bergson's concept of art

British Journal ojAesthetics, Vol. 39, No. 4, October lggg

BERGSON'S CONCEPT OF ARTRuth Lorand

HENRI Bergson did not present a systematic theory of art, nor did he dedicate awhole, separate discussion to art. Yet Bergson's conception of art not only playsan important role in his own philosophy, but also contributes significantly to theunderstanding of the paradoxical nature of art. This understanding is developedalong with his criticism of Western philosophy and his theory of time, intuition,and order. Art, as Bergson conceives it, serves as a major paradigm for illustratingsome central arguments on these issues; many of the examples that substantiatehis arguments are taken from aesthetic experience. One may say that in Bergson'sphilosophy art is not the question, it is the answer.1

Although it had a great impact on his own generation,2 Bergson's philosophywas almost entirely forgotten soon after his death in 1941. There are manyreasons for this neglect; one is probably associated with Bergson's poetic style andinclination towards intuitive knowledge—qualities which won him the NobelPrize for literature, but stood in contrast to prevalent analytical trends. Never-theless there is currently revived interest in Bergson's philosophy, mainly in histheory on time. This revived interest may well justify a re-examination ofBergson's theory of art. Yet fashion should not count as the only justification.The insight that Bergson has offered us bears its own merit regardless of trendsand fashions.

Most, if not all, of Bergson's distinctions stem from his basic discriminationbetween intuition and intellect and between time (durational succession) andspace.3 Bergson, however, is not an impartial dualist. He not only examines hisconcepts in pairs but also expresses a clear bias towards one element of each pair.It is always one of the two that reflects the genuine quality of reality or presents

1 The following works of Henri Bergson are cited in the text: Creative Evolution, trans. ArthurMitchel (New York: Henry Holt, 1944), hereafter CE; The Creative Mind, trans. Mabelle L.Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), hereafter CM; Matter and Memory, trans. NancyMargaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1911), hereafter MM.

2 Bergson was one of three philosophers who received the Nobel Prize for literature, although, likeBertrand Russell he received it for his philosophical writings. Sartre was offered the prize as awriter as well as a philosopher.

3 Bergson uses 'duration' to indicate the distinct features of time that is not analogous to space: itsirreversibility, its continuity, and its inner unpredictable direction.

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the more vigorous and alluring aspect of experience: intuition versus intellect, timeversus space, organized versus unorganized bodies, and vital order versus geo-metrical order.

The core of Bergson's criticism of Western philosophy is that it has reducedtime into spatial concepts and thus made time dispensable or illusionary.Bergson's motto is that time is real, and, as such, it is irreducible, effective, andrelevant to the true understanding of reality. Denying the reality of time results intheories which 'are not cut to the measure of the reality in which we live' and'could apply equally well to a world in which neither plants nor animals haveexistence' (CM, p. 9).

Bergson criticizes Kant's philosophy for the analogy it makes between spaceand time, an analogy by which time is given spatial qualities and denied its owndurational character: 'Intelligence, as Kant represents it to us, is bathed in anatmosphere of spatiality' (CE, p. 215). Geometry is the paradigm of the operationof the intellect. It is not surprising, then, that philosophers such as Hobbes,Descartes, and Spinoza praised geometry as the valid method for achieving trueknowledge. By contrast, Bergson considers durational perception (intuition) asthe reliable channel for comprehending the true nature of things, whereas spatial(geometrical) thinking has only pragmatic values. Bergson does not dismissintellectual knowledge; he merely wishes to limit its range and redefine its scope.Although the intellect is not designed for true knowledge, it has an importantfunction.4

As I have indicated, the concept of art serves for Bergson as a means of illus-trating his brand of dualism. In this paper I reverse directions and examineBergson's theory as a means of understanding art. The first part focuses on thenotions of geometrical and vital order, which reflect other central distinctions—intuition and intellect, time and space. It appears that Bergson's ideas of art comeclose to the traditional concept of organic form, though its association with thenotion of order brings into play new observations and problems. The second partof the paper is dedicated to my criticism of some points in Bergson's theory oforder and their projections onto the concept of art. These points, I claim, chargethe fruitful distinction between the two orders with difficulties that a less extremedualism could avoid. These difficulties are associated mainly with two ofBergson's arguments: (i) the denial of any positive interactions between the twotypes of order; and (ii) the denial of disorder as an effective element of experiencein general and the aesthetic experience in particular.

I. TWO TYPES OF ORDER

The exposition of the theory of two types of order is found in the third chapter of

4 The question of how can anything be of pragmatic value if it does not respond in one way oranother to the true nature of things is a legitimate question that cannot be discussed in this context.


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Creative Evolution. The concepts and observations concerning space versus timeand intellect versus intuition that support and prepare the grounds for this theoryare found in all of Bergson's writings; they constitute the cornerstone of hisphilosophy.

The distinction between the two orders is based on space-time separation.Geometrical order corresponds to space and intellect; vital order corresponds to time(duration) and intuition. Bergson mentions other orders as well, and it is notentirely clear whether he is suggesting the existence of other orders, or simplyusing synonyms for the basic dichotomy that he proposes. The latter seems moreplausible since it coheres with Bergson's overall dualism. The geometrical orderis 'physical', 'automatic', 'spatial', 'intellectual', and it is the order of'unorganized(lifeless) bodies'. Vital order, is 'intuitive', 'natural', 'positive', 'willed', 'creative','individual', and the order of'organized (living) bodies'.

The two types of order share the common qualities of order in general, butdiffer in the way these qualities are expressed. Order in general is complex. Itconsists of relations among the parts of a given object. These relations expresssome kind of necessity. It is either a necessity determined from within or anecessity determined by an external principle. Geometrical complexity is createdby the ability of the intellect to neglect natural parts and break the whole intoartificial homogeneous units. A law, a principle or a pattern that is imposed uponthese units connects them into a reordered object. The more an object is 'broken'into unnatural components, the more complicated its structure appears. Bycontrast, vital order consists of natural parts. The interrelations of these parts aredirected from within and express their real qualities. The intuition grasps asuccession, which is not juxtaposition, but rather, as Bergson puts it, 'a growthfrom within' {CM, p. 35).

This is the core of the distinction between the two orders. All other charac-teristics of the two orders as presented below are consequences of the essentialdifference in their complexities.

(i) Predictability versus novelty

Space is homogeneous and symmetrical; unlike duration, it does not have anydirection or inner tendencies of its own. Spatial objects can be divided in any wayand their elements comply with any principle; they are indifferent to whateveris imposed on them. 'Geometrical' objects are thus lifeless. A spatial approachregards the whole as comprising equal (homogeneous) units, which only anexternal principle can differentiate. The intellect has an 'unlimited power ofdecomposing according to any law and of recomposing into any system' (CE,p. 173). Time, or more precisely duration, has an inner natural direction. It isneither symmetrical nor homogeneous. One cannot go back in time as one can inspace. The past can never be repeated. Even memories (which in a sense do goback in time) cannot reflect past events without reflecting the succeeding events


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and the present situation as well. 'Consciousness', argues Bergson, 'cannot gothrough the same state twice' (CE, p. 6).

Space, being homogeneous and reversible, is predictable (or rather deducible).All spatial elements are alike in the sense that they may equally endure any orderimposed on them, and thus whatever is true for one spatial element may also betrue for another. The very notion of natural laws implies that all natural events arealike: they all comply with the same laws and can, therefore, be foreseen. Treatingtime in the same manner as space leads to the unavoidable errors of determinism:the natural duration and its one-way direction are ignored. What is true for thepast is held to be equally true for coming events. Logical deduction is confusedhere with prediction of events. 'To foresee', argues Bergson, 'consists ofprojecting into the future what has been perceived in the past' (CE, p. 9). This is,in fact, merely a matter of 'predicting' the past, not foreseeing the 'truly new',which is, by definition, unpredictable.

Bergson's main argument against the autonomy of the traditional concept oforder is, therefore, concerned with predictability:

We say of astronomical phenomena that they manifest an admirable order, meaningby this that they can be foreseen mathematically. And we find an order no lessadmirable in a symphony of Beethoven, which is genius, originality, and thereforeunforeseeability itself. (CE, p. 245)

Indeed, one cannot foresee a symphony by Beethoven before actually hearing itfor the first time and the same is true for any work of art—at least for good worksof art. But if a symphony by Beethoven is praised for its novelty, that is, for itsunpredictability, can it be said to conform to order? Not according to oneconventional conception. Order, by this conception, always entails laws that areindependent of and prior to their instances and thus enable prediction. A systemthat is unpredictable is, by this conception, disordered. This understanding istypically conveyed by deterministic theories (such as Laplace's and Spinoza's), aswell as by information theory that relates novelty and unpredictability to dis-ordered systems only.5

According to this conception art can be viewed in one of the three ways:

1. Art is a form of order; the governing laws of the artistic order, however, havenot yet been discovered.

2. Art is a form of disorder (on account of its unpredictability).3. Art expresses a medium point between order and disorder.

The first option reflects Baumgarten's doctrine of the possibility of a science of

5 See Abraham Moles, Information Theory and Esthetic Perception, trans. Joel E. Cohen (Urbana andLondon: University of Illinois Press, 1966).


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aesthetics. Baumgarten's followers are mainly psychologists and mathematicianswho set themselves to unveil the secret of beauty and discover its governing law.As we know, this idea was firmly rejected by Kant and many of his followers. Thesecond option is a necessary conclusion of information theory that associatesdisorder with novelty and originality—attributes that are traditionally related toart. This conclusion goes against common sense. It is quite obvious that art, beingmeaningful, cannot be viewed as disordered. The third option is expressedmainly by experimental aestheticians.5 The idea that art (and beauty) reflects a'happy medium'—not entirely new, not entirely old, not entirely predictable orunpredictable, and so forth—was firmly criticized by Beardsley.7

Bergson's theory does not allow for any of these options. This is the hub ofBergson's observation: a state exists in which predictions are entirely impossibleand yet this is a state of order! Art is the principal paradigm for this peculiar typeof order; it compels us to accept the fact that beside the intellectual, deterministicorder there exists an order that does not allow for predictions.

We imagine that everything which occurs could have been foreseen by any suffi-ciently informed mind, and that, in the form of an idea, it was thus pre-existent to itsrealization; an absurd conception in the case of a work of art. (CM, p. 22)

Principles of geometrical order are logically prior to their instances and indepen-dent of them. Therefore, they allow for prediction: the same principles areexpected to govern further events. By contrast, in the case of art there are no suchindependent principles that equally govern all works of art and determine thequalities of works that have not yet been created.

A good work of art, or any beautiful object, is not a mere instance of a theory,a law or convention, in spite of the fact that it can be analyzed via theories, laws orconventions. Novelty and individuality are essential for art. And yet, art (at least,good art) expresses order and necessity; it creates the impression that the com-ponents of the work are well situated. Praising Beethoven's symphony for itsartistic merit also means that the symphony is as it should be. But what does itmean? Do we know how it should be before listening to it? Of course we do not.By comparison, when we tell someone how he or she should behave, we mightbe taken to imply thereby that we have principles that dictate the desirablebehaviour—moral, religious, or cultural principles. This, of course, is not the casewith Beethoven's symphony. There are no governing principles to justify orsubstantiate the impression of necessity or to define how things should be. If therewere such principles we could have not only foreseen a not-yet-composedsymphony (or a poem, or a painting), but also compose it ourselves by following

6 See, for instance, E. D. Berlyne, Conflict, Arousal, and Curiosity (New York: McGraw-Hill, i960).7 Monroe Beardsley, 'Order and Disorder in Art', in Paul Kuntz, (ed.), The Concept of Order (Seattle

and London: University ofWashington Press, 1968), pp. 192-218.


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the rules. This is the paradoxical nature of vital-artistic-order: when we face it, weknow it is right though we could not foresee it before actually experiencing it.

The fact that there are no ordering principles in the case of art bears on theissue of/brm and content. These, according to Bergson, cannot be separated in thecase of art.

The thing and the idea of the thing, its reality and its possibility, were . . . created atone stroke. (CM, p. 23)

There is no basis for prediction in the case of art or in any case of a 'truly newform'. Art expresses an unpredictable order.

It is noteworthy that although Bergson and Croce are very close in their viewsregarding art and intuition, they disagree about the relation between the idea andits materialization in the case of art. Croce argues that the ideal, real existence ofthe work precedes the actual, physical existence of it.8 Bergson does not acceptthis separation. The final product of art—'the thing'— is not a mere implement-ation of a pre-existing idea; if it were, the actual work could have been predicted.The process itself is not a mere redundant implementation of an idea. The idea ofthe work and its material qualities are inseparable; they are bound to change alongwith the process of creation because time is real and therefore affective.

(ii) Sensitivity versus indifference

The elements of geometrical order are indifferent. They are motionless; they lackdirection of their own; they have no 'will'. They therefore can endure anyprinciple that is imposed upon them. The principles of geometric order are 'im-personal premises [that] are given once for all' (CE, p. 10). A logical syllogism,for instance, is indifferent to the nature of its elements or the context ofargument. The argument will maintain its validity despite changes in content, aslong as the overall structure remains the same. In a word: geometrical orderallows for a separation between form and content. The same elements may occurin different logical arguments, while the same argument may be demonstrated bydifferent elements.

There is also a kind of indifference among all objects of geometrical orderand among their parts. These remain 'external' to each other, which means that achange in one object or one part leaves the other intact. When the intellect isdirected towards organized (living) bodies, it treats them in the same manner asit treats unorganized bodies. The intellect 'freezes' the motion of the organizedbody and 'turns' it into a lifeless object. The intellect is bound to ignore theindividuality and vitality of its object by regarding it as a mere instance of ageneral category. If X is viewed as an instance of Y it loses its individuality and is

8 B. Croce, The Essence of the Aesthetics, trans. Douglas Ainslie (Folcroft: Folcroft Library Edition,1978).


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thus replaceable by any other instance of Y. Individual differences thereforebecome ineffective and redundant.

By contrast, vital order is sensitive. Since the object and its idea (the orderingprinciple) are one, any change in the object is a change in its order and vice versa.Works of art are thus generally sensitive. Their meanings and values are easilyaffected by changes of components or context. A change of one single word in apoem may affect its overall meaning, and playing the same composition ondifferent instruments results in different performances. Works of art are sensitiveto comparisons with other works—a comparison may reveal new aspects andmodify the original appreciation of the work. The same work in differentcontexts can acquire different meanings, and as a result different artistic values.Art may be sensitive to differences in materials, size, colour, language (theproblem of translation), and so forth. This sensitivity is a reflection of motion andvitality. Geometrical order, by contrast, maintains its features regardless ofchanging contexts. An idea is 'eternal' and indifferent to its instances: a triangle isa triangle regardless of changes in space, time, colour, size, or material.

(Hi) Closed and open borders

'Unorganized' geometrically ordered bodies are cut off from their homogeneousenvironment and separated by the intellect. This separation is capricious orconventional. They could have been separated differently. Spatially orderedobjects are thus open. Their borders are flexible and artificial, and yet they are aprerequisite for order. No particular object can be understood unless limited anddefined as a closed set:

If I boil water in a kettle on a stove, the operation and the object that support it are,in reality, bound up with multitude of other objects and multitude of other opera-tions. . . . but. . . for the spatial end I am pursuing, I may admit that things happen asif the group water-kettle-stove were an independent microcosm. (CE, p. 226)

The group water-kettle-stove forms a body that is artificially unified and defined.This group serves a purpose, but when this purpose is no longer in force, thegroup is disjointed and the components may 'join' other groups that are con-structed for different purposes. A geometrical progression can go forever, itsborders are 'open'. A geometrical progression, therefore, like any intellectualproduct, does not really end; it is stopped at some point for pragmatic reasons.Organized bodies, by contrast, are 'separated and closed off by nature herself(CE, p. 13). The interrelations among the components are necessitated fromwithin and do not depend on any external purpose. Works of art should be likeorganized bodies in this respect. The borders of a work have to be determined bythe nature of the components, not by an external purpose. A good story (or amusical composition or a poem) has a 'natural' beginning and ending that expressthe inner tendency of its components. A work of art, unlike a geometrical


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progression, cannot go forever or even create the impression that it can go foreverwithout losing its meaning and value.9

II. PROBLEMS AND CRITICISM

As already noted, Bergson's vital order is close to the notion of 'organic unity'.The novelty of Bergson's version is in the use it makes of the concept of order.'Order' brings into play some qualities that the 'organic unity' lacks. An objectcan be ordered more or less than another object, while an organic unity cannot bebetter organized than another organic unity. Also, order is the common conceptthat associates geometrical and vital order and could allow for common groundsand interactions among the two types of orders, while 'organic unity' is detachedfrom mechanical objects. However, it is my view that Bergson fails at some pointsto benefit from the advantages of the concept of order, and indeed falls into someof the unnecessary traps of'organic unity'.

(i) Interrelations between the two orders

Since the two orders reflect the operation of two cognitive powers that belong tothe same mind, one would assume that intuition and intellect are not entirelyalienated. However, Bergson's firm dualism denies any positive interactionbetween intuition and intellect, and thus creates some avoidable problems. Asalready noted, intuition and intellect operate in opposite directions: 'Intuitiongoes in the very direction of life, intellect goes in the inverse direction' (CE,p. 281). Each of the cognitive faculties creates its own domain, its own products,and its own purposes.10 Consequently, Bergson disallows any interaction betweenthe two orders. Yet, in some loose sense, there is an asymmetrical, negative inter-action between the two orders: 'From intuition one can pass on to analysis, butnot from analysis to intuition' (CM, p. 213).

This limited kind of interaction is a destructive and not a creative interaction.The intellect cannot create its own objects; it depends for its operation on intuit-ive perception that provides the intellect with the object of analysis. The intellectis capable of taking apart a vital order (a work of art, an organized body), but it isincapable of recreating such an order using intellectual methods: 'life does notproceed by the association and addition of elements' (CE, p. 99). The intellectualanalysis of 'living objects' ends up with elementary facts that cannot be re-assembled into a vital order. A work of art can be analysed by the intellect, but the

9 Endless soap-operas on television do create the impression that they can go forever. They thereforelose direction and inner necessity: anything may equally happen next week. These series usuallystop (without ending), like geometrical progression, due to external forces.

10 Croce expresses a similar view by defining two types of knowledge that do not interact. SeeBenedetto Croce, The Aesthetic as the Science of Expression and of the Linguistic in General, trans. ColinLyas (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1992).


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result is a list of facts, fractured pieces of information that fail to explain whatmakes a work of art tick. Intellectual understanding therefore is limited; it cannotreconstruct living things let alone capture their vitality.

Since there is no positive interaction between the two orders, the fracturedanalysed vital order is 'condemned'. It cannot be revived by the intellect, since theintellect does not create vital orders; it cannot be restored by the intuition, sincethe intuition does not operate on intellectual components. Intuition operatesindependently of the intellect and it makes no use whatsoever of intellectualproducts or methods. As a result vital entities are completely detached from 'geo-metrical' objects, and works of art, being products of intuition, are independentof intellectual activity."

A paradox arises here. While Bergson places intuition above intellect, he equipsthe intellect with a power that he denies intuition: the intellect can exercise viaanalysis its power over the products of intuition, but intuition is unable toreciprocate—it cannot construct a whole out of conceptual components. Thisalso indicates that the 'damage' caused by the intellect while fracturing the vitalorder cannot be reversed. Bergson is led to this position by his basic distinctionsand values. If he were to accept that intuition could move from geometricalorder to vital order, he would admit that, at least in some cases, geometrical orderpreconditions vital order. Consequently, the priority of intuition over intellectwould be shattered.

The case of art, however, presents a difficulty for the position that disallowsinteraction between vital and geometrical order. Art demonstrates that theintuition is not only capable of operating on geometrical orders, but also thatthe interaction between the orders is necessary. A poem, for instance, is a work ofart, a vital order, composed of words that signify concepts. Words are typicallyintellectual; they are like geometrical objects. One has to be familiar with thelanguage (grammar and vocabulary) in order to comprehend the meaning of apoem. In many cases this meaning involves more than just the knowledge of thelanguage: it may involve an acquaintance with generic patterns, previous works ofthe same genre, historical information, and so forth. A poem clearly demonstratesthat a vital order may be composed of geometrical components without therebylosing its vitality. Likewise, a representational painting makes use of conceptswithout which the work cannot be experienced as the work it is. This is trueabout music, dance, and any other form of art. It is an obvious fact that it takes ussome time to get used to and be able to enjoy the music of a foreign culture. Ittakes time because we need to be acquainted with the specific cultural patterns,norms, and motifs that the music consists of. Concepts are a necessary require-ment (though not sufficient) for perceiving the work and appreciating it. Motionpictures, to use one of Bergson's favourite examples (e.g. CE, pp. 296-299), not

Here, again, Bergson is close to Croce's view.


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only illustrate how motion is broken into motionless, separate frames, but alsohow those motionless objects 'miraculously' turn into a flowing, durationalsuccession. The flow of the 'living', moving pictures simulates the natural flow ofevents. Thus, Bergson's own example shows that not only can the intellectfracture vital orders, but that the intuition can move from geometric order (singleframes, words, concepts, symbols, pieces of information, and alike) toward vitalorder.

Being an artefact, a work of art cannot be completely detached from andindependent of intellectual thinking. Kant, who endorsed the idea of non-conceptuality in the pure judgement of taste, made it clear that art (or most of it)is conceptual; only 'free beauty' is non-conceptual and thus free of intellectualperception.12 Even the most admirable symphony by Beethoven involves 'geo-metrical' order not only for its perception but also for its creation. Original andunpredictable as it may be, Beethoven's symphony consists of musical patterns,conventions, and ideas that were effective at the time of its creation. Beethovencould not have written his music in a different cultural surrounding. It is not invain that, although music appears the least conceptual form of art, we can stillrecognize cultural differences, trends, and ideologies expressed in music.

The fact that intuition composes its vital order out of 'geometrical' com-ponents (in the case of art) does not entail that the final product, the work of artas a whole, is of a geometric order. The same conceptual components maycomprise a philosophical essay, or a political article, or a poem: the order may stillbe different in each case. If this is indeed obvious, why is it that Bergson does notacknowledge this fact? Why does he deny any positive interaction between thetwo orders? I believe that the main reason lies in the hierarchy of orders thatBergson wishes to preserve. Accepting positive interactions of both sides wouldforce Bergson to admit that the two orders are interdependent and that no orderis prior to or independent of the other. It would also force Bergson to acknow-ledge that intuition and intellect are mutually dependent. Such a concession 'would compel him to reconsider his view of intuition as the only genuine facultyfor apprehending reality.

Intuition can and does utilize geometrical objects and integrate them into avital whole. To be sure, the intuitive 'method' is different from the method of theintellect. Intuition does not analyse; it composes. Yet there is a positive inter-action between the two faculties. Grasping something as a whole involvesdistinctions among its parts. If there are no distinguishable (intellectual) parts, thewhole is nothing but a simple homogeneous entity that does not express any kindof order. It is then not a whole. An 'admirable symphony' is indeed a whole, but itis certainly not a simple entity: it consists of distinguishable elements. The'geometric' elements (the pitches, for instance) may exist as separate, definable

12 It is my view that even 'free beauty' cannot be non-conceptual, but this is beside the point here.


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entities that are available as raw material to other vital orders (other musicalcompositions). As intellectual entities, the pitches express mathematical relations,but within the composition they create a new order that is not simply reduced totheir mathematical relations. The act of composition is indeed an act that showsthat intuition can move from geometric order to vital order by using intellectualproducts but not intellectual methods. The act of composition is not intellectual.

Bergson claims that the two orders reflect the operation of the mind. Thisimplies a bond between the two distinct orders. It could not have been the samemind if its faculties were to operate independently one of each other. The mindis able to move from intellectual order to intuitive order and back again; thereforethe two orders cannot be entirely alienated.

(ii) The problem of disorder

The denial of the significance, let alone the existence, of disorder is anotherexpression of Bergson's strict dualism. Disorder, if accepted as an effective factor,would constitute a third element that would interfere with the dichotomy of thetwo orders. Moreover, the very notion of disorder does not fit in with Bergson'sunderstanding of order. Order, according to Bergson, consists of 'A certainagreement between subject and object. It is the mind finding itself again in things'(CE, p. 244). If indeed order reflects the operation of the mind, it is then clearwhy disorder is not to be found: whenever the mind is active, either in its naturalor inverse direction, it is bound to find some kind of order. No specific order isnecessary in itself, since for any kind of order an alternative one may be found.But it is inescapable that the mind always finds some kind of order and never astate of disorder. In this view 'disorder' is just a 'simple verbal entity' (CE, p. 243).It is a word that does not denote any actual state and does not have a clearconceptual reference.

This position is also consistent with Bergson's criticism of the conventionalconception of order. If only one type of order existed, as the conventional view hasit, then disorder would not only be possible but necessary. Disorder would constitutethe negative pole of the only type of order; it would be the indispensable contrastingconcept to 'order'. Bergson's dualism is based on such dichotomies: organizedbodies are opposed to unorganized bodies; time is opposed to space, and so on. Sincerationalism acknowledges only one type of order, it has to contrast it with the notionof disorder.

The only kind of disorder that Bergson implicitly admits is the disorder thatthe intellect produces. In the process of creating geometrical order the intellectinterrupts and fractures the vital order and turns it into homogeneous units.Thus, the intellect creates a virtual disorder that is then, as it were, 'conquered' andreordered by a mechanical principle imposed by the intellect on these homo-geneous units. Geometrical order is, in a sense, preconditioned by intellectualdisorder. If geometrical order were indeed the only existing order (as implied by


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rationalism) it would certainly be a 'conquest over disorder' (CE, p. 240).However, Bergson does not accept that geometrical order is the only existingorder, and he does not accept that the disorder created by the intellect is real inany sense. Therefore, he does not approve of the idea that geometrical order mustbe contrasted with the virtual disorder it creates. The two orders sufficiently opposeeach other: being natural, vital order forms the positive pole, while geometricorder, as artificial order, forms the negative pole. In the absence of one order, oneencounters its alternative. The situation in which both orders are absent 'isneither perceived nor conceived' (CE, p. 243). It is clear, then, that Bergson doesnot need disorder as an opposing principle.

If this is the case, what is the meaning and function of this mere 'verbal entity'?'Disorder' is neither an absence of all orders nor the opposite state of any order;it is rather an expression of disappointment. As already stated, whenever the mindis active it will find some kind of order, though it may not be the order that oneexpects or prefers. Therefore, the term 'disorder' denotes the absence of a specifickind of order that one expects to find; it is the term we use to express ourdisappointed expectations, and thus it is merely a 'verbal entity'. However, beingdisappointed is not the same as being in a genuine state of disorder.

This is, I believe, a powerful argument, but there are a few crucial pointsregarding the concept of disorder that Bergson seems to ignore:

(i) It is not always the case that in the absence of one type of order an alternativetype of order is found.

(ii) The variety in degrees of order cannot be explained without taking intoaccount the concept of disorder as a significant component.

(iii) The concept of disorder plays an important role in understanding the sig-nificance of art and the process of creation.

These issues are interrelated. They all indicate, as I further elaborate, the in-dispensability of disorder in real experience as well as a theoretical tool forunderstanding the complexity of art.

77ie reality of disorder

Bergson argues that in the absence of one type of order another type is found.Everyday experience tells us otherwise. It is simply not always true that in theabsence of geometrical order one finds an impressive vital order (beauty?), or thatfacing a poor work of art (unsatisfactory vital order) one necessarily discovers aperfect geometrical order. An intellectual failure is not necessarily a triumph ofthe intuition and vice versa. A work of art may be evaluated as a poor, confusedproduct of intuition, but that does not make it, ipso facto, an excellent product ofthe intellect. In a case of mixed styles that do not integrate, for instance, there isno reasonable order of any kind. Actual cases are more complicated. Even a great


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work of art may appear confused or meaningless to a person who is ignorant ofthe context of the work; and likewise, a brilliant essay (a product of the intellect)may be entirely misunderstood (and thus appear disordered) by the uninitiated.

The experience of disorder is no less real than the experience of order. Byignoring cases of disorder Bergson expresses a kind of determinism that entirelydisallows uncertainty and misunderstandings. Confusion and uncertainty that astate of disorder may evoke are no less real than feelings of confidence orappreciation initiated by states of order. Bergson fails to distinguish between theargument that in every given state order can be found, and the argument thatone actually finds order in every given state. The difference is highly importantespecially if one demands, as Bergson does, that philosophy be loyal to real ex-perience.

The argument that order can always be found is the same as the argument thatfor any given sequence of numbers a formula can be formed. As much asthese arguments may be true they do not reflect actual experience. Out of thetheoretical framework one may consider a sequence of numbers random simplybecause one does not realize their potential order. Likewise, a stranger in townmay experience a state of disorder in spite of the fact that he or she understandsthat this is not the case for local people. The theoretical understanding that thereis an order behind every apparent disorder is often not enough to alter the natureof the experience. In spite of one's understanding that a given text is written inChinese, one is bound to have a sense of disorder if one is ignorant of thelanguage. This sense of disorder is clearly not a mere expression of one'sdisappointment. One is not necessarily expecting every text to be written in one'sown language, and therefore one is not necessarily disappointed by the fact thatthe text is written in Chinese. One undergoes an experience of disorder, even ifone expects a Chinese text. This sense of disorder is bound to increase if one isnot even certain that the given signs form a language at all: is it really a languageor just a random assembly of marks? Disorder, like order, is manifested in variousdegrees.

Moreover, Bergson's durational succession, the endless flow that he considersto be the genuine state of reality, seems closer to a state of disorder than any otherkind of experience. It is not predictable, therefore it does not form a geometricalorder; being an endless flow, it has no borders to define its extension and itsinternal relations, therefore it is not like organized bodies or works of art that aredefined by nature or intuition. The endless flow is rather a chaotic entity. Historycan be described as such an open endless flow: it has no defined beginning orending. However, when we wish to discuss certain periods, evaluate them andcompare them to others, we have to define their borderlines (artificially), as ifthey were stories that make sense on their own. This point, as I will furtherelaborate, is important for understanding the function of art.

The essential question, as I see it, is not whether order or disorder is real, since


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any order is, according to Bergson, a reflection of the operation of one's mind.Order and disorder can be both real and illusory in the same sense. The questionis rather whether 'disorder' is reducible to either of the two orders without a lossof important and useful distinctions. The answer, I believe, is negative. 'Disorder'is not a reducible, dispensable notion. There is more to 'disorder' than just thedisappointment over the absence of an expected order and it is certainly not amere verbal entity.

The quantitative aspect

While Bergson treats order qualitatively, he neglects the fact that order is alsoquantitative. Bergson hardly pays attention to the obvious fact that order mani-fests itself in various degrees, and that objects are appreciated accordingly.Bergson sums up the issue of degrees by asserting that: 'reality is ordered exactlyto the degree in which it satisfies our thought' {CE, p. 224). This is a somewhatsurprising statement. It may mean that the order we ideally impute to reality is ofa satisfying degree, but this is surely not the degree of order actually found inthings. It is quite obvious that in experience one finds various degrees of order innatural objects as well as in artefacts. If we would have found every objectsatisfyingly ordered, the concept of order, let alone the concept of disorder, wouldhave never occurred to us.

Bergson is probably right to some extent about disorder: we may never experi-ence total disorder.13 But this is only half of the truth. Not only is total disorderbeyond our grasp, but so is perfect order. Many philosophers have associated per-fect order with heavenly powers because the frail human mind cannot apprehendit. This does not mean, however, that the two ideal extremes are mere 'verbalentities'. They are problematic, ideal states, but not meaningless. Moreover, theyare indispensable concepts for our understanding of orders and disorders that wecan apprehend. If we accept the proposition that actual objects are less thanperfectly ordered, then any order of some degree simultaneously implies adisorder of some degree.

Works of art, just like any other kind of object, differ in their degrees of order.14

It is undeniable that there are good and bad works of art, highly original works aswell as relatively predictable works, and so on. If a Beethoven symphony exhibits,as Bergson puts it, an 'admirable order', there are surely some less admirableorders created by inferior composers. Not every composition is a masterpiece. Ifall works of art were equally 'admirable', this attribute would become meaning-less, and there would be nothing special about a Beethoven symphony.

13 For instance, we cannot even imagine the state of a complete homogeneity in which no dis-tinctions whatsoever are possible.

14 George Dickie boldly raised a similar point. Dickie criticized traditional definitions of art forallowing good instances only and ignoring the fact that a bad work of art is still a work of art. See,for instance, The Art Circle (Evanston, IL: Chicago Spectrum Press, 1997), ch. 1.


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A theory that recognizes only ideal instances is not very useful, especially whenit is meant to be relevant to real experience and deal with real objects, not withideal (intellectual) entities. Recognizing the fact that order, vital as well asgeometrical, comes in various degrees compels us to accept that disorder is anessential component of experience and of any theory of order. If X exhibits lessorder than Y, then, by the same token, X exhibits more disorder than Y. If both Xand Y are completely ordered, their values must be the same. Each case that is lessthan perfectly ordered demonstrates a certain degree of order and, at the sametime, a certain degree of disorder. In some cases we may pay more attention to theorder aspect and in others to the disorder aspect, but we cannot deny either ofthem. Bergson's somewhat overenthusiastic defence of natural order and hisbelief in the power of artistic intuition leads him to such unnecessary extremes asdenying the reality of disorder. He fuses ideology with philosophical analysis; afusion that I believe one should strive to avoid.

III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF DISORDER FOR UNDERSTANDING ART

The general idea that art expresses order, and that this order is of a different typefrom the order that is related to the intellect, is a fruitful idea. This idea allows forthe apparently paradoxical combination between order and unpredictability, andbetween necessity and originality. It furthermore excludes the absurd idea thatart is a form of disorder. Notwithstanding, disorder is an important concept forunderstanding art as a form of order. The significance of disorder goes evenbeyond the issue of evaluation that I have introduced in the previous section.Disorder has a crucial role to play in explaining the process of creation as well asthe function of art.

If, as Bergson argues, disorder does not exist and the order we actually find inthings is satisfactory, there can be no reasonable motivation and explanation forthe act of creating a new vital order. Why would someone attempt to create a neworder if the existing one is satisfactory? In the case of geometrical order, not onlyis a new order created, but an existing natural order is deliberately fractured. YetBergson himself justifies the 'brutal' act of the intellect on the basis of itspragmatic value. This indicates that even if the natural order is satisfactory, it isnot beneficial in every respect. Geometrical order does not reflect the true natureof things, but as long as this is acknowledged, this artificial order has its merit.But what is the justification for a man-made vital order? What is its 'excuse'?What is its function? After all, works of art are not natural entities, and there is nopoint in creating alternative vital orders if the original satisfies us.

Art, according to Bergson's theory, cannot be explained on the basis of over-coming vital disorder or replacing the natural vital order since the latter revealsthe true nature of things. Also, art cannot be explained on the basis of the need todefeat geometrical order, since geometrical order is useful and thus indispensable.As things stand in Bergson's theory, it is not clear at all why works of art are


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created. Intuition is capable of grasping the truth of life, duration, and movementby focusing on natural objects—these reflect, according to Bergson, a satisfyingorder. What can art teach us more than what is already intuitively revealed vianatural orders? In what ways can the intuition gain from art?

The general justification for creating a new order must stem from the fact thateither this new order overcomes a state of disorder, or that the given order is notsatisfying. In both cases the acknowledgement of disorder is crucial. If indeed artoffers new vital orders, it must be understood as either defeating some kind ofdisorder or as offering entirely new information that cannot be drawn from thenatural flow of life. The latter position would characterize art as a mere productof imagination that has no relevance to real experience. However, this is notBergson's view. Art is not a pointless or gratuitous product of imagination.15 Artreveals to us something important about human experience and enables us tosee the real nature of things. Accepting that art contributes something significantto the intuitive comprehension of reality, as Bergson does, compels us to admitthat the 'natural' intuitive experience is not satisfactory: it is disordered to someextent.

Reflecting upon human experience one is bound to find in it chaotic com-ponents: blurred impressions, feelings of uncertainty, events that fuse one intoeach other and have no clear beginnings and ends, obscure ideas, and so forth.The fragmented, disordered chunks of experience initiate us to put them inorder; in some cases it is geometrical order, in others it is vital order: each orderanswers different needs. Art offers new vital orders that consist of materials takenfrom our chaotic experience or from orders that no longer satisfy us. Newsituations present new confusions, raise new questions, and motivate the searchfor new orders. Works of art, like organized bodies, are stamped with indiv-iduality. They are sensitive to their context, and keep changing their meaningsaccordingly. This is why we are never satisfied with the achievements of the past.As much as we may admire Beethoven's work, we do not regard it as the finalmusical order; new compositions are created and admired because they answerthe musical needs of new times. We would not admire the new if the old werecompletely satisfying. Indeed, as Bergson argues, the endless flow of lifeconstantly creates new vital orders, but its currents carry new confusions andindeterminate elements as well. Art takes up the challenge or else it is vacuous.16

Ruth Lorand, Department of Philosophy, University of Haifa, Haifa, Israel. Email:[email protected].

15 Stuart Hampshire arrives at this view, although from a completely different point of view. See'Logic and Appreciation', in W. E. Kennick (ed.), Art and Phibsophy:- Readings in Aesthetics (NewYork, St Martin's Press, 1979), pp. 651-657.

16 I wish to thank my friend and colleague Dr Giora Hon for commenting on earlier versions of thispaper.


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