintellectualmysticism.The image of fleeting illuminationapplies to alldifficult ntellectual hallenges,notonly to apprehensionf ineffable ruths.Similarly,preference or silence need not have a mysticalbasis; it maysimply reinforce awareness of the purely intellectual relation betweenworshipersandGod, a relation hatrenders inguisticarticulation uperflu-ous or misleading.It was not Maimonides'ntention,however, to recom-mendmysticaldetachmentromknowledgeof the world.24Onthe contrary,in affirmingheabsolute ranscendence f God,Maimonides resentsknowl-edge of the world and contemplationof its teleological structureas thesupremehumanachievement.25Maimonidesreturns o this theme in themost mysticalchapterof the Guide:

Thosewho set theirthought o workafterhavingattainedperfection nthe divine science, turnwholly towardGod,may He be cherishedandheld sublime,renouncewhat s other hanHe, and directall the acts oflosophy 2ded., NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress, 1983)19-31. See alsoAlfredL. Ivry,"NeoplatonicCurrentsn Maimonides'Thought," n Kraemer,Perspectiveson Maimonides,115-40.22Maimonides uide1. Introduction; T 7.23Maimonides uide2.5; ET 260.24This s not to say that he did notrecommend etachment romthe affairsof the world.25SeeShlomoPines'scomparisonbetweenNeoplatonicandMaimonidean pplications fnegativetheology ("ThePhilosophicSources,"xcvi).


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their intellect toward an examinationof the beings with a view todrawing rom them proof with regard o Him, so as to know His gov-ernanceof them in whateverway is possible.... This is the worshippeculiar o those who have apprehendedhe truerealities.26Apprehensionof the "true realities" eads not to mystical absorption nabsolute being but to contemplationof the universe. It further eads toconstruction f a moral idea of God as a perfect ruler, as can be seen inthe case of Moses and his proclamation f the thirteenattributes.27 heseconsiderations lso show that even if negative theology yields no specialapprehension f what God is, according o Maimonides, t does not followthat all we ought to think or say about God is "whatGod is not."

The emergingMaimonidean istinctionbetweenknowledgeand languagedeserves closer and more detailed consideration han is possible in theconfines of this article;relationsbetween thinking,understanding, eliev-ing, knowing, and the use of languageare very complex. While we maysometimesbe tempted o believe that we think and understandmore thanwe can express in words, it is at least as likely that we can think muchmore than we can know and can say even more than we can think. On theone hand, negative theology can argue for the inadequacy f languageyetallow the soul a superrational,mystical knowledgeof God. On the otherhand, negative theology can claim that the soul is unable to have anyknowledgeof God whatsoever nd, accordingly,has little or no concern orthe inadequacy f language o expressthat which can neitherbe knownnorthought. Negative theologians of the first and second persuasionwouldhave considerablydifferent approaches o religious language. Since, ac-cording to Maimonides, he semantic mplicationsof the way of negation

26Maimonides uide 3.51; ET 620.27Regardinghe attributes, ee Exod 34:6-7. It is important o realize that the moral deaof God cannotresult from metaphysical lluminationbut must be interpreted s a constructthat mposesa moral nterpretationn nature. believe this is the only way to account or theethical turn n Maimonides' resentation f the life of intellectualperfection.This accountovercomes Shlomo Pines's argument "PhilosophicSources,"cxxii, and idem, "Spinoza'sTractatus Theologico-Politicus, Maimonides, nd Kant,"Scripta Hierosolymitana 20 [1968]27-28) that manyof God'sactions, includingearthquakes nd floods, and the qualitiestheymay represent,do not conform o any recognizable onceptionof morality.A constructivistaccount also avoids Altmann's esort to an un-Aristotelian otion of virtue to explain theMaimonideanhift froma theoretical o an ethicalconception f human xcellence (AlexanderAltmann,"Maimonides's our Perfections," n idem,Essays in Jewish Intellectual History[Hanover:UniversityPressof New England,1981] 65-76). I discuss the issue at some lengthin my Worship of the Heart: A Study in Maimonides' Philosophy of Religion (New York:SUNY, forthcoming).The argument hatthe 'overflow of perfection" hatcompels prophetsto prophesyand philosophers o teach, moves the solitaryMaimonidean ontemplative o anethicalimitatio dei, does not explain how such an ideal is cognitively possible. For analysisof the final section of the Guide in which the ethical shift takes place, see Ralph Lerner,"Maimonides'Governance f the Solitary" n Kraemer, erspectives on Maimonides, 33-46.


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require neither mystical silence nor constant negation, it is necessary todeterminehow Maimonidesunderstoodnegative theology, what purpose thad for him, and why he thought t did not have austeresemantic mplica-tions.I propose that Maimonidesfound in negative theology a method ofuniquely dentifyingthe groundof all being, and thus a method of deter-mining the referenceof the name '4God,"withoutformingany conceptionof what God is.28 The primarypurposeof negative theology is neithertodirect the mind towardsome notion of God nor to instruct n the intelli-gible use of theological language, but to determinehow anythinghumanbeings think or say, however erroneousor misguided,can be about God.Maimonideannegative theology is not an inquiry regardingwhat sort oftheological thoughts should occupy one's mind or which theological lan-guage one might use to cultivate or express these thoughts.According omy reconstruction,Maimonides' adical thesis of absolute divine incom-mensurability nd its epistemological mplications orced him to confrontthe difficult philosophicalproblem of explaining how thoughts or wordscan be aboutGod if humanspossess neithera descriptionnor an expenenceof God. I believe he found the solution in negative theology.g Representationf God:Meaning ndReferenceTo understand ow Maimonides houghtnegative theology could directthe mind towardGod and solve the problemof how thoughtor speech can

28This roposal uggeststhatMaimonides' eligious nterests ed him towarda theory hatmodernphilosophyof languagerecognizes as an anti-Fregean iew of the relationbetweenmeaning and reference. Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), who initiated the moderndistinctionbetween the meaningof a term (what humanminds grasp when we understandt) and therelationof thatterm o the object t designates its reference),held thatthe meaningof a termdetermines ts reference(ssOnSense and Reference," n Peter Geach and Max Black, eds.Translationsrom the PhilosophicalWritings f GottlobFrege [Oxford:Blackwell,1952l 56-78). This is also a standard iew of language n medieval Arabic philosophy,a view thatMaimonidesgenerally akes for granted.A dissentingmedievalview, which dissociates ref-erence from meaning, may be found in Ghazali'sargument hat particular bjects can beidentified only by ostension (includingsuch indexical words as "this"and "that"),with noappeal o meaningsapprehended y the intellect.Ghazali's rguments quotedby Averroes nTahafutal-Tahafut The Incoherenceof the Incoherence)(trans. Simon van den Bergh; 2vols.; Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress andLondon:Luzac,1954) 1. 275-77. In claiIning hatthe name"God" an refer to God withouta mediating oncept,I believe Maimonidesmovedtowarda position similarto the anti-Fregean iews of HilaryPutnamand Saul Kripke,whohold thatreferencecan be determinedndependently f meaning.See HilaryPutnam,"Mean-ing and Reference,"Journalof Philosophy70 (1973) 699-711 and Saul A. Kripke,Namingand Necessity(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1980). Onlyby movingaway froma representationheoryof reference ould Maimonides resent he articulated ame(YHWH)as indicativeof God'sessence (MaimonidesGuide 1.61; ET 148). My commentshere are apartial esponse o ArthurHyman's bservation 'Maimonideson Religious Language," 90)that "Maimonides'heoryof how propernames signify remains o be workedout."


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be aboutGod, it is necessary o examinehis notionof the relationsbetweenwords, thoughts,and objects. According to the philosophicalconcept oflanguageacceptedby Maimonides,words refer to objects by mediationofconcepts. Threeelements are involved;words, representations,oncepts orideas in the mind; and objects,the essences of which are graspedby theintellect throughabstraction.29Maimonides' asic notion of representationin the mind is similarto whatmodernphilosophyof languagecalls mean-ing. The technicalterm"representation"a$awwur, in Arabic, suggestingsomething hat s "figured" was used in medievalphilosophy o denoteanisolatedconcept n the mind. No truthvalue can be ascribed o the conceptitself, but it can be affirmedor denied in relationto other concepts or incorrespondenceo externalreality. In modernterminology,representationis the idea an image, notion, or concept formed in our mindwhen weunderstand he meaningof a word or a phrase.Linguisticentities, such as words or phrases, are thought to refer toextralinguistic ntities throughthe mediationof mental entities, such asnotions orpropositions hatcorrespond o essences of things or to relationsbetweenessences. In this view of language, eference s established hroughmeaning.Consequently,Maimonidesheld that no theological doctrine aperson professescan be about God. This view motivatesMaimonides' e-ligious intellectualismby implying that, withoutknowledge,piety and de-votion amountto worship of a figment of one's imagination.Yet, God'swholly othernatureand unknowability uggest thatthe requiredknowledgeis necessarilybeyond our reach.I believe it is significant hatMaimonides'amous statement hat beliefis not a matterof utterance r proclamation, utratherof representationnthe mind, openshis expositionof negative heology.30He asserts hatbeliefrequiresbothrepresentationndaffirmation hat what s representeds true.Once thereferenceof God is establishednegatively,as denotinga being sodifferent romthe universe hat the being does noteven partake n its modeof existence and hence is inconceivable o our mind, Maimonides hinksthatthe necessitythatGod exists immediately ollows. This is shown n hisargument hat "there s an existent that is necessaryof existence in respectto its own essence.''3lIt is noteworthy hat of his four speculativeproofsfor the existence of God, Maimonidessingles out this third proof as "ademonstrationoncerningwhichthere can be no doubt, no refutation,andno dispute."32Maimonides' osition would then be that with this determi-nation of the referenceof the word "God" hroughnegation comes not

29The distinction can be traced back to Aristotle's De Interpretatione 16a.3-9.30Maimonides Guide 1.50.3lIbid., 2.1; ET 247-48.32Ibid., 2.1; ET 248.


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only affirmation hat the referentof the word "God" s real, but also cer-tainty.33Maimonides eeks to show that negative theology alone can yieldthe required epresentationf God thatdoes not violate God'sunknowabilty.By analyzinghow it does so and what the representation mounts o, onecan see that Maimonides' elineationof indirect dentificationof an entitythrougha process of negation moves toward a position that resembles amoderndistinctionbetween meaningand reference.Maimonides' olution is based on the existence and the uniquenessofGod as establishedby the cosmologicalproof.34The majorpremiseof thesolution is simple and straightforward: uniqueentity can be isolated andidentified ndirectlyby negative descriptions hat rule out all that it is not.Although Maimonidesasserts that an entity can be definitively identifiedthroughnegation and that the reference of the term denoting it can bedetermined, e stops shortof claimingthat negative identification mountsto proper representation.Regardinga person who comes to acquire theconcept of "a ship" by means of negations,he circumspectlyaffirms thatthis "individualhas nearly achieved,by means of these negative attributes,the representation f the ship as it is," and goes on to say that "thenegativeattributesmake you come nearer in a similar way to the cognition andapprehension f God."3s

If one can only "nearlyachieve"representation f an object like a ship,the essence of which is directly accessible to intellectualabstraction ndthe relationof which to otherentities allows us to constructan approximateidea of what it must be like, it is reasonable o think that the indirectnegative identificationof God will achieve even less of a representation.This seems to be what Maimonideshas in mind when he proclaims hatAs everyone s awarethat it is not possible, except throughnegation,to achieve an apprehension f that which is in our powerto apprehend[of God] and that, on the otherhandnegationdoes not give knowledgein any respectof the true reality of the thing with regard o which theparticularmatter n question s negatedall men, those of the past andthose of the future,affirmclearly that God, may he be exalted, cannot

33Foranalysis of Maimonidess statement on beliefs see Charles H. Manekins "Beliefs Cer-taintys and Divine Attributes in the Guideof the Perplexed, Maimonidean tudies1 (1990)117-41. I believe that Manekinss conclusions regarding "aboutness are too conservative.34SeeMaimonides Guide . 1; ET 247-49 on "the third philosophic speculation.ssFor analysisof Maimonidess arguments for the existence of Gods see William Lane CraigsTheCosmologi-cal Argumentrom Plato to Leibniz London: Macmillans 1980) 131-57.35MaimonidesGuide1.6;ET 143-44 (my emphases). It is interesting to compare Maimonidessstruggles with representation through negation to Thomas Aquinass categorical statement that"through negationss when we have a proper knowledge of a things we know that it is distinctfrom other thingss yet what it is remains unknown (see SummaContraGentiles3.49.1; ET127).


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be apprehended y the intellects, and that none but He Himself canapprehendwhat He is, and that apprehension f Him consists in theinability o attain he ultimate erm n apprehending im.36How shouldone understandMaimonides'vasive conclusionaboutnega-tive representation? suggestthat it is best understoodwhen rephrased nmodern ermsas a claim thatnegativepredication dentifies the entity Godby determininghe referenceof the word "God"but leaves the worddevoidof meaning.37If, as I suggest, Maimonidesheld that the way of negation s sufficientand necessary o determine he referenceof God-talk, hen it follows thatreligiouslanguageneed not, andindeed should not, employ positivepredi-

cates to directthe humanmind to God. A conclusionsuch as thismay havehelped Maimonidesto uphold his uncompromising octrine of absolutehomonymybetweentermspredicated f absoluteor divine beingand thesesame termswhen predicated f mundane r humanbeing. By denying anyanalogy between these domainsof meaning,Maimonidesausterely pre-ferred he objectivityof a truereferent or human houghtsaboutGod overthe satisfactionof providingcontent to these thoughtsthat would rendertheir referentan object of intellectual llusion.Like otherphilosophicallynclinedreligiousthinkers,Maimonides dvo-cated an allegorical approach o religious language and applied it to theinterpretationf scripture.38orhim, allegory s a methodof graftingphilo-sophical doctrines to mythic images. It is essential for Maimonidean

36Maimonides uide 1.59; ET 139 (my emphasis).37This uggestionrequires arefulexamination. t is not a claim that the word"God"hasno linguisticinterpretation r that the word cannotbe given a dictionarydefinition.Rather,the claim is thathowever he word s defined, t is notaccompanied y a correspondingdeain the mind.Maimonides' nderstandingf the term"necessary xistent" s entirelynegative.The questionof whetherany specifiable hought ancorrespond o a negationof all thatGodis not is interesting. believe the only Maimonidean andidate or such a thought s Moses,to whomMaimonides ttributeshe totalgraspof the structure f the universeandtherelationof its parts.Thistype of scientia intuitivacan perhapsbe a correspondingmentalcounterpartof "all that God is not,"and as such maybe available ordenial in thought.To Maimonides'idealizedMoses,then,"whatGod s not"hasthe requiredmeaning.My reading f Maimonides'discussionof representationhroughnegation s diametrically pposed o Hyman's onclusion("Maimonides n Religious Language,"189) that "fromall this it follows that we can saysomething ignificantaboutGod'sessential attributeswithoutassigning o themaffirmativesignification."38Maimonidesevoted a majorpartof his introduction o the first partof the Guide o amethodof allegorical nterpretationf scripture nd prophecy Guide 1. Introduction; T 8-14). For further eferences o Maimonides' efenseof allegoryand ts application o interpre-tation of rabbinic iterature, ee IsadoreTwersky,Introduction o the Code of Maimonides(New Haven, CT:Yale UniversityPress, 1980) 366 n. 31. For a history of the allegoricalmethod rom Philoto the church athers,see HarryAustrynWolfson, ThePhilosophyof theChurchFathers(Cambridge,MA:HarvardUniversityPress, 1970) 24-72.


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hermeneuticshatboth sides of an allegoricalequationbe available o thehumanmind: one available to the imagination, he other to the trainedintellect.As I suggest,however,negativetheologyuniquely dentifiesab-soluteor necessarybeing,anddetermineshe referenceof the name"God"withoutformingany conceptionof what God is. Insofaras Maimonidesadheresto a theology of negationand is committed o deny the humanintellectany contentfor its idea of God,he must also be committed o theview thatno allegoricalrepresentationf God is possible.Theseconsiderationsuggesta strictMaimonidean istinction,n the actof thinkingaboutGod,betweenforminga notionof Godin one'smindanddirectingone's mindto God. The first is an exercise in positive theologyinvolving a quest for the most adequatedescriptionof God, howeverim-preciseits terminology, ecognizing hatsome notionmustbe apprehendedby the mind if it is to be thinkingaboutanything.39 he secondinvolvesuse of conceptsand wordsto direct the mindtowardGod withoutgener-ating false beliefs about God. When Maimonidesmust choose betweenthem, he prefers the second. The determining actor in his unqualifiedpreferences his concern orreference o truereality.Thisconcern s statedboldlyin Maimonides'trikingclaimthatpiety anddevotionarenothingatall if they lack an objectiveintentionalrelationto God.40 carefullynoteherethatMaimonides onsidersan inadequatedea of God to be an inven-tion of the imaginationonly if it is constructedwithoutpriorknowledge.This leaves room for an inadequatedea of God to be constructed,withknowledge,not as a mereproductof the imagination.Maimonides' nthro-pology identifiestwo cognitive facultiesthatare capableof positinggen-eralconceptionsof theworld:an intellectthatconforms o objectivereality,and an imagination hat projectsa view of the world in the service ofhumandesires. In the latterMaimonides inds the root cause of idolatry,

39Maimonidesecognizes hisnecessityinhis discussionof thelanguageof prayer Guide1.59; ET 140-41), wherehe quotes a Talmudicstory aboutRabbiHanina'scriticismof apersonwho openedhis prayerwithan invocationmuch ongerthanthetersetraditionalor-mula,"Godthe great,the valiant,the terrible" b. Ber. 33b). Even thoughthe traditionalepithetsare logically permissibleattributesof action,Maimonidesarguesthattheiruse inprayerwouldnothavebeenpermittedwereit not fortheneedto formsomenotionof Godina worshiper'smind.ThusMaimonideswrites:"Consider lso thathe hasstatedclearlythat fwe wereleft only to ourintellectswe shouldneverhavementioned heseattributes r statedanythingappertainingo them.Yetthenecessityto addressmenin suchtermsas wouldmakethemachievesomerepresentation in accordancewith the dictumof the Sages:TheTorahspeaks in the languageof humanbeings obliged resortto predicatingof God their ownperfectionswhenspeaking o them."Sinceprayers notdirected o humanbeingsbutto God,use of these attributes n the invocationis permittedonly because it is rituallyrequired.Rabbinicdiscussionof thesepredicates howsthatthey aremeant o designateattributes faction(see b. Yoma69b:"Whywerethey calledGreatAssembly?").40Maimonides uide3.51; ET620 (quotedabove);see also Guide1.50.


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because maginativeprojection s uninterestedn correspondenceo reality.An inadequatedea of God constructed fter knowledgehas been achievedcan no longer be considered maginative n this sense because it alreadyassumes an objective orientationof the mind.41The objectivityof reference o God is indispensible n genuineMaimoni-dean worship,and it can only be established hrougha strict theology ofnegation that yields no conception of God. Yet, for all its austerity,Maimonides' heology of negationhas a profound iberatingeffect. Ratherthan stultify religious discourse, it gives Maimonides he freedom to ex-perimentwith a variety of theological models which make the Guide sorich and multitextured.Once a relationof reference s firmly established,leaving no place for doubt concerningwhich entity one uses the word"God" o designate,severalpossibilitiesemerge.First, it becomes possibleto worship the real God. Second, it becomes possible to have mistakenbeliefs that are still beliefs aboutGod. Such mistakeswould not otherwisebe possible because mistakenbeliefs form in the mind a representation fanotherentity and thus are not, after all, mistakes about the real God.Third, and most important or this article, it also becomes possible, self-consciously,to entertainpositive notionsof God in order o affect a properattitudetoward God, while knowing these notions to be untrue of God.This is a dialectical awareness hat keeps such inadequatenotions fromdetermining he referenceof the word "God."Even thoughthe second andthird possibilities are important to religion, not to philosophy, it isMaimonidean hilosopherswho need them most, for only these philoso-phers reach the stage where their concept of God is truly empty.42g Philosophical ymbolsof Perfection:ntellect ndMoralExcellence

I believe the austerityof Maimonides' ormaltheology of negation,andthe certaintywith which he thought t establisheda genuine referencetoGod, allowed him not to leave religiousthought n a state of unconceivingsilence. This allowed him to resort insteadto symbolic ideas of God thatprovidecontentfor religious thoughtas they point beyond themselvesanddeny their literal or metaphoric truth. We underestimate he problem

41I discuss Maimonides' view of the cognitive role of the imagination in "Models forUnderstanding Evil in the Guide or the Perplexed," yyun34 (1985) [Hebrew].42This Socratic attitude toward true wisdom as overcoming the illusion of knowledge isinteresting when compared to the nonphilosophical view of R. Solomon ben Isaac (Rashi,1040-1105). In his commentary to page 49b of b. Yebamot,Rashi writes: "all the prophetslooked through an unclear glass imagining they were seeing but were not and Moses lookedthrough a clear glass and knew that he did not see God's face" (U':5p9ORn ltD^O: C'R':U t:1'D9 1n^C RtZ MN'l UN'RDUU'Cbp9ORn tDn:: nsnl lsm stl nlsmb C'ClODl :nN'RD 'RU). I amindebted to Yeshayahu Leibovitz for this reference.


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Maimonides aced if we locate it in the inability of language to expressdifficult metaphysical deas. The problemsof the limits and imprecisionoflanguage can be easily overcome by silence when speech is unnecessary.Maimonides ecommends his kind of silence throughout is writings.Moreprofound s the difficulty facing those who reach the stage where theirconcept of God is truly empty and realize that they must either rid theirminds of all thoughtabout God or allow their minds to entertain houghtsthey know are inadequate.Given the choice betweenrelating o God through ontentless houghtorthrough ome inadequate otion,Maimonidesprefers he latter.He was notattracted o the self-enclosed nfinity of an empty self-contemplatingmindthat Aristotle describes in book twelve of his Metaphysics.43 ltimately,Maimonidesdoes not seem to accept Aristotle's dea as a notion of whatGod'sthoughtmight be like, nor can he accept it as a mode of intellectualworship. Being self-enclosed and empty, such thought cannot be aboutanythingand cannotrelate to God. If the intellect is to relateto God at all,it must permit itself to use inadequate deas to provide necessarycontentfor thought about God. The most importantnotions Maimonidesuses forthis purposeare those of intellect and ethical perfection. t is these notionsalone that providecontentfor his ideals of intellectual ove of God and ofimitatiodei. Both are employedas self-transcendingonceptions; nvokinga notion of perfectionyet made transparent y their ever-apparentnad-equacy, hey pointbeyond hemselves oward he inconceivable ivinebeing.While the idea of the wholly other nature of God described by thenegative concept of necessary existent dominatesMaimonides'religiousepistemology, he idea of divine perfection nformshis attitude owardGod.Centralhere is the idea of an unmovedmover, the supreme eleologicalcause, whose perfectionmotivates mitation n all inferiorbeings and setsthe universe n motion. For Maimonides,God as an epitome of perfection"is the ultimateend of everything;and the end of the universe s similarlya seeking to be like unto His perfectionas far as is in its capacity.... In

43Speculating on the nature of divine thought, Aristotle concluded that "it must be itselfthat thought thinks (since it is the most excellent of things), and its thinking is a thinking onthinking" (TheCompleteWorks f Aristotle trans. W. D. Ross; Princeton: Princeton Univer-sity Press, 1984] 1074bl5-35). Maimonides seems to suggest this view when he argues for theidentity of life and knowledge in God, saying that "everyone who apprehends his own essencepossesses both life and knowledge by virtue of the same thing" (Guide 1.55; ET 122). Hedistinguishes there between his allusion to divine self-knowledge and the focus on God'sknowledge of the world by theologians who believe in positive attributes. While Maimonidesascribes self-knowledge to God, he is unwilling to limit God's knowledge to a self-knowledgethat is not also omniscient. He deviates from the Aristotelian model and presents divinethought as knowing the world (1.68) and later defends the doctrine of divine omniscienceagainst philosophical criticism (3.19-21).


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virtue of this it is said of Him that He is the end of the ends."44Accord-ingly, when Maimonidesadapts o his purposes he rabbinicprinciple hat"Torahspeaks in human language" o save the Bible from materialisticanthropomorphism,e tries to show that scripture ttributes o God actionsand qualities that people tend to consider instances of perfection.45 t isnot, however, anthropomorphisms such that Maimonides eeks to over-come, but the crude materialisticnotions that sophisticatedbelievers findembarrassing. moral dea of God can perhapsbe defendedas more spiri-tually refinedthan the notion of a mightyheavenlywarrior,but not as lessanthropomorphic. suggest that Maimonidesdevoted major parts of theGuide to extend this theory and create a religious languageappropriateothe needs of those who use philosophy o overcome he materialistic imi-tations of the imagination.lntellect as Symbol for God's Unity and lmmateriality:In apparentcontradiction o negative theology, Maimonidespresents as generally ac-cepteda philosophicaldoctrine hatGod is an intellectfor whomthe know-ing subject, the known object, and the activity of knowing are one.Maimonidesseems to have no reservations n concludingthe discussionwith a positive statement egardingGod's essence, relating t to a state ofthe human ntellect:"ThusHis essence is the intellectuallycognizing sub-ject, the intellectuallycognized object, and the intellect, as is also neces-sarily he case with regard o every ntellect n actu."46 oweverMaimonidesintendedhis special formulation f this philosophicaldoctrine o be under-stood,47 t clearly directshis reader o think of God as of an intellect, andthis notionwill not be totallyobliterated y Maimonides' rgumentn anotherpart of the book that humanknowledgeand God's knowledgehave only aname in common.48This glaring inconsistencygives the readerreason tosuspect that Maimonides'use of the term "intellect" n relation both to

44Maimonides Guide3.20.45Maimonides'explanation for why angels are described as flying with wings is an instruc-tive application of his theory. He claims that "through the admixture with their shape ofsomething belonging to the shape of irrational animals. . . the mind is guided toward a knowl-edge of the fact that the rank of the existence of the angels is below the rank of the deity"(Guide 1.49;ET 109). He says that the motion of flying was chosen to point to the fact thatthe angels are living beings because flying "is the most perfect and the noblest of the motionsof the irrational animals, and man believes it to be a great perfection; so that he wishes to flyin order that it might be easy for him to flee from all that harms him and that he might betakehimself swiftly to whatever agrees with him."46Maimonides Guide 1.68.47For discussion, see Shlomo Pines, "The Philosophic Sources," xcvii-xcviii; and idem,"The Limitations of Human Knowledge according to Al-Farabi, Ibn Bajja, and Maimonides,"in Buijs, Maimonides:A Collectionof CriticalEssays.See also Altmann, "Maimonides on theIntellect and the Scope of Metaphysics."48Maimonides Guide3.20.


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human beings and God representsa further case of homonymy. In hislectures on the Guide, Yeshayahu Leibovitch proposed that all ofMaimonides' eferencesto a conception of God as self-cognizing subjectshould be subsumedunderthe generalprincipleof negative theology. A1-though I believe this is true, it cannot be the whole story. One still mustexplain why Maimonideschose to write as if he had a positive notion ofwhat God is.Maimonides llows himself bold positive languageunmitigated y warn-ings that the term can be used homonymously. n part one of the Guide,Maimonidespresents he philosophicaldoctrine hat God is an intellectthatdiffers from our intellect by being always in actu, never moving frompotential o actual ntellection.49n part three, Maimonidesuses predicatesof divinity in reference o the intellect, describing t as "thegreatking whoalways accompanieshim [the man of God] and cleaves to him.''SMai-monides moderates his daring deification of the intellect with a typicalMaimonidean mbiguity.In the final clause of the statement,he clarifiesthat "thisking who cleaves to him and accompanies im is the intellectthatoverflows toward us and is the bond between us and Him, may He beexalted.''SlAlthough it seems here that Maimonideswithdraws rom anidentificationof God and intellect, the readermust confrontan even moreproblematicpossibility that Maimonides s referring o the Agent Intellectas an intermediary bjectof religiousexperience.S2 ouldMaimonides avewantedhis readers o think of God as an intellect and at the same time tobe aware that the wholly other natureof God renders hat notion absurd?What purposecould such thoughtsserve? This is exactly what he does inthe first chapterof the Guide.Maimonides irst introducesan oblique identificationof God and intel-lect in discussing the biblical idea that humanbeings were created n theimage of God: "Thatwhich was meant n the scriptural ictum, et us makeman in our image, was the specific form, which is intellectualapprehen-sion, not the shape and configuration.''S3 aimonides' urpose s to over-come the materialistic mplication hat since man was made in the imageof God, God must have some sort of human-like orm. He claims that theimage of God in man is not the human hape but the power of intellection.Performing his substitution,Maimonidespresents human ntellectualca-

49Ibid.50Ibid., 3.52; ET 629.5lIbid., 3.52; ET 629.52For a discussion of a possible parallel to mystical christology, see Ithamar Gruenwald,"Maimonides'Quest beyond Philosophy and Prophecy," n Kraemer,Perspectives on Maimonides,145.53Maimonides Guide 1.1; ET 22.


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356 HARVARD THEOLOG ICAL REVIEW

pacity as true humanessence and inevitably implies thereby that in thishumans resemble God. The chapter ends several sentences later with aqualifyingexplanation:Now man possesses as his proprium omething n him that is verystrangeas it is not found in anythingelse that exists under he sphereof the moon, namely ntellectualapprehension.n the exercise of this,no sense, no part of the body, none of the extremitiesare used; andthereforethis apprehensionwas likened to the apprehension f thedeity, which does not requirean instrument, lthough n reality it isnot like the latterapprehension, ut only appears o to the first stirringsof opinion. It was because of this something,I mean because of the

divine intellect conjoinedwith man, that it is said of the latterthat heis in the image of God and in His likeness, not that God, may He beexalted, s a body and possesses a shape.54It is no simple task to sort out what the chapteraffirms and what itdenies. At first, human beings are said to be God-like because of theirintellect.This suggests hatGod is also some sort of intellect.Subsequently,the suggestion is severely qualified and then reaffirmedwith no furtherdenial. Informedby negativetheology and the doctrineof the wholly othernatureof God, the readerwould not have been surprisedhad Maimonides

chosen to end the chapter with a statementof the opposite import. A1-though he could have written that "God, may He be exalted, is not anintellect,"he chose not to do so. Maimonides tates that the notion of theintellect is invoked to representGod because the human intellect is theonly immaterial ntity with which the readersare familiar,and he warnshis readersnot to thinkthat God apprehends s humansdo. The notion thatGod is an immaterial,knowing subject, however, is not denied. SinceMaimonides hought hatmost people were incapableof comprehendinghenotion of an intellect and that those who can are able to do so only afterdemandingphilosophical nstruction,he could not have thought hat scrip-ture resorted o the languageof humanbeings and likened God to an in-tellect. The languagescripturedescends o is a languageof imagery,not ofabstractconcepts.Throughouthe Guide, Maimonideshelps his intended eaderunderstandwhat the human ntellect s, what its perfection equires,how a personwhoachieves it lives, and what such a person can expect in life and in death.It is Maimonideswho resorts here to the language of humanbeings anduses the concept of the intellect to representGod's immateriality.As heinvokes the notion of the intellect, Maimonides eminds he studentnot tobelieve that the comparisondenotes what God is. Maimonidesuses the

54Ibid., 1. 1; ET 23.


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notion of the human ntellect as a symbol for God's mode of being. Think-ing of God as an intellect makes it easier for our mind to accept the realityof God's immaterialmode of being, but thinkingabout God and knowingare separate hings. The distinctionbetweenthem is securedby the demandof negative theology that humanbeings deny of God everything hat Godis not, everything that does not share God's unique mode of necessaryexistence the intellect included.To those who understandhis view of the nature of the intellect,Maimonides uggests that the unity of the intellect can be a symbolfor theunity of God.55The concept of the unity of the human ntellect beyond itsdiverse applicationshelps the reader o accept the claim that attributingoGod many diverse actionsneed not threatenGod'sunity. Thus Maimonideswrites:

There need not be a diversity in the notions subsisting n an agentbecauseof the diversityof his variousactions....I shall illustrate his by the exampleof the rational aculty subsist-ing in man. It is one faculty with regard o which no multiplicity sposited. Through t he acquires he sciences and the arts; through hesame faculty he sews, carpenters,weaves, builds, has a knowledgeofgeometry architecture?],nd governs he city.56This illustration orms an importantink betweenMaimonides'wo majornotions of God, intellect and moral agent. The intellect is presentedas anagent and its unity is invoked to represent he unity of God. No referenceis yet made to the natureof that unity. The missing reference o the essen-tial unity of the intellect, whether human or divine, is supplied in thetripartite dentificationof knower, known, and knowing in chaptersixty-eight of part one of the Guide.God as Moral Person: Maimonidespresents the notion of God as anideal of practicalexcellence as a theological construct hat serves as anobject of imitation or those who have reached ntellectualperfection.S7 e55Maimonides was able to use the intellect as a symbol for God due to the particularlystrong view he held of the unity of the intellect. Unlike other Aristotelian thinkers, mostnotably Alfarabi, he refused to distinguish between a theoretical and a practical intellect. Fordiscussion of the relevant sources and references to secondary works, see Howard Kreisel,"The Practical Intellect in the Philosophy of Maimonides," HUCA59 (1988) 189-215.56Maimonides Guide 1.53; ET 120-21.57Isadore Twersky has shown ("On Law and Ethics in the MishneTorah:A Case Study ofHilkhot Megillah II-17," Tradition 4 [1989] 143) that Maimonides made "a major and most

far-reaching innovation" in determining that the scriptural phrase "You shall walk in Hisways" (Deut 28;9) should be considered a distinct commandment and not only a general callto obey God's laws. Maimonides' son, Abraham, justified this decision by explaining that thephrase should be understood as a command to mold, nurture, and sustain an ethical personal-ity. He explained that this is a completely autonomous mitzvah.


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offers two versionsof the ideal: one embodied n the Mosaic proclamationof God's ways, and the other in a verse from Jeremiah hat describesGodas "the Lord who exercises loving-kindness, udgment,and righteousness,in the earth" Jer 9:23). Both consist of virtues attributed o God on thebasis of attributes f action, and their status is accordinglyproblematic.S8Maimonides ays that they are "merelysomething hat is in thought," hatthey "are indicativeof a perfection ikened to our perfections,which areunderstoodby us''S9 nd that "the meaning here is not that He possessesmoralqualities,but that He performsactionsresembling he actions that inus proceed from moral qualities I mean from aptitudesof the soul; themeaning is not that He, may He be exalted, possesses aptitudesof thesoul."60Again, both affirmationand denial direct human beings towardGod's unknowable erfection.Maimonides alls upon a philosophical on-ception of humanexcellence to represent he perfectionof God's mode ofaction, with which it is known and attestedto have nothing in common.It is a centralclaim in Maimonides' sychologyof religionthat once thehuman soul turns to perfect its intellectualcapacities by embarkingon ascientific quest to comprehend he wisdom that is manifest in nature, hesoul finds itself inexorablyattracted o secure a knowledgeof God. Failingto apprehendGod, the perfected ntellect is strickenby a passionate oveof God that drives it to generatea speculative dea of God out of the onlyelements which the theory of attributesallows-out of attributesof ac-tion.61Humanbeings generate his idea of God by contemplatinghe struc-tureof nature nd nterpretingt as an expression f God'swill, as proceedingfromthatwhich n humanswouldbe virtues.The result s an acknowledgedlyinadequatedea of God that humans onstructby imposingan ethical inter-pretation n the structure f nature. t is importantor Maimonides hatthisidea of God is not merely an imaginativeprojectionbut a constructof theintellect that requirespracticalwisdom.62

58The theological status of attributes of action is itself problematic. Feldman succinctlyexplains this ("A Scholastic Misinterpretation of Maimonides' Doctrine of Divine Attributes,"271), noting that "the actions of God are coextensive with the course of nature, which mendescribe in anthropomorphic terms," that "all expressions, even of God's actions, are abso-lutely equivocal," and that "this level of religious language is inferior to negative attributes,which Maimonides maintains are the only true attributes of God."59Maimonides Guide 1. 53; ET 123.60Ibid., 1. 53; ET 124.6lI defend this claim systematically in chapter one of my Worship of the Heart.62This is the main thrust of Maimonides' argument in the first part of Guide 3.51. Describ-ing the "regimen of the solitary," of those who "attained perfection in the divine science[metaphysics]," Maimonides says that they "direct all the acts of their intellect toward exami-nation of the beings. . . so as to know His governance of them in whatever way it is possible."Several sentences later, Maimonides sets forth the necessary conditions for avoiding thatwhich "has merely been invented by the imagination" (3.51; ET 620).


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The Aristotelian concept of practical wisdom, on which Maimonides'work is based, involves understanding the relations between ends accordingto their place in a teleologically ordered life. Such wisdom can include thebest function of a craftsman in a household or the total scheme of civicactivities. The wider the context in which a person can order the ends,deliberate, and justify a course of action, the greater the person's wisdom.Since, according to Maimonides, the highest theoretical achievement pos-sible for a human being is a firm grasp of the totality of the teleologicalstructure of nature, this achievement establishes the widest possible contextwithin which human ends can be understood. Maimonides presents a por-trait of Moses as the person who understood the ends of politics and stroveto imitate the example set by an idea of God that personifies Maimonides'notion of the ideal ruler.63 The accomplished person of the end of theGuide,who is not a prophet-rulerbut a solitary religious intellectual, comesto exhibit the totality of the practical virtues by attributing to God andexpressing in action the qualities of loving-kindness, justice, and righteous-ness.g Remarks n Maimonidean onstructivism

Clearly, Maimonides did not think that we can meaningfully say onlywhat God is not even though he did think that we can only know what Godis not. Rather, knowing what God is not allows Maimonides relatively freeuse of language to effect what he considers a proper attitude toward God'sunknowable perfection.64 His major theological models, which depict Godas intellect and as paradigm of moral excellence, use the most highly re-spected notions of human perfection available in his philosophical culture.His principle that choice of symbols must be culturally sensitive means thatno specific construct should ever be absolutized. Whoever would be guidedby Maimonides' analysis of the nature of religious language should beaware, for instance, that under no circumstances may a description of Godas a moral ideal determine how human beings ought to act; this would bean absurd reversal of logical order.65Consequently, a society that comes to63ExplainingMoses' requests o know God, as described n Exod 33:12-23, Maimonideswrites: "This was [Moses'] ultimate object in his demand, he conclusion of what he saysbeing: That may know Thee, to the end thatI may find grace n Thy sight andconsider hatthis nation s Thy people' that is, a people for the government f which I need to performactions that I must seek to make similarto Thy actions in governing hem" Guide 1.54; ET125).64Another urposeof Maimonideanheologicalconstruction,whichI cannotdiscuss here,is to protect he unknowing umanmind romdangerous peculative rrors.This, for example,is the purposeof his discussion of God'sknowledge n part hree of the Guide.65In hapter ne of Maimonides' LawsConcerningCharacter raits"-the partof his codeof Jewish law devoted solely to ethical instruction he applies the logical orderjust de-


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doubt and reevaluate its moral ideals will not be saved by imitation of God.From a Maimonidean perspective, moral and theological confusion wouldseem to be intimately related. His analysis suggests that doubts now com-mon in contemporary society regarding whether religion should present thesame image of God to women and men will only be resolved if society isable to achieve a unified concept of the best life for a human being aconcept that can apply both to women and men. These brief remarks suf-fice to show that freedom from the constraints of true representation doesnot lead Maimonidean constructivism to theological anarchy. Freed fromspeculating on what God might truly be like, this constructivism demandsthat human beings attend to what we can know and that we use this knowl-edge symbolically to shape our thoughts about what we want to know butcannot.

scribed. First, he presents the Aristotelian doctrine of the mean (without revealing its philo-sophical origins). Later, imitating the language of scripture, Maimonides says that "we arecommanded to walk in these middle ways, which are good and right ways." Then he states thatthe prophets and sages applied terms to God thatdenote median virtues. This allows Maimonidesto conclude: "Since these are names by which the Maker is called, and they are the middle waythat we are obliged to walk, this way is called the way of God." Theology does not precedeethics but follows it. Forthe full text, see Raymond L. Weiss and Charles L. Butterworth, eds.,Ethical Writings of Maimonides (New York: Dover, 1983) 28-30. My translation is signifi-cantly different in some places.

benor - meaning and reference in maim on ides' negative theology

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