bernstein, j. m., the fate of art

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The Fate of Art

Aesthetic Alienation from Kant

to Derrida and Adorno

J . M . B ernstein

The Pennsy lvan ia S ta te Univers i ty Press

Un i v ers i t y P a rk , P en n s y l v a n i a



Copyright © J. M. Bernstein 1992

First published 1992 in the United States by The Pennsylvania State University

Press, Suite C, 820 North Universi ty Drive, Universi ty Park, PA 16802

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To my father and sister

— and in memory of my mother

Literature

and

Philosophy

A . J . Cascardi, General Editor

This new series will publish books in a wide range of subjects

in philosophy and literature, including studies of the social

and historical issues that relate these two fields. Drawing

on the resources of the Anglo-American and Continental

traditions, the series will be open to philosophically

informed scholarship covering the entire range of con

temporary critical thought.



Contents

A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s v i i

L i s t o f Ab brev ia t ions ix

In t rod uc t io n : Aes the t i c A l iena t ion I

1 M e m o r i a l A e s t h e t ic s : K a n t ' s Critique of Judgement 17

i J u d g e m e n t w i t h o u t K n o w l e d g e 18

ii Im pera t ive Beau ty? 23

iii T h e A n t i n o m y o f A u t o n o m o u s A e s t h e ti c s 2 9

a F r e e a n d D e p e n d e n t B e a u t y 3 2

b F re e Beau ty and the Idea l o f Bea u ty 35

c T h e Beau t i fu l and the Su b l im e 38

iv T h e Q u e s t i o n o f R e f le c t iv e J u d g e m e n t 4 4

v B e a u t y a n d t h e L a b o u r o f M o u r n i n g 5 5

v i I n d e t e r m i n a c y a n d M e t a p h y s i c s ( A n t i c i p a t in g

D e c o n s t r u c t i o n ) 6 3

2 T h e G e n i u s o f B e i n g : H e i d e g g e r ' s ' T h e O r i g i n

of the W ork o f A r t ' 66

i I n t r o d u c t i o n : I m a g i n a t i o n a n d F i n i t u d e 6 6ii Ov ercom ing Aes the t i c s ( I ) : T h in g , H is to r ic i ty and

D o u b l e R e a d i n g 7 2

iii Ov erco min g Aes the t i c s ( I I ) : G rea t Ar t 82

iv Gr ea t Ar t and Ge n iu s : O n Be ing Ex em pla ry 89



V I C O N T E N T S

v G e n i u s , C o m m u n i t y a n d P r a x i s 9 9

v i Ar t and Te ch no log y 108

vii E ar th , W or ld and Alter i ty : T h e Pol is as Ar t 116

vii i Ae s thet ic Al ie nat io n 130

3 T h e D e c o n s t r u c t iv e S u b l i m e : D e r r i d a ' s The Truth in Painting 136

i Ar t , H i s to ry and La ng ua ge 136

ii P a i n t i n g w i t h o u t T r u t h 1 40

i ii T h e re is Pa in t ing 148

iv I n t e r r u p t i n g M e t a p h y s i c s 1 55

v F r a m i n g t h e W i t h o u t E n d o f P u r e B e a u t y 1 59

vi F r a m i n g t h e S u b l i m e 1 66

vii Su bl im ity or T ra g ic Pol i t ics? 175

4 Cons te l l a t ions o f Co nce p t and In tu i t ion : Ad orn o ' s Aesthetic

Theory 188

i R e i n s c r i b i n g A e s t h e t i c s : M o d e r n i s m , A u t o n o m y a n d

Synthes is 190

ii Syn th es i s , I l lu s ion and N on - id en t i ty 197

iii W i t h o u t P u r p o s e 2 0 6

iv A r t , T e c h n o l o g y a n d N a t u r e 2 1 2

5 O l d G o d s A s c e n d i n g : D i s i n t e g r a t i o n a n d S p e c u l a t i o n in

Aesthetic Theory 225

i Ra t iona l iza t ion , D i f fe ren t ia t ion and Ca teg or ies 225

ii D is in teg ra t io n , Sacr if ice and T ru th 233

iii T r u t h o r C o m m u n i c a t i o n ? 2 41

iv T r u t h a n d S p e c u l a t i o n 2 4 8

v Spec u la t ion , Ar t an d Po l i t i c s 261

N o t e s 2 7 5

Index 289



Acknowledgements

This work would not have taken i ts present shape had i t not been for

the in tense and congen ia l a tmosphere I have en joyed in the Ph i losophy

D ep ar tm en t o f the Univ er s i ty o f Es sex over the pas t dozen year s . In pa r t i cu la r , I m us t thank Ro be r t Bernasco n i ; h i s en th us ias m fo r He id egg er

kep t m e read ing h im , and i t was he who f irst exp la ined to m e He ideg ger ' s

h i s to ry o f be ing . Dur ing the decade we were co l leagues , we shared our

f irst read ing of D err id a w i th each o th er , and a lo t mo re .

Whi le I have l ea rned much f rom severa l r e sea rch s tuden ts in the

D e p a r t m e n t , I m u s t m e n t i o n N i c k L a n d ; M i c h a e l N e w m a n , w h o h e l p e d

m e to und er s ta nd V an Go gh and m od ern a r t ; O l iv ie r Sera f inowicz ; and

Ian Wil l iamson, whose ef for ts in help ing me t rans la te passages f rom

A d o r n o ' s Aesthetic Theory will be a bonus for all readers of this text. If

there is credi t here , i t mus t be h is ; mine is the b lame.

Three f r i ends r ead the manuscr ip t a s a who le and o f fe red adv ice , c r i t i

c ism an d sup po r t . N o on e will read th is wo rk as careful ly and thou ghtfu l ly

as Ro be r t P ipp in d id . H is pages o f c r i t i c i sm and a rgu m ent shap ed t he

d i rec t ion o f my rew r i t ing . How ard Cayg i l l knew jus t wha t I was t ry ing

to do and to ld me how to do i t bet ter . He and Gil l ian Rose gave me

Br ig h ton du r ing th e sum m er o f 1988 wh ere the fir st d ra ft o f cha p te r 4 was

wr i t t en . T he re i s no one to who m I am c lose r in te l lec tua l ly and sp i r i tua l lythan Gil l ian Rose; what is bes t in th is work would not have been there

wi thou t he r . For the r es t I a lone am respons ib le .

M y ed i to r a t Po l i ty P res s , Jo hn T h om ps o n , kep t f a ith and th rou gh h i s

cau t ions ma de me p rod uc e a m ore genera l ly acces s ib le t ex t .

Por t ions o f th i s work have been pub l i shed p rev ious ly as : 'Aes the t i c



V l l l ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

a l i ena tion : He idegg er , A do rno , and t ru th a t the end o f a r t ' , in Life After

Postmodernism, e d . J o h n F e k e t e ( L o n d o n : M a c m i l l a n , 1 9 87 ), p p . 8 6 - 1 1 9 ;

'The pol i t ics of fu l f i lment and t ransf igurat ion ' , Radical Philosophy, 47

(1987) , p p . 2 1 - 9 ; ' A r t a g a i n s t e n l i g h t e n m e n t : A d o r n o ' s c r i t i q u e o f e n

l i g h t e n m e n t ' , i n The Problems of Modernity, e d . A n d r e w B e n j a m i n

( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e , 1 98 9 ), p p . 4 9 - 6 6 .

J . M. Berns te in

Colches te r , Es sex



Abbreviations

A T T . W . A d o r n o , Aesthetic Theory, t r . C . L e n h a r d t ( L o n d o n : R o u t -

l edge & Ke ga n Pau l , 1984)

C J I m m a n u e l K a n t , The Critique of Judgement, t r . J a m e s C r e e d

Mered i th (Oxford : C la rendon P res s , 1952)

D o E M a x H o r k h e i m e r a n d T . W . A d o r n o , Dialectic of Enlightenment,t r . J o h n C u m m i n g ( L o n d o n : A l le n L a n e , 1 97 3)

E J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , ' E c o n o m i m e s i s ' , Diacritics 11, 2 (1981) , pp .

3 - 2 5

N M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , Nietzsche, vol. I: The Will to Power as Art, t r .

D a v i d F a r r e l l K r e l l ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e a n d K e g a n P a u l , 1 9 8 1 )

N i i i M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , Nietzsche, v o l . I l l : The Will to Power as

Knowledge and as Metaphysics, t r . J o a n S t a m b a u g h , D a v i d F a r r e l l

K r e l l a n d F r a n k A . C a p u z z i ( L o n d o n : R o u t l e d g e a n d K e g a n P a u l ,

1987)

N D T . W . A d o r n o , Negative Dialectics, t r . E . B . A s h t o n ( L o n d o n :

Rou t ledge and Kegan Pau l , 1973)

O W A M ar t in He ide gger , 'T h e o r ig in o f the work o f a r t ' , in Poetry

Language, Thought, t r . A l b e r t H o f s t a d t e r ( L o n d o n : H a r p e r a n d

Row, 1971)

P H H a n s - G e o r g G a d a m e r , Philosophical Hermeneutics, t r . and ed .

Da vid E. Li ng e (Berkeley: U niv ers i ty of Cal i fornia Press , 1976)

Q T M a r t i n H e i d e g g e r , The Question Concerning Technology and OtherEssays, t r . Wi l l i am Lov i t t (New York : Harper and Row, 1977)

R B H a n s - G e o r g G a d a m e r , The Relevance of the Beautiful and Other

Essays, t r . N i c h o l a s W a l k e r ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y

P r e s s , 1986)



x ABBREVIATIONS

S A T T . W . A d o r n o , Aesthtische Theorie ( F r a n k f u r t a . m . : S u h r k a m p

Verlag, 1970)

T M H a n s - G e o r g G a d a m e r , Truth and Method, t r . W . G l e n - D o e p e l

( L o n d o n : S h e e d a n d W a r d , 1 9 7 5 )

T P J a c q u e s D e r r i d a , The Truth in Painting, t r . Geof f Benn ing ton and

I a n M c L e o d ( L o n d o n : U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 1 98 7)

T S R A l b r e c h t W e l l m e r , ' T r u t h , s e m b l a n c e , r e c o n c il i at i o n : A d o r n o ' s

a e s t h e t i c r e d e m p t i o n o f m o d e r n i t y ' , Telos, 6 1 ( 1 9 8 4 / 5 ), p p . 8 9 -

115



Introduction:

Aesthetic Alienation

Very ear ly in my l i fe I took the ques t ion

of the re la t ion of art to truth ser ious ly :

even now I s tand in holy dread in the faceof th i s d i s co rdance .

F . N i e t z s c h e , Nachlass

T h e d i s co rdan ce o f a r t and t ru th , in the face o f wh ich N ie tzsch e fe lt ho ly

dread, i s as o ld as phi losophy itself. P h i l o s o p h y b e g a n w i t h P l a t o ' s c h a l

l enge to the au thor i ty o f H om er , and w i th the expu ls ion o f the poe t s f rom

the r epub l ic tha t was to be g ro un de d in r eason , t ru th , a lone . T h a t ch a l

l enge and expu ls ion s tand over and cons t i tu te modern i ty even more

empha t ica l ly than they d id P la to ' s ph i losoph ica l U top ia . Modern , au ton

omous a r t - the a r t whose fo rms have become au tonomous f rom the

domin ion o f the metaphys ica l a s sumpt ions and o r ien ta t ions o f Chr i s t i an

faith — has been ' expe l led ' f rom modern soc ie t i e s , f rom the cons t i tu t ive ,

c o g n i t i v e a n d p r a c t i c a l m e c h a n i s m s p r o d u c i n g a n d r e p r o d u c i n g s o c i e t a l

modern i ty : tha t i s the thes i s an imat ing th i s work , and i t s p r imary a im i s to

sus ta in N ie tz sche ' s ho ly d rea d th ro ug h an ana lys is o f the d i s co rd ance

be tw een a r t and t ru th as i t in fo rms con tem po ra ry ph i losoph y .

For N ie tzsche bu t no t fo r h im a lone , the d i s co rdance be tween a r t and

t ru th a rouses d read because a r t and aes the t i c s ( the theore t i ca l d i s course

t h a t c o m p r e h e n d s a r t i n i t s a u t o n o m o u s , p o s t - C h r i s t i a n g u i s e ) a p p e a r a s

s o m e h o w m o r e t r u t h f u l t h a n e m p i r i c a l t r u t h ( k n o w l e d g e u n d e r s t o o d a s

the subsumpt ion o f pa r t i cu la r s under concep ts o r k inds under l aws , and



2 I N T R O D U C T I O N : A E S T H E T I C A L I E N A T I O N

t ru th as a co r re spon den ce be twee n s ta tem en ts - l aws , theor ies , e tc . - and

facts), more r a t iona l than method ica l r eason , more jus t than l ibe ra l ju s t i ce

(beauty , or what beauty s ignif ies , des ignat ing the f i r s t v i r tue of socia l

ins t i tu t ions ) , more va luab le than p r inc ip led mora l i ty o r u t i l i ty . There i s

dread in th is for two reasons : f i r s t , because par t of our exper ience of ar t

is i t s becoming only ar t , mere ar t , a mat ter of tas te ; secondly , because

as such , a r t and aes the t i c s a lways appear to be ou t s ide t ru th , r eason and

mo ra l i ty , thu s a r t be ing 'm or e ' than these i s a lways inde m ons t rab l e , an d

incommensurab le w i th wha t t ru th s ay ing and va lu ing have become as

ra t ional enterpr ises . I f ar t i s taken as ly ing outs ide t ru th and reason then i f

ar t speaks in i t s own voice i t does not speak t ru thful ly or ra t ional ly ; whi le

i f one defends ar t from w ith in the conf ines of the langua ge of t ru th -o nl y

cogn i t ion one be l i e s the c la im tha t a r t i s more t ru th fu l than tha t t ru th -

on ly cogn i t ion .In order to make sense of th is apor ia i t mus t be conceded that the d is

co rdan ce be tween a r t and t r u t h is m iscon s t rued if r egard ed as an op po

s i t ion that s imply inver ts thei r re la t ionship: ar t and aes thet ics are t rue

while t ru th-only cogni t ion , say in i t s rea l iza t ion in the natura l sc iences , i s

false. T h e cha l lenge i s r a th e r to th ink th rou gh w ha t t ru th , m ora l i ty and

beauty (or i t s pr imary ins tance: ar t ) are when what is denied is thei r

categor ia l separat io n f rom one anot he r - a sep arat ion , I shal l argu e, fo l

l o w i n g W e b e r a n d H a b e r m a s , t h a t is c o n s t i t u t iv e o f m o d e r n i t y .1

It is the

en twinement o f a r t and t ru th , the exper ience o f a r t a s somehow cogn i t ive

and o f t ru th as s ensuous and par t i cu la r , and no t the subs t i tu t ion o f one fo r

the o the r w i th in a s t ab le m etaph ys ica l h ie ra rch y , tha t cons t i tu tes the cha l

l enge . T h e im me dia te r ep ercus s ion o f th i s thes i s for a r t and aes the t i c s

is that they are wrongly unders tood i f they are t reated in oppos i t ion

to know ledge and t r u t h , mo ra l i ty and r igh t ac tion . T o cons ide r a r t a s

' m e r e l y ' a e s t h e t i c a l , w h e r e ' a e s t h e t i c s ' h a s c o m e t o m e a n t h e u n d e r s t a n d

ing of beauty and ar t in non-cogni t ive terms , enta i ls a l ienat ing ar t f rom

tru th and mora l i ty . Hence the cha l lenge to modern i ty f rom the pe r spect ive of ar t and aes thet ics , which insofar as i t t ru ly comprehends the

exper ience o f a r t m us t exceed i ts cons t i tu t ion as s t and ing ou t s ide t ru th ,

t ends to occur p r imar i ly th rough ph i losoph ies o f a r t tha t t ake a r t i s t i c

ph en om en a as m ore tha n a m at te r o f t a s te , a s m ore than m ere ly ' aes the t i c '

p h e n o m e n a .

The theore t i ca l and p rac t i ca l e t io la t ion o f the mean ing o f aes the t i c

phe nom ena , the r e lega t ion o f a r t and aes the t i c s to wha t is ou t s id e t ru th

and g ood ness , occ urre d as a con seq ue nce of a do ub le iso la t ion: fi rs t,

th r ou gh the d i r em pt io n o f the ques t ion o f mo ra l va lue f rom ques t ions

of t r u t h and falsi ty - th e fact /value d is t in ct ion - tha t resu l ted f rom the

grow th o f m od ern s c ience and i ts me thodo log ica l s e l f -u nde r s tand ing ; and

second ly , th roug h the s epara t ion o f a r t i s t ic wo r th f rom m ora l wor th - the

insc r ib ing o f a r t w i th in the au tonomous domain o f the ' aes the t i c ' . Th i s



I N T R O D U C T I O N : A E S T H E T I C A L I E N A T I O N 3

la t t e r s epara t ion r ece ived i t s m os t pe r sp icuo us r ep resen ta t ion in the

Kan t ian d ic tum tha t works o f a r t a re pu rposefu l in themse lves , wh i le l ack

ing any pos i t ive , pract ica l (moral) end over and above their in ternal com

p lex ion . Of cour se , even in Kan t , aes the t i c judge m ent was de f ined no t

on ly by means o f the exc lus ion o f cogn i t ion and mora l wor th , bu t equa l ly

t h r o u g h t h e a p p r o x i m a t i o n a n d a n a l o g y i n a e s t h e t i c j u d g e m e n t o f j u d g e

men t in a concep t and the r equ i remen t o f un iver sa l i ty . Which i s to s ay ,

f rom the beginning of the aes thet ic cons trual of ar t there was a s t ra in on

our concep t ion o f aes the t i c judgement and wha t i t to ld us abou t a r t

work s - a s sum ing fo r the purpos es o f a rg um en t tha t ou r concep t ion o f a r t

a n d j u d g e m e n t a r e r o u g h l y d e l i n e a t e d b y t h e K a n t i a n e x c l u s i o n s . W h a t

can we make of a domain in which ques t ions of t ru th , goodness , ef f icacy,

even p leasure (s ince our in teres t in ar t i s 'd is in teres ted ' ) are e l iminated a t

the outse t? W ha t sor t of bea s t m igh t beau ty be i f in con s ide r ing i t we areno t cons ide r ing how the wor ld i s ( t ru th ) , how we do o r shou ld compor t

our se lves in the wor ld (mora l i ty ) , o r wha t migh t be use fu l o r p leasu reab le

to us? A s i lent beas t , then , g iven voice only through the ges tures of

app rox im at ion and ana logy to wh a t i t i s no t . I t is a smal l wond er tha t

the r e ign ing ph i losoph ica l o r thodoxy in the Eng l i sh - speak ing wor ld con

s idered such a phenomenon a t a l l , for i t says nothing in i t s own voice , and

when i t does speak i t i s bu t an ac t o f ven t r i loqu ism whereby t ru th and

mora l i ty speak th rough i t .

T h e cen t ra l in ten t ion o f th i s s tud y i s to in te r roga te and un de rw r i te

the aes the t i c c r i t ique o f t ru t h -o n ly cog n i t ion , and dem on s t ra te how tha t

c r i t ique r esu l t s in a c r i t ique o f en l igh tened modern i ty . I sha l l fu r the r

c la im th at the re is an indirec t reco nce ptua l izat io n of pol i t ics an d t he

mean ing o f the po l i t i ca l a t work in the aes the t i c c r i t ique o f modern i ty ; the

discourse of aes thet ics is a proto-pol i t ica l d iscourse s tanding in for and

m ark ing the absence o f a t ru ly po l it i ca l dom ain in m od ern , en l igh ten ed

soc ie ti e s . In o rder to ind ica te how th i s a rgum en t i s to be pu r su ed , w e

should f i r s t turn to the very idea of phi losophies of ar t that seek to go

beyond aes the t i c s .

I f ' aes thet ics ' in i t s nar row sense refers to the unders tanding of ar t as an

ob jec t o f t a s te ou t s ide t ru th and mora l i ty , then ' pos t - aes the t i c ' theo r ies o f

a r t a re them se lves c r i t iques o f t ru th -o n ly co gn i t ion inso fa r a s the i r go ing

beyond aes the t i c s impl ies a den ia l o f the r ig id d i s t inc t ions s epara t ing the

cla im s of tas te from th e c la ims of kn ow ing or r ight ac t ion . P os t- ae s the t ic

theor ies a re the k ind o f ph i losoph ies o f a r t examined in th i s work . They

a r e , very approx im ate ly , th e ana logu e in the ph i loso phy o f a r t for wh a tpos t -pos i t iv i s t th ink ing i s in the ph i losophy o f s c ience .

2

A c c o r d i n g t o

pos t - aes the t i c theor ies , a r t works mus t be under s tood in nonaes the t i c

terms because the very idea of aes thet ics is based upon a ser ies of

exc lus ions which themse lves as sume a concep t ion o f t ru th in t e rms o f i t s




i so la tion f rom norm at iv e and 'ae s th et i c ' values - an iso la t ion w hic h , rec en t

ly , pos t -pos i t iv i s t ph i losoph ies o f s c ience have undermined . Fur the r , ju s t a s

pos t-pos i t iv ism sees sc ience and i ts object as h is tor ical cons truct ions , so

pos t-aes thet ic theor ies of ar t a t tempt to in ter rogate ar t h is tor ical ly , asking

no t wha t a r t i s , ah i s to r ica lly , bu t wha t i t has been and beco me . T o un de r

s tand ar t , to answer the ques t ion of the meaning and being of ar t , i s to

under s tand , g rasp and ga the r a ce r ta in h i s to ry . Which h i s to ry , however , i s

jus t the ques t ion in d i spu te among compet ing pos t - aes the t i c theor ies .

Pos t - aes the t i c ph i losoph ies o f a r t , the k ind o f theor ies tha t employ a r t

in o rde r to cha l l enge t ru th -on ly cog n i t ion , t end to m ove in an oppos i t e

d i r ec t ion to pos t -pos i t iv i s t ph i losoph ies o f s c ience , loca t ing the mean ing

and be ing o f a r t in i t s cogn i t ive d im ens ion , thus con nec t in g o r r ec on

nec t ing a r t and t ru th . Th is shou ld no t su rp r i s e us , fo r in deny ing pos i t iv

i sm we have come to deny the s epara t ion o f domains ; thus the cen t ra lp lank in sc ience ' s c la im for a hegemony over ques t ions of t ru th is taken

away, which a l lows for the poss ib i l i ty that o ther forms of ac t iv i ty might

have s ignif icant cogni t ive capaci t ies , however d i f ferent those capaci t ies are

f rom tho se of s c ience . Ho we ver , a l thoug h the h i s to ry of a r t up to the m od

ern age appears to l icense the c la im of ar t ' s cogni t ive potent ia l ( for

exam ple , r e l ig ious a r t r e -p rese n t in g the t ru th o f Ch r i s t i an me taphy s ics ) ,

t h e m o d e r n e x p e r i e n c e o f a r t d o e s n o t ; o n t h e c o n t r a r y , m o d e r n e x p e r i

ence of art , i t is argued, is precisely the experience of art as cut off and

separated f rom tru th , as s i lenced, as d i rempted f rom al l that would g ive i t

s ign i f i cance . Au tonomous a r t i s a r t tha t i s au tonomous f rom ( ra t iona l ized )

t ru th and mora l i ty . Th is i s the h i s to r ica l t ru th tha t suppor t s the c la ims o f

t ru th -on ly cogn i t ion and p r inc ip led m ora l i ty ; i t i s the t ru t h und er ly in g

Nietzsche 's holy dread, and i t provides us wi th the f i r s t h in t as to how the

d i sco rdance o f a r t and t ru th comes to s t and as a s ign o f modern i ty . The

exper ience of ar t as aesthetical i s the exper ience of ar t as having los t or

been depr ived o f i t s power to speak the t ru th - wha tever t ru th w i l l mean

when no longer def ined in exclus ive ways . This loss , no mat ter how

theor ized or expla ined, I shal l ca l l ' aes thet ic a l ienat ion ' ; i t denominates

ar t ' s a l ienat ion f rom tr u t h w hich is cause d by ar t ' s becoming aes thet ica l , a

bec om ing tha t has been fu l ly con sum m ate d on ly in m od er n soc ie t i e s . 3

Fur the r , to the ex ten t to wh ich pos t - aes the t i c ph i losoph ies o f a r t con

ceive of art as having suffered a loss , the past is projected from the s tate of

a l i ena t ion as a t ime wh en a r t and t r u th were no t in d i s co rdan ce , whe n they

were un i ted o r in ha rmony . Thus every concep t ion o f the a l i ena t ion o f a r t

f rom t ru th i s s imul taneous ly a work o f r emembrance , a work o f mourn ing

a n d grief, even fo r those ph i losopher s who doub t tha t such an ' o r ig ina l '

s ta te of union ever exis ted . In moderni ty beauty is not only a l ienated f rom

tru th , but gr ieves i t s loss ; m od ern i ty is th e s i te of be au ty berea ved -

be reaved o f t ru th .

One way o f concep tua l i z ing aes the t i c a l i ena t ion which inc ludes the




moment o f mourn ing i s in t e rms o f the end o r dea th o f a r t . Ar t ends as i t

becomes p rogres s ive ly fu r the r d i s tanced f rom t ru th and mora l goodnes s ,

as i t loses i t s capaci ty to speak the t ru th concerning our mos t fundamental

ca tegor ia l engagements and commitmen ts - an even t Hege l iden t i f i e s w i th

a r t ' s s epara t ion from i t s epoc h- lon g subm ers io n in Chr i s t i an i ty . Bu t th i s

f i r s t end of ar t i s ambiguous for two reasons . F irs t , what i s los t or

suppressed in aes thet ic a l ienat ion , the end of ar t , equal ly involves a

defo rm at ion o f wh a t a r t i s s epara te d f rom: t r u t h p r io r to su bs um p-

t ion and goodnes s p r io r to p rocedura l , un iver sa l i s t i c mora l r eason . These

too a re de fo rmed , bu t in ways tha t a re no t obv ious ; on the con t ra ry ,

va lue -neu t ra l r eason and un iver sa l i s t i c mora l i ty a re o f ten t aken to r ep

r e s e n t t h e c o g ni ti v e a c h i e v e m e n t s o f e n l i g h t e n e d m o d e r n i t y . N o n e t h e l e s s ,

i f ar t i s a l ienated f rom tru th and goodness by being iso la ted in to a sep

a ra te sphere , then tha t en ta i l s tha t ' t ru th ' and ' goodnes s ' a r e a l i ena ted ,s epara te d from themse lves . Aes the t i c a l i ena t ion , then , be tok ens t ru th ' s

and r easo n ' s in te rna l d i r em pt io n and defo rm at ion . T he re is a s econd

reas on for the am big ui ty . Because only ar t ' suf fers ' i ts a l ienat ion , be cau se

ar t d i s cover s it s au ton om ou s voca t ion to be uns tab le and incapa b le o f

be in g sus ta ined , becau se a r t mu s t con t inua l ly conce ive o f i t s au t ono m y as

a burden i t mus t bo th embrace and escape f rom, in a l l th i s a r t comes to

speak the t ru th - in a ' l angu age ' tha t i s no t tha t o f t ru th -on ly cogn i t ion -

ab ou t the fa te of t ru th and a r t in m od ern i ty . Ar t ' s exclus ion f rom f irst -

o rde r cogn i t ion and mo ra l jud ge m en t i s , then , a cond i t ion o f i t s ab i l i tyto regis te r ( in a spea king s i lence) a sec on d-o rde r t ru th ab ou t f ir st -order

t r u t h . A r t is the cr it ica l se l f -ref lection of t ru th -o nl y cogni t io n and i ts co n

sc ience . To cons ide r a r t a s a l i ena ted f rom t ru th , and no t ju s t s epara ted

from i t in a happy language game of i t s own, is necessar i ly to conceive of

i t as ac t ing in excess of i t s exclude d s ta tus . W h en ar t loses i t s cr i t ica l

capaci ty i t ends , wi l l end, for a second t ime.

T h e re i s one mo m en t in th i s s to ry of a r t ' s a l iena t ion f rom t ru th and i t s

a t tempt to overcome that a l ienat ion that i s of specia l s ignif icance: i t i sK a n t ' s Critique of Judgement. T h e s ign if i cance o f K an t ' s work is twofo ld .

O n th e one han d , i t i s K an t ' s th i rd Critique tha t a t t empts to genera te , to

ca rve ou t and cons t i tu te , the domain o f the aes the t i c in i t s who l ly modern

s ign i f i ca t ion . In s ecur ing an au tonomous domain o f aes the t i c judgement , a

domain w i th i t s own norms , l anguage and s e t o f p rac t i ces , Kan t was

s imu l taneou s ly s ecur ing the ind epe nd en ce o f the dom ains of cogn i t ion and

mora l wor th f rom aes the t i c in te r f e rence . Fo l lowing Habermas , I sha l l

a rgue tha t the ca tegor ia l d iv i s ions o f r eason r ep resen ted by the th ree

Critiques in sc r ibes a theory o f modern i ty th rough i t s p rov i s ion o f aca tegor ia l und er s t and ing o f the d i f fe rences be tw een w ha t have com e to be

ca l l ed the l anguage games o f knowing , r igh t ac t ion and mora l wor th , and

ar t and aes the t i c s . 4 M o d e r n i t y is t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f s p h e r e s , th e b e c o m i n g

au tonomous o f t ru th , beau ty and goodnes s f rom one ano ther , and the i r




developing in to se l f -suff ic ient forms of pract ice : modern sc ience and tech

no logy , p r iva te mora l i ty and modern l ega l fo rms , and modern a r t . Th i s

ca tegor ia l s epara t ion o f domains r ep resen t s the d i s so lu t ion o f the meta

phys ica l to ta li t ie s o f the p r e - m od ern age . T o th i s day , fo r mo s t ph i loso pher s

th i s d iv i s ion o f l abour r emains un impeachab le . Even wr i t e r s on a r t who

th ink tha t the p roper way o f co m pre he nd ing a r t is a s an ins t i tu t iona l

phenomenon , a move tha t a t f i r s t g lance appear s to pa ra l l e l pos t -pos i t iv i s t

ph i losophy o f s c ience , ho ld tha t the l anguage o f a r t , a r t p rac t i ces , a re au

tonomous p rac t i ces , who l ly un l ike e th ica l o r cogn i t ive p rac t i ces . And th i s

should te l l us that the move to 'p ract ice ' ta lk , to providing an account of

what i t is and what i t is not to be a full ci t izen of the art world, does not of

i tse l f d i rect ly enta i l the k ind of subla t ion of d is t inct ions centra l to over

com ing aes the t i c s ; such t a lk me re ly r ep laces m en ta l t alk ( aes the t i c a t t i tude s

and the l ike) by pract ice ( ins t i tu t ion or language game) ta lk , but leaves thecategor ia l separat io n of ar t and t ru th f irmly in p lace .

On the o the r hand , pa r t o f Kan t ' s p ro jec t in the Critique of Judgement

was to use aes the t i c judgement in o rder to loca te the under ly ing un i ty o f

reason and to c ros s the gu l f s epara t ing the domains o f f r eedom and na tu re ,

oug h t and i s . A lm os t no one has tho ug h t K an t succes sfu l in th i s end eav

our . On the con t ra ry , for m an y o f the genera t ion o f ph i los oph er s fo llowing

Kant , h is fa i lure here was a c lue to the fa i lure , the wrong turning, of the

C r i t i c a l p r o g r a m m e itself. F o r t h e m , t h e a r g u m e n t s o f t h e t h i r d Critique

indicated the fa ls i ty of the categor ia l d iv is ions between the three facul t ies

o f mind and the i r r e spec t ive ob jec t domains . They s aw in the th i rd

Critique the shadow y ou t l ines o f a ph i losop hy p remis sed u po n the sub la

t ion of those legis la t ive d iv is ions . But s ince for them, for Schi l ler ,

Schel l ing and Hegel , the categor ia l d iv is ions of the Cr i t ica l sys tem were

ind ices o f the f r agm enta t ions cons t i tu t ing m od ern soc ie t i e s, the n in

seek ing to con t r ive an overcoming o f Kan t they were s imul taneous ly

engaged in a c r i ti ca l p ro jec t for the overc om ing o f m od ern i ty .5

A n d

because fo r them, fo r German Idea l i sm and Romant ic i sm, i t was p rec i s e ly

the domain o f a r t and aes the t i c s tha t was the Arch imedean po in t tha t

a l lowed fo r the overcoming o f modern i ty , then the re was a l so a na tu ra l

t empta t ion to r egard the p rov i s ion o f a new aes the t i c , a pos t - aes the t i c

ph i losophy o f a r t , a s the po l i t i ca l means th rough which modern i ty was to

be r econs t i tu ted . For them the h ighes t ac t o f r eason was to be an aes the t i c

act , and their goal was to provide a new mythology of reason that would

un i te mank ind . For aes the t i c modern i sm, as these c r i t i ca l p ro jec t s may be

ca l l ed , the a l i ena t ion o f a r t f rom t ru th mus t be cons t rued as bo th a

ca tegor ia l cause and a symptom of the d i s loca t ions and defo rmat ionsund er ly ing mo dern i ty ; the aes the t i c dom ain as charac te r ized by Ka n t

provides ins ight in to those d is locat ions and deformat ions as wel l as

ins inua t ing the concep tua l r esources fo r t r ans fo rmat ion and r e in teg ra t ion ,

r esources fo r the po l i t i ca l t r ans fo rmat ion o f the modern wor ld . Whether




b l ind ly o r knowing ly , th i s is the cr i t ica l p ro gra m m e pursu ed by th e

wri ters d iscussed in th is book.

What the c la im for the double ef fect of the th i rd Critique amounts to i s

the thes i s tha t the d iv i s ion be tween c r i t i c s and suppor te r s o f en l igh tened

modern i ty ( a d iv i s ion somet imes though t o f a s cen t ra l to wha t s epara tes the

t r ad i t i ons o f m od ern c on t inen ta l and ana ly t i c ph i losoph y) is bes t loca tedon and a r ou nd the am bigu ous l egacy o f the th i rd Critique. I f one r eads the

Critique as mo dera te ly success fu l in es tab l i sh ing the au ton om y o f the

aes t het ic d om ain , one wil l fo llow the t ra jectory of analy t ic phi lo sop hy in i t s

pur su i t o f t ru th -on ly cogn i t ion . Fo l lowing th i s t r a jec to ry amoun ts to the

uncr i t i ca l accep tance o f en l igh tened modern i ty . I f one r eads the Critique

as the r ad ica l undo ing o f the ca tegor ia l d iv i s ions be tween knowledge ,

m ora l i ty and aes th et ics , on e wil l fo llow the t ra jectory of th e c on t ine nta l

t r ad i t io n . Fo l low ing th i s t r a jec to ry invo lves a c r i t ique o f en l igh te ned m o d

e r n i t y . T h e Critique of Judgement, an d no t the ph i loso phy o f He ge l , is the

p lace wh ere the ques t ion o f m od ern i ty i s m os t pe r sp icuous ly r a i s ed , whe re

the ca tegor ia l c la ims tha t En l igh tened modern i ty mus t subs tan t ia te fo r

i tse l f are mos t v is ib ly a t i s sue . Are the goals of the Enl ightenment t ru ly

fulf il led thr ou gh the categor ia l separa t ion an d d iv is ion of sph ere s ; or do

tho se d iv is ions proh ibi t the fu lf i lment of th e goals and in ten t ion s w hic h

the i r emergence p romise?

In i t i a l ly , I had in te nde d m y open ing chap te r on K an t to be a r ehear sa l

o f the coming to be o f the domain o f the aes the t i c p remis sed upon a s e r ieso f nega t ions : aes the t i c judgment i s w i thou t concep t , w i thou t in te res t ,

w i th ou t p leasu re ; i t s ob jec t pu rposefu l b u t w i th ou t pu rp ose , e tc . T h i s was

to be fo l lowed by accoun ts o f the pos t - aes the t i c theor ies tha t a t t empt to

g ive back to a r t and ' aes the t i c s ' a l l tha t Kan t had nega ted . The husk o f

such r ead ings i s , pe rhaps , s t i l l v i s ib le . However , in the cour se o f wr i t ing

I found myself beginning to perceive not the famil iar th i rd Critique of

A n g l o - A m e r i c a n c o m m e n t a r i e s , b u t t h e Critique as i t migh t have appeared

to i t s G er m an Idea l i s t r eade r . Ch ap te r 1 a t t e m pts analy t ica l ly to r ec on

s t ruc t such a r ead ing ; my goa l i s to demons t ra te how apore t i c i s aes the t i cau tonomy ( f rom t ru th and mora l T igh tnes s ) , and to loca te w i th in Kan t ' s

text i t s own impl ic i t h is tor ical ref lec t ion , i t s own act of mourning, on the

c o m i n g i n t o b e in g of a u t o n o m o u s a e s t h e t i c s.

The r epercus s ions o f such a r ead ing o f Kan t ' s th i rd Critique are

immense, for not only does i t provide a f i r s t h in t about the nature of the

overcoming o f the a l i ena t ion o f a r t f rom t ru th , bu t i t beg ins to engender

wh a t we have come to th ink o f a s the fundam enta l conc ep tua l vocab u la ry

of con t in en ta l ph i lo sophy , the ph i losoph y tha t cha l l enges en l igh tened

modern i ty th rough recourse to the phenomena o f a r t and aes the t i c s . A

good dea l of wh at I wan t to de m on s tr a te in th is work is tha t what we have

co m e to recogn ize as th e co nt in enta l t rad i t ion inv olves , or i s bes t c on

s t rued as invo lv ing , a s e r ies o f va r ia t ions on themes d rawn f rom Kan t ' s




Critique of Judgement. Theore t i ca l ly , th i s means tha t each wr i t e r con

s ide red w i l l be shown to be pur su ing a ve r s ion o f aes the t i c modern i sm, an

aes the t i c c r i t ique o f en l igh tened r eason and mo dern i ty ; in te rp re ta t ive ly ,

each chap te r w i l l s eek to demons t ra te tha t the fundamenta l in s igh t o f the

tex t under cons ide ra t ion i s bes t under s tood as the work ing ou t o f one

(o r more ) o f the fundamenta l concep ts o f Kan t ' s aes the t i c s . The cen t ra l

conc ep ts o f K an t ' s aes the t i c s - aes the t i c re f lec tive judg em ent , gen ius ,

sensus communis, the sub l ime - a re themse lves c r i t i ca l in te r roga t ions o f

our s t andard ep i s temolog ica l and mora l vocabu la ry : aes the t i c judgement

q u e s t i o n s t h e p a r a d i g m o f k n o w i n g a s s u b s u m i n g p a r t i c u l a r s u n d e r u n i

versal ; the act of genius conceptual izes f ree act ion as creat ive and legis la

t ive ra ther than as ru le fo l lowing; the idea of the sensus communis installs

a no t ion o f an ep i s temic communi ty tha t b reaks w i th the c la ims o f meth

odological so l ips ism and permits a re inscr ip t ion of sens ib i l i ty ; whi le theidea of the subl ime provides for a concept ion of a l ter i ty or o therness that

cha l lenges the sovere ign ty o f the s e l f -de te rmin ing , au to no m ou s mora l su b

ject . T h e languag e of K an t ia n aes thet ics is no t s im ply d if ferent f rom the

Cr i t i ca l vocabu la ry o f knowing and r igh t ac t ion , bu t , desp i te Kan t ' s

in ten t ions , r a i s es a cha l l enge to tha t vocabu la ry . In exp lo i t ing Kan t ' s aes

the t i c d i s course He idegger (gen ius ) , Der r ida ( the sub l ime) and Adorno

( j u d g e m e n t a n d sensus communis) sys temat ica l ly pu r sue the work o f de fo rm

ing and r e fo rming our un de r s ta nd ing o f t ru th and m ora l i ty .

T o p u t th is sam e point a no the r way, a t leas t on e s ignificant s t ra in of

m od ern t ho ug h t has been s eek ing ways o f ( r e ) con nec t ing the m od ern

subject or se l f wi th an order beyond i t , searching ' for moral sources

outside the sub jec t th rough languages which r esona te within h im or he r ,

the g rasp ing o f an o rder wh ich i s in separab ly indexed to a pe r sona l

v i s i o n ' .6

Now the wr i t e r s I in te r roga te cons ide r tha t such sources canno t

be d iscovered in , say , the fact of language as a lways in tersubject ive , or in

l ingu is t i c communi ty as the inev i tab le bea re r o f the pos s ib i l i t i e s o f ind i

v idua l speech and ac t ion , tha t on ly r equ i res a pos i t ive commitmen t to i t ino rde r fo r co m m un al l if e to be r e inv igora ted as a m ora l source and au th

o r i ty . T h is is the b land hop e of so -ca ll ed com m un i ta r ia n po l i t ica l theo ry .

The depr iva t ions o f modern i ty a re exper ien t ia l a s we l l a s theore t i ca l , a

socie ta l or cul tu ra l fa ta li ty as wel l as a phi lo soph ical p erple xi ty . So for

Heidegger and Adorno acces s to sources o f mean ing beyond the s e l f a re

b locked , on the one han d b y the d i spos i t ion o f m od er n soc ia l fo rmat ions

as technolog ical ly or ie nte d or ra t iona l ized , an iron cage, an d on the o th er

hand by the d i spos i t ion o f ou r ca tegor ia l f r ameworks , wh ich in s epara t ing

the d i s courses o f t ru th , goodnes s and beau ty f rom one ano ther debar s usf rom comprehens ive ly r ecord ing our s i tua t ion , f rom mak ing in te l l ig ib le

and s ignif icant i t s specif ic human weight and sa l ience, i t s v io lences and

griefs, dis rup t io ns and insens i t iv i t ies . A cer ta in defo rm at ion of socie ty and

c u l t u r e s i m u l t a n e o u s ly e n g e n d e r s a d e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e t e r m s t h r o u g h




which those f i r s t-o rder de fo rm at ions co u ld be cogn ized and c r i t iqued . Fo r

reasons tha t w i l l need ex tens ive expound ing , au tonomous a r t manages ,

o r m ana ged , however ind i rec t ly , such a cogn i t ion and c r i t ique ; an d , even

more s ignif icant ly for my purposes , aesthetic discourse contains concepts and

terms of analysis, a categorial framew ork, which , if freed from confinem ent in

an autonomous aesthetic domain, would open the possibility of encountering asecular world empowered as a source of meaning beyond the self or subject.

Aes the t i c judgem ent , the jud gem ent o f t a s te , in tend s a cogn i t ion o f wh a t

is s ignif icant or wor thy in i t se l f through the way i t resonates for us ; sub

l imi ty in tends an exper ience o f empha t ic o the rnes s o r a l t e r i ty i r r educ ib le

to t ru th -on ly cogn i t ion o r mora l r eason ; gen ius in tends an ac t ing beyond

the mean ing-g iv ing powers o f the sub jec t ive w i l l ; the sensus communis

i n t e n d s a c o n c e p t i o n of c o m m u n i t y w h o s e m u t u a l i t ie s a n d a t t u n e m e n t s

cond i t ion and o r ien t wha t aes the t i c judgement judges and gen ius c rea tes .

Toge ther these concep ts t r ace o r env i s ion an a l t e rna te fo rm o f communi ty

wh ich is i r revocab ly 'pol i t ica l ' in i t s com ple xio n.

H ibe rna t ing w i th in aes the t i c d i s cou rse i s ano ther d i s course , ano the r

m etaph ys ics , the ve ry one we app aren t ly nee d in o rd er to cogn ize an d

t rans fo rm the one we rou t ine ly inhab i t . T h u s the r e fuge tha t aes the t i c s

rep resen t s fo r th i s a l t e rna t ive concep t ion o f communi ty and mode o f cog

n i t ion s imul taneous ly en t r aps i t , a t r ap tha t r emains un t i l i t s aes the t i c

c o n f i n e m e n t i s b r o u g h t t o a n e n d . I n H e i d e g g e r , D e r r i d a a n d A d o r n o t h e

a t t em pt i s m ade to un do th e b lock , r e lease wh a t a r t and aes the t i c d i s courses ignify f rom the spel l that encloses them with in the i l lusory wor ld of ar t .

Par t of what is involved in th is a t tempt is the ass imila t ion of the d iscourse

of th i s ph i losoph ica l en te rp r i s e to the d i s course o f aes the t i c s ; the hope

of th is pract ice is tha t thro ug h th is ass imila t ion p hi loso phy wil l co m e to

possess the cr i t ica l character is t ics of the (aes thet ic) objects i t i s ta lk ing

abo u t . Aes the t i c m od ern i sm in ph i los ophy i s no t on ly about ar t ' s a l i en

a t ion f rom and c r i t ique o f modern i ty , bu t equa l ly is tha t a l i ena t ion and

cr i t ique; i t i s the a t tempt by phi losophy to l iken i tse l f to an aes thet ic

object in order that i t can both d iscurs ively analyse the fa te of ar t andt ru th whi le s imul taneous ly be ing works to be judged ( the way poems a re

works to be judged) . Whi le th i s a s s imi la t ion a l lows these ph i losoph ies to

app rop r ia te for themse lve s som e o f th e power and fo rce o f a r t work s , it

equa l ly en ta i l s the i r s il enc ing and d i r em pt io n f rom th e so r t o f t ru th tha t

r emains dominan t fo r us .

At one level , th is s ta te of af fa i rs i s inevi table . I f t ru th-only cogni t ion is

bo th a de fo rmed conc ep t ion o f t ru th and cons t i tu t ive o f m od ern i ty , th en

ph i lo soph y canno t say wh a t is t ru e w i th ou t aba nd on ing i t se l f to tha t w h ichi t seeks to cr i t ic ize . Al ternat ively , i f the cr i t ique of t ru th-only cogni t ion

and m ode rn i ty i s lodged ou t s ide wh a t t ru th has bec om e, and hence is m ar

g ina l an d ex te rna l to the acc om pl i sh m en ts o f m ode rn i ty , then in r em ain

ing loyal to i ts object , in i ts conceptual f ideli ty to art , philosophy loses the




capac i ty d i s cu r s ive ly to unde r s ta nd and exp la in . T h i s is the cons t i tu t ive

apor ia o f aes the t i c modern i sm: in r emain ing fu l ly d i s cu r s ive i t be t r ays

wha t r eason and t ru th cou ld be , wha t a r t and aes the t i c d i s course r emain a

promise of ; but i f i t abandons the r igours of fu l l d iscurs iv i ty i t necessar i ly

fa l ls s i lent , an inmate in the refuge and pr ison of ar t .

Pe rhaps the p rocedura l d i l emma tha t the thes i s o f aes the t i c a l i ena t ion

enta i ls can be put th is way. I f ar t works and aes thet ic d iscourse do not

em bo dy a se lf -suffic ient a l tern at ive to t ru th -o nl y cog ni t ion , bu t ra th er

reveal i t s l imi ts th ro ug h exem pli fy ing their own par t ia l ch ara cte r , thei r

own in te rna l con t rad ic t ions and apor ia i , then one canno t t ake up a pos i

t ion e i the r in s ide o r ou t s ide them. To take up a pos i t ion ins ide wou ld

mean having phi losophy jo in ar t in i t s s t rangled d iscourse , thereby leaving

the or ig in of th at s ta te of affai rs un exp lain ed an d una cc ou nte d for.Conv er se ly , to exp la in m od ern i ty ph i losoph ica l ly m ean s s tand ing o u t s ide

the c r i t i ca l van tage po in t a r t pe rmi t s and subsuming i t under the ve ry

terms of reference i t i s s t ruggl ing agains t . An 'outs ide ' pos i t ion is sug

ges ted by each o f the ph i losoph er s cons ide red ex cep t De r r id a : i t i s the h i s

tory of progress ive moral cul ture in Kant ; the h is tory of being (as the

epoch o f metaphys ics ) and modern i ty as governed by the es sence o f t ech

no logy in He idegger ; and the h i s to ry o f r a t iona l iza t ion comple t ing i t s e l f in

cap i ta l i sm in Ad orn o . Each o f these h i s to r ies exp la in mod ern i ty , p rov id ing

the u l t ima te f r ame o f r e fe rence fo r under s tand ing i t . And in o rder to s i tu

a te these compet ing accoun ts and a rb i t r a te be tween them, I sha l l p lace

the i r accoun ts w i th in wha t I t ake to be the bes t h i s to r ica l accoun t o f mod

erni ty . That wi l l be th is work 's ' a f f in i ty to barbar ism' ,7

i t s ra t ional is t ic

m o m e n t .

Ye t Der r id a i s no t w ron g in dem ur r ing f rom suc h accoun ts , fo r these

t r anscenden t pe r spec t ives approx imate in one way o r ano ther to the ve ry

th ing they a re a t t empt ing to tw is t f r ee f rom and overcome. In pos i t ing ,

th rough wha tever means , a h i s to ry as the spec i f i c de te rminan t o f ou r f a tethey, and I , take up a pos i t ion outs ide h is tory and unify i t , g iv ing i t the

very un i ty and t r anscendence they a re o the rwise wr i t ing aga ins t . A

phi losophical h is tory of ar t , or pol i t ics , d isp laces the uniqueness of the ar t

work o r hu m an ac t ion w i th a me an in g ex te rna l to i t . So , H an na h A ren d t

h a s a r g u e d ,

Hege l ' s ph i losophy , though concerned wi th ac t ion and the r ea lm o f

human a f fa i r s , cons i s ted in con templa t ion . Befo re the backward-

d i rec ted g lance o f though t , every th ing tha t had been po l i t i ca l - ac t s ,

and w ord s , an d events - bec am e his tor ical , wi th the resul t tha t the

new wor ld which was ushered in by the e igh teen th cen tu ry d id no t

rece ive . . . a ' ne w sc ience o f po l i t i e s ' , bu t a ph i losop hy o f h i s to ry .8




A re nd t ' s own work is v i ta l ly conc erned wi th the d i s appeara nce o f po l it i ca l

act ion and judgement , pol i t ica l l i fe itself, s ince the t ime o f the Greeks ; and

one o f the cen t ra l even t s in he r na r ra t ive i s the deve lopment o f the ph i los

ophy o f h i s to ry which s imul taneous ly acknowledges and wipes away , a s

wi th a sponge , the immanence o f human a f fa i r s , en tw in ing them in p rov i

dence, progress , c lass conf l ic t , the workings of the ' invis ib le hand ' , e tc .Bu t in r eco rd ing the s to ry o f the suppres s ion o f po l i t i ca l judgement and

ac t ion Ar en d t becom es ano ther ph i losoph ica l con tem pla to r o f h i s to ry . Sh e

can only reveal , judge, the fa te of pol i t ica l judgement through recourse to

the ve ry k ind of h i s to ry which i s the supp res s ion o f judg em ent .

I f ar t i s a l ienated f rom tru th b u t not i t s abs olu te o ther , if pol i t ica l

act ion is a l ienated f rom his tor ical me an ing bu t no t i t s abso lu te o t he r

(as Arend t appear s to be l i eve) , then the p rocedura l , ph i losoph ica l apor ia

enca psu la te d in the d ia lec ti c o f im m an en t (in s ide ) and t r an sce nd en t

(ou t s ide ) c r i t i c i sm, de r iv ing f rom the i r incommensurab i l i ty w i th each

o t h e r , m u s t e q ua l ly b e a p r o d u c t a n d s y m p t o m o f t h e p h e n o m e n o n b e i n g

a n a l y s e d . W h e n A d o r n o , f o r e x a m p l e , c o n c e d e s t h a t t r a n s c e n d e n t c r i t i

c ism , the pro vid ing of a ph i loso phy of h is t ory , con ta ins an 'a ff in i ty to b ar

ba r i sm ' and ye t in s is t s upo n i t , he is m ak in g m ore than an ep i s temolog ica l

po in t abou t the unavo idab i l i ty o f the c r i t ique r eco i l ing upon the c r i t i c .9

W ha t ap pea r s as a reco i l tha t u su r ps th e c r i ti c ep is temolog ica l ly i s ethically

a m om en t o f s e l f - impl ica t ion , an ackn ow ledg em ent o f com pl ic i ty and

gu i l t . Fo r Adorno tha t acknowledgement o f compl ic i ty and gu i l t i s the

eth ical ges ture that makes cr i t ique poss ib le . I shal l fo l low Adorno in th is ,

a rgu ing tha t the ques t ion o f method , the ques t ion o f in s ide and ou t s ide ,

o f immanence and t r anscendence , the ques t ion o f how ph i losophy i s to

compor t i t se l f when i ts terms of analys is are a lways a l ready e lements of a

defo rm at ion o f r eason , mu s t be cons t ru ed as a que s t ion o f e th ics and po l i

t ics . O r ra the r , i f t ru th -on ly cogn i t ion do es r ep rese n t bo th the rea l i ty and

defo rm at ion o f ex i s t ing r eason , then p h i losoph ica l wr i t ing mu s t find a way

of ' express ing ' i t s non-neutra l i ty , i t s defence of a ra t ional i ty that i t s own

s tan dar d fo rms o f work ing p rosc r ibe .Nor i s the men t ion o f e th ics and po l i t i c s ex t r aneous to the main l ines o f

a rgument in th i s e s say . I began th i s in t roduc t ion by invok ing the d i s co r

dan ce be tw een a r t and t ru th th a t a rose in the expu ls ion o f the poe t s f rom

Pla to ' s idea l s t a te . Tha t the d i s co rdance be tween a r t and t ru th f i r s t a rose

in th is 'pol i t ica l ' se t t ing is s ignif icant . In order to adumbrate the nature of

that s ignif icance I want to te l l a fable , a mythic s tory .

O nc e upon a t ime the re was a p rec ip i tou s mo m en t in the h i s to ry o f the

Wes t when the deba te be tween ph i losophy and po l i t i c s , be tween theory as

con templa t ion and po l i t i ca l praxis, was in a s ta te of tense equi l ibr ium,

undec ided one way o r the o the r . Such a moment was ce r ta in ly a f te r the

moment o f Greek t r agedy ; pe rhaps i t occur red a t o r ju s t a f t e r the t ime o f




th e t r ia l of Soc rates . I t is a m om en t recal led , bu t whic h ma y never have

exis ted , in Ar is to t le ' s imaging of the bios politikos, Greek ethical l ife, as the

life of the polis. I n P l a t o ' s Republic the is sue between pol i t ica l l i fe and the

theore t i ca l , the l i f e o f con templa t ion , i s dec ided : the au tonomy and inde

pendence o f theory i s e s tab l i shed th rough the ins t i tu t ion o f a d i s inc t and

au thor i t a t ive domain ou t s ide the chang ing and f r ag i le a rena o f humanaffa i rs . Hencefor th , pol i t ics (pract ice) was to be only the appl icat ion of

theory to the wor ld . Pract ice los t i t s own s ight , i t s own form of reasoning

and ac t iv i ty . P rac t i ca l r eason became the app l ica t ion o f theore t i ca l under

s tand ing to p rac t i ca l ma t te r s r a the r than a fo rm o f wor ld ly engagement in

i t s own r igh t . T h e t r iu m ph o f the li fe o f con tem pla t io n in P la to - wh ich

wou ld be con t inue d in Chr i s t i an i ty , in m od er n ph i losoph ies o f h i s to ry and

in th e econo m ic org aniz at ion of m ass socie ties - spel led the end of e th ical

l ife a lm os t before i t ha d b eg un . T h is is a s tory famil iar to reade rs of

A r e n d t a n d H e g e l . 1 0

Now a t the s ame t ime as P la to was e rec t ing h i s theore t i ca l r epub l ic , and

in order to secure the sovereignty of theory for i t , he expel led the ar t is ts .

Th is expu ls ion and /o r marg ina l i za t ion was unavo idab le , fo r the p rac t i ce o f

a r t , no m at te r how con s t rue d , in s t i tu tes a th ree fo ld de pa r tu re from the

dominance o f theory : because a r t au thor izes un ique , ind iv idua l i t ems ,

i t t enden t ia l ly w orks aga ins t the h ie ra rch y o f un iver sa l and par t i cu la r ;

because ar t i s bound to the l i fe of par t iculars , i t tendent ia l ly celebrates

the c la ims o f s ensu ousn es s and em bo d im en t ; becau se it s p rac t i ces a retenden t ia l ly gov erned by the c la ims o f s ensuou snes s and par t i cu la r i ty , i t

in s t iga tes an a l t e rna t ive concep t ion o f ac t ing , one which b inds do ing and

m a k i n g , praxis a n d poiesis, t o g e t h e r . T h e e n t w i n e m e n t o f t h e s e t h r e e

dep ar tu res f rom theory i s a r t ' s in s t iga t ion o f a kno win g and a t ru th ou t s ide

theore t i ca l knowing and t ru th . I f no t comple te ly v i s ib le a t the beg inn ing

of the s tory , where the reason for ar t ' s expuls ion had to do with i t s being a

copy of a copy, a reason whol ly in ternal to the logic of theoret ica l know

ing , then the dev e lop m ent o f a r t p rov ides ano th er in s igh t in to a r t ' s su p

press ion , namely i ts l ikeness to pol i t ica l knowing and pol i t ica l pract ice .A r t ' s supp res s ion , i t s m arg ina l i za t ion a nd exc lus ion f rom t r u t h , occur red

as a d i r ec t consequence o f the suppres s ion o f the bios politikos.

Of course , s ince the under s tand ing o f a r t has a lways been de te rmined

by the theore t i ca l pe r spec t ive , i t was no t un t i l a r t became au tonomous

from theory , t ru ly external to i t , that the grounds for i t s or ig inal sup

p r e s si o n c o u l d e m e r g e . T h r o u g h o u t i t s h i s t o r y p h i l o s o p h y a t t e m p t e d t o

tame a r t , to suppres s i t s t enden t ia l p ro tes t to the r e ign o f theory . Bu t

whi le phi los op hy h ad n o d if ficulty in con s ign ing ar t to th e realm of se n

so ry exper ience , to the wor ld o f op in ion (doxa) and appearance ( the ve ry

'wor ld ' of pol i t ica l l i fe) , a lmos t to non-being, nonetheless the beauty of

works shone , and the i r sh in ing , the i r c la iming spec ta to r s th rough the i r

sensory character is t ics , tendent ia l ly gave pause to the re legat ion of ar t




t o n o n - b e i n g a n d n o n - t r u t h . A s t h e d o m i n a n c e o f t h e o r y g r e w , a r t ' s

ten de nt ia l d if ference f rom i t grew as wel l ; the d iscord anc e betw een ar t a nd

t ru th began to r age . S lowly , then , a r t i s t i c knowing , wha t came to be ca l l ed

aes thet ic ref lect ion by Kant , took on the v isage of an af ter - image of pract i

ca l knowing , o f phronesis; and s lowly ar t is t ic pract ice , creat ive genius ,

emerged as an af ter - image of pol i t ica l praxis. H e n c e t h e m o d e r n w o r k o fa r t i ts e lf in i t s un i ty w i th ou t a p r inc ip le o r concep t de te rm in ing th a t un i ty ,

a n d t h e c o m m u n i t y g a t h e r e d a r o u n d p a r t i c u l a r w o r k s w i t h t h e i r s h a r e d

sensus communis, became images o r a f t e r - images o f the ( idea l i zed ) polis.

T h e d i s co rdan ce be tween a r t and t ru th i s the a f t e r - image , the mem ory , of

the d i s co rdance be tween po l i t i c s and ph i losophy , po l i t i c s and t ru th -on ly

cog ni t ion . Ar t no w, or jus t before n ow , is (or was) th e c iph er for an ab sen t

po l i t i c s , a po l i ti ca l do m ain au t on om ou s from the s ta m p and sub juga t ion o f

t h e o r y .

I t i s thus no acc iden t tha t Arend t shou ld have come to r egard Kan t ' s

t h i r d Critique as the place to look for his poli t ics , for i t is in his theory

of tas te that we f ind a cons iderat ion of appearances in thei r own r ight

t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e c o n c e p t s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n , i n te r s u b je c t iv e a g r e e m e n t ,

a n d s h a r e d j u d g e m e n t t h a t a r e c o n s t i t u t i v e fo r e m p h a t i c , a u t o n o m o u s p o l

i t ica l th ink in g . How eve r , Are nd t g ives no ind ica t ion as to wh y fun da m en

ta l th inking on pol i t ica l l i fe should now be found in a text on aes thet ics .1 1

Ce rta in ly K an t d id no t v iew his aes th et ics in th is way; no r is th e the s is

that ar t i s the p lace-holder for an absent pol i t ics d i rect ly s ta ted by any ofthe ph i losopher s cons ide red in th i s book . None the les s , i f we v iew a r t f rom

the van tage po in t o f i t s au tonomy, and v iew tha t van tage po in t a s

revea l ing someth ing in t r ins ic abou t a r t works and the p rac t i ces su r round

ing them, someth ing l a ten t o r impl ic i t in them wha tever theore t i ca l cover

ing they have been g iven , then the suppres s ion o f the bios politikos a n d t h e

expu ls ion o f the a r t i s t s become convergen t e lemen ts o f a s ing le ac t o f

domina t ion and suppres s ion . Specu la t ive ly , a r t and po l i t i c s a re one .

Beau ty be reaved i s po l i t i c s be reaved . Th is r ead ing o f the mean ing o f aes

the t i c mo dern i sm i s the one tow ards which the p resen t work is d i r ec te d . I ti s a though t tha t I sha l l a t t empt to in s inua te in to the r ead ings o f the t ex t s

s t u d i e d .

T o sum m ariz e my ter m s of analys is : f ir st , each rea din g wil l in te r ro gat e

a vers io n of the a l ienat ion of ar t f rom t ru th an d the cr i t iq ue of mo de rn i ty

impl ied by tha t a l i ena t ion . Second ly , each r ead ing w i l l comment upon the

ana lys i s o f m od ern i ty and th e ph i losoph y o f h i s to ry suppo r t ing i t in th e

tex t under cons ide ra t ion . Each ph i losophy o f h i s to ry w i l l be s een to invoke

a d if ferent effor t of m em or y, a d i f ferent object of m ou rni ng . T hi rd ly , eac h

reading wil l seek to reveal the operat ion of a fundamental aes thet ic

ca tegory d raw n from Ka n t as con s t i tu t ing the do m ina n t tho ug h t o r in s igh t

of the text in ques t ion . Four th ly , each reading wil l take up the is sue of the

reco i l upon though t o f tha t wh ich i t i s a t t empt ing to overcome. F ina l ly ,




each reading wil l ins inuate a th inking through how ar t and pol i t ics are

categor ia l ly re la ted .

These , o f cour se , a re genera l gu ide l ines and no t d i r ec t ives ; they p rov ide

the o r ien ta t ion fo r my read in gs and no t an ou t l ine of the m . F ur th e r ,

r ead ings a re no t r es t r i c ted to chap te r s . I do no t g ive my read ing o f Kan t

on genius and ar t unt i l chapter 2 , and I do not complete my analys is ofDer r ida on He idegger on Van Gogh un t i l the f ina l chap te r . Hence chap te r

2, on 'The or ig in of the work of ar t ' , i s rea l ly about Heidegger and

K a n t ; D e r r i d a ' s The Truth in Painting i s i t se l f a reading of Heidegger and

Kan t ; and chap te r s 4 and 5 , a long the way , in s t iga te c r i t i ca l engagements

b e t w e e n A d o r n o a n d b o t h H e i d e g g e r a n d D e r r i d a r e s p e c t i v e l y .

In cha p te r 2 I tu rn to He ideg ger ' s 'T h e o r ig in o f the work o f a r t ' in

o rder to beg in th ink ing th rough the thes i s tha t a r t mus t be under s tood

his tor ical ly , and that aes thet ics , as the ref lect ive comprehens ion of ar t

a l i ena ted f rom t ru th , i s a p rod uc t o f m ode rn i ty . Non-a es th e t i c a r t

H e i d e g g e r t e r m s ' g r e a t a r t ' ; h e n c e , m o d e r n i t y i s u n d e r s t o o d b y H e i d e g g e r

through the end or death of great ar t . In Heidegger ' s essay aes thet ic ar t i s

r ep rese n ted by Van G og h ' s pa in t ing of the peasan t wom an ' s shoes ; and i t

i s th rough an ana lys i s o f the ro le the pa in t ing p lays in He idegger ' s accoun t

tha t the 'm ean ing ' o f m od ern a r t first beg ins to em erge . Fo r He idegg er

tha t mean ing i s in t imate ly connec ted w i th a r t ' s l ikenes s to and d i f f e rence

f rom techno log y , wh ich i ts e lf m us t be und er s too d in t e rm s o f the u n i ty

and di ff e rence ho ld ing be twe en 'c r ea t ing ' and 'm ak in g ' . O n e som ewh ataus te re and t echn ica l way o f d rawing tha t d i s t inc t ion wou ld be th rough

K a n t ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l , p r o d u c t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n a n d

the r ep ro duc t ive imag ina t ion . T h e fo rmer i s them at ized in the th i rd Criti

que's analys is of the work of genius . Works of great ar t are pre-modern

works of gen ius . T h e p ro voca t ion o f cha p te r 2 l i es in m y a t t em pt to d em

ons t r a te tha t the th ink ing abou t the mean ing o f be ing tha t He idegger

develops f rom his analys is of great ar t i s but a general ized th inking of the

K an t ian no t ion o f gen iu s . Bu t gen ius in Ka n t i s the qu in tes senc e o f fr ee

d o m , s o H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t d r a w s o n t h e m o s t e m p h a t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n o fmodern f r eedom, w i thou t wh ich h i s theory wou ld be un th inkab le , in o rder

to p ropound a th ink ing (o f be ing) where f r eedom and sub jec t iv i ty have no

p lace .

Two dif f icul t ies emerge in my reading of Heidegger . F i rs t , h is theory

lacks the resources to expl icate the ro le that modern ar t p lays in i t .

Second ly , i t s moment o f t r anscendence , He idegger ' s concep t ion o f be ing

and the h i s to ry o f be ing , r em ain too d i s tan t f rom the phen om ena they

in fo rm, and as a consequence end up suppres s ing wha t was to be s a lvaged .

T h i s suppre s s ion i s m os t p ron ou nc ed in the way He idegg er b inds the

cons ide ra t ion o f a r t w i th po l i t i c s . Der r ida ' s p rac t i ce o f r ead ing appear s

to provide a so lu t ion to these d i f f icul t ies . I t locates the moment of

t r ansc end enc e , wh ich i s equa l ly a m om en t o f the los s o f g ro un d in g , in pa r

t i cu la r t ex t s ; thus , un l ike in He idegger , the moment o f t r anscendence i s




whol ly and d i s c re te ly en m eshe d wi th in pa r t i cu la r i t ems . T h is is wh a t is a t

is sue in h is analys is of 'The Orig in of the Work of Ar t ' : the pain t ing of the

shoes g rounds the pos s ib i l i ty o f He idegger ' s theory whi le exceed ing i t .

D er r id a ' s r ead ing revea l s the Van G og h as a ful ly m od ern and m od ern i s t

work o f a r t . On ly w i th h igh mod ern i sm i s a r t ' s dep ar tu re f rom an d

cr i t iqu e o f r ep rese n ta t ion and t ru th -o n ly cogn i t ion ach ieved . M od ern i s t

works o f a r t a re sub l ime: they exceed r ep resen ta t iona l ca tegor ies wh i le

open ing up the ca tegor ia l space in wh ich they a re r ep resen ted . My p rovo

ca t ion in th i s cha p te r i s to con tend tha t th i s charac te r iza t ion o f m od ern i s t

ar t i s equal ly appl icable to decons truct ive readings : they work to d iscover /

c rea te the sub l ime moment in each t ex t - the moment tha t canno t be

rep re sen te d in the tex t bu t wh ich none the les s g ro un ds i t s mo s t fun da m en

ta l poss ib i l i t ies .

D er r ida ' s theory (o r an t i - the ory , ana logous to the an t i - a r t e lem en t o fh i g h m o d e r n i s m ) is c o n s u b s t a n t i a l w i t h t h e t h o u g h t o f t h e K a n t i a n s u b

l ime - the u l t ima te t a rge t o f h i s r ead ing o f Kan t . In r ead ing Der r ida r ead

ing K an t I fo llow w ha t am ou n ts to a He ge l ian t ack : can we un de r s ta nd the

mean ing o f the sub l ime fo rmal ly w i thou t a t the s ame t ime re f lec t ing on

the h i s to r ica l subs tan t ia l i ty s ed imen ted in i t ? Does no t such a h i s to ry

in t ru de on and upse t i t s fo rmal work ings? M u s t no t the fo rmat ive work o f

h i s to ry be acknowledged? The sub l ime , I w i l l sugges t , has s ed imen ted

wi th in i t the though t o f Greek t r agedy and the po l i t i c s appropr ia te to i t .

T h a t a b s e n t p ol it ic s r e m a i n s u n k n o w n t o D e r r i d a .

Derr ida chal lenges such a th inking of h is tory - the af f in i ty to barbar ism

at work in my re adin g of h i m - on the bas is of jus t the sor t of con

s iderat ion we wil l have come to expect : i t s repress ion of the very i tems

that are to be sa lvaged through recourse to i t . In avoiding th is h is tory

Der r ida l eaves unknown the f a te aga ins t wh ich the modern i s t sub l ime

works ; in p lace of unders tanding and explanat ion he of fers an e th ical chal

l enge to m ode rn i ty , a cha l l enge tha t is em pha t ic and b l ind a t the s am e

t i m e .

T h e fa i lures of aes th et ic m od er ni sm are fa i lures ade qua te ly to reflect

upon i t s t e rms o f ana lys i s , the t e rms o f Kan t ' s aes the t i c theory . Such a

ref lection is the project of Ad or no 's Aesthetic Theory. U s i n g t h e a c h i e v e

ments of modernis t ar t as i t s guid ing thread, i t seeks to t race the cr i t ica l

t r ans fo rmat ion tha t aes the t i c d i s course pe r fo rms upon the l anguage o f

reason ( t ru th -on ly cogn i t ion and ca tegor ica l mora l i ty ) . On ly th rough such

a r e flect ion can we co m pre he nd how a r t ' s app are n t un reaso n revea l s the

i r ra t ional i ty of formal , en l ightened reason. In chapter 4 th is ref lect ion is

fo l lowed to the point where ar t ' s l ikeness to and d if ference f rom technolog ica l r eason is r evea led ; th i s p rov ides the coun te r to He ideg ger ' s th ink

ing o f the a r t / t echno lo gy nex us . C ha p t e r 5 works toward an un de r s ta nd ing

of the modern i s t sub l ime , an under s tand ing o f i t s power and l imi t s

exempl i f ed by the ph i losoph ica l wr i t ing o f bo th Der r ida and Adorno .

I wil l co nten d tha t the bes t formal ch arac ter iza t ion of the work of



1 6 I N T R O D U C T I O N : A E S T H E T I C A L I E N A T I O N

He idegg er and D er r i da i s tha t they fo llow the pa th o f the Ka n t ian

t r anscenden ta l ( in the d i r ec t ion o f immanence and concre tenes s ) wh i le

displac ing i ts se l f- reflect ive na tur e - t ran sce nde nta l ar gu m en ts are ref lec

t ions f rom wi th in exper ience on wha t makes i t pos s ib le . He idegger and

Der r ida ho ld on to the e lemen ts o f Kan t ' s theory excep t fo r the f ac t tha t i ti s a ^ / / - ref lect ion , which is per fect ly reasonable s ince they are out to

e x p l o d e t h e m o d e r n h u m a n i s t b e l i e f t h a t w h a t g r o u n d s e x p e r i e n c e a n d

makes i t poss ib le is a se l f or subject . Adorno expl ic i t ly g ives up the

t r anscenden ta l ; the c las s ica l ph i losoph ica l ques t fo r t r anscenden ta l foun

da t ions , however immanen t o r t r anscenden t they a re though t to be , i s

dropped. I t i s the path of se l f - ref lect ion i tse l f that i s to be fo l lowed.

Ad orn oesq ue c r i ti ca l theo ry i s a con t inua t ion o f th e m od ern p ro jec t

of se l f- reflect ion be yon d a ll t ran sce nd en ta l un de rs t an di ng . Self - reflect ion

w ith ou t t ran sce nd en ta l ref lec tion is the e th ical ac t of se l f -con sciousn ess

that br ings the subject before and in to h is or her h is tor ical s i tuat ion .

He idegger ' s and Der r ida ' s a f f i rmat ive though t , the i r th ink ing beyond good

and evi l , i s contes ted in Adorno 's ac t of se l f - impl icat ion: he is a par t of the

barbar i sm tha t he i s s eek ing to under s tand and overcome. On ly th rough

the confess ion of gui l t can immanence be achieved; that gui l t i s the gui l t

of se l f - ref lect ion 's to ta l iza t ion of exper ience: the h is tory i t recounts and

the exp lana t ions i t of fers. W h en t he to ta l i ty is ref lec ted an d c hal len ged

in the s ame though t , e th ica l ac t ion beg ins to su rmoun t i t s e l f toward the

pol i t ica l wor ld whose absence cal ls i t in to being.



1

Memorial Aesthetics:

Kant's Critique of Judgement

I n t h e o t h e r w i s e u n n o t e w o r t h y o p e n i n g p a r a g r a p h o f § 5 4 o f t h e Critique of

Judgement, K an t r ema rks on ' how de ep pa in ma y s t il l g ive p leasu re to

th e sufferer (as th e sorro w of a wid ow over the dea th of her dese rvin g

h u s b a n d ) ' . L e t u s d e n o m i n a t e t h i s c o m p l e x o f p l e a s u r e a n d p a i n ' m e m

or ia l ' . In w hat fo llows I shal l arg ue tha t th e exp er ien ce of the beau t i fu l ,

the p leasu re we take in beau ty as i t i s denned and de l imi ted by Kan t int h e t h i r d Critique, i s bes t undes tood as » / t h i s p l e a s u r e w e r e m e m o r i a l , a

r em em be r ing tha t i s a lso a m ou rn ing . T h e ' a s i f o f th i s thes is m ark s the

fact that Kant does not d i rect ly c la im that the p leasure in the beaut i fu l i s

m em or ia l , no r i s a m em or ia l v iew d i rec t ly impl ied by wha t he does c la im.

Ra ther , th i s r ead ing o f the th i rd Critique offers the memoria l thes is as an

exp lana to ry hypo thes i s answer ing to w ide ly r ecogn ized theore t i ca l t ens ions ,

d i f f i cu l t i e s and an tagon isms sco r ing Kan t ' s a rgument .

W h a t , t h e n , is m o u r n e d i n t h e Critique of Judgement} Of what loss is the

p leasu re in beau ty a r em em bran ce? As a f ir st appro ach , the p leasu re we

take in the beaut i fu l recal ls a knowing, a cogni t ion of th ings that was i t se l f

p leasu rab le ; and a p leasu re , in te res t , des i r e and need fo r th ings an d

per sons tha t was ne i the r p r iva t ive nor in need o f cons t r a in t no r p roduced

ou t o f an abs t r ac t d em and for respec t . In shor t , wha t is m ou rne d in the

exper ience o f beau ty as such i s the s epara t ion o f beau ty f rom t ru th and

goodnes s . Of cour se , the a rch i tec ton ic goa l o f the th i rd Critique is ,

th r ou gh re fe rence to the supe r sens ib le , to eng ine er a r econc i l i a t ion o r

u n i t y o f n a t u r e a n d m o r a l i t y , u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n , t r u t h a n d g o o d n e s s , t h r o u g h j u d g e m e n t a n d b e a u t y . K a n t ' s a r g u m e n t in t h i s r e g a r d h a s

c o n v i n c e d n o o n e s i n c e t h e G e r m a n R o m a n t i c s . I f m y a r g u m e n t i s c o r r e c t ,



18 M E M O R I A L A E S T H E T I C S

then what is sues f rom the exper ience of beauty is not the recogni t ion of a

pos s ib le r econc i l i a tion o f mo ra l i ty and na tu re in a t r an sce nde n t bey ond ,

bu t r a th e r a r ecogn i t ion o f the i r p rese n t in t r ac tab le bu t con t inge n t s e par

a t ion . Ka n t ' s r e fe rence to the super sens ib le ma rks a d i sp lac em en t o f a

(pe rhaps mytho log ica l ) pas t in to the beyond ; the a rche- tec tu re o f a rch i tec

ton ic b luepr in t ing i s no t a b r idge to span the ' g rea t gu l f (CJ , In t ro . I I ,175) s epara t ing the r ea lms o f f r eedom and na tu re , bu t r a the r a s epu lch re

to s tand over thei r los t uni ty .

i J u d g e m e n t w i t h ou t K n o w l e d g e

Accord ing to Kan t a judgement o f t a s te o f the fo rm 'Th is i s beau t i fu l ' i s

a ref lect ive asser t ion of the p leasure one takes in a par t icular object or

s ta te of affai rs wh ich , w i tho ut th e me diat ion of co nc ep ts , lays c la im to

in te r sub jec t ive va l id i ty . T h e f irst and th i rd 'M om en ts ' o f the 'Ana ly t i c

of the Be aut i fu l ' s ta te th at one is just i fied in mak ing suc h a jud ge m en t i f

the judg em ent i s m ad e w i tho u t in te res t , tha t i s , apa r t f rom any p rac t i ca l ,

moral , or sens ib le in teres ts one may have in the object of judgement ; and

if the judgement cons iders only the pure form of the object as i t i s

r e fl ec ted up on by the im ag ina t ion .

K an t ' s ca tegoria l in sc r ip t ion o f the judge m ent o f t a s te , in i ts de te r m i

na t ion o f aes the t i c re f lec tive judge m ents as au ton om ou s judg em ent s , o ff er swha t amoun ts to the d i s covery o f a new ph i losoph ica l sub jec t .

1

W h a t K a n t

d i s covered i s tha t in aes the t i c re f lec tive judg em ent s , a l tho ugh the ob jec t

judged i s no t subsumed under e i the r cogn i t ive o r mora l concep ts , wha t

issues is a judgement which can be e i ther t rue or fa lse , and not a mere

exp ress ion or s ta te m en t of l ike or d is l ike . T o c la im that a ju dg em en t of

tas te i s no t subsumpt ive i s to c la im tha t the de te rmin ing g round o f the

judgement does not re ly upon the object judged fa l l ing or fa i l ing to fa l l

under a pa r t i cu la r cogn i t ive o r mora l concep t . An ob jec t ' s pos ses s ion o f

one o r s evera l empi r ica l p roper t i e s capab le o f concep tua l d i s c r imina t ioncan neve r enta i l tha t object bein g beau t i fu l . S o even i f one had val id ly

jud ge d an ob ject to be bea utifu l w hic h fell un d e r just co nc ep ts a , (J, *y, in

ar r an ge m en t <(>, i t would n ot fo llow th at one m us t judg e th e next s imilar ly

desc r ibab le ob jec t a s beau t i fu l , no r tha t one ' s nega t ive judgement was in

any way inva l id . Fo r the pu rpos es o f aes the t i c r ef lec t ive jud gem ent no

con cep tual a r t icula t ion of an object can sa tu ra te i t suff ic iently so as to

l icense a val id judg em en t of tas te . T h e ideal , l imi t case for th is the s is

wou ld be quan t i t a t ive ly d i s t inc t bu t qua l i t a tive ly iden t ica l i t em s . T h i s i s a

l imi t case because qua l i t a t ive ind i sce rnab i l i ty can be e i the r 'macroscop ic '

o r 'mic roscop ic ' ; bu t on ly s t r i c t , 'mic roscop ic ' ind i s ce rnab i l i ty cou ld r e

quire the logical passage of val id i ty f rom one i tem to another ; however ,

th is i s not the level a t which we make aes thet ic judgements . Aes thet ic



M E M O R I A L A E S T H E T I C S 1 9

ref lect ive judgements , then , are i r revocably s ingular and their objects

u n i q u e .

Ana logous ly , an ob jec t ' s be ing the r ep resen ta t ion o f someth ing mora l ly

wo r th y cann ot of i t se lf de ter m ine th at th e object i s beau t i fu l ; nor can t he

ob jec t ' s be ing a r ep resen ta t ion o f someth ing mora l ly unwor thy , o r ug ly o r

dis tas tefu l , en ta i l tha t the object ca nn ot be beaut i fu l . O n the co ntr ary , fine

ar t can descr ibe beaut i fu l ly ' th ings that in nature would be ugly or d is

p leas ing ' (CJ , § 4 8 , 3 1 2 ) , inc lud ing such ' ha rm fu l ' th ings as d i s ease an d the

devas ta t ions of war . Nor , again , would i t fo l low f rom an ar t is t having suc

cessfully fulf i l led his or her art is t ic intention in the production of a work

tha t the work mus t be beau t i fu l .

Desp i te the f ac t tha t in judgements o f t a s te the ob jec t and the p leasu re

a re conn ec ted w i thou t the med ia t ion o f con cep ts , wh ich i s wh a t K an t

means in r equ i r ing such judgements to be ' d i s in te res ted ' , he be l i evestha t in such judgements the connec t ion be tween the p leasu re and the r ep

rese nta t ion of th e object is a nec essary o ne and he nce univers al ly or

in tersubject ively val id . In o ther words , despi te thei r lack of conceptual

g round ing , judgements o f t a s te none the les s c la im o r demand as sen t f rom

all o the r s . Ju dg em en ts o f the fo rm 'T h i s is beau t i fu l ' s t a te m ore tha n

'This object p leases me ' ; they a lso s ta te that any and a l l o thers who judge

this object d is in teres tedly wi l l and should f ind i t beaut i fu l . I t i s precise ly

th i s e luc ida t ion o f the ' g r am m ar ' o f aes the t i c r e fl ect ive jud gem ent s as

con s t i tu ted by the i r non con cep tua l g ro un d in g bu t c la im to un iver sa l va l id i ty , wh ich compr i s es Kan t ' s d i s covery o f the au tonomy o f judgement o f

t a s t e , and of what we cal l ' aes thet ics ' general ly .

Now the un iver sa l i ty o f judgements o f t a s te , wh i le ev iden t ia l ly sup

po r ted by d i s in te res tedn es s , is con seq ue n t upo n the p leasu re a r i s ing f rom

th e r e flect ive ha rm ony o f the ima g ina t ion and the und er s ta nd in g . W ha t

Kant means by th is i s that in the mere es t imat ion of an object by the

imaginat ion i t d iscovers the sor t of uni ty or togetherness of a manifo ld

which i s r equ i red by the und er s t an d in g for the mak ing o f de te rm ina te

cogn i t ive judgements genera l ly , on ly he re the d i s covery o f un i ty i s ne i the r

regu la ted by an ex i s t ing con cep t no r does it y ield a conc ep t . Th a t such an

aconcep tua l o r nonconcep tua l syn thes i s o f the imag ina t ion shou ld be a

source of p leasure fo l lows f rom the achieved synthes is sa t is fy ing the

goa l o f cogn i t ion genera l ly , namely , d i s cover ing un i ty w i th in empi r ica l

d ive r s i ty .

Judgements o f t a s te a re in need o f a deduc t ion because they l ay c la im

to universal val id i ty . As Kant notes , that i t i s wi th p leasure that I es t imate

an ob jec t is an empi r ica l judg em en t ; bu t 'wh a t i s r ep rese n ted a priori as auniversal ru le for the judgement and as val id for every one, i s not the

p leasu re bu t the universal validity of th i s p leasu re . . . ' (CJ , § 3 7 , 2 8 9 ) .

H en ce , wha t i s to be sough t in the dedu c t ion o f judg em ents o f ta s te is a

g ro un d fo r th i s a t t r ib u t io n o f un iver sa l va l id i ty . T h e ded uc t io n w i ll tu rn




on the f ac t tha t the ha rmony be tween imag ina t ion and under s tand ing ,

which is the source of the p leasure founding aes thet ic ref lect ive judge

m en t s , i s ju s t the r e la t ion be tween ima g ina t ion and un de r s ta nd ing tha t is

neces sa ry fo r cogn i t ive judgements genera l ly , and hence may be p resup

posed as common to a l l .

Kan t ' s a rgument in §38 , the 'Deduc t ion o f judgements o f t a s te ' , i s shor t

and to the po in t . I f we accep t h i s p rev ious a rguments , then in a pu re

judgement of tas te the del ight we take in the object i s due to the mere es t i

mate of i t s form; that i s , the del ight excludes a l l par t icular subject ive

sources of delight, as well as any pleasure that follows from the object fall

ing under a par t icular concept . As a source for the feel ing of p leasure th is

leaves only the 'subjective f inali ty ' of the representation of the object for

the f acu l ty o f judgement , by which Kan t means the su i t ab i l i ty o f the

object to the facul ty of judgement . This su i tabi l i ty of the object for judgem en t Ka n t t e rm s it s adh ere nce to the 'fo rmal ru les o f e s t im at ing ' , fo rmal

because apar t f rom ' a l l ma t te r (whe ther s ensa t ion o r concep t ) ' . I f these

cond i t ions a re met , then the judgement can ' on ly be d i r ec ted to the sub

ject ive condi t ions of i t s employment in general ' ; and th is subject ive factor

'we may p resu pp ose in a ll m en (as req uis i te for a poss ib le exp er ienc e g en

era l ly ) ' . This is to say , s ince the p leasure which ar ises f rom the mere es t i

mate of the form of an object occurs because there is a harmony between

the imag ina t ion and the unde r s ta nd ing , and th i s ha rm on y is wh a t i s r eq u i

s i te for a poss ib le exper ience general ly , then we are warranted ' in requir ing f rom every one ' judgementa l accord . More s imply , the cond i t ions met

in a val id aes thet ic ref lect ive judgement are jus t the necessary subject ive

cond i t ions fo r de te rm ina te cogn i t ive judge m ent s , and a re thus a p r io r i and

universal ly val id .

Every th ing tha t goes wrong wi th th i s a rgument goes wrong in v i r tue o f

the way Kan t a t t empts to underwr i te aes the t i c r e f l ec t ive judgements in

te rm s o f the i r conn ec t ion w i th de te rm ina te cogn i t ive judg em ents . A min or

ob jec t ion to Kan t ' s a rgument wou ld exp lo i t the d i f f e rence be tween aes

thet ic and cogni t ive judgements by not ing how i t does not fo l low f rom the

leg it imacy o f a t t r ib u t in g to everyo ne the sub jec t ive cond i t ions for d e te r

m ina te judg em ents - jud gem ents w i th a conc ep t - tha t one i s en t i t l ed to

a t t r ibu te to everyone the capac i ty o f becoming aware o r consc ious o f tha t

un i ty w hen i t i s to be ach ieved w i thou t concep tua l m ed ia t ion . 2 In order to

meet th is object ion Kant would need e i ther to show that the d i f ference

be tween co gn i t ive and ae s the t i c judge m ents i s a que s t ion o f a t t en d ing to

dif ferent aspects of the same process ; or to demons tra te that the capaci ty

for br inging manifo lds to uni ty wi thout concepts conscious ly is i t se l fp resupposed by the capac i ty fo r fo rming de te rmina te cogn i t ive judge

m en ts . T o adop t the f ir st l im b of th is d is jun ct ion w ould involve K an t in

deta i led ques t ions of empir ical psychology; to go for the second l imb of

the d is junct ion would a lmos t cer ta in ly enta i l modif icat ions to the centra l

arguments of the f i r s t Critique, as we shall see.



M E M O R I A L A E S T H E T I C S 21

Ho we ver , th e re i s a m ore genera l and obv ious ob jec t ion wh ich goes

to the hear t o f the way in wh ich Kan t connec t s aes the t i c and cogn i t ive

judgements . G iven i t s w ide canvas s ing and accep tance , I sha l l ca l l i t ' t he

s t a n d a r d o b j e c t i o n ' .3

The fo rce o f Kan t ' s deduc t ion tu rns on the un i ty o f

the representa t ion of an object present in aes thet ic ref lect ion being jus t

the uni ty present in cogni t ive judgements when the f inal synthes is of theob jec t un de r a conc ep t i s r em ove d . B u t th i s i s imp laus ib le s ince i t en ta i ls

tha t fo r every ob jec t abo u t wh ich w e can mak e a de te rm ina te cogn i t ive

ju dg em en t we can , by ab s t rac t ing f rom t he final synth es is of th e obje ct

under a concep t , make a va l id aes the t i c judgement . I f Kan t i s to main ta in

a t igh t l inkage be tween aes the t i c and cogn i t ive judgements , mak ing the

necessary subject ive condi t ions for the poss ib i l i ty of empir ical cogni t ion

provide the suff ic ient condi t ions for the general val id i ty of aes thet ic

judgements , then he canno t p roper ly d i s t ingu ish the ob jec t s abou t wh ich

we can make de te rmina te cogn i t ive judgements and those fo r wh ich anaes the t i c jud gem ent i s app rop r ia te ; on th i s acc oun t ing , he mu s t al low a l l

ob jec t s abo u t wh ich de te r m ina t e cogn i t ive jud gem en ts can be m ad e to be

beaut i fu l (as d id W olf f ) .

I n § 2 0 K a n t c l a i m s t h a t t h e j u d g e m e n t o f t a s t e d e p e n d s o n t h e ' p r e s u p

pos i t ion ' o f a ' common sense ' (CJ , §20 , 238) ; and in §21 he a t t empts to

demons t ra te tha t we do in f ac t have good reason fo r p resuppos ing the

e x i s t e n c e o f a c o m m o n s e n s e . K a n t ' s a r g u m e n t h e r e p a r a l l e l s t h e d e d u c

tion offered in §38 with an ap pa re nt ly s l ight , albe it s ignif icant, differenc e.

Kan t beg ins by c la iming tha t judgements and the p ropos i t iona l a t t i tudes

we take towards those judgements mus t admi t o f be ing un iver sa l ly com

m u n i c a b l e {allgemein mitteilen). T h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r c o m m u n i c a b i l i t y

here is s tronger than the f irs t Critique's demand tha t we be ab le to s epar

a te how th ings appear to me f rom how th ings a re in the wor ld , o r sub jec

t ive success ion f rom object ive success ion . Let us put th is object ion as ide

f o r t h e m o m e n t .

Kan t con t inues in a way d i r ec t ly ana logous w i th the a rgument in §38 ; i f

o u r c o g n i t i o n s a n d a t t i t u d e s a r e t o b e c o m m u n i c a b l e , t h e n ' t h e a t t u n e m e n t(Stimmung) of the cogni t ive powers required for cogni t ion in general ' , i . e .

the sub jec t ive cond i t ions fo r the ac t o f knowledge , mus t equa l ly admi t o f

be ing co m m unic a ted . I t i s a t th i s junc tu re tha t a smal l tw is t occur s in

Kan t ' s a rgument , fo r in s tead o f t a lk ing abou t the ha rmony o f the imag in

a t ion and un der s tan d in g he in t rod uces the idea o f ' r e la t ive p ro po r t ion s '

be tw ee n these facul t ies . T h e se pro po r t io ns d if fer, he says , wi th the d i ve r

s i ty o f ob jec t s p resen ted to them. However , ' t he re mus t be one [p ro

por t ion] in which th is in ternal ra t io su i table for quickening (one facul ty by

an oth er) i s bes t ad apte d for bo th me nta l pow ers in respe ct of cog ni t ion (of

g iven ob ject s ) genera l ly ' (CJ , §21 , 23 8 -9 ) . T h e s e t t ing o f ou r f acu lt ie s

towards th is opt imal ra t io can only be determined by feel ing , s ince i t i s

only in v i r tue of the a t ta inment of th is ra t io that the complet ion of syn

thes is in a concept becomes poss ib le . S ince both the d ispos i t ion of our




facul t ies as a t tuned in th is opt imal ra t io and the consequent feel ing rep

resen t necessary subject ive co nd i t io ns for th e poss ib i l i ty of cogn i t ion ge n

e ra l ly , bo th m us t adm i t o f un iver sa l com m unica b i l i ty . (Ka n t m oves

ambiguous ly be tween the thes i s tha t f ee l ing does the ' tun ing ' be tween the

cogn i t ive powers , and the thes i s tha t p leasu re i s the consequen t o f a t tune-

m en t . ) On th i s r ead ing com m on sense is ju s t the f acu lty o f jud gem ent

itself, the capac i ty fo r judgement w i thou t concep ts ; hence Kan t can con

c lude tha t we a re en t ided to p resuppose the ex i s tence o f a common sense .

Clear ly , ou r in i tia l object io n to the ded uc t io n in §38 is equa l ly a pp l i

c a b l e h e r e .4

W h a t i s m o r e i n t e r e s t in g is K a n t ' s p r o p o r t i o n a r g u m e n t . I n

the first Critique Kant con tends tha t every man i fo ld o f wh ich one can

become aware can be b rough t to the un i ty o f judgement . I f we ho ld to th i s

req u i re m en t , then the idea o f an op t imal r a t io does no ind ep en de n t work ,

and K an t ' s a rg um en t he re is d i r ec t ly r educ ib le to the a rg um en t in §38 ,ca r ry ing w i th i t the s ame implaus ib le as sumpt ion tha t a l l ob jec t s o f wh ich

we can bec om e aware a re beau t i fu l . If, ho wev er , we cons id e r tha t wh a t the

idea o f an op t imal r a t io p resen t s i s a p ic tu re whereby a he igh tened a t tune-

men t o f ou r cogn i t ive f acu l t i e s i s a t t a ined , and we connec t th i s a rgument

wi th Kan t ' s c la im tha t the r e la t ive p ropor t ion be tween our cogn i t ive

powers d i f fers wi th d i f fer ing objects , then we can qui te proper ly c la im that

some objects are beaut i fu l and some not , s ince not a l l objects wi l l en

g e n d e r th e o p ti m a l r a t io b e t w e e n i m a g i n a t io n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . T h e

diff icul ty wi th th is arg um en t is tha t the not ion of an opt im al ra t io can nolonger be cons trued as being an opt imal ra t io for cognition. I n o r d e r

to mainta in cogni t ion in i t s contro l l ing ro le one would not only have to

as sume tha t some ob jec t s were beau t i fu l and some no t ; bu t fu r the r , tha t

those tha t were beau t i fu l were be t t e r in the sense o f m ore know ab le ,

which i s coun te r - in tu i t ive in the ex t r eme . Hence , i f the idea o f an op t imal

ra t io i s to do independen t work , then we mus t a s sume tha t the cond i t ions

which provide for i t a re not d i rect ly re la ted to the condi t ions for cogni t ion .

A l though th i s wou ld f r ee us f rom the r equ i remen t o f hav ing to r egardas beaut i fu l a l l objects of which we may become conscious , i t would

equa l ly b reak the in t imate connec t ion be tween cogn i t ive and aes the t i c

j u d g e m e n t w h i c h m o t o r e d a n d m o t i v a t e d K a n t ' s a r g u m e n t f r o m t h e

beg inn ing . And th i s wou ld be no id le lo s s s ince beau ty ' s an t i c ipa t ion o f

knowing p rov ides the purchase th rough which we ga in some ins igh t in to

how and why un i ty , d ive r s i ty , fo rm, p leasu re and the l ike c lus te r toge ther

as ' aes the t i c ' t e rms . Wi thou t the c lus te r ing tha t the t e los o f knowing

prov ides , these concep ts lo se bo th the i r toge thernes s and , a s a conse

quence , the i r u sua l mean ings . What migh t the fo rce o f ' un i ty ' be apar tf rom i ts usual cogni t ive ro les? As such, the generous reading of the pro

por t ion a rgument en ta i l s an ob jec t ion which i s the inver se complemen t ,

the r ever se s ide , o f the s tan dard ob jec t ion .

To ge the r , the s t an dar d ob jec t ion and i t s inver se com ple m en t t e ll a




r evea l ing and , fo r Kan t ' s p rogramme, devas ta t ing s to ry . In the 'P re face ' to

the th i rd Critique Kant s ta tes that whi le aes thet ic es t imates of objects do

not contr ibute ' a whi t to the knowledge of th ings , they s t i l l belong to the

facul ty of knowledge alone' ( C J , 1 6 9 ; my i t a l i c s ) . F rom the beg inn ing

Kan t p resupposes tha t the cond i t ions fo r the aes the t i c e s t imate o f th ings

represents jus t the necessary subject ive condi t ions for knowledge ingenera l ; and fu r the r , the p leasu re a t t endan t on aes the t i c e s t imates a r i s es

because such es t imates fu l f i l the general and overr id ing goal of cogni t ion .

Bo th h i s ep i s temolog ica l c la im and theore t i ca l , exp lana to ry c la im mus t

now be b rough t in to ques t ion . A neces sa ry l inkage be tween aes the t i c and

c o g n i t i v e j u d g e m e n t c a n n o t b e m a i n t a i n e d w i t h o u t e i t h e r r e q u i r i n g t h a t

a l l objects be capable of being regarded as beaut i fu l , or ra is ing the ques

t ion as to why some manifo lds are found beaut i fu l and o thers not . One

cou ld look to empi r ica l p sycho logy to answer th i s ques t ion , bu t to do so

wo uld r e duc e ques t ion s o f aes the t i c s to ques t ion s of psycho logy . O nK an t ia n g r ou nd s , i f no o the r , tha t mov e shou ld be r es i st ed un t i l a m ore

thorough canvas s ing o f the op t ions ava i l ab le has been comple ted .

Fu r th e r , even i f i t were conceded tha t the m in im al sub jec t ive c ond i t ions

for cogn i t ion provid ed a necessa ry con di t io n for aes the t ic ref lect ion , th e

op t imal r a t io a rgument wou ld s t i l l show tha t these cond i t ions were too

weak to expla in aes thet ic p leasure or to underwri te universal i ty , s ince i t

impl ies tha t fo r an aes the t i c r esponse to be p rompted more than these

cond i t ions have to be s a ti sf ied . T h a t 'm or e ' i s p rec i se ly wha t d i s t ingu ishes

beaut i fu l objects f rom the to ta l i ty of th ings of which cogni t ion is poss ib le .

H en ce , i t m us t be as sum ed tha t bo th th e g ro un ds for a t t r ib u t ing un iver sa l

va l id i ty to aes the t i c judgements , and the p leasu re tha t r e su l t s f rom aes

thet ic ref lect ion , der ive f rom sources that do not belong exclus ively to the

facul ty of knowledge.

G iv en tha t Kan t c la ims tha t a cons id e ra t ion o f jud ge m ent w il l he l p

br idge the gu l f s epara t ing f r eedom f rom na tu re , mora l i ty f rom knowledge ,

i t i s tempting to look to Kant ' s l inking of beauty and moral i ty in the th i rd

Critique as providing a so lu t ion to the d i f f icul t ies thus far encountered .Fur the r , by look ing in th i s d i r ec t ion we can pe rhaps d i s cover an a l t e r

nat ive te los to g ive sa l ience and s ignif icance to the concepts of aes thet ic

d i s cou rse . Wh at we f ind is no t ve ry enco urag ing .

ii Im pera t ive Beauty?

I t is no t unusu a l to c la im tha t Ka n t ' s ded uc t i on o f t a s te i s no t com ple ted

u n t i l § 5 9 where he t r ea t s o f beau ty as a symbol o f mora l i ty .5

T h r e e

cons iderat ions te l l in favour of th is thes is . F i rs t , g iven the a l l too obvious

diff icul ties wi th the epis tem ologica l a t te m pt to gr ou nd jud ge m en ts of tas te

as s ta ted in the s tandard object ion and i ts inverse complement , i t i s hard




to be l i eve tha t Kan t was no t aware o f the p rob lems the deduc t ion in §38

faced. And th is receives informal conf i rmat ion f rom the sense one has in

read ing the th i rd Critique that i t i s cont inual ly c i rc l ing back upon itself,

deep en ing and modi fy ing i t s inaugu ra l ges tu res r a the r than mo ving

direct ly forward th ro ug h a ser ies of ar gu m en ts progre ss ively and logically

l inked to one another . I t reads , that i s to say , more l ike a journey of d is

covery than a r igo rous a rgument .

Sec ond ly , K an t s ta tes in §59 tha t ' th e beaut i fu l i s th e sym bo l of the

mora l ly good (Sittlich-Guten), and on ly in th i s l igh t . . . does i t g ive p leasu re

with a c la im to the agreement of every one e lse ' (CJ , §59, 353) . Now i t

ce r ta in ly sounds he re as i f Kan t i s con tend ing tha t the c la im to un iver

sa l i ty in judgements of tas te is in some sense paras i t ic upon the c la im to

un iver sa l i ty cons t i tu t ive o f mora l ly wor thy p rac t i ca l judgements ; and

fur the r , t hat the p le asure enjoyed in aes th et ic ref lect ion is l ikewise par a

s i t i ca l . Th i s c la im would g ive room to the ro le Kan t apparen t ly wan ts toas s ign to aes the t i c ideas and dependen t beau ty in r egu la t ing the deve lop

m e n t o f a e s t h e t ic j u d g e m e n t .

Whi le th i s d i r ec t ly con t rad ic t s the c la im o f Kan t ' s 'P re face ' a l r eady

cons id ered , it i s backed u p by our th i rd cons ide ra t ion , nam ely , K an t ' s

cons i s ten t ly r e i t e ra ted con te n t ion tha t judge m ent s o f t a s te ' de m an d ' o r

' exac t ' ag reemen t f rom everyone ; and tha t everyone ' ough t ' to g ive the

object in ques t ion their approval and pronounce i t beaut i fu l (e .g . CJ , §7 ,

213 ; §19, 237) . When someone says a th ing is beaut i fu l , Kant c la ims , i t i s

not jus t that or suf f ic ient that she merely counts on o thers agreeing

because they have ag reed in the pas t ; r a the r she ' demands ' (fordert) the i r

a g r e e m e n t , a n d s h e ' b l a m e s ' (tadelt) the m i f the y judg e d if ferent ly ; she

den ies them tas te , wh i le none the les s r equ i r ing i t o f them as someth ing

t h e y ' o u g h t ' (sollen) to have .

N ow w hi le K an t ' s po in t he re ma y be to s epara te a we l l - founded be l ie f

that o thers wi l l agree wi th us , as can occur even with th ings that are

merely agreeable , f rom the c la im to universal val id i ty impl ied by a judge

ment of tas te , such a d is t inct ion does scant jus t ice to the ' c la im' invoked.I f we accepted a purely epis temological reading of the c la ims of tas te , then

what the deduct ion would es tabl ish , were i t t rue , i s that we have a pr ior i

good reasons for expect ing that o thers wi l l agree wi th our judgement (or

bet ter : i t i s not imposs ib le that o thers wi l l agree g iven that we a l l mus t

have the s ame cogn i t ive equ ipmen t ) . What Kan t ca l l s a ' demand ' i s

real ly , on such an account , ' a predic t ion , but an ideal predic t ion - a pre

d ic t ion which p res upp oses idea l know ledge o f one ' s own responses and

idea l c i r cums tances o f r esponse fo r o the r s ' .6

However , i f we p res s the

ques t ion of what is invoked by the reference to the ' ideal ' c i rcumstances ofresp ons e for o th ers , the n necessar i ly include d would be their capac i ty and

wi l l ingnes s to judge d i s in te res ted ly ; and whi le d i s in te res tednes s opera tes

evident ia l ly w hen I pro no un ce s om eth ing to be beaut i fu l as a ref lect ively




dep loye d cr i ter ion for the val id i ty of m y jud ge m en t , it c lear ly can no t

be so regarded in i t s reference to o thers . So whi le there is indeed an

' e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i m p e r t i n e n c e '7

in my speaking with a 'universal voice '

(CJ , §8 , 216) in mak ing a judgement o f t a s te , tha t imper t inence inc ludes a

de m an d on o the r s to ado p t a ce r ta in - d i s in te res ted - s t ance towards the

object of jud ge m en t . And s ince taking u p tha t s tance is an ach ieve m ent -whe ther we cons ide r i t a mora l o r ep i s temolog ica l ach ievement i s he re a

mat ter of indif ference - i t necessar i ly fa l ls outs ide what can be predic ted ,

even whe n tha t p red ic t ion i s m ad e on a p r io r i g rou nd s .

To s ta te the s ame po in t more empha t ica l ly , d i s in te res tednes s i s , in

a s ense , me asured aga ins t , and pe rhap s de te rm ined by , the power fu l in

te res t s f rom which i t w i thdraws . In w i thdrawing f rom sensuous in te res t s ,

the ve ry ' pa tho log ica l ' in te res t s wh ich mora l r eason r equ i res us to w i th

d raw f rom, th e ach ie vem ent o f aes the t i c d i s in te res tednes s i s nea r ly as

g rea t , g ran t ing the d imin i shed charac te r o f the ' s ac r i f i ce ' invo lved , a s theach iev em ent o f mo ra l au ton om y. Th e d im in i she d charac te r of the s ac r if ice

o f s ensuous in te res t s tu rns on the f ac t tha t aes the t i c d i s in te res tednes s

requ i res on ly the t emp ora ry ' b rac ke t i ng ' o r de fe r ra l o f s ensuo us in te res t s

and no t the i r who lesa le abandonment . However , th i s d i s t inc t ion may ca r ry

less force than i t a t f i r s t appears to sugges t s ince , i f d is in teres tedness is an

a c h i e v e m e n t , t h e n i t s a c c o m p l i s h m e n t w il l h a v e a c u m u l a t i v e , c h a r a c t e r -

informing af fect . How large the scope of th is af fect may be should not be

pre - judged , s ince the measuremen t o f tha t r equ i res con t ras t ing the s ense

of object iv i ty enta i led by d is in teres tedness wi th the sense of object iv i ty

enta i led by pract ica l and theoret ica l ca tegor ia l synthes is . In brief, if aes

the t i c d i s in te res tednes s i s an independen t rou te to ob jec t iv i ty , an a l t e rna

t ive form of object iv i ty , then th e qu es t ion m us t be posed as to w he the r or

no t i t i s s t r a igh t foward ly complemen ta ry w i th the o the r fo rms o f ob jec

t iv ity s ecured by the c r i ti ca l ph i lo soph y ; and i f no t com plem en ta ry , then

wh at o rder in g o f ob jec t iv i t ie s i s to be ' r a t iona l ly ' r equ i red and m ain ta ine d?

In sugges t ing tha t d i s in te res ted nes s i s an ach ieve me nt a rguab ly on a pa r

wi th the ach ievement o f mora l r e f l ec t ion on na tu ra l des i r e , we mus t d i s t inguish receiv ing p leasure f rom 'aes thet ic ' objects , i . e . works of ar t , which

can be as subject ive and pr ivat ive as any o ther sensuous p leasure , f rom

aes the t i c d i s in te res tednes s p rop er . I t i s , for K an t , no t the ob jec t wh ich

de te rmines the charac te r o f the p leasu re , bu t r a the r the fo rm o f ou r

engagement w i th the ob jec t . I f we now append to the d i s in te res tednes s in

sensu ous p leasu re the abs t r ac t ion f rom the in te res t s o f mo ra l i ty and c og

n i t ion a l so r eq u i re d for aes the t i c r e f lec t ion , then th e accom pl i shm en t o f

aes the t i c d i s in te res tednes s beg ins to emerge .

Of cour se , pu t t ing the mat te r th i s way en ta i l s s ea rch ing ou t an in te res t

suff ic ient to mot ivate d is in teres t , o therwise the adopt ion of the s tance of

aes the t i c d i s in te res tednes s w i l l become a l toge ther mys te r ious . Th is i s the

course adop ted by N ie tzsche in The Genealogy of Morals, w h e r e K a n t i a n




aes the t ic d is in teres t , s t r ic t ly in te rpr ete d as abs t rac t ion f rom the in tere s ts

of formal m oral i ty an d categor ia l , t ru thon ly , cogni t io n , i s l inked to

S t e n d h a l ' s s e n s u a l i s m , h i s promesse de bonnheur? E v e n , h o w e v e r , w i t h o u t

an expl ic i t acc ou nt of th e in teres t of d is in tere s ted nes s , i t i s ev id ent that

the epis tem ological ro le of d is in teres tedn ess is id le in abs t ract ion f rom

the in te res t s sub tend ing i t ; bu t the inc lus ion o f them en ta i l s r egard ingdis in teres tedness 'p ract ica l ly ' as wel l as evident ia l ly .

I t i s hence not surpr is ing that Kant regular ly uses the language of

' demand ' and ' exac t ing ' w i th r espec t to judgements o f t a s te ; he a l so s ays ,

i f we cou ld as sum e tha t the me re com mu nicab i l i ty as such o f ou r f ee ling

already car r ied wi th i t an ' in teres t ' for us , then we could expla in how i t i s

that the ' fee l ing in the judgement of tas te comes to be exacted f rom every

one as a sort of duty {Pflichif (CJ , §40, 296) . And th is , in fact , accords

wel l w i th our p re - theore t i ca l in tu i t ions on th i s mat te r . What I mean by

this is tha t we reg ard m oral re la t iv ism and epis tem ologica l sce pt ic ism

as th rea t s to ou r s e l f -under s tand ing abou t ou r r e la t ions to the wor ld , to

others , and to our mos t fundamental bel iefs . In these cases , a t leas t , we

know what not f inding an a pr ior i pr incip le of legis la t ion would mean. In

the ques t ion o f judgements o f t a s te , o f aes the t i c s cep t ic i sm, where the

scep t ic den ies tha t judgements o f t a s te a re p roper ly judgements a t a l l , we

are asking i f th is denia l i s more l ike denying the object iv i ty of epis temic

jud gem ents o r mo re like deny ing the ob jec t iv i ty o f som e va lue . In pa r t i cu

lar cases , i s our sense that o thers do not share our judgement a concern

with the m no t seeing so m eth ing tha t is the re ; or i s i t a sense of the i r refus

ing to t ake up a ce r ta in s t ance , and the reby coming to acknowledge a ce r

tain import , s ignif icance or value? Is failure in tas te a failure to possess a

cer ta in type of sk i l l or abi l i ty , a lack of pract ice ( in apprecia t ion) ; or does i t

m ark t he lack of a cer ta in sor t of cha rac ter t ra i t? In asking the se q ues t ion s

I am not t ry ing to force an answer on one s ide or the o ther ; and I doubt

whether an easy or cons is tent response can be g iven. Here I want to say ,

to be fo rced to choose wou ld be to be fo rced in to an unna tu ra l pos tu re .

W i th ou t some fu r the r a rg um en t the c la im i s un f oun ded tha t the th rea tposed by aes thet ic re la t iv ism or scept ic ism is an extens ion of the anxie ty

a t t e nd an t on the th re a t o f s cep t ic i sm conc ern ing know ledge ; and c on

versely , i t i s not obvious ly wrong or untoward to regard the aes thet ic scep

t i c a s someone who i s refusing to ackno wledg e or r ecogn ize wha t de m an ds

or c la ims acknowledgement ; and tha t th i s r e fusa l by the s cep t ic , who

is perhaps a lso the phi l is t ine , i s bes t in terpreted as a refusal to take up a

ce r ta in s t ance towa rd a r ange o f ob jec t s , a d i s in te res ted s tance .

In u rg ing tha t the c la im to t a s te i s more than ep i s temolog ica l , more

tha n pred ic t ive , we hav e not gone the fu ll d is tance tha t a pro per ly m oral

in te rp re ta t ion o f the c la im to t a s te r equ i res . Nor can we . F i r s t , Kan t does

not say that a judgement of tas te is exacted f rom everyone as a duty , but

'as a sor t o f (gleichsam: as i t were , so to speak, a lmos t) a duty . Secondly ,




even th i s ana logous du ty wou ld ho ld on ly i f mere communicab i l i ty o f ou r

feel ing impl ied an independent in teres t ; in fact , we cannot infer such an

in teres t so le ly on the bas is of the ref lect ive power of judgement (CJ , §40,

2 9 6 ) . This denia l of an in teres t wi l l concern us below. Third ly , whi le an

aes thet ic ref lect ive judgement involves a ' c la im' (Anspruch) u p o n e v e r y o n e

to as sen t , the f ee l ing insp i red by the abso lu te ly good invokes a ' command '

(Gebot) u p o n e v e r y o n e t o a s s e n t ( C J , ' G e n e r a l R e m a r k u p o n t h e E x p o

s i t ion o f Aes the t i c Ref lec t ive Judgements ' , 267) . And th i s d i s t inc t ion i t s e l f

s imp ly r e i t e ra tes the d i s t inc t ion K an t d raw s as ea r ly as §5 , wh ere he s ta tes

tha t wh i le the good i s wha t i s e s teemed and ' ex to r t s approva l ' , t a s te in the

beaut i fu l i s a 'd is in tere s ted and free de l igh t ' . F rom the ou t se t , the f r ee

pleasure we take in the beaut i fu l i s contras ted with ' an object of incl i

na t ion , and one which a l aw o f r eason imposes upon our des i r e , [wh ich]

leaves us no f reedom to turn anything in to an object of p leasure ' (CJ , § 5,

210) .M u ch o f the po in t o f judge m en t o f t a s te is tha t they inhab i t a dom ain

be tw een w ha t can be expec ted and wha t is co m m an de d (by the mo ra l ly

g o o d ) ; and that the force of the demand and the c la im they make is thei r

lack of force and their lack of an abi l i ty to command assent . So , whi le the

demand involved , in aes thet ic judgements has a pr ima facie c la im to be

regarded as s t ronger than an idea l p red ic t ion , i t mus t equa l ly be r egarded

as be ing weaker than the commands o f the mora l ly good . Fa i lu re to

resp ect th e la t ter is as invid ious as ign or in g the former ; epis tem ologic al

r e a d i n g s u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e n o r m a t i v i t y o f a e s t h e ti c j u d g e m e n t s , w h i le

mora l r ead ings underes t imate the so r t o f f r eedom they invoke , the i r non-

c o m p u l s o r y c h a r a c t e r . F o r t h e m o s t p a r t , K a n t ' s v o c a b u l a r y a n d a r g u m e n t

m ove s so as to sus ta in , p rec is e ly , th e au ton om y o f judg em ent f rom the

in te res t s of know ledge and mora l i ty . T o a t t em pt , a s a ll K an t ' s in te rp re t e r s

h a v e , to fo rce Kan t ' s a rgument in to e i the r an ep i s temolog ica l o r a mora l

mode necessar i ly does v io lence to the overal l s t ra tegy governing h is argu

m en t . T o subsu m e judge m en ts o f t a s te who l ly un de r e i the r the goa ls

of un de r s tan d in g o r the de m an ds o f r eason neces sa r ily v io la tes the f ree

de l igh t spec i f i c to judgements concern ing the beau t i fu l . Conver se ly , how

eve r , i f aes thet ic ref lection we re wh ol ly sepa rated f rom qu es t ion s ab ou t

the true and the good, i t is diff icult to see what sense or point could be

a t t r ibu ted to i t beyond s imple p leasu re (which wou ld r educe the ques t ion

of beau ty to mere ag reeab lenes s , and hence accede to aes the t i c s cep t ic i sm) .

I t i s th i s tha t exp la ins Ka n t ' s ow n tem pta t i ons to ass imi la te aes the t i c

jud ge m en t to e i the r mora l i ty o r un de r s ta nd ing : they a re to p rov ide th e

'h idden ' in te res t beh ind aes the t i c d i s in te res tednes s . Bu t then the ca tegory

of dis in tere s ted nes s loses i t s gr i p ; i t be com es a m ask or facade for the 'h id de n ' in te res t . K an t ' s d if fi cu lty i s tha t he has no o the r in s t ru m en ts ava i l

ab le , at leas t in the f i r s t ins tance, wi th which to pr ise open the domain

of t a s te , o the r than those p rov ided by under s tand ing ( the f acu l ty o f




kno wled ge) and reaso n ( the faculty of f reedo m). T hi s does not e xem pt

K a n t ' s c o m m e n t a t o r s f ro m a t t e m p t i n g t o s u s t a in t h e a n o m a l o u s d e m a n d

of tas te , but i t does perhaps expla in their fa i lure to do so .

M ora l in te rp re ta t io ns o f the judge m ent o f t a s te t end to tu rn on K an t ' s

con ten t ion in §20 tha t a judge m ent o f t a s te p resup pos es the ex i s tence o f a

com m on sense ; and then ce to a rgue tha t co m m on sense is a r egu la t ive ideaof reason, which as such we can be commanded to seek af ter . On th is

accoun t , the c la im o f t a s te becomes a med ia ted mora l ob l iga t ion : you a re

ob l iga ted to deve lop common sense and so t a s te a s an imper fec t du ty ; and

if you had tas te , the n you wou ld f ind ' th is ' beau t i fu l . As a co nse qu enc e we

are ent i t led , indirec t ly , to 'b la m e' o the rs for a lack of tas te , an d, indirect ly ,

to ' demand ' the i r a s sen t to ou r judgement o f t a s te . The sub jec t ive un iver

sa l i ty of the judgement of tas te , on th is account , i s der ived f rom the uni

versal i ty and necess i ty of the categor ical imperat ive i t se l f by means of the

demand i t se ts us to seek af ter the h ighes t good. Here , then , an object canbe regarded as beaut i fu l and so have p leasure necessar i ly connected with i t

bec ause i t i s l ike th e m ora l ly good. T h is mak es mora l i ty cons t i tu t iv e of

beau ty , d i r ec t ly m ak in g tas te a me ans to a mo ra l end ; wh ere t a s te ' s s t a tus

as a means i s i t s e l f dependen t on beau ty ' s l ikenes s to the mora l ly good .9

Once the capac i ty fo r the apprec ia t ion o f beau ty becomes es sen t ia l ly a

m o r a l v i r t u e , t h e n t h e a u t o n o m y , i n t e g r i t y , d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s a n d i m p a r

t i a l i ty o f judgements o f t a s te a re des t royed .1 0

While the a t t empt to g round aes the t i c neces s i ty on mora l i ty unequ ivo

ca l ly ab roga tes the au tonomy o f the judgement o f t a s te , a p r io r ques t ion

shou ld in te rced e he re , nam ely , is th i s a t t em pt to g ro un d tas te in mora l i ty

Kan t ' s ? There a re good reasons fo r answer ing th i s ques t ion in the nega

t ive . Not on ly does Kan t no t r a i s e the ques t ion o f p rov id ing a t i t l e and a

deduct ion for tas te af ter §38, as one might expect i f he were us ing h is d is

cuss ion of moral i ty to do what he had fa i led to do ear l ier ; but he regular ly

and c ons is te nt ly s ta tes tha t be au ty is wh at p leases in the me re ' es t ima te of

i t ' ( e .g . CJ , 'G en era l R em ar k . . . ' , 267 ; §3 1 , 28 1 ; §38 , 289 ; §45 , 306 ; §54 ,

330) . An d K an t ope ns § 15 by s ta t ing th at the beau t i fu l i s es t im ated on thegr ou nd of a m er e form al f inali ty, th at is , 'a f inali ty ap art from an end (eine

Zweckm dssigkeit ohne Zmeck), [one] who l ly ind ep en de n t o f the r e p res en

ta t ion of the good ' .

Fur ther , a l i t t le ref lect ion wil l reveal that the a t tempt to ground aes

thet ic necess i ty in moral i ty deprives the ana logy be tween mora l i ty and

beau ty o f i t s fo rce . The fo rce o f Kan t ' s ana log ica l a rgument depends upon

tas te and beau ty in t r ins ica l ly pos ses s ing the charac te r i s t i c s g round ing

th e analogy , and th erefo re be ing a su i tab le vehic le for the pro m otio n

of mora l ends . To subsume tas te under mora l i ty wou ld deny mora l i ty

re -en fo rcemen t f rom e l s ewhere . Hence , a f t e r no t ing the four po in t s o f

ana logy be tween the two domains - beau ty p leases immedia te ly ; i t p leases

apar t f rom al l in teres t ; the f reedom of the imaginat ion in es t imat ing the




beau t i fu l i s in accord w i th the un de r s ta nd ing ' s confo rmi ty to l aw; and the

cla im of tas te is universal - Kant concludes by urging us to note that

i t i s no t mora l ju dge m ent a lone w hich ' ad m i t s o f de f in i te cons t i tu t ive

pr i nc ip l es ' (C J , §5 9, 354) ; tha t i s , w ha t we are of fered is a sys te m of an al

ogies and d isana log ies be tween the aes the t i c and the mora l , w i th Kan t

careful ly not ing the d isanalogies for each point in parenthes is ; and the

sys tem of analogies and d isanalogies g ives force to the points of pos i t ive

l ikeness because the two are based on d if ferent cons t i tu t ive pr incip les .

U nl ess bea ut y ' s p leas ing apa r t f rom al l in ter es t we re cons t i tu t ively d i f fer

en t f rom mora l i ty ' s , no ana logy be tween the two domains cou ld be d rawn .

Th is c la im i s bo rne ou t by the phras ing o f Kan t ' s f amous f ina l s en tence

in §59:

Tas te makes , a s i t were , the t r ans i t ion f rom the charm of s ense to

habi tual moral in teres t poss ib le wi thout too v io lent a leap , for i tr ep resen t s the imag ina t ion , even in i t s f r eedom, as amenab le to a

f inal dete rm ina t ion for un de rs t an di ng , an d teaches us to find , even

in sensuous objects , a f ree del ight apar t f rom any charm of sense .

(CJ , §59, 354)

N ot i ce tha t it i s not c la im ed tha t tas te provid es a t rans i t ion to mo ral i ty

direct ly , but only 'as i t were ' (gleichsam), by, that i s , i t s analogical re la t io ns

with m oral i ty . And w hat the se analogical re la t ion s reveal i s a f reedom

in confo rmi ty w i th l aw ( though here , no te , in confo rmi ty w i th the l aws

of the und er s ta nd in g) an d a non-cau sa l ly induc ed exper ience o f p leasu re

in the objects of sense . In o ther words , the exper ience of beauty provides

us wi th an analogue of the refusal of the demands of natura l des i re and of

a f reedo m in con form ity to law wh ich is essent ia l to K an t ' s mo ral d oc

t r i n e . Kant ' s poin t i s that ar t can possess moral s ignif icance and moral

impor t because i t au tonomous ly pos ses ses charac te r i s t i c s wh ich ha rmonize

wi th the demands o f mora l i ty . Of cour se , the au tonomous mora l - l ikenes s

of aes thet ic exper ience ra ises a d i f f icul ty of i t s own, namely , i f that exper i

ence i s au ton om ous ly s t ruc tu re d , th en w i l l i t no t p ro jec t a conc ep t ion o f

ou r re la t ion to ou r own high es t end s and o th ers tha t i s an a l ternat ive to

the moral i ty of reason?

iii T h e An t i n o m y o f A u t o n o m o u s Aes t h e t i c s

K an t ' s ep i s temolog ica l dedu c t ion o f the judg em ent o f t a s te l eaves i t r ad

ica lly und erd e te rm ine d : i t cann o t exp la in , on the basi s o f the r equ i reds imilar i ty of our subject ive facul t ies , why we m us t al l aes thet ica l ly res po nd

to specif ic objects in the same way; i t reduces the normat iv i ty of the c la im

of tas te to a predic t ion; and, because of these two fa i lures , i t cannot




explain the p leasure we take in the beaut i fu l . Conversely , the moral

in te rp re ta t ion o f the jud gem ent o f t a s te ove rde te rm ines i t by con ver t ing

the c la im o f t a s te in to a mora l command; in so do ing i t ab roga tes the

es sen t ia l d i s in te res tednes s and au tonomy o f t a s te .

When , however , we cons t rue the ana logy be tween tas te and mora l i ty as

one which in ten ds to dem ons t ra te the mora l s igni f icance o f a r t w i thou tt r ansgres s ing i t s au tonomy, then we migh t pe rhaps come to th ink tha t a

new d i ff icu lty i s be ing in t ro duc ed : n o t on ly is the un der de te rm ina t ion o f

tas te no t made good , bu t i t ough t to be ab le to be made good by tu rn ing to

reason and mora l i ty ; the conn ec t ion be tw een aes the t i c s and mo ra l i ty

shou ld somehow be ab le to suppor t t a s te w i thou t v io la t ing i t s impar t i a l i ty .

As th ings s tand , however , the p leasu re we take in the mere es t imat ion o f

th ings aes thet ica l ly and the moral s ignif icance of tas te , however compat

ib le they a re , none the les s r em ain a t a d i s tance f rom one ano th er . Th e log i

cal d is tance separat ing the judgement of beauty f rom i ts moral s ignif icance

would be a l toge ther un pro b le m at ic , and indeed in com ple te confo rmi ty

wi th Kan t ' s Cr i t i ca l p rogramme, were i t no t fo r the inexpung ib le l acunae

remain ing in the deduc t ion o f t a s te .

Clear ly , the logical d is tance separat ing the judgement of tas te i t se l f

f rom i ts s ignif icance for moral i ty s imply repeats the logical d is tance

separa t ing the cons t i tu t ive p r inc ip les o f knowledge f rom the cons t i tu t ive

pr incip le of moral ly wor thy act ion . And f rom here i t would not be

implaus ib le to suppose tha t , r a the r than d i r ec t ly o r ana log ica l ly b r idg ingthe gu l f be tween knowledge and mora l i ty , the ana lys i s o f t a s te wou ld

reg i s te r the i r p rob lemat ic dua l i ty as p rob lemat ic . And in a s ense , th i s i s

the s i tuat ion we now f ind ourselves in .

However , we mus t no t be s angu ine abou t th i s s i tua t ion , fo r Kan t ' s

opera t ing as su m pt ion i s tha t the re i s no th in g d i r ec t ly p rob lem at ic ab ou t

the dua l i ty be tween knowledge and mora l i ty :

Unders tand ing and r eason , the re fo re , have two d i s t inc t ju r i sd ic t ions

over one and the s ame te r r i to ry o f exper ience . Bu t ne i the r can in te r

fere wi th the o ther . For the concept of f reedom jus t as l i t t le d is turbs

the legis la t ion of nature , as the concept of nature inf luences legis

l a t ion th roug h the concep t o f f r eedom. (C J , In t ro . I I , 175)

Kan t be l i eves the two- ju r i sd ic t ions pe r spec t ive opened up by the f i r s t

Critique sa t is f acto r ily und erw r i tes the non - in te r fe renc e o f un der s tan d in g

and reason . T o be su re , K an t a rgues , mo ra l f r eedom i s m ea n t to in f luence

the domain o f na tu re ; and to th ink th i s we mus t be capab le o f r egard ingna tu re in a way com pat ib le w i th th e ends o f mo ra l i ty ; and the way to th ink

this poss ib i l i ty is to refer both moral i ty and nature to a uni tary ground in

the super sens ib le , abou t wh ich we can , o f cour se , have no knowledge . On

the moral in terpreta t ion of the judgement of tas te i t i s typical ly argued




that beauty as a symbol of the moral ly good operates by leading us to a

c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f t h i s u n i t a r y , s u p e r s e n s i b l e g r o u n d .1 1

Because wha t i s

he re refer red to is the bas is of bo th mo ral i ty and cogni t ive jud ge m en t ,

then th is argument fa i ls to secure a specif ic connect ion between the aes

the t ic and the m oral (as the idea of bea uty as a sym bol of the mora l ly g ood

r e q u i r e s ) .1 2

The ques t ion tha t now needs to be asked i s whe ther the ana lys i s o f

j u d g e m e n t , a n d t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f b e a u t y itself, d o e s n o t ' d i s t u r b ' t h e

logical and peaceful dual i ty of knowledge and moral i ty . The centra l thes is

wh ich u rges th i s ques t ion i s a l r eady befo re us , nam ely , K an t ' s app aren t ly

con s ide red v iew tha t the universa l i ty of the c la im of tas te is s t ro ng er th an

an a p r io r i g rounded p red ic t ion and weaker than the command o f r eason .

I t i s , in the f i r s t ins tance, precise ly the anomalous normat iv i ty of aes thet ic

re f lec t ive judgements wh ich ' d i s tu rbs ' and unse t t l e s the dua l i ty knowledge

and m ora l i ty , ca ll ing fo r th a new co ns t i tu t ive p r in c ip le tha t w i ll no ne th e

less make essent ia l reference to our capaci t ies as knowers and moral

a g e n t s .

T h e re verse s ide of th is d is tur ba nc e is the way in wh ich the logical se p

a ra t ion o f knowledge f rom mora l i ty unse t t l e s and d i s tu rbs the ana lys i s

Kant of fers of the judgement of tas te . I t i s th is d is turbance which is

manifes t in our reading of the th i rd Critique, where we f ind ourselves

confronted by a ser ies of dual isms — b e t w e e n f r e e a n d d e p e n d e n t b e a u t y ;

be tween pure and idea l beau t ies ; be tween the in t r ins ic and a p r io r i in te res twe take in the beaut i fu l , and the empir ical in teres t the beaut i fu l has for us

as a m ed iu m of com m uni ca t i on ; and finally , and pe rha ps mos t s ign if i

can t ly , be tw een the beau t i fu l and the sub l im e - wh ich a re p resum pt ive ly

underwr i t t en and r equ i red by the log ica l d i s t inc t ion s epara t ing cogn i t ion

f ro m m o r a l i ty , b u t w h i c h , a l m o s t i m p e r c e p t i b l y , s u n d e r o u r u n d e r s t a n d

ing and exper ience of beauty in to par ts that des t roy i t , leaving i t less than

it is.

T h e sugge s t ion is bro adly th at K a n t ' s fa i lures in prov idin g t i t le for th e

jud ge m en t of t a s te de r ive from th e l eg i s la t ive dua l i ty be tween un de r s t an ding and reason . W hile no d irec t evid enc e for th is c la im is poss ib le , in dire ct

ev idence wou ld be fo r thcoming i f i t cou ld be demons t ra ted tha t the

spec i f i c l eg i s la t ive dua l i ty be tween reason and under s tand ing was des t ruc

t ive o f the concep tua l in teg r i ty o f beau ty . The s t ruc tu ra l neces s i ty

en jo in ing the des t ruc t ion o f beau ty may be encapsu la ted in the fo rmu

la t ion o f a k ind o f an t i nom y, the an t ino m y o f aes the t i c au ton om y. I t

s t a t e s : The conditions necessary for securing the autonomy of the judgement of

taste necessarily exclude the worth of beauty from belonging to it intrinsically.

In o th e r word s , wha t con s t i tu tes the au ton om y o f t a s te neces sa r ily m akes

the va lue o f beau ty con t ingen t , ex te rna l and ins t rumen ta l . And th i s has an

t inom ic force because the p leasu re and the un iver sa l i ty o f the judg em ent o f

tas te are to be regarded as in t r ins ic to i t . Hence, the fact /value d is t inct ion




in sc r ibed in th i s an t inomy will be des t ruct ive of beauty jus t in case i t s

ex i s tence can be r egarded as d i r ec t ly en ta i l ing the f a i lu re o f Kan t ' s deduc

t ion , and as v io lent ly and i l leg i t imately sunder ing the in tegr i ty of tas te .

a Free and Dependent Beauty

In §16 Kant s ta tes that there are two kinds of beauty: f ree beauty

(pulchritudo vaga) a n d d e p e n d e n t b e a u t y (pulchritudo adhaerens). F r e e

beau ty p resup poses n o conce p t o f wh a t the ob jec t o f jud gem ent shou ld b e ;

whi le in judg ing dependen t beau t ies we p resuppose a concep t fo r the

ob jec t o f judgement , and w i th tha t concep t ' an answer ing pe r fec t ion o f the

objec t ' (CJ , § 16 , 229) . F u r t h er , K an t s ta tes , f ree bea ut ies are regarde d as

se l f - subs i s t ing , wh i le dependen t beau t ies , because they a re a lways judged

th ro ug h a con cep t , a r e con d i t ione d as beau t i fu l by tha t concep t , and hence

mus t be r egarded as coming under the concep t o f a pa r t i cu la r end .

Free beaut ies typify the ideal of objects which are purpos ively ordered

wi thou t , however , hav ing tha t o rder a s fo r some o ther end o r pu rpose ,

be i t in ternal or external to the object . Free beaut ies are not per fect

exem pla r s o f a k ind o f ob jec t because they a re no t cons ide red un der the

concept of the object they are ( i f one is avai lable) ; nor do f ree beaut ies

r e p r e s e n t anything or possess any intrinsic m e a n i n g . A m o n g s t the free

beau t ies o f na tu re , Kan t men t ions f lowers , many b i rds (the p a r r o t , th eh u m m i n g - b i r d , the b i rd o f pa rad i se ) and a nu m be r o f Crustacea. A m o n g s t

the f ree beaut ies of ar t , Kant l i s ts des igns a la grecque, fo l iage on p ic ture

f rames or on wal lpaper , mus ical fantas ias (wi thout a theme) , and general ly

al l mus ic that i s not se t to words .

O n th e basi s o f these rud im en ta ry d i s t inc t ions , Ka n t f eel s h imse l f

ent i t led to c la im that when we form an es t imate of a f ree beauty we are

m a k i n g a pure judgement of tas te . Now i t i s precise ly for the sake of

de l im i t ing and insc r ib ing a pu re judg em ent o f t a s te tha t K an t d raws h i s

d i s t inc t ion be tween f r ee and dependen t beau ty . A pure judgement o f t a s te

is an es t imate of a th ing 's beauty and nothing e lse ; and i t mus t be a t leas t

poss ib le for us to make pure judgements of tas te , o therwise tas te ' s c la im to

au tonomy would be j eopard ized f rom the ou t se t . Kan t ' s s t r a tegy , then , i s

to seek to unco ver a ran ge of objects - f ree beau t ies - for which the re

exis ts a prima facie case for him to claim, pace ra t ional is t aes thet ic

theor ies , tha t in judg ing them beau t ies we a re no t mak ing any so r t o f

c la im, confused o r o the rwise , abou t the i r pe r fec t ion . Kan t ' s theory

requires that there be pure judgements of tas te i f he is to be able to c la im

them to be au tonomous f rom cogn i t ion and mora l i ty ; and the ex i s tence o f

f ree beaut ies would legi t imate th is c la im.

As s ta ted , Ka n t ' s d i s t inc t ion be tw een f ree and de pe nd en t beau t ies can

not be sus ta ined, for i t sys temat ical ly conf la tes the bas is on which we




make a judgement o f beau ty , and hence our a t t i tude toward the ob jec t o f

t a s t e , with the idea of cer ta in objects , be they products of ar t or nature ,

be ing in t r ins ica l ly e i the r f r ee o r dependen t beau t ies .1 3

A flower may be

judged beaut i fu l , mis takenly , because i t s form 'beaut i fu l ly ' and 'per fect ly '

fu lfils the a im of r ep rodu c t ion . Con ver se ly , conc ep ts , images and sy mb ols ,

say , can legi t imately ente r in to the man ifo ld of an aes thet ic re pre sen ta t io njus t so long as they do not inhib i t the f ree p lay of the imaginat ion by

r e q u i r i n g t h a t m a n i f o ld t o b e s u b s u m e d u n d e r a c o n c e p t . I n § 4 9 K a n t

def ines aes thet ic ideas as ' th at repre sen ta t io n of the imag inat io n w hic h

indu ces m uc h tho ug h t , ye t w i th ou t the pos s ib i l i ty of any def in i te tho ug h t

wha tever , i . e . concept, being adequate to i t ' (CJ , §49, 314) ; and i f th is i s so ,

then the objects express ing aes thet ic ideas may be the subjects of pure

jud ge m en ts o f t a s te . A l l tha t i s r equ i red for judg em ents o f beau ty to be

pure i s tha t the bas i s o f the judgement no t inc lude a concep t ion o f wha t

the ob jec t r ep resen ted ough t to be .

Fo r K an t , th i s r eq u i re m en t was le s s easy to m ee t tha n mig h t a t first

app ear , s ince he t ende d to be li eve tha t a cen t ra l , if no t cons t i tu t ive , p u r

pose of ar t works was to represent some object or concept . So he says that

'a natura l beauty is a beautiful thing; an ar t is t ic beauty is a beautiful rep

resentation of a th ing ' (CJ , §49, 311) ; and i f represent ing is a purpose of a

work, then i ts success in achieving that end wil l be the cr i ter ion for our

evaluat ion of i t (as beaut i fu l ) . I t does not fo l low f rom th is , however , that

r ep resen ta t iona l works canno t be the ob jec t s o f pu re judgements o f t a s te ,

for K an t does no th ing to dem on s t ra t e tha t a cons ide ra t ion o f a wo rk ' s suc

cess in sa t is fy ing i ts representa t ional end necessar i ly mus t be deployed in a

jud ge m en t of t a s te . A succes s fu l - accura te and in fo rmat ive - r ep rese n

ta t ion of a th ing is not necessar i ly a beaut i fu l representa t ion of that th ing;

and conver se ly , a beau t i fu l r ep re sen ta t ion o f som e th ing o r idea i s no t

necessar i ly accurate , informat ive and the l ike .

Ye t , these f ami l i a r a rguments aga ins t Kan t ' s d i s t inc t ion a re a l toge ther

too quick , for a t leas t one of the objects he l i s ts under dependent beaut ies

s tands ou t , namely , ' t he beau ty o f man ( inc lud ing under th i s head tha t o fa ma n , a w om an , o r ch i ld ) . . . ' (C J , § 16 , 230) . Eve n i f we read the ca teg or i

ca l imp era t ive as l eg i sla ting an a t t i tu de , nam ely , tha t we oug h t a lways to

treat ourse lves and o the r sub jec t s a s ends - in - themse lves and never as mere

means , and hence as no t mak ing an on to log ica l c la im abou t wha t human

be ings a re , none the les s th i s a t t i tude , by means o f the concep t govern ing i t ,

i s cons t i tu t ive for Kant of how we must regard ourselves and a l l o thers .

And th is does enta i l that whi le there may be no in t r ins ical ly f ree beaut ies ,

one bea u ty , tha t of m an , i s in t r ins ica l ly de pe nd en t .

I f the r ep resen ta t ion o f pe r sons canno t be a mere means to aes the t i c

b e a u t y , t h e n t h e i m p u r e j u d g e m e n t o f w o r k s t h a t d o r e p r e s e n t p e r s o n s ,

and ideas character is t ic of them, wi l l necessar i ly include moral cr i ter ia

amongs t the i r cons t i tu t ive aes the t i c c r i t e r i a . In i t i a l ly , Kan t p resen t s the




employment of moral cr i ter ia , as he had tended to do with the categor ical

i m p e r a t i v e itself, as p rov id ing on ly a nega t ive cons t r a in t . S o K an t sugges t s

that the ta t tooing done by the Maor i , wi th i t s ' f lour ishes and l ight but reg

u la r l ines ' , cou ld be cons ide red beau t i fu l were we dea l ing w i th any th ing

other than the f igure of a human being. And th is seems compat ib le wi th

the sor ts of th ings we might say about works which were over t ly racis t ormisogynis t . As we shal l see d i rect ly , Kant a lso has s t rong v iews concern

ing the pos i t ive em plo ym en t o f m ora l c r i t e ri a in jud ge m en ts o f t a s te .

In o rder to p rese rve the au ton om y o f aes the t i c re f lec tive ju dge m ents ,

K a n t i s r e q u i r e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t t h e r e c a n b e p u r e j u d g e m e n t s o f

t a s t e . O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , K a n t ' s m o r a l t h e o r y r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e r e b e s o m e

ob jec t s o f aes the t i c jud gem en t abo u t wh ich pure judge m en ts canno t be

m a d e . N o w a l t h o u g h I h a v e s u g g e s t e d o t h e r w i s e , K a n t ' s a c t u a l a r g u m e n t

up to th i s po in t does no t en ta i l tha t in mak ing impure judgements o f t a s te

aes thet ic and moral cr i ter ia are articulated with one ano ther ; r a the r , the

sugges t ion is only that in some cases moral cons iderat ions can overr ide

aes the t i c cons ide ra t ion . And ye t K an t speaks o f ' de pe nd en t beau t ies ' , tha t

is , he speaks as i f the beauty of these objects cannot be d isar t icula ted f rom

their being the k ind of objects they are , namely , ones possess ing an in t r in

s ic d igni ty and wor th . I t i s , of course , not surpr is ing that we should only

become aware o f the ques t ion o f a r t i cu la t ion when these two va lues

bec om e disa r t icu la ted , that i s , wh en th ere is a conf lic t betw een th e mo ral

and the aes the t i c . Bu t the sugges t ion tha t the beau ty o f ob jec t s , o r r ep

resenta t ion of objects , possess ing in t r ins ic moral wor th could be indif fer

en t to tha t wor th i s su re ly im plaus ib le , if obscure .

Perhaps th i s p rov ides some leverage fo r v iewing the d i s t inc t ion be tween

f ree and de pe nd en t beau t ies some wh at d if f e ren t ly , a s who l ly de pen de n t on

K a n t ' s m o r a l t h e o r y . O b j e c t s a b o u t w h i c h p u r e j u d g e m e n t s o f b e a u t y c a n

be made are essent ia l ly , as i t were , jus t those that lack any in t r ins ic moral

wor th ; they a re th ings tha t can be means and a re never neces sa r i ly ends -

in - themse lves ; wh i le ob jec t s o r r ep resen ta t ions o f ob jec t s abou t wh ich

on ly impure judgements o f beau ty can be made , a re those which pos ses sin t r ins ic mora l wor th , a re ends - in - themse lves . And th i s l eads to the r a the r

unsa t i s f ac to ry conc lus ion tha t the re can be pure judgements o f t a s te , and

h e n c e a n a u t o n o m o u s d o m a i n o f a e s t h e t ic j u d g e m e n t , j u d g e m e n t s w h i c h ,

remember , lay c la im to the assent of a l l , jus t in case there are some objects

which l ack in t r ins ic wo r th o r va lue . T h e p o in t he re i s no t s imply th a t

Kan t ' s d i s t inc t ion be tween f r ee and dependen t beau t ies r ep l i ca tes the

logical dual i ty a l ready present in h is sys tem, where objects of pure aes

the t i c judgements a re ne i the r good nor bad , wh i le ob jec t s wh ich a re

intr insically good or evil are never just beautiful or not beautiful; i t is

more tha t the ve ry ex i s tence o f th ings l ack ing in t r ins ic mora l wor th (which

is not equivalent to ' th ings in t r ins ical ly lacking moral wor th ' ) i s a con-




d i t ion (iiberhaupt) for the very poss ib i l i ty of aes thet ic judgements of tas te ,

a n d h e n c e b e a u t y .

b Free Beauty and the Ideal of Beauty

T o w a r d t h e e n d o f § 16 , K an t p rese n t s the a r t i cu la t ion o f r eason ( the go od)

and judgement (beau ty ) a s an ex te rna l subord ina t ion o f the l a t t e r to the

ends o f the fo rmer , and s ta tes tha t ' s t r i c t ly speak ing , pe r fec t ion ne i the r

ga ins by beau ty , no r beau ty by pe r fec t ion ' (CJ , §16 , 231) ; th i s he mus t

mainta in i f he is to prevent h is theory f rom regress ing to some form of

ra t ional is t aes thet ics where perfect ion is t rea ted conceptual ly as a cr i ter ion

of beauty . Hence in §17, where Kant of fers h is pos i t ive ar t icula t ion of

beau ty and goodnes s , r eason and judgement , he does so by beg inn ing w i th

beau ty , and con t inu ing in a manner mean t to in su re aga ins t any conceptual cr i ter ion of beauty f rom being es tabl ished. And th is , sure ly , i s the

c o r r e c t p r o c e d u r e t o a d o p t h e r e .

A l though , Kan t a rgues , the re can be no ob jec t ive ru les o f t a s te , the

dom ain o f t a s te is sus ta ined and r ep rod uc ed ; th i s occu r s th r ou gh the

em plo ym ent o f ce r ta in p ro du c t s o f t a s te be ing t r ea ted as mo de ls w h ich

a r e , fo r t a s te , exempla ry (exemplarisch). And the h ighes t model of tas te -

tha t mode l , o r mode ls , wh ich bes t exempl i f i e s beau ty , and in so do ing

provides some order l iness and uni ty to the d ivers i ty of models of tas te by

m ean s o f wh ich th e do m ain o f t a s te i s r ep rod uce d - is the a rch e typ e

(Urbild) of tas te . So th is archetype of tas te is a model or an idea of tas te

wh ich each o f us mu s t a t t e m pt to bege t w i th in our se lves , and in ac cord

ance with which we form our es t imates of ' everyth ing that i s an Object of

t a s t e , or that i s an example of cr i t ica l tas te , and even of universal tas te

i t s e l f (C J , §17 , 232) . T h e a rc he ty pe o f t a s te , and the o the r mo de ls o f

t a s t e , are what s tand in for object ive ru les and conceptual cr i ter ia in judg

ing the beau t ifu l . Ex em pla ry i t em s take u p the bu rde n o f o r ien t in g us in

the f ield of the aesthetic, a f ield in which the question of orientation isemphas ized because i t i s not t ranscendenta l ly legis la ted . But i f , a t any

level , the aes thet ic themat izes the subject ive condi t ions for ( theoret ica l or

p rac t i ca l ) judg em ent , then the o r ien ta t ion p rov ided fo r us he re m ay tu rn

out to be e i ther equivalent to or a proxy for what provides or ienta t ion in

genera l . The ques t ion migh t then a r i s e as to whe ther wha t o r ien t s , wha t

p rov ides fo r ' d i r ec t ion in the wor ld ' , 1 4 in the absence o f adequa te ob jec t ive

pr incip les is , in fact , an tecedent to a l l object ive pr incip les . At the very

leas t , then , Kan t ' s ques t ion ing here t akes up the ques t ion o f how ac t iv i t i e s

can be governed or or iented in accordance with feel ing and need, whenno t underwr i t t en by ob jec t ive p r inc ip les . (A t the ve ry mos t , o r ien ta t ion

th rough exempla ry i t ems , a r t works , w i l l be s een to d i sp lace Kan t ' s



3 6 M E M O R I A L A E S T H E T I C S

categor ia l ant ic ipat ions of real i ty in Heidegger ' s 'The or ig in of the work

of ar t ' . ) That we do have a d iverse but ' regula ted ' f ie ld of d iscourse about

a r t and beau ty is t e s t im ony to the ex i s tence o f a r a t iona l i ty de te rm ined

th ro ug h a d i s c r im ina t in g fo rmat ion o f s ens ib il i ty and no t th ro ug h t r an

scendenta l leg is la t ion .

Kant goes on to d is t inguish between an ' idea ' , which s ignif ies a concepto f r eason , and an ' idea l ' , wh ich i s the r ep rese n ta t ion o f an ind iv idua l ex i s t

ence as adequa te to an idea . Hence the a rche type o f t a s te , wh i le r es t ing on

reason ' s idea o f an inde te rmina te max imum, s ince i t canno t be r ep resen ted

by means of concepts , wi l l necessar i ly be an ideal - the ideal of the beaut i

ful. Now the ideal of beauty cannot be drawn f rom the realm of f ree

bea ut ies be cau se , as f ree , the fact that an indiv id ual m em be r of a species is

beaut i fu l i s pur ely con t in ge nt . S inc e the re is no th ing abo ut f ree be aut ies

that makes them, as such, beaut ies , then by def in i t ion they are i l l - su i ted to

play the ro le of ideal beaut ies . An ideal beauty , then , mus t be one for

wh ich th er e exis ts a f ixed, or co ns tan t, co nc ep t of objec tive f inali ty. B ut

where the object ive f inal i ty of the object i s a t tached to changeable ends , as

wi th the idea o f beau t i fu l hom es , church es , ga rden s e tc . , the n he re too

con t inge ncy d isqual if ies th is rang e of objects f rom form ing an ideal :

In o th e r wo rds , whe re an idea l i s to have p lace am ong th e g rou nds

upon which any es t imate i s fo rmed , then benea th g rounds o f tha t

k ind the re mus t l i e some idea o f r eason accord ing to de te rmina teconcep ts , by which the end under ly ing the in te rna l pos s ib i l i ty o f the

object i s de te rm in ed a pr i or i . . . O nly w hat ha s in it se l f the end of it s

real exis tence - only man tha t i s ab le h imse l f to de te rmine h i s ends

by reason , o r , where he has to de r ive them f rom ex te rna l pe rcep t ion ,

can st il l com pare the m wi th es sen tia l and un iver sa l end s , and then

fu r the r p ronounce aes the t i ca l ly upon the i r accord w i th such ends ,

only he , among a l l objects in the wor ld , admits , therefore , of an ideal

of beauty, jus t as humani ty in h is person, as in te l l igence, a lone

admits of the ideal of perfection. (C J , § 17 , 2 3 3 )

T h e ideal of bea uty r es ts u po n th e ra t ional idea of m a n , tha t i s , th e idea of

man as pos ses s ing in t r ins ic mora l wor th , and the v i r tues a t t endan t on such

an idea . These ideas a re to be employed as govern ing the r ep resen ta t ion o f

the hu m an figure suc h tha t it becom es the ou tw ard expres s ion o f these

pure ly in wa rd , abs t r ac t an d co ncep tua l , ideas . T h e idea l o f the beau t i fu l i s

t h e i m a g e o f h u m a n w o r t h a n d v i r t u e e m b o d i e d .

I f we couple th is conclus ion with the conclus ion of our cons iderat ion of

f ree and dependent beaut ies , then we are presented with what a t f i r s t s ight

looks to be a paradoxical pos i t ion . A necessary condi t ion for the exis tence

of beauty is that there exis t objects that possess no in t r ins ic wor th or

value; i t i s only of these objects that pure judgements of tas te can be




formed . Conver se ly , the ideal of b e a u t y , the a r c h e t y p e and s t a n d a r d of all

beau t ies , wh ich fo rms the m o d e l in accordance w i th which all j u d g e m e n t s

of tas te are m a d e , d e p e n d s u p o n the ex is tence of ob jec t s pos ses s ing in t r in

s i c w o r t h a b o u t w h i c h p u r e j u d g e m e n t s of b e a u t y can n e v e r be f o r m e d .

F r e e b e a u t i e s are necessar i ly not ideal ; and about ideal beaut ies necessar i ly

p u r e j u d g e m e n t s of t a s te canno t be f o r m e d . If there were only f ree beaut ies, no ideal of beau ty wou ld be poss ib le , and aes the t i c r e la t iv i sm would

resu l t . If the re were on ly ob jec t s hav ing in t r ins ic mora l wor th , then the re

w o u l d be no a u t o n o m o u s d o m a i n of b e a u t y , w h i c h m i g h t be t aken as

e q u i v a l e n t to c la iming tha t the re wou ld be no beau ty at all - r a t iona l i s t

p e r f e c t i o n i s m w o u l d t r i u m p h . How are we to in tepret th is s i tuat ion?

I t s e e m s i m m e n s e l y t e m p t i n g to say h e r e t h a t the ideal of beauty f igures

( r e p r e s e n t s or images ) wha t does not ex is t , namely , the e m b o d i m e n t or

mater ia l in s tan t ia t ion of w h a t is essent ia l ly not mater ia l , the ideas and

c o n c e p t s of h u m a n w o r t h . B e a u t y a p p e a r s to be posed be tween inner and

ou te r , f r eedom and n a t u r e , r e a s o n and u n d e r s t a n d i n g , r e p r e s e n t i n g the

' s pecu la t ive ' r ea l i za t ion of the f o r m e r in the la t ter . But th i s r ep resen ta t ion

is d e p e n d e n t u p o n t h e r e b e i n g a b i fu rca t ion be tween inner and o u t e r . In a

s t r i c t ly causa l un iver se judgements of tas te would be imposs ib le , wh i le in

a comple te ly r a t iona l un iver se judgements of tas te would be u n n e c e s s a r y .

H u m a n b e i n g s , h o w e v e r , i n h a b i t b o t h w o r l d s ; h e n c e the human f igure

c o m e s to i m a g e the ideal union of the bru te ly mate r ia l and the ideal ly

ra t iona l . In th is argument f ree beaut ies f igure the idea tha t beau ty be longs

essent ia l ly to a wor ld tha t is not fu l ly mora l ly / r a t iona l ly de te rmined , wh i le

idea l beau ty r ep resen t s the o v e r c o m i n g of the d u a l i t y b e t w e e n n a t u r e and

f r eedom. Wi th in th i s s cheme the ideal of beau ty r ep resen t s , we m i g h t say,

t h e p o i n t of b e a u t y . And the p leasu re we t ake in beau ty wou ld be e x p l i c

ab le as dif ferent f rom m er e agre eab lenes s or mora l p leasu re s ince it w o u l d

f igure, pe rha ps , v i r tu e and h a p p i n e s s u n i t e d .

T h i s d i r e c t a r g u m e n t for the unif icat ion of f reedom and n a t u r e in

beau ty , wh i le appea l ing , is not K a n t ' s , nor is it really satisfactory. The

a r g u m e n t is not sat is factory because it mere ly uses the idea of f ree beauties to figure the m o m e n t of na tu re , w i thou t ac tua l ly exp la in ing why we

m u s t be capab le of f o r m i n g p u r e j u d g e m e n t s of t a s te ( a l though the h i n t it

offers us shou ld be k e p t in m i n d ) . S e c o n d l y , the a r g u m e n t s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y

d r o p s the a u t o n o m y of tas te , le t t ing the un iver sa l i ty of the mora l ideas

i n f o r m i n g the ideal of beau ty p ick up the slack left in the ep is temolog ica l

d e d u c t i o n . H e r e too, h o w e v e r , t h e r e is a h in t wor th ho ld ing on to, s ince

the un iver sa l i ty of the ideal of b e a u t y , as ideal and not idea , is necessar i ly

i n d e t e r m i n a t e and n o n - c o n c e p t u a l . T h i r d l y , w h i l e the ana lys i s makes use

of the b i fu rca t ion be tween na tu re and f r eedom, tha t b i fu rca t ion does en te r

in to the exper ience of b e a u t y itself; yet if beau ty ob ta ins on ly under

c o n d i t i o n s of lack , then surely that lack should appear in the e x p e r i e n c e of

b e a u t y itself. Fina l ly , the w h o l e of th is l ine of inqu i ry con ta ins a se r ious




c The Beautiful and the Sublime

In genera l t e rms , Kan t ' s accoun t o f the sub l ime i s f ami l i a r enough , and

ini t ia l ly a t leas t qui te p laus ib le . 'Sublime,'' Kant says , ' i s the name given to

what is absolutely great' ( C J , § 2 5 , 2 4 8 ) . What i s beyond a l l compar i songreat i s something in compar ison with which a l l e lse mus t be accounted as

smal l ; no th ing , and hence no object of nature , can have th is character is t ic .

Thus the absolute ly great i s not to be found outs ide us , but refers to the

ideas of reason; and the greates t of these is the moral law, which

cond i t ions and governs a l l o the r s . In judg ing the sub l ime , then , we a re

faced with cer ta in objects whose extent or s ize exceeds the capaci ty of the

imag ina t ion to syn thes ize them in accordance w i th the under s tand ing ' s

genera l dem and for un i ty ; such ob jec t s a re ap pre he nd ed as 'inhe ren t ly

con t ra - f ina l ' (CJ , § 2 3 , 2 4 5 ) to the goals of the facul ty of knowledge. Suchcontra- f inal i ty is fe l t as d isp leasure; but th is d isp leasure , which is fe l t

w i th the b reakdown o f the imag ina t ion in coming to g r ips w i th wha t

is pre sen ted , gets refer red to reaso n, wh ich is m edia te ly awo ken in it s

t r anscendence o f every th ing s ens ib le .

m isdire ct ion , for the ideal of bea uty is pro pe r ly a co nce rn for the b ea ut i

ful. However , i f the d ign i ty and wor th o f human be ings a re a t i s sue , then

the aes the t i c r e f l ec t ive judgement o f the human fo rm b r ings to l igh t wha t

transcends sens ib i l i ty ; as such, but only to that degree , the judgement of

t h e h u m a n f o r m m u s t b e r e g a r d e d a s s u b l i m e .

Wi th the f a i lu re o f the d i r ec t a rgument we a re r e tu rned to the o r ig ina l

paradoxical formulat ion of the s i tuat ion: i f there were only f ree beaut ies ,

no ideal of beauty would be poss ib le , and aes thet ic re la t iv ism would

resul t ; i f there were only objects having in t r ins ic moral wor th , then there

w o u l d b e n o a u t o n o m o u s d o m a i n of b e a u t y . T h e n o n - e q u i v a l e n c e b e t w e e n

free and ideal beauty records again , but more emphat ical ly , the dual i ty

between fact and value . But now we have been provided with a h in t as to

how that dual i ty i t se l f condi t ions the exis tence of beauty . This h in t i s id le ,

however , un les s some in road can be made aga ins t the d i r ec t l ink Kan td raws be tween f r ee beau t ies , pu re judgements o f t a s te , and the ha rmony

be tween the imag ina t ion and under s tand ing as cons t i tu t ive o f aes the t i c

es t imat ion . Jus t so long as aes thet ic es t imat ion necessar i ly excludes reason,

o r , m ore b road ly , som e norm at ive conc ep t ion o f the wor th o f the ob jec ts

o f aes the t i c judge m ent , then the i r r e f rang ib le co nnec t ion be tween f ree

beau t ies and p ur e judg em ent s o f beau ty w i ll r em ain , and the au tonom y o f

aes the t i c judgement w i l l depend on i t be ing a t t ached to the va lue - f r eedom

of the un der s tan d in g . I n shor t , the f ac t /va lue d i s t inc t ion in K an t tu r ns on

the d i s t inc t ion be tween under s tand ing and r eason . The i r dua l i ty i sthemat ized in the s epara t ion be tween the beau t i fu l and the sub l ime .




I n K a n t ' s a c c o u n t two v e r y d u b i o u s t h o u g h t s are in t imate ly l inked . On

th e one h a n d , he c la ims tha t 'the s u b l i m e in n a t u r e is i m p r o p e r l y so

cal led ' s ince the a p p r e h e n s i o n of ob jec t s ' o the rwise fo rmles s ' is the ' m e r e

o c c a s i o n ' for the a d o p t i o n of an a t t i t u d e of t h o u g h t and t h a t w h i c h (the

ideas of reason) serves as its bas is (CJ, §30, 280). H e n c e the contra- f inal i ty

of the object of a j u d g e m e n t of s u b l i m i t y is not e s t i m a t e d on its owna c c o u n t , but used; and the use to w h i c h it is put is to h a v e us c o n s i d e r the

s u p e r s e n s i b l e in us. On the o ther hand , s ince the a t t i t u d e of t h o u g h t

w h i c h is the proper ly sub l ime mus t a l r eady be c o n c e d e d to be a p r i o r i

val id , then a separa te ' aes the t i c ' deduc t ion of the cla im to un iver sa l i ty

m a d e in j u d g e m e n t s of the s u b l i m e is u n n e c e s s a r y . Its claim to i n t e r -

subject ive val id i ty is not s imply pa ras i t i c upon the val id i ty of the m o r a l

law: it is the moral law 's c la im to va l id i ty wh ich is b e i n g i n v o k e d . W h i c h

is why Kant s t a tes in §30 t h a t the s u b l i m e is not in n e e d of a s e p a r a t e

d e d u c t i o n ; and fu r the r tha t it is 'far l e s s i m p o r t a n t and r ich in c o n s e q u e n c e s ' t h a n the b e a u t y of n a t u r e , on the whole g iv ing 'no ind ica t ion of

anything f inal in n a t u r e itself, but only in the p o s s i b l e e m p l o y m e n t of our

i n t u i t i o n s of it i n d u c i n g a feeling in our own selves of a f inali ty quite inde

p e n d e n t of n a t u r e ' (CJ, §23, 246).

If, h o w e v e r , it is this m o u n t a i n r a n g e , d e e p r a v i n e , v o l c a n o or r a g i n g

t o r r e n t t h a t i n d u c e s the j u d g e m e n t of s u b l i m i t y ; if t h e r e are ob jec t s wh ich

p r o p e r l y and i m p r o p e r l y i n d u c e s u c h j u d g e m e n t s ; if a j u d g e m e n t of s u b

l imity can be falsely or t ru ly occas ioned , so to speak, then a j u d g e m e n t isb e i n g m a d e . As we have jus t s een , Kan t does , and mus t , make r e fe rence to

specif ic in tu i t ions , and ' p a r t i c u l a r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ^ ] ' (CJ, §25, 250). M o r e

o v e r , he br ief ly sugges ts what may be the u n d e r l y i n g a s s u m p t i o n of the

whole accoun t , tha t in the e x p e r i e n c e of s u b l i m i t y we find 'the s t r a i n i n g of

the imag ina t ion to use n a t u r e as a s c h e m a for i d e a s ' (CJ, §29, 265). Of

course , every th ing he re tu rns on the i m a g i n a t i o n ' s ' s t r a i n i n g ' to e m p l o y

n a t u r e as a s c h e m a for the ideas of r e a s o n , to make ce r ta in so r t s of n a t u r a l

ob jec t s s ens ib le p resen ta t ions of w h a t e x c e e d s all sens ib i l i ty . None the les s ,

s u c h ' s t r a i n i n g ' , h o w e v e r d o o m e d to failure it may be, r equ i res tha t on lycer ta in objects be fit or p r o p e r c a n d i d a t e s for be ing pos s ib le s chemas for

an idea of r eason . If it w e r e t r u e t h a t ' s u b l i m i t y ' did 'not r es ide in any of

t h e t h i n g s of n a t u r e , but only in our own m i n d , in so far as we may

b e c o m e c o n s c i o u s of our s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r n a t u r e w i t h i n , a n d . . . w i t h o u t '

( C J , §28, 264), t h e n we w o u l d n e v e r be en t i t l ed to c l a i m t h a t s o m e o n e

o u g h t to find this p r o s p e c t s u b l i m e ; but if th is were the case , then

j u d g e m e n t s of s u b l i m i t y w o u l d not be j u d g e m e n t s at all. R a t h e r , t h e r e

would on ly be ' a e s the t i c ' occas ions where in we were led to p r o n o u n c e the

' m o r a l l y s u b l i m e ' . 1 5

K a n t ' s a tt e m p t to avo id g iv ing c redence to the aes the t i ca l ly sub l ime was

d o u b t l e s s p r o m p t e d by his view that the only proper object of awe or r e v

e r e n c e in a non- te leo log ica l un iver se is the m o r a l law itself; h e n c e the




feeling genera ted b y the subl im e m us t be a t tac hed to it . F ur th er , i f a

d i r ec t aes the t i c judgement o f sub l imi ty were to be made , then r eason

would be pu t in to d i r ec t , and no t mere ly med ia te , con tac t w i th the s en

s ib le wo r ld , y ie ld ing a confus ion of facul t ies. F ina l ly , s ince the only pro pe r

object of awe and reverence is the moral law, and i t i s th is that i s thegro un d of the universa l i ty a t t r i bu ted to the feel ing of sub l im ity , then

external nature can only be permit ted or to lera ted to be an 'occas ion ' for a

judgement o f the sub l ime . I f an ex te rna l ob jec t were accoun ted as more

than an 'occas ion ' for such a judgement , then the objects of such

jud ge m en ts wou ld be 'aes thet ica l ly perc eive d ' as of inf in ite value , or so

Kant appears to fear . Kant ' s d i f f icul ty here ar ises because he wants the

not ion of 'occas ion ' to be merely causal ; but i f i t were only causal , then

sub l imi ty cou ld no t be long to the aes the t i c a t a l l . Kan t thus r equ i res a

no t ion o f ' occas ion ' tha t pos ses ses a judgementa l and r e f lec t ive moment ;bu t to a l low th i s runs con t ra ry to the ac tua l quas i - causa l na r ra t ive o f the

exper ience o f sub l imi ty he p rov ides . Hence h i s accoun t s l ides be tween the

causal and cogni t ive senses of 'occas ion ' , secre t ing the la t ter in the former .

K an t hand les the app are n t pe rcep t ion o f sub l im i ty by con tend ing tha t it

involves ' a cer ta in sub rep t io n (su bs t i tu t io n of a respec t for th e Object in

place of one for th e idea of hu m an i ty in our se lf - th e Su bje ct) ' (CJ , § 2 7 ,

2 5 7 ) . To a rgue o the rwise wou ld invo lve Kan t in a l lowing tha t we cou ld

perceive som eth ing to be o f va lue (wor th ) . W ha t s l igh t p laus ib i l i ty K an t ' s

a rgument has de r ives f rom h i s con ten t ion tha t the fo rmles snes s o f the

objects of ref lect ion leading to the (dynamical ly) subl ime is the oppos i te

of form; he nce no jud ge m en t of the m is m ad e, bu t a feeling of th e

fa i lure of the poss ib i l i ty of a pe rce ptu al ju dg em en t is reco rded in our feel

ing of d isp leasure . However , in so far as an es t imat ion of an external

object reflec tively c la im s it ou gh t or ou gh t not to be jud ged a su i tab le ca n

d ida te fo r a judgement o f sub l imi ty , then a judgement abou t i t i s be ing

m ade . As a con sequ ence , fo rmles snes s i s no t the u t t e r absence o f fo rm,

and hen ce i t s opp os i t e , as K an t ' s a rgu m ent r eq u i re s , bu t in te rna l lyimpl icated in form as i t s contrary . The thes is that the objects generat ing

judgements o f sub l imi ty a re fo rmles s on ly appear s p laus ib le in connec t ion

wi th a ce r ta in r ange o f na tu ra l ob jec t s . K an t avo ids con ced in g the obv ious

coun te r -example to h i s theory , sub l ime a r t works , by sugges t ing tha t in

such cases wha t we have i s a p resen ta t ion o f the sub l ime in ' un ion ' w i th

the beau t i fu l (CJ , § 5 2 , 3 2 5 ) ; and he appear s to sugges t tha t th i s s ame

un ion i s a t work in ce r ta in aes the t i c p resen ta t io ns o f the ' hu m an fo rm '

( C J , ' G e n e r a l R e m a r k . . . ' , 2 7 0 ) .

Conced ing the po in t over the human fo rm, however , concedes too

much . In the pas sage where Kan t makes th i s r emark , h i s a rgument i s to

the e ffect th a t in m ak in g judg em ents o f sub l im i ty we m us t avo id r egard ing

what is perceived ideological ly , that i s , we mus t not perceive the s tar ry




heavens , fo r example , a s ' s uns moving in o rb i t s p resc r ibed fo r them wi th

the wises t regard to ends . But we mus t take i t , jus t as i t s t r ikes the eye, as

a b r o a d a n d a l l - e m b r a c i n g c a n o p y . ' W h e n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e h u m a n f o r m ,

t h e s a m e p o i n t h o l d s : t h e d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d o f t h e j u d g e m e n t m u s t n o t

have d i r ec t r ecourse to the mora l ends 'subserved by a l l i t s l imbs and

members , o r a l low the i r accordance w i th these ends to influence o u r a e s the t i c judgement ' . The c la im here i s tha t the judgement on ly r emains aes

thet ic to the degree to which what is present to sens ib i l i ty exceeds itself in

the d i r ec t ion o f the super sen s ib le ; if we p ro jec t ou r ideas o f hu m an w or th

on t o the p resen ta t ion , then our judg em ent can no longer be r ega rded

as aes the t i c . I f we ho ld to wha t de Man has ca l l ed Kan t ' s 'ma te r ia l i sm '

h e r e , 1 6

tha t i s , to a pe rcep t ion o f wha t i s p res en t to the s enses w i th ou t p ro

jec t ion and wi thou t r edu c ing the p res en te d ob jec t to a m ed ium th ro ug h

which another person expresses her ideas , then i t fo l lows that what i s

' technical ly ' not sens ib le - not sens ib le in accordance with the d ic ta tes of

Cr i t ica l theory - can appear to sens ib i l i ty by taking on sens ib le form. In

ant ic ipat io n , we m ig ht haz ard th at wh at th is te l ls agains t is a cer ta in c o n

cep t ion o f wha t i s and i s no t s ens ib le r a the r than aga ins t aes the t i c pe rcep

t ion . E i th e r way , th i s m om en t is an awkw ard one fo r K an t ' s theory .

What ' s t r ikes the eye ' in pe rce iv ing Miche lange lo ' s Moses, fo r example

(but cons ider a lso such works as King Lear a n d Guernica), i s the in

de te rmina te s e l f - t r anscendence o f the s ens ib le in the s ens ib le . And i f we

are presse d as to w ha t feel ings are aro use d in th is per ce pt io n , the n we h adbe t te r s ay a p leasu red pa in , o r a pa in fu l p leasu re . In these r ep re sen ta t ion s

wha t i s a t i s sue i s p rec i s e ly the en twinement o f human d ign i ty and the

end les s vu lnerab i l i ty o f the hum an fo rm , a d ign i ty and w or th con s t i tu te d

th r ou gh tha t vu lnerab i l i ty . H en ce even the tho ugh t of a un i ty o f the

sens ib le and super sens ib le he re s eems mis lead ing . The ques t ion r a i s ed

by Kan t ' s 'ma te r ia l i sm ' , h i s r es t r a in ing o f p ro jec t ion , and r es t r i c t ion o f

aes thet ic percept ion to 'what s t r ikes the eye ' , i s what can s tr ike the eye?

In a s ignif icant passage Ka nt s ta tes : ' T h e beaut i fu l pre par es us to love

someth ing , even na tu re , apar t f rom any in te res t : the sub l ime to es teem

someth ing h igh ly even in oppos i t ion to ou r ( s ens ib le ) in te res t ' (CJ , 'Gen

e ra l R em ar k . . . ' , 267) . N ow the exam ple o f sub l imely beau ti ful a r t th row s

in to ques t ion the dua l i ty o f love and es teem, o r r a the r , th rows in to ques

t ion the dual i ty bet we en the two dif ferent co nce pts of d is in te res t tha t

under l i e i t . Kan t a s soc ia tes the d i s in te res t invo lved in judgements o f

be aut y as a f reedom from w ha t sens ib i l i ty des i res as suc h, tog eth er w i th

a f reedom from a d i rec t in teres t in the a im s of cog ni t ion and mo ral i ty . In

con t ras t to th i s , K an t r egards th e d i s in te res tedn es s o f the sub l im e as

ac t ing against the in teres t of sense . So he s ta tes that the moral law is only

made known to us aes thet ica l ly ' through sacr i f ices ' , and hence is only

known to us th rough the sub l ime and no t the beau t i fu l ; ' f o r human




The p r inc ip le o f mutua l love admonishes men cons tan t ly to come

nearer to each o ther ; that of the respect which they owe each o ther ,

na tu re , ' Kan t con t inues , ' does no t o f i t s own p roper mot ion accord w i th

the good, but only by v ir tue of the dominion which reason exercises over

sens ib i l i ty ' ( C J , ' G e n e r a l R e m a r k . . . ' , 2 7 1 ) .

T hi s con t ras t make s poor s ense o f wha t Ka n t s ays abo u t beau ty and

love , and invo lves h im in a mis in te rp re ta t ion o f h i s own mora l theory . Thela t ter poin t f i r s t . Kant ' s moral theory does not require that there be a

conf l ic t between the in teres ts of sens ib i l i ty , what we 'natura l ly ' des i re , and

the d ic ta tes of the moral law. Rather , i t i s the case that the wor th of

act ions depends on their being done for the sake of the moral law, and

hence no t na tu ra l ly . T h e over r id ing supre m acy o f the mo ra l l aw , however ,

only becomes se l f -evident and v is ib le g iven the general opaci ty of the

human hear t , in cases of conf l ic t . Kant here appears to be making the

heur i s t i c and pedag og ica l sup rem acy o f the confl ic t m ode l in to the p a ra

d igm at ic r e la t ionsh ip b e twe en the mo ra l l aw and s ense ; o r , r a the r , heappears to read the condi t ions for cogni t ive awareness of the moral law,

namely , over t conf l ic t between i t and des i re , in to what the dominion of the

moral law enta i ls .

I t could be argu ed th at K a nt is not com m it te d to such a v iew, bu t

h is poin t concerns ra ther the avai labi l i ty of the moral law in aes thet ic

ref lect ion; thus paral le l ing ra ther than contras t ing with h is moral theory .

N o t only does th is c la im i ll acc ord wi th wh at he says ab ou t ' sacr if ice ' and

hu m an na tu re , bu t it fa lse ly poses the ques t i on f rom th e po int of v iew of

the mora l l aw , r a the r than f rom the pe r spec t ive o f the sub l ime itself.

What is the sor t of love prepared for by beauty? And how does beauty

prepare us for love? While a fu l ler answer to the second ques t ion mus t

awai t our d iscuss ion of ref lect ive judgement , we know already that aes

thet ic ref lect ion involve s , in i t s d is in tere s ted nes s , a f reedom from the

dic ta tes of our personal wants and needs ; th is level of d is in teres t i s taken

by Kan t to be su f f i c ien t , a s suming the o the r r equ i remen ts o f judgement

are met , to a l low us to c la im universal val id i ty for our judgement . Such a

judgement prepares us to love the object in that i t a l lows us to perceivethe ob jec t in i t s own r igh t . And th i s though t i s backed up by Kan t ' s

demand tha t we conce ive o f the ob jec t a s no t de te rmined by any pos i t ive

end, be i t ex ternal or in ternal . The object i s perceived as if it were an end

in itself. So to perceive an object aesthetically is to perceive i t as if it were

of wor th in i t se l f apar t f rom our own or any o ther ends or in teres ts .

A l though Kan t r ad ica l ly d i s t ingu ishes love and es teem in the th i rd

Critique, in Par t I I of h is The Metaphysics of Morals, ' T h e d o c t r i n e o f v i r

t u e ' , he argues that love and respect should be regarded as operat ing l ike

the p r inc ip les o f a t t r ac t ion and r epu ls ion in the phys ica l wor ld , toge ther

b ind ing the wor ld in to a who le :




to keep themselves a t a distance f rom one ano ther . And shou ld one

of thes e great m ora l forces fa il , ' th en no thin gn ess ( im m oral i ty ) wi th

gap ing th ro a t , wou ld d r ink the w ho le k ingd om of (mora l ) be ings l ike

a d rop o f wa te r ' .1 7

What is a t i s sue , then , in the d is t inct ion between love and es teem is a

ques t ion of 'd is tance ' , of the d is tance necessary in order to have a proper

reg ard conjoined with a pro pe r co nc ern for th e o th er . N ow in the fo l low

ing pa rag raph K an t d i s t ingu ishes va r ious so r t s o f love and es teem in o r der

to d iscover which is the proper object of moral leg is la t ion . The sor t of love

appropr ia te here is not ' aes thet ic love ' , which is based on a feel ing of

pleasure one takes in the perfect ion of the o ther ; nor is i t ' emot ional love ' ,

for o thers cannot obl igate us to have feel ings for them; i t mus t ra ther be

'p rac t i ca l love ' , based on a max im of benevo lence , wh ich has benef icence

for the o ther as i t s consequence. Analogous ly wi th respect : i t cannot bebased on a f ee l ing de r ived f rom compar i s ion (Kan t in s tances a ch i ld ' s

a t t i t ud e towa rd a pa r en t , a pu p i l ' s for h i s teacher , e tc . ) ; r a the r , r e sp ec t

in i t s pract ica l sense mus t be taken as a 'maxim of l im it ing ou r se l f -es teem

b y t h e d i g n i t y o f h u m a n i t y i n a n o t h e r p e r s o n ' .1 8

W h a t i s n o t e w o r t h y h e r e is t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e l o v e - r e s p e c t p r e p a r e d

for by aes thet ic ref lect ive judgement c lear ly has the same consequences as

pract ica l love and respect , i t i s not based on a maxim nor on the sor ts of

feel ing Ka n t m en t ion s . Ra ther , i t i s based on pe rce p t ion , an ' a s i f pe rce p

t ion m ade in accordan ce w i th the r equ i rem en ts o f aes the t i c r e fl ect ive

judgement , bu t pe rcep t ion none the les s . Aes the t i c r e f l ec t ive judgement o f

the k ind be ing cons ide red he re cu t s ac ros s the d i s t inc t ion be tween aes

thet ic love and pract ica l love, and between aes thet ic respect and pract ica l

respect ; in so doing i t reveals love and respect to be not d i f ferent in k ind ,

bu t d if ferent in deg ree , a qu es t ion of bala nce , m or e precise ly of d is ta nce -

a qu es t ion , then , of or ie nta t ion , to p ick up a con cep t a l ready in p lace . So

aes the t i c r e fl ect ive ju dg em ent o f the hu m an fo rm can o r ien t u s in o u r

re la t ions w i th o the r s w i th ou t the in te rm ed ia ry o f p rac t i ca l m ax im s un de rthe legis la t ive author i ty of the categor ical imperat ive . And th is cer ta in ly

sugges t s tha t p rac ti ca l love and p rac t i ca l r e spec t , as K an t dep lo ys th ese

concep ts , a re no t the founda t ion o f ou r r egard fo r o the r s , bu t s a lu ta ry

defences mark ing the p lace where v i s ion , pe rcep t ion o r judgement has

fa il ed. ( I t is a m oo t ques t ion w he the r Ka n t i an m ora l i ty in i t s pos tu la ted

fulfi lment or ar t i s a be t ter r em in de r of th is v is ion . )

I f subl imity is to be a ques t ion of judgement , then i t mus t be a species of

beau ty , and no t some th ing s ep ara te f rom i t; and the a rt i s ti c sub l im e ,

which has the human fo rm as i t s focus , un i tes the sub l ime and the beau t i

ful. This un ion does no t deny the f ac t /va lue d i s t inc t ion ; i t i s p remised

up on i t . T h i s p remise i s g ran te d in the ' a s i f l ink ing the d i s in te res ted nes s




of aes th et ic reflective jud ge m en t wi th th e in t r in s ic finali ty , th e pur po s iv e-

nes s w i thou t pu rpose , the end- in - i t s e l f -nes s , o f the ob jec t o f judgement .

What has been den ied i s tha t the d i s t inc t ion be tween reason and under

s tand in g i s a p r io r i and he nce neces sa ry , r a the r th an a pos te r io r i and con

t ingen t . And th i s i s wha t mus t be den ied i f the judgement o f sub l imi ty i s

go ing to be a judgement a t a l l . Bu t i f the d i s t inc t ion be tween reason andund er s ta nd i ng i s con t inge n t , and they appear ' a s i f un i te d in a t l eas t a

species of aes thet ic ref lect ive judgement , then th is should a l ter radical ly

what the c la im of tas te is a c la im for . And th is y ie lds a somewhat prolept ic

af f i rmat ive answer to the ques t ion with which we began th is sect ion: aes

the t i c judgement , the exper ience o f the beau t i fu l and the sub l ime , does

d i s tu rb the log ica l and peacefu l dua l i ty o f knowledge and mora l i ty .

iv T h e Qu est ion o f Ref l ec tive Jud gem ent

I f reaso n and u nd er s ta nd in g can op era te in un ion , if, that i s , we can p er

ceive the wor ld as coloured in accordance with value , or bet ter , i f we can

perce ive th ings ' a s ' va lued where the ques t ion o f whe ther pe rce ived va lue

is or ig inal to the th ing or projected on to i t can be shown to be o t iose , then

the poss ib i l i ty for th is wi l l have to l ie in the nature of ref lect ive judgement

itself. An in i t ia l ly p laus ib le sugges t ion that would a l low us to th ink th is

pos s ib i l i ty wou ld invo lve r egard ing r eason and under s tand ing as hav ing

become sepa rated ou t from a s ta te of un i ty in reflective jud ge m en t . A nd

th i s t em pora l beco m ing wou ld hav e compu ls ive fo rce i f i t were doub led by

a log ica l beco min g , tha t i s , a dem ons t ra t io n to the e f fect tha t som eth ing

l ike what w e cal l aes th et ic ref lect ive ju dg em en t could be sho wn to be logi

ca l ly p r io r to de te rmina te judgement . We need , then , to demons t ra te : f i r s t ,

some ev idenc e tha t a t em po ra l o r h i s to r ica l sto ry migh t be appro pr ia te ;

secondly , a logical account of the pr ior i ty of ref lect ive over determinate

judgement ; and th i rd ly , an accoun t o f r e f l ec t ive judgement answer ing to

the ne ed s of these two c la im s . W e shal l take up thes e ques t ion s in reverseorder . Once these po in t s a re es tab l i shed , then the memor ia l hypo thes i s

in t roduced a t the very beginning of th is chapter wi l l be able to be

f o w a r d e d .1 9

W hile genera l ly ju dg em ent i s the facu lty for th ink i ng the p a r t i cu la r

as con ta in ed in the un iver sa l , K an t d i s t ingu ishes be twe en de te rm ina te

jud gem ent , whe re the pa r t i cu la r i s sub sum ed u nd er the un iver sa l , f rom

ref lect ive judgement , where ' the par t icular i s g iven and the universal has

to be found for i t ' (C J , In t r o . IV , 179) . Ref lect ion , K an t te l ls us in §6 of

h is Logic, i s a going back over d i f ferent presenta t ions in order to d iscover

i n t h e m s o m e t h i n g t h a t r e m a i n s c o n s t a n t o r i n v a r i a n t . 2 0 Now if reflection

is req uir ed w he n a co nc ep t is lacking, when , for ex am ple , we wan t to

general ize over s imilar but d i f ferent indiv iduals , then the work of ref lec-




t ion , a l though ca r r i ed ou t fo r the s ake o f the und er s ta nd ing , p rop er ly

be longs to the p roduc t ive imag ina t ion , wh ich f r ee ly confo rms to the l aws

of the under s tand ing and i s fo rm-g iv ing , hence l aw-g iv ing (CJ , 'Genera l

R e m a r k . . . ' , 2 4 0 - 1 ) . A n d b y f o r m , a t i ts m o s t a b s t r a c t , w e s h o u l d u n d e r

s tan d ' th e com ing tog eth er ( in a ma nifo ld of an object) of som e or al l of

the e le m ent s of the man ifo ld in a un i ty in acc orda nce w ith a co nce pt or ina uni ty su i table for some poss ib le , even i f unspecif ied , concept ' .

2 1

S i n c e

the form of concepts cons is ts in thei r general i ty , and th is general i ty

responds to , co r responds w i th , o r i s answerab le to the genera l i ty o f the

e lem en ts d i s covered th r ou gh re f lec t ion in a man i fo ld , then th e work o f

ref lect ion is the generat ion of concepts adequate to the forms of the

e lemen ts o f a man i fo ld .

Now what is c lear , even f rom th is br ief sketch , i s that the act iv i ty

of judgement , when cons idered as a ref lect ive act iv i ty , has about i t an

appra i s ing o r qua l i t a t ive ly d i s c r imina to ry charac te r , wha t Kan t ca l l s ' e s t i

m a t i n g ' (Beurteilung; CJ , §9 , 218) . And th i s appra i s ing charac te r o f judge

men t i s opera t ive , i f submerged , even in o rd ina ry ac t s o f subsumpt ion . So

at B172 of the first Critique, K an t s ays tha t if un de r s ta nd ing i s the f acu lty

o f ru les , ' j udgement w i l l be the f acu l ty o f subsuming under ru les ; tha t i s ,

o f d i s t ingu ish ing where someth ing does o r does no t s t and under a g iven

r u l e ' . K a n t ' s t h o u g h t h e r e is j u s t t h a t t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g

s ta nd s und er a g iven ru le cann ot i t se lf be decide d by the appl ica t ion of a

ru le w i thou t genera t ing a in f in i t e r eg res s . Hence judgement i t s e l f i s no t

ru le -go verne d ; it s appra i s in g is the non -con cep tua l ly governe d ' s can n in g '

o r apprehend ing o f a man i fo ld in o rder to a r r ange a match be tween i t and

a conc ep t . A jud gem ent i s de t e rm ina te , th en , no t becau se th i s appra i s in g

can ever be absen t , bu t wh en th i s appra i s ing work i s don e und er the

gove rnanc e (de te rm ina t ion ) o f som e leg i sla tive facu lty o the r than jud ge

m e n t itself:

T ak e a doc to r who know s wha t typh o id ( the concep t ) i s, bu t does

not recognize i t in an indiv idual case ( judgement or d iagnos is ) . Wemight be incl ined to see in the d iagnos is (which impl ies a g i f t or an

ar t ) an example o f de te rmin ing judgement , s ince the concep t i s sup

posed to be known. But in re la t ion to an indiv idual case the concept

i tse lf i s not g iven: i t i s pro ble m at i c , or a l tog ethe r inde ter m ina te . In

fact the d iagnos is i s an example of ref lect ive judgement . I f we look

t o m e d i c i n e fo r a n e x a m p l e o f d e t e r m i n i n g j u d g e m e n t , w e m u s t t u r n

to a therapeut ic decis ion: there the concept is g iven in re la t ion to

an indiv idual case , but w ha t is d i ff icult i s i t s app l icat ion (co un ter -

ind ica t ions in the pa t i en t , e t c . ) .2 2

Gen er ica l ly , then , judg em ent is a lways an ac t o f appra i s ing , d i s ce rn ing o r

es t imat ing tha t i s underde te rmined by ru les , and the opera t ion o f th i s




d isce rnm ent i s a neces sa ry cond i t ion fo r the sub sum pt i on o f syn thes ized

mani fo lds under ru les .

There i s no th ing su rp r i s ing o r un toward in th i s r esu l t : f rom the ou t se t

we have t aken Kan t ' s s t r a tegy in the th i rd Critique t o d e m o n s t r a t e h o w

aes the t i c r ef lec tive ju dg em en t invo lves , e s sen t ia l ly , the ne ces sa ry su b

jec t ive cond i t ions fo r de te rmina te judgement . What we migh t haveregarded as d i spu tab le was whe ther such cond i t ions were p roper ly

ep i s temic o r mere ly psycho log ica l .2 3

Focus ing on the appra i s ing and d i s

ce rn ing work neces sa ry fo r de te rmina te judgement r evea l s tha t t a lk abou t

a ' ha rmony o f f acu l t i e s ' canno t be b ru te ly psycho log ica l , bu t i s p roper ly

ep i s temolog ica l . And Kan t ' s s t r a tegy in the th i rd Critique can hence be

reg ard ed as the in ter ro gat io n of jud gem en t whe n it i s f reed f rom i ts su b

merged ro le in de te rmina te judgement , when , we migh t s ay , judgement i s

opera t ing au tonomous ly o r fo r i t s own sake .

Phras ing the p rob lem in th i s manner , however , p rov ides a h in t a s to

how we m igh t d i sp lace the cen t ra l i ty g iven to de t e rm ina t e judg em en t , for

i n a s k i n g h o w j u d g e m e n t a p p e a r s w h e n o p e r a t i n g a u t o n o m o u s l y w e m i g h t

sugges t that when i t operates under the governance of the legis la t ive facul

t i e s o f r eason o r un de r s ta nd ing i t i s be ing em ploye d he te r ono m ous ly .

Knowledge-get t ing for Kant is a form of in tent ional ac t iv i ty ; which is to

say , when Kan t speaks o f syn thes iz ing man i fo lds , and o f subsuming a

perce ived man i fo ld u nd er a conc ep t , he is cons ide r ing kno wled ge-ge t t ing

as a goal-d irected act iv i ty . The s imples t rea l iza t ion of th is goal occurs ino rd inary , p red ica t ive judgements o f pe rce ived ob jec t s ; wh i le the h ighes t

level of th is ac t iv i ty is the cons truct ion of a unif ied phys ical theory . 2 4

T h a t act in g to gain cog ni t io n by mea ns of con cep ts is a form of act iv i ty

has a lso been presupposed f rom the beginning, s ince i t i s f rom the general

pu rpo ses of cog ni t io n tha t the p leasu re in jud ge m en ts of tas te is to f low:

The regular i ty that conduces to the concept of an object i s , in fact ,

the ind i spensa b le co nd i t io n . . . o f g rasp ing the ob jec t as a s ing le r e p

resen ta t ion and g iv ing to the man i fo ld i t s de te rmina te fo rm. Th is

d e t e r m i n a t i o n i s an end in respect of knowledge; and in this connexion

it is invariably coupled with delight (Wo hlgefallen) ( such as a t t ends

t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t o f a n y , e v e n p r o b l e m a t i c a l p u r p o s e ) . H e r e ,

however , we have mere ly the va lue s e t upon the so lu t ion o f a de te r

mina te p rob lem, and no t a f r ee and inde te rmina te ly f ina l en te r ta in

m en t of the me nta l po w ers wi th wha t is ca l led beaut i fu l . In the la t ter

case un de rs t an di ng is a t the service of im agin at ion , in the former the

re la t ion is r ever sed . (CJ , 'Ge ner a l R em ar k . . . ' , 242 ; m y i t al i cs )

Now the p leasu re t aken in the so lu t ion o f a ' de te rmina te p rob lem' , tha t i s ,

the p leasure we take in ordinary acts of cogni t ion , i s interested because ' the

concept is determinate , so that the p leasure is p leasure in the fact that a




mani fo ld co nfo rm s de te rm ina te ly to a conc ep t and i ts a s soc ia ted s ch em a ' .2 5

And th is i s jus t as the above passage sugges ts : in acts of determinate

jud ge m en t the imag ina t ion i s be ing p res sed in to the 's e rv ice ' o f the un de r

s tan d in g , wh ich en ta il s tha t the ima g ina t ion i s be ing used he t e ro nom ou s ly ,

a po in t we sha l l r e tu rn to ; and the p leasu re evoked is the un de r s ta nd ing ' s

p leasu re in subsumpt ion . Kan t s t a ted the s ame though t ea r l i e r in morev iv id t e rms :

B ut the la t ter k ind of f inali ty [ i .e . th e purpo s ive nes s of co gn i t io n] ,

as i t refers to the form of the Object , not to the Subject ' s cogni t ive

facul t ies engag ed in it s ap pre he ns ion , bu t to a def in i te cogn i t ion of

the ob jec t under a g iven concep t , has nothing to do with a feeling of

pleasure in things, bu t on ly w i th the under s tand ing and i t s e s t imate

o f the m . (C J , In t ro . V I I I , 192 ; m y i t a li c s)

N ot e tha t the p leasu re t aken in o rd ina ry ac t s o f cogn i t ion has no th i ng to

do wi th a p leasu re t aken in the th ings themse lves , bu t on ly in the i r subjec

tion t o t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g .

I t i s precise ly because in ordinary acts of cogni t ion p leasure is

in te res ted , and because in such ac t s the imag ina t ion i s be ing employed

he te rono mo us ly , and finally b ecause in such ac ts o f sub sum pt io n - sub jec

t ion our p leasure has noth ing to do with a p leasure in th ings but i s a

p leasu re in domin ion , tha t the re a re g rounds fo r th ink ing tha t pe rhaps

ordinary cogni t ion (a t leas t as i t i s conceived of as being cont inuous wi th

the work o f s c ience) i s a he te r on om ou s fo rm o f know ledge-g e t t ing . T h e

reas on wh y Ka nt do es no t con s ider th is poss ib i l i ty is bec ause for h i m t he

und er s t an d in g , a s a l eg is lat ive facu l ty governed by the ca tegor ies , cann o t

be r egarded as in any way op t iona l . Hence he con tends tha t the o r ig in o f

th e un iver sa l l aws o f the un de r s ta nd ing do es no t p resup pose any fu r the r

in ten t ion o r a im (Absicht), ' s ee ing that i t i s only by their means that we

f i r s t come by any concep t ion o f the mean ing o f knowledge o f th ings . . . '( C J , I n t r o . V I , 1 8 6 - 7 ) . K n o w l e d g e - g e t t i n g a s l eg is la te d b y t h e u n d e r

s tan d in g , and as invo lv ing the su bs um pt i on o f ob jec t s un de r con cep ts ,

canno t be r egarded as he te ronomous because such ac t iv i t i e s de f ine knowl

edge in the f i r s t ins tance. This c la im, of course , has the weight of the

whole of the f irs t Critique be hin d i t . Yet th e revers ib i l i ty of th e re la t ions

be tw een the un de r s ta nd ing and the imag ina t ion , a s exempl i fi ed by the

p a s s a g e f ro m t h e ' G e n e r a l R e m a r k . . . ' a p p e n d e d t o § 2 2 q u o t e d a b o v e , a n d

the concess ion that the p leasure in aes thet ic ref lect ive judgement is a

p leasu re t aken in th ings , migh t sugges t tha t the s i tua t ion i s o the r tha n asKan t cons t rues o r in tends i t .

In ordin ary cogn i t ive act iv i ty the im agin at ion is con s tra in ed by th e laws

of the u nd ers tan din g, i t i s ' t ied do w n to a def in i te form of th is Ob ject an d,




to that extent , does not enjoy f ree p lay , (as i t does in poetry) ' (CJ , 'Gen

e ra l R e m a rk . . . ' , 240). In the judg em ent o f t a s te , how ever , the p roduc t ive

imaginat ion exer ts an act iv i ty of i t s own 'as the or ig inator of arb i t rary

fo rms o f pos s ib le cogn i t ion ' . The t e rm here t r ans la ted as ' a rb i t r a ry ' i s

willkurlich; the p roper t r ans la t ion o f th i s t e rm i s cen t ra l for und er s ta nd in g

K a n t h e r e , a n d i t h a s m u c h e x e r c i z e d c o m m e n t a t o r s .

2 6

Clear ly ' a rb i t r a ry 'o r ' r andom' ha rd ly f i t Kan t ' s in ten t ions he re . Bu t willkurlich also has the

sense of ' a t p leasure ' , as in doing something a t one ' s own pleasure , that i s ,

not a t anyone e lse ' s . And th is seems to match Kant ' s poin t per fect ly . In

judg em ents o f t a s te the p rod uc t ive imag ina t ion p rod uce s pos s ib le fo rms

of in tu i t ion f reely , a t i t s own pleasure , and not as cons tra ined by the

de te rm ina te needs o f un de r s ta nd ing o r r eason . W ha t it p rod uce s i s

' lawful ' , th at i s , orde r ly , hav ing a s ignif icant d ivers i ty w i th in un i ty ,

bu t co r responds to no g iven ( ex te rna l ) l aw . Hence wha t we d i s cover o r

produce in a judgement of tas te is a ' conformity to law without a law(Gesetzmdssigkeit ohne Gesetz)\

21

N o w t h e p r o d u c t i o n ( w h i c h c a n o n l y b e p r o p e r l y u n d e r s t o o d t h r o u g h

Kant ' s analyses of ar t and genius , to be taken up in the next chapter ) or

recept ion (which is a lso a product ion) of an object exempli fy ing a lawful

ness wi thout law is not , for a l l that , something which is non-conceptual or

non-d i scu r s ive ; hence Kan t in s tances poe t ry as an example o f the f r ee p lay

of the p roduc t ive imag ina t ion . What makes judgement f r ee he re i s tha t

no one concep t o r s e t o f concep ts i s t aken as subsuming the ob jec t under

any ends external to i t . Hence the idea of a lawfulness wi thout law is

the com ple m en t o f the idea o f a pu rpos iven es s w i tho u t pu rp ose : the

f i rs t formula des ignates the modus of the imaginat ion , whi le the second

des ignates the character izat ion of the object that a t tends such a form of

apprehens ion . In d i s cover ing a l awfu lnes s w i thou t l aw we a re a t t end ing to

the ob jec t in i t s g ivennes s (where the na tu re o f ' g ivennes s ' i s de te rmined

epis temical ly and not causal ly) , and hence apar t f rom any subject ive or

object ive ends , including those of ca tegor ia l cogni t ion , that we might

br ing to i t. O u r es t im at ion of the object is un co ns t ra in ed by any nec ess i t ies apar t f rom apprais ing the object in i t s own r ight .

T h e que s t ion as to w he the r we a re he re t r ea t ing ob jec t s ' a s i f they

were end s - in - th em se lve s o r s imply ' a s ' end s - in - them se lves cann o t , f rom

a Kan t ian pe r spec t ive , be a ques t ion as to whe ther o r no t they ' a r e ' ,

me taphys ica l ly o r on to log ica l ly speak ing , ends - in - themse lves , fo r in th i s

con tex t tha t que s t ion devo lves on to the ques t ion as to whe th er so r ega rd

ing them i s a pa ras i t i c and ana logous mode o f comprehens ion o r o r ig ina ry

(a pr ior i ) . And thus far the only evidence we have for c la iming that

such inde te rm ina te judgem enta l com preh ens io n i s ne i the r in t rins ica l ly

evaluat ive nor in t r ins ical ly epis temic is the a pr ior i c la ims to val id i ty of

reason and the un de r s tan d in g . Th e d i s in te res ted p leasu re o f the judg e

ment of tas te speaks agains t these c la ims .

Of cour se , i f tha t p leasu re i s cons ide red to be con t inuous w i th the




p leasu re a r is ing from success fu l ac t s o f cogn i t ion , then the s ub ord ina t ion

of aes the t i c r ef lec tion un de r de te rm ina te judge m ent wou ld r emai n in

fo rce. W ha t fo rwards tha t subo rd in a t io n i s the thou gh t tha t the k ind o f

uni ty or togetherness of a manifo ld d iscovered in aes thet ic ref lect ion is the

sam e as wou ld s at is fy the de m an ds o f the und er s tan d in g genera l ly . B u t i s

th i s r ea l ly so? What the under s tand ing s eeks ( th rough the p roduc t iveimaginat ion) is invar iant features of indiv iduals in v i r tue of which they can

be regarded as the same as o ther indiv iduals ; and i t i s th is cogni t ive goal

tha t i s con t inued in the cons t ru c t ive ac t iv i ti e s o f m od ern s c ience . T h e

p leasu re t aken in such cogn i t ion i s , p rec i s e ly , p leasu re in the subord ina

t ion o f an ind iv idua l by a concep t (o r the subord ina t ion o f one o r more

laws under some more genera l l aw) , a p leasu re in the mas te ry o f an ind i

v idual (or law) by a concept (or more general law) cover ing a range of

ind iv idua l s (o r l aws ) . A l te rna t ive ly , aes the t i c r e f l ec t ive judgement

marsha l s concep ts , wh ich by de f in i t ion app ly to more than one ind iv idua l ,for the sake of the indiv idual judged. In the abs t ract , the idea of seeking

uni ty in d ivers i ty appl ies in both sor ts of cases ; however , the d i rect ion of

cogn i t ion va r ies be tween the two cases , and so , one wou ld expec t , wou ld

t h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g p l e a s u r e s .

In o the r wo rds the in te res t s o f un de r s ta nd ing and r eason a re neu t ra l

ized and d ignif ied by their c la im to a pr ior i val id i ty . Aes thet ic ref lect ive

ju dg em en t ' s d is in te res te dne ss a t f ir st s ight app ear s as an oth er ef for t of

n e u t r a l i z a t i o n . H o w e v e r , t h e t e n s i o n s i n K a n t ' s a r g u m e n t , w h i c h d e r i v e a tbo t tom f rom h i s a s s ign ing to t a s te a d i f f i cu l t au tonomy, wh ich bo th sup

po r t tha t d i s in te res tednes s and s im ul tane ous ly a t t em pt to cu r ta i l i ts c la ims

b y k e e p i n g i t s u b s u m e d u n d e r e i t h e r t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r r e a s o n , m a k e

the a p r io r i c la ims o f r eason and under s tand ing appear in te res ted in a

more sub jec t ive , l e s s neu t ra l s ense . For r eason and under s tand ing ob jec

t iv i ty involves the d iscovery (or invent ion) wi th in subject iv i ty of forms

tha t a re , p resumpt ive ly , more than sub jec t ive ; wh i le the d i s in te res tednes s

o f aes the t i c r e f l ec t ive judgement invo lves , in a cu r ious manner , the who le

sale brac ket ing or se l f - re l in qu ishm ent of subject iv i ty for the sake of theob jec t judged . F ro m the pe r spec t ive o f d i s in te re s tedne s s , r eason an d

under s tand ing s t i l l wear the mark o f the i r sub jec t ive o r ig in , a mark

revea led by the i r in te res t s t ruc tu re and under l ined by the na tu re o f the

p leasu re r esu l t ing f rom the i r success ful opera t ion . Tr an sce nd en ta l sub je c

tivity is s t i l l subjectivity, and i t is revealed as just or only subjectivity in

the d i s covery o f judgementa l p leasu re w i thou t domin ion . I f we a re no t

to b lame Kant for th is fa te , a fa te that would be outs ide h is contro l in

the 'ma t te r s ' themse lves , then the s imples t hypo thes i s exp la in ing h i s

dif f icul t ies sugges ts that aes thet ic d is in teres tedness works against t h e

in te res t s o f r eason and under s tand ing . Aesthetic reflective judgem ent in the

mom ent that it (historically) becomes autonomous, which is the mom ent of

Kan t's unea rthing of the logical gram mar of the aesthetic, reveals the subjec

tive interests of truth-only cognition and categorical mo ral reason. T h e s e




sub jec t ive in te res t s a re so deep ly en t r enched in ou r concep tua l s cheme

and l i fe pract ices that here tofore they had appeared as object ive . And to

the degree to wh ich they a re historically non-op t iona l tha t appearance i s

not absolu te ly fa lse .

I t thus now becomes a t l eas t p laus ib le and perhaps neces sa ry to r egardthe p leasu re t aken in de te rmina te judgements as de r iv ing f rom ends o r

in teres ts external to the in t r ins ic bent of ref lect ive judgement itself; a n d

f u r t h e r, t o r e g a r d t h e s u b s u m p t i v e e m p l o y m e n t o f c o n c e p t s i n d e t e r

m i n a t e j u d g e m e n t a s i n v o lv i n g a h e t e r o n o m o u s d e p l o y m e n t o f t h e p r o

duc t ive imag ina t ion . One migh t a t t empt to r es i s t th i s thes i s by deny ing

the c la im tha t appra i s ing ju dg em ent i s cogn i t ion , e i the r b ecause it is

non-subsumpt ive , wh ich d i r ec t ly begs the ques t ion a t i s sue , o r because

such judgement i s mere ly con templa t ive , and hence o f no (p rac t i ca l )

s ign i f i cance apar t f rom i t s connec t ion w i th de te rmina te judgement . Th ist o o , however , i s ques t ion -begg ing s ince the r emotenes s o f appra i s ing

judgement f rom prac t i ca l concerns p resupposes tha t the on ly s ign i f i can t

em plo ym ent o f appra i s ing jud gem ent i s aes the t i ca l ; bu t th is e i the r ignores

o r r epud ia tes the pos s ib i l i ty tha t r e f l ec t ive judgement became mere ly aes

the t i c under de te rmina te h i s to r ica l cond i t ions . The on ly d i r ec t g rounds

fo r r epud ia t ing th i s hypo thes i s wou ld be Kan t ' s o r ig ina l t r anscenden ta l

fo rmula t ions o f un de r s ta nd ing an d r eason ; wh ich is wh y the r ep ud ia t ion

can on ly be que s t ion -b egg ing . F ur th e r , in ou r exam ina t ion o f the mod a l

force of aes the t ic ref lect ive judg em en ts we were forced to recog nize t he

pract ica l as wel l as the evident ia l s ta tus of d is in teres tedness .

Al l th is s t i l l leaves qui te problemat ic the in teres t of d is in teres t , and

hen ce the end or pu rpo se cons t i t u t ive of aes th et ic ref lect ion . I n d iscuss ing

the an t in om y of aes the t i c au ton om y I m en t io ned , bu t d id no t e labora te ,

the dua l i ty be twe en th e a p r io r i d i s in te res ted nes s o f t a s te and our e m pi r i

ca l in te res t in beau ty as a m ed ium of com m unic a t ion . K an t t akes up th i s

issue in § 4 1 . There he t r ea t s the empi r ica l in te res t in beau ty as a means

and medium of sociabi l i ty , as i t se l f an end added to the in t r ins ic p leasurewe take in beau ty . However , p r io r to h i s Cr i t i ca l endeavours (c . 1 7 6 9 - 7 0 )

Kant had in f ac t though t communica t ion and tas te were more c lose ly

con jo ined :

The con templa t ion o f the beau t i fu l i s an es t imat ion (Beurteilung)

and no grat i f ica t ion (Genuss). This appearance , to be su re , makes fo r

some enjoyment but , by far , not in re la t ion to the judgement

(Urteil) of del ig ht in th e beaut i fu l ; ra the r , th is (p lea sure) con s is ts

sole ly in the judgement of the general i ty of the del ight in the object .

From th is i t may be seen that , s ince th is general val id i ty is useless

in the absence of socie ty , in that case a l l charm of beauty mus t

also be lost . Just as l i t t le will any inclination to beauty arise in statu

solitarto.2*




T h e r e is a t ens ion in t h i s a c c o u n t b e t w e e n w h e t h e r the p leasu re we take

in the beautiful derives from an in t r ins ic r esponse to the ob jec t of

c o n t e m p l a t i o n , or from the in te res t we have in c o m m u n i c a t i n g t h a t

r e s p o n s e . To u r g e the l a t t e r po in t , however , wou ld be unsat is factory s ince

un les s we did feel pleasure in c o n t e m p l a t i n g the beau t i fu l the re wou ld be

n o t h i n g n e e d i n g to be c o m m u n i c a t e d . H e n c e e v e n in his ear ly wr i t ings

Kan t usua l ly s epara ted the p l e a s u r e one migh t t ake in beauty f rom the

j u d g e m e n t of tas te itself, t h a t is, the j u d g e m e n t t h a t s u c h - a n d - s u c h an

object has been judged d i s in te res ted ly , etc., and the re fo re the c la im tha t it

i s beaut i fu l is a cla im to in te r sub jec t ive as sen t . Hence a logical wedge is

be ing inse r ted he re be tween the abi l i ty to r e s p o n d to an ob jec t aes the t

ica l ly , which is a pr ior i , f rom the abi l i ty to eva lua te tha t p leasu re , wh ich is

social and a pos te r io r i .

In favour of prese rv ing such a logical separat ion is the t h o u g h t t h a t

un les s we had the capac i ty to respond aes thet ica l ly , unless some s tory l iket h e h a r m o n y of the facul t ies were operat ive , no t h e o r y of b e a u t y c o u l d

e v e n get a foo tho ld . None the les s , such an a b s o l u t e d u a l i t y s e e m s i m p l a u s

ib le . Fi r s t , because an aes the t i c r esponse is not a raw or u n m e d i a t e d

r e s p o n s e to the object of c o n t e m p l a t i o n , but involves a c o m p l e x act of

d i s c r i m i n a t i n g j u d g e m e n t . If th i s is so, t h e n to say t h a t it is on ly the

d isc r imina t ion be tween p leasu res tha t is social but not the p l e a s u r e s t h e m

selves is to pres s the d is t inc t ion be tween na tu ra l and a c q u i r e d f u r t h e r t h a n

it can t a k e . T h i s , by itself, w o u l d not m a k e the poss ib le as sen t of o t h e r s

p a r t of the g r o u n d d e t e r m i n i n g the p l e a s u r e in the beau t i fu l , but it w o u l d

th row in to ques t ion the a t t e m p t to m a k e the a c c o u n t of tas te and b e a u t y

r e q u i r e two d iscon t inuous s to r ies : the first about the feeling for the b e a u t i

ful, and the second abou t the j u d g i n g of that fee l ing .

S e c o n d l y , as Kant h imse l f a sks the q u e s t i o n , w h a t is the sense or p o i n t

o f beau ty ou t s ide of society? In the t h i r d Critique K a n t s u g g e s t s an a n s w e r

to th i s ques t ion , namely , the p l e a s u r e we t ake in the beaut i fu l der ives f rom

the d i s covery of an a t t u n e m e n t b e t w e e n o b j e c t s and the genera l ends

of cogni t ion even when cogni t ion i tse l f is not the in teres ted goal of theact iv i ty . It is ju s t th i s r esponse , however , the e x p l a n a t o r y c o m p o n e n t of

K a n t ' s t h e o r y in the d e d u c t i o n of t a s te , tha t we have c la imed to be i n a d

equa te . Once aes the t i c r esponse and the j u d g e m e n t of tas te are d i r e m p t e d

f rom se r ious ques t ions of t r u t h and goodnes s , then they do a p p e a r

pecu l ia r ly po in t l e s s , s ense les s , empty .

F ina l ly , in §41 K a n t ' s s e n s e of the u r g e n c y of th is ques t ion surfaces .

Af te r conced ing the po in t tha t an in te res t in c o m m u n i c a t i o n c a n n o t f o r m

p a r t of the d e t e r m i n i n g g r o u n d of the j u d g e m e n t of t a s te , he goes on to

s ta te :

O n l y in socie ty does it o c c u r to him to be not m e r e l y a man, but

a man refined after the m a n n e r of his kind (the b e g i n n i n g of




civ i l iza t ion) - for that i s the es t imate formed of one who has the

ben t and tu rn fo r communica t ing h i s p leasu re to o the r s , and who i s

not quite satisf ied with an Object unless his feeling of delight in i t

can be shared in communion wi th o the r s . Fur the r , a r egard to un i

ve r sa l communica t ion i s a th ing which everyone expec t s and

requires f rom everyone e lse , jus t as i f i t were par t of an or ig inalc o m p a c t d i c t a t e d b y h u m a n i t y itself. (CJ , §41 , 297)

A s ta tem en t l ike th i s pu t s t he d i s t inc t ion be tw een th e a p r io r i and the a

pos te r io r i , be tween the na tu ra l and the acqu i red , under in tense p res su re

s ince i t ra ises d i rect ly the ques t ion of the re la t ion between methodological

so l ips i sm as a ph i losoph ica l p rocedure , and the apparen t f ac t o f human

sociabi l i ty . Par t of th is pressure der ives f rom the fact that the procedure of

m ethod ologic al so l ips ism is her e associa ted with a pre-se l f -c onsc ious s ta te

of affairs ; but if self-consciousness of our selves as beings of a certain sort

i s cons t i tu t ive o f ou r be ing , then the as sumpt ions o f methodo log ica l so l ip

s ism are more than counter factual . I t i s th is which g ives urgency to our

ques t ion: What poin t or c la im can the c la im of tas te have i f i t i s made

f rom a pe r spec t ive no t gov erned by ac t ing a f te r the m an ne r o f ou r o wn

kind? What is the ques t ion of beauty apar t f rom civ i l iza t ion , apar t , that i s ,

f rom human in te rcourse in genera l? How or ig ina ry does an o r ig ina l com

pact have to be before i t becomes a pr ior i? Especia l ly i f man is ' a creature

in t en de d for socie ty '? A nd i f m an is a cre atu re in te nd ed for socie ty , who se

sociabi l i ty belongs essent ia l ly to h is humani ty , then are not these facts a

priori facts about us too?

Nor shou ld one suppose tha t these ques t ions r e fe r on ly to the c la ims

of tas te ; d i rect ly analogous cons iderat ions ar ise wi th respect to bel iefs . In

'What i s o r ien ta t ion in th ink ing? ' Kan t a rgues aga ins t the sharp d i s t inc

t i o n b e t w e e n t h i n k i n g a n d c o m m u n i c a t i n g i n t h e s e t e r m s :

Bu t how mu ch , and h ow cor re c t , wou ld w e th ink if we d id no t th ink

as i t were in co m m on wi th o the r s , w i th who m we m utua l ly co m

munica te ! Thus one can we l l s ay tha t the ex te rna l power which

wres t s f rom ma n the f r eedom to pub l ic ly com m un ica te h i s thoug h ts

also takes away the f reedom to th ink - the so le jewel that remains to

us under a l l c iv i l repress ion and through which a lone counsel agains t

a l l ev i ls of that s ta te can be taken.2 9

The issue ra ised by th is passage is the connect ion between object iv i ty ,

in tersubject iv i ty and oppress ion . While the f i r s t two Critiques give pr ior i ty

to ob jec t iv i ty ( as g ro un de d in t r ansc end en ta l sub jec t iv i ty ) , the th i rd moves

in the d i rect ion of g iv in g pr ior i ty to in tersu bject iv i ty t hr ou gh reflective

judgement ' s l ack o f an ob jec t ive de te rmin ing p r inc ip le . P resupposed

commonal i ty and no t p resupposed p r inc ip les a re i t s a im. Bu t th i s a im,




again , cuts across the a ims and pr incip les of the ear l ier Critiques. H e n c e

the methodo log ica l so l ips i s im o f the Critique of Judgement b e c o m e s self-

undermin ing : i t can on ly have wha t i t s eeks , namely , commonal i ty , by

tu rn ing aga ins t i t s own methodo log ica l s t a r t ing po in t .

The exp l ic i t thes i s Kan t p ronounces he re i s tha t communica t ion (o r a t

leas t com m un icab i l i ty) i s necessary for the poss ib i l i ty of th in kin g; 'o bje ct iv i ty ' i s a product of taking in to account the poss ib le and real v iews of

o ther s . Wi thou t acces s to o the r op in ions we have no pe r spec t ive th rough

which to evaluate our own; for real purposes logical cons is tency is too

weak a cons tra in t . Loss of the f reedom of speech enta i ls a real loss in

the poss ib i l i t ies of th inking, and thereby a real loss in object iv i ty . Hence

the very poss ib i l i ty of thought is 'pol i t ica l ' . ( I t i s th is connect ion between

the poss ib i l i ty of object ive tho ug ht in general and pol i t ica l f reedom tha t

l ed Arend t to employ Kan t ' s aes the t i c fo r the purpose o f r econs t ruc t ing

the concep t o f the ' po l i t i ca l ' .3 0

) Bu t i f the a rgument o f the p rev ious pa ra g raph i s co r rec t , then the transcendental legislation of reason and understand

ing is equivalent to a transcenden tal repression of the political, which en ta i l s ,

a fo r t io r i , a t r anscenden ta l de fo rmat ion o f th ink ing and r eason itself. O f

co urse , such a thes is cann ot be es tabl ish ed on th e bas is of a pa ra gr ap h

from o ne of K an t ' s m ino r essays ; i t s rea l back ing can only begin to em erg e

from t he cons id erat io n of th e fa te of th e com m un icab i l i ty of ref lect ive

j u d g e m e n t .

P ick ing up the a rgument f rom the th i rd Critique: i f the c la im to com

munica t ion inaugura tes c iv i l i za t ion , i t equa l ly consummates i t , fo r when

civi l iza t ion reaches i t s height , then i t 'makes th is work of communicat ion

almos t the main bus iness of ref ined incl inat ion ' ; to such an extent that the

'ent i re value of sensat ions is p laced in the degree to which they admit

o f un iver sa l com m un ica t io n ' (C J , § 41 , 297) . A t th i s jun c tu r e , Ka n t s t a tes ,

the in teres t in d i rect p leasure in the object of judgement is a lmos t

inconsp icuous , wh i le ' the idea o f i t s un iver sa l communicab i l i ty a lmos t

indef in i te ly augments i t s value (ihren W ert heinahe unendlich vergrossert)1

( ib id . ) . An in f in i te au gm enta t ion in the va lue of som eth in g wou ld a l together d isp lace i t s or ig inal value , so here the augmentat ion is only

'nea r ly ' o r 'a lm os t ' ' i ndef in i t e ' . B u t so near ly , tha t one won ders wh a t th e

sense and ef fectiveness o f the or ig inal in teres t mi gh t be? Ca n we co m for t

ab ly , knowing ly and conf iden t ly s epara te an o r ig ina l and wha t supp le

m en ts it ' i ndef in it e ly ' , w i th ou t end? Wh y even a t t e m pt to sus ta in w ha t ,

p r im a fac ie , beg ins to app ear bo th qu i te unsus ta inab le , and worse , w i tho u t

point?

Wel l , Kan t does have a po in t ; and wha t r equ i res ques t ion ing i s whe ther

he need s the r ad ica l d i s t inc t ion be tw een a p r io r i g ro un ded aes the t i c

p leasu re and empi r ica l p leasu re in communica t ion in o rder to sus ta in i t .

Kan t ' s cen t ra l r eason fo r d i s a l lowing an in te res t in communica t ion f rom

en te r ing in to the de t e rm in in g g ro un ds o f a jud gem ent o f t a s te conc erns ,




again , the logical grammar of tas te . One does not judge a th ing beaut i fu l

because that judgement wi l l or i s l ikely to f ind universal assent ; for so to

g ro und one ' s judg em ent i s to judge he te ron om ous ly . Bu t th i s i s on ly to

say that the empir ical poss ib i l i ty ( l ikel ihood) of universal agreement can

no t be the c r i t e r ion o f one ' s judgement . One mus t judge fo r oneself. B u t

wha t i f the p leasu re in aes the t i c judg ing was , f rom the ou t se t , g rounded in

a c o m m o n a l i t y w h i c h o n l y b e c a m e v is i b le , p a l p a b l e a n d c o m m u n i c a b l e ,

in v i r tue o f the judgements de l ive red? In such an ins tance common sense ,

t h e sensus communis, cou ld be bo th the g round and the goa l o f judgement .

The aes the t i c wou ld then mark an in te res t in communi ty , a s we l l a s s ig

nify a d i f ferent re la t ion to objects that had been severed by reason and

under s tand ing in the i r s t r i c t l eg i s la t ive s ense . Th is c la im na tu ra l ly r e tu rns

us to the d i spu ted p r io r i ty o f ob jec t iv i ty over in te r sub jec t iv i ty .

T h e c l a i m b e i n g f o r w a r d e d h e r e i s t h a t c o m m o n a l i t y , c o m m u n i c a t i o nand sens ib i l i ty entwine in aes thet ic ref lect ive judgement to provide a

not ion of val id i ty that i s d is t inct f rom the not ion of universal val id i ty

der ivable f rom t ranscendenta l ref lec t ion . In the former case sens ib i l i ty , the

de l ive rances o f the s enses and the i r cu l tu ra l fo rmat ion , p rov ide fo r o r ien

ta t ion; whi le in the la t ter case only what is a pr ior i val id does so . The

specif ic i ty of the aes thet ic turns , then , on the fact that in th is domain we

are in t r ins ical ly b oth ra t iona l and sen s ib le , in a m an ne r that i s not the case

in ca tegor ia l cogn i t ion th rough the under s tand ing o r r eason . Our s ens ib ly

fashion ed f initude, on e m ig ht say , is co ns ti tu tiv e of th e ver y idea of tas te ;and hav ing t as te i s , i t wou ld appear , cons t i tu t ive o f ou r humani ty . In

dis t in gu ishin g th e three k inds of p le asu re to wh ich we are subject and of

which we a re capab le , Kan t s ays :

Ag reeab leness is a signif icant factor eve n with i r ra t ional anim als ;

beauty has purpor t and s ignif icance only for human beings , i . e . for

be ings a t once an imal and r a t iona l (bu t no t mere ly fo r them as

ra t ional - in te l l igent beings - but only for them as a t once animaland ra t ional) ; whereas the good is good for every ra t ional being in

g e n e r a l . . . ( C J , § 5 , 2 1 0 )

Be ing capab le o f t a s te ( judgement ) and be ing human hence appear to be

cons ubs tan t ia l , s ince he r e , even m ore so tha n w i th r espec t to ' know ledg e ' ,

where we take an in teres ted p leasure in objects , we operate as sens ib le

be ings who have the capac i ty to d i s cover w i th in our s ens ib le de te rmi

nat i on the poss ib i l i ty of a l ignin g it s im ul tan eou s ly wi t h both objects and

o ther s . What makes th i s d i s covery bo th p leasu rab le and t e r r i fy ing i s tha tno th ing ( t r anscenden ta l ly ) guaran tees o r in su res i t . ' Sens ib ly ' , in te r sub jec -

t ive val id i ty jus t i s , in th e final ins tan ce, co m m un ica bi l i ty . F or jud ge m en t ,

then , the gap s epara t ing the c la im to un iver sa l i ty and the c la im to un iver

sa l c o m m u n i c a b i l i t y m u s t d i s a p p e a r .




Ju dg em en ts o f t a s te , the n , a re ha rd ly id le ; on the con t ra ry , the a t tu ne -

m en t be twe en us and th ing s they s igna l i s a l so , and neces sa r i ly , an a t tu ne -

m en t be tween per so ns , w i t hou t con s t r a in t o r in te res t . T h e l awfu lnes s

wi th ou t l aw en joyed in a jud ge m en t o f t a s te en jo ins an unc ons t r a ine d

a t t u n e m e n t a m o n g s t m e n c o n c e r n i n g t h e w o r l d t h e y i n h a b i t , i m a g i n g a

so l ida r i ty among per sons and th ings . The normat ive anomalousnes s o f thec la im to t a ste i r r evocab ly t r ansg res ses the dua l i ty o f mo ra l dem an d and

free l ik ing; the c la im to tas te being the ' c la im' of uncons tra ined del ight ,

or , to s ta te th is in i t s fu l l paradoxical form, the demand of love.

v Beau ty and the Lab our o f M our ning

T h e re i s a genera l , theo re t i ca l p rob lem wi th K an t ' s theory o f t a s te , wh ich

is a lso a textual problem, as we shal l see shor t ly . Aes thet ic response , we

have bee n to ld t ime and aga in , invo lves syn thes i s w i th ou t a conc ep t ; a nd

th i s d ir ec t ly con t ra d ic t s the s ta ted conc lu s ion of the Tr an sce nd en ta l

Deduc t ion in the f i r s t Critique: ' A l l s y n t h e s i s . . . e v e n t h a t w h i c h r e n d e r s

percept ion poss ib le , i s subject to the categor ies ; and s ince exper ience is

knowledge by means o f connec ted pe rcep t ions , the ca tegor ies a re con

di t io ns of the poss ib i l i ty of ex per ienc e, and ar e therefo re val id a pr io r i for

a l l objec ts of exp er ie nce ' (B 161) . W hil e it m ig ht be tem pt ing to argue tha t

aes the t i c syn thes i s in t rudes be tween ca tegor ia l syn thes i s and syn thes i s

th ro ug h an em pir ical con cep t - f il ling the gap, so to speak, be tw een the

two - such a thes i s , i t has been a rgued , wou ld have the dub ious conse

qu en ce tha t we cou ld emp loy a ca tegory in genera l w i th ou t emplo y ing any

empi r ica l concep t be ing the va lue o f tha t ca tegor ia l va r iab le .3 1

F u r t h e r , t h e

m os t p lau s ib le so lu t io n to th is d i f ficulty , nam ely , to con s ider the h ar m on y

of the facul t ies in psychological ra ther than epis temic terms , has a l ready

been show n to un de res t i m ate the ep i s tem ic - d i s ce rn ing , app ra i s ing -

work ca r r i ed ou t by judgement .H er e is the t ex tua l co nu nd ru m . In s ec t ion VI o f the In t rod uc t io n to the

t h i r d Critique (187) , Kant notes that , as a mat ter of fact , nei ther the appl i

cat ion of the categor ies in general nor the appl icat ion of ordinary empir ical

concepts to objects i s a source of p leasure; however , i f cogni t ion is an

act iv i ty , then success in these mat ters should y ie ld p leasure . Of course ,

Kant needs th is p leasure , s ince i t i s to be the source of the p leasure taken

in aes thet ic ref lect ive judgements . So he hypothes izes : 'S t i l l i t i s cer ta in

that the p leasure appeared in due course [or : ex is ted in i t s day: zu ihrer

Zeit gemesen], and on ly by r eason o f the mos t o rd ina ry exper ience be ing

imposs ib le w i thou t i t , has i t become g radua l ly fused w i th s imple cog

n i t ion , and no longer a r r es t s pa r t i cu la r a t t en t ion . ' Th i s mus t have been a

s t range t ime, a t ime when the appl icabi l i ty of the categor ies to exper ience




was suff ic ient ly unsure that thei r success fu l employment was exper i

enc ed w ith p leasu re . An d th is p leasu re , of the in te l l ig ib i l i ty of na tur e in

general and of the uni ty and d iv is ion of nature in to k inds , would c lear ly

have been a p leasu re in the mas te ry o f na tu re , a p leasu re in the subsuming

of the many under the one .

Bo th pe rp lex i t i e s r e fe r to an inde te rmina te ' p re -c r i t i ca l ' t ime , log ica l ,psychological or temporal , in which nei ther the appl icabi l i ty of the cat

egor ies nor th e d is t r ib ut io n of ind iv id uals in to k inds had a suff ic ient gr ip

such tha t one cou ld speak o f e i the r a s unpro b lem at ica l ly cons t i tu t ive o f

object iv i ty (as suc h) , as es tab l ish in g an object ive do m ain that could c on

sequen t ly be in te r sub jec t ive ly shared . And ye t , th roughou t the f i r s t and

s e c o n d Critiques K an t cons ide r s the a p r io r i a s tha t wh ic h opens u p

and s imul taneous ly es tabl ishes the wor ld as 'wor ld ' , as capable of being a

shared a nd shareab le in te r sub jec t ive dom ain o f ob jec t s , on the one hand ,

and as providing the condi t ions for f ree act ion and the 'wor th ' of the indiv idual on the o ther . This opens the ques t ion of what i t i s to have a wor ld ,

and what is s ignif ied by the c la im that the categor ies of reason and under

s tand ing a re cons t i tu t ive o f the i r r e spec t ive domains . I t can be conceded

in the case of reason that there is a connect ion between our awareness of

the categor ical imperat ive and i ts power to govern our act iv i t ies ; what i s

now be ing sugges ted , w i th the p rov i so tha t it i s pe r hap s someth in g K an t

nev er me an t to op pos e even i f he is norm al ly read o th erw ise , is tha t th e

gr ip of the categor ies of the unders tanding on empir ical rea l i ty , in v i r tue

of thei r normat ive s ta tus in governing cogni t ive act iv i ty , i s to be regarded

i n t h e s a m e m a n n e r .3 2

Su ch a sugges t ion wou ld ce r ta in ly un de rm ine a ny

c la im tha t the re i s a t igh t connec t ion be tween the cons t i tu t ive powers o f

the categor ies and our (or anyone 's ) possess ion of an in tersubject ive wor ld ,

as we l l a s , more genera l ly , ca l l ing in to ques t ion how s t rong ly Kan t in tends

h i s concep t ion o f ob jec t iv i ty to be . Th is ques t ion ing o f the mean ing o f

cons t i tu t ion in Kan t ' s ep i s temology canno t p roceed d i r ec t ly , however , fo r

th roughou t the ana lys i s o f the judgement o f t a s te i t has no t been the

epis temic categor ies of the a pr ior i and a pos ter ior i which have been

centra l ly a t i s sue , nor has i t been the modal ca tegor ies of necess i ty and

con t ingency ; r a the r , the compar i son has been be tween the indeterminacy of

re f lec t ive judgement and the determinacy o f s u b s u m p t i v e ( d e t e r m i n a t e )

j u d g e m e n t .

Par t of the d i f f icul ty in th inking through the in terp lay between deter

mina cy and inde te rm inac y in K an t ' s thou gh t i s r em ove d once we reca ll

tha t h i s t r ans cen den ta l idea l i sm i s no t equ iv a len t to any fo rm o f phe n

omena l i sm. Ob jec t s o f exper ience a re no t syn the t i c p roduc t ions cons t ruc ted

out of sense data . Rather , ca tegor ies are bes t conceived of as character iz ing

' the way in wh ich we connec t pe rc ep t ion s in th ou gh t . . . i f we are to exper i

e n c e through them' object ively obta in ing s ta tes of af fa i rs .3 3




Cons ider , aga in , the example o f the med ica l d iagnos i s : in examin ing the

pa t ien t , in appra i s ing and d i s ce rn ing the body befo re h im, the doc to r mus t

decide , on the bas is of what he perceives , whether a feature of the pat ient

is or i s not a symptom; to t reat something as a symptom is to c la im that i t

i s an event in accordance with the category of causal i ty ; to c la im that the

feature is not a symptom could involve e i ther th inking of i t as an eventwithout medical s ignif icance, or as a s table , a lbei t s ta t is t ica l ly i r regular

p ro per ty o f the subec t ( e .g . a mo le ) , and h ence w i thou t pa tho log ica l causa l

an tec ed en ts . In ref lect ive ju dg em en ts of th is sor t i t i s not jus t par t i cul ar

con cep ts , such as ' s y m pt om ' , wh ich a re sub jec t to d i s conf i rmat ion , bu t

equa l ly the ca tegory govern ing those concep ts . Ca tegory app l ica t ion does

no t occur au tomat ica l ly , mechan ica l ly o r th rough the opera t ion o f an

a lgor i thm; ca tegory app l ica t ion , ju s t a s much and in the s ame way as con

cep t app l ica t ion , r equ i re s the d i s ce rn ing pow ers o f judg em ent . Bu t th i s is

jus t to br ing to the fore what was contended ear l ier , namely , that the workof un de r s tan d in g p resup pose s r e fl ec tive judge m ent ; and th a t it i s bes t to

conce ive of the d i ff e rence be tw een re flect ive and de te rm ina te jud gem ent

as a d i f ference of degree (and use) ra ther than an absolute d i f ference in

kin d, s ince the form er is su bm erg ed bu t prese nt in th e act iv i ty of th e

la t t e r .

I t now seems per t inen t to ask the ques t ion : How inde te rmina te i s

r e flect ive judg ing? T h e fo rce o f th i s ques t ion be com es app aren t wh en

we app ly the s tanda rd ob jec t ion to the jud gem ent o f t a s te d i r ec t ly toKan t ' s ep i s temology . Remember , the s t andard ob jec t ion s ta ted tha t i f

jus t the necessary subject ive condi t ions for object ive judgement were

suff ic ient for a jud ge m en t of tas te , th en K a n t w ould ha ve to dec lare a ll

s ense -percep t ib le ob jec t s beau t i fu l . What th i s p resupposes , and wha t now

appear s to be p resupposed by Kan t ' s genera l theory o f knowledge , i s tha t

the r e a re invar ian t f ea tu res o f pe rc ep tu a l man i fo lds wh ich a re r ega rded as

inv ar ia nt in v i r tue of the i r con form ity to the invar iant features of the

u n d e r s t a n d i n g .3 4

What goes wrong wi th th i s accoun t , and wha t i s po in ted

to i f not s ta te d by th e s tan da rd o bject io n , i s tha t there is a s l ippag ebe tween invar iance and r ecogn i t ion , and be tween recogn i t ion and syn

t h e s i s . The complex doub l ing o f invar iance ( asc r ibab le to f ea tu res bo th o f

man i fo lds and o f the under s tand ing) , we migh t s ay , t ends to l i cense a

m ore causa l concep t ion o f wha t occu r s tha n i s r ead i ly com pat ib le w i th an

acceptance of the account of fered of the k ind of mental ac t iv i ty requis i te to

reg i s te r invar iance . T h e gap ope ned u p and ins i s ted up on by the s tan dard

ob jec t ion , wh i le appear ing to ask fo r someth ing more than invar iance as

a cond i t ion o f bea u ty , w h ich i t of cou r se does do , does so th r ou gh an

invoca t ion o f a d i s ce rn ing , d i s c r imin a to ry ac t iv i ty wh ich s imu l taneou s ly

un de rm ine s the pu ta t ive causa l ro le of invar ian t f ea tu res o f ma n i fo lds in

the epis temological s tory . But th is i s jus t to say that appl icabi l i ty of the




ca tegor ies to exper ien ce m us t be r egarde d as a non - t r iv ia l ach ievem ent ;

and only by conceding th is poin t can any sense of the ro le of ref lect ive

j u d g e m e n t b e m a i n t a i n e d .

Again , what makes th is argument p laus ib le is the ro le of ref lect ive

j u d g e m e n t i n d e t e r m i n a t e j u d g e m e n t . W h a t s e e m s t o b e i m p l i e d b y t h i s

ro le i s tha t the de te rm ina t ion o f wh ich appra i s ed f ea tu res o f an ob jec t

confo rm to the invar ian t f ea tu res of the und er s tan d in g p resupp oses a

non -nom olog ic a l co m m on sense in v i r tue o f wh ic h va r ian t and invar ian t

f ea tu res a re so r ted . Even th i s migh t appear too s t rong , s ince i t p resup

poses that the d is t inct ion between var iant and invar iant i s se t t led a pr ior i ,

r a the r than d i s covered . A l though p rob lemat ic , l e t u s ignore th i s po in t . I t

would s t i l l follow that the sorting of features of objects and s tates of affairs

i n t o v a r i a n t a n d i n v a r i a n t is p r e s u p p o s e d b y d e t e r m i n a t e j u d g e m e n t .

Now le t us a t tempt to conceive of a s ta te of af fa i rs in which categor ia l

invar iance is not yet secure; what , then , would have had to be the case ino rder fo r i t to be s ecured? Two cond i t ions wou ld need to have been

fulf i l led , some evidence for which wil l be g iven below. F irs t , there mus t

have ex i sted a co m m on sense , a sha red app ra i s ing d i s co urse ; and s econd ,

an in te res t in p roduc ing wha t we (now) r egard as ob jec t ive judgement ,

tha t is , an in te res t in r egard in g ob jec t s in t e rm s o f those p rope r t i e s t ha t

p e r m i t d e t e r m i n a t e i d e n t i t a r y j u d g e m e n t s . ( I n f o r w a r d i n g t h e s e t w o

cond i t ions I do no t in tend to deny tha t ce r ta in nomolog ica l cond i t ions a re

p res upp osed fo r the pos s ib i l ity o f an in te r sub jec t ive dom ain ; r a the r , th e

cla im is that Kant conf la ted the causal ly necessary condi t ions for judgem en t w i th the p roper ly ep i s tem ic con d i t ion s ; and fu r the r , tha t tha t

conf la t ion i s m ad e pos s ib le by the va lo r iz ing of de te rm inac y over inde te r

minacy, and by conf la t ing , as we shal l see , common sense as pure form

wi th common sense as a concre te fo rm o f ep i s temic soc ia t ion . )

Bo th cond i t ions a re o f con sequ enc e . T o c la im th a t , in the first in s tance

at leas t , we cannot conceive of the appl icat ion of object ive categor ies in the

absence o f a common sense , i s to c la im tha t no th ing insu res o r guaran tees

the ex i s tence o f an in te r sub jec t ive wor ld a p r io r i ; un les s we a l r eady shareda way of v iewing the wor ld , shared concepts and capaci t ies for apprais ing

and d i s c r imina t ing , then the d i s t inc t ion be tween var ian t and invar ian t

cou ld no t f ind purchase . Tha t i t does f ind purchase , equa l ly as sumes tha t

we have an ' in te res t ' in p ro du c in g judg em en ts tha t a re d i s conn ec ted f rom

what anyone des i res , or th inks beaut i fu l or holy or good. Even th is i s too

weak; for i f we are to imagine an ins tance in which the sa t is fact ion of th is

in teres t is to be a sou rce of p lea sure , th en w e mu s t equa l ly be im agin ing a

s i tua t ion in wh ich th i s in te res t , in p roduc ing ob jec t ive ly va l id judgements

in accordance w i th the ca tegor ies o f the under s tand ing , has become anident i f iable in teres t apar t f rom other forms of in teres t .

I s th i s the t ime o f wh ich Kan t was speak ing when he c la imed tha t , once

up on a t im e , p leasu re app eare d f rom the app l ica t ion o f ca tegor ies and the




sor t in g of indiv idua ls in to gen era an d species? I t i s cer ta in ly d if ficul t to

imag ine a s e t o f cond i t ions o the r than wha t has been p roposed tha t wou ld

sat is fy th is c la im. In conceiv ing of such a t ime we are in i t ia l ly conceiv ing a

w o r l d i n w h i c h t h e j u d g e m e n t s o f c o m m o n s e n s e p r e d o m i n a t e ; in w h i c h ,

that i s , ref lec t ive judgements as such had a cer ta in sor t of dominance

over de te rm ina te ju dge m ents . Such a do m ina nce wou ld ob ta in i f the co re

judgements concern ing ob jec t s were made on the bas i s o f inde te rmina te

ru les incapa b le o f de te rm ina te ev iden t ia l conf i rmat ion . Bu t to conce ive o f

a s i tuat ion l ike th is i s jus t , I want to sugges t , to conceive of a s i tuat ion in

which ob jec t iv i ty and ' t ru th ' a r e no t d i s t ingu ished f rom the beau t i fu l o r

the good or say the holy; where , perhaps , to be t rue is to be good, or

where nothing is beaut i fu l that i s not a lso holy or good or t rue .

As sugges ted a t the end o f the p rev iou s sec t ion , a wor ld p rem ised up on

common sense and no t ob jec t ive ru les i s one in wh ich the re wou ld bea l awfu lnes s w i thou t l aw; and th i s approx imates wha t Hege l w i l l t e rm

Sittlichkeit, cus to m ary p rac t i ces in wh ich fo rm as cond i t ion i s no t s ep

ara ted f rom what i t informs . Such an idea models , we might say , such a

wor ld . The model l ing is not ideal , however , s ince the objects of such a

wor ld a re no t conce ived o f a s w i thou t end o r pu rpose ex te rna l to them

selves ; on the contrary , they are deeply enmeshed in an endless ser ies of

te leo log ica l r e fe rences ( th i s approx imates to wha t He idegger w i l l des igna te

as a 'wor ld ' ) . What d i f ferent ia tes objects so judged f rom the objects of the

u n d e r s t a n d i n g , h o w e v e r , is t h a t t h e j u d g e m e n t p l a c in g t h e m w i t h i n t h ete leological who le is ref lec t ive ra th er tha n det erm ina te : thei r u l t im ate

de te rm ina t ion i s no t ma de on the bas is o f the i r s ense -percep t ib le f ea tu res .

Judg ing them would have been more l ike an inde te rmina te d iagnos i s

than an as se r t ive judgement o f f ac t . Conver se ly , Kantian invariance is

reductively boun d to the sense-percep tible features of objects, or rather, Kan t's

idea of the sense-percep tible features of things, wh ich provides for the

invariance his theory requires, must be constru ed as reductive if reflective

I judgement is perceptual. This c la im, then , conf i rms and r e i t e ra tes the a rgu-

'", m en t of th e previou s sect ion: wh at is sen se-p erc ept i b le gets re du ce d

I t h r o u g h t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l e g i sl a ti o n to it s l o w es t c o m m o n d e n o m i n a t o r ,

namely , what accords wi th the d ic ta tes of ca tegor ia l causal i ty and phys ical

theo ry so un der s tood . As soon as the inde te rm ina t e cond i t ions o f de te rm i

na te judgement a re b rough t in to p lay , however , the p resumpt ive ly a p r io r i

; de t e rm ina t ion o f wh a t i s o r is no t s ense -perce p t ib le i s au tom at ica l ly ca l l ed

in to ques t ion .

T o n o w c o n c e i v e o f a w o r l d i n w h i c h d e t e r m i n a t e , s u b s u m p t i v e j u d g e -

m en t p redo m ina te s over co m m on sense is to conce ive of a wor ld in wh ic hthe in te res t in knowledge has come to mean an in te res t in wha t th ings a re

apar t f rom any o the r in te res t s ; and where , the re fo re , wha t p rov ides the

commonness o f the wor ld , i t s sha reab i l i ty , a re the s ense -percep t ib le p rop

e r t i e s o f o rd ina ry ob jec t s in the i r ( r educ t ive ly ) de te rmina te r e la t ions to one




ano ther . S ince the c la im has been tha t the in te res t sub tend ing th i s s t a te o f

af fa i rs i s ' subject ive ' , then the recovery of the h is tory producing i t wi l l

amount to a genealogy of reason. Vers ions of such a genealogy wil l be

offered in sub seq ue n t ch ap t e r s .

F ro m the pe r spec t ive o f r e fl ect ive ju dge m en t the a t t a inm en t o f such a

wor ld looks l ike a loss ; a loss of commonness and sol idar i ty . Or bet ter , i ti m a g e s a c o m m o n w o r l d w i t h o u t s o l i d a r i t y . T h i n g s a n d p e r s o n s a r e m e a n

ing les s , w i thou t va lue , in t e rms o r wha t can be s a id abou t them 'ob jec

t ive ly ' , pe rce p tua l ly , th rou gh th e de l ive rances o f th e s enses .

In such a wor ld , ou r wor ld , judgements o f beau ty a re memor ia l : in

m ak ing aes the t ic jud gem ent s we judge th ings ' a s i f f rom the pe r spec t ive

of ou r lo s t common sense , a common sense tha t may never have ex i s ted

(evidence for i t der iv ing s t r ic t ly f rom the tors ions of the analy t ic ar t icu

la t ion o f aes the t i c exper ience) . Th is ' r emembered ' common sense i s , a s

K a n t h a s i t t h r o u g h o u t t h e t h i r d Critique, b o t h p r e s u p p o s e d i n t h e j u d g e ment of tas te and yet to be obta ined. I t i s present by v ir tue of i t s absence.

A s r e m e m b e r e d / p r e s u p p o s e d , c o m m o n s e n s e is c o n s t i t u t iv e o f t h e j u d g e

men t o f t a s te ; a s no t ex i s ten t , i t i s r egu la t ive . Hence the answer to Kan t ' s

r e m a r k a b l e a n d c u r i o u s q u e s t i o n ( C J , § 2 2 , 2 3 9 - 4 0 ) : is c o m m o n s e n s e, t h e

necessary co nd i t ion for the poss ib i li ty of jud ge m en ts of tas te , con s t i tu t ive

or regula t ive?; the answer is both . Of course , i f a common sense d id exis t ,

t h e n K a n t ' s m o r a l t h e o r y w o u l d b e c o m e r e d u n d a n t ; a l t e r n a t i v e l y , i f K a n t

took common sense as r egu la t ive , then the d i s in te res tednes s o f aes the t i c

judgement wou ld have been in f r inged upon . In accordance w i th the l e t t e r

o f the c r i t i ca l sys tem, then , common sense can ne i the r be p resupposed nor

demanded and judgements o f t a s te a re no t pos s ib le . On ly by conce iv ing o f

t h e j u d g e m e n t o f t a s te a s m e m o r i a l c a n w e c o m p r e h e n d h o w a n d w h y

Kant vasc i l l a ted over wha t i s a l inchp in o f h i s a rgument .

C om m on sense can p rov ide the g rou nd fo r a jud ge m en t o f t a s te on ly to

the degree to which i t ex is ts , s ince by def in i t ion i t lacks the sor t of a pr ior i

fo rm which can be imposed on an independen t con ten t . As i t s p lacemen t

in the imag ina t ion ind ica tes , and as Kan t ' s w ide de f in i t ion o f imag ina t ionin the th i rd Critique as s ens ib i li ty p lus imag ina t ion emp has iz es , com m on

s e n s e is t h e b e c o m i n g - f o r m - o f - c o n t e n t and t h e b e c o m i n g - c o n t e n t - o f - f o r m .

T h e f r eedom of the ima g ina t ion in r ef lec tive judg em en ts o f t a s te ma rks i t s

f reedom from th e co ns tr a in t of a pr ior i leg isla t ion as suc h. K an t c ontr as ts

the under s tand ing ' s de te rmina te judgement w i th aes the t i c r e f l ec t ive

judgement on p rec i s e ly th i s bas i s :

T h e a p t i t u d e o f m e n f or c o m m u n i c a t i n g t h e i r t h o u g h t s r e q u i r e s ,

a lso , a r e la t ion be tween the imag ina t ion and the under s tand ing , in

o rder to connec t in tu i t ions w i th concep ts , and concep ts , in tu rn , w i th

in tu i t ions , wh ich bo th un i te in cogn i t ion . Bu t the re the ag reemen t o f

bo th men ta l powers i s according to law, and under the cons t r a in t o f




def in i te concepts . Only when the imaginat ion in i t s f reedom s t i r s the

u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a n d t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a p a r t f ro m c o n c e p t s p u t s t h e

imag ina t ion in to r egu la r p lay , does the r ep rese n ta t ion com m unic a te

itself not as thought, but as an internal feeling of a f inal s tate of

m i n d . ( C J , § 4 0 , 2 9 5 - 6 )

Although there is an act iv i ty of the unders tanding in aes thet ic ref lect ive

judgements , i t i s no t the under s tand ing o f the f i r s t Critique; here i t is

' s t i r red ' in to act iv i ty by the mater ia ls of fered to i t , and a l though i t

in te rac t s w i th the imag ina t ion , i t does no t subsume o r l eg i s la te .

Kan t , then , was qu i te r igh t in §41 no t to l e t the p resupposed com-

m u n i c a b i l i ty o f a e s t h e ti c ju d g e m e n t b e c o m e a d e m a n d ; to d e m a n d c o m

mon sense , to moral ly require i t , i s to des t roy i t . Common sense is not

form , but th e non -form al con di t io n of form , as lawfulness w i tho ut law is

law wi thou t l eg i s la t ion , and the re fo re w i thou t cons t r a in t . Common sense

is the com mu nicab i l i ty o f f ee ling , and no t the dem and for such . Bu t suc h

a com m on sense does not no w exis t , or exis ts only as a m em ory ; bu t in so

far as 'we ' remember i t ( in v i r tue of ser ious par t ic ipat ion in aes thet ic d is

course and pract ice) , judge through i t , i t does exis t . In i t s exis t ing i t b inds

us, no t as a con s tra in t or extern al law bin ds us bu t as t ies of af fect ion (and

disaffection) do.

From the perspective of comm on sense, legislative morality is a remedial

virtue.Because common sense i s on ly ac t iva ted th rough par t i c ipa t ion in aes

the t i c d i s course , and because , a s Kan t concedes , tha t pa r t i c ipa t ion i s

exh aus te d by the k ind o f com m unic ab i l i ty toke n ing co m m on sense , then i t

is unsurp r i s ing tha t Kan t shou ld r egard the ' un iver sa l communicab i l i ty o f

the men ta l s t a te ' in judgement as the g round o f ou r ' p leasu re in the ob jec t '

(C J , §9 , 217) . On ly w he n we judge in accordanc e w i th our lo s t com m on

sense is there an aesthetic f ee l ing o f p leasu re in the ob jec t . Kan t ' s mak ing

the feel ing of p leasure in the object consequent on i ts universal com

mu nicab i l i ty , a p re sum pt io n tha t app ear s back ward s f rom a na tu ra l i s t i cper spec t ive , however hes i t an t ly , acknowledges the p r imacy o f common

sense over ca tegor ia l under s tand ing and mora l r eason .

By conce iv ing o f the judgement o f t a s te a s memor ia l we can now pro

v ide a t l east the rud im en ts o f a so lu t ion to the p rob le m of the s tan da rd

objec t ion , tha t i s , the p rob lem of wh at sor ts of non - t r iv ia l , if inde ter

mina te , cond i t ions a re met by ob jec t s judged beau t i fu l tha t d i s t ingu ish

the m f rom o the r s ense -p ercep t ib le ob jec t s . Rou gh ly , a jud gem ent o f t a s te

is appropr ia te to the degree to wh ich we a re ab le , in cons ide r ing the

ob jec t , to abs t r ac t f rom the de te rmina te concep ts tha t cons t i tu te tha t

ob jec t a s be long ing to an ob jec t ive r ea lm. The though t ly ing beh ind th i s

req u i r em en t i s tha t th e l e ss an ob jec t 'm us t ' be conce ived of in t e r m s o f

de te rm ina te jud gem ent , th e l es s i t i s cau gh t in the 'we b ' o f subs um pt iv e



1


tho ug h t , the mo re su i t ab le i t i s for the work of r em em br an ce cons t i tu t ive

of aes the t ic ref lect ive jud ge m en t .

At f i r s t g lance, th is requirement appears to get caught in a d i f f icul ty

direct ly analo gou s to th e d if ficul ty wh ich so t rou ble s K a n t ' s d iscuss ion of

f ree and dep en de n t beau t ies . T h er e K an t appeare d to supp ose tha t forsome objects , l ike churches and horses , we are unable to abs t ract f rom the

de te rm ina te end s they s e rve ; and w i th a r t works , we a re unab le to abs t r ac t

f rom the causa l , in ten t iona l h i s to ry th rough which they a re p roduced .

Agains t Kant , on the ques t ion of works of ar t , i t has been argued that he

' fa i led to not ice that a power of abs t ract ion broad enough for h is general

theory of aes thet ic response would a lso be broad enough to a l low f ree

jud ge m en ts on the bea uty of objects wh ich are , as a m at ter of fact, wo rks

of ar t and even repr ese nta t ion al ar t ' . An d tha t general ly , ' i t i s no t c lear

w h e t h e r t h e m e r e presence of any concep ts - the mere knowledge o f the i r

appl icab i l i ty to a g iven man ifo ld , ev en the m er e fact of suc h appl icabi l i ty -

is suff ic ient to cons tra in the ima gin at io n , or wh eth er the ima gina t ion ca n

a lways abs t r ac t f rom conc ep ts know n to app ly to ob jec t s . ' 3 5

Now in con tend ing tha t we a re no t a lways f r ee to abs t r ac t f rom the ne t

o f de te rmina te concep ts and ends which ' s a tu ra te ' d i f f e ren t ob jec t s to va r i

ous degrees , and fur ther , that whether we are or are not so f ree is essent ia l

to what makes an object su i table for aes thet ic appraisa l , Kant was , I am

cla iming , on to someth ing impor tan t . I t s eems ev iden t tha t such cons t ra in ts do operate . Kant ran in to d i f f icul ty on two counts : f i r s t because he

wan ted to d raw the l ine be twe en wh ere we cou ld and cou ld no t abs t r ac t

on a p r io r i g rounds ; and s econd ly because he cou ld no t exp l ica te why pure

judgements o f t a s te shou ld be so cen t ra l to cons t i tu t ing the domain o f

t a s t e , given that i t s value ( impor t and s ignif icance) seemed to res ide in

de pe nd en t bea ut ies . A nd , again , the la t ter d if ficulty is ope rat ive becau se

K an t cou ld no t conce ive o f va lue ( im por t and w or th ) apa r t f rom the space

opened up by the ca tegor ica l impera t ive , wh i le the d i s in te res tednes s o f

tas te and the p resuppos i t ion o f common sense c lea r ly opens up an a l t e rna

t ive concep t ion o f va lue . ( Indeed , f rom th i s pe r spec t ive the c la im tha t

beau ty i s a symbol o f the mora l ly good appear s the wrong way round : i s

no t the mora l ly good a symbol fo r the inde te rmina te beau ty o f common

sense?)

No ne th e les s , Ka n t r igh t ly r ecogn izes tha t the re i s a que s t ion he re , and

tha t the re is a con te s ta t ion be twe en cons t r a in t and f r eedom; w ha t he ca n

no t do is success fu lly loc ate th e gro un d of th e con tes ta t ion . W e now hav e

the thes is that the ground of that contes ta t ion is precise ly the degree ofsa tu ra t ion o f an ob jec t , o r s e t o f ob jec t s , by de t e rm ina te tho ug h t and p ra c

t ica l ends , a poin t Kant obl iquely regis ters in h is d isqual i f ica t ion of craf t

works as su i table objects of aes thet ic regard on the bas is of thei r entrap

m e n t w i t h i n c o m m o d i t y p r o d u c t i o n ( C J , § 4 3 , 3 0 4 ; § 5 1 , 3 2 1 ) with the

fu r the r p rov i so tha t the inde te rm ina te jud gem ent o f s a tu ra t io n i s i ts e lf h i s -




tor ical ly and cul tura l ly var iable . I f th is i s correct , then we would expect

there to be a h is tory of tas te wherein d i f ferent objects (ar ts and s ty les of

ar t ) became paradigmat ic on the bas is of thei r su i tabi l i ty for aes thet ic

ref lect ion; where such sui tabi l i ty was judged on the bas is of those objects '

d i s t ance f rom or ab i l i ty to r es i s t the c la ims o f de te rmina te judgement and

the soc ia l p rac t i ces wh ich fo rward those c la ims . Perhaps the movementf rom rep resen ta t iona l pa in t ing , to ' f r ee ' na tu re , to roman t ic poe t ry , to the

real is t novel , to modernis t ar t and l i tera ture inscr ibes jus t such a h is tory .

What tha t h i s to ry wou ld r ecord i s the co l lec t ive l abour o f mourn ing

th rough which the c la ims o f common sense have been kep t a l ive . A ver

s ion of jus t such a h is tory forms the core of Adorno 's aes thet ic theory .

v i Indeterm inacy and M etaphy s ics( An t i c i p a t i n g Deco n s t ru c t i o n )

T h a t the f r eedom of the ima g ina t ion to abs t r ac t from de te rm ina te co n

ce pts and end s is a socio -cul tu ra l var iab le and not indel ib ly inscr ibe d in

our ' hu m an na tu r e ' ha rd ly needs de fend ing . W ha t has need ed c la ri f ica

t ion i s the de te rminan ts o f the p roces s o f abs t r ac t ion and the po in t o f

engag ing in tha t ac t iv i ty . Kan t ' s c la im tha t such ac t iv i t i e s fo rwarded the

end s of cogn i t ion skewed f rom th e ou t se t ou r p re - theore t i ca l in tu i t ionsconcern ing the ro le o f aes the t i c judgement in r e la t ion to knowing and ac t

ing . For a l l that , Kant ' s account p in-points the real source of d i f f icul ty in

th i s a rea : how a re we to sus ta in the au tonomy o f aes the t i c judgement , the

inde te rm inacy o f aes the t i c r e fl ect ive judg em en t , wh i le s imu l taneo us ly su s

ta in ing i ts in t imate connect ion with cogni t ion and moral i ty? And in so far

as we now regard , mus t r egard , the ' g rammars ' o f the t rue , the good and

the beau t i fu l a s opera t ing in d i s junc t io n f rom on e ano ther , th i s que s t ion

b e c o m e s al l b u t u n a n s w e r a b l e .

However , the g rammar o f beau ty ev inces , marks , a r es i s t ance to th i s

d is jun ct ion ; a res is tance th at is evinc ed in both th e pos i t ive theses an d th e

theore t i ca l t ens ions and l acunae o f the th i rd Critique. To l i s t en to beau ty ,

to hear i t s c la ims , i s to come to doubt the a pr ior i val id i ty of the d is junc

t ion o f domains . Because Kan t had a l r eady commit ted h imse l f to the a

pr ior i val id i ty of th is d is junct ion , he could only regis ter the c la im of

beau ty th r ou gh re fe rence to a supe r sens ib le beyo nd . In a s ense , the g es

tu re of d isp lac ing that be yon d in to the pas t i s a (me ta-cr i t ica l ) ges ture of

conserva t ion ; a ges tu re l i censed and mot iva ted by Kan t ' s own per suas ive

accoun t o f judg ing ( as oppos ing to under s tand ing) , and h i s r a i s ing o f the

ques t ion o f ou r lo s t p leasu re in knowing .

T h e ind e te rm ina te jud g ing o f ou r lo s t co m m on sense i s no t the jo in ing

of th ings o the rwise s epara te , bu t the log ica l and t empora l roo t and o r ig in




of what have becom e au ton om ous fo rms o f d i s course . Reflect ive ju dge

ment , we have seen, i s logical ly pr ior to and a necessary condi t ion of

de te rm ina te jud gem ent ; and the inde te rm ina te f r ee p lay o f the ima g in

a t ion , wh ich und erp ins and is un de rp i nn ed by d i s in te res ted p leasu re /

des i r e / in te res t , is p r io r to the mov em ent f rom he te ron om y, ex te rna l

de te rm inacy , to au to nom y and se l f -de te rminac y . Ref lec t ive judgem ent , o rheautonomous self-«Kdeterminacy, is the logical and historical root o f s u b

s u m p t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( b r i n g i n g i n t u i t i o n s under c o n c e p t s ) a n d s u b

sumpt ive r eason (b r ing ing p rac t i ca l r ep resen ta t ions - ma te r ia l ly des i r es

and fo rmal ly max ims - under the categor ia l pr incip les of r ight ac t ion: the

ca tegor ica l and hypo the t i ca l impera t ives ) . Kan t ' s c r i t ique o f metaphys ics

repea t s metaphys ics because h i s sys tem as p roduced sus ta ins the idea l o f

comple te de te rminacy - U top ian s c ience and the summum bonum - even

tho ug h these ideals a ll too eviden t ly funct ion as im agina ry sup ple m en ts to

the fundamenta l c r i t ique to wh ich they a re a l igned and appended . 3 6

Res is tance to the m emo r ia l i za t ion o f aes the t i c s on the g ro und s tha t i t

des t roys the un iver sa l i ty o f Kan t ' s c r i t i ca l sys tem th rough the in t roduc

t ion o f an es sen t ia l ly apore t i c moment , a non- recuperab le inde te rminacy

at the core of de ter m in ate rea son, is no net hele ss mispla ced s ince it ignore s

the f ac t tha t h i s metaphys ics was apore t i c f rom the beg inn ing , invok ing , a s

i t d id , in sc ru tab le cond i t ions fo r under s tand ing ( the ' I th ink ' , and the

s p o n t a n e o u s p o w e r s of t h e m i n d ) , u n k n o w a b l e d o m a i n s a n d u n t o t al i z ab l e

to ta l i t i e s . I t i s on ly aga ins t the background o f these apore t i c moments tha tK an t f ee ls cons t r a ined t o p ro m ote the idea l o f de te rm inac y . How ever , to

ignore the moments of l imi t and opaci ty in the cr i t ica l sys tem is to render

i t uncr i t ica l .

An o the r l ine o f ob jec t ion to the me m or ia l i za t ion o f aes the t i c s mig h t

be tha t i t m ake s too mu ch of what is , af ter a l l , only a fa iled argu m en t of

K a n t ' s .3 7

M or e forceful ly , m y cla im ha s bee n that the a t te m pt to sus ta in a

radical i so la t ion of determinate f rom ref lect ive judgement is incoherent ,

and th at res is t ing th is a t te m pt m ea ns f inding a way to poin t out the

inheren t ly s a tu ra ted n a tu re o f a ll ob je c t -de te rm in ing , and tha t in d i ff e ren tsoc io -h i s to r ica l con tex t s more and more r ad ica l means fo r po in t ing th i s

ou t migh t be neces sa ry . Pe rhaps modern i s t a r t has become such a means

for us . But how can we be sure that ref lec t ive judgement is submerged in

de te rmina te judgement? How can we wi th conf idence s epara te the c la im

that 'here ' ref lec t ion has been suppressed f rom the c la im that 'here ' we

ha ve shif ted to a different do m ain , a different kin d of s ignif icance an d

mean ing? Perhaps Kan t was jus t wrong to employ the l anguage o f ob jec

t iv i ty , d is in teres t and the l ike for aes thet ics .

No answer to th is object ion can be def in i t ive . S ince the memoria l

hypothes is turns on acknowledging the exis tence of an act of h is tor ical

suppress ion (or , a t leas t , the semblance or t race of such an act ) , i t s defence

wil l require both a h is tor ical account of the repress ion of ref lect ion (or




some ana logue o f wha t appear s in Kan t a s r e f l ec t ion ) , and an accoun t

o f those con tex t s , p redominan t ly now those o f modern a r t , where tha t

repress ion gets poin ted out . I f , however , a l l th is amounts to an account of

the de fo rmat ion o f r eason , i f the l a rge and sys temat ic ph i losophy o f h i s

to ry p resupposed by th i s accoun t conc ludes by dep ic t ing the t r iumph

of reason in moderni ty as i t se l f i r ra t ional , then we ref lect in the dark .No ne th e les s , in so fa r a s K an t ' s g r am m ar o f aes the t i c s r em ains our ow n ,

an d in so far as h is acc ou nt of the effor ts invo lved in aes thet ic ju dg em en t

con t inue to phenom eno log ica l ly ca p tu re ou r exper ien ce o f jud gem en t , we

ca nn ot fa il to find the pra ct ice of aes th et ics unca nni ly akin to and d if ferent

f rom the pract ices of knowing and r ight ac t ion . More, we cannot fa i l to

f ind our exper ience of ar t s tu t ter ing , want ing a lways to say more than

is permit ted , to speak of a pas t or a fu ture , hal f - remembered or half-

g l impsed , con t inuous ly evad ing p resen ta t ion , bu t whose evas ions a re the

gu id ing- th rea d fo r th ink in g . I t i s to the dec ip he rm en t o f th i s s tu t t e r th a tthese pages a re ded ica ted .

In aes thet ic ref lect ive jud ge m en t we ( re- )ex per ie nce in painful p le asu re

o u r lo s t c o m m o n s e n s e; w e m o u r n t h e d e a t h o f n a t u r e a n d c o m m u n i t y .

Our in teres t in beauty is nei ther empir ical nor in te l lec tual , for such a con

cept of aes thet ic judgement detaches i t f rom the pas t to which i t belongs .

In the ( re- )exper ience of beauty we discover a t race (Spur) or sign (Wink)

(CJ , §42, 300) of that los t common sense; our p leasure in th is i s d iscover

ing now w ha t we tho ug h t was gone fo rever .



The Genius of Being:

Heidegger's 'The Origin of

the Work of Art'

i In troduct ion: Imag inat ion and F in i tude

Fo ur funda me nta l sh i f t s, co r re spon d ing to fou r funda me nta l ges tu res o f

p o s t - K a n t i a n p h i l o s o p h y , a r e i m p l i e d b y t h e a r g u m e n t s o f t h e p r e v i o u s

chap te r . F i r s t , we can now on ly under s tand aes the t i c s , o r wha t we th ink o f

as aes the t i c s , the new sub jec t whose log ica l g rammar Kan t e labora ted , his

torically as the coming to be of the separat ion of ref lect ive judgement f rom

dete rmina te judgement and mora l r e f l ec t ion . In accordance w i th t e rms

tha t have beco m e famil iar , aes thet ics and i ts m ate r ia l and ins t i tu t iona l

e q u i v a l e n t , a u t o n o m o u s a r t , r e p r e s e n t t h e en d of ar t , whe re ' en d ' s ignif ies

jus t a r t ' s a l i ena t ion f rom knowledge and p rocedura l mora l i ty , t ru th -on ly

cogn i t ion and r igh t ac t ion . Hence to r espond to the impl ic i t genea logy o f

the th i rd Critique, aes the t i c s mus t become h i s to r ica l in te r roga t ion tha t can

th ink pas t beau ty ' s ( r e f l ec t ive judgement ' s , a r t ' s ) p lacemen t in the domain

of the aes thet ic .

Secondly , the genealogy of aes thet ics mus t a lso be a genealogy oft ru th -on ly c ogn i t ion th a t r evea ls it a s a fo rm o f dom ina t io n o r su p

p res s ion . How d id t ru th -on ly cogn i t ion become hegemonic fo r cogn i t ion?

Implied by both these sh if ts to h is tor ical inquiry is the necess i ty of gener

a t ing a conce p t ion o f t ru th ex tens iona l ly equ iva len t to the m ode l o f know

ing imaged in the t ime o f ou r lo s t common sense . Fur the r , bo th these

shif ts are inaugurated by aes thet ic ar t , by the ins ight that the ar t that has

bec om e al ienated f rom tr u t h does no t suf fer i t s a l iena t ion s i lent ly ; on th e

con t ra ry , the p ro tes t o f aes the t i c a r t , i t s way o f be ing more than mere ly

aes th et ic , i s wh at f ir st reveals t ru thon ly cog ni t io n as dom ina t ion an d



T H E G E N I U S O F B EI N G 67

henc e opens up the i r suppres sed h i s to ry . Aes the t i c s i s f rom i t s beg inn in gs

the overcoming o f aes the t i c s .

Third ly , however , the sh if t to a h is tor ical cons iderat ion of ar t and aes

thet ics cannot be done naively , that i s , in h is tor ic is t terms , i f the idea of

the a l ienat ion of ar t f rom t ru th and m oral i ty is going to have we igh t . T o

hold on to an a l ienat ion thes is requires us to th ink not only h is tor ical lybut ca tegor ia l ly and ' t ranscendenta l ly ' a t the same t ime, to f ind a way of

th in k ing abo u t the h i s to r ica l em erge nce o f au t ono m ous aes the t ic s and a r t

th at respects the h is tor ical specif ic i ty and in tegr i ty of the ph en om en a

un de r cons ide ra t ion , wh i le s imul tan eous ly accord ing a p lace to a c r it i ca l

com preh ens io n o f the h i s to ry in que s t ion . I f h i s to ry mat te r s to ph i los oph y

the n ph i losoph ica l fo rms a re a lso h i s to r ica l fo rms and even ts bo un d u p

with o ther h is tor ical events ; but they are not jus t h is tor ical forms and

events s ince , i f they are of phi losophical s ignif icance in some sense con

t inuous w i th wha t ph i losophy has been , then they ' in fo rm ' the even ts

su r rou nd ing th em in a ca tegor ia l way . In brief, we appear to r equ i re a

ph i lo soph y o f h i s to ry , whe re the ( t e leo log ica l ) m ove m en t o f tha t h i s to ry

takes up the burden o f the work p rev ious ly accompl i shed th rough

t ranscenden ta l l eg i s la t ion by p rov id ing ca tegor ia l o r ien ta t ion fo r the con

c re te i t ems under r ev iew .

Ye t , f inally, su ch a ph i loso ph y of h is to ry can no t be the fu ll resp on se to

the analys is of Kant s ince on i ts own i t would repeat , and make worse , the

supp res s ion o f jud gem ent th e ana lys i s soug h t to dem ons t ra te - th i s i s thepo in t made by Arend t b r ie f ly no ted in the In t roduc t ion ; and fu r the r , i t

wou ld con t ravene the conc lud ing thes i s tha t the t r anscenden ta l cond i t ions

for the poss ib i l i ty of kno win g are no t fu l ly ex po nibl e . T h is f inal c on

c lus ion , i t was c la imed , was no t a con t raven t ion o f c r i t i ca l me taphys ics bu t

i t s r ea l i za t ion . As was ind ica ted in the In t roduc t ion , and w i l l become more

apparen t th roughou t wha t fo l lows , we have no de f in i t ive way o f r eso lv ing

the t ens ion be tween the r equ i remen ts o f these f ina l two ges tu res , tha t i s ,

no non-c on t inge n t way o f fo l lowing the pa t h o f inc reas ing im m an en ce

w ith ou t los ing a cr i t ica l pe rspe ct iv e or a t ta i n ing a cr i t ica l pers pec t ive t ha tdoes no t r epea t the suppres s ion o f pa r t i cu la r i ty . Our pos i t ion i s apore t i c ,

Kafkaesque ; wha tever we do i s wrong ; we canno t ge t ' t he re ' f rom 'he re ' .

I t i s the aporet ic character of our s i tuat ion , the apor ia i that f low f rom

K an t ' s th ink in g , tha t has m ad e po s t -K an t ian ph i losoph y so r e f lec t ive , so

in t imate ly concerned wi th i t s own p rocedures and pos s ib i l i t i e s o f ' go ing

on ' : we can ' t go , we m us t go on . T h e c r i t ique o f K an t ia n fo rmal i sm

impl ies tha t ph i losoph ica l r e f l ec t ion mus t become more immanen t , more

concrete , more h is tor ical . Al ternat ively , to go a l l the way in the d i rect ion

of immanence wou ld en ta i l su r render ing any ph i losoph ica l , c r i t i ca l pe r

s p e c t iv e : t h e ve r y t e m p t a t i o n o f p o e t i c t h i n k i n g a n d p u r e p h e n o m e n o l o g y .

Ye t th e very cha ract er of th e ' aes the t ic ' c r i t iq ue of a pr ior i leg is la t ion i tse l f

en ta i l s tha t such a com ple te ly im m an en t pe r spec t ive , one in wh ich n o



6 8 T H E G E N I U S O F B E IN G

t r anscenden ta l o r ca tegor ia l d i s c r imina t ion wou ld be e i the r neces sa ry o r

poss ib le , i s fa lse . His tory is determinant for the d ispos i t ion of the categ

or ia l poss ib i l i t ies of thought , but not every d ispos i t ion is of equal value .

M y reason for tu rn ing to He ideg ger he re i s tha t , on the r ead ing o f h im

I shal l of fer, h is 'T h e or ig in of the w ork of ar t ' d i rect ly engag es w i th

ques t ions and issues that were posed above as f lowing f rom the reading ofK an t . In dee d , I sha l l wa n t to c la im tha t 'O r ig in ' i s , desp i te appea rances to

the con t ra ry , a r esponse to Kan t and a con t inua t ion o f the p ro jec t impl ied

by the above analys is . Af ter a br ief as ide , we wil l fo l low Heidegger ' s

in ter rogat ion of the poss ib i l i ty of th inking the end of ar t , the a l ienat ion of

ar t f rom t ru th , whic h equa l ly involves th ink ing h ow ar t is or could be a

p rov ider o f t ru th . He idegger ' s tu rn to a r t and away f rom the ques t ion o f

aes the t i c r e f l ec t ive judgement fo l lows Hege l ' s ana logous move ; however ,

the jus t i f ica t ion for th is move is s imple enough to unders tand d irect ly . I f

aes the t i c s is un de r s to od Ka n t ian ly in t e rm s o f d i sp lac ing d i r ec t me ta phys ica l ana lys i s w i th t r anscenden ta l inves t iga t ion , then once tha t

t ran sce nd ent a l an d he nce subje ct ive tu rn is taken as a h is tor ical resul t , i t s

p lacemen t mus t tu rn back to the ' o r ig ina l ' phenomena : he re , beau ty gen

era l ly and ar t specif ica l ly . And our bes t c lue to the unders tanding of

beauty is i t s mos t typical ins tance, the work of ar t .

He ide gg er ' s pro ject i s to un de rs t an d th e en d of ar t as ar t ' s a l ienat ion

from tru th . That end wil l have cr i t ica l s ignif icance for our unders tanding

of the world which insti tutes i t : the end of art will be a loss to bem ou rne d . Ho we ver , th e t ru th th a t is lo s t to a r t on He id egg er ' s accoun t i s

no t empi r ica l t ru th bu t a ca tegor ia l o r t r ans cen den ta l t ru t h . He ideg ger ' s

overcoming o f Kan t ian fo rmal i sm, h i s move in to h i s to ry , fundamenta l ly

invo lves l e t t ing concre te , empi r ica l i t ems , i t ems tha t a re i r r evocab ly in

his tory , possess a t ra nsc en de nta l funct ion , b e legis la t ive in the K an t ia n

sense . Nor i s i t by acc iden t tha t He idegger ' s a t t en t ion shou ld focus on a r t

works as the i tems where th is legis la t ive funct ion is mos t perspicuous ,

s ince for h im the ques t ion of h is tor ical leg is la t ion is a ques t ion of the

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n .To reader s f ami l i a r w i th He idegger i t s t i l l comes as someth ing o f a su r

p r i s e tha t h i s mos t ex tended engagement w i th the ques t ion o f a r t i s no t

o r ien ted by a r ead in g o f K an t ' s th i rd Critique. ]

T h i s m i g h t h a v e b e e n

expec ted on the g rounds tha t in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics he

had a l r eady focused upon Kan t ' s concep ts o f the t r anscenden ta l imag in

a t ion and s chemat i sm as a c lue to th ink ing th rough the p rob lems o f t em

pora l i ty and metaphys ics in a manner consonan t w i th the t r a jec to ry o f h i s

major work Being and Time. W h a t , t h e n , c o u l d b e m o r e n a t u r a l t h a n t o

ex tend and deve lop tha t o r ig ina l a rgument th rough an examina t ion o f how

the t r anscen den ta l im ag ina t ion o pera tes whe n i t i s them at ized in i ts own

r igh t in the judgement and p roduc t ion o f works o f a r t ? And th i s ques t ion

receives fur ther emphas is when i t i s recal led that in Kant and the Problem



T H E G E N I U S O F B E IN G 6 9

of Metaphysics H e i d e g g e r a r g u e s t h a t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n ,

which we found d i sp laced in the p rev ious chap te r in to the sensus communis,

i s the ' com m on roo t ' o f un de r s ta nd ing a nd s ens ib i l ity ; th i s pe r hap s pa r a l

le l l ing our ident if ica t ion of co m m on sense as the co m m on root of reaso n

a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g .

In h i s book on K an t He id egg er de m ons t r a tes tha t i t i s the c ons t i tu t iveor ' essent ia l ' f in itude of h u m an being s that expla ins why i t i s tha t kn ow l

edge r equ i res s ens ib i l i ty and d i s cu r s ive d i s c r imina t ion , and no t , a s a na tu

ra l i s t i c accoun t wou ld have i t , the o the r way round . Th is p recedence o f

f in itude i tse l f over sens ib i l i ty an d un de rs t an di ng is sub s tan t ia te d in the

thes i s tha t the s chem at iz ing p roc ed ure o f the p rod uc t iv e im ag ina t ion ,

wh ereb y p ure ca tegor ies a re g iven t em pora l fo rms , is the com m on roo t of

bo t h s ens ib i li ty and unde r s ta nd ing , and i s no t , the re fo re , to be r ega rde d as

me re ly a m ed ia t ing ac t iv i ty be twe en th e two s tems o f hu m an cogn i t ion . I n

m ak in g th i s c la im He idegg er i s no t deny in g tha t t r ansce nde n ta l syn thes i s

i s a p ro jec t ive under s tand ing o f ou r concep t o f an ob jec t ; s chemat i sm and

pro jec t ive un der s tan d in g a re to be r e ta ined . T h e c la im is r a the r tha t the

s t r uc tu re of the three- fo ld synth es is i tse l f reveals the essence of f in itude.

A l l syn thes i s is fundam enta l ly t em por a l : app rehen s ion in in tu i t ion : p re s

en t ; r ep roduc t ion in imag ina t ion : pas t ; and r ecogn i t ion in a concep t :

f u t u r e . H o w e v e r , t h e s e t h r e e m o m e n t s a r e n o t t h e m s e l v e s t e m p o r a l l y

o r d e r e d . O n t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e r e c a n b e n o a p p r e h e n s i o n w i t h o u t r e p r o

d u c t i o n , a n d n o r e p r o d u c t i o n w i t h o u t r e c o g n i ti o n i n a c o n c e p t . T h e r e i s

no pos s ib i l i ty o f an o r ig ina l apprehens ion , an in tu i t ed p resence , p r io r to

the ' imag inary ' cond i t ion genera t ing the pos s ib i l i ty o f i t s r epe t i t ion in

rep rod uc t i on ; w ha t is first is s econd . An d the re i s no r ep rod uc t io n w i t ho u t

natural ant ic ipat ion of the k ind of uni ty necessary for conceptual izat ion .

The fu ture is ' logical ly ' pr ior to the pas t that makes presence poss ib le .

Pas t an d fu ture are not pr ivat ive or defect ive mo de s of th e pre sen t ; the

pre sen t i s a lways a com ing- to -p rese nce th rou gh the cond i t ion ing syn the ses

o f r e ten t ion and an t ic ipa t ion . Th is r igo rous en tw in ing o f the th ree t em

pora l moda l i t i e s has some t i t l e to be acknowledged as wha t He ideggerte rms ' ecs ta t i c t empora l i ty ' .

T im e is not a pr od uc t of the se lf or subjec t , but i t s essence: 'As p ur e

self-af fect ion , t im e is not an act ive af fect ion c onc ern ed with th e c on crete

self; as pure , i t forms the essence of a l l au to-sol ic i ta t ion . Therefore , i f the

power of being solicited as self belongs to the essence of the f inite subject ,

t ime as pure se l f -af fect ion forms the essent ia l s t ructure of subject iv i ty . '2

I f

t i m e , in the fo rm o f ecs ta t i c t empora l i ty , p recedes and cond i t ions sub jec

t iv i ty , r a the r than be ing a p roduc t o f i t , then He idegger wou ld have

gr ou nd s for bel ieving th at f in itude, in th e form of ecs ta t ic tem po ral i t y ,

cons t i tu tes the or ig inal poss ib i l i ty of f in i te , sens ib le and d iscurs ive

k n o w i n g . 3

W ha t He id egg er ' s r ad ica l iza t ion of K an t ' s s chem at i sm accom pl i shes is a



70 T H E G E N I U S O F B E I N G

k ind o f comple t ion o r r ea l i za t ion o f the c r i t ique o f metaphys ics . Kan t ' s

tu rn away f rom m eta ph ys ic s was , af ter a l l, jus t the ins ight tha t p hi loso phy

cou ld no t be pur sued f rom a God ' s eye pe r spec t ive ; to do tha t we wou ld

li terally have to leap out of ou r skins . O u r skins , ou r f lesh, ou r f initude is

cons t i tu t ive o f ou r ve ry be ing . Hence our under s tand ing mus t be f in i t e

and n o t in fin i te . In f in it e u nd er s tan d in g wou ld be ab le to s ee every th ingjus t as i t i s , wi th nothing miss ing: the wor ld would be whol ly present to

such s ee ing . F in i t e un de r s ta nd ing i s l imi ted and cond i t ioned . Th e l imi t ,

as i t were , i s t ime: the wor ld cannot be whol ly present to us because the

prese n t i s a lways cond i t ioned by wha t i s no t p res en t , na m ely , the pas t and

fu tu re . Hence wha t cons t i tu tes metaphys ics as wha t i s to be c r i t iqued i s i t s

bel ief in the poss ib i l i ty of presence. Metaphys ics jus t i s the metaphys ics of

p r e s e n c e .

I f the analys is of the Kant book are regarded as a summary vers ion of

t h e a r g u m e n t o f Being and Time, then we have a h in t a s to why Heidegger

re t rea ted f rom th is l ine of inq uiry . O n e m igh t th ink th at i t wo uld fol low

f rom the ana lys i s o f the f in i tude o f human knowing in t e rms o f t empor

a l i ty that such knowing was , a t bot tom, a lways h is tor ical in character ; and

it certainly was the case that in Being and Time H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t e d t o

th ink th rough the l ink be tween tempora l i ty and h i s to r ica l i ty . 4 Such a l ink

ing does not , however , eas i ly fo l low on f rom the k ind of regress ive analys is

o f the con d i t ions for th e pos s ib i li ty o f exper ien ce pu r su ed in the K an t

book . Tha t ana lys i s , to be su re , r eg res ses to on to log ica l cond i t ions tha t

a re p r io r to Kan t ' s own ep i s temolog ica l cond i t ions . None the les s , the

Heidegger ian r ead ing i t s e l f r emains a tempora l and t r anscenden ta l in

charac te r : ecs ta t i c t empora l i ty , in wh ich the p resen t ( and hence the p res

ence of any i tem to con sciou snes s ) is a lways m ed iate d an d def er red , a lway s

cond i t ioned by mo m en ts tha t a re no t p resen t , i s i t se l f presented as the

t r ansce nden ta l cond i t ion o f sub jec t iv ity . T h e p rese n ta t io n o f ecs ta t ic t em

poral i ty contravenes i t s inner nature : i f we are f in i te because ecs ta t ica l ly

tempora l c rea tu res , then we canno t ach ieve an a tempora l , fu l ly p resen t

s e l f -c o m p r e h e n s i o n . T h e m o m e n t o f a b s e n c e m u s t s o m e h o w m a n i fe s ti t se l f in our phi losophical th inking; th is i s what i t means to radical ize

the Ka n t ia n tho ug h t tha t we know on ly app earan ces and no t th ings in

t h e m s e l v e s .

I f the fini tude of hu m an cog ni t ion is to be fu lly ackno wle dge d, the n two

condi t ions mus t be sa t is f ied: ( i ) h is tory and h is tor ical i ty mus t precede tem

pora l i ty : and the re fo re ( i i ) the d i s t inc t ion be tween t r anscenden ta l con

di t ion and empir ical rea l iza t ion cannot be es tabl ished on the bas is of the

dis t in ct ion betw een a pr io r i form a nd em pir ical con ten t . T o sat is fy (i ) and

( i i) toge ther , th e cond i t ion s for th e poss ib i l i ty of exp er ien ce m us t res ide

fu l ly w i th in exper ience , be cond i t ioned by an unequ ivoca l ly empi r ica l

i tem . Th is is wh at mo t iva tes Heid egg er to focus on the wo rk of ar t , not in



T H E G E N I U S O F B E I N G 71

te rms o f works as p roduc t s o f the t r anscenden ta l imag ina t ion , bu t in t e rms

of the i r be ing c rea ted th ing s , th ings wh ose ve ry na tu re is to app ear a t

some t ime and in appear ing add to ou r under s tand ing o f th ings . Whi le i t

is in it i a lly a rguab le w he th er the un de r s ta nd ing tha t works of a r t p rov id e is

i t s e l f t empora l o r a tempora l , He idegger fo l lows the pa th o f Hege l ' s end o f

ar t thes is in order to in ter rogate the former poss ib i l i ty , a poss ib i l i ty inwh ich wo rks are un de rs to od as the m selv es f in ite, as cogni t ively l iv ing an d

d y i n g .

None the les s , th i s approach to the p rob lem i s someth ing o f a fo i l , an

avo idance o f Kan t ian aes the t i c s , an avo idance tha t tu rns ou t to be a lmos t

too wel l mot ivated . In the analys is of the th i rd Critique we focused on

the t r ea tmen t o f judgement , and hence on the ' pas s ive ' , o r a t any r a te

con templa t ive , a spec t o f h i s aes the t i c theory . Th is l ed to h i s to ry be ing

in t roduced as impl ied by pa r t i cu la r a spec t s o f Kan t ' s accoun t . Ye t i f h i s

to ry i s impl ica ted in Kan t ' s accoun t i t mus t be the re ' ac t ive ly ' a s we l l

as by impl ica t ion . More p rec i s e ly , the ques t ion mus t a r i s e f rom wha t has

been sa id thus far : how does the impl ied h is tory of the separat ion of the

ac t iv i ty o f jud gem ent f rom u nd er s tan d in g and reason look wh en the pow er

of judgement , the work o f the t r anscenden ta l imag ina t ion , i s conce ived o f

as ac t ive and p roduc t ive? To answer th i s ques t ion invo lves examin ing

Kan t ' s concep t ions o f a r t and gen ius . What were a r t and gen ius p r io r to

th e s epara t ion o f dom ains? T h e p rovoca t ion o f th i s cha p te r i s the c la im

tha t 'O r ig in ' i s bes t under s tood as an answer to th i s ques t ion . He idegger

wi l l t ake up and genera l i ze the b r ie f ly men t ioned op t ion tha t ' t r anscenden

t a l ' or ien ta t ion i s pos s ib le w i tho u t a p r io r i l eg i sla t ion th ro ug h the in te r

med ia ry o f ' exempla ry ' works . And th i s amoun ts to an answer to a ques t ion

imp l ied bu t no t s t a ted p rev ious ly : how i s a sensus communis poss ib le?

Heidegger w i l l c la im tha t p re -aes the t i c exempla ry works , works o f wha t he

terms 'great ar t ' , were h is tor ical ly legis la t ive , doing for h is tor ical peoples

wha t K an t has the p r inc ip les o f t r ans cen den ta l sub jec t iv i ty d o ing fo r a l l

peoples a t a l l t imes .

Why, then , the use of Hegel as a fo i l? Why doesn ' t Heidegger fo l low

through h i s ea r l i e r accoun t o f the t r anscenden ta l imag ina t ion w i th a

conf ron ta t ion w i th i t in i t s p roduc t ive , c rea t ive mode? Gen ius i s a

cons ide ra t ion o f a r t no t on ly und er the ausp ices o f the ques t io n o f the

ac t iv i ty of the p rod uc t iv e imag ina t ion , bu t equa l ly as enu nc ia t ing , pe rha ps

in i t s mo s t r ad ica l fo rm, the p rob lem of f r eedom and au ton om y; inde ed ,

the work o f gen ius may be r egarded as the p rod uc t ion o f f r eedom.

Ho we ver , th i s em phas i s on fr eedom and au ton om y is deep ly a l ien

to He ideg ger ' s p ro jec t s ince it con cerns th e sub jec t iv i ty o f the sub jec t .

A l te rna t ive ly , however , one migh t wonder wha t fo rce the r e fe rence to the

sensus communis can have i f i t i s detached f rom the ques t ion of f reedom.

At leas t par t of the c la im of the las t chapter was that the separat ion of



72 T H E G E N I U S O F BE I N G

do m ain s involved the pro du ct i on of an i l lusory f reedom ( the f reedom of

the r a t iona l w il l th r ou gh the fo rmal m ed ia t io n o f the ca tegorica l imp era

t ive) , a n d t h e s u p p r e s s i o n of s u b s t a n t i a l , c o m m u n a l f r e ed o m . H e n c e ,

in encounter ing Heidegger ' s concept ion of ar t we shal l f ind ourselves

engag ing w i th the ques t ion o f the compat ib i l i ty , the congruence and

n o n - c o n g r u e n c e , b e t w e e n a u t o n o m y , h i s t o r y a n d c o m m u n i t y . T h e q u e s t ion of the re la t ions between these i tems is the ques t ion of the pol i t ica l .

In moderni ty ar t i s the s i te where th is ques t ion is ra ised .

T h e fi rs t tw o sect ions of th is ch ap ter fol low H eid eg ge r ' s in t ro du ct io n

of h i s to ry in to th ink ing abou t a r t . These two sec t ions , wh ich a re mean t to

p rov ide a gen t le t r ans i t ion in to He idegger ' s s ty le o f th ink ing , beg in to

show what is involved by taking on board the f i r s t two ges tures of pos t -

K an t ian ph i losoph y . Sec t ion s (iv) and (v) a re m y p rovoca t ion : He ideg ger ' s

th ink ing the que s t ion o f be ing , h i s p ro jec t , is mo de l led on and bes t un de r

s tood as a general iza t ion of Kant ' s analys is of f ine ar t as the ar t of genius .

Hence the c r i t i ca l impe tus we no ted in the th i rd Critique i s developed by

Heidegger th rough the deve lopment o f one o f i t s moments . I f the work o f

gen ius i s wha t happens to g rea t a r t when i t becomes aes the t i c , then how

does He ideg ger e xp la in the c r i ti ca l po ten t ia l i ty o f non -g rea t a rt ? W hat

opens up the present to the pas t for h im? How can he begin? One of

Heidegger ' s r e sponses , namely , tha t wh ich works th rough the iden t i ty and

dif ference of ar t and technology, i s canvassed in sect ion (v i ) . The fa i lure of

Heidegger ' s argument there wi l l lead us to ques t ion the s ignif icance of h is

se t t ing pa rad igmat ica l ly g rea t a r t in the Greek pas t . He idegger ' s concep

t ion of great ar t , I shal l argue, involves projecting back into the Greek past a

conception of art which only m odernity makes possible. T h e d i r e c t c o n s e

qu en ce of th is project ion is tha t i t a l lows He ide gg er to th ink the re la t ion

be tween a r t and po l i t i c s ; i t s ind i r ec t consequence i s h i s an t i -modern po l i

t ics itself.

ii Ov erco min g Aesthet i cs ( I ) : T h in g , His tor ic i tya n d Do u b l e Rea d i n g

In the 'Epi logue ' to 'The or ig in of the work of ar t ' Heidegger of fers us a

s ignif icant c lue as to what the beginning in tent ion , the or ig inal problem,

governing h is medi ta t ion on the work of ar t might be . People speak of

immorta l works of ar t and of ar t works possess ing e ternal value; even i f

these c la ims are inf la ted , c la ims l ike them are a lways in c i rcula t ion in those

p laces whe re a r t i s s e r ious ly cons ide red . Wh at sub s tanc e o r con te n t do

such c la ims pos ses s? He idegger r egards Hege l ' s Aesthetics as the mos t

comprehens ive - because metaphys ica l ly in fo rmed - r e f l ec t ion on the

nature of ar t that we have; hence i ts conclus ions mus t necessar i ly form our

s tar t ing point . Hegel c la ims that 'Ar t no longer counts for us as the




h i g h e s t m a n n e r in which t ru th ob ta ins ex i s tence for itself,' and b e c a u s e

th i s is so 'art is and r e m a i n s for us, on the s ide of its h ighes t voca t ion ,

s o m e t h i n g p a s t ' .5

Art wil l con t inue , it wil l advance , change , deve lop and

perhaps even ' pe r fec t ' itself; h e n c e art wil l cont inue a long its his tor ical

way . No th ing Hege l s ays is m e a n t to deny these obv ious t ru ths . How t h e n

are we to c o n s t r u e the end of art? To beg in w i th I w a n t to deve lop th i sthes i s in a m a n n e r t h a t is n e u t r a l b e t w e e n H e g e l and H e i d e g g e r in o r d e r

to allow for a f ai rly qu ick tr ans i t ion in to He ideg ger ' s tho ug h t .

T o s p e a k of the end of art is to c la im tha t art is no longer for us the

p lace in which the t r u t h (of who and how we are, and of how ' t h i n g s ' are

for us) o c c u r s ; art is no longer unavo idab ly fo rmat ive for our e x p e r i e n c e

of ourselves or the w o r l d ; it no lpnger cons t i tu t ive ly p resen t s or e v e n

r e p r e s e n t s w h a t is a b s o l u t e for us. The d e a t h or end of art d e n o t e s not the

h a l t i n g of h i s t o r i c a l m o v e m e n t , nor, t h e n , the cessat ion of an act iv i ty and

t h e c o n c e r n s s u r r o u n d i n g it; but a d i s l o d g e m e n t , as it w e r e , of t h o s e

act iv i t ies and concerns f rom the (metaphys ica l -h i s to r ica l ) cen t re to the

p e r i p h e r y . T h a t s u c h a fate can befall a m o d e of human ac t iv i ty is easy to

g r a s p ; it is c o m m o n l y c l a i m e d as the fate of re l ig ion in the t r ans i t ion to

m o d e r n i t y . Of course , once such a d is lodgement occur s , then those ac t iv i

t ies and c o n c e r n s c a n n o t be q u i t e the s a m e as they were p r io r to the d i s

l o d g e m e n t ; the s e n s e , m e a n i n g or signif icance of those ac t iv i t i e s mus t

c h a n g e too; and those changes w i l l have r epercus s ions on the act iv i t ies and

c o n c e r n s t h e m s e l v e s .

T w o d i s t i n c t c l a i m s are at work here . The first is t h a t any c o m p l e x

social world will be c o m p o s e d of a divers i ty of in te r r e la ted fo rms of

act iv i ty : pol i t ica l , moral , sc ient i f ic , pract ica l , re l ig ious , recreat ional , econ

o m i c , etc. It is at leas t h is tor ical ly t rue that the categor ia l separat ion of

domains in to cogn i t ive , no rmat ive and aes the t i c did not t radi t ional ly fo l

low the l ines of demarca t ion be tween var ious fo rms of ac t iv i ty . Indeed , in

t radi t ional socie t ies d i f ferent forms of ac t iv i ty each migh t have had t h e i r

own d i s t inc t cogn i t ive capac i t i e s and n o r m a t i v e a u t h o r i t y . H o w e v e r ,

different forms of act iv i ty s tood in def in i te re la t ions of d o m i n a n c e ands u b o r d i n a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t to one a n o t h e r . So at different his torical

j u n c t u r e s m y t h , law, sc r ip tu re , po l i t i c s , art or sc ience migh t have been

d o m i n a n t - m i g h t h a v e b e e n the p lace of t r anscenden ta l l eg i s la t ion - whi le

o ther fo rms of activity s tood in def in i te re la t ions of s u b o r d i n a t i o n (and

r e la t ive au tonomy) w i th r espec t to w h a t a p p e a r e d as l eg i s la t ive . Those

fo rms of act iv i ty whose cogni t ive and n o r m a t i v e a u t h o r i t y w e r e m o s t

marg ina l i zed (or ev isce ra ted ) by w h a t a p p e a r e d as the place of t r a n s c e n

den ta l au thor i ty s tood at the c o g n i t i v e / n o r m a t i v e p e r i p h e r y of the society

in ques t ion . Ana logous to changes be tween sc ien t i f i c f r ameworks , we can

c o n s i d e r one major sense of h is to r ica l change to be any shift in the locus

a n d c h a r a c t e r of w h a t is t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l y a u t h o r i t a t iv e for a socia l wor ld .

N o w if we conce ive of socia l wor lds a long the l ines of scientific



74 T H E G E N I U S O F B E IN G

f rame work s un de rs to od in ter m s of thei r h is tor ical i ty , the n a ch ang e in the

meaning (sense , poin t , s ignif icance) of a form of act iv i ty which occurs in a

dis lodgement (or ' lodgement ' ) of a form of act iv i ty f rom i ts p lace of auth

or i ty to th e pe r iph ery (or v ice versa) wi ll involve a cha nge in the ' e ssenc e '

o f tha t ac t iv i ty . For example , when 'God ' ceases to be the t r anscenden ta l

source o f mean ing , then bo th the concep t 'God ' changes and wi th i t themeaning of the act iv i t ies governed by that concept . Which is to say that

the essence of phenomena is not unhis tor ical ; h is tor ic i ty invades the very

na tu re o f the modes o f ac t iv i ty ( and the i r p roduc t s ) w i th which we a re

c o n c e r n e d .

In order , however , for th is conclus ion to car ry , which thus far involves

only a quick h is tor ical induct ion over the var ie ty of forms of human

ac t iv i ty and the i r chang ing r e la t ions w i th r espec t to one ano ther , a fu r the r

thes i s i s r equ i red . For He idegger , l ike Hege l , wha t marks the s i t e o f the

t r ansce nde n ta l a s opp osed to the pe r iph ery i s ' t he ma nn er in wh ich t ru th

obta ins exis tence for itself. T hi s does no t mea n tha t wha t i s, and t ru t h ,

r em ain the s am e th r ou gh ou t h i s to ry and a ll tha t chan ges i s ou r mod e o f

ap pre he nd ing wh a t i s . Su ch a r ea l ism p res upp oses some fo rm of sub jec t -

object dual ism: what is remains the same but we br ing to i t var ious

ins t ruments , forms of pract ice or ca tegor ia l f rameworks (ar t , sc ience,

re l ig ion , phi l oso phy ) in acc ord anc e wi th which we m ak e d if ferent type s of

c la im as to what is , in t ru th , there . In order for such an approach to have a

chance of being val id i t would have to be the case that th ings were jus t

' the re ' , and we cou ld thence jus t b r ing our cogn i t ive ( and eva lua t ing )

i n s t r u m e n t s t o t h e m . F r o m t h a t p e r s p e c t iv e it w o u l d t h e n b e c o m e a n

in te ll ig ib le p rob le m to s ea rch fo r the f r amework wh ich was m os t ade qua te

or m os t fund am enta l for kno wle dge ; tha t i s, to fo l low th e path of e i the r

pos i t iv i sm o r Ka n t . An app roac h a long these l ines ce r ta in ly does no t

cohere wi th what is now said about the h is tor ical character of sc ient i f ic

f r ameworks ; and in bo th Being and Time a n d ' O r i g i n ' H e i d e g g e r d e n i e s

that th is i s the case .

He idegger pu r sues two , d i s t inc t a lbe i t in te r r e la ted , l ines o f a rgument .

T h e first, q ua s i -K an t ian , l ine beg ins by conc ed ing tha t we cons ide r a

p ropos i t ion t rue i f i t co r rec t ly r ep resen t s wha t i s the re . He idegger then

goes on to ask how a fact can be shown to correspond to a propos i t ion , and

propos i t ion to fact , i f i t were not a l ready the case that the fact was avai l

ab le p r io r to and independen t ly o f the p ropos i t ion r ep resen t ing i t ? 'How

can fact show i tse l f i f i t cannot s tand for th out of concealedness , i f i t can

not s tand in the unconcealed? ' I f such d id not occur , then the fact could

no t ' become b ind ing on the p ropos i t ion ' (OWA, 51) . In o the r words , fo r a

p ropo s i t ion to be t rue ' in v i r tue o f i ts co r re spo nde nce to fact r equ i res the

independen t ava i l ab i l i ty o f f ac t . Tha t independen t ava i l ab i l i ty He idegger

th inks in t e rms o f the f ac t s ' unconcea lednes s , the i r be ing ' in the open ' .

An d th is being ' in the op en ' and avai lable m us t be of suc h a k ind th at



T H E G E N I U S O F BE I N G 75

the way in which facts are avai lable a l lows them to be 'b inding ' for the

cor rec tnes s o r incor rec tnes s o f p ropos i t ions . In 'Or ig in ' He idegger wan ts

to pursue a regress ive analys is of the condi t ions for the poss ib i l i ty of

co r rec tnes s , conced ing tha t t ru th has t r ad i t iona l ly mean t co r rec tnes s o r

c o r r e s p o n d e n c e . H o w e v e r , a p r o j e c t i v e u n d e r s t a n d i n g i n t h e m a n n e r o f a

t r anscenden ta l an t i c ipa t ion o f the ca tegor ia l de te rmina t ions o f ob jec thood

conf la tes ( i ) the appropr ia te fact that we mus t be in possess ion of th is

an t ic ipa to ry com preh ens io n , w i th ( ii ) the s cep t ica l - en ta i l ing in fe rence tha t

these ca tegor ia l an t i c ipa t ions and de te rmina t ions mus t come f rom us .

Much o f the cen t ra l a rgument o f 'O r ig in ' s eeks to demons t ra te tha t ( i )

does no t p resuppose ( i i ) .

Along with the necess i ty for regress ive analys is Heidegger adopts a

second l ine of c r i t iqu e o f t ru th as r ep re sen ta t ion which tu rns on t he

demons t ra t ion tha t the r ep resen ta t iona l cons t rua l o f the na tu re o f the

th ing depends on the adop t ion o f de fec t ive cases as pa rad igmat ic fo r ou ru n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h i n g h o o d . T h i s li n e o f a r g u m e n t , p r o m i n e n t in b o t h

Being and Time and 'Or ig in ' , a lbe i t d if f eren tly in the two tex t s , a rgu es th a t

th ings are f i r s t avai lable to us ' as ' i tems of equipment wi th in a funct ional

con tex t and on ly de r iva t ive ly ava i lab le ' a s ' mere th ings , a s subs tances

h a v i n g d e t e r m i n a t e p r o p e r t i e s . O r d i n a r y i t e m s o f e q u i p m e n t a r e u s e d i n

the ar gu m en t , b ut i t i s m ea nt to hold as wel l for na tur a l i tem s . Before a

h am m er or a pair of shoe s is an object - out th ere - in f ront of us , we are

famil iar wi th i t as something having a p lace wi th in the c i rcui t of our prac

t i ca l engagements . Hence i t s func t iona l and purpos ive p roper t i e s a re

a n o r ig i n a l c o m p o n e n t o f o u r n o n - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f it .

Equ ipment becomes an ob jec t , a mere th ing , on ly de fec t ive ly : when the

shoe rubs o r the hammer b reaks , on ly then , when i t s tops be ing func

t ional , does i t ca l l a t tent ion to itself, fall ou t of pla ce, ou t of th e circu it of

p r a c t i c e s , a n d b e c o m e a m e r e t h i n g , s o m e t h i n g w i t h o u t p u r p o s e , t o b e

no t iced , v iewed , r e -p resen ted . The conver se o f th i s en ta i l s tha t when an

i tem is in use i ts cha rac ter ' a s ' pur pos efu l , and i ts in t r ica t io n wi th in a

complex o f i t ems and p rac t i ces i s no t pe rce ived as such ; equ ipmen t i s

m os t useful w hen i t i s ap pro pr i a te to the task to hand and ' inv is ib le ' as a

dis t inct i tem. The shoe that ca l ls a t tent ion to i t se l f because i t rubs or the

hammer tha t d raws our a t t en t ion because i t does no t f ee l r igh t o r has a

loose head i s one tha t i s no t func t ion ing ' p roper ly ' . The ' p roper ' u se o f an

i t em o f equ ipmen t i s i t s inconsp icuous fu l l work ing . Hence , the ' a s ' o f

e q u i p m e n t a l i t y a n d t h e ' a s ' o f b a r e o b j e c t h o o d a r e b o t h a n n o u n c e d , h o w

ever ob l ique ly , on ly a t the moment o f de fau l t . Fo r He idegger th i s shows

bo th why we tend to th ink o f th ings genera l ly w i thou t the p ro jec t ive

under s tand ing o f an ' a s ' s t ruc tu re , a long the l ines o f the pa rad igm of therep resen ta t iona l ob jec t , bu t tha t i t r emains the case tha t ba re ob jec thood

can on ly be und er s too d f rom the pa rad igm of eq u ip m en t ; and tha t , co n

ver se ly , equ ipmen t canno t be under s tood a r igh t f rom the pa rad igm of



7 6 T H E G E N I U S O F B E IN G

b a r e t h i n g s . T h e ' a s ' s t r u c t u r e o f e q u i p m e n t a l i t y a p p r o x i m a t e s t h e i m a g e

of e th ical li fe pre sup po sed by th e logic of the los t sensus communis, whi le

the 'a s ' s t ruc tu re o f ba re ob jec thood a ppro x im ates the ca tegoria l f r ame

work of the first Critique. H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t i s t h a t t h e l a t te r p r e s u p

poses th e former .

The usua l p rac t i ce o f t r ea t ing equ ipmen t as th ings w i th an ex t r a , addedproper ty , namely , pu rposefu lnes s , inver t s the t rue o rder o f dependency .

Our on to logy o f the th ing , and our r ep resen ta t iona l s t ance toward th ings

in genera l , dep end s on ma k ing defec t ive , b roken th in gs pa rad igm at ic ; and

our s t and ing back f rom th ings and v iewing them, our con templa t ive

c o m p o r t m e n t t o w a r d s t h i n g s t r e a t s t h e m , p r i m o r d i a l l y a n d f o r t h e m o s t

par t , a s to be v iewed , a s p r io r to ou r p rac t i ca l engagements . Where

'Origin ' differs from Being and Time i s in no t taki ng the ' a s ' s t ru ctu re

o f equ ip m en ta l i ty a nd ba re ob jec t jood , ca l l ed r espec t ive ly ' r e ad in es s - to -

han d ' and ' p rese nce - to - ha nd ' in the ea r li e r work , a s the de fin it ive t r a n

scenden ta l de te rmina t ions o f the wor ld fo r us . In t roduc ing the work o f a r t

in to the accoun t den ies the apparen t ca tegor ia l hegemony o f the two ' a s '

s t ructures of the ear l ier analys is , and ins t igates the poss ib i l i ty of an

a l t e rna t ive accoun t o f how the wor ld i s ' announced ' and r evea led in i t s

ca tegor ia l de te rm ina t ion s . T h e con s ide ra t ion o f a r t w i ll a l low fo r the

poss ib i l i ty tha t the announcement o f cons t i tu t ive ' a s ' s t ruc tu res occur s

his tor ical ly .

In d i sp lac ing the dom ina nce of the r ep resen ta t io na l un der s tan d in g oft ru th and th ing He idegger does no t in tend to deny the obv ious , namely ,

that th is un de rs t an din g wo rks , tha t i t i s ef fect ive , a nd in dee d th at i t i s

hegemonic fo r o rd ina ry p rac t i ce and fo r t r ad i t iona l ph i losoph ica l th ink ing .

'To be su re , ' He idegger concedes , ' t he cu r ren t th ing-concep t f i t s each

thing. Never theless i t does not lay hold of the th ing as i t i s in i t s own

be ing , bu t makes an as sau l t (uberfallt) u p o n i t ' ( O W A , 2 5 ) . T h i s ' a ss a u l t'

on the th ing is the work of the unders tanding; th is work is an assaul t ,

we now kno w, becau se th e ca tegor ia l fr amework o f the und er s ta nd ing ,

which indeed f i t s each th ing , i s the recrui tment of th ings for subject ivi ty ; o r r a the r , ca tegor ia l th in gho od i s th i s r ec ru i tm en t . C onve r se ly , then ,

He ideg ger t akes Ka n t i an d i s in te res tedn es s as the b rac ke t ing o f the

unref lect ive assaul t of the unders tanding, the le t t ing of a th ing appear in

its own right, 'purely as i t is in itself... in i t s own s ta tu re and wor th ' (N ,

109). Heidegger does want to draw th is d is t inct ion , a lbei t on d if ferent

g rounds , namely , on the bas i s o f the d i s t inc t ion be tween ob jec t s appear ing

in accordan ce w i th the categor ia l dem an ds o f r ep re sen ta t iona l thou gh t and

those s ame ob jec t s appear ing on the bas i s o f wha t makes r ep resen ta t iona l

though t pos s ib le . Hence He idegger does no t cons ide r the ques t ion o f r ep

resenta t ion inn oc en t ; nor does he con s ider the qu es t ion of th e access ib i l ity

o f th ing s to cogn i t ion as hav ing n o r epercu s s ions ou t s id e ph i losoph ica l

ref lect ion . On the contrary , i t i s precise ly because the current th ing-




concept does f i t each th ing and yet cannot be t ranscendenta l ly val idated

wi thou t r emainder tha t the ques t ion o f the th ing-concep t , o f p ropos i t iona l

s t ruc tu re , o f t ru th and r ep resen ta t ion beco me s u rgen t ly and p res s ing ly

h i s to r ica l .

P lac ing th i s c r i t ique o f sub jec t -ob jec t dua l i sm toge ther w i th our

previous h is tor ical induct ion - both : th ings are not avai lable tous indepen den t ly o f ou r p rac t i ca l invo lve me nts w i th them ; an d thos e

invo lvem ents a re a lways socia lly and h is tor ical ly specif ic in na tu re —

enta i l s tha t t ru th and the na tu re o f wha t i s (be ing) a re in te rna l co r re la t ives

tha t can no t be ex em pte d f rom the f lux of h is tory . I t is only in v i r tue of the

l inking of these two c la ims that we can make sense of the thes is that the

essence of phenomena, what i t i s for any th ing to be a th ing , i s h is tor ical

(because 'essencing ' i s i t se l f something h is tor ical ) .

S ince what is t ranscendenta l ly legis la t ive of any socia l wor ld wi l l pro

vide the norm at iv e con cep t of an objec t for the socia l wo r ld in qu es t ion -

fo r example , th ings a re c rea ted be ings ( in the Chr i s t i an wor ld ) , th ings a re

ob jec t s o f r ep resen ta t ion ( in the modern wor ld domina ted by the new sc i

e n c e ) , e tc . - then the s e r ies o f fund am enta l conc ep t ions o f how th i ng s a re

i s the h i s to ry o f t ru th . As a consequence , He idegger c la ims , the h i s to ry o f

the na tu re o f Wes te rn a r t w i l l co r respond to the changes in the na tu re o f

t ru th (OWA, 81) , s ince wi th in any g iven socia l format ion what ar t i s wi l l

be governed by the con cep t o f an ob jec t fo r tha t fo rmat ion ' s t r ans cen den ta l

s c h e m e .

He ideg ger ' s cons ide ra t ion o f W es te rn a r t f rom the pe r spec t ive o f

changes in the na tu re o f t ru th con ta ins th ree in te r r e la ted l ines o f in te r

rog at ion . T h e f ir st i s to un de rs t an d ho w ar t i s for us no w whe re t r u t h and

be ing a re de te rmined by the es sence o f t echno logy , fo r He idegger be l i eves

tha t the categor ia l s t ru ctu re of tech nolo gy is con s t i tu t iv e of ou r socia l

wor ld . However , th is in ter rogat ion requires that we f i r s t have a t our d is

posal a h is tor ical , no n-a es th et ic c on cep t ion of ar t works ; s ince a es the t ic

concep t ions o f a r t a re non-h i s to r ica l , then changes in the es sence o f a r t

would necessar i ly be invis ib le f rom with in an aes thet ic perspect ive . Second ly , then , we sha l l have to pu rge our comprehens ion o f a r t works o f

those ' aes the t i c ' ca tegor ies wh ich have p reva i led th roughou t the h i s to ry o f

W es te rn ref lect ion on ar t , for those categ or ies - abov e a l l , form , m at te r

an d aes the t ic exp er ien ce (of bea uty , p le asu re , e tc . ) - con s ider th e ar t wo rk

in t e rms o f the metaphys ics o f p resence , tha t i s , in t e rms which make

thinking the essence of ar t h is tor ical ly , ar t ' s essence as h is tor ical , imposs

ib le . Par t of the lure of those categor ies is that they are determined by the

fundamenta l ca tegor ia l in sc r ip t ions o f ba re ob jec thood , each o f wh ich

presu ppo ses the p r io r i ty o f r ep resen ta t iona l th ou gh t . So a r t wo rks a re

th ing s , bu t th ings of a spec ia l k ind : th in gs which m an i fes t so m eth in g o the r

(ar t works as a l legor ies ) ; or th ings which are infused with something o ther

(a r t works as symbols ) (O W A, 19 -2 0) .




In such and s imilar cases we begin by cons ider ing the ar t work a th ing

in accord ance w i th a t r ad i t iona l ca tegoria l ana lys is o f th ing hoo d - su b

s tance and acc iden t ; the un i ty o f a man i fo ld o f s ensa t ions ; fo rm and mat te r

- and co ns ide r the ar t work as a de ve lop m en t or mo dif icat ion of that

ca tegor ia l ana lys i s . He idegger ' s med i ta t ion on 'Th ing and Work ' , the

open ing s ec t ion o f 'O r ig in ' , i s nega t ive and des t ruc t ive in i t s movement ; i ti s meant to f ree cons iderat ion of ar t works f rom aes thet ic ca tegor ies , and

not , therefore , to regis ter a t rue account of the nature of the th ing in order

to s ee be t t e r how a r t works a re th ings .6

I n d e e d , H e i d e g g e r w i l l c o n t e n d

(O W A , 68 -9 ) tha t a wo rk ' s th ing ly charac te r i s no pa r t o f i t qua work ;

that the ques t ion of a work 's th ingly character wrongly takes the work f i r s t

as an object d i rect ly there , as a th ing , and in so doing h ides , so long as th is

per spec t ive i s m a in ta in ed , th e wo rk ' s charac te r a s work .

None the les s , tha t we do cons ide r works th ings - in pa r t because they

are capab le o f be ing d ea l t w i th as m ere th ings : we ighed , hun g , s to red ,

sh ip ped , e tc . (O W A , 19) - i s no id le po in t to be pe re mp to r i ly pa s sed over

once we have come theore t i ca l ly to d i squa l i fy the i r 'me taphys ica l ' th ing ly

aspec t s as co n t r ibu t ing to the i r t rue na tu re . Ta k in g the m as th ing ly is no t

a ' theoret ica l ' e r ror ; i t i s par t of the h is tor ical fa te of ar t works , par t of

their being for us now.

H e i d e g g e r r e g a r d s t h e m a t t e r - f o r m a c c o u n t of t h i n g h o o d a s d e r iv a t iv e

f rom the exper ience o f p roduc ing a r t i c les fo r some p rac t i ca l pu rpose . The

genera l i za t ion o f th i s mode l fo r th ink ing the s t ruc tu re o f the th ing ,extending i t to mere th ings and works of ar t , i s g iven point by a re l ig ious

th ink ing which cons ide r s the wor ld as a who le to be the p roduc t o f a c re

a t ive god who makes the wor ld the way a craf tsman makes a useful i tem.

An d whi le we can no t bu t find these ex tens ions o f the ma t te r - fo rm s t ru c

tu re p rob lemat ic , cases o f over -genera l i za t ion , the con t inuance o f th i s

s t ructure in defaul t of a bel ief in the wor ld as a created being mus t render

the mode l o t iose , ' an as sau l t upon the th ing ' (OWA, 30) . Af te r a l l , when

th ink ing o f mere th ings , the 'mere ' 'means the r emova l o f the charac te r o f

use fu lnes s a nd o f be ing m ade . T h e me re th ing is a so r t o f eq u ip m en t ,a l b e it e q u i p m e n t d e n u d e d o f i ts e q u i p m e n t a l b e i n g ' ( O W A , 3 0) . W i t h o u t

t h e t h o u g h t o f G o d ' s h i d d e n p u r p o s e s t h e ' m e r e ' o f ' m e r e t h i n g s ' i d l e s .

K a n t ' s C o p e r n i c a n t u r n a t t e m p t s q u i e tl y to r e i n s t i t u t e a n a p p a r e n t l y

ben ig n t e leo logy and purposefu ln es s to the fo rm -m at t e r s t ru c tu re . Bu t

e i the r the t e leo logy o f the sys tem mus t be suppres sed , in wh ich case the

a t t ac hm ent o f t r ansc end en ta l fo rms to hu m an sub jec t iv ity becom es

opa qu e ; o r t r ansc end en ta l fo rms a re fo r the s ake of hu m an sub jec t s , and

sub jec t iv i sm appe ar s and the t r ansc end en ta l c la im to ob jec t iv ity becom es

p r o b l e m a t i c .

I t is i m p o s s i b l e w h e n r e a d i n g H e i d e g g e r o n t h e f o r m - m a t t e r s t r u c t u r e

and the na tu re o f 'mere ' th ings no t to r egard i t a s a c r i t ique o f Kan t , o f

the Kan t ian ca tegor ia l ' a s s au l t ' on the th ing ; an as sau l t wh ich i s ha l t ed ,



T H E G E N I U S O F B E IN G 79

d i rec ted e l s ewhere , when tha t s ame ca tegor ia l concep t ion o f fo rm comes to

be r e -dep loyed , ambiguous ly to r e lease the ob jec t o f aes the t i c judgement

in an act which is perhaps bes t descr ibed as one of ca tegor ia l se l f - res t ra in t .

W e sha l l r e tu rn to d i s cus s how tha t s e l f - r es t r a in t connec t s w i th the ea r l i e r

v io lence of the assaul t .

P lacing th is resul t next to our ear l ier cr i t iq ue of sub jec t-ob jec t du al is m ,o f wh ich i t can be cons ide red a pa r t , we can t ake He idegger ' s des t ruc t ive

argument as g iven ( fur ther aspects of i t wi l l be taken up in our cons idera

t ion o f Der r ida ' s r ead ing o f He idegger ) , and tu rn to the th i rd pa r t o f h i s

in te r roga t ion : an accoun t o f wh a t overc om ing aes the t i c s i s , and th e d eve l

opment o f a non-aes the t i c way o f th ink ing abou t a r t .

I n h i s a c c o u n t o f ' O r i g i n ' , H a n s - G e o r g G a d a m e r i n t e r p r e t s H e i d e g g e r ' s

p ro jec t o f overcoming aes the t i c s in t e rms o f h i s own p rogramme fo r

overcoming aes the t i c s in Truth and Method. W h i l e b o t h H e i d e g g e r a n d

G a d a m e r c o m p r e h e n d t h e o v e r c o m i n g o f a e s t h e t i c s i n t e r m s o f r e s t o r i n g

to a r t works the i r s t a tus as fo rms o f cogn i t ion , Gadamer ' s p rogramme i s

ra ther less radical than Heidegger ' s in that he regards aes thet ics as the

sub jec t if i ca t ion o f a r t tha t i s a p r od uc t o f the age of En l ig h te nm en t wh ere

' the au tonomous r igh t o f s ensuous knowledge [was ] a s se r ted and wi th i t

th e r e la tive inde pen den ce o f the judge m en t o f t a s te f rom un de r s ta nd ing

and i ts con cep ts ' (P H , 218) . Fo r He ideg ger , wh i le th i s m om en t is inde ed a

t u r n i n g - p o i n t i n t h e h i s t o r y o f k n o w l e d g e a b o u t a r t , c o r r e s p o n d i n g g e n e r a l ly to the metaphys ica l tu rn in wh ich the ind iv idua l ' s s t a tes (o f though t ,

w i l l and f ee l ing ) become p r imary and hence the ' cour t o f jud ica tu re over

being ' (N, 83) , i t does not mark the beginning of aes thet ics . Aes thet ics , for

Heidegger , i s any cons ide ra t ion o f a r t wh ich comprehends i t in t e rms o f

the s tate of feeling aroused by the beautiful; that is , for a theory of art to

be aes thet ica l i t mus t make sense , sensat ion or feel ing in response to the

beau t i fu l p r imary in ou r un de r s ta nd ing o f a r t . In aes the t i c und er s tan d in gs

of ar t , a r t works are objects for subjects , where the re la t ion between sub

ject and object is one of feeling (N, 78).

' A e s t h e t i c s b e g i n s , ' s a y s H e i d e g g e r , ' w i t h t h e G r e e k s a t t h a t m o m e n t

w he n their great ar t and a lso th e grea t phi l oso ph y that f lour ished a lon g

wi th i t comes to an end ' (N , 80 ) . Th is s t a temen t i s ambiguous , fo r i t i s

unc lea r f rom i t , o r f rom wh a t fo llows , wh e the r 'g rea t ph i lo sop hy ' inc ludes

or exc ludes P la to and Ar i s to t l e ( i t ce r ta in ly inc ludes the p re -Socra t i c s ) .

T h e am bigu i ty i s sys tem at ic , how ever , for P la to ' s and Ar i s to t l e ' s w r i t ing

on a r t bo th be long and do no t be long to aes the t i c s . To the degree to wh ich

the vocabu la ry - above a ll : fo rm and m at te r - an d the p rob le m s tha t

belong to the t radi t ion of aes thet ic wr i t ing are f i r s t se t out in thei r works ,

then to tha t degree the i r wr i t ing and a rgumenta t ion a re shaped by

aes the t i ca l cons ide ra t ions and mus t be r ead accord ing ly . However ,

H eid eg ge r a lso f inds in P la to an d Aris to t le a th i nk ing th at is roo ted in an




exper ience o f a d i ff e ren t fo rm o f un de r s ta nd ing be ing , one i n wh ich be ing

and presence are not ident i f ied . Consequent ly there exis ts as wel l in thei r

wr i t ing an unders tanding of ar t which is not aes thet ica l . I t i s wel l to recal l

he re He idegger ' s c la im in 'Or ig in ' , whose mos t wor ry ing conno ta t ions we

sha ll s ee De r r id a exp lo i t , tha t 'Ro m an tho ug h t t akes over th e Gre ek word s

wi th ou t a co r r espo nd i ng , equa l ly au th en t i c exper ience o f w ha t they s ay ,w i tho u t the Gre ek wo rd . T h e roo t les snes s o f W es te rn th ou gh t beg ins w i th

th i s t r ans la t ion ' (OWA, 23) .

T h u s we shou ld n o t be su rp r i s ed w hen Heideg ger finds in P la to no t

only our famil iar d is tancing of ar t and t ru th , a d is tancing that wi l l become

a separa t ion , bu t equa l ly , in the Phaedrus (250d) , a ' f e l i c i tous d i s co rd ance ' :

the r ad iance o f the beau t i fu l l ibe ra tes us f rom appearances ( f rom be ings ,

f rom th e obl iv ion or forgetfu lness of bein g) to a l low us a v ie w up on bein g

(N , 197). W e m igh t be su rp r i s ed , how ever , when He id eg ge r sugges t s

an equ iv a len t doub le r ead ing o f K an t on the beau t i fu l ( N , 1 09 -10 ) . SoK a n t ' s Critique of Judgement, the ve ry t ex t tha t in s t i tu tes the r ad ica l

au tonomy o f aes the t i c s and a r t in modern i ty , equa l ly ' exp lodes i t s e l f (N ,

131), prov id ing a non-ae s the t i ca l com preh ens io n of a r t and be au ty .

W e can und er s tan d th i s even tua l i ty if we r ecord two in te rc onn ec te d

theses o f He ideg ger ' s . F i r s t , th e h i s to ry and t r ad i t ion o f m eta ph ys ic s i s a

h i s to ry o f succeed ing cons t rua l s o f 'wha t i s ' in genera l t e rms mode l led on

the under s tand ing o f pa r t i cu la r s s imply the re be fo re us , on , tha t i s , i t ems

taken as ful ly and u neq uivo cal ly p rese nt . So 'wh at i s ' in ge ne ral has been

i n t e r p r e t e d i n t e r m s o f o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p a r t i c u l a r b e i n g s . F o r

exam ple , th i s way o f un de r s ta nd ing 'w ha t i s ' wou ld a l low us to a ppr eh end

ind iv idua l s w i th ou t the cond i t ion in g of the r ep ro duc t ive im ag ina t ion o r

conceptual synthes is . But th is i s jus t to say that th is model takes the pres

ent as independent of and as pr ior to pas t and fu ture . Again , th is way of

under s tand ing 'wha t i s ' He idegger t e rms the metaphys ics o f p resence ; i t

be l i e s a t l eas t the i r r evocab le en twinement o f the t empora l moda l i t i e s

tha t cons t i tu te ecs ta t i c t empora l i ty ; and now, r ad ica l i z ing tha t mode l , the

en twin ing o f be ing and tempora l i ty tha t makes es senc ing h i s to r ica l . L inking our ea r l i e r s t a temen t o f ecs ta t i c t empora l i ty w i th wha t we have been

say ing abou t h i s to ry and h i s to r ica l i ty , we can pu t He i de gg er ' s tho ug h t th i s

way : the t r ad i t ion o f me taphy s ics conf la ted som eth ing be ing p rese n t ( an

i n t u i t i o n ) w i t h s o m e t h i n g c o m i n g - t o - b e p r e s e n t ( t e m p o r a l s y n t h e s i s ) , a n d

gave p r io r i ty to the fo rmer . H e ide gge r ' s s t r a tegy is to tu r n our a t t en t ion

from th e form er to th e la t ter , f rom ' be in g ' as a no m in al par t ic ip le to

'being ' t rea ted as a verbal par t ic ip le . Being is not a th ing of any k ind, but

the p roces s th ro ug h and in wh ich th ings com e to p re senc e . A ckno wle dg

ing tha t th ings come to p resence invo lves acknowledg ing tha t the p resenceof th ings be l i e s the i r be ing cond i t ioned by wha t i s no t p resen t , by wha t i s

absent or d i f ferent . And th is , of course , i s jus t how Heidegger cons trued

th e s ignif icance of th e threefold tem po ral synth es is of th e sc hem at ism :



T H E G E N I U S OF B E I N G 81

a p p r e h e n s i o n ( p r e s e n c e ) is never p resen t excep t de r iva t ive ly th rough

r e p r o d u c t i o n and r ecogn i t ion . On ly now th i s cond i t ion ing of p r e s e n c e by

a b s e n c e is b e i n g c o n s t r u e d in t e r m s of the ca tegor ia l de te rmina t ions of

w o r l d s as a w h o l e . F u r t h e r , t h i s p r o c e s s is not s o m e t h i n g n a t u r a l , an

u n c h a n g i n g p r o c e s s of n a t u r e , but h is to r ica l . 'Be ing ' , as a f i r s t approx ima

t ion , is ju s t He idegger ' s t e rm for the proces s or h is to ry of a l t e ra t ions inw h a t t h e r e is, of the v a r i o u s e c o n o m i e s of presence which have governed

W e s t e r n t h o u g h t and h is to ry .

Bu t , s econd ly , the c o n t i n u a l s u b s t i t u t i o n of s o m e m e t a p h y s i c of p r e s

e n c e for b e i n g , the s u b s t i t u t i o n of b e i n g s (a be ing) for b e i n g (as a proces s

o f p resenc ing) as the key to u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t t h e r e is, is itself, a c c o r d

in g to H e i d e g g e r , the way in which tha t h i s to ry of a l t e ra t ions has w o r k e d ;

t h e c o m p r e h e n s i o n of the b e i n g of b e i n g s in t e r m s of p r e s e n c e , t h a t is, in

t e r m s of be ings , opera tes in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the fatefulness of b e i n g itself.

I t is b e i n g , we m i g h t say, w h i c h in its e p o c h a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of w h a t is

offers a m o d e of u n d e r s t a n d i n g w h a t is that bel ies its e p o c h a l and h i s t o r i

cal way of br ing ing be ings in to p resence ; each way of b r i n g i n g t h i n g s to

u n c o n c e a l m e n t , of making them ava i lab le (uberhaupt), c o r r e s p o n d s to a

m o d e of b e i n g ' s c o n c e a l m e n t . E a c h e p o c h a l m o d e of p r e s e n c i n g , and

h e n c e t h a t in v i r tue of w h i c h an e p o c h is an epoch , ju s t is a sel f -occlus ion

o f b e i n g w h e r e b y it presen t s i t s e l f (p resenc ing) as w h a t it is not (a p r e s e n t

t h i n g or b e i n g - I d e a s , God, the wil l , e tc . ) . Being works h is tor ical ly

th rough d i s s imula t ion . Be ing loves to h i d e . H e n c e in any f u n d a m e n t a l

m e t a p h y s i c a l t h i n k i n g b e i n g is l i cens ing its d i s p l a c e m e n t by b e i n g s . As a

c o n s e q u e n c e , we who r e a d m e t a p h y s i c s at the end of m e t a p h y s i c s , we who

ca n no longer ignore the p lace of h is to ry in the es sence of p h e n o m e n a ,

m u s t r e a d d o u b l y : the t e x t s of the t radi t ion wil l manifes t both the s u b s t i

t u t i o n of be ings for b e i n g , and so the obl iv ion or forgetfu lness of b e i n g ;

a n d , at the m a r g i n , b e t w e e n the l ines , the p r e s e n c i n g of b e i n g s by b e i n g .

I f the t ex t s of m e t a p h y s i c s did not ' e x p l o d e ' or exceed themse lves (for us,

d e c i p h e r i n g t h e m at the end) in the d i rec t ion of the a b s e n t i a l d i m e n s i o n s

of p resenc ing , then they cou ld not h a v e a place in the h is to ry of m e t a p h y s i c s . F u n d a m e n t a l m e t a p h y s i c a l g e s t u r e s , f r o m the Pla ton ic Idea on,

a r e m o m e n t s of d i s p l a c e m e n t (of the be ing p roces s ) and u n c o n c e a l m e n t

(o f th ings in to p resence) ; and t h e r e can be no h is to ry of m e t a p h y s i c s in

a s t r ic t sense unless that h is tory is u n d e r s t o o d in t e r m s of the h is to ry

o f b e i n g ' s u n c o n c e a l m e n t (of t h i n g s ) and w i t h d r a w a l (of its p r o c e s s of

p r e s e n c i n g ) .

H e i d e g g e r ' s h i s t o r y of ph i losophy , where ph i losoph ica l works are p r e

s u m e d to be w h e r e the mos t r evea l ing t r aces of past his torical f ields are

to be found , is a h is to ry of metaphys ica l theor ies of w h a t is tha t have

o p e r a t e d in forgetfu lness of tha t wh ich makes them poss ib le . Metaphys ics

is the ignor ing of the dif ference between being and be ings , p resenc ing and

p r e s e n c e , the e v e n t of u n c o n c e a l m e n t and w h a t has b e e n u n c o n c e a l e d ;




m etap hy s ics is th e fa i lure to th in k the ontological d i f ference. T h e h is tory

of bein g is the h is tory of th e growin g forgetfu lness of th e eve nt of

u n c o n c e a l m e n t , t h e e v e n t t h a t w i t h d r a w s , a n d m u s t w i t h d r a w g i v e n t h a t

absence is a condi t ion of presence, in the very process of reveal ing .

Aes thet ics , what we cal l or th ink of as aes thet ics , i s the working of the

metaphys ics o f p resence w i th r espec t to a r t and beau ty . Overcoming aes the t i c s , then , invo lves no t ing those moments in the h i s to ry o f aes the t i c s

where th ink ing on a r t exceeds aes the t i c s , ju s t a s overcoming metaphys ics

( inaugura l ly ) invo lves r eg i s te r ing those moments in the h i s to ry o f meta

phys ics where the t ex t s o f the t r ad i t ion ' exp lode ' themse lves by exceed ing

the logic of presence that apparent ly , and fa tefu l ly , governs them. So, for

example , Kan t ' s under s tand ing o f judgements o f t a s te a s d i s in te res ted , a s

devoid of a l l in teres t , can be read aes thet ica l ly as a mere bracket ing of cog

ni t ive , sens ib le and moral in teres ts that a l lows us to a t tend to a work 's

fo rm, a b racke t ing tha t has come to be ca l l ed ' adop t ing the aes the t i c a t t i

t u d e ' to the object in ques t ion . As we have a l ready seen, however , there is

a t ens ion in Kan t ' s accoun t , tha t a r i s es a t the cen t re o f h i s deduc t ion o f

tas te as a consequence of h is a t tempt to specify the pecul iar s ta tus of the

judgement o f t a s te , tha t th rows in to ques t ion the p r io r i ty o f the a p r io r i

ca tegor ies of cogn i t ion and mo ra l wor th . A n echo o f th i s unse t t l ing o f

ca tegor ia l pa ramete r s can be heard in He idegger ' s ques t ion whe ther we

can hear in the ' unc on s t r a in ed f avou r ing ' con seq uen t up on d i s in te res te d

ness ' the supreme ef for t of our essent ia l nature , the l ibera t ion of ourselves

for the re lease of what has proper wor th in itself, only in order that we

may have i t pu re ly? ' (N , 109) .7

T h e s e l f - r e l i n q u i s h m e n t o f d i s i n t e r e s t e d

nes s is equa l ly the r e l in qu i shm en t o f t r ansc end en ta l sub jec t iv i ty . Ev en o ur

'me re ly ' aes the t i c s t ance , a s t ance tha t is con s t i tu ted by m etaph ys ics ,

e x c e e d s m e t a p h y s i c s .

He idegger con t inues th i s cons ide ra t ion o f Kan t in an in t r igu ing way .

Speak ing o f Kan t ' s in te rp re ta t ion o f aes the t i c behav iour as ' p leasu re o f

ref lect ion ' , Heidegger s ta tes that th is p leasure 'p ropels us toward a bas ic

s ta te of human being in which man for the f i r s t t ime ar r ives a t the wel l -

grounded fu l lness of h is essence. I t i s the s ta te that Schi l ler conceives of as

the cond i t ion o f the pos s ib i l i ty o f man ' s ex i s tence as h i s to r ica l , a s g round

ing h i s to ry ' (N , 113). H ow does aes the t i c behav iour ope n us up to ou r h i s

tor ical exis tence, indeed, to that which grounds h is tory (by le t t ing i t be)?

iii Ov erco m ing Aesth et i cs ( I I ) : Great Art

The p rac t i ce o f doub le r ead ing does no t p rov ide a non-aes the t i c com

pre hen s ion of ar t ; ra th er , i t i s an acco un t of how to read w ri t ings on ar t

tha t r evea l s the i r compl iance w i th and dev ia t ion f rom aes the t i c s . The

wri t ings of the t radi t ion exceed aes thet ics in the course of thei r work of




ins t i tu t ing and reproducing i t . As we shal l see la ter , th is pract ice of double

read ing is app ropr ia ted and t r an s fo rm ed by De r r ida . I t i s a l so wo r th

no t ing tha t a l though pa ten t ly no t He idegger ian , ou r r ead ing o f Kan t

none the les s r evea led how in the ve ry a t t empt to genera te a p roper and

pu re concep t ion o f ' aes the t i c ' jud ge m ent , Ka n t was con t inua l ly fo rced to

b lu r th e bou ndar ie s be tw een the aes the t i c and th e cogn i t ive ( and m ora l ) ,to s lur a l l the more the s l id ing and s l ipping d iscordance between ar t and

t ru th , un t i l in the mourned fo r lo s t common sense we d i s covered a con

cep t ion o f ' t ru th ' mo re fund am enta l than tha t p rov id ed fo r by the un de r

s tand ing . Bu t i f tha t r ead ing was no t He idegger ian , was no t governed

by the ex igenc ies o f the r evea l ing -concea l ing p lay o f be ing , wha t log ic

or law governed i t? And how does i t s exceeding of aes thet ics re la te to

H e i d e g g e r ' s ?

A l t h o u g h H e i d e g g e r c o n t e n d s t h a t f r o m t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g W e s t e r n

th ink ing on a r t was bound up w i th aes the t i c s , he does mark o f f wha t i s

usua l ly r egarded as the e ra o f aes the t i c s , the epoch o f modern i ty , a s d i s

t inct ive , as making a radical break with the pas t ; and th is break re la tes

direct ly to the h is tory and value of ar t itself. R o u g h l y , H e i d e g g e r a r g u e s

tha t in the age o f t echno logy , ou r epoch , the re i s no more ' g rea t a r t ' ,

where the concep t o f g rea t a r t supp l ies h i s non-aes the t i c concep t ion o f a r t

(N , 80 ) . In 'Or ig in ' He idegger i s a t t empt ing to theor ize Hege l ' s idea o f

the end or death of ar t in terms of the end of great ar t ; or bet ter , he is

a t t empt ing to theor ize a concep t ion o f a r t , namely , g rea t a r t , a s the so r t o f

ar t that can 'd ie ' , that can lose i t s capaci ty to reveal a wor ld (OWA, 40) .

T h is wo uld be a con cep t ion of ar t as fini te ra t he r th an ' inf in i te ' , w hich

wou ld be an acco un t o f a r t in t e rm s o f unc han g ing c harac te r i s t i c s , th e

necessa ry and suff ic ient con di t io ns for any i tem to be a work of ar t , e tc .

The mor ta l i ty of great ar t wi l l be specif ied as ar t ' s possess ing a h is tor ical ly

del im ited t ru th pote nt ia l . H en ce gre at ar t i s no n-ae s the t ic as fin ite and as

pos ses s ing a cogn i t ive po ten t ia l .

Great ar t wi l l not be great because of i t s beauty or formal e legance or

aes thet ic mer i t , for these cr i ter ia for judging ar t works are themselvesaes thet ica l . I f the theory of great ar t i s to form the bas is for a non-

aes thet ic concept ion of ar t , then cr i ter ia for greatness wi l l of necess i ty

be of a d i f ferent o rde r f rom t rad i t ion al aes th et ic cr i ter ia . O f cours e ,

H eid eg ge r ' s prop ose d new cr i ter ia are no t proffered as an a l tern at ive

theore t i ca l f r amework fo r de f in ing a r t , s ince any such a t t empt wou ld con

t r ad ic t h i s fundamenta l in s igh t concern ing the h i s to r ica l i ty o f phenomena .

Nor , however , does He idegger wan t to r educe the h i s to r ica l under s tand ing

of ar t to a cons iderat ion of what h is tor ical ly has been sa id about i t . Rather ,

h is concern is to reveal how ar t i s one of the ways in which h is tory takes

place; that i s , ar t i s cons idered as one of the ways in which an epoch comes

to i t se l f and is formed; and th is wi l l equal ly say something about that

epocha l conce p t ion o f h i s to ry . Ind ee d , the s t ruc tu re o f 'O r ig i n ' w orks




on the bas is of proffer ing a con cep t ion of great ar t whi ch s im ul ta ne

ous ly , and for the f ir st t im e in H eid eg ge r , ar t icu la tes a con cept io n of

epocha l h i s to ry . For ou r pu rposes , however , we can r ead th i s accoun t

f rom the o ther d i rect ion: the concept of great ar t i s fa i r ly d i rect ly

en ta i l ed by He idegger ' s epocha l concep t ion o f h i s to ry , toge ther w i th the

thes is that wi th in any epoch cer ta in forms of ac t iv i ty wi l l be e i ther a s i tewh ere w hat is t ran sce nd en ta l for that ep och is revealed or a s i te inform ed

by tha t t r anscenden ta l au thor i ty ( and hence one whose ac t iv i t i e s can be

only empir ica l ) . F ro m thes e two ideas i t fo llows tha t a no n-a es t he t ic co n

cep t ion o f a r t w i l l s eek to demons t ra te how works can be epoch-mak ing ,

pos ses s ing an ' o r ig ina t ing ' power in He idegger ' s l ex icon , capab le o f

reveal ing t ranscendenta l t ru th . Br ief ly , in h is own terms f i r s t , Heidegger

c o n t e n d s :

( i) W hen eve r a r t ha pp en s - tha t i s , wh eneve r the r e i s a beg inn ing - a

th rus t en te r s h i s to ry , h i s to ry e i the r beg ins o r s t a r t s over aga in . . .

His tory is the t ranspor t ing of a people in to i t s appointed task as

e n t r a n c e i n t o t h a t p e o p l e ' s e n d o w m e n t . ( O W A , 7 7 )

(i i) O f on e grea t w ork , H eid eg ge r says: i t f irst gives to th in gs the ir look

and to men the i r ou t look . (OWA, 43)

( ii i) S ince the me an ing of be ing , the t r u th of bei ng is i t se l f epoc hal , then

ar t i s one o f the ways in wh ich t ru th happens . (OWA, 55)

( iv) H en ce , ar t is h is to ry , in the essent ia l sense tha t i t gro un ds h is tory .

( O W A , 7 7 )

At the conc lus ion o f the open ing s ec t ion o f 'O r ig in ' He idegger s ays ,

'Ar t i s t ru th se t t ing i tse l f to work ' , and he cont inues wi th the leading

ques t ion o f the r emainder o f the es say : 'What i s t ru th itself, tha t i t some

t imes comes to pas s as a r t ? ' (OWA, 39) . We have a l r eady no ted how the

cor respondence theory o f t ru th embedded in the pos i t iv i s t concep t ion o f

sc ience be l i e s how the g rowth o f knowledge occur s in s c ience ; modern s c i

ence does involve a sys te m at ic , if not d i rect ly co nt inu ou s , growth in our

k n o w l e d g e of n a t u r e , b u t th a t g r o w t h c a n n o t b e c o m p r e h e n d e d r e p r e s e n t a -

t ional ly . Ra ther , s c ien t if ic f r amewo rks - pa rad igm s , r esea rch p rog ram m es ,

domains - that a t any g iven t ime say what any por t ion of nature is , deter

m ine w ha t i s s c ien ti fi c and wha t no t , gu ide con t in u ing r ese a rch , p ro v ide

cr i ter ia for theory choic e , e tc . Wh at th e conc ept of a sc ient if ic f ramew ork

invokes wi th respect to the work of the f ramework i tse l f i s a productive

rather than 'reproductive' or 're-presentational' concep tion of truth. Scientif ic

f r a m e w o r k s p r o v i d e t h e m e a s u r e o f n a t u r e r a t h e r t h a n b e i n g m e a s u r e d

agains t i t; the grow th of kno wle dge w ith in a f rame work is m ad e poss ib le

by the f r amework itself, while the sh if t f rom one f ramework to another

s imul taneous ly r evea l s the pa roch ia l i sm o f pas t knowing and new poss i -




b i l it i e s fo r und er s ta nd i ng wh a t na tu re i s and w ha t s c ience is , and hen ce

new poss ib i l i t ies for doing sc ience. Scient i f ic f rameworks , in thei r pro

duct ive capaci ty , provide the condi t ions in general for both sc ience and i ts

objects .

He idegger ' s concep t ion o f t ru th in a r t a s b r ing ing in to unconcea lmen t

is, i t s eems to me , d i r ec t ly ana logous w i th th i s p roduc t ive concep t ion o ft ru th in s c ience , w i th two excep t ions . F i r s t , the p roduc t ive concep t ion o f

t ru th in s c ience cons ide r s the r evea l ing s t ruc tu re (pa rad igm, r esea rch p ro

g ramme, e tc . ) to be a d i s t inc t ly human p roduc t , wh i le fo r He idegger wha t

b r i n g s i n t o u n c o n c e a l m e n t c a n n o t b e r e g a r d e d a s a u n i q u e l y h u m a n p r o d

uct , a product of the imaginat ion or wi l l as they are usual ly conceived. As

we have a l ready seen, being withdraws or occludes i t se l f in those p laces

wh ere uncon cea lm en t occu r s ; th i s w il l en ta i l no t on ly a ce r ta in ' t r an sce n

de n ta l ' opac i ty , a ce r ta in cu r ta i lm en t o f the t r anscen den ta l in such e ven ts ,

bu t mo reover a ques t ion as to the i r p lace o f o r ig ina t ion . Seco nd ly , wha td i s t ingu ishes g rea t a r t f rom reg iona l ly spec i f i c fo rms o f t ru th -p roduc t ion

(b r ing ing in to unconcea lmen t ) - and s c ien t i f i c t ru th fo r He idegger i s

a lways regional , even i f product ive (OWA, 62) - i s that i t operates for a

to ta l i ty qua to ta l i ty , a wor ld qua world , and not merely for some region or

dom ain w i th in a wor ld . M or e , the r e is such a th in g as a wor ld on ly in v i r

tue of the work performed by a great work or i t s equivalent - the act that

founds a pol i t ica l s ta te , sacr i f ice , the th inker ' s ques t ioning (OWA, 62) .

What is meant by 'wor ld ' here is the k ind of uni ty or sense of belonging

toge th er tha t the d i ff e ren t fo rms o f ac t iv ity and unde r s ta nd ing th a t a

people engage in possess for them. So Heidegger wi l l say that great ar t

r evea l s how be ings as a who le a re : 'What i s ho ly and wha t unho ly , wha t

g rea t and wha t smal l , wha t b rave and wha t coward ly , wha t lo f ty and wha t

f ligh ty , wha t m as te r and wh a t s l ave ' (O W A, 43) . T h i s work , I am

claiming, ' reveals ' a wor ld in a way precise ly analogous to the way in

which a pa rad igm or r esea rch p rogramme ins t i tu tes an ob jec t domain by

providing a concept of an object in general , and hence unifies scientif ic

pract ice by providing guidel ines for inquiry , cr i ter ia for theory evolut ion

and so for th . A work of great ar t can ins t i tu te the hor izons of a wor ld in

jus t the same way tha t a sc ient if ic f ram ew ork ins t i tu tes the hor i zo ns of a

scienti f ic 'w or l d ' . O r be t ter , He ide gg er ' s l i s t shou ld be read as a l i st of

categor ies , and hence as a h is tor ical counter to Kant ' s ca tegor ies of the

u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d r e a s o n .

T o b e sure , the k ind of to ta l i ty th at Heid egg er is c la im ing great ar t

p rov ides i s p rob lem at ic fo r us , bo th because , r igh t ly o r wrong ly (which

I shal l comment on la ter ) , we do not conceive of ourselves as actual ly

inhabi t ing a to ta l i ty having th is sor t of force; and because i t i s a normat ive

pr in cip le of l ibera l dem ocra cies th at the que s t ion of wh at is th e good l ife

for man, which includes the ques t ion of how each is to make sense of and

unify the complex of ac t iv i t ies in which he or she engages , i s a mat ter for



8 6 T H E G E N I U S O F BE I N G

each indiv idual to decide for h im or herself, and is not to be ' legis lated ' by

the s ta te or socie ty a t large . Nonetheless , s ince we take th is pos i t ion to be

a h i s to r ica l ach ievement o f l ibe ra l s t a tes , an ach ievement o f modern i ty ,

and H eideg ger w i ll be r es t r i c t ing g rea t a r t to (m ore o r l es s) p re -m od ern ,

pre- l ibera l socia l format ions , then the concept ion of t radi t ional socie t ies as

normat ive to ta l i t i e s does no t con t rad ic t the s tandard s e l f -p resen ta t ion o f

m ode rn i ty , and inde ed g ives succo ur to the ph i losoph y o f h i s to ry u nd er

wri t ing that se l f -presenta t ion , a t leas t in the f i r s t ins tane.

I f p res s u red , one m igh t s ay tha t even i f a work o f a r t cou ld be p ro m i

ne nt in the rep ro du cin g of th e categor ia l f ramew ork of a socia l form at ion ,

i t i s sure ly an exaggerat ion to say i t might produce a normat ive to ta l i ty ,

and i t i s th i s l a t t e r c la im tha t He id egg er i s m ak in g . Res pon d ing to th i s

charge r equ i res fo l lowing th rough two d i s t inc t l ines o f though t . F i r s t , we

need to make c lea re r wha t He idegger ' s c la im amoun ts to , the reby mi t iga t ing th e in i t ia l im plau s ib i l i ty of th e thes is . W e then n eed to ask the qu es

t ion why H eideg ger t akes g rea t a r t a s h i s mo de l in deve lop ing an acco un t

of epochal h is tory , why the h is tory of being, which is a h is tory of econ

omies of presence and hence t ru th , should f ind l icence for i t se l f in the

concep tua l i za t ion o f th e que s t ion o f a r t in t e rm s o f g rea t a r t , wh ich the n

metaphor ica l ly images the h i s to ry o f be ing as an a r t h i s to ry? In answer ing

the la t ter ques t ion we make expl ic i t what was impl ic i t in the answer to the

f i rs t ques t ion . Now i t might be argued that to ask th is la t ter ques t ion here

in th i s way i s p rec ip i tous s ince a p roper answer to i t r equ i res under s tanding why , a t the end o f 'O r ig in ' , He idegger con tends tha t ' l anguage i t s e l f i s

poe t ry in the es sen t ia l s ense ' (O W A , 74) , and the n ana lys ing the com pre

h e n s i o n o f p o e t r y / l a n g u a g e / t h i n k i n g i n H e i d e g g e r ' s l a te w o r k s. T h i s s t a n

dard mo ve is una cce p tab le , fo r un t i l we un de r s ta nd t he o r ig ina l cen t r in g

of a r t , the o r ig ina l de p lo ym en t o f a r t in b reak ing w i th the concep t o f

his toricali ty offered in Being and Time (as we shall see is the case below),

w e c a n n o t e n t e r ' u n d e r s t a n d i n g l y ' i n t o t h e l a t e r t h i n k i n g a b o u t p o e t r y ,

l anguage and th ink ing . 'O r ig in ' , we migh t s ay , p rov ides the He idegger ian

ladder to the s tandpo in t o f the ' abso lu te ' . Hence i t i s ju s t th i s ques ton , o f

th e m ot iva t ion an d jus t i f ica t ion for emp loy ing ar t as a m ode l for th ink ing

th ro ug h the que s t ions o f h i s to r ica l i ty and epocha l h i s to ry , tha t wi ll fo rm a

cen t ra l t a rge t of ou r con s ide ra t ions for the r em ain der o f th i s cha p te r .

As w i l l become inc reas ing ev iden t , He idegger ' s accoun t has much to do

wi th wh a t is c rea ted as op po sed to wha t i s me re ly p rod uc ed . P ro duc t ion ,

m ak in g , is a lways the r e - p r od uc t io n o f wh a t was first c rea ted . W hic h

i s why the fo rm/mat te r s t ruc tu re so mis leads : i t cons t rues c rea t ion as

p roduc t ion and hence suppres ses c rea tednes s . Ar t works a re i r r evocab lycrea ted; and great ar t wi l l f igure t ransc en den ta l create dne ss , t rans cen

den ta l l eg i s la t ion , w i thou t impos i t ion o r a s sau l t .

As a f i r s t approx imat ion , He idegger ' s concep t ion o f wha t g rea t a r t

accom pl i shes can be b rok en do w n in to two con s t i tu te n t pa r t s , an exp lana-




to ry thes i s and a func t iona l thes i s . The exp lana to ry thes i s occur s in

H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t g r e a t w o r k s h a p p e n s u d d e n l y , m a r k i n g t h e

beg inn ing o f an epoch . In s ay ing th i s He idegger g ran t s tha t the beg inn ing

m ad e by a great wo rk 'pr ep ar es i tse l f for the longes t t ime and who l ly

inconsp icuou s ly ' (O W A , 76). W hy t he n speak o f a beg inn ing? Because

g r e a t w o r k s a r e n o t m o m e n t s in a t radi t ion or a h is tory , but are works

w h i c h disrupt some p rev ious h i s to ry and hence s e t in mot ion the pos s i

b i l i ty of another h is tory . This is why Heidegger speaks of great works as

' u n m e d i a t e d ' {Unvermittelte: O W A , 7 6 ). T h e p o i n t i s n o t t h a t t h e y s p r i n g

f rom nowhere , bu t r a the r tha t they canno t be accoun ted fo r in t e rms o f

the i r an teceden ts , however an teceden ts a re under s tood (e .g . a s r easons ,

causes o r ends ) . Med ia t ion i s someth ing tha t occur s w i th in a ( con t inuous )

his to ry , wi th in a h is tor ical to ta l i ty , and he nce cann ot be app l icab le to

c o m p r e h e n d i n g w h a t b r i n g s a w o r l d i n t o u n c o n c e a l m e n t a s a w o r l d . T o

put the same point o therwise , i t i s par t of what is meant by cal l ing ar t' c r ea t ive ' tha t no accoun t o f the e lemen ts o r an teceden ts o f a work i s

sufficient to explain what i t is that is achieved in i t . Of course works often,

if not usually, fall below this level of originali ty; and not every original

work i s g rea t a r t , r evea l ing how th ings a re as a who le . None the les s , o r ig

inal i ty , ab ou t w hich K an t says a grea t deal , i s a l l bu t cons t i tu t ive of ou r

con cep t io n and va lu ing o f a r t . Fu r th e r , i f h i s to ry is epoch a l , and if epoc hs

are normat ive to ta l i t i e s , in sc r ib ing the ever non-ob jec t ive hor izons o f a

wor ld , then i t i s p laus ib le to a rgue tha t the re a re ' p laces ' where the

d i sco n t inu i ty be tween epoc hs i s enu nc ia ted , pe rh aps ak in to the ro le fun damenta l theor ies p lay in mos t non-pos i t iv i s t concep t ions o f s c ien t i f i c

pro gre ss and ra t ional i ty . Fo r H eid eg ger , great ar t i s such a p lace , and i t

would appear uniquely su i ted to the ro le ass igned to i t .

Th i s he lps to exp la in why Heidegger speaks o f t ru th as an even t o r

happen ing . The po in t i s no t to in s t i tu te an in tu i t ion i s t v iew o f a r t i s t i c

t ru th o r to l eg i t ima te a R om an t ic con cep t io n o f a r t i s t i c ac t ion , any m ore

tha n i t i s K u h n ' s po in t to und erm ine th e r a t iona l i ty o f s c ience wh en

he ins i s t s upon the r evo lu t ionary charac te r o f ce r ta in deve lopments , o rcharac te r izes the a l t e ra t ion of un de r s ta nd ing th a t occu r s du r in g such

d e v e l o p m e n t s a s a ' c o n v e r s i o n ' . 8 Rather , He idegger uses h i s t e rms in o rder

to contrast the uneventfu l ac t iv i t ies and works which deal wi th par t iculars

belonging to a to ta l i ty to the event of the to ta l i ty itself. B e c a u s e t h a t e v e n t

i s a lways doub le , bo th the ' r i s e o r incep t ion o f an epocha l economy, and . . .

the mutua l en t ry in to p resence o f th ings , words , and ac t ions ' , 9 i t is always

a moot ques t ion as to whe ther the even t o f the g rea t work des igna tes a

tempora l p r io r i ty , the r e leas ing o f an economy o f p resence , o r on ly the

expl ic i t cogni t ion of the ' event ' of the wor ld i t se l f as the wor ld i t i s (oreven : the even t o f unconcea lmen t as an even t o f unconcea lmen t ) . The idea

of be ing p repare d for the longes t t ime i s , o f cour se , equa l ly am big uo us

be tween these two pos s ib i l i t i e s . An incep t ion need no t be marked ; hence




what does the marking need not be ' respons ib le ' , in the causal sense , for

the incept ion . And, indeed, th is mus t be so for Heidegger s ince the

me asure -g iv ing en t i ti e s wh ich epocha l ly s t a m p be ing - ' t he su prasenso ry

wor ld , the Ideas , God , the mora l l aw , the au thor i ty o f r eason , p rogres s ,

the happ ines s o f the g rea tes t number , cu l tu re , c iv i l i za t ion ' (QT, 65 ) -

them se lves on ly m ark a m od e o f be ing ' s w i thdraw al . Because th i s move

in t rod uces a r ad ica l con t ingenc y in to the on t ic a r t i cu la t ion o f on to log ica l

h is tory , which in t ime wil l y ie ld a general ques t ion about the apparent

unconnec tednes s o f on t ic and on to log ica l h i s to ry , 1 0 i t heightens a l l the

m ore th e ques t io n w hy great ar t i s bein g emp loy ed in orde r to f igure

epoc hal h is tory as wel l as form a m od el of the in tera ct io n and in t erp en e-

t r a t ion o f on t ic and on to log ica l , em pi r ica l and t r ansc end en ta l .

This br ings us to the funct ional thes is . Great ar t , by def in i t ion , br ings

th ing s in to unc onc ea lm en t , and hence has a (quas i - t r an scend en ta l ) t ru th

funct io n; b y def in i t ion , g reat ar t reveals a wo r ld , and in so doin g ass ignsmen a p lace amongs t th ings , the reby g iv ing the i r l ives a ' s ense ' . These

funct ion s are th e no n-a es th et ic analog ues of the famil iar Russ ia n formal is t

thes is that th e l i terary effect is defamiliarization (ostranenie), m a k i n g t h e

world s t range, a l lowing famil iar objects to be t ru ly ' seen ' ra ther than

me re ly r ecogn ized ( r e -cogn ized ) ; wh ich i ts e lf i s ana logou s to B rech t ' s

es t r angem ent -e f fec t , wh ere the goa l o f a r t is to r e tu rn the a ppare n t ly

eternal , changeless features of l i fe to h is tory in a l l i t s cont ingency and

tran s ien ce. Fo r He ide gg er , th e ef fect of grea t works is equal ly one of

defami l i a r i za t ion , on ly fo r h im the mo vem en t i s no t to a m ere r enew ed

vis ion of some par t icular , or away f rom the apparent ly inevi table to the

f lux of h is tory , but f rom the ordinary and par t icular to that which le ts the

ord inary and par t i cu la r have the i r pecu l ia r shape and mean ing . So g rea t

a r t t r an spo r t s me n ou t o f the r ea lm o f the o rd in ary , w here to sub m i t to

th i s d i sp lace me n t m ean s ' to t r ans fo rm our accus to m ed t i es to wor ld and

ear th and hencefo r th r es t r a in a l l u sua l do ing and p r iz ing , knowing and

look ing , in o rder to s t ay w i th in the t ru th tha t i s happen ing in the work '

(OWA, 66) . Let t ing a work be in th is way, le t t ing i t have th is ef fect ,

He idegger ca l l s ' p rese rv ing ' (Bewahrung), wh ere p re se rv ing i s to be

con t ras ted w i th conno is seu r sh ip , wh ich pa r r i es a work ' s ' t h rus t in to the

e x t r a o r d i n a r y ' ( O W A , 6 8 ) .

Ostranenie and the es t rangement-ef fect work cr i t ica l ly ; thei r cogni t ive

c la iming i s nega t ive in charac te r . T h is r es t r i c t ion , however , is compa t ib le

with the thought that for us ar t works are per ipheral , thei r s ignif icance

l imi ted to po in t ing to o r ges tu r ing a t wh a t is t r ansc end en ta l ly au thor i t a t ive

wi thou t be ing ab le to invade i t . Fu r the r , in cons ide r ing the cogn i t ive pur

po r t of l i ter a tu re , ther e is a t leas t som e recog ni t ion tha t i t s them at ic

con cerns - w i th love , dea th , pow er , iden t i ty , e tc . ; rough ly , Kan t ' s aes

thet ic ideas - address not our empir ical bel iefs , but the categor ies and

c o n c e p t s through which we process those bel iefs . We tend to read ar t ' s




tr u t h c la im s as con cep tual or ca tego r ia l ; bu t because ar t i s pe r iph era l t he

s ignif icance of these c la ims is usual ly in terpreted in terms of ar t rehears ing

'pos s ib i l i t i e s ' . I f a r t i s pe r iphera l , however , then mus t no t those c la ims

funct ion d if ferently wh en ar t can be legis la tive? And wil l wh at we m ea n

by 'pos sib il i t y ' not shif t wh en i t is co ns tru ed h is toric ally, as an effect of

marg ina l i za t ion?

iv Great Art and Ge nius: O n Being Exem plary

He ide gge r ' s charac te r iza t ion o f g rea t a r t can be cons t ru ed as an ex tend ing

and reworking of more famil iar accounts of ar t such that these features of

works r e la te to h i s epocha l theory o f h i s to ry in the con tex t o f non-modern

or t r ad i t iona l soc ie t i e s . Conver se ly , we migh t r ecogn ize our aes the t i c con

cep t ion of ar t as a co nse qu en ce of ou r repress io n of h is tor ical i ty in n o n -

normat ive ly to ta l i zed soc ia l fo rmat ions . Whi le such ana log ica l ges tu res

m i g h t r e m o v e s o m e o f t h e a p p a r e n t h y p e r b o l e i n H e i d e g g e r ' s t h e o r y , it

leaves whol ly une xp lore d t he que s t io n precise ly why i t i s ar t , grea t ar t ,

tha t i s be ing dep loyed in o rder to th ink the p rob lem of epocha l i ty .

H e i d e g g e r c o n t e n d s t h a t m o d e r n s u b j e c t i v i s m m i s i n t e r p r e t s t h e c r e

a t ion of great ar t , grea t ar t ' s pro du ct iv i ty , ' as the se l f -sovereign sub jec t ' s

pe r fo rma nce o f gen ius ' (O W A , 76) . Con ver se ly , then , gen ius is the su b jec -

t iv izat ion of great ar t . Hence when Heidegger f i r s t in t roduces great ar t ,

t r ack ing w ha t for h im i s i ts cen t ra l chara c te r i s t i c , namely ' s e l f - subs i s tence ' ,

he s t a tes tha t in g rea t a r t ' t he a r t i s t r emains inconsequen t ia l a s compared

with the work , a lmos t l ike a passageway that des t roys i t se l f in the creat ive

process for the work to emerge ' (OWA, 40) . As we shal l see , whi le there is

a c lear sense in which works exceed the contro l l ing consciousness and

in ten t ions o f the i r p roducer s , He idegger ' s r ender ing o f the a r t i s t in to a

'pas sagew ay ' , a c iphe r in the c rea t ive p roces s , p resen t s pecu l ia r the ore t i ca l

d i f f icul t ies for h is account . Nonetheless , the thes is that great ar t i s the ar t

of genius pr ior to subject iv izat ion coheres wi th the account we have beenof fe r ing . En ta i l ed by i t i s the th ou gh t tha t g rea t a r t p ro no unc es a m od e o f

f reedom, of f ree act ion that i s d i f ferent f rom and anter ior to the concep

t ion of f ree act ion enc aps ula t ed in th e work of gen ius . T h is sense of f ree

d o m w i ll n e e d to b e c o m p a r e d w i t h K a n t i a n a u t o n o m y .

I f i t i s the case that ' every mode of presencing - every cons te l la t ion of

tem po ral d i f ference - reach es us as a ca l l (Anruf), a d e m a n d (Anspruch)\u

hen ce as a c la im hav ing the s am e mo da l s t a tus as the jud gem en t o f t a s te ,

then perhaps th is c la imed his tor ical af f i l ia t ion between the work of genius

and great ar t can te l l us why ar t i s being employed to th ink the problem of

epocha l i ty . T h e Kan t ian un de r s ta nd ing o f a r t and gen ius figures sotto voce

in He ide gg er , not as a guid e for exp lor in g the ques t io n of ar t , b ut ra the r

as a model for epochal h is tory , the h is tory of being; and i t i s only as a




c o n s e q u e n c e of th i s mode l l ing tha t art c o m e s to h a v e a pr iv i leged s ta tus ,

in the f irs t instance, for o p e n i n g the poss ib i l i ty of t h i n k i n g s u c h a h is to ry .

M o r e e m p h a t i c a l l y , n o n - g r e a t art, the art of gen ius , en jo ins a kind of

in te rna l h i s to r ic i ty w i th in the r ea lm of art tha t mode ls h i s to r ic i ty , in the

sense of the h i s t o r y of b e i n g in g e n e r a l . Art is a locus for th ink ing h i s to r

icity and t r u t h b e c a u s e art c o n t i n u e s to opera te ' h i s to r ica l ly ' desp i te its

r e m o v a l to the p e r i p h e r y of m o d e r n i t y w h e r e it loses the capac i ty to effect

a n y t h i n g o u t s i d e itself.

Pursu ing th i s l ine of thought wi l l ra ise a c lus te r of ques t ions . F i r s t , why

s h o u l d ' a e s t h e t i c ' art be conce ived of as the end or d e a t h of art? Why

s h o u l d it be the case tha t when art finally achieves a v o c a t i o n ' p r o p e r ' to

itself, b e c o m i n g j u s t art and n o t h i n g m o r e , if s h o u l d in so d o i n g b e c o m e

less than 'a r t ' , less than what art has b e e n or c o u l d be? S e c o n d l y , why is it

art in m o d e r n i t y t h a t d e s p i t e its derac ina ted s ta te shou ld con t inue to have

t h e p o w e r to p r o v o k e a th ink ing tha t t r anscends modern i ty , tha t r eca l l s( a d u m b r a t e s ) a pas t ( fu tu re ) mode of his tor ical exis tence? How, in shor t ,

can tha t wh ich is not grea t pe r fo rm the func t ion of r e v e a l i n g m o d e r n i t y to

i t s e l f ? T h i r d l y , if it is the case tha t it is t h r o u g h n o n - g r e a t art tha t g rea t

a r t and its epocha l func t ion ing is r e v e a l e d , d o e s H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t p o s

sess the theore t i ca l r e sources to sus ta in th i s thes i s ? Four th , can gen ius

b e u n d e r s t o o d as only the subjectif ication of grea t art, or is it the

subjectif ication of g r e a t art and someth ing e l s e? At i s sue he re is the c o n

n e c t i o n b e t w e e n f r e e d o m ( a u t o n o m y ) and h is to r ica l i ty , a connec t ion tha t

K a n t g e n e r a l l y r e p r e s s e s t h r o u g h the pos i t ing of the c o n s t r a i n i n g n o r m s of

r e a s o n , and t h a t H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t s to b r e a k c o m p l e t e l y by u n d e r m i n i n g

t h e m o d e r n d i s c o v e r y of f r e e d o m .

H e i d e g g e r ' s c o u p l i n g of reveal ing and c o n c e a l i n g , his e m p h a t i c h i g h

l igh t ing of the se l f -occ lud ing charac te r of b e i n g and of the absen t ia l

d i m e n s i o n s of all b r i n g i n g - i n t o - u n c o n c e a l m e n t is not as r e m o t e f ro m K a n t

as it f irs t appears . And K a n t ' s t h i n k i n g of the q u e s t i o n of art in t e r m s of

g e n i u s is more l ike an inves t iga t ion in to the n a t u r e of g r e a t art t h a n it is

like the t r a d i t i o n a l a t t e m p t to p r o v i d e a neutra l def in i t ion of art tha t wou ldpick out the neces sa ry and suff ic ient condi t ions for us cal l ing an i tem a

w o r k of art.

K a n t b e g i n s his i n q u i r y i n t o art in § § 4 3 - 4 as if his p u r p o s e was to g e n

e r a t e a def in i t ion of art. So art is d is t ingu ished f rom na tu re in t h a t it is a

p r o d u c t i o n t h r o u g h f r e e d o m t h a t has r eason at the bas is of its ac t ion ; it is

d is t ingu ished f rom sc ience as the prac t i ca l is d is t ingu ished f rom the t h e o r

e t ica l ; an art is m e c h a n i c a l if it seeks only to actual ize poss ib le objects to

the cogn i t ion of w h i c h it is a d e q u a t e . N o n - m e c h a n i c a l a r t s , a e s t h e t i c art,

has p leasu re as its i m m e d i a t e g o a l . A e s t h e t i c art is of two k inds , ag reeab leand fine: 'The d e s c r i p t i o n " a g r e e a b l e art" app l ies where the end of the art

is that the p l e a s u r e s h o u l d a c c o m p a n y the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s c o n s i d e r e d as

m e r e sensations, the descr ip t ion " f ine art" w h e r e it is to a c c o m p a n y t h e m




cons idered as modes of cognition 1

(CJ , §44, 305) . F inal ly , in §45 Kant s ta tes

that ar t can only be termed beaut i fu l when, despi te our awareness of i t as

an in ten t iona l p roduc t , i t ye t has the appearance o f na tu re . A l though I

sha l l wan t to r e tu rn to th i s thes i s , for the p rese n t a min im al i s t in te rp re ta

t ion of i t wi l l suf f ice . Kant has recourse to the appearance of nature here

in order to avoid perfect ionism becoming the cr i ter ion for ar t is t ic excel

lence, as would be enta i led by h is in tent ional is t concept ion of ar t a lone.

Nor i s th i s move d i s ingenuous , s ince w i thou t the ' appearance o f na tu re '

cond i t ion the d i s t inc t ion be tween mechan ica l and aes the t i c a r t wou ld co l

l a p s e .1 2

The ex t ra cond i t ion , then , beg ins to d i s t ingu ish the k ind o f in ten

t ion necessary for aes thet ic ar t as opposed to mechanical ar t . I t generates

the space which the theory of genius f i l l s .

N o n e t h e l e s s , K a n t ' s i n t r o d u c t i o n o f g e n i u s at t h i s j u n c t u r e i n t r o d u c e s

a h ia tu s in to h is def in i t ional p ro ce du re of seeking af ter specif ic d i f ferences .

While Kant does regard genius in a wide sense as specify ing a l l that i snecessary in order to make a work of f ine ar t poss ib le ,

1 3

he equal ly uses i t

as a dynamic concept to expl icate the 'vocat ion ' of ar t in v i r tue of which

ar t has a h is tory , or bet ter , reveals ar t as sa t is fy ing i ts vocat ion only in so

far as i t i s dynamical ly h is tor ical . In th is la t ter sense the cons iderat ion of

a r t i s more normat ive than neu t ra l ly de f in i t iona l ; bu t more than th i s , the

ques t ion o f a r t comes to be r ecogn ized as someth ing incapab le o f be ing

answ ered , o r even co m pre he nd ed , th ro ug h the p rov id ing of a de f in it ion in

terms of species and differentia. And i t is easy enough to see why this is

so . T h e species an d d if ferent ia ana lys is of ar t break s off a t jus t the m om en twhere Kan t becomes t ac i t ly aware tha t works o f a r t a re p roduc t s o f f r ee

dom or autonomy: works of f ine ar t , exact ly l ike objects of the judgement

of tas te , mus t be in t r ins ical ly f inal a l though without an end. An ar t work

that had a t i t s bas is the in tent ion to real ize an a l ready conceptual ly deter

mina te ob jec t wou ld hence be mechan ica l , the work s a tu ra ted by the goa l

o f p roduc ing the token o f a concep tua l type . Ana logous ly , a work o f ag ree

able ar t has i t s goal outs ide itself, namely , in the goa l o f p roduc ing

p leasu re cons ide re d as m ere s ensa t ions . No w th e p rod uc t io n o f a work o f

fine art could be considered free in a weak sense just in case i t were the

pr od uc t o f an in ten t iona l ac t com pat ib le w i th the de m an ds o f the ca tego r i

cal imperat ive . But in c la iming that works of ar t are devoid of external

e n d s , and he nce p rod uc t s o f ac t ions done fo r the i r own sake , K an t i s

ins i s t ing tha t such p roduc t ion no t on ly p resupposes f r eedom in the weak

sense bu t manifes ts f ree dom , ins tan t ia te s i t, a im s a t i t , ha s f reedom for i ts

m ean ing . Such ac t s a re the p rod uc t io n o f f r eedom th r oug h fr eedom. In

works of f ine art freedom appears, and f reedom can only thus appear i f i t

detaches i t se l f f rom the subject iv i ty producing i t , s ince whatever wouldb ind a work to sub jec t iv i ty , above a l l the commensurab i l i ty be tween the

ob jec t and the in ten t ion to p roduce jus t i t , wou ld equa l ly p roh ib i t the

work f rom being ' f ine ' ar t . H en ce a nece ssary co ndi t ion for a work to be




' f ine ' , a work of genius , i s that the ru le ef fectuat ing the work be essent ia l ly

unava i lab le to p roducer and aud ience . The work o f f ine a r t mus t be

ground les s , w i thou t de te rmina te an teceden ts . I t s be ing a f r ee p roduc t ion ,

a product ion that cannot be expla ined or accounted for in terms of i t s

antecedents , e i ther h is tor ical ly or psychological ly , mus t be cons t i tu t ive of

the work and man i fes t in i t s appear ing . No te tha t the s ame d i s t inc t ionbe tw een p r odu c t ion and c rea t ion tha t i s a t the bas i s o f He ide gge r ' s

acc oun t of great ar t i s a t the bas is of K a n t ' s accou nt of fine ar t ; wi th K an t ,

how eve r , to th in k creat io n is to th ink f reedo m in i t s m os t radical form.

Thus art 's having a his tory, i ts satisfying i ts vocation only in so far as i t

i s dynamical ly h is tor ical , in ter rupt ing previous ar t h is tory in order for that

h is to ry to begin aga in , is con nec ted with , inde ed a co nse qu en ce of, t he

human vocat ion for f reedom that f i r s t becomes manifes t in f ine ar t . While

the ca tegor ica l impera t ive hover s over th i s f r eedom and h i s to ry , i t appear s

to r equ i re qu i te d i f f e ren t c r i t e r i a . The r e la t ion be tween normat ive f r ee

dom and a r t i s t i c au tonomy i s p layed ou t in Kan t ' s ana lys i s in t e rms o f the

re la t ion be tw een g en ius and t as te . T h e r e la t ively new theore t i ca l t rop e

o f g e n i u s r e p r e s e n t s K a n t ' s a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t t h a t b o t h t h e q u e s t io n o f

au ton om y is a t i ssue he re and tha t i t i s no t d i rect ly co m pa t ib l e wi th the

f reedom of reason - reas on is be ing t ransfo rm ed in to poet iz ed reason , or ,

wha t i s the s ame , becoming iden t i f i ed w i th the t r anscenden ta l imag in

at ion . This p lacement of genius a lso te l ls us why the idea of great ar t i s

so d i s c re te ly han d led by He ideg ger . A r t , fo r us , i s th e pa rad igm at ic , th e

exempla ry t r ansg res s ing o f de f in i t iona l p rocedures because i t i s the work

of f reedom ; and for us i t i s con s t i tu t iv e of f reed om tha t it be self-

t r ansg res s ing in i t s e s sen t ia l movements . Or so I now wan t to a rgue .

However , i f ar t does work in th is way, then our unders tanding of i t i s

bound to i t s h is tory , where i t s work of h is tor ic iz ing is a cr i ter ion for that

c o m p r e h e n s i o n .

K an t ' s acc oun t o f gen ius is an a t t em pt to th ink th e ques t ion o f a r t in

ter m s of creat iv i ty and or ig ina l i ty , creat iv i ty as or ig in al i ty ; in term s , th en ,

of an acategor ical , t ransgress ive f reedom which decentres h is previous

focus on p leasu re and beau ty . I f works o f a r t a re in ten t ion a l p rod uc t s ,

then they mus t in some sense be ru le -governed ; however , the ve ry concep t

of f ine ar t proh ibi t s i t s pr od uc ts f rom being gro un de d in a def in ite c on

cep t . How then i s a r t pos s ib le? Only i f the re a re p roduc t s o f in ten t iona l

act iv i ty for which no def in i te ru le can be g iven, but that can nonetheless

demons t ra te the i r in ten t iona l o r ig in , the f ac t tha t they make ' o r ig ina l '

sense as opposed to or ig inal nonsense , by serving as models , by being

exe m plary . A work is exe m plar y i f i t can serve as a m od el for success ion .

Tha t in us wh ich a l lows such works to be p roduced i s gen ius .

Ex em pla r i ty func t ions in Kan t ' s accoun t o f a r t a s spec i fy ing how s om e

th ing can be an imm an en t and con t inge n t abso lu te , ho w, tha t i s , som e

th ing can be empirically transcendental. T h e p r o d u c t s o f g e n i u s a r e i t e m s

for which no ru le can be g iven but which nonetheless themselves can serve




'as a s tandard or ru le for es t imat ing ' (CJ , §46, 308) . I t i s precise ly th is

feature of works of ar t that severs them f rom the general assumptions of

t r anscenden ta l ph i losophy . Here tha t wh ich supp l ies the ru le fo r e s t imat

ing is ne i the r a pr ior i no r nece ssary , bu t , from t he pe rspec t ive of the

t r ansc end en ta l , con t ingen t ; fu r the r , a s such the ru le -g iv ing i t em is em pi r i

cal , a con crete par t icula r and no t a form of any sor t . In these re spe ctsworks o f g rea t a r t a re d i r ec t ly ana logous to Kan t ian exempla ry i t ems . In

bo th cases the t r anscen den ta l / em pi r ica l d i s t inc t ion i s be ing tu rne d in the

d i rec t ion o f the emp i r ica l , the reb y un de rm in i ng the easy neces sa ry /con t in

gent d is t inct ion that fo l lows the t racks of the t ranscendenta l when i t i s

conceived formal ly , as form.

In works of f ine ar t f reedom appears . Or ig inal i ty , which Kant cal ls the

'pr imary proper ty ' ( ib id . ) of the work of f ine ar t , i s the appear ing of f ree

dom. The way in which f r eedom appear s as o r ig ina l i ty i s wha t y ie lds the

connect ion between the praxis specif ic to ar t and h is tor ical i ty . Or ig inal i ty

becomes man i fes t in two modes : des t ruc t ive ly and cons t ruc t ive ly . In o rder

to ca r ry ou t the i r work o f s e t t ing new ru les and s tandards fo r judgement ,

wh ich i s ju s t ano ther way o f r evea l ing the i r au toch thonous s ta tus , exemp

la ry i t ems mus t cha l l enge and p rovoke the i r aud ience by over t ly t r ans

g res s ing the ru les , s t an dard s , no rm s and con ven t ion s o f p rev ious p rac t i ce ,

fo r wha t has coun ted as ar t o r beau ty ; they a re p rovoca t ions which ca l l

com m ons ense und er s t and ing in to ques t io n . W orks of a r t succeed in be ing

or ig inal only i f they can d ispossess and es t range their audience of thei r

s tand ing cogn i t ive gu ide l ines fo r judg ing and , in so do ing , cha l l enge the i r

audience ' s se l f -possess ion of i t se l f and i ts wor ld , thei r sense that they

k n o w w h a t a r t is . When speak ing o f g rea t a r t , He idegger t e rms th i s p rovo

ca t ion ' d i sp la cem en t ' , a t r an spo r t ing o f us ' ou t o f the r ea lm o f the o rd i

n a r y ' ( O W A , 6 6 ) . H e i d e g g e r ' s l a n g u a g e h e r e , t h e ' e x t r a o r d i n a r y (ungeheur.

awesome, sub l ime) th rus t ' o f the work , cons i s ten t ly sugges t s the exper i

ence o f the sub l ime; 1 4 and by the ve ry f ac t tha t Kan t con t ras t s gen ius and

t a s t e , i t would appear p laus ib le to a l ign the provocat ion of the work of ar t

more w i th the exper ience o f sub l imi ty than w i th beau ty . P rovoca t ion i snecessary i f the work is going to detach i tse l f f rom i ts antecedents , and

t h e r e b y b e c o m e s e l f - a u t h e n t i c a t i n g .

However , th is provocat ion , which is a mark of or ig inal i ty , i s not

suff ic ient s ince the provocat ion may be empty and id le , f ru i t less . Or ig

ina l i ty mus t invo lve more than b reak ing ru les ; i t s de fo rmat ions mus t a l low

for the pos s ib i l ity of r e fo rma t ion . T h e l i tm us t e s t o f exem pla r i ty , nam ely ,

succes s ion (Nackfolge), i s no t as unif ied or s im ple as K a nt ' s pre sen ta

t ion o f i t makes i t appear . Rough ly , on the one hand , Kan t equa tes

exem pla r i ty , and hence succes s ion , w i th p rov id ing new ways o f mak ing

sense :

Succession which re la tes i t se l f to a precedent , not imita t ion , i s the cor

rect express ion for th e inf luence whic h the pr od uc t of an ex em plary




or ig ina to r can have on o the r s ; wh ich means the s ame as th i s : to c re

a te f rom the same sources out of which the former h imself created ,

and to learn f rom one 's predecessor only the way to proceed in such

crea t ion oneself. (CJ , §32 , 283)

An example of success ion in th is sense would be the founding of a new' schoo l ' o f pa in t ing o r poe t ry . The exempla ry work wou ld p rov ide pos s i

b i l i t ies , in the p lura l , tha t were not previou s ly avai lab le ; and whi le

succeeding works may a l ter what we conceive those poss ib i l i t ies to be , i t

wou ld r emain the case tha t the ' o r ig ina l ' exempla ry work was the ' o r ig in '

wi th respect to which succeeding works had their sense . Of course , seeing

the provocat ion of an or ig inal work may only be poss ib le in v i r tue of the

work s succ eed ing i t . D u e reco gni t io n of th is in m od er ni s t ar t i s g iven by

the centra l i ty of ser ies of works which permit the new rule won for ar t to

become v i s ib le ; in shor t , modern i s t a r t i s t s acknowledge the connec t ion

be tween exempla r i ty and succes s ion by p roduc ing the succes s ive works

themse lves . Here , then , exempla r i ty means the open ing up o f new

poss ib i l i t i e s w i thou t the i t em o r i t ems tha t do tha t open ing up be ing ab le

to be accoun ted fo r in t e rms o f i t s o r the i r an teceden ts . Exempla ry i t ems

prov ide the measure , w i th on ly the i r p rovoca t ion , on the one hand , and

s u c ce s si o n o n t h e o t h e r , ' m e a s u r i n g ' ( w i t h o u t m e a s u r i n g ) t h e m .

Kant , however , does not qui te see th is poss ib i l i ty ; harassed by an over ly

sharp d i s t inc t ion b e twe en the sp i r i t o f imi ta t ion and th e sp i r i t o f gen ius ,be tween imi ta t ion and au tonomy, he t ends to r ead the r equ i remen ts fo r

au t on om ous r ep ro du c t io n , fo r succes s ion , in t e rm s o f fu r the r exem pla ry

ins tances :

. . . the p ro du ct of a ge ni u s . . . i s an exa m ple , not for im ita t ion ( for t ha t

wou ld mean the los s o f the e lemen t o f gen ius , wh ich cons t i tu tes the

very soul of th e work ) , b ut to be fo llowed by ano the r genius - one

whom i t arouses to a sense of h is own or ig inal i ty in put t ing f reedom

from the constraint of rules so into force in his ar t , that for ar t i tself

a new rule is wo n - wh ich is wh at show s a ta len t to be exe m plary .

(CJ , §49, 318)

And th is cer ta in ly makes i t sound as i f not to respond to a work of genius

wi th gen ius i s to r espond non-au tonomous ly ; to sugges t th i s , however ,

r edu ces the new ru le won th rou gh e xem pla r i ty to a s ing le case, thu s

redu c ing the inde te rm inacy o f the exem pla ry ins tance to un i ty .1 5

T h e r e i s

in K an t so s ta rk a d i f fe ren t ia t ion be tw een au to nom y and im i ta t ion , and h i saccount is so resolu te ly indiv idual is t ic , that when the is sue is f reedom

i ts e lf K a n t i a n a u t o n o m y b e c o m e s a r e q u i r e m e n t fo r p e r p e t u a l r e v o l u t io n .

Con ver se ly , the de m an d for an au ton om us response to o r ig ina l works

demons t ra tes tha t i t i s p rec i s e ly and r eso lu te ly the ques t ion o f au tonomy




in i t s own r ight that sur faces in the ques t ion of f ine ar t . Fur ther , whi le

K a n t ' s a u t o n o m y r e q u i r e m e n t s o u n d s u t t e r ly h y p e r b o l ic a l , i ts u r g i n g o f

nove l ty and o r ig ina l i ty coheres , w i th unnerv ing accuracy , w i th a t l eas t tha t

do m ina n t s t r e tch o f m od ern i s t a r t tha t re s tl e s sly s ea rches a f te r the ' ne w ' .

K an t ian exem pla r i ty , then , w il l bo t h r evea l a m ore r ad ica l s ense o f au to n

omy than tha t e i the r usua l ly as soc ia ted w i th h im o r found in modernphi losophy; and, by the very r igour of i t s demands , and their f renet ic

co nse qu en ce in m od ern is t ar t , wi ll expo se the need for a reform at ion of

th e or ig inal theory . At f ir st g lanc e, th e exag gerated sever i ty of the de m an d

for an au t ono m ou s r espo nse and the f rene t ic p lay ing ou t o f tha t de m an d

appear to be en ta i l ed by the ind iv idua l i sm o f the accoun t and t h e

ind iv idua l i s t cond i t ions o f p roduc t ion in modern i s t a r t . As we sha l l s ee ,

however , judgement on the demand canno t be made in i so la t ion o f the

p lacemen t o f a r t in the con tex t o f the cu l tu re su r round ing i t . Befo re

a t t empt ing to make a judgement he re ( in f ac t to be de layed un t i l we con

s ider Adorno 's wres t l ing with the 'new') , we need to f i l l in the deta i ls of

the r es t o f Kan t ' s accoun t .

An exempla ry work beg ins a new movement o f h i s to ry , and w i l l ac t a s a

cons t r a in ing p rov oca t ion to a l a te r gen iu s . Fu r th e r , a s K an t ' s ge n iu s - to -

gen ius a rgument sugges t s , the aud ience o f gen ius mus t i t s e l f r e spond

' au to nom ous ly ' ; th i s fo rm o f r espon se w il l be ak in to the m an ne r o f

Heidegger ian p rese rver s as opposed to conno is seu r s o r aes the tes .

T h e coheren t de fo rm at ions r equ i red o f exem pla ry works a re never , fo rKan t , mere fo rmal innova t ions ; works o f gen ius mus t have ' sou l ' (Geist).

A work 's having soul i s that in v i r tue of which i t makes a demand upon i ts

aud ience to r espond to i t in t r in s ica l ly , w i thou t any fu r the r pu rpose . Sou l ,

as the animat ing pr incip le in the mind, ' i s noth ing e lse than the facul ty of

p r e s e n t i n g (Darstellung) aesthetic ideas' (CJ , §49, 313) . Aes thet ic ideas are

the coun te rpar t s to r a t iona l ideas ; r a t iona l ideas a re concep ts to wh ich no

in tu i t io n i s ade qua te , wh i le aes the t i c ideas a re in tu i t ions to wh ich n o co n

cep t o r concep ts a re ever adequa te , ' and which l anguage , consequen t ly ,

can never get qui te on level terms with or render complete ly in te l l ig ib le '

(CJ , §49 , 314) . I f r a t iona l ideas a re fo r Kan t the indemons t rab le concep ts

o f r eason , then aes the t i c ideas mus t be r egarded as the inexpon ib le

rep resen ta t ions o f imag ina t ion (CJ , §57 , 342) . To as se r t tha t aes the t i c

ideas are inexponible is not to say that they are a l together inef fable , but

on ly tha t no e labora t ion can make them concep tua l ly de te rmina te ; the i r

i n t u i t i v i t y r e m a i n s u n m a s t e r a b l e t h r o u g h c o n c e p t u a l a r t i c u l a t i o n .

Although Kant is less than c lear on th is ques t ion , i t appears that aes

the t i c ideas concern b o th th e m at te r and fo rm o f p resen ta t ion . M ate r ia l ly ,an aes the t i c idea i s one which mus t be capab le o f bea r ing ' the burden o f

h u m a n s i g n i f i c a n c e '1 6 uberhaupt; and i f i t were no t Kan t w i th whom we

were dea l ing he re we wou ld s ay tha t th i s means tha t an aes the t i c idea mus t

engage a ca tegor ia l o r t r anscenden ta l de te rmina t ion o f exper ience . An




aes thet ic idea , and what is and what is not an aes thet ic idea , i s not deter

mined a pr ior i but i s ra ther a funct ion of works of genius ; they mus t mark

ou t ce r ta in phenomena as ones which a re de te rmina t ive fo r ou r concep t ion

of ou r se lves as human be ings . Because Kan t r egards our ca tegor ia l de te r

mina t ion as f ina l and de te rmina te , and hence r ep res ses the ' a s ' in the ' con

cept ion of ourselves as human be ings ' , he s ays aes the t i c ideas invo lve

phe nom en a tha t t r ansg res s the l imi t s o f expe r ience , a l tho ugh the y occur in

exper ience . The i t ems Kan t men t ions in th i s r egard - dea th , envy , v ices ,

fame, love (CJ , §49, 314) - t ransgress exper ience only in h is technical

sense of the word; or bet ter , in having s ignif icance they t ransgress h is

technical sense of exper ience. Of itself, to say that is to say too l i t t le.

Formal ly , the aes the t i c ideas mus t be p resen ted in a manner in wh ich

the in tu i t ive can be p reponderan t over the concep tua l . Kan t conce ives

o f r ep resen ta t ions where th i s occur s as symbol ic in charac te r . H is theory

of symbol i sm i s too th in to g ive th i s though t much subs tance . I f in s tead o f

emphas iz ing the making of the invis ib le v is ib le , or bodying for th to sense

(CJ , §49, 314) an idea of reason, as Kant is tempted to do , ra ther than

ho ld ing to the p r imacy o f in tu i t ion , then wha t Kan t i s r equ i r ing i s tha t the

presen ta t ion be su f f i c ien t to r es i s t the work o f the under s tand ing . Pu t t ing

the point th is way picks up the point made a t the end of the las t chapter

tha t aes the t i c phenomena were those capab le o f r es i s t ing the sway o f d i s

cu r s ive ra t iona l i ty , un de r s ta nd ing and r eason . F ig ura t ion , o f cour se , is oneof th e ways we acc om plish th is end ; crucia l ly , i t is a lso one of the centra l

ways in wh ich we defo rm and re fo rm co m m on sense .

I t i s he re , pe rhaps , tha t we can connec t gen ius and the t r anscenden ta l ,

p roduc t ive imag ina t ion , fo r how e l s e migh t we spec i fy the governance o f

works of genius than as schemat iz ing aes thet ic ideas? Is i t not as (d is

p laced) t r anscenden ta l s chemata tha t exempla ry works fu l f i l the i r exemp

la ry func tion? T h is ce r ta in ly is the hyp o the s i s He id egg er fo llows . H e

m arks the d i sp lac em en t o f the work of t r ans cen den ta l s chem at i sm f rom

subject iv i ty to ar t work in these terms: 'Truth is never gathered f rom

objec t s tha t a re p res en t and o rd inary . Ra th er , the open in g up o f the O pen ,

and th e c lear ing of wh at is , ha pp en s only as the op en ne ss is pro jected ,

ske tched ou t , tha t makes i t s adven t in th rownness ' (OWA, 71) . Equa l ly ,

he speaks o f ' poe t i c p ro jec t ion ' , wh ich he spec i f i e s in a Kan t ian manner

as coming ' f rom nothing, in th is respect , that i t never takes i t s g i f t f rom

the o rd inary o r t r ad i t iona l ' (OWA, 76) . Grea t a r t , fo r He idegger , does the

work fo rmal ly done by the t r anscenden ta l imag ina t ion . Such works p ro

v ide a ' p ro jec ted s ke tc h ' , an 'i l lum ina t in g p ro jec t io n ' , a ' l igh t ing p ro jec t ion o f t ru th ' (O W A , 73-4 ) ; a p ro jec t ion , then , wh ich i s the cond i t ion for

the poss ib i l i ty of objects s tanding in the Open, that i s , having an in te l l i

g ib le sense wi th respect to us and o ther objects . Al l th is i s an echo of what

Kant says in the f irs t Critique (B, 142) where he specif ies the work of

schem at i sm in these t e rm s : ' . . . the image i s a product of the empir ical fac-




u l ty o f r ep roduc t ive imag ina t ion ; the schema of sens ib le concepts , such as

of f igures in space, i s a product and, as i t were , a monogram, of a pure a

p r io r i imag ina t ion , th rough which , and in accordance w i th which , images

themse lves f i r s t become pos s ib le . '

In 'Or ig in ' He idegg er is no t on ly r e insc r ib in g the tho ug h t of s ch em a

t i sm tha t had in fo rmed h i s ea r l i e r book on Kan t , he i s s imul taneous lyt r ans fo rmin g i t in accord ance w i th and as a de pa r tu re f rom i t s p rese nce in

N i e t z s c h e : ' N o t " t o k n o w " b u t t o s c h e m a t i z e - t o i m p o s e u p o n c h a o s a s

m uc h regu la r i ty and as m any fo rm s as ou r p rac t i ca l needs r equ i re ' (N i i i ,

70; aphor i sm 515 o f the Will to Power, M a r c h - J u n e 1 8 8 8 ) . A l t h o u g h

He ideg ger i s c r i ti ca l o f N ie tzsch e ' s them at iza t ion o f the t r ansc end en ta l

ima g ina t ion and s ch em at i sm in t e rm s o f the p rob le m of l if e (N i i i , 9 6 -

100), and c r i ti c izes N ie tzsc he bo th for h i s sub jec t iv i sm an d inve r ted

P la ton i sm, wha t i s cen t ra l i s tha t N ie tzsche a l lows Heidegger to s t a te wha t

was impl ic i t in h i s book on Kan t , namely , tha t o r ig ina ry knowing i s boundup wi th p rax i s a s the exerc i s e o f poe t ized r eason (N i i i , 94 -100) . For

He ideg ger , s chem ata t ake over the e labora t ion o f wha t was tho ug h t p re

vious ly in terms of l imi t and hor izon, which are not l imi ts in the negat ive

sense but that f rom which l i fe takes i t s tar t (Ni i i , 86) . Schemata , then ,

a re no t imp res sed on chaos as a s t a m p; r a the r , they a re tho ug h t ou t

in advan ce and the n s en t ou t to m ee t w ha t i s enc ou n te r ed , so tha t

th e la t ter f ir st app ea rs a lway s a l rea dy in th e hor iz on of th e sch em ata ,

and on ly the re . Sch em at iz in g in no way m ean s a s chem at ic o r der in g

i n r e a d y m a d e c o m p a r t m e n t s o f w h a t h a s n o o r d e r , b u t t h e i n v e n t i o n

tha t p laces on accoun t a r ange o f conf igura t ions in to which the rush

and th rong mus t move in o rder thus to p rov ide l iv ing be ings w i th

someth ing cons tan t , and thus to afford them the poss ib i l i ty of thei r

own permanence and s ecur i ty . (N i i i , 92 )

Schemata f i r s t g ive to th ings their look and to men their out look. S t i l l , i fwe were to fo l low th is path then i t would be ar t is ts and not works which

were s chemat iz ing . 'O r ig in ' p roves the co r rec t ive fo r th i s belief.

Heidegger a t t empts to back h i s r ewr i t ing o f s chemat i sm and t r anscen

den ta l im ag ina t ion in t e rm s o f the l igh t ing p ro jec tion o f work s th r ou gh h i s

in ter locking c la ims that a l l ar t i s essent ia l ly poetry , and that language i tse l f

is poetry in the essent ia l sense . By the f i r s t c la im Heidegger only in tends

that a l l works of what Kant ca l ls f ine ar t - archi tecture , pain t ing , scul ture ,

mu s ic and ' poesy ' i ts e lf - have the capac i ty fo r in te r rup t io n and p ro je c

t ion . This project ion is a lways e i ther language- l ike or l inguis t ic ; which is

wh y for bo th He ide gg er and K an t poesy has a pr iv i leged pos i t ion .

I t i s the s econd thes i s wh ich mus t t ake up the burden o f He idegger ' s

accoun t . I t tu rns on two theses :



9 8 T H E G E N I U S O F B E I N G

1 Aga ins t acco un ts tha t focus on l anguage as m ed iu m and ins t ru m en t

o f communica t ion , He idegger in s i s t s tha t i t i s l anguage a lone tha t b r ings

what is , as i t i s , in to the open for the f i r s t t ime: 'Where there is no

language, as in the being of s tone, p lant , and animal , there is a lso no open

ness of wh at is , an d co nse qu ent ly no op enn ess e i th er of tha t wh ich is no t

and o f the empty ' (OWA, 73) . In brief, w i t h o u t l a n g u a g e e v e n n o t h i n g

ness ' i s not ' ; i t i s only in v i r tue of language that the d is t inct ion between

someth ing and no th ing ' comes in to be ing ' , r eg i s te r s and makes a

dif ference. Exa ct ly why we shou ld not cons ide r th is a d i re ct s ta te m ent of

t r ansc end en ta l idea l i sm, and hence a new quas i - fo rm al i sm, He idegg er

does not say .

2 H ow ev er , th is c la im is insuff ic ient to a l ign lang uag e with po etry ,

and hen ce g rea t a r t w i th the s chem at i sm o f the t r ans cen den ta l ima g in a t ion . For tha t He idegger r equ i res the add i t iona l thes i s tha t fundamenta l ly

al l language is , a t i t s base , metaphor ical , that the metaphor ic i ty of

language p recedes i t s l i t e r a l i ty ( as c rea t ion p recedes p roduc t ion ) . Th is

thes i s he ge t s a t ind i r ec t ly r a the r than d i r ec t ly . H is a rgument tu rns on the

acknowledgement tha t any ca tegor ia l f r amework , fo r example , th ings as

r e a d y - t o - h a n d o r as p r e s e n t - t o - h a n d o r as ens creatum, i s jus t the ins t i

tu t ion of an as s t ruc tu re . He idegger th inks o f l anguage work ing in th i s

way as a form of or ig inal naming; naming is used here in order to capture

the ( t r anscenden ta l ) p r imi t ivenes s o f l anguage work ing a t th i s l eve l .

None the les s i t i s the as that i s centra l : 'Such saying is a project ing of the

c lea r ing , in wh ich ann ou nc em en t i s m ad e o f wh a t i t i s tha t be ings com e

i n t o t h e O p e n as' ( O W A , 73 ) . H e i d e g g e r t e r m s th i s o r i g in a l n a m i n g ' p r o

ject ive saying ' (entwerfende Sagen; OWA, 74) . P ro jec t ive s ay ing exp l ica tes

how works can be exempla ry and hence accompl i sh the i r s chemat iz ing

func t ion .

I t i s easy enough to see how works of (great) ar t involve a l inking of

the ca tegor ia l and the metaphor ica l as. S u c h w o r k s w o r k b y p r o d u c i n gmetaphor ica l t r ans fo rmat ions o f t e rms as o rd ina r i ly under s tood ; and i f

the new metaphor ica l s enses o f t e rms re la te to t e rms tha t , in v i r tue o f

tha t t r ans fo rmat ion , become cen t ra l to ou r ca tegor ia l under s tand ing , then

the metaphor ica l work o f l anguage and i t s work o f p ro jec t ion mus t be

recogn ized as the sam e wo rk. W h en la ngu age is f igured in i t s m os t esse n

tial po ssi bil ity it is figured a s po et ry . Po et ry is th e figure of th e figuring

of language in i t s essent ia l sense . Project ive saying in taking up the work

of the t r anscenden ta l imag ina t ion d i sp laces i t in to works ; works , we mus t

now say , of genius .

T h i s con t inua t io n o f the thoug h t o f s che ma t i sm de par t s f rom the

Kan t ian on th ree s ign i f i can t po in t s . F i r s t , in the Critique of Pure Reason

Kant of fers to each schemat ized category a separate proof of i t s object ive

val id i ty . Once categor ies are recognized to be h is tor ical , th is poss ib i l i ty




is occluded. Success ion appears to be the only cons tra in t avai lable for

es tabl ish ing categor ia l object iv i ty . Secondly , i t was only the se t t ing of the

schemat ized ca tegor ies in the con tex t o f the ques t ion o f the neces sa ry

condi t ions for the poss ib i l i ty of exper ience that a l lowed Kant to dr ive a

wedge be tween wha t was cons t i tu ted by those ca tegor ies , and was hence

fu l ly knowab le o r cogn izab le , and wha t exceeded tha t cons t i tu t ion , thusremain ing ou t s ide ' exper ience ' . Once the genera l i ty o r fo rmal i ty o f ca te

gor ia l de te rm ina t io n becom es h i s to r ica l , the n the con s t i tu t ing spon tane i ty

of reaso n becom es axio logical - wh ich is jus t Ni etz sch e 's co nte nt io n th at

a ll reason ing i s eva lua t ing . In o the r wo rds , once a m om en t o f em pi r ic i ty o r

con t ingency i s r equ i red in t r anscenden ta l l eg i s la t ion , then the p r imacy o f

pract ica l over theoret ica l reason fo l lows s t ra ightaway. In th is sense , s ince

a l l idea l i ty i s empi r ica l ly cond i t ioned , r emain ing sub jec t to an uncon

t ro l led o r contro l lable c ont ing enc y (w hich , we shal l see , i s one of the

majo r s ign if icances o f He ide gg er ' s conce p t of ' ea r th ' ) , the n even K an t ' s

p resumpt ive ideas o f r eason mus t be aes the t i c ideas . F ina l ly , wha t con t ro l s

th i s en t i r e dev e lop m ent i s the d i s covery tha t the powe rs o f cogn i t ion and

eva lua t ion a re g rounded in the i r en tw inement as the p roduc t ive power o f

genius : our capaci ty to project beyond a l l that i s g iven factual ly and

concep tua l ly . A l l ca tegor ia l de te rmina t ion announces f r eedom in i t s t r ans -

g res s ive mode . Schemat i sm as c rea t ion , the h i s to r ic iz ing o f ca tegor ia l

l eg i s la t ion , po in t s i r r es i s t ib ly towards wha t g ives to humans an open

space , a wor ld ; and thus towards the ques t ion o f the k inds o f wor lds com

pa t ib le w i th du ly acknowledg ing th i s t r ansg res s ive power . In approach ing

this ques t ion we come face to face wi th the ques t ion of the re la t ion

be tween a r t and po l i t i c s .

v G e n i u s , Co m m u n i t y a n d P rax is

A work o f gen ius is an exem pla ry work which p resen t s aes the t ic ideas . O n

i t s own th i s appear s a p laus ib le thes i s . Why , then , does Kan t s t ipu la te tha t

gen ius is equa l ly the ' inn a te men ta l ap t i tu de th rou gh which nature gives

th e ru le to ar t ' (CJ , §46, 307)? And w hy does he fur ther req uir e gen eral ly

of wo rks of fine ar t that they ha ve the ap pea ran ce of natu re? A nd how do

these concep ts o f na tu re r e la te to Kan t ' s though t tha t ' t he imag ina t ion

(as a product ive facul ty of cogni t ion) is a powerful agent for creat ing , as

i t were , a s econd na tu re ou t o f the mate r ia l supp l ied by ac tua l na tu re '

(CJ , §49, 314)?

Som e o f the p res su re K an t ' s con cep t o f gen ius is un de r he re , p res s u remean t to be a l l ev ia ted th rough re fe rence to na tu re , de r ives f rom i t s e s sen

t ia l doubleness : on the one hand, as or ig ins , works of genius are or ig inals ,

incapab le o f be ing exp l ica ted in t e rms o f any an teceden t ru les . And th i s

means that even their creators are not thei r mas ters ; works of genius are




created , are products of in tent ional ac t iv i ty , but they are a lways more than

produc t s , more than wha t the i r p roducer s in ten t iona l ly pu t in to them.

Kan t t e rms ' na tu re ' the su rp lus in c rea to r and p roduc t tha t i s incapab le

o f exp lana t ion th rou gh re fe rence to an te ced en ts . On the o the r hand , the

exemplary work se ts the ru le and the measure , not wi l fu l ly or arb i t rar i ly

o r th ro ug h a de fac to pos i t ing , bu t , someh ow, w i th r igh t and p ropr ie ty ,truth fully ; as if, we m ig ht say, i ts law wer e nat ur al law . An d it is in this

s ense tha t works o f imag ina t ion ' r emode l exper ience ' (CJ , §49 , 314) to

p ro duc e , a s i t were , a s econd na tu re , a cu l tu re w h ich i s no t a rb i t r a ry

bu t f a te fu l , ne i the r r educ t ive ly conven t iona l no r con t ingen t no r na tu ra l ly

neces sa ry . As an tecenden t to p roducer and p roduc t , na tu re i s a p r inc ip le

of opaci ty , of reserve and absence which prohibi ts f ine ar t 'o f i t s own sel f

[ to] excogitate (ausdenken: th ink out) the ru le according to which i t i s to

ef fectuate i t s product ' (CJ , §46, 307) ; as the appearance worn by the work

of a r t , na tu re i s a p r inc ip le o f ( t r anscenden ta l ) l eg i t ima t ion : i t i s unna tu ra l

na tura l law. N at ur e in th is la t ter sense legi t ima tes not external ly , as a

source , bu t imm ane n t ly ; i t i s aga in jus t K an t ' s r e i t e ra ted thou gh t tha t

f reedom is lawful not lawless . Hence for the work to appear as a product

of nature is for i t to appear as lawful, even if i ts conditioning rule is

unavai lable . But i t i s not th is appearance i tse l f that leg i t imates the work ,

shows i t to be exempla ry ; on ly succes s ion demons t ra tes and so l eg i t ima tes

exempla r i ty . Succes s ion g ives to the exempla ry i t em i t s exempla r i ty ; ye t

the work mu s t p rovok e th i s r espon se , con ta in i t a s i ts m os t fundam enta l

poss ib i l i ty . T h is c i rcular mo ve m en t f rom work to success ion and back is

the movement in to f in i tude and away f rom a p r io r i t r anscenden ta l l eg i s

la t ion . I t wi l l come to be des ignated as the 'hermeneut ic c i rc le ' , the c i rcu

lar m ove m ent in wh ich and th ro ug h which we com e to s e l f -u nder s tan d ing .

The un i ty o f Kan t ' s two senses o f na tu re , a s opaque r ese rve and as l aw

ful, as a pr incip le of t ranscendenta l opaci ty - which wil l la ter (a l ready by

the t ime of Schel l ing) become the unconscious - and as that which is our

gr ou nd re la t ion to ourselves and the wor ld , reveal a co nce pt io n of na tur e ,

and of genius , as nei ther natura l nor cul tura l in the usual senses of theset e r m s . Genius b reaks the cu l tu re /na tu re dua l i ty by r eg i s te r ing na tu re ' s

dou b le an te r io r i ty ; an an te r io r i ty , howe ver , wh ich is ne i the r p rodu ced nor

given. Indeed, i t i s by the double inscr ip t ion of nature that the act ive/

pas s ive d i s t inc t ion , a lways und er th rea t in the tho ug h t o f the p rod uc t ive

(ac t ive ) imag ina t ion (pas s ive ) , unsea t s the r ig id d i s t inc t ion be tween wha t

i s p roduced and wha t i s g iven /d i s covered . Crea t ion and c rea tednes s ,

pe rhaps , su rp r i s ing ly , cond i t ion p roduc t ion ( imi ta t ion ) , bu t in so do ing

subver t the log ica l a s sumpt ions abou t mak ing and do ing tha t under l i e ou r

p rodu c t ion i s t com preh ens io n o f the w i ll and sub jec t iv i ty . A nd gen ius is

the conceal ing and reveal ing of nature jus t as Heidegger has being as

wi thdrawing in the ve ry ac t o f p resenc ing , a s p resenc ing and p resence ,

as or ig inal and ru le ; great ar t measures and is unmeasured . I t i s precise ly




because works of genius are not the products of a sovereign subject iv i ty ,

and because the i r exces s beyo nd sub jec t iv i ty en ta il s a t r ansce nden ta l opac i ty

t h a t is thei r d is tance f rom subject iv i ty , that they can be brought in to

direct af f i l ia t ion with Heidegger ' s thought of being as revealed in great ar t .

The equa t ion be tween gen ius (na tu re ) and be ing can be s t r eng thened i f

we reca l l tha t for K an t aes the t i c cu l tu re i s pa rad igm at ic o f cu l tu re gen er a l l y . 1 7 Fur the r , a s we have a l r eady s een , Kan t ' s a t t empt to b r ing r e f lec t ive

judgement under the domin ion o f the Ca tegor ica l Impera t ive , to d i r ec t ly

harmonize aes the t i c and mora l cu l tu re by mak ing the l a t t e r r egu la t ive fo r

the fo rmer , f ai ls . K an t a t t e m pts a d i r ec t ly ana logous subsu m pt io n in §50 ,

where he argues for the cons tra in ing of genius by tas te , in tac i t recogni t ion

of th e radical ins tabi l i ty th at the co nce pt of geniu s in t r od uce s in to the idea

of a ' con t inua l ly p rogres s ive [= mora l = under the gu idance o f the Ca teg

o r ica l Imp era t iv e ] cu l tu re ' (CJ , §50 , 319) . As Pau l Gu ye r has fo rce fu l ly

a rgu ed , Ka n t ' s a t t em pt to t r ans fo rm tas te f rom a ' neces sa ry con d i t io n ' o f

gen ius in to the ' corre ct iv e ' an d 'd is c ip l ine ' of geniu s wh ich ' severely c l ips

i ts wings ' (CJ , §50, 319) in order to 'defuse the incendiary impl icat ions of

h i s t h e o r y o f a e s t h e t i c a u t o n o m y ' ,1 8

i s n o t c o u n t e n a n c e d b y a n y a r g u m e n t

K an t o ffer s. K an t ' s f a i lu re to g ro un d th e judg em ent o f t a s te in e i the r cog

ni t ion or moral i ty merely under l ines h is fa i lure here .

H o w e v e r , G u y e r ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e d e b a te h e r e i s b e t w e e n social

in teg r i ty and individual aes the t i c au tonomy concedes too much to the idea

of a progress ive cul ture and hence overs impl i f ies the d ia lect ic of Kant ' stheory . F i r s t , a s Guyer h imse l f no tes ,

1 9

in teres t and p leasure in actual

communica t ion , upon which the in teg r i ty o f the soc ie ty i s based , can i t s e l f

be over tu rned by an in te res t in au tonomy, l ead ing soc ie ty ' to encourage

the product ion of works of ar t which are themselves des igned to break the

bo nd s o f t r ad i t ion wh ich g rou nd ac tua l if no t idea l ag r eem en t ' . Seco nd ly ,

the cha racter iza t ion of work s of gen ius as req uir i ng success ion and as

c la iming an aud ience o f gen ius , a s mak ing c la ims th rough the i r c r i t i ca l

p rovoca t ion o f common sense , shows tha t the c la ims o f gen ius a re soc ia l

c la ims . But , f inal ly , that th is i s so should come as no surpr ise s ince thelawfulness w i th ou t law enjoyed in ju dg em en ts of tas te f igures , as we saw,

an ideal of socia l au ton om y and sol id ar i ty . In an t ic ipat io n , we can pu t th e

po in t th i s way : works o f gen ius exhaus t themse lves in communi ty c rea t ion

(as we have a l ready seen the way in which , according to Kant , aes thet ic

j u d g e m e n t s e x h a u s t t h e m s e l v e s i n c o m m u n i c a b i l i t y ) ; b u t s u c h c r e a t i o n

(and i t s r ecep t ion ) works th rough ind iv idua l s . Because the ac t iv i ty o f

genius is indiv idual ized and yet exhaus ts i t se l f in community , i t reveals

a d ia lec t i c be tween ind iv idua l and communi ty w i thou t l imi t o r end ex

c e p t t h e p e r p e t u a t i o n o f i t s m u t u a l l y c o n d i t i o n i n g a n d i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e

m o m e n t s .

In i t s or ig inal invocat ion the c la im of so l idar i ty might have appeared

som ew hat my s te r ious ; i t shou ld n ow beg in to t ake on a com preh ens ib le




phys iognomy. Lawfu lnes s w i thou t l aw p rov ides , more concre te ly than

the concep t o f judgement , a way o f charac te r iz ing works o f gen ius as the

es tab l i sh ing o f inde te rmina te s chemata . Lawfu lnes s now re fe r s to the

' appearance o f na tu re ' thes i s , wh i le w i thou t l aw re fe r s to t r anscenden ta l

opac i ty , the w i thdrawal o f the o r ig in . Exempla ry i t ems a re exempla ry fo r

u s ; th i s depends upon our r ecogn iz ing them as such , and r ecogn i t ion o f

th is recogn i t ion is pro vid ed b y our abi l i ty to go on in the ap pro pr i a te w ay.

Our f i r s t r ecogn i t ion i s p rob lemat ic s ince no th ing can u l t ima te ly g round

i t , a l though i t wou ld no t be pos s ib le un les s we shared much . Th is

g round- leve l sha r ing i s the sensus communis as a lways a l r eady p resu ppo sed .

A sharp vers ion of i t i s sugges ted in a passage of S tanley Cavel l ' s :

We lea rn and teach words in ce r ta in con tex t s , and then we a re

expec ted , and expec t o the r s , to be ab le to p ro jec t them in to fu r the rcon tex t s . No th ing insu res tha t th i s p ro jec t ion w i l l t ake p lace ( in pa r

t icular , not the grasping of universals nor the grasping of books of

ru l e s ) , ju s t a s no th ing insu res tha t we wi l l make , and under s tand the

same p ro jec t ions . T h a t on the w ho le we do is a m at te r o f ou r sha r ing

rou tes o f in te res t and f ee l ing , modes o f r esponse , s enses o f humour

and of s ignif icance and fu lf i lment , of what is outrageous , of what is

s imilar to what e lse , what a rebuke, what forgiveness , of when an

u t te ran ce i s an as se r t ion , when an appe a l , wh en an exp lana t ion -

a ll the whi r l o f o rgan i sm W i t tgen s te in ca l ls 'f o rm s o f l i fe ' . H um an

speech and ac t iv i ty , s an i ty and communi ty , r e s t upon no th ing more ,

but nothing less , than this . I t is a vis ion as s imple as i t is diff icult ,

and as diff icult as i t is (and because i t is) terr ifying. 2 0

This is to say the reservoir / reserve of nature as a pr incip le of opaci ty mus t

be a t l eas t pa r t i a l ly bound up w i th the inexpon ib le sensus communis t h a t

a l lows an exempla ry i t em to be r ecogn ized as such . No th ing i s more

human than to deny the ways in wh ich th i s sha r ing , th i s accordance ,cond i t ions and makes pos s ib le even those norms o f cogn i t ion and ac t ion

tha t t r aver se i t . Th i s was the c la im o f the p rev ious chap te r concern ing the

norms o f under s tand ing and r eason . Na tu re as p r inc ip le o f r ese rve tha t i s

equal ly a pr incip le of lawfulness incapable of fu l l d iscurs ive e laborat ion

and a r t i cu la t ion , i s ju s t a p re -c r i t i ca l na tu re , a na tu re an teced en t t o the

lawl ike na tu re p ro jec ted by the under s tand ing o r the l ega l soc ie ty p ro

duced by r eason .

B ut thes e cond i t ion s can no t provi de the fu ll s tory s ince th is is an im age

of g iven communi ty , o f a pas s ive sensus communis, o f l i k e - m i n d e d n e s s

wi thou t h i s to ry , o f l ike -mindednes s tha t i s g iven r a the r than c rea ted .

Above a l l , such an image p ic tu res h i s to ry in i r r evocab ly con t inu i s t t e rms ,

and human beings as wi thout a sense of , or the capaci ty for , self-

t r anscendence , o f becoming o the r to themse lves . Un les s the pas s ive sensus




communis were open to de fo rm at ion and r e fo rm at ion i t wou ld r ep resen t a

p r inc ip le o f na tu re in oppos i t ion to cu l tu re , the reby con t rad ic t ing the

med ian ro le tha t the sensus communis is designed to f i l l . We need, then, to

recal l that exemplary works in ter rupt present h is tory in order to le t h is

to ry beg in anew. Th is r a i s es two ques t ions : Why shou ld au tonomous

works opera te on the bas i s o f in te r rup t ion? And how does tha t in te r rupt ion ca r ry th ro ug h to an a l t e rna t ive s ense o f com mu ni ty? H ow i s co m

m u n i t y b o t h g r o u n d a n d g r o u n d e d , g i ve n a n d p r o d u c e d ?

Le t us s ay the works o f gen ius en join com m un i ty bec ause no th in g bu t

communi ty , in the s ense o f a sensus communis, i s a t i s sue in the recogni t ion

of the m . Th is is ju s t wh a t Ka n t s ays: 'F i ne a r t . . . i s a way o f r ep rese n t ing

tha t i s pu rpos iv e on it s ow n and tha t fu r the r s , even tho ug h wi th ou t a p u r

p o s e , the cu l tu re o f ou r men ta l powers to [ f ac i l i t a te ] soc ia l communica

t ion ' (CJ , §44 , 306) . The i r be ing w i thou t an end i s wha t s epara tes works

of f ine art from agreeable art ; but works of f ine art only ' reveal ' that they

are no t fo r the s ake o f mere p leasu re , s ensory de l igh t , th rough tu rn ing

away f rom the s ensory in te res t s o f the i r aud ience and exhaus t ing them

se lves in the o r ig ina ry es tab l i shm en t o f co m m un i ty . He ide gger d en om i

na tes th i s com m uni t y - fo rm ing e ffor t o f s chem at iz ing ' acc ord anc e ' . And

w h i l e o n e m i g h t h a v e t h o u g h t a c c o r d a n c e , a g r e e m e n t i n j u d g e m e n t ,

l ike-mindedness , was s imply a g iven of socia l l i fe , Heidegger g ives i t the

same cr i t ica l sense i t has in Kant :

Accordance is the h ighes t s t ruggle for the essent ia l goals that h is tor i

ca l humani ty s e t s up over itself. Thus , in the p resen t h i s to r ica l s i tu

a t ion , accordance can on ly mean hav ing the courage fo r the s ing le

qu es t io n as to w he the r th e We st s t il l dare s to create a goal abov e

i tse l f and i ts h is tory , or whether i t prefers to s ink to the level of

p r e s e r v a ti o n a n d e n h a n c e m e n t o f t r a d e i n te r e s ts a n d e n t e r t a i n m e n t s ,

to be sa t is f ied wi th appeal ing to the s ta tus quo as i f th is were ab

solu te . (Ni i i , 91) .

Ac cor dan ce, wh ich is jus t the poss ib i l i ty of iden t i ty and d if ference, i s the

e ffor t o f e s tab l i sh ing co m m un i ty aga ins t wh a t co m m un i ty has bec om e.

T h e l awfu lnes s o f works o f gen ius is a s eco nd-o rder t r ans fo rm at ive

re i t e ra t ion , in t e rm s governed by some aes the t i c idea , o f the p re sup po sed

common sense that a l lows them to be recognized in the f i r s t ins tance.

He ideg ger s t a tes ju s t th i s tho ug h t w hen he s ays: 'P rese rv ing the work does

no t r educe peop le to the i r p r iva te exper iences , bu t b r ings them in to

a f f i l i a t ion w i th the t ru th happen ing in the work . Thus i t g rounds be ing fo r

and wi th one ano ther a s the h i s to r ica l s t and ing-ou t o f human ex i s tence in

re fe rence to unc onc ea le dne s s ' (O W A , 68) . O f cour se , wha t p res e rv in g

means in concrete terms is for Heidegger h is tor ical ly var iable , and a lways

exc lus ive ly ' coc rea ted and p resc r ibed on ly and exc lus ive ly by the work '



1 0 4 T H E G E N I U S O F B E I N G

( O W A , 6 8 ). F u r t h e r , w h e r e H e i d e g g e r p la c e s ' u n c o n c e a l e d n e s s ' K a n t

would specify some aes thet ic idea . And that d i f ference wil l , again , mark a

dif ference in the p lace that human act ion and f reedom have in thei r

d i f ferent accounts .

I t i s because works are not based on formal laws and cannot authent i

ca te themse lves in t e rms o the r than those they p rov ide fo r themse lves ,tha t they en jo in communi ty . Recogn i t ion o f the c la ims o f the work i s

hence cogn i tive in a m an ne r incomp at ib le w i th s tand ard Ka n t ia n n o t ions

of un de r s ta nd ing and f r ee ac t ion . He ideg ger , mak ing clea r r e fe rence to

Aris to t le ' s not ions of phronesis an d praxis, speaks of the kno wing and

wil l ing involved in responding to great works in these terms:

P rese rv ing the work means : s t and ing w i th in the opennes s o f be ings

tha t happens in the work . Th is ' s t and ing-wi th in ' o f p rese rva t ion ,

however , i s a knowing . Ye t knowing does no t cons i s t in mere in fo r

mat ion and no t ions abou t someth ing . He who t ru ly knows wha t i s ,

knows what he wi l ls to do in the mids t of what is .

The w i l l ing he re r e fe r red to . . . ne i the r mere ly app l ies knowledge

b e f o r e h a n d n o r d e c i d e s b e f o r e h a n d . . . K n o w i n g t h a t r e m a i n s a

wi l l ing , and w i l ling tha t r ema ins a kno win g , is the hu m an be ing ' s

e n t r a n c e i n t o a n d c o m p l i a n c e w i t h t h e u n c o n c e a l e d n e s s o f B e i n g . . .

Wil l ing is the sober resolu t ion of that exis tent ia l se l f - t ranscendence

which exposes i t se l f to the openness of being as i t i s se t in to thework . In th i s way , s t and ing-wi th in i s b rough t under l aw . (OWA, 67)

The knowing and wi l l ing ru led ou t in the s econd parag raph a re techne and

poiesis r espec t ive ly . Hence these pa rag raphs a re t ak ing up Ar i s to t l e ' s

t h o u g h t t h a t t h e m e a n s - e n d s t r u c t u r e g o v e r n i n g p r o d u c t i v e a c t i v i t y

generates an inf in i te regress . For Ar is to t le th is regress ends wi th what is

done for i t s own sake; such doing is praxis, and the knowing as soc ia ted

with it is phronesis. H e i d e g g e r , p e r h a p s n o t i n g t h a t t h e s t r u c t u r e o f

Aris to t le ' s defence of the pr ior i ty of praxis over poiesis r e p e a t s t h e m e a n s -end s t ructure of product iv is t logic , specif ies the a l ternat ive forms of know

ing and wil l ing a t i s sue here not as what ends a regress , as the c losure

of a ser ies , but as what opens or ig inar i ly , hence as opening in general .

He ideg ger ' s t r ans fo rm at ion o f Ar i s to t l e thu s su r rep t i t ious ly dep en ds upo n

the Kan t ian cons t rua l o f man as an end in h imse l f who creates ends f rom

out o f h i s f r eedom; f r eedom , w hich i s no t a de te rm ina te e nd and which

appear s on ly in c rea ted works , i s the cond i t ion o f a l l ends . Read ing Kan t

now th rough Heidegger , th i s in fo rms us tha t Kan t ' s aes the t i c concep ts

a re ' aes the t i ca l ' t r ans fo rmat ions o f Ar i s to t l e ' s p rac t i ca l concep ts under

t h e d o m i n i o n o f t h e n e w t h o u g h t o f a u t o n o m y : praxis b e c o m e s g e n i u s ,

phronesis becomes ref lect ive judgement , and the ro le of doxa is taken up in

K a n t ' s e m p l o y m e n t o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d c o m m u n i c a b i li t y .




Law i s the ru le won by the exempla ry work . To respond to the work , to

respond to i t s provocat ion , i s to judge in a manner that a l lows the work

to judge what was knowing and wil l ing . The exis tent ia l d is locat ions of

aes the t ic ref lect ive j ud ge m en t , th e ser ies of neg at ion s def in ing i t (not

in te res ted , no t knowledge , e tc . ) mark works ' capac i ty fo r in te r rup t ion ,

i n t e r r u p t i o n s w h i c h a r e w o r k s ' j u d g e m e n t o n p r e v i o u s m o d e s o f u n d e r s tanding. And because the response to the exemplary work is f ree f rom

cons t r a in t , one ' s f r eedom on ly appear s in r e la t ion to i t . F reedom i s

g ro un ded in the r esponse to the work ; au ton om y is pos s ib le on ly th ro ug h

the inde te rmina te a l t e r i ty the work r ep resen t s . F ina l ly , because in te r rup

t ion is a jud ge m en t on the jud ge r , it again app ears correc t to po in t to a

deeper conf luence o f beau ty and sub l imi ty , however th i s i s to be under

s tood wi th r espec t to a r t works , than Kan t typ ica l ly a l lows . Th is l inkage

be tween sub l imi ty , a l t e r i ty and au tonomy wi l l be one o f the c ruces fo r ou r

u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f D e r r i d a .

T h e mo s t d i r ec t ma nn er fo r unde r s ta nd ing ho w a new ru le i s wo n is

th r ou gh the idea o f p ro jec t ive s ay ing and meta pho r ica l d i sp lace me n t

ske tched a t the end o f the l a s t s ec t ion . A t tend ing to such a d i sp lacemen t , a

d i sp lacemen t tha t appear s neu t ra l be tween Heidegger ' s accoun t o f p ro jec

t ive s ay ing and K an t ' s conc ep t ion o f the expres s ion o f aes the t i c ideas ,

would be to a l low cer ta in s ignif icances to or ient one ' s percept ions and

consequent ly one 's ac t iv i t ies , ac t iv i t ies which would then be sa id to ' f low '

f rom those pe rcep t ions . On th i s Ar i s to te l i an accoun t , the de l ive rances o fsens i tiv i ty wh ich p ick ou t the r eq u i r em en ts o f a s i tua t ion cons t i tu te an d

exhaus t an agent ' s reasons for ac t ing as she does . 2 1 This , su re ly , i s the

un i ty of kno win g and w il l ing of wh ich H eid egg er is spea king. I t i s equ al ly ,

how ever , the accou n t tha t i s imp l ied by bo th Ka n t ' s conc ep t ion o f the

sensus communis and h i s acc oun t o f the work o f gen iu s . T h e acc oun t ' s

diff icult ies l ie in the blunt fact that i t refers either to how things perhaps

were once upon a t ime , o r how they a re now in the domain o f the aes

thetic; or , f inally, to how the aesthetic f igures a memory of a past unity of

r e a s o n .

The doub lenes s o f gen ius s eques te r s w i th in i t s e l f the doub lenes s o f

lawfu lnes s w i thou t l aw , a g round les s , abysmal , o r ig ina ry governance ,

whose r ea l i za t ion in communi ty can be on ly a ha rb inger o f i t s demise .

Aes th e t i c cu l tu re hence bec om es a cha l l enge to p rogres s ive cu l tu re , w here

the d i s c ip l in ing ( t a s te ' c l ipp in g the w ings ' o f gen ius ) and p rogres s ive

(as def ined by the dem an ds of ca tegor ical mo ral i ty) features of th e la t ter

a re undermined by the de fo rming and r e fo rming d ia lec t i c o f the

d i scon t inuous h i s to ry in the fo rmer . When seen from the perspective of fine

art th e analytic critique of the separation of dom ains provided in the previous

chapter becom es the social critique of aesthetic cu lture against the re gnan t

claims of progressive culture, the culture constituted by the dom inating subjec

tivity of the understanding and reason. Aes the t i c cu l tu re , because mere ly



1


aes the t i c , i s power les s to d i sp lace p rogres s ive cu l tu re . Fur the r , i t i s pe r

haps th is power lessness that expla ins why the search for or ig inal i ty

becomes de f in i t ive fo r aes the t i c cu l tu re , the cu l tu re o f a r t i s t i c modern i sm.

Cer ta in ly th e incend ia ry d ia lec ti c of aes the t i c cu l tu re appe ar s d i s tu rb ing ly

frenet ic , res t less , as i f th e auto no m y i t secu red were i l lusory .As a mode l o f cu l tu ra l t r ans fo rmat ion genera l ly , Kan t ' s idea o f an

aes the t i c cu l tu re an t i c ipa tes and comments upon the He idegger ian epocha l

theory o f h i s to ry . Where He idegger has the d i sp lacemen t o f p resenc ing

by p resence , a r e fo rme d Ka n t ia n h i s to ry wou ld see the d i sp lacem en t

of or ig inary lawfulness (wi thout law) by pos i t ive or natura l law. Hei

degger ian th ink ing becomes Kan t ian r e f lec t ive judgement ; and where

Heidegger has unconcea lmen t , Kan t ian theory wou ld have l awfu lnes s

wi thou t l aw . In r e fus ing t r anscenden ta l g round ing bo th theor ies f ace the

ques t ion o f the force of the c la im made by what lacks force , by what is

g rou nd les s o r w i t hou t ru le ; and in bo th theor ies a t e rm o f absence -

na tu re , being - gat her s in to i t se lf an auth or i ty i t sou ght to d ispossess i t se l f

of . This is not to c la im that such terms are surrogate foundat ions , icons of

a mis s ing p resence ; a l though I am sugges t ing tha t the i r c la iming canno t be

ut ter ly d isentangled f rom that whose force they seek to d isp lace and

inher i t . Ra ther , the sugges t ion i s tha t the re i s someth ing deep ly en igmat ic

in the very idea that a work can be e x e m p l a r y , bring i n t o u n c o n c e a l m e n t ,

take up the burden o f human s ign i f i cance ; and tha t we unavo idab lyacknowledge th is enigma in acknowledging the r isk of fa i lure , the poss i

b i l i ty that noth ing wil l take up the burden, c la im us for i t and for our

se lves . And th is i s to say that there remains here , or perhaps emerges for

the f i r s t t ime here , an en igma abou t t ru th and a r t ; an en igma tha t ' gen ius ' ,

' na tu re ' , and ' be ing ' a re r ecogn i t ions o f and r esponses to .

The gen ius o f be ing and the be ing o f gen ius r a i s e the ques t ion o f ' t ru th '

tha t they a re , des igned ly , unab le to answer . Bo th gen ius and be ing r e fe r to

a h i s to ry (o r to h i s to r ies ) tha t they a re a t t empt ing to undo ; o r be t t e r , we

f ind ou rselves wi th ter m s whic h d isplace a prev iou s h is tory , are a pr ov o

ca t ion to ou r common sense , bu t a s ye t a re w i thou t aud ience o r succes so r s .

How are we to comprehend th i s f a i lu re? Does the philosophical effort to

point out these poss ib i l i t ies necessar i ly capi tu la te to the thought i t i s

th inking agains t? Is phi losophy i r revocably legis la t ive? Or might not th is

fa i lure be connected to a pervas ive s i lence about the poss ib i l i ty of fa i lure

itself (failure as the reverse s ide of freedom)? But how is failure here to

be unders tood? Is fa i lure something that happens to us ; or i s i t , ra ther , a

fa i lure of knowing and wil l ing? How are fa i lure , fa te and respons ib i l i ty

c o n n e c t e d ?

T h e K an t ia n p ara dig m of aes th et ic h is tory g ives us a t leas t a c lue as

to why Heid egg er s t ages h is p resen ta t ion o f epocha l h i s to ry th rou gh a

cons iderat ion of the work of ar t . That c lue l ies predominant ly in the form

of d i s co n t inu ous h i s to ry r ehear sed by the p ro duc t ion o f gen ius : exem pla ry




works a re immanen t abso lu tes ; in them t r anscenden ta l and empi r ica l

levels are no longer opposed to one another , nor are form and mat ter .

Exempla ry works in te r rup t p rev ious a r t h i s to ry in o rder tha t i t may beg in

anew. They a re log ica l ly and exp lana to r i ly w i thou t an teceden ts : such

w o r k s a r e u n m e a s u r e d b y p a s t a r t b u t m e a s u r e f ut u re p r o d u c t i o n s . T h a t

measur ing is the work of success ion; success ion , l ike preservat ion , i s thel i tmu s te s t of the o rig ina ry governan ce of exem pla ry works . T h e m oto r

for th is ac t iv i ty is the des i re for autonomy without external cons tra in t .

What makes pas t works cons t r a in ing i s the i r l apse in to the demands and

cla ims of abs t ract reason. While success ion is the tes t of exemplar i ty , i t s

r ea l i zat ion is com m un i ty . In mod ern i ty , th i s co m m un i ty is 'me re ly ' ae s

the t ic , a lm os t a f ic tional co m m un ity , a co m m un ity iso la ted from a nd in

oppos i t ion to the c la ims o f p rogres s ive cu l tu re , the cu l tu re o f En l igh tened

ra t iona l i ty unde r pos it ive l aw an d theore t i ca l un der s tan d in g .

Heidegger wi l l ident i fy th is progress ive cul ture wi th the epoch of tech

nology; h is account of great ar t p lays of f the death of that ar t agains t a cul

tu r e wh ere a r t has beco m e mere ly ' aes the t i c ' ; bu t i t i s the log ic o f aes the t i c

a r t tha t a l lows the phys iognomy o f g rea t a r t to appear . Where e l s e than

from the h is tor ical conscio usne ss of m od ern i ty , i ts sense of cr is is an d i ts

eschewal o f t r ad i t ion , cou ld He id egg er even beg in to co l lec t the tho ug h t o f

his tory as formed through what in ter rupts i t? And i f th is sense of h is tory

as fo rmed th ro ugh wh a t r evo lu t ion izes i t t akes i t s cue from De sca r tes ' s

new beg inn ing , the new sc ience , the F rench Revo lu t ion , e tc . , th i s though t

reac hes formal pre sen ta t io n in th e idea of ar t works as pr od uc ts of gen ius ,

as He ideg ger ack now ledges , and m ate r ia l r ea li za t ion in s e l f- consc ious ly

m o d e r n , a u t o n o m o u s a r t .2 2

'O r ig in ' is an essay ab ou t h is tory and cre a

t iv ity ; and the h i s to ry of the ' new ' tha t in fo rms the mod ern un de r s t an d

ing of h is tor ical exis tence forms the general background agains t which

He ideg ger th ink s , wh i le r ad ica l aes the t i c cu l tu re is the unac kno wle dge d

source of h is cons iderat ions . Heidegger swerves away f rom i ts c la ims

bec ause a es thet ic ar t is ar t that radical ly conn ects h is tor ical i ty in the sense

he wants wi th f reedom in a sense he wishes to deny. As we shal l see , th isleaves h i s accoun t o f the in te rp lay be tween aes the t i c and p rogres s ive cu l

t u r e , modern a r t and t echno logy , u t t e r ly inde te rmina te and wi thou t fo rce .

The c lue , then , l ies in the nature of works of genius and in the space

separa t ing p rogres s ive , En l igh tenment cu l tu re f rom aes the t i c cu l tu re . Aes

the t i c cu l tu re can , th rou gh the ' d i s c ip l in e ' of t a s te , be fo rced to com ply

wi th the demands o f p rogres s ive cu l tu re , and the re i s no deny ing the

poss ib i l i ty tha t th i s d i s c ip l ine may domina te w i thou t r emainder (Adorno

will argue that this , in fact , is the necessary f a te o f a r t i s t i c modern i sm) ; bu t

aes the t i c cu l tu re does con ta in an incend ia ry d ia lec t i c wh ich ca l l s tha t p ro

gress ive cul ture in to ques t ion . I t i s the ar t of genius , great ar t wi thout

greatness , that , lodged a t the per iphery of progress ive cul ture , seeks to

un do i t s dem and s . L e t us cons id e r p rogres s ive cu l tu re as equ iv a len t to



1 0 8 T H E G E N I U S O F B E IN G

modern cogni t ive , moral and legal cul ture , as our ear l ier cons iderat ion of

Kan t en ta i l s . Now, how a re we to charac te r ize p rogres s ive cu l tu re such

that the dual i ty between aes thet ic and progress ive can appear? Why is ar t

exc luded f rom progres s ive cu l tu re? How, in ou r concre te engagement w i th

works of ar t , does the incendiary c la im of ar t make i tse l f manifes t? Does

Heidegger ' s theory con ta in su f f i c ien t mate r ia l s to underwr i te i t s own

a t ten t ion to a r t and the r e la t ion o f a r t to the dominan t , p rogres s ive cu l

ture? Above a l l , wi th what r ight or in accordance with what reasons are we

t o p r e fe r t h e H e i d e g g e r i a n t h o u g h t of u n c o n c e a l m e n t t o t h e K a n t i a n

accou n t o f au ton om y? T h i s que s t ion is no longer an easy one s ince wha t

shou ld have ru led ou t Kan t ' s accoun t , namely h i s concep t ion o f gen ius as

subject iv i ty , in fact i s not one which makes the subject sovereign . Indeed,

for Kant too the subject i s something of a passageway; and in formal terms

his account d i f fers not a t a l l f rom Heidegger ' s . What , however , doesdis t in guis h the two acc ou nts is thei r or ienta t ion : for K a n t gen ius f igures

our vocat ion for f reedom, and the cr i t ica l d ia logue between aes thet ic and

progress iv e cu l tur e f igures th e poss ib i l i ty of au ton om y in mo de rni t y ;

He idegger , by cover ing h i s t r acks , de taches exempla r i ty f rom f reedom - a

move which bo th tu rns h i s to ry in to f a te and p resages a d i s t inc t ly an t i -

m o d e r n t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f c u l t u r e .

Now th is c la im could begin to weigh i f , fo l lowing on f rom the decipher ing

of the f igure of the modern work of ar t in great ar t , we could equal ly come

to s ee a 'Kan t ian ' modern work o f a r t , a work o f g rea t a r t w i thou t g rea t

n ess , as being centra l to the ' c la im' of 'Or ig in ' ; and fur ther , i f th is

c la iming , because rea l ly abou t 'K an t ia n ' m od ern a r t , a work o f gen ius ,

cou ld then be shown to exceed the f r amework in wh ich He idegger

a t t empts to cap tu re i t . Such a work i s p ivo ta l in He idegger ' s a rgument in

'Or ig in ' ; i t i s h is analys is , and the ro le that analys is has , of Van Gogh 's

pa in t ing o f the peasan t woman ' s shoes . These shoes w i l l wa lk th rough th i s

tex t , r eappear in g in the d i s cus s ions o f De r r id a and A dor no in an ana l

ogous pos i t ion , namely , a s a touchs tone fo r the appropr ia te comprehens ion of aes thet ic cul ture in i t s s t ruggle wi th the demands of progress ive

cu l tu re . Der r ida w i l l po in t u s to the way in wh ich Van Gogh ' s pa in t ing

exceeds the p lace He idegger g ives i t ; wh i le Adorno ' s though t w i l l p rov ide

the t e rms in wh ich we can accoun t fo r the pa in t ing ' s c la iming . F i r s t , how

ever , we need to examine the pain t ing in i t s or ig inal se t t ing .

v i Art and Te ch no logy

'O r ig in ' conc ludes w i th a ques t ion : Are we now in our ex i s tence h i s to r i

cally at the origin of art? Does art now reveal how things as a whole are?

Or is ar t a th ing of the pas t , something whose value we possess only

t h r o u g h r e m e m b r a n c e ? H e i d e g g e r d e fe r s h e r e t o H o l d e r l i n ( O W A , 7 8 ) :




R e l u c t a n t l y

that which dwel ls near i t s or ig in depar ts .

' T h e J o u r n e y ' , v e rs es 1 8 - 1 9

At the beg inn ing o f the mo de rn pe r iod g rea t a r t began to dec l ine bec ause

i t could n o longe r fu lfil i t s essent ia l funct ion of des ig nat in g the a bso lute ,o f beg inn ing h i s to ry o r s t a r t ing i t aga in . Th is i s no t a comment abou t the

qua l i ty o f the a r t works p roduced a t th i s t ime , bu t a r eco rd ing o f the i r

h i s to r ica l p lace . Tha t dec l ine became the ' end o f a r t ' a t the beg inn ing o f

the n ine teen th cen tu ry , a t the ve ry moment when aes the t i c s ach ieved

' i t s greates t poss ib le height , breadth and r igour of form' (N, 84) in the

Aesthetics of Hege l .

From a Heidegger ian perspect ive aes thet ic axio logy is in a s ta te of

diso rde r because we do not and ca nn ot exis t a t th e or ig in of ar t - w he re

ar t i s an or ig in ; nonetheless , and however d imly , our response to ar t i s

morethan-aes the t i ca l , ou r s ense o f the s ign i f i cance o f a r t t r anscends the

aes the t i c ca tegor ies w i th which we tend to th ink abou t and dea l w i th a r t

works . We a re spec ta to r s o f a r t works who , somet imes , s eek to be o r

behave as i f we were preservers , not knowing, of course , that th is i s what

we a re do ing . Th is dua l r esponse marks , we migh t now say , ou r dua l

m e m b e r s h i p : i n p r o g r e s s i v e c u l t u r e a n d i n a e s t h e t i c c u l t u r e . U n l i k e K a n t ,

h o w e v e r , w h o re f us e d t h e a c t o f m o u r n i n g a n d r e m e m b r a n c e , H e i d e g g e r ' s

' end of (great) ar t ' thes is a l lows for and makes the work of remembrance in teg ra l to ou r engagement w i th works o f a r t . In the r ecupera t ion

of the es sence o f a r t we become, th rough remembrance , p rese rver s o f a r t

once r emoved - p rese rver s o f a pos s ib i l i ty .

Yet th is thes is cannot be qui te adequate as i t s tands , for i t says nothing

abou t He idegger ' s approach to modern a r t ; and in the one d i s cus s ion o f a

modern work o f a r t in 'Or ig in ' , tha t o f Van Gogh ' s pa in t ing o f the peasan t

woman ' s shoes , He idegger appear s to be fo rward ing the c la ims tha t , f i r s t ,

the pa in t ing r evea l s the t rue na tu re o f equ ipmen t , namely , i t s r e l i ab i l i ty ;

and s econd ly , because the pa in t ing can pe r fo rm th i s cogn i t ive func t ion we

can deduce that the essence or nature of ar t i s to reveal , d isc lose , br ing

in to unconcea lmen t the be ing o r genera l e s sence o f pa r t i cu la r so r t s o f

th ings . A modern work o f a r t , then , i s dep loyed to r evea l the t rue na tu re

of ar t , which , g iven Heidegger ' s thes is concerning the end of great ar t , i t

ought not to be able to do; or , a t leas t i t s doing, i f i t does , ought not to be

as unprob lemat ic as i t i s p resen ted to be .

W orse , in 'Or ig i n ' He ideg ger o f fe rs th e exam ple o f a Gre ek t em ple to

i l lus t ra te th e natu re of great ar t . T h e choice is gov erne d by h is h is tory

of aes thet ics where Greek ar t i s the f i r s t s tep , the zero point for Wes tern

ref lect ion on ar t . The example of ear ly Greek ar t i s unique because there

ex i s t s no co r respond ing ' cogn i t ive -concep tua l med i ta t ion ' (N , 80 ) on i t ;

i t i s , a s such , p re -ph i losoph ica l , p re -metaphys ica l and p re -aes the t i c . Ye t




'O r ig in ' i s u sua l ly r ead in a manner in wh ich the accoun t o f the peasan t

woman ' s shoes and tha t o f the t emple a re cons t rued as pa ra l l e l ing one

ano ther . Th is i s un tenab le . The Greek t emple s tands a t the o r ig in o f a r t ,

the pain t ing a t the end of ar t ; the temple reveals a wor ld , g iv ing to th ings

the i r look and to men the i r ou t look on themse lves , wh i le the pa in t ing

revea l s wha t the peasan t woman knows 'w i thou t no t ic ing o r r e f l ec t ing '(O W A , 34) ; the po in t o f the t em ple exam ple is to il lu s t r a te the wor ld ing

powers of a work , whi le the pain t ing is f i r s t in t roduced in order to help us

th ink ourselves f ree of the t radi t ional ca tegor ies of the th ing .

G iven the d i f f e rences be tween the t emple and the pa in t ing , i t migh t

seem mos t appropr ia te e i the r to cons ide r them as func t ion ing as con t ras t

ing pos s ib il i ti e s w i th in the concep tua l econom y Heide gge r is p ropo s ing -

i l lus t ra t ing , as i t were , the d i f ference between works and great works ; or to

cons ide r the example o f the shoes as exhaus ted w i th the demons t ra t ion o f

h o w t h e e q u i p m e n t a l c h a r a c t e r o f e q u i p m e n t r e q u i r e s a m o d e o f a c c o u n t

ing tha t goes ou t s ide the t e rms o f the metaphys ics o f the th ing , wh i le

offering a possibil i ty as to the true nature of art , a possibil i ty which is

f inal ly revealed in the account of the temple , thus making o t iose the or ig

ina l in fe rence d rawn f rom the pa in t ing . Bo th p roposa l s r equ i re tha t , in

one way o r ano ther , the accoun t o f the Van Gogh as r evea l ing , more o r

less , the es sence o f a r t be w i thdrawn . Ne i the r p roposa l , however , i s

accep tab le . He idegger nowhere w i thdraws h i s accoun t o f the Van Gogh as

i l lus t ra t ing t he n atu re of the ar t work (whi ch , again , i s or ien ted tow ard

great ar t only (OWA, 40)) , as one might expect h im to do i f the example

were there so le ly for a s t ra tegic purpose; and worse , near the end of the

sec t ion 'T h e W ork an d T r u t h ' (OW A, 56) , he exp l ic it ly pa ra l le l s the way

' t r u t h h a p p e n s ' i n t h e t e m p l e ' s s t a n d i n g a n d i n t h e V a n G o g h p a i n t i n g .

Ne i the r co r rec t ly r ep resen t s any th ing ; r a the r , bo th a l low the 'wh ich i s ' a s

a who le - wor ld and ea r th in the i r coun te rp lay - to a t t a in to unc onc ea led -

n ess . I f ' t r u t h h a p p e n s i n V a n G o g h ' s p a i n t i n g ' th e n a m o d e r n w o r k of

ar t , a work of genius , i s ascr ibed the same (or a deeply analogous) t ru th

potent ia l , a potent ia l for unconcealment , as a work of great ar t .

How can we b r ing the con t ras t ing and para l l e l ing aspec t s o f He idegger ' s

accoun ts o f t emple and shoes toge ther? More p rec i s e ly , how a re we to

regard the happening of t ru th of an ar t work a t the end of ar t? And th is

qu es t io n is th e qu es t ion of the value , m ea nin g and t r u t h of ar t for

'wh e th er and h ow an e ra i s com m i t ted to an aes the t i c s, wh e ther and how

it adopts a s tance toward ar t of an aes thet ic character , i s decis ive for the

way ar t shapes the h is tory of that era - or remains i r re levant to i t ' (N, 79)

A h in t a s to how we migh t approach th i s ques t ion i s p rov ided by

Heidegger ' s remark a t the beginning of h is d iscuss ion of the shoes that he

in tends to d is regard the poss ib i l i ty that d i f ferences re la t ing to the h is tory

of be ing may be p resen t in the way tha t equ ipmen t is ( O W A , 3 2 ) . T h i s



T H E G E N I U S O F B E I N G 11 1

remark should not be too quickly passed over s ince the centra l ef for t of

'Or ig in ' is to dem ons t ra te th a t such d i ff e rences cann o t be d i s reg arde d ; o r

even be t t e r , tha t me taphys ics , inc lud ing , a s we sha l l s ee , Being and Time,

is th i s d i s regard ing , th i s fo rge t fu lnes s ; and hence the be ing o f equ ip

m en t i s a lways p rov inc ia l to wha t t r anscend en ta l ly s t am ps i t . As suc h ,

He ide gg er ' s appare n t ly casua l r em ark m us t be r egard ed as cen t ra l to thes t ra tegy governing the essay as a whole: the essay wil l d is regard epochal

s tam pin g in o rder to i l lumina te w ha t r egard ing i t i s , a r ega rd ing tha t a

m o d e r n w o r k o f a r t b r i n g s t o l i g h t . H e n c e w h a t H e i d e g g e r ' s r e m a r k

d i rec t ly sugges t s i s tha t the accoun t o f the pa in t ing , a l though go ing

beyond t radi t ional ca tegor ies of the th ing and so of aes thet ics , as in i t s

own way d id Being and Time, d o e s n o t t h e r e b y i n s t a l l o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g

of the work in the t ru th of being. Rather , despi te i t s cr i t ica l surpass ing of

the t r ad i t iona l metaphys ica l ca tegor ies o f th ing , equ ipmen t and work , the

accoun t o f the pa in t ing i s none the les s 'me taphys ica l ' , ju s t a s Being andTime r emains metaphys ica l , bound to the v i s ion o f t ru th as p resence ( even

if wha t i s the re ma de p re sen t i s ecs ta t i c t em pora l i ty ) . Sur re p t i t iou s ly ,

'Or ig in ' i s a doub le r ead ing o f the ca tegor ia l p re tens ions o f Being and

Time.

I n o r d e r t o u n d e r s t a n d w h a t t h i s m i g h t m e a n , a n d i n o r d e r t o c o m p r e

h e n d t h e h a p p e n i n g o f t r u t h i n t h e V a n G o g h , t h e p a i n t i n g m u s t b e p u t

in to i t s p lace , our p lace , in the age of technology, where the end of ar t

is a consequence of the epochal legis la t ion of the essence of technology.Fur ther , i t i s only in v i r tue of the qui te specif ic character izat ion of tech

nology that Heidegger of fers that the privileged na tu re o f (non-g rea t ) a r t in

m od ern i ty can be unde r s to od . H e ide gge r ' s ana lys i s o f t echno lo gy is h i s

charac te r iza t ion o f the p rogres s ive cu l tu re o f m ode rn i ty ; and i t i s th r ou gh

th e analys is of ar t and tec hno logy as formin g a un i ty in d i f ference tha t

Heidegger spel ls out the cr i t ica l re la t ion of aes thet ic cul ture to progress ive

c u l t u r e .

Fo r He ideg ger t ech no logy i s no th in g t echn ica l ; i t i s no t to be un de r

s tood in t e rm s o f the dom ina t io n o f m ean s - end r eason in g over o th e r

fo rms o f r eason ing , a l though th i s may be one o f i t s consequences ; no r i s

i t to be under s tood in t e rms o f the k inds o f in s t rumen ts and modes o f

c o - o p e r a t i o n r e q u i r e d b y t h e m t h a t c o m e t o d o m i n a t e p r o d u c t i o n i n t h e

techno log ica l e ra ; no r can t echn o logy be un der s too d as a p ro du c t o f a

secu la r hubr i s ha rnes sed to an uncons t r a ined des i r e fo r mas te ry over

n a t u r e w i t h o u t a n d w i t h i n . T o u n d e r s t a n d t e c h n o l o g y , t o g r a s p t h e

es sence o f t echno logy , i s to s ee wha t ga the r s these d ive r se phenomena

tog eth er as ma nifes ta t io ns of the sam e. T o do th is i s no t to reg ard the se

ph en om en a as ef fects of som e centra l , locatab le and ident i f iable ca use .

Rather , s ince the h is tory of being is the h is tory of the essence of t ru th , of

the modes in which th ings appear as being what they are , i t i s to grasp




these phenomena as coeff ic ients of the technological way of presencing

m en an d th ings , tha t is , to com pre he nd tech no logy th rou gh i ts t r an

scenden ta l s chemat iza t ion o f exper ience .

'Ch a l len g in g ' i s the r evea l ing tha t ru les in m od ern t echno log y , fo r in

i t every th ing in the wor ld i s ' cha l l enged ' , t r ans fo rmed , r ead ied , s to red ,

o rdered and s ecured so as to be a t ou r d i sposa l , to be immedia te ly a t hand ,ind ee d, to s tand t he re jus t so tha t it m ay be on call for a fur the r ord er in g

(Q T , 17) . Because every th ing appe ar s as the r e to be cha l lenged does no t

en ta i l tha t i t i s we who a r range th ings thus , tha t the cha l l enge i s some

th ing we c rea te o r b r ing abou t . Such an an th ropo log ica l humanism

supposes tha t the pos s ib i l i t i e s o f b r ing ing th ings to unconcea lmen t , the

modes o f wor ld -d i s c losu re , a re themse lves a t ou r d i sposa l , tha t men can

decide what is to be real and what not . This i l lus ion , the u t ter obl iv ion of

being, the bel ief that there is only man and not being, i s i t se l f c lear ly a

ref lect ive ef fect of the essence of technology. For Heidegger , only to the

ex ten t that ma n for h is pa r t is a l ready chal leng ed can the ord er ing

revea l ing o f the cha l l enge occur ; hence the Kan t ian be l i e f tha t we t r an -

scendentally legis late is an effect , Kantian transcendental legislation stand

ing to techn ology's legislation as produ ction to creation (a creation w hich

institutes the schem a of produc tion — the Kan tian 'assault' on the thin g).

He ideg ger de no m ina tes the essence o f t echno lo gy , the cha l l en g ing c la im

u p o n m a n , Ge-stell- var ious ly t r ans la ted as ' en f ra m ing ' , ' t he co m -pos i t ing ' ,

' ( u n i v e r s a l ) i m p o s i t i o n ' .2 3

It is Ge-stell that c la ims man so what is a lwaysa l r eady comprehended , ac tua l ly o r po ten t ia l ly , does so in t e rms o f the

ord er in g and s ecur ing o f t echno log ica l r evea l ing .

A l though , f rom the beg inn ing , Wes te rn though t on a r t has been

aes the t ica l , in m od er ni ty , in the era of aes th et ics in i t s usu al ex tens io n ,

the re i s no more g rea t a r t . A l though f rom the beg inn ing o f Wes te rn meta

phys ics there has been an obl iv ion of being, in the epoch of technology

that obl iv ion a t ta ins a k ind of complet ion . I f there is a p lace where these

two s t r eams o f a rgument come toge ther i t i s in He idegger ' s ana lys i s o f the

fate of poiesis; an d i t i s equ al ly in th is analys is th at the h is tor ica l p lac em entof ar t in re la t ion to technology is ar t icula ted .

S ta r t in g f rom a cons ide ra t ion o f P la to ' s Symposium 2 0 5 b , H e i d e g g e r

con tends tha t fo r the Greeks every occas ion in wh ich someth ing pas ses

over f rom absence to presence is poiesis, a b r i n g i n g - f o r t h . E v e n physis,

n a t u r e ' s o r d e r l y b r i n g i n g t h i n g s f r o m c o n c e a l m e n t t o u n c o n c e a l m e n t , i s

poiesis. E q u a l l y , H e i d e g g e r r e m i n d s u s , t h e G r e e k s c o n s i d e r e d techne, a

term in tended to cover both craf t sk i l ls and the f ine ar ts , a k ind of poiesis,

bu t a poiesis of a d is t inct k ind , namely , one which involves a s ta te of the

sou l pos ses s ing t ru th . Techne i s a knowledge o f th ings tha t come in to

u n c o n c e a l m e n t n e i t h e r b y n a t u r e n o r t h r o u g h n e c e s s i t y , b u t t h r o u g h

h u m a n a c t i v i t y . Techne i s a mode of poet ic reveal ing , being a mode of

poiesis and o f t ru th (aletheia).




Ge-stell, Heidegger c la ims , dr ives out every o ther poss ib i l i ty of reveal

ing; above a l l , i t cancels , b locks , ' tha t reveal ing which , in the sense of

poiesis, l e t s wha t p resences come fo r th in appearance ' (QT, 27 ) . Ge-stell,

the essence of technology, i s techne w i t h o u t poiesis; i t reveals not by br ing

ing for th , but ra ther by regula t ing , secur ing , t ransforming; i t leg is la tes

m a k i n g ( p r o d u c t i o n ) w i t h o u t c r e a t e d n e s s , r e d u c i n g c r e a t i o n t o p r o d u c t i o n .B e c a u s e Ge-stell dr ives out a ll o th er forms of reveal ing and , fun d

amental ly , conceals i t se l f as a mode of reveal ing , i t provides or invokes no

concep t ion o f be ing p roper to itself. Ge-stell, th rough i t s concea l ing o f

reveal ing , lacks a word for being, a word that , whi le obeying the logic of

p resence govern ing Wes te rn metaphys ics wou ld none the les s exceed i t

because being or ig inary , l ike the great work of ar t , i t would reveal a mode

of be ing ' s way o f ho ld ing sway in concea lmen t .2 4

M o r e s i m p l y , t e c h n o l o g y

rea l i zes , in the fo rm o f the ' s t and ing r ese rve ' , the cons tan t p resence , the

making of a l l th ings potent ia l ly or ac tual ly present , that has been thedo m ina n t d r ive o f a ll me taphy s ics ; bu t th i s r ea l iza t ion is acco mp l i shed

prec i s e ly th rough the co l laps ing o f the d i f f e rence be tween the t r an

scenden ta l and the empi r ica l , e t e rn i ty and t ime , the d i f f e rences tha t

marked, in forgetfu lness , the ontological d i f ference between being and

be ing s , prese ncin g and prese nce . I t i s beca use techno logical reveal ing ca n

invoke no word o f be ing , because i t s ees man everywhere and be ing

nowhere , because i t i s a refusal of being, i t becomes the complet ion of the

ob l iv ion o f be ing and i s hen ce d i s t ingu ished f rom a ll p rev iou s m od es

of r evea l ing . For He idegger , the cance l l ing o f poiesis by techno log ica l

r evea l ing en ta i l s the a t t a in ing o f the l imi t o f be in g ' s w i thdra wa l , and henc e

the complete e t io la t ion of i t s powers and poss ib i l i t ies of presencing.

Techne w i t h o u t poiesis is l ike de te rm ina t e judg em ent w i th ou t r e fl ect ive

j u d g e m e n t , t h e r e p r o d u c t i v e i m a g i n a t i o n w i t h o u t t h e t r a n s c e n d e n t a l

imag ina t ion o r , aga in , p roduc t ion w i thou t c rea t ion .

Now the re i s a s ign i f i can t ambigu i ty in He idegger ' s c la im tha t Gestell

dr ives out and b locks poiesis. On the one hand , i t cou ld mean tha t Ge-stell

as a mode of reveal ing is the only one such whose very nature i t se l finvolves a refusal of poiesis. On the o the r hand , i t migh t mean tha t because

in i t s nature Ge-stell dr ives ou t poiesis i t therefore , l i tera l ly , banishes a l l

o ther modes of reveal ing in to non-exis tence. In the f i r s t case what is a t

i s sue i s the charac te r o f a cen t re , a dominan t mode o f p resenc ing , whose

effects and re la t ions to the per iphery require analys is and e lucidat ion .

Th is wou ld be l ike ana lys ing the r e la t ion be tween de te rmina te and

re f lec t ive judgement . I f the l a t t e r p roposa l were the co r rec t in te rp re ta t ion

of He ideg ger ' s thes i s , the n the re wou ld be a cen t re w i thou t a pe r i phe ry -

de te rmina te judgement w i thou t r e f l ec t ive judgement . In the f i r s t case ,

ques t ion ing wou ld p robe the way the cen t re ho lds sway , how i t cen t res

i tse l f and sus ta ins i t s dominance; in the second case , where the poss ib i l i ty

of de ce ntr i ng could com e f rom th e centre a lone - for th ere is only the



1 1 4 T H E G E N I U S O F B E IN G

cen t re - ques t ion ing w ou ld h ave to focus on how tha t decen t r ing cou ld

take p lace .

I n ' T h e q u e s t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t e c h n o l o g y ' H e i d e g g e r a t t e m p t s t o t h i n k

the overcoming o f Ge-stell th ro ug h the use of the famil iar rhetor ica l f igure

of an extreme pos i t ion reveal ing (engender ing , condi t ioning, so l ic i t ing) i t s

oppos i t e : the moment o f the g rea tes t danger , when so pe rce ived , i s whence

the s av ing power g rows (QT, 28). Given his reliance on this f igure, i t

sou nds as if He ideg ger accep t s the second un de r s ta nd ing o f Ge-stelPs

refusal of poiesis; however , the conclus ion of the essay speaks decis ively

aga ins t such a un ivoca l and u nequ iv oca l c ons t rua l o f the t echno log ica l

e p o c h .

Because the essence of technology is noth ing technological , essent ia l

ref lect ion up on tech nolo gy and decisive con fronta t ion with i t m us thappen in a realm that i s , on the one hand, akin to the essence of

techn ology and , on th e o th er , fund am enta l ly d i f ferent f rom i t .

Such a realm is ar t . (QT, 3 5 )

I t i s precise ly because technology, techne w i t h o u t poiesis, refers back to a

techne tha t covered bo t h t echn ica l p rod uc t io n an d a r t tha t we a re now

ent i t led to regard technology and ar t as akin yet d i f ferent . What is puz

zl ing is that Heidegger says nothing to jus t i fy the d i f ference. Rather , he

merely asks whether the f ine ar ts are cal led to poet ic reveal ing; whether

such reveal ing in some sense lays c la im to the ar ts so that they can fos ter

the g rowth o f the s av ing power . To these ques t ions He idegger r esponds :

'W he th er ar t ma y be gra nte d th is h ighe s t poss ib i l i ty of i t s essence in the

mids t o f the ex t r eme danger , no one can t e l l ' (QT, 3 5 ) .

This agnos t i c d iagnos i s i s t roub l ing in two respec t s . F i r s t , because in

refer r ing to the 'h ighes t poss ib i l i ty of i t s essence ' , a poss ib i l i ty real ized

p e r h a p s o n l y i n a n c i e n t G r e e c e ( Q T , 3 4 ) , Heidegger l apses in to an

atemporal essent ia l iz ing of f ine ar t ; that i s , h is contras t fa i ls to make d irectand essent ia l reference to the h is tory of ar t s ince the Greeks in cons ider ing

the poss ib i l i ty of f ine ar t p laying th is cr i t ica l ro le . This contravenes the

very idea of epochal his tory. If ar t were to be able to play a cri t ical role

surely i t would be because of something more specif ic to i t s h is tory than

i t s anc ien t l ink ing w i th t echn ica l p ro duc t ion . W ha t has ha ppe ne d to the

ident i ty and d if ference of ar t and technical product ion s ince then? Perhaps

i t i s not a m at t er of shee r accide nt or tas te tha t He ide gg er for the m os t

par t refers us to Romant ic poets and fa i ls to engage with the ques t ions of

a r t i s t i c modern i sm as such . A t l eas t the Kan t ian d i s t inc t ion be tween p ro gress ive and ae s thet ic cul tu re g ives us a cu rre nt i f una naly sed d if ference

with which to work , one which , as we have seen, poin ts re lent less ly in the

d i r e c t io n o f t h e p r o b l e m a t i c o f m o d e r n i s m .

Second ly , however , i t beg ins to look very dub ious whe ther He idegger




could provide the sor t of specif ica t ion that would make h is reference to ar t

have point . Af ter a l l , i t i s because the essence of technology is noth ing

techn ica l , no th ing em pi r ica l , ub iqu i tou s th ro ug h i t s h idd enn es s , tha t

He ideg ger i s fo rced to ges tu re toward ano ther m od e o f r evea l ing in o rder

to spo t the danger . Bu t , and he re i s the t roub le , w i thou t a r t , w i thou t the

ident i ty and d if ference of ar t and technology in moderni ty , there is nodanger; there is only technology. I t i s no accident that technology only

comes in to v iew as t echno logy and as epocha l when Heid egge r shows tha t

'T h e Rh ine ' , a s f igured in Ho lde r l in ' s hy m n by tha t nam e, is no t p resen t

in the landscape; i t i s avai lable there in no o ther way than as an 'object on

ca ll fo r in spec t ion by a tou r g ro up o rd ered the re by the vaca t ion ind us t ry '

( Q T , 1 6 ) . Without the contrast of the two Rhines there is not even technology.

Which i s on ly to s ay tha t in o rder to p lace the p resen t we requ i re some

van tage po in t ' ou t s ide ' it , som e p lace marg ina l o r pe r iphera l to i t , f rom

which to pe rce ive i t . Ar t was to be tha t po in t . Wi thou t a r t a s the coun te r po in t to t echno logy ne i the r the ques t ion o f be ing nor the h i s to ry o f be ing

c a n b e o p e n e d . 2 5

One migh t a rgue tha t in a t t empt ing to cons ide r the ques t ion o f a r t

in abs t r ac t ion f rom Heidegger ' s va r ious and numerous cons ide ra t ions o f

language we abs t r ac t f rom the co re o f h i s concern w i th a r t . Th i s canno t be

correct , for the whole force of Heidegger ' s thes is that ' language i tse l f i s

poe t ry in the essen t ia l s ense ' (O W A , 74) , and thenc e h is com m enta r ies o n

Holder l in , for example , only come in to v iew and take on s ignif icance

th r ou gh a th ink ing o f the toge therne s s and oppos i t ion o f a r t and t ec h

nology. Of course , Heidegger can read a poet l ike Holder l in and f ind in

h i m a representation of the con t ras t be tween an age in wh ich the gods were

s t il l ac t ive and o ur age in whic h the y hav e fled, a co ntra s t be tw ee n a

dwel l ing p lace and abs t r ac t space , be tween unconcea lmen t and t ru th , bu t

in so far as these or analogous accounts are of fered ar t remains aes thet ic :

an imag ina t ive p ro jec t ion o f o the r pos s ib i l i t i e s o f th ink ing exper ience .

H e i d e g g e r c a n n o t t h i n k m o d e r n i t y t h r o u g h a r t w i t h o u t t h i n k i n g t h e

mean ing o f a r t in modern i ty , th ink ing , then , how non-g rea t a r t i s morethan aes thet ica l . I f such an excess beyond aes thet ics is impl ic i t in modern

art, what is required of phi losophy is to underwri te i t , to g ive back to ar t

the t ransfo rm at ion of cog ni t ion th at i t f ir st m ake s poss ib le .

In saying a l l th is I do not in tend to deny that the ar t and technology

nexus (o r wha tever o the r concep tua l appara tus we migh t use to ana lyse

progress ive cul ture) has something l ike the k ind of s ignif icance Heidegger

at t r ibutes to i t ; or even to deny that some sor t of epochal h is tory is centra l

for the br inging of that nexus in to relief. On the con t ra ry , I have been

pres s in g the v i r tues o f He ideg ge r ' s h i s to r ica l r ad ica li za t ion o f the impl ic i t

c r i t i q u e of m o d e r n i t y f o u n d i n K a n t ' s t h i r d Critique. W h a t I a m q u e r y i n g

i s He ideg ger ' s way o f con s t ru in g m od ern i ty in t e rm s o f the es sence o f

technology; and hence the form of the technology and ar t nexus he of fers .




vii Earth , W orld and Alteri ty: T h e Pol is as Art

At the end o f the p rev ious chap te r I sugges ted tha t Kan t ' s th i rd Critique

suffered f rom a refusal of m em or y, a refusal to m ou rn , to ackn ow ledge th e

pas t whose loss se ts cr i t ica l phi losophy 's aes thet ic theory in to mot ion . One

per t inen t way o f r ead ing the c la ims wi th which I ended the l a s t s ec t ionwould be to s ay tha t He idegger ' s a r t i cu la t ion o f the a r t and t echno logy

n e x u s in ' T h e Q u e s t i o n C o n c e r n i n g T e c h n o l o g y ' - t h e v e ry n e x u s t h a t

provides theoret ica l backing, g ives force and point to Heidegger ' s c la im

concern ing the c losu re o f metaphys ics and hence opens up the h i s to ry o f

b e i n g - i s o v e r w h e l m e d b y a n e x o r b i t a n t m e m o r y a n d m o u r n i n g . I m m e

dia te ly pr ior to h is ques t ioning of the poss ib i l i ty of ar t providing a

coun te r fo rce to t echno logy , o f inhab i t ing the g rea tes t danger and ' tu rn ing '

i t in to a saving power , Heidegger says :

In Greece, a t the outse t of the des t in ing of the West , the ar ts soared

t o t h e s u p r e m e h e i g h t o f t h e r e v e a l i n g g r a n t e d t h e m . T h e y b r o u g h t

the p resence (Gegenwart) of the gods , b rough t the d ia logue o f d iv ine

and human des t in ings , to r ad iance . And a r t was s imply techne. I t

was a s ingle , manifo ld reveal ing . I t was p ious , promos, i .e . yielding to

the ho ld ing- sway and the s a fekeep ing o f t ru th .

The a r t s were no t de r ived f rom the a r t i s t i c . Ar t works were no t

enjoyed aes thet ica l ly . Ar t was not a sector of cul tura l ac t iv i ty . . .The poe t ica l b r ings the t rue in to the sp lendor o f wha t P la to in the

Phaedrus calls to ekphanestaton, tha t wh ich sh ines fo r th mos t pu re ly .

The poe t ica l tho rough ly pe rvades every a r t , eve ry r evea l ing o f

coming to p resence in to the beau t i fu l . (OWA, 34)

Heidegger ' s i s not a backward- looking Utopia , a hope for a re turn to pas t

t imes and pas t gods ; bu t to concede th i s i s no t to concede tha t He idegger ' s

p h i l o s o p h i c a l m e m o r y i s n o t s u b m e r g e d i n a n e x o r b i t a n t m o u r n i n g . O n e

can refuse memory, refuse the cal l of the pas t , or heed i t too wel l ; a pas t

tha t is neve r pre sen t an d a pas t tha t i s a lways pres en t bot h involve a fa i l

ure to negot ia te , to acknowledge proper ly , the ro le of the pas t in the

presen t . When the pas t i s r e fused , i t w i l l de te rmine the p resen t b l ind ly

th ro ug h tha t r e fusa l, do om ing us to r epea t w ha t i s pa r t i a l and b roken : th e

I f ar t does (or might) p lay the cr i t ica l ro le Heidegger sugges ts , i t i s not for

the reasons he sugges t . The evident force of Heidegger ' s cr i t ica l analyses

does not der ive f rom the f ramework, or h is tory , that informs them; the

juxtapos i t ion of ar t and technology, and with i t the d is t inct ions between

prod uc t io n and c rea ted nes s and the l ike , do beg in to a r t i cu la te m ode rn i ty ,

bu t fo r reasons tha t a s ye t r emain opa que .



T H E G E N I U S O F BE I N G 11 7

pa tho log ies o f p rogres s ive cu l tu re . When we remember too we l l , the pas t

ove rw helm s the prese nt as a p lace of ac t ion . I n bo th cases we are d ep r ive d

of a fu tu re and cau gh t in an end les s p re sen t , bu t d if fe rent ly . W he n m e m

ory is refused, we are conscious of only the cont inuance of present ac t ions

wi thou t source o r o r ig in ; when remember ing too we l l , we a re consc ious o f

the inabi l i ty to act , of the lack of poss ib i l i t ies in the present . I f the mem

ory o f the ' r ad i anc e ' o f anc ien t G ree ce i s an ach ievem ent over u t t e r

forgetfu lness , and i t i s , i t i s here equal ly a problem, a hal t ; a ' rad iance '

so subl ime that the present cannot be seen a t a l l , or a t bes t seen only

ind i ff e ren t ly , un de r the ub iq u i to us and ano ny m ou s sway o f the es sence o f

techno logy . Be tween the fu l l p resence o f the pas t and the empty p resence

of the p resen t no th ing in te rcedes : th i s i s the long epoch o f metaphys ics .

C a u g h t b e t w e e n t w o p r e s e n c e s , t h e ' r a d i a n t ' a n d t h e e m p t y , n e i t h e r p r e s

en t no r pas t i s kno wn , and po ten t ia l i ty becom es locked in to un m ov ing

ac tua l i ty . Th is i s the cos t o f He idegger ' s r educ t ive ph i losophy o f h i s to ry ,one that sees the present only in terms of the eschato logical rea l iza t ion of

the metaphys ics o f p resence , l eav ing no room fo r a way o f judg ing the

los ses and ach ievements o f modern i ty .

I t migh t be though t tha t th i s c la im i s too s t rong , tha t He idegger i s

do ing no more than tu rn ing our a t t en t ion toward the Greek pas t in o rder

to re te l l the h is tory of metaphys ics in a manner that would a l low the

potent ia l i t ies for presencing in the present to be re leased . This is cer ta in ly

the in ten t ion beh ind Heidegger ' s a t t empt to demons t ra te the sh i f t tha t

' e s sence ' undergoes in t echno logy . None the les s , th i s de fence mus t f a l l

shor t so long as the cr i t ica l s ignif icance of modern ar t remains suppressed .

As we have a l r eady s een , He idegger ' s suppres s ion o f a r t i s t i c modern i ty i s

a t one w i th h i s r e fusal o f au t on om y, the t r ansg res s ive f r eedom of m od ern

subject iv i ty . But th is ra ises a technical problem for Heidegger ' s analys is ,

nam ely , how i s he to co m pre he nd the r espec t ive ro les of a r t i st , spe c ta to r

and w ork in a r t i s ti c c rea t ion? In o the r w ords , He ideg ger and K an t ag ree

on the na tu re o f the exempla ry work , on wha t i t ach ieves and how tha t

ach ievement es tab l i shes itself; wh ere they d isagree is on how ' sub jec ts ' a reconn ec ted to such wo rks .

I n t h e ' A d d e n d u m ' t o ' O r i g i n ' H e i d e g g e r c o n c e d e s t h a t t h e e s s a y ' s

analys is fa i ls adequate ly to re la te ar t is t and work, and th is fa i lure tokens a

d i s loca t ion o f be ing and be ings wh ereb y the fo rmer com es to do m ina te the

la t ter . So a l tho ugh H eid eg ge r s t resses tha t 'Being is a ca ll to m an [or :

n e e d s m a n ] a n d i s n o t w i t h o u t m a n ' ( O W A , 8 6 ) , n o n e t h e l e s s i n t h e m o v e

m en t of es tabl ish ing an a l ter i ty suff ic ient to desub ject iv ize ar t , and he nc e

wr i te the r idd le o f a r t in t e rms no t dependen t on sub jec t /ob jec t dua l i sm,

Heidegger so s t resses the ro le of the work and of being that they take on

the ro le of subject . Only i f i t were undecidable whether ar t is t or work

were r espons ib le fo r the s e t t ing - in to -work o f t ru th wou ld the s t ruc tu res o f

sub jec t /ob jec t dua l i sm be t r anscended . He idegger ' s f a i lu re he re i s wor th




detail ing, f irs t because it is e n d e m i c to his pos i t ion and r e m a i n s the m o s t

p e r s p i c u o u s s o u r c e of his refusal of sub jec t iv i ty ; and second ly because it is

equa l ly the precise p lace in his w o r k w h e r e the q u e s t i o n of art and pol i t ics

is posed.

The diff iculty to w h i c h H e i d e g g e r p o i n t s in the ' A d d e n d u m ' o c c u r s ,

i ronical ly , in one of the s t ronges t l ines of t h o u g h t in the essay. For K a n t ,

r e m e m b e r , the j u d g e m e n t of t a s t e ' d e m a n d s ' a g r e e m e n t . In a t t e m p t i n g to

g r o u n d t h i s d e m a n d we d iscovered tha t the neu t ra l i zed , d i s in te res ted sub

ject was i n a d e q u a t e to the task; and f u r t h e r , as we pressed the c la ims

of gen ius , work and sub l imi ty aga ins t the c la ims of t a s te it b e c a m e

increas ing ly obv ious tha t it was the ob jec t of j u d g e m e n t t h a t was m a k i n g

d e m a n d s u p o n the j u d g i n g s u b j e c t . H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t is a r e insc r ip t ion

of sub l imi ty w i th in the t e r m s of the his tor ical i ty of t r u t h , w h e r e the

r e la t ion be tween tas te and s u b l i m i t y is r e w r i t t e n in t e r m s of the difference

b e t w e e n art and ' g r ea t art'. For H e i d e g g e r , a g a i n , the work of art is

a n a d d r e s s ;2 6

its a d d r e s s o c c u r s t h r o u g h a ' t h r u s t ' w h i c h is ungeheuer.

e n o r m o u s , c o l o s s a l , m o n s t r o u s , a w e s o m e , e x t r a o r d i n a r y - sub l ime . Af te r

desc r ib ing wha t g rea t art a c c o m p l i s h e s , H e i d e g g e r a s k s 'Why is the se t t ing

u p of a work an erec t ing tha t consecra tes and pra i s es? ' (OWA, 44); and

r e s p o n d s , ' B e c a u s e the w o r k , in its w o r k - b e i n g , d e m a n d s (fordern) it'.

H e i d e g g e r ' s s t r a t e g y , t h e n , is to p r o v i d e an ana lys i s of grea t works tha t

s h o r t - c i r c u i t s the ro le of ar t i s t s and aud ience , l e t t ing the d e m a n d s , c a l l s

and addres ses tha t occur he re occur th rough wha t is in t r ins ic to w o r k st h e m s e l v e s . The t h r u s t of w o r k s e n g e n d e r s a d i s p l a c e m e n t , a h o l d i n g and

e n g e n d e r i n g of b o t h p r o d u c e r s and consumers ; works f igure and e x e m p

l i fy or ig inar i ly thei r createdness , and e n g e n d e r (an awe-ful l ) respect and

love . In the Nie tzsche l ec tu res He idegger ca l l s th i s en tang lemen t of love

a n d r e s p e c t ' r a p t u r e ' ; in t h i n k i n g t h i s e n t a n g l e m e n t he uses Rilke's first

' D u i n o E l e g y ' as his g u i d e : 'For the beaut i fu l is n o t h i n g but the b e g i n n i n g

of the t e r r ib le , a b e g i n n i n g we but b a r e l y e n d u r e ' (N, 116).

C e n t r a l to any such accoun t wou ld be the d isp lac ing of (subject ive)

d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s - t h a t in v i r tue of w h i c h a work is r e g a r d e d for its own

sake and not for any e n d s e x t e r n a l to it - in to the w o r k itself, t h e r e b y

g r o u n d i n g its a u t o n o m y , its be ing , so to speak , an end in itself. T h i s , of

c o u r s e , is a s tandard thes i s of G e r m a n I d e a l i s t a e s t h e t i c s : the i n w a r d n e s s

a n d d e p t h of the work of art, its hav ing ' sou l ' in K a n t ' s s e n s e , is w h a t

d r a w s the s p e c t a t o r in and gro un ds d i s in te res tedne s s . He ideg ger iden t if ie s

t h i s a u t o n o m y as a work ' s ' s e l f - subs i s tence ' , a ' c lo sed , un i ta ry r epose of

s e l f - s u p p o r t ' (OWA, 48); th is is a w o r k ' s w o r k - b e i n g , w h o s e two essent ia l

features are the se t t ing up of a w o r l d and the set t ing for th of e a r t h . W o r k sa re a s t r i f e be tween wor ld and e a r t h . The t e r m s ' w o r l d ' and ' e a r t h ' are

i n t e n d e d as n o n - m e t a p h y s i c a l r e p l a c e m e n t s for w h a t has been t radi t ional ly

t h o u g h t in t e r m s of fo rm and m a t t e r , and r eca ll N ie tzsch e ' s d i s t inc tion

b e t w e e n the A p o l l o n i a n and the D i o n y s i a n .



T H E G E N I U S O F B E IN G 1 1 9

W orl d is not to be con s tru ed as an object before us , bu t ra th er as the

dispos i t ion of men and th ings wi th respect to one another in v i r tue of

which they possess the k ind of p lace , durat ion and wor th they do or can

h a v e . I t i s the ' ever-nonobject ive to which we are subject so long as the

pa ths o f b i r th and dea th , b les s ing and cu r se keep us t r anspor ted in to

Being . Where those dec i s ions o f ou r h i s to ry tha t r e la te to ou r ve ry be ing

are made , a re t aken up and abandoned , go unrecogn ized and a re r ed i s

c o v e r e d b y n e w i n q u i r y , t h e r e t h e w o r l d w o r l d s ' ( O W A , 4 4 - 5 ) . T o b e

' t ra ns po r te d in to Bein g ' is to inh ab i t a wo r ld and f ind a sense in on e ' s

ac t iv i ti e s tha t is m ade po s s ib le e l s ewhere th an th rou gh tho se ac t iv i t ie s

themse lves . To ac t ' h i s to r ica l ly ' i s to ac t in a manner tha t pe r sp icuous ly

responds to the non-ob jec t ive cond i t ions o f the pos s ib i l i ty o f exper ience ; i t

is , we migh t s ay , to r emain a t t endan t to the to ta l i ty qua to ta l i ty , to the

categor ia l qua categor ia l , and hence to the way in which the categor ia l

to ta l i ty ga the r s and d i s t r i bu te s pa r t i cu la r s an d k ind s , g iv ing to each i t sp lace .

Works s e t up wor ld , bu t in o rder to do so they mus t employ some

wo rk-m ate r ia l : s tone , wood , co lou r , l angua ge (word) , ton e - co l lec t ive ly

' ea r th ' . Works use mate r ia l s w i thou t us ing them up ; works r es t upon and

set themselves back onto the ear th , but in so doing reveal the ear th as

ea r th , tha t i s , ear th is recog nized in wo rks as a fun da m en t for thei r po ss i

b i l i ty . W ha t i s so r evea led and r eco gn ized i s tha t , a l th oug h capa b le o f

being se t for th in an endless var ie ty of ways , the ear th i t se l f cannot be

finally, onc e and for all , rev eal ed . T h e ear th for H eid eg ge r is prec isely

tha t wh ich i s by na tu re un d isc losab le . S ta ted pos i tive ly : 'T h e ea r t h i s

es sen tia l ly s e l f- s ec lud ing ' (O W A , 47) . T h e ea r th , the n , a s a non -h i s to r ica l

p r inc ip le o f t r ansce nden ta l opac i ty , a p r inc ip le o f r ese rve , them at izes an

aspec t o f wha t K an t ' s conc ep t ion o f gen ius tho ug h t th ro ug h the conc ep t

o f n a t u r e .

Ear th i s ' by na tu re und isc losab le , tha t wh ich sh r inks f rom every d i s

c losure and cons tant ly keeps i t se l f c losed up ' ; the e lements of the ear th ,

a l tho ugh be long ing toge the r in a m utu a l accord , a lways r ehea r se a ' n o t -k n o w i n g - o f - o n e - a n o t h e r ' ( O W A , 4 7 ). N o w t h i s c la i m m a y s o u n d a s i f

He ideg ger w ere a t t e m pt in g to m ake wha t i s u sua l ly ca l led na tu re (bu t ,

r em em be r , inc ludes l anguage) incapab le o f be ing comple te ly cogn i t ive ly

object i f ied; hence, sa lvaging some cogni t ive pr iv i lege or poss ib i l i ty for

wo rks agains t the c la im s of sc ience an d tech nolog y. An d i t i s cer ta in ly th e

case that the c la ims of reason cannot be res t r ic ted unless they ar ise f rom,

lean and depend upon , wha t they canno t acknowledge . Because a r t works

can acknowledge , indeed themat ize , the i r ma te r ia l bas i s , every ach ieve

m en t o f a r t is s imu l taneou s ly an acknow ledgem ent o f de pe nd enc y . And i fwha t i s so acknowledged i s the non- founda t iona l g round fo r any wor ld ,

and s ince for a wor ld to be wor ld requires i t s being re la ted to that ground,

the n a r t works can rehear se the en tan g lem en t o f every wor ld w i th ea r th




in a manner that escapes the c la ims of reason (and is suppressed by

t e c h n o l o g i c a l p r e s e n c i n g ) .2 7

But to say th is , to acknowledge a source of

wor ld and reason beyond the contro l of reason, i s jus t to say that t ru th ,

what is revealed by the l ight of reason, what a wor ld makes v is ib le , i s

nei th er sel f-suff ic ient nor se l f -gro und ing: un tr u t h , wha t i s no t revealed

bu t co nd i t ions r evea l ing , is a co m po ne n t o f t ru th itself. Because themetaphys ical t radi t ion tended to th ink of absence as a defect ive mode of

p resen ce , and tho ug h t o f t ru th in t e rm s o f p resen ce ( and s e l f -p resence) ,

un t ru th was neces sa r i ly though t o f a s a t empora ry , con t ingen t and in p r in

c ip le avo idab le de fec t. O nc e , however , the absen t ia l d imen s ion i s shown to

be an unmas terable and hence not fu l ly object i f iable or present i f iable

componen t o f how th ings can be p resen t , then un t ru th ( absence) can no

longer be conceived as external to or a s imple lack of t ru th (presence) .

World d isc losures are f in i te , so wi th each wor ld d isc losure there mus t

a l so occur two concea lmen ts . The f i r s t concea lmen t i s o f wha t l i e s beyond

tha t wor ld , hence c once a lm en t func t ions h e re as a l imi t o f know ledge tha t

is equa l ly it s con d i t ion . T h e s econd con cea lm en t r e la tes to t ru th and e r ro r

in thei r ord inary sense . Heidegger cal ls the f i r s t sor t of concealment

' r e fusa l ', and the s econd so r t ' d i s s em bl ing ' . T r u th ha pp en s , i s an even t ,

because wor lds a re the p roduc t s o f works ; bu t the unconcea lednes s tha t

works provide in se t t ing for th a wor ld a lways and necessar i ly is accom

pan ied by the dou b le concea lm en t o f r e fusal and d i s sem bl ing . U n t ru th -

conce a lme n t , l imi t , r e fusa l , w i thdra wa l , d i s s em bl ing - be longs to the

es sence o f t ru th .

He idegger ' s hypo thes i s i s tha t s e l f - s ec lud ing ea r th i s the ' sou rce ' o f the

u n t r u t h t h a t m a k e s t r u t h p o s s i b l e . B e c a u s e K a n t t h o u g h t t h e h o r i z o n s o f

h u m a n t h o u g h t t o b e u n c h a n g i n g , h e t h o u g h t w h a t H e i d e g g e r t e r m s t h e

ear th th ro ugh th e con cep t o f the th ing- in - i t se l f , wh a t bo th m us t and can

no t con t r ibu te to human knowing . Kan t , we migh t s ay , wan ted to keep

un t ru th ex te rna l to t ru th whi le s imul taneous ly r ecogn iz ing tha t the l imi t s

o f knowledge were a l so the cond i t ions fo r i t s pos s ib i l i ty . The Copern ican

tu rn ins tant ia tes the f in itude of hu m an cogni t ion with ou t acce pt ing theconsequences o f tha t in s tan t ia t ion . He idegger ' s r ecogn i t ion o f the h i s to r i -

ca l i ty o f t ru th a l lows and r equ i res h im to th ink t ru th and un t ru th

toge ther . The concea lmen t , the l imi t and the cond i t ion , e s sen t ia l to a l l

unc onc ea lm en t , i s r evea led in the se t t ing for th of se l f -secluding ear th in

w o r k s .

I t i s the p lace of the ear th as being revealed ' in ' works ' as ' self-

sec lud ing tha t s t ruc tu res and t roub les He idegger ' s accoun t . Th is ' i n ' and

' a s ' mark the sub jec t iv iz ing , the ac t iva t ion , the empower ing o f the work

itself; an empower ing tha t occur s in r esponse to He idegger ' s des i r e to

iden ti fy the even t o f unc onc ea lm en t w i th p resen c ing as be ing . W orks

are a s t ri f e be twe en wor ld and ea r th , conce a lm en t and unco ncea lme n t ,

p resenc ing and w i thdraw al . Fo r He ide gger th i s s t ri f e i s no t the mere




c o m p l e m e n t a r i t y a n d i n c o m m e n s u r a b i l i t y o f t h e s e t w o a t t r i b u t e s o f w o r k s ,

bu t a pe r son if i ed , and em pow er in g , ba t t l e :

In es sen t ia l s t r iv i ng . . . th e op po ne n ts r a is e each o the r in to the

self-assert ion (Selbstbehaupttung) of the i r na tur es . Self -asser t ion of

na tu re , however , i s never a r ig id ins i s tence upon some con t ingen ts t a t e , bu t surre nd er to th e conc ealed or ig inal i ty of th e sourc e of

one ' s own be ing . In the s t rugg le , each opponen t ca r r i e s the o the r

b e y o n d itself. T h u s t h e s t r i v i n g b e c o m e s e v e r m o r e i n t e n s e a s

s t r iv ing , and more au then t ica l ly wha t i t i s . (OWA, 49)

'Se l f - as se r t ion ' and ' au th en t ic i ty ' shou ld r eca l l u s to the abysma l self-

de te rmina t ion , the r ad ica l au tonomy o f the work ing o f gen ius . In th i s

passage we can perceive the l i teralizing of our f igural identif ication of

be ing and gen ius , the gen ius o f be ing . On ly now th i s iden t i f i ca t ion i s more

d i ff icu lt , m ore than th e ma rk ing o f a sha red ph i losoph ica l p ro b le m at ic , for

here the abysmal r i sk o f t ak ing up the burden o f human s ign i f i cance i s d i s

p laced into works , the e lemen ts ' s t r iv ing ' w i th in them, and the ques t ion o f

p r e s e n c i n g as such. Heidegger appear s to r egard these two moves as

r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o a c k n o w l e d g e a n o n - f o u n d a t i o n a l g r o u n d i n a m a n n e r

that secures i t s ro le h is tor ical ly ( for each and every wor ld) and meta

phys ical ly ( for wo r lds as su ch ) . By personify ing the e lem ents in wo rks

Heidegger d i sp laces ou r en tang lemen t w i th these e lemen ts . I f ' e s s en t ia l

s t r iv ing ' occurs among the e lements of works , wi l l i t not fo l low that our

re la t ion to wh a t is ' e s s en t ia l ' bec om es pas s ive , and th us a r e tu r n to k no w

i n g / c o n t e m p l a t i n g / r e p r e s e n t i n g a s g r o u n d i n g o u r b e i n g - i n - t h e w o r l d ? A n d

wou ld n o t such a r e tu rn a l so be a r e t u rn to sub jec t /ob jec t dua l i sm , as we ll

as mark ing an evas ion o f wha t t ak ing up the burden o f human s ign i f i cance

migh t en ta i l ?

W ha t we cann o t avo id no t ic in g i s how Heide gge r r e th inks the ind e te r

minacy and s chemat iz ing work o f the ( au tonomous and o r ig ina ry )

t r anscenden ta l imag ina t ion o f the th i rd Critique in terms of the ' r i f t '(Riss), and fur ther l inks the work of the r i f t wi th the createdness of the

created work, i t s ' tha t i t « ' uberhaupt. Br ie f ly ,2 8

H e i d e g g e r e m p l o y s t h e

s e m a n t i c n e t w o r k s e d i m e n t e d i n Riss t o s u g g e s t t h e c o m p l e m e n t a r y

incom m ensu rab i l i ty o f ea r th and w or ld , the i r iden t i ty in d i ff e rence ; and

tha t the complemen ta r i ty o f the i r incommensurab i l i ty ge t s r evea led

th rough the ' bas ic des ign ' , the ' ou t l ine ske tch ' , the Riss or s chema the

work pro du ces or i s. T h e r i ft i s an act ive inde ter m ina cy , a d i f ference, a nd

a ma rk ing-un i fy ing in v i r tu e o f wh ich the r if t a s un pre sen tab le con d i t ion

can be though t . The r i f t , then , sp reads ou t to qua l i fy ea r th and wor ld ,

their uni ty and d if ference, and their co-belonging in s t r i fe . In general ,

o f cour se , He idegger i s a t t empt ing to desc r ibe the work-be ing o f a work

in a manner tha t exp l ica tes concea lmen t as an es sen t ia l , cond i t ion ing




c o m p o n e n t of the work , tha t can become manifes t , f igured if not p r e s e n t e d ,

in a w o r k t h r o u g h the work itself. The f inal prizing of the work as the c o n

d i t ion tha t p resen t s its c o n d i t i o n s is t h e r e to spell the dif ference between

h e r m e n e u t i c and t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n q u i r y , a l t h o u g h it is a r g u a b l e w h e t h e r

t h e p r o g r e s s i v e - r e g r e s s i v e m o v e m e n t of t r anscenden ta l r e f l ec t ion is so very

dif ferent f rom Heidegger ' s form of h e r m e n e u t i c a l i n q u i r y . A g a i n , H e i d e g

ger is not offering a t r anscenden ta l ana lys i s on ly in the sense tha t : (i) w h a t

i s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l is not fo rmal or u t te r ly d i s t inc t f rom empi r ica l i t ems ;

a n d (ii) w h a t is t r anscenden ta l canno t i t s e l f be m a d e p r e s e n t or p e r c e p t i b l e .

A good deal of the b u r d e n H e i d e g g e r p l a c e s on the rift, as well as

i t s connec t ion w i th the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n and t r a n s c e n d e n t a l

s c h e m a , c o m e s out in th i s pas sage where He idegger is d iscus s ing D i i r e r ' s

r e m a r k : 'For in t r u t h , art l i e s h idden wi th in na tu re ; he who can wres t it

f rom her, has it.'

' W r e s t ' h e r e m e a n s to d r a w out the rift and to d r a w the des ign with

t h e d r a w i n g - p e n on the d r a w i n g - b o a r d . But we at once ra ise the

c o u n t e r q u e s t i o n : how can the r i f t -des ign be d r a w n out if it is not

b r o u g h t i n t o the O p e n by the crea t ive ske tch as a r if t , which is to

s a y , b r o u g h t out b e f o r e h a n d as a conflict of m e a s u r e [ w o r l d ] and

u n m e a s u r e [ e a r t h ] ? T r u e , t h e r e l i e s h i d d e n in n a t u r e a r i f t -des ign , a

m e a s u r e and a b o u n d a r y and, t ied to it, a capac i ty for b r i n g i n g

for th - t h a t is art. But it is equal ly cer ta in that th is art h i d d e n in

n a t u r e b e c o m e s m a n i f e s t o n l y t h r o u g h the work , because it l ies orig

inally in the w o r k . (OWA, 70)

The r i f t as i n d e t e r m i n a c y is an an t ic ipa t ion ; the re is, we m i g h t say, a rift

in na tu re tha t an t i c ipa tes it as reso urc e , des i gn ( form, f igure, sh ap e,

Gestalt) and se l f - c los ing ( ' boundary ' ) . The rift is the po ten t ia l i ty for the

schema tha t r evea l s bo th wor ld and the rift in n a t u r e as the po ten t ia l i ty for

t h a t w o r l d . W h i c h is to say t h a t we h a v e no access to e a r t h as the non-f o u n d a t i o n a l g r o u n d for w o r l d s o t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h w h a t is revealed in

w o r k s . The f r eedom of the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n a t i o n a p p e a r s h e r e as the

'creative ske tch ' , wh ich He idegger immedia te ly d raws back in to the rift,

an d the conflict of m e a s u r e and u n m e a s u r e . A g a i n , w h i l e the in te rp lay of

ar t and na tu re r epea t s Kan t ' s qua l i f i ca t ion of g e n i u s as t h a t t h r o u g h w h i c h

na tu re g ives the ru le (measure ) to art, H e i d e g g e r q u i c k l y s u b l i m a t e s

n a t u r e i n t o the w o r k . E a c h a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t of the es sen t ia l g round

lessness of a u t o n o m y and the al ter i ty of n a t u r e as u n m a s t e r a b l e g r o u n d

ge t s d i sp laced in to the work itself.

T h e p r e s s u r e on H e i d e g g e r to make th i s d i sp lacemen t de r ives f rom the

des i r e to keep be ing and h u m a n b e i n g i n t i m a t e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h o u t

reduc ing c rea t ion to subject iv i ty . And, aga in , th i s canno t be u n t o w a r d if

th e act of crea t ion is m o r e t h a n an i n t e n t i o n a l d o i n g , m o r e t h a n p r o d u c i n g




in accordance w i th an ex i s t ing p lan . Bu t in He idegger the consequence o f

th i s s t r a tegy i s no t mere ly to make c rea to r s and p rese rver s dependen t on

the work (OWA, 71) , bu t in so do ing to make the work an addres s posed

to ' some a l t e r i ty and no t posed by man fo r man ' . 2 9 A n d t h e c o n s e q u e n c e

of tha t i s to m ake the 'o t he rn es s ' of the ' rec ogn i t ion of se lf in o t he rne ss ' ,

wh ich i s s ti ll he re the gove rn ing and ga th er ing ges tu re , the m ov em en to f coming in to p resence itself. This i s why Heidegger in te rp re t s the

c rea tednes s o f works no t in t r ad i t iona l in ten t iona l i s t t e rms tha t wou ld no te

a work ' s o r ig in in human p roduc t ive ac t iv i ty ; bu t r a the r , in on to log ica l

t e rms where tha t ' a work is at a l l ra t he r than is no t ' (O W A , 64) is the

ha pp en ing o f the work , wh a t makes it r em arkab le . Hence what is

(figuratively) brough t into the open by a work is that there is some thing

rather than nothin g, that is the ultimate source of its sublimity; and only in

virtue of its conn ection with this (figuratively concealed) revelation can a

work open a world.

To be su re , s ince we do no t de te rmine the sheer ex i s tence o f the wor ld

th rough our ac t iv i t i e s , then i f the be ing o f th ings mat te r s w i th r espec t to

t r u t h , w orks can only f igure w or ld s i f they do def in i t ively t ra ns ce nd their

p roducer s . He idegger i s append ing th i s though t to the va l id thes i s tha t

some works , e spec ia l ly , fo r us , the au tonomous works o f a r t i s t i c modern

i sm - works K an t cons ide r s to be p rod uc t s o f gen ius because they exceed

the p rev io us de te rm ina t io ns o f a r t h i s to ry - can on ly func t ion by

eng end er ing th e i r ow n cond i t io ns of r ecep t ion . Whi ch is bu t an o th er w ay

of s ay ing tha t m ode rn i s t w orks c rea te the com m uni ty tha t can ackno wl

edge their s ignif icance as works of ar t . In th is case , as we have a l ready

seen , works r ea l ly a re in a s t r ange way communi ty -c rea t ing . He idegger

fo lds th is concept ion of works over the great works of the pas t , wi th the

con seq uen ce th at the ' a s ' of 'as ar t ' is do ub led in ord er to f igure the bei ng

of the world as such, i ts ' that i t exis ts at al l ' . Hence the createdness of the

world as a whole is finally thought through immanently. T hi s i s ce r ta in ly the

ul t imate d isp lacement of creat ion myths . But i t i s jus t th is radical i ty in

Heidegger ' s accoun t tha t t roub les i t . In o rder to manage an u l t ima te d i s p lacemen t o f the p roduc t iv i s t pa rad igm he mus t f i r s t t ake up the case o f

the exem pla ry h um an c rea t ion - the work of a r t - an d the n d i sp lace the

s i te of human beings in the creat ive act . Heidegger hence deals wi th the

rea l inadequacy o f s t andard concep t ions fo r the under s tand ing o f ac t ion

by t r ans fe r r ing the p rob lem at ic a t t r ib u te s of sub jec t iv ity in to the ob jec t ,

and then , th rough the r e lay the work r ep resen t s , in to na tu re itself. N a t u r e

becomes ea r th which r ewr i tes physis as the process of manifes ta t ion .

W o r l d s t h u s b e c o m e m a n i f e s t a t i o n s , o r m o d e s , o f n a t u r e .

At B 181 of the first Critique K an t s t a tes tha t s chem at i sm is an ' a r t

concea led in the dep ths o f the human sou l , whose r ea l modes o f ac t iv i ty

nature is hardly l ikely ever to a l low us to d iscover , and to have open to our

g a z e ' . Ev ery th ing in the s en ten ce is co r rec t for He ideg ger excep t the




p l a c e m e n t of th is art in the h u m a n s o u l : s c h e m a t i s m is an art h i d d e n in

n a t u r e ; t h i s art, impl ic i t in na tu re , on ly becomes ac tua l in the work ; and

whi le the work wou ld not be withou t c rea to r s and p r e s e r v e r s , it is the

work tha t 'makes c rea to r s pos s ib le ' (OWA, 71). W o r k s s c h e m a t i z e e x p e r i

en ce ; the i r doub le 'as' s t ructure of fer ing both a f igure of w o r l d and a

figure of the e v e n t of figuration. Schematism is Ereignis (the a p p r o p r i a t i v eev en t ) : what g ives be ing , the e v e n t of u n c o n c e a l m e n t . The p r i c e for th is

t r a n s f o r m a t i o n is t h a t the mot iva t ing fo rce for c o n s i d e r i n g the forgot ten

q u e s t i o n of b e i n g , n a m e l y , the o v e r c o m i n g of the r e d u c t i o n of the b e i n g of

t h i n g s to p r e s e n c e in o r d e r to set free their al ter i ty or o t h e r n e s s , b e c o m e s

s q u a n d e r e d in the a l t e r i ty of b e i n g itself. How c o u l d a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t

of the absen t ia l cond i t ions for presence s ecure the a l t e r i ty of t h i n g s , an

al ter i ty the m e a n i n g and signif icance of w h i c h r e m a i n s u t t e r l y o p a q u e on

th i s accoun t , w i thou t our r e s p e c t i n g and h e e d i n g it? But if be ing c rea tes

t h e c o n d i t i o n s of its own r e c e p t i o n , in concea l ing and r evea l ing , then all

r espons ib i l i ty is r e m o v e d f r o m us.

In d i sp lac ing the t r a i t s of human sub jec t iv i ty in to works in o r d e r to

avoid subject iv iz ing their creat ion , the b u r d e n of human s ign i f i cance , a

b u r d e n t h a t is now w i t h o u t l i m i t or g r o u n d , is l if ted from the s h o u l d e r s of

h u m a n b e i n g s and given over to b e i n g - s o m e t h i n g t h a t is evident f rom

t h e c o m p a r i s o n of the H e i d e g g e r i a n and K a n t i a n v e r s i o n s of the creat ion

of exempla ry works ( even if one concedes tha t Kan t ' s incend ia ry d ia lec t i c

p r o m o t e s a f r e n z i e d a u t o n o m y ) . Of c o u r s e , a cer ta in ' l e f t ' He ideg-g e r i a n i s m m i g h t w a n t to d ispu te th i s thes i s by c la iming tha t the real goal

o f H e i d e g g e r ' s t h o u g h t is not the t r u t h of b e i n g (and the b e i n g of t r u t h )

b u t r a t h e r to t h i n k 'an or ig ina l ga the r ing which does not abrogate var ie ty ,

bu t un i f i e s wha t t ends apar t in a way that preserves d i f ference with in

u n i t y ' .3 0

W h a t is b e i n g t h o u g h t h e r e is a n o n - i m p o s i t i o n a l or non-

d o m i n a t i n g s y n t h e s i s of the mani fo ld - w h i c h is ju s t , as we shal l see,

A d o r n o ' s way of t h i n k i n g a b o u t the a u t o n o m o u s w o r k of a r t . And H e i d e g

ger does say th ings l ike th is :

I f we have g rasped the f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g of logos as g a t h e r i n g

and toge thernes s , then we mus t t ake no t ice and keep firmly in m i n d

tha t : ga the r ing is n e v e r a m e r e r o u n d i n g up and h e a p i n g t o g e t h e r . It

m a i n t a i n s w h a t is s t r iv ing apar t and agains t one a n o t h e r in the i r

b e l o n g i n g - t o g e t h e r n e s s . Nor d o e s it let them dec l ine in to d i sper s ion

a n d c o l l a p s e . . . I t d o e s not a l l o w t h a t w h i c h r e i g n s t h r o u g h o u t

to d issolve in to an empty ind i f f e rence , but by u n i f y i n g o p p o n e n t s

p rese rves the e x t r e m e s h a r p n e s s of t h e i r t e n s i o n .3 1

S o the str ife in the w o r k of art b e c o m e s a g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n for the

re la t ion of e l e m e n t s in a to ta l i ty that can t h e n be p r o j e c t e d o n t o a c o m

m u n i t y itself. And, i n d e e d , in An Introduction to Metaphysics H e i d e g g e r



T H E G E N I U S OF B E I N G 1 2 5

f igures the polis as a s i t e s t ruc tu ra l ly homologous to the w o r k of grea t art;

b e t t e r , it becomes c lea r in th i s work tha t wha t He idegger was c o n s i d e r i n g

in his a c c o u n t of grea t art in ' O r i g i n ' was the G r e e k polis: the polis is the

Greek work of great art. The p a s s a g e in ques t ion is w o r t h q u o t i n g in its

e n t i r e t y :

N o l o n g e r poros, but polis, is n a m e d ; not all p a t h s to the r e a l m s of

b e i n g s , but the bas is and locus of the Dasein of h u m a n b e i n g itself,

the junc t ion of all t h e s e p a t h s , the polis. One t r ans la tes polis as s ta te

or c i ty-s ta te ; which misses its fu l l mean ing . Ra ther , polis n a m e s the

si te , the Da, w h e r e i n and as w h i c h Da-sein is as h is to r ica l . The polis

is the site of h is to ry , tha t Da, in w h i c h , through which , and fo r w h i c h

h i s t o r y h a p p e n s . To this s i te of h is to ry be long the g o d s , the t e m p l e s ,

the p r ies t s , the festivals , the g a m e s , the p o e t s , the t h i n k e r s , the

r u l e r s , the counc i l of e l d e r s , the a s s e m b l y of p e o p l e , the a r m y and

the fleet. All th i s does not first belong to the polis, is not po l i t i ca l ,

b e c a u s e of en t ry in to r e la t ion w i th a s t a t e s m e n and a genera l and the

b u s i n e s s of s ta te . On the c o n t r a r y , t h o s e n a m e d are pol i t ica l , that

m e a n s , at the site of h is to ry , in so far as t h e r e are, for e x a m p l e , p o e t s

alone, but then r ea l ly poe t s , th inker s alone, but then r ea l ly th inker s ,

p r ies t s alone, but then real ly pr ies ts , ru lers alone, but then real ly

r u l e r s . To be, h o w e v e r , h e r e m e a n s : as the power fu l ones , to use

p o w e r and b e c o m e o u t s t a n d i n g in his tor ical being as crea to r s , doer s .

O u t - s t a n d i n g in the site of h is to ry , they become equa l ly apolis, w i t h

out c i ty and s i t e , a lone , homeles s , w i thou t exped ien t in the m i d s t of

be ings as a whole , equa l ly w i thou t s t a tu te and l i m i t , w i t h o u t s t r u c

t u r e and order , because they as creators mus t a lways f i r s t found all

t h i s . 3 2

T h e polis is the site of h is to ry , tha t is, the site in v i r t u e of w h i c h a

c o m m u n i t y has a specif ic his torical identi ty and t h u s d e s t i n y . H e r e , t h e n ,

t h e t e m p l e t h a t was h is to r ic iz ing in 'O r ig in ' becomes i t s e l f a m o m e n t in

the l a rge r work tha t is the polis itself. And w h a t m a k e s the e l e m e n t s of the

polis polit ical is the i r r emain ing s tead fas t 'at the site of h i s t o r y ' . The ' p o l

i t i ca l ' thence deno tes not m a t t e r s of g o v e r n m e n t (the leg is la t ion , execut ion

a n d j u d g e m e n t of l aws , say), but the crea t ion , fo rmat ion and s u s t a i n i n g of

the h is tor ical ident i ty of a p e o p l e as b e i n g the p e o p l e it is, the crea t ion or

r e -c rea t ion of thei r ca tegor ia l being in the wor ld , the i r way of t a k i n g up

and sus ta in ing the b u r d e n of human s ign i f i cance .

I t m i g h t now be t e m p t i n g to c o n s i d e r the a lonenes s of the m e m b e r s of

t h e polis as tha t wh ich a l lows them to en te r in to conver sa t ion w i th one

a n o t h e r in o r d e r to c o - c r e a t e a c o m m u n i t y w h o s e e s s e n c e is m o r e t h a n

w h a t any one i n d i v i d u a l c o n t r i b u t e s . And th i s wou ld be p laus ib le if we

t h o u g h t H e i d e g g e r was a t t e m p t i n g to b i n d K a n t i a n and Aris to te l i an



1 2 6 T H E G E N I U S O F B EI N G

t e r m s . Again : does no t the 'w i tho u t e nd ' s t ru c tu re o f gen iu s al ign it to

praxis, and does no t the non -su bsu m pt iv e cogn i t ion o f r e fl ect ive ju dge

ment recal l us to phronesis? W o u l d n o t t h e K a n t i a n i d e a t h a t w e m u s t

respond to an au tonomous work au tonomous ly and tha t the sp i r i t o f

genius is radical ly opposed to the sp ir i t of imita t ion g ive force and gener

a l i ty to He idegger ian a lonenes s , under l in ing h i s con ten t ion tha t ' c r ea to r s

must a lways f i r s t found a l l th is '? Are not these creators more l ike auton

o m o u s b e i n g s t h a n N i e t z s c h e a n n o b l e b e i n g s ? W o u l d n o t s u c h a n a s s u m p

t ion exp l ica te the connec t ion be tween the polis a n d d e m o c r a c y , w h e r e

dem ocracy f igures the tho ug h t tha t the burd en o f hu m an s ign if icance is

our r espons ib i l i ty , bu t a r espons ib i l i ty th a t we can satisfy only if each of us

acts alone, au tonomous ly? I s i t no t then th rough these though ts tha t we

ar r ive a t the concep t ion o f the polis as wor ld , in the s t rong sense , whose

being is pol i t ica l , where the idea of the pol i t ica l refers to some concept ionof h is tor ical ly f in i te t ran sce nd en ta l leg isla t ion?

Cer ta in ly wi th these thoughts in mind i t would not be d i f f icul t to

under s tand Heidegger ' s emphas i s on the work o f a r t a s a way o f h igh

l igh t ing , and r es to r ing , the anc ien t p r io r i ty o f praxis over poiesis, d o i n g

over mak ing , c rea t ion over p roduc t ion ; w i th the p rov i so tha t p rax i s i s on ly

revea led in someth ing made , poe t ica l ly .3 3

For Kan t , I sugges ted , th i s

amoun ts to the thes i s tha t f r eedom appears on ly in the c rea ted th ing , the

work of ar t ; and only in the a l ter i ty represented by the created work can

w e s p e c t a t o rs b e s u m m o n e d t o o u r fr e e d o m . K a n t ' s e m p h a s i s o n

communicab i l i ty in the judgement o f the work o f a r t wou ld then be a d i s

tant echo of the fact that for Ar is to t le the domain of praxis a n d phronesis

was one of doxa, op in ion , no t demons t rab le knowledge . P res s ing these

though ts , we migh t now con jec tu re tha t r ead ing the inner iden t i ty o f the

Greek work of great ar t and the polis through the lens of the work of

genius a l lows us to perceive that t ranscendenta l leg is la t ion in i t s var ious

t r ad i t iona l ph i losoph ica l fo rmula t ions - f rom t he P la ton ic ideas , to Go d ' s

c rea t ion , to the cog i to o r the Kan t ian l eg i s la t ion o f under s tand ing and

reason - in each case suppres ses a more immanen t and es sen t ia l ly political

categor ia l gather ing , where , again , what makes th is legis la t ion pol i t ica l i s

i ts his to rica l f initeness . If this we re the case, th at is , if th e un sai d of the

G r e e k polis were i ts being retrospectively a work of great ar t , then i t would

fol low that the metaphys ics (of presence) , which is the object of

He ideg ger ' s co ncern , is the sup pres s io n o f the hu m an voca t ion fo r f r ee

dom f i r s t r e leased in modern i ty and themat ized in the modern work o f a r t .

Gen ius - o r be t t e r , the p r inc ip le gen ius r ep resen t s , namely , tha t the

h u m an v ocat ion for f reedom is real ized only w he n the ef for t to actau tonomous ly , to t ake up the burden o f human s ign i f i cance o r ig ina r i ly , i s

m ad e - i s the re lease and h is tor ica l rea l iza t ion of the m ean ing of praxis.

G e n i u s i m p r i n t s o n t o t h e G r e e k polis, which knew ne i the r h i s to ry nor c re

a t ion in the modern sense , i t s excess ive character as f igur ing pol i t ica l




praxis as t ran sce nd en ta l leg is la t ion - a legis la tion that i s necessar i ly , as

c rea t ive , s chemat iz ing and o r ig ina ry , g round les s . On ly as a work o f a r t

un der s too d th ro ug h the s e lf - t r ansg res sing f r eedom of gen iu s can the

m e a n i n g o f t h e polis be un de r s to od . And on ly in t e rm s o f the gen ius -be ing

of the polis c a n w e u n d e r s t a n d H e i d e g g e r ' s e m p l o y m e n t o f g r e a t a r t a s

exempla ry fo r the ques t ion o f be ing and h i s to ry .

3 4

Heidegger ' s r e la t ing o fa r t to h i s to ry and communi ty r e leases the po l i t i ca l s ign i f i cance o f modern

ar t th r ou gh h i s com preh ens io n o f the ' aes th e t i c ' f ea tu res of an t i que po l i t i c s .

Corre la t ively , aes th et ic cu l tu re figures a radical ly dem ocr at ic pol i t ica l

cu l tu r e , a cu l tu re tha t ex i s ts now on ly aes the ti ca l ly because the p ro du c-

t iv is t logic of progress ive , technological cul ture is the suppress ion of the

e th ica l : p rac t i ca l knowing and wi l l ing . Hence , the burden o f h i s to r ica l

ex i s tence ge t s dec ided apar t f rom the h i s to r ica l communi ty in the

mechan isms o f soc ie ta l r ep roduc t ion demanded by the log ic o f the p ro

g res s ive (p roduc t iv i s t ) cu l t u re . H is to ry i s m ad e , p ro du ced , be h in d th ebacks of men - by Gestell.

E e r i l y , t h i s a r g u m e n t w o u l d m a k e H e i d e g g e r ' s d e s t r u c t i o n a n d d o u b l e

read ing o f the t r ad i t ion an a lmos t Feuerbach ian o r Marx ian f ab le o f p ro

jec t ion and ( r e )appropr ia t ion , w i th the an t i -humanis t o r an t i - sub jec t iv i s t

tw is t tha t the c rea t ions o f f r eedom t r ansce nden ta l ly exceed and g ro un d th e

sub jec t iv i ty f rom which they ' o r ig ina te ' . Of cour se , tha t tw is t tu rns ,

tw is t s , the ax is o f the f ab le : ( r e )app ropr ia t ion occur s th ro ug h d i spo s ses

s ion; we come closer to our es t ranged essence as pol i t ica l beings through

d i s t a n c i n g , t h r o u g h t h e a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t t h a t m o d e r n ( t r a n s c e n d e n t a l )

subject iv i ty , which appears as what is mos t near , as our t rue self, is in fact

wha t i s mos t metaphys ica l ly d i s tan t . And wha t makes th i s a p laus ib le

hypothes is i s the v iew that a l l the moments of the logic of the c lass ical

acco un t o f ex te rna l i za t ion , r e if i cat ion and r eapp ropr ia t ion dep end up on a

l o gi c o f p r o d u c t i o n . T h i s l e av e s u n i n t e r r o g a t e d , a n d u n k n o w n , w h a t

ins t i tu tes a l ter i ty , why our fa te is t ied to exter ior i ty , how what is o ther

than se l f can ground i t ; a l l we have is a that such is the case , wi th the

being of genius and the genius of being s t i l l locked in an unfathomabledance . None the les s , such an a rgument migh t we l l be t aken to r ep resen t a

ce r ta in ' l e f t ' He idegger ian pe r spec t ive .

B ut i t i s no t H eid eg ge r ' s . Alon enes s for h im figures th e d is ta nc e

between those who are s t i l l mired in the everyday, in chat ter , and those

who can r espond to the sub l ime addres s , who can l i s t en in o rder tha t the

des t iny o f a peop le can beco m e man i fes t . T h e acco un t o f g rea t a r t r e leases

a though t ac t ive in He idegger ever s ince §74 o f Being and Time. N o t e ,

above a l l , the f inal sentence of th is passage:

In finite liberty Dasein t akes on the impo tence (Ohnmacht) of its

being-yie lded up to i t se l f and i t becomes c la i rvoyant wi th respect

to th e cont ing enc ies of th e s i tua t ion that i s revealed to i t . N o w if




Dasein, sub jec ted to des t iny , ex i st s a s a be in g- in - the -w or ld ; i f by v i r

tue of th is i t ex is ts essent ia l ly in being-with o thers , i t s advent is a lso

a n a d v e n t - w i t h (ein Mitgeschehen), i t has the sense of something

des t ined (Geschick). By th i s we in ten d the adv en t o f the co m m un i ty ,

o f the peop le . What i s des t ined does no t s imply r esu l t f rom the sum

of ind iv idua l des t in ies , any more than be ing-wi th - in - rec ip roc i ty

in a s ingle wor ld and in the decis ion-resolved (Entschlossenheit) fo r

cer ta in determined poss ib i l i t ies , des t in ies f ind themselves a l ready

c h a n n e l e d . I n c o m m u n i c a t i o n (Mitteilung) a n d i n c o m b a t t h e p o w e r

of wha t i s des t ined i s mere ly l ibe ra ted . 3 5

Freedom i s the r eso lu te passivity a n d impotence that a l lows what has

p repared i t s e l f fo r the longes t t ime to become l ibe ra ted ; communica t ion ,

a t bes t , f ac i l i t a tes tha t l ibe ra t ion . 'O r ig in ' empha t ica l ly under l ines th i st h o u g h t : ' T h e r e s o l u t e n e s s (Entschlossenheit) i n t e n d e d i n Being and Time is

no t the de l ibe ra te ac t ion o f a sub jec t , bu t the open ing up o f human be ing ,

ou t o f i t s cap t iv i ty in tha t wh ich i s , to the opennes s o f Be ing ' (OWA, 67) .

On ly the s chema o f the sub l ime addres s a l lows the r eso lu te ind iv idua l to

be ' b rough t under l aw ' ; hence , aga in , p rese rv ing ' a s knowing , i s a sober

s tand ing-wi th in the ex t r ao rd inary awesomeness o f the t ru th tha t i s

h a p p e n i n g i n t h e w o r k ' ( O W A , 6 7 - 8 ) . H e i d e g g e r , d e s p e r a t e t o a v o i d t h e

' f rom the ins ide ou t ' logic of subject iv i ty an d pro du ct i on , can only inv er t

it: lExistenz i s ou t - s tand ing s tand ing-wi th in the es sen t ia l sunderance o f

the c lear ing of beings ' (OWA, 67) . Al l ef for t i s towards the suppress ion of

wi l l , towards be ing in a pos i t ion to r espond to wha t addres ses us empha t i

cal ly and absolute ly f rom without .

I t is precisely because he conceives of freedom as only to be freed for a

des t iny a lways a l r eady s en t tha t He idegger mus t suppres s h i s fundamenta l

r e l i ance on the modern exper ience tha t connec t s f r eedom and h i s to ry . H is

mise ry i s tha t on ly someth ing l ike c rea t ion , whose empha t ic in s tance i s

g iven in ar t , i s adequate for the purpose of bracket ing the c la ims of thelogic of product ion . But creat ion in the sense required is indel ib ly t ied to

the modern exper ience o f f r eedom and sub jec t iv i ty . What makes a r t puz

zl ing , enigmat ic , i s jus t that ar t works are in tent ional i tems , a lbei t ones

tha t can no t be s a tu ra ted b y any in ten t iona l desc r ip t ion o f the i r com ing to

b e . N on eth ele ss , the ef for t of creat io n can be precise in i t s or ien ta t ion .

F u r t h e r , c o m m u n i c a t i o n b e c o m e s i m p o r t a n t , m o r e t h a n a n a i d t o l i b e r

a t ing a des t iny , on ly i f human p lu ra l i ty i s a l r eady es tab l i shed . Bu t p lu

ra l i ty , wha tever e l s e i t means , mus t r e fe r to the d i s t inc t ion be tween gen ius

and imi ta t ion , however overd rawn tha t d i s t inc t ion may be in Kan t , andhowev er en igm at ic the idea o f an aud ience o f gen ius m ay be . Fo r wha t

tha t idea enta i ls i s bo th t ha t the work of gen ius is id le un t i l success ion -

fu r the r works tha t ackno wledg e i ts exem pla r i ty - i s ev id enc ed ; and tha t

success ion mus t i t se l f be a work of f ree judgement s ince what g ives back

to the exempla r the de te rminacy i t pos ses ses a re i t s succes so r s . Exempla ry




works are thus de facto answers to the paradox of legis la t ive author i ty ,

tha t i s , the pa radox as to how to pu t the l aw above man and the reby es tab

l i sh the va l id i ty o f man-made laws . Th is pa radox i s bu t the mos t s t r ik ing

vers ion of the paradox of f in i tude, namely , how can what is man-made,

and hence empi r ica l , be s imul taneous ly t r anscenden ta l and au thor i t a t ive?

I f one ins i s t s tha t wha t i s man-made i s mere ly empi r ica l , o r wha t i s

t ranscendenta l i s necessar i ly a temporal , or a pr ior i or formal , then th is

paradox has no so lu t ion . He idegger , desp i te himself, accep ts the t e rms o f

the pa radox , and the reby den ies the so lu t ion exempla ry works y ie ld . What

they demons tra te is the fa ls i ty of the e i ther /or of : e i ther ins ide out ( subjec

t iv ism) , or outs ide in (object iv ism) . Heidegger is forced to opt for objec

t iv i sm the moment he cons igns gen ius to the log ic o f modern sub jec t iv i ty .

I f we now look aga in a t He idegger ' s desc r ip t ion o f the sub l ime polis, it

henc e beco me s clear tha t i t does no t desc r ibe a dem ocra t i c au to - ins t i tu t ion

of a peop le , bu t the i r fo rmat ion , the i r aes the t i c educ a t ion th rou gh thework of art or what is sufficiently l ike the work of great ar t to be thought

o f in t e rms o f a sub l ime addres s . Th is i s why polis shou ld no t be t r ans la ted

as s ta te or c i ty-s ta te , of what d i rect ly per ta ins to the pol i t ica l ; the s ta te

and the pol i t ica l are founded or grounded in the wor ld , in the categor ia l

l eg i s la t ion r e leased by the s chemat iz ing o f works , indeed , the ' opennes s

o f B e i n g ' itself. A nd s ince the kno win g of th e wo r ld as a wh ole is

ph i losoph ica l knowing , then the s ta te i s g rounded in ph i losoph ica l cog

ni t ion - and not pol i t ica l praxis or judgement , these be ing g rounded in the

or ig inal ins ight in to the bein g of th e wo r ld as a wh ole . A l th ou gh great ly

defe r red , He idegger he re r epea t s the f ab led P la ton ic suppres s ion o f the

po l i t i ca l w i th which we began th i s s tudy .3 6

Heidegger ' s aes the t i c iza t ion o f

th e poli t ical , his f iguring of th e polis in the image of the work of great ar t ,

is hen ce ha rd ly ben ign . By sup pre s s ing the m om en t o f f r eedom th r ou gh

which the work o f a r t can mode l the c rea t ive d imens ion o f h i s to ry , i t s

s e l f -o the r ing , the ana logy be tween a r t and the s ta te makes the who le o f the

s t a t e a s u b l i m e i n s t a n c e s u b m e r g i n g i t s m e m b e r s . U n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s ,

the aes thet ic izat ion of the pol i t ica l devolves f rom the real iza t ion of the

m e a n i n g o f p o l it ic s t o it s u t t e r a b a n d o n m e n t .

The ques t ion o f the po l i t i ca l i s in t imate ly r e la ted to the ques t ion o f

ar t because the la t ter i s cons is tent ly or iented toward the ques t ion of

communi ty : a t f i r s t weak ly in t e rms o f the ambiguous s ta tus o f the ' un i

ve r sa l i ty ' o f the jud gem ent o f t a s te , and the n r ad ica l ly in the com m un i ty -

c rea t ing o f the work o f gen ius . These aes the t i c o r a r t i s t i c communi t i e s

provide a l ternat ive concept ions of so l idar i ty to those on offer in contem

pora ry p rogres s ive cu l t u re . An d th i s m at te r s , the tho ugh t o f accord o r

sensus communis mat te r s , because the modern be l i e f tha t l i e s beh ind l ibe r a l ism has prove d id le , nam ely , tha t the wo r ld of every day af fa i rs , th e

wor ld of family and work, of cul ture and le isure , are able to p ick up the

burden o f human s ign i f i cance l e f t vacan t w i th the d i s appearance o f

re l ig ious belief. T h e po in t is no t tha t we requ i re a t r ans cen den t dom ain




beyond everyday l i fe ; i t i s ra ther that the c la ims of ordinar iness have not

p rove d s e l f - au then t ica t ing . H en ce the l ibe ra l s t r a tegy o f vaca t ing the pu b

l ic wor ld of e th ical subs tance for the sake of pr ivate goods , in terpreted

broadly as the goods of secular exis tence, has in fact quickened the

d i s in teg ra t ion o f mean ing , the rush o f n ih i l i s t i c decay .3 7

Only a subs tan t ia l

pol i t ica l cul ture is now capable of providing the or ienta t ion that could

release everyday l i fe , mundane real i ty , a l lowing i t to escape the fu t i l i ty

asc r ibed to i t by the r e l ig ious t r ad i t ion . He idegger under s tood per fec t ly

th e sense in which 'ac co rd ' i s a qu es t io n for us , how t he pat h of f in i tude

m us t be p rov ided w i th a pub l ic mean ing i f o rd in a r ines s i s to escape

fut il i ty . T h u s it i s th at in h is Nie tzsc he lec ture s He ide gg er ma kes jus t ice

the point of convergence between ar t and t ru th (Ni i i , sect ion 21) , a lbei t a

convergence which in i t s N ie tzschean fo rm so he igh tens the p lace o f the

wi l l tha t Be ing , t r ans f igu red o rd inar ines s , i s suppres sed . None the les s , i t i s

ar t ' s t ransf igurat ive power , the work of genius , that sus ta ins the poss ib i l i ty

o f t r ans f igu red o rd ina r ines s in m ode rn i ty .

I n m a r r y i n g a r t , s c h e m a t i s m a n d polis Heidegger un locks the impl ic i t

r ad ica l i ty o f the theory o f gen ius wh i le s imul taneous ly p rov id ing fo r

a n o n - H e g e l i a n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e polis as a work of art . By his very

un K an t ia n de ta ch m en t of gen ius f rom f reedom and h i s a ll too Kan t ian

t r anscenden ta l cons t rua l o f s chemat i sm Heidegger suppres ses the po l i t i ca l

a t the moment o f i t s ( r e )appearance . He idegger thus mis reads the po l i t i ca l

impl icat ions of ar t . Because he wishes for the re- ins t i tu t ion of the Greekexper ience o f the polis, bu t f a i l s to acknowledge wha t the modern con t r i

bu t io n to the m ean ing o f i t i s , wha t wou ld m ake a r e - ins t i tu t ion m ore than

mere ly a du l l imi ta t ion , he aes the t i c izes the po l i t i ca l . Modern a r t and aes

thet ic s are no t a m er e refuge for the Gre ek polis, they l ibe ra te a mean ing

in i t not here tofore present . Nei ther an aes thet ic izat ion of the pol i t ica l nor

a po l i t i c ized aes the t i c cou ld r espond to the d i l emma o f modern i ty , a

d i l emma bes t encapsu la ted in the though t o f the duality be tween these

t w o , what causes tha t dua l i ty and thus makes e i the r an aes the t i c iza t ion o f

pol i t ics or a pol i t ic izat ion of aes thet ics appear as authent ic responses to i t .

Th i s i s no t to deny wha t has now appeared as the d r iv ing con ten t ion o f

th i s work , tha t ph i losoph ica l cons id e ra t ion o f the m ean ing o f a r t in m od

e rn i ty beco me s the tho ug h t o f a ce r ta in ab sen t po l i t ic s ; a tho ug h t en ta i l ing

tha t , in a m an ne r o f speak ing , a r t and aes the t i c s a re the unsa id o f mod ern

pol i t ics , i t s specula t ive o ther .

v ii i A e s t h e t i c A l i e n a t i o n

Throughou t th i s chap te r I have been ins i s t ing tha t a r t and aes the t i c d i s

course as they are for us now are what provide the cr i t ica l vantage point

that opposes and reveals the re ign of technological presencing, and

th rough th i s r eve la t ion the h i s to ry tha t loca tes th i s r e ign as the sup-




pres s ion o f f in i t e t r anscendence . I have nowhere den ied tha t such a van

tage po in t and h i s to ry a re p rov ided by He ideg ger ' s e s say . T h is c om m its

me to the c la im tha t He idegger ' s s t r a tegy in 'Or ig in ' , h i s manner o f

en jo in ing the a r t and t echno logy nexus the re , does no t r e ly upon the

specif ics of the l inkage es tabl ished in the la ter essay , 'The ques t ion con

ce rn ing t echno logy ' , namely , the iden t i ty and d i f f e rence o f techne a n dpoiesis, and the inver s ion t rop e o f ' g rea tes t dange r / s av ing pow er ' .

The cen t ra l ques t ion posed by 'Or ig in ' , a s we l l a s by the N ie tzsche

lectu res on ar t , is w he the r we can engag e with ar t in a m an ne r tha t is not

aes the t i ca l , in a m an ner th a t t r an scen ds the c i r cumsc r ip t ion o f a r t in

'p l ea su re ' and outs id e cogni t i on an d e th ic s . Ind ee d, as we saw in the f ir st

s ec t ion o f th i s chap te r , He id egg er i s com m i t ted to the thes i s tha t aes the t i c

perc ep t io n exceeds i ts e lf tow ards 'wh a t has p ro per wor th in i t s e l f (N ,

109). In po in t ing to the Gree k t emp le He ide gger i s po in t in g to ano th er

con cep t io n o f a r t , and ask ing wh e th er , however dom ina te d and r ep res se d ,

a r t does no t make an ana logous c la im now. I t i s in and th rough the

ack now ledg em ent th a t such an ex t ra -ae s the t i ca l c la im i s be ing mad e - tha t

ar t i s not ident ical wi th i t se l f in terms of i t s ca tegor ia l inscr ip t ion as

m ere ly aes the t ic - that it i s th ro w n in to cr i t ica l juxta pos i t io n with th e

regnan t (p rogres s ive ) cu l tu re , the ru l ing economy o f p resence tha t r educes

c r e a t i o n t o p r o d u c t i o n , p r e s e n c i n g t o p r e s e n c e . H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t

mus t go th i s way s ince the c la im, s ay , tha t the Greek t emple r evea led a

wor ld mus t remain id le for us now so long as noth ing in our wor ld

cor responds to i t . Whi le the Greek t emple may s t i l l s t and , ' t he wor ld o f

t h e w o r k t h a t s t a n d s t h e r e h a s p e r i s h e d . . . W o r l d - w i t h d r a w a l a n d w o r l d -

decay can never be undone ' (OWA, 41) . On i t s own , a l l the example o f the

Greek t emple r evea l s i s tha t , once upon a t ime , a r t works were more than

aes the t i c ob jec t s . Un les s the re i s 'm or e ' to Van Go gh ' s pa in t ing tha n w ha t

an aes thet ic regard can make of i t , then there exis ts noth ing to pose

aga ins t the c la ims o f t ru th -on ly cogn i t ion and techno log ica l p resenc ing .

How, then , does aes the t i c pe rcep t ion exceed i t s e l f ?

A na tu re poem by Holder l in , the pa in t ing o f a pa i r o f peasan t shoes byV a n G o g h : s o m e t h i n g i n H e i d e g g e r ' s p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d d e p l o y m e n t o f

these works c la im, so l ic i t us to a mode of reveal ing we cannot val idate ,

sus ta in o r even in a s ense fu lly un de r s ta nd . T he y lu re us to an o th er s cen e

of r evea l ing , bu t one we can no t inhab i t . Th er e is a t em pta t i on to pu t th i s

thought in famil iar terms: ar t works of fer poss ib i l i t ies of unders tanding

phenomena that are not now real ized; hence ar t i s f ic t ional because i t deals

wi th imag ina t ive ly conce ived pos s ib i l i t i e s . A l though Heidegger ' s thes i s a t

f i r s t sounds l ike th is , and in 'Or ig in ' i s in tended to so sound, he is in fact

a t t e m pt in g to deny jus t such a thes i s s ince i ts opera t ive conc ep t ion o f

'mere pos s ib i l i ty ' depends upon mak ing ac tua l i ty (p resence) p r io r to and

ind epe nd en t o f wh a t make s it ( t r anscen den ta l ly ) pos s ib le . I t is ju s t th i s

r educ t ion o f pos s ib i l i ty tha t r educes ' aes the t i c ' cogn i t ion to t a s te .

What , then , a re we to make o f the c la ims o f the Van Gogh and the




Holder l in? Does the end of great ar t en ta i l that these works have only

'object-being ' , being as objects for aes thet ic consciousness ; or , despi te the

pass ing away of great ar t , do they not possess some 'work-being ' as wel l

(OWA, 41)? He idegger concedes to the Van Gogh tha t a s a work i t

be longs ' un iq ue ly w i th in the r ea lm tha t i s open ed up by i t s e l f (O W A ,

41) . What i s the mean ing and be ing o f such a r ea lm which i s ne i the r anepochal wor ld nor a realm of the imaginat ion , a fantasy wor ld? In Truth

and Method, Gadamer too s eeks to r edeem ar t f rom the c lu tches o f the

a e s t h e t i c .3 8

According to Gadamer , aes thet ic consciousness feels i t se l f f ree

to accep t o r re jec t a r t works , an d , a t bo t tom , a l though we m igh t c ha l l enge

or d i spu te aes the t i c judgements , the i r au tonomy guaran tees tha t ne i the r

reason ( logic) nor moral consciousness can jus t i fably force us to a l ter such

a judgement . However , aes the t i c consc iousnes s , ou r s e l f - consc iousnes s o f

ourselves as being free to accept or reject ar t works on the basis of

aes the t i c judgements , be l i e s a more bas ic exper ience whereby , once s e ized

by the c la im of an ar t work , we no longer feel ourselves f ree to accept or

re ject the work on our o w n t e r m s . G a d a m e r ' s p o i n t h e r e c o u l d b e t h a t

d i s in te res tednes s , s ay , exposes us to a work the exper ience o f wh ich

transcends mere l ik ing . In fact he regards the nature of the c la im at i s sue

as s t ronger . Fo l lowing Heidegger he con tends tha t a r t works f rom ear l i e r

t imes were not created for aesthetic accep tance o r r e jec t ion . Our con

sciousne ss of ar t - aes th et ic con sciou sness - i s , G ad am er s ta tes , ' a lways

secondary to the immedia te t ru th c la im tha t p roceeds f rom the work o f

a r t ' ( P H , 5 ) . A e s t h e t ic j u d g e m e n t s alienate us f rom th i s fund am enta l , cog

n i t ive enga gem ent w i th a r t wo rks . T h e expe r ience o f aes the t i c a l iena t ion i s

the exper ience of the gap between an or ig inal t ru th c la im by a work and

an aes thet ic response to that c la im; i t i s the exper ience of the gap b e t w e e n

so l ic i t at ion and r e fusa l , be tw een th e lu re o f the work and the un inh ab i -

tabi l i ty of the space invok ed. T o ex per ie nce tha t gap is to exp er ien ce a

work ' s exces s to aes the t i c s . M y c la im i s tha t an ap pro pr ia te va lu ing o f a r t

as cr i t ica l of dominant cul ture l ies in the gap and in the exper ience of aes

the t i c a l i ena t ion , an exper ience (o f de fused c rea tednes s ) tha t r everbera tesi n H e i d e g g e r ' s t h i n k i n g .

Let us cons ider again Van Gogh 's pain t ing . I t so l ic i ts and c la ims us ,

bu t how? In the f irs t in s tance as r evea l ing the ' t r u t h ' o f some phe nom ena ,

tha t i s , in the ma nn er invoked by He ideg ger ' s phenom eno lo g ica l r e

count ing of the p ic ture - a re-count ing we shal l ques t ion la ter . I t i s not

impor tan t fo r He idegger ' s ana lys i s tha t h i s r e -coun t ing shou ld work fo r us

as an accoun t o f the Van Gogh ; wha t i s impor tan t i s tha t we shou ld be

ab le to conce ive o f a pa in t ing o r poem which c la ims us in accordance w i th

the k inds o f s ign i fi cances tha t He ideg ger ' s acco un t d i sp lays . T h er e a re

two natu ral bu t naive cr i t ica l respon ses to suc h an acc ou nt . T h e f ir st i s

ep i tom ized by M ey er Sch ap i ro ' s c r i t iqu e o f He ideg ger on Van Go gh ; it

t rea ts the account as i f i t were a defence of one representa t ion charac-




te r iza t ion o f the pa in t ing in oppos i t ion to o the r pos s ib le charac te r iza t ions ,

a n d d i s p u t e s H e i d e g g e r ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a c c o r d i n g l y .3 9

H o w e v e r i n a d

equa te and inappropr ia te such a c r i t ique i s , i t does r evea l how thorough ly

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l a n d a e s t h e t i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s d o m i n a t e o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g

of art , and how diff icult i t is to alter the terrain of aesthetic discourse.

Schap i ro ' s c r i t ique un in ten t iona l ly r evea l s the a r t work ' s suscep t ib i l i tybefo re the sway o f the cen t re , the heg em ony o f p rogres s ive cu l tu re over

aes the t i c cu l tu re .

C lose r to the bone wou ld be the c r i t i c i sm o f He idegger ' s accoun t a s a

na ive roman t ic iz ing o f the peasan t wor ld where men , th ings and na tu re

engaged one ano ther , and were together , d i f ferent to the way that men,

ins t r um en t s and na tu r e engage and in te rac t w i th one ano ther n ow .

Signif icant ly , th is same charge can be level led agains t Heidegger ' s famous

d iscus s ion o f the ham m er in Being and Time (section 15ff) . In both cases a

cla im abo ut the na tur e of eq ui pm en t is of fered t ha t re locates th e i tem f rom

representa t ional space - as an object before us to be v iewed - to a c i rcui t

of praxis as i t s in t r ins ic p lace , a dwel l ing place as opp ose d to ind if ferent ,

geomet r ica l space.40

In bo th cases , i t migh t be c la imed , the re i s someth ing

archa iz ing abou t H e ide gge r ' s app roac h . In s tead o f p rov id ing access to a

' t r u e ' accou n t o f eq u ip m en t (o r space) , in bo th cases He ideg ger can be

seen as r e fe r ring us back to an ea r li e r fo rm o f un de r s ta nd ing a nd p rac t i ce ;

to be , precise ly , valor iz ing a representa t ion of a pas t poss ib i l i ty ; and hence

to be propos ing a pas t rura l ideology as h is cr i t ique of the present . Surely ,

hydroe lec t r i c dams o r a s sembly l ine robo ts a re no t in s t rumen ts in the

same es sen t ia l i s t s ense tha t He idegger p roc la ims fo r the hammer and the

peasan t wo m an ' s shoes ; the es sence o f eq u ip m en t has chan ged s ince the n .

And i f th i s i s so , then the mere p resen ta t ion o f a pas t concep t ion o f equ ip

men t mus t r emain c r i t i ca l ly vacuous , a s t ro l l in a p leasan t imag inary

wo rld . Pa r t of th e cr i t ica l thru s t of 'Or i g i n ' i s to tease us away f rom bo th

th i s concep t ion o f wor ld and f rom i t s s angu ine r ep resen ta t ion o f th ings

( 'We be l i eve we a re a t home in the immedia te c i r c le o f be ings . Tha t wh ich

is , i s f ami li a r, r e l iab le , o rd ina ry . Ne ve r th e le s s . . . ' (O W A , 54).Thus when Heidegger says he wi l l of fer h is analys is of the nature of

e q u i p m e n t w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a ti o n a s t o w h e t h e i t h a t n a t u r e m i g h t b e s u b

ject to a l ternat ion , he is explicitly adm itting the legitimacy of this criticism

of both accounts. His ges tu re o f f r ee ing the cons ide ra t ion o f equ ipmen-

ta l i ty f rom his tory is the re for the sake of dra w ing an analogy w ith the

p r o c e d u r e s o f Being and Time, a n d h e n c e w i t h t h e h a m m e r e x a m p l e . H i s

con t ra s t ing o f the G reek t em ple tha t d i sc loses a wor ld w i th the pa in t ing

tha t t e l l s u s on ly wha t the peasan t woman a l r eady knows d i s t ingu ishes the

ah i s to r ica l , a lbe i t t empora l ly cons t i tu ted , r evea l ing o f Being and Time from

the epochal reveal ing of the h is tory of being. Heidegger ' s se l f -cr i t ique

of the metaphys ica l pos tu r ing o f Being and Time, and h is cr i t ique of any

ah is to r ica l , r eve la t iona l theory o f a r t , occur s by means o f the d i sp lacemen t




tha t the acc oun t of the V an G og h suffers as a resul t of i t s bei ng con tras te d

wi th the Gr eek t em ple . Fo r the Gre ek t em ple , fo r a Gr eek t r agedy o r

med ieva l ca thedra l , pe rhaps fo r the Divine Comedy, i t is intell igible to us

that these works d id g ive th ings their look and men their out look - or

might have done so , in a sense Heidegger never fu l ly c lar i f ies ; but th is i s

someth ing tha t canno t p laus ib ly be s a id fo r Van Gogh ' s pa in t ing . I tbelongs to the end of great ar t .

Why , then , does He idegger invoke the pa in t ing in t e rms consangu ineous

wi th the cogn i t ive r eg ime o f b r ing ing to unconcea lmen t? How does the

Van Gogh exceed aes the t i c s ( and hence how does Being and Time exceed

metaphys ics )? Because , a l though the cogn i t ive c la im i t s e l f o f the modern

ar t wo rk is show n to be defect ive - the pa in t ing is no Gre ek te m ple - the

cla iming i tse l f of the ar t work is not representa t ional (of what is ac tual or

poss ib le) , hence the work is not a product ion but s t i l l a creation, a work. I t

i s i t s present and subs tant ia l createdness now which, as defused, invokes a

pas t poss ib i l i ty of reveal ing that is the c la im o f the work upon us . In o the r

words , wha t we a re a t t empt ing to e l i c i t i s the na tu re o f the c la im tha t a

m od er n a r t work make s up on us . H ow does it p roc la im itself,

au then t ica t ing i t s sway on our l ives? One answer has been e l imina ted :

through disc los ing a wor ld (pas t , present or fu ture) . But seen f rom afar , i t

does not seem wrong to say that the work enacts a wor ld d isc losure i t can

not del iver ; i t l ives in i t s (necessary) fa i lure to a t ta in i t s ownmost poss i

b i l i ty of reveal ing; hence i ts createdness , that which makes i t a work and

no t p roduc t , en tw ines ea r th and wor ld as the cons t i tu t ive e lemen ts tha t

c o n s t i t u t e t h e being of w or ks . T h e sense of idea li ty, f ictiveness, th e im ag in

ary that haunts ar t works , i s not a funct ion of thei r contents (peasant

wo r lds , ideal fu tures , e tc . ) bu t of thei r ' form ' , of thei r bein g ar t works;

i t is past and future possibil i t ies of ar t i tself which is the source of the

work 's c la im upon us . Their fa i lure to reveal a wor ld , or to reveal only

wh at is a l ready kn ow n, thei r lack of cogn i t ive pow er , thei r e xclus ion

from q ues t ion s of t r u t h , i s hen ce the source of the i r po we r , thei r n egat ive

c o g n i t i o n .

I t is a mo o t ques t io n w he ther H e ide gge r ' s way o f ana lys ing the Van

Gogh wil l del iver us over to the k ind of c la iming here broached; af ter a l l ,

h is reason for choos ing the Van Gogh was to invoke an example that

wou ld a l low h im to r epea t the hammer example , to a l low h im to gu ide

us f rom the accompl i shmen ts and f a i lu res o f Being and Time to the new

van tage po in t of epoch a l h i s to ry . H en ce the m ode rn i ty o f the Van Gog h

can on ly come in to v iew in r e t rospec t . Fur the r , the re i s no deny ing an

e lemen t o f ru ra l ideo logy haun t ing He idegger ' s ph i losoph ica l imag ina t ion .

None the les s , the con t ras t be tween the Greek t emple and the pa in t ing i s

pressed , and a v is ion of the end of great ar t presented . As such, what we

lea rn i s wha t the Van Gogh canno t do ; bu t in u rg ing a pa ra l l e l w i th the

Greek temple we are a lso being to ld that that fa i lure is cons t i tu t ive of the




pa in t ing ' s r emain ing power o f r evea l ing . Pe rhaps th i s i s wha t i s c la imed

when Heidegger s t a tes , w i th c lea r r e fe rence to Ho lder l in , ' I n a wor ld ' s

wor ld ing i s ga the r ing tha t spac iousnes s ou t o f wh ich the p ro tec t ive g race

of the gods i s g ran ted o r w i thhe ld . Even th i s doom of the god remain ing

abse n t i s a way in wh ich th e wor ld wo r lds ' (O W A , 45) . H ow e ls e cou ld the

absence of a god, the abse nce of an ackn ow ledg em ent of the absen t ia ld im ens ion o f a ll p resen ce , be r evea led as a h i s to rica l p red ic am en t th an

th ro ug h a wo rk 's essent ia l defaul t u po n i ts essent ia l poss ib i l i ty as work?

If i t were not a work 's defaul t upon i ts essent ia l poss ib i l i t ies that were

revealed , then the work would be one of great ar t , and technology not the

eschato logical fu l f ilment of the h is to ry of being .

Modern a r t works , works o f gen ius , th r ive on the i r own es sen t ia l

imposs ib i l i ty , on their fa i lure to be works of great ar t , to d isc lose a wor ld ;

and the y can do no o the r , fo r tha t is wh ere a r t i s . H en ce th r ou gh the m we

come to exper ience the s ense o f the pe r iphery as a p e r i p h e r y , a n d t h u s t h e

mean ing o f the sway o f the cen t re . The a r t work so l i c i t s in r emembrance

and an t ic ipa t ion o f a power , a po ten t ia l i ty o f a r t . Th i s po ten t ia l i ty , when

t rea ted as a p rese n t ac tua l i ty - the p res um pt iv e t ru th -c l a im o f the work -

concea l s the ac tua l mean ing o f the work , i t s work o f r emembrance and

an t ic ipa t ion . W he n th i s work i s acco m pl i shed the p rese n t is b ro ug h t to

presence in i ts specif icity: the impossibil i ty of great ar t is the his torical fate

o f a r t under the sway o f t echno logy . I f He idegger ' s s cheme were in work

ing order , he could then say: technological reveal ing reveals wi thout le t

t ing what presences come for th in to appearance; i t s refusal of poiesis is the

con s ign m ent o f a r t to the pe r iphe ry and henc e the a l i ena t ion o f a r t f rom

its or ig in . I t is a ne at and e legan t formu lat ion , b ut fa lse . T h e a l iena t ion

of a r t f rom t ru th i s m ore com plex and qu i te o the r than wha t H e ide gge r

a n n o u n c e s . I t i s D e r r i d a ' s a c h i e v e m e n t t o d e m o n s t r a t e p r e c i s e l y h o w o n l y

as a fu lly mod ern i s t work can Van G og h ' s pa in t ing accede to the ro le

Heidegger needs i t to have for h is ref lect ions to begin . But once g iven that

s t a t u s , once m ode rn i ty r ece ives i t s r e fl ec tive com preh ens ion th ro ug h t he

works o f a r t i s t i c modern i sm, a deep t r ans fo rmat ion o f the He idegger ianproject occurs .



The Deconstruct ive Sublime:

Derrida's The Truth in Painting

i Art , Histor y and La ngu age

The r idd le o f a r t does no t be long to the epocha l h i s to ry t e rmina t ing in the

u t te r ob l iv ion o f be ing t e rmed Gestell. This h i s to ry i s no t ou r h i s to ry , the

his tory a l ienat in g ar t f rom t ru th . But w ha t i f the ques t io n of h is tory ,

the c la iming tha t wou ld l ead to the cons t ru ing o f h i s to ry in ph i losoph ica l

t e r m s , were i tse l f cons t i tu t ive of metaphys ics (as presence) , were i t se l f a

funct ion of what generates the a l ienat ion of ar t f rom t ru th? What i f the

very idea of a phi losophy of h is tory belongs to metaphys ics because the

que s t ions 'W hic h h is to ry? W hos e h i s to ry? ' a r e cond i t ioned by conc ep ts -

s ay , the concep ts o f end o r pu rpose on the one hand , and /o r the concep t o f

a (col lect ive) subject on the o ther - that can only be in terpreted meta

phys ical ly? Is the ges ture of seeking such a h is tory so col lus ive wi th the

m etaph ys ica l do m ina t io n of ar t that i t could ne ver achieve a space in

which a r t cou ld ques t ion t ru th , ques t ion h i s to ry? I f the Arend t ian judge

m en t , t r aced in the in t ro duc t ion , i s co r rec t tha t th e ph i losoph y o f h i s to ry

en te r s a s a suppres s ion o f jud gem ent , then m us t no t a judgem ent aga ins t it

be par t icular? An event? An act? A work?

A qu es t io n of th e 'ow ne rsh ip ' of h is tory form s one of th e centra l l ines

o f a r g u m e n t i n t h e ' R e s t i t u t i o n ' e s s a y t h a t c o n c l u d e s D e r r i d a ' s The Truth

in Painting. Der r ida i s in te res ted in ques t ion ing the co l lus ive connec t ion

of ar t and h is to ry , an in te rco nne ct io n th at naively ass imila tes the ar t/

na tu re dua l i ty to the h i s to ry /na tu re dua l i ty , and as s imi la tes bo th o f these

to the physis[techne ( n a t u r e / p r o d u c t i o n ) d i s t i n c t i o n . T h i s le a d s D e r r i d a t o

sug ges t th at ' i f th e ph ilos op hy of art alwa ys has th e gre ate st diff iculty



T H E D E C O N ST R U C T IV E S U B L I M E 137

in dominat ing the h is tory of ar t , a cer ta in concept of the h is tor ic i ty of

ar t , th is i s , paradoxical ly , because i t too eas i ly th inks of ar t as h is tor ical '

( T P , 21) . The reason for th is s i tuat ion is that the concept of h is tory is

t ransformed in i t s two usages : ar t ' s h is tor ic i ty is incompat ib le wi th the

his tory of ar t of the sor t that would ef face i t se l f in ar t ' s coming in to

possess ion of i t s essence as ar t . Derr ida wi l l argue that ar t ' s h is tor ic i tyis de pe nd en t on those mo m en ts tha t in t e r r up t it , tha t i s , on so m eth in g

l ike the nature of h is tor ic i ty impl ied by the above analyses of Kant and

H e i d e g g e r .

Bu t the re i s a fu r the r r eason fo r tu rn ing to Der r ida a t th i s junc tu re .

Tha t r eason l i e s a t the in te r s ec t ion o f one o f the e lemen ts o f He idegger ' s

pr oc ed ure for readin g the texts of th e t rad i t ion , an d a d i ff icul ty he

concedes concern ing the a rgument o f 'O r ig in ' . The h i s to ry o f be ing ,

wh ich is th e forget t ing of bei ng , i s co nd i t ion ed by and equiv alen t to th e

wi thdrawal o f be ing , to be ing ' s s e l f -d i sp lacemen t by the metaphys ica l

t e rm s tha t have dom ina te d th e h i s to ry o f ph i losop hy : idea, energeia,

actualitas, wil l . Epocha l h i s to ry i s no t the h i s to ry o f epochs domina ted by

the concep ts o f metaphys ics , bu t the ' des t iny o f Be ing in whose s end ing

an d the I t wh ich send s for th hold back with their se l f -m anif es ta t ion . . .

Ep oc h does no t me an here a span o f t ime in occ ur ren ce , bu t r a the r th e

fundamenta l charac te r i s t i c s o f s end ing , the ac tua l ho ld ing-back o f i t s e l f in

favor of the d isce rnib i l i ty of the g i ft , tha t i s , of Be ing with reg ard t o th e

g r o u n d i n g o f b e i n g s . '1

Since the words o f be ing , wh ich i s wha t the t e rms

of m etap hys ics are for Heid eg ge r , are 'ans we rs to a c la im wh ich speak s in

the s end ing concea l ing itself',2

then i t fo l lows that the texts of the t ra

d i t io n req uire a do ub le read ing . T o rep eat w hat was sa id ear l ier : f ir s t, a

t ex t mus t be r ead in a manner tha t r evea l s how the words o f be ing

organ ize the t ex t toward p resence and s e l f -p resence ; then those s ame

te rms mus t be r e - r ead as exceed ing p resence , a s exceed ing the r educ t ion

of p resenc ing to p resence , and hence as answer ing to the concea l ing o f

wha t g ives p resence . Tex ts ' exces s beyond p resence i s the ' unsa id ' o f those

t ex t s , the concea lmen t o r absence in the even t o f d i s c losu re . Wi thou t adoub le r ead ing - r evea l ing how each fo rmat ion o f be ing , each way be ing i s

s t a m p e d (Seinspragungen) is , as seen from the Ereignis, a w i t h d r a w i n g o f

the sender in favour of what is sent - the texts in ques t ion could not be

sa id to be long to the h i s to ry o f be in g . In o the r wo rds , fund am enta l m e t a

phys ica l concep ts are withdrawals o f be ing . Hence the neces s i ty fo r doub le

r e a d i n g .

T h i s p roc edu re fo r r ead ing , fo r doub le r ead ing , i s a ( if no t the ) co rne r

s tone o f Der r ida ' s p rac t i ce o f decons t ruc t ive r ead ing . Wi th a d i f f e rence .

A l though Der r idean p rac t i ce a l so focuses on concep ts in accordance w i th

which t ex t s o rgan ize and c lose in upon themse lves , to ta l i ze themse lves ,

and exceed tha t c losu re , r evea l wha tever can never be accommodated by

metaphys ics , and hence wha t cond i t ions bo th i t s pos s ib i l i ty (o f mean ing)



138 T H E D E C O N S T R U C T I V E S U B L I M E

and imposs ib i l i ty (of being equal to itself, u n d i v i d e d ) ; n e v e r t h e l e s s ,

Derr idean pract ice is not governed by the h is tory of being, that i s , by the

idea of a des t in ing . While Heidegger is c lear in denying that des t in ing is

e i the r con t ingen t o r neces sa ry , b ru te ly empi r ica l o r governed by an imma

nent te leology; he nonetheless c la ims that 'what i s appropr ia te shows i tse l f

in the be long ing toge ther o f the epochs . The epochs over lap each o the r intheir sequence so that the or ig inal sending of Being as presence is more

and more obscured in d i f f e ren t ways . '3

But th is enta i ls that the des t in ing is

th e representing, in d i f ferent and ever more obscure ways , of the or ig inal

w i thdrawal o f be ing . And hence tha t the log ic o f r ep resen ta t ion , wh ich i s

the cen t ra l ca r r i e r o f the metaphys ics o f p resence , governs the ve ry des t iny

and des t in ing that i s to reveal i t s d isp lacement .4

And it is precisely this

rep resen ta t iona l cons t rua l o f the p rogres s ive occ lus ion o f the w i thdrawal

o f be ing tha t en ta i l s He idegger ' s exorb i tan t mourn ing , h i s inab i l i ty to

f in ish mourning the l i fe and death , presence and absence, of being in the

exper ience o f anc ien t Greece .

T h is i s no t to deny th a t th e ob jec t o f dec ons t ruc t ion , m os t b road ly and

acu te ly cons t rued , i s the metaphys ics o f p resence , bu t on ly tha t : ( i ) the

o the rnes s o r a l t e r ity p rese nce r e fuses an d d om ina te s i s no t be ing o r

presencing as such, and hence not e i ther another word for being, or for

what g ives being; and ( i i ) the necess i ty of or for decons truct ion cannot be

an escha to log ica l neces s ity , g ro un ded in the thou gh t o f the t ech no log i

ca l epoch as r ep resen t ing the u t t e r ob l iv ion o f be ing , tha t g roundsHe idegg er ian do ub le r ead ing . D er r i da ' s ga in in d i s tanc ing h imse l f f rom

des t in in g i s tha t he is f ree to engage w i th the he te ro gene ous de te rm ina

t ions o f the metaphys ics o f p resence w i thou t commit t ing h imse l f to a

th ink ing o f wha t essentially governs and l ies beyond epochal h is tory; h is

loss is that the grounds for engaging in double reading have a lso

d i s a p p e a r e d .

T h i s d i s a p p e a r a n c e , p e r h a p s , o p e n s u p o n t o a n o t h e r g a i n . I t c o n c e r n s

t h e ' A d d e n d u m ' t o ' O r i g i n ' w h e r e H e i d e g g e r c o n c e d e s t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n

of be in g and hu m an be ing is no t adequ a te ly tho ug h t th ro ug h in the

essay; and that th is fa i lure has something to do with h is fa i lure to con

ce ive adequa te ly o f a r t i s t and work as equ ip r imord ia l , co - respons ib le ; tha t

in the s e t t ing - in to -work o f t ru th i t r emains ' undec ided bu t deddable w h o

does the s e t t ing o r in wha t way i t occur s ' (OWA, 87) . Th is dec idab i l i ty

en ta i l s mak ing one o f the t e rms sub jec t ( ac t ive and p roduc t ive ) and the

other , therefore , object (pass ive) . S ince subject /object dual ism, which

req uire s rep res en ta t i on and se ts i t in p lace , i s a cen tra l s t ran d in the

m eta ph ys ic s of pre sen ce, i t s ove rco m ing is poss ib le only i f a poin t of

^ d e c i d a b i l i t y c a n b e d e m o n s t r a t e d t o b e c o n s t i t u t i v e fo r b o t h p r e s e n c e

and absence , the s ame and the o the r , iden t i ty and d i f f e rence . Bu t the

Der r idean t e rms tha t come to d i sp lace He idegger ' s words fo r be ing , words

aga in which func t ion as gua ran to r s of p resenc e and s im ul taneous ly ma rk



T H E D E C O N S T R U C T I V E S U B L I M E 139

a wi thdrawal o r w i thho ld ing o f be ing , a re p rec i s e ly undec idab le in th i s

s e n s e. T h e s e t e r m s - h y m e n , pharmakon, supplement, differance, etc . - are

what , local ly and textual ly , cons t i tu te the poss ib i l i ty of the ideal and des i re

for presence in a text , and hence the imposs ib i l i ty of i t s rea l iza t ion .5

T h e y

become p laus ib le d i sp lacemen ts o f and subs t i tu tes fo r words fo r be ing i f

we regard the Der r ide an w ord ' t ex t ' a s a t r ans la t ion ( and d i sp lac em en t )fo r the He id egge r ian word ' be in g ' ; a t r ans la t ion and d i sp lacem en t r e

qu i red , on the one han d , by D er r ida ' s c r it i ca l r e fusa l o f the des t in ing tha t

g rounds exp l ic i t ly He idegger ian doub le r ead ing ; and , on the o the r hand ,

by Der r ida ' s t ak ing s e r ious ly and l i t e ra l ly He idegger ' s focus on l anguage

as the un ique r epos i to ry fo r th ink ing be ing . A l though in tended fo r o the r

purposes , the fo l lowing pas sage f rom Maur ice B lancho t e legan t ly s t a tes

how the r e fo rming o f the He ideg ger ia n conce p t ion o f l anguag e i s to be

t h o u g h t . W h a t B l a n c h o t d e s i g n a t e s a s M a l l a r m e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f l a n g u a g e ,

as opposed to He idegger ' s , s eems to me to f i t Der r ida exac t ly .

One cou ld ind ica te tha t the a t t en t ion borne to l anguage by

Heidegger , and which i s o f an ex t r emely p res s ing charac te r , i s an

a t t en t ion to words cons ide red on the i r own , concen t ra ted in them

se lves , to such words he ld to be fundamenta l and to rmen ted up to

the point where , in the h is tory of thei r format ion , can be heard the

his tory of being, - but never to the re la t ions of words , and s t i l l less

to the an te r io r space p resupposed by these r e la t ions and whoseor ig ina ry movement a lone makes pos s ib le l anguage as dep loyment .

For Mal la rme , l anguage i s no t made o f words , even pure words : i t

i s tha t in wh ich words have a lways a l r eady d i s appeared and th i s

o s ci ll a ti n g m o v e m e n t o f a p p e a r i n g a n d d i s a p p e a r i n g .6

W ha t to rm en t s the l anguag e of me taphy s ics is no t s ec re ted in s em an t ic

h i s to ry ; consequen t ly , wha t to rmen ts metaphys ics can no longer be a

u n i t a r y p h e n o m e n o n .

The nex t two sec t ions o f th i s chap te r w i l l s eek to ana lyse Der r ida ' s

r ead ing of 'O r ig in ' . W ha t tha t r ead ing dem ons t r a tes is how a r t exceeds

metaphys ics and makes i t pos s ib le no t genera l ly o r un iver sa l ly bu t

textual ly , specif ica l ly : i t i s Van Gogh 's pain t ing of the shoes that does th is

work in He idegger ' s e s say . Hence , Der r ida r ea l i zes , p resen t s and dem

ons tra tes , the meaning of ar t as the ar t of genius , previous ly only asser ted

b y K a n t a n d H e i d e g g e r . M o r e o v e r , D e r r i d a ' s a n a l y s i s d e m o n s t r a t e s w h y

that character izat ion of ar t has come to be real ized only wi th the ar r ival of

a r t i s t i c modern i sm, even i f i t has be longed to a r t th roughou t i t s h i s to ry .

T h is ep i s temic p r iv i l eg ing o f a r t i s t i c m od ern i sm - wh ich i s wh a t l ie s

b e h i n d D e r r i d a ' s ' i n t e r e s t ' i n M a l l a r m e , V a l e r y , A r t a u d , J o y c e , S o l l e r s ,

J abes and Van Gogh as opposed to , above a l l , Ho lder l in - i s equa l ly an

embar ras smen t to Der r ida s ince i t a s sumes a ph i losophy o f h i s to ry , a




r evea l ing o f the mean ing o f the pas t th rough the ach ievements o f the p res

ent . All D err ida c an do with th is em ba rras s ing fact is to d is t ra ct the re ader

f rom i t s p resence . I t none the les s r emains to haun t h i s ana lyses . Tha t

haun t ing i s the focus o f the r emainder o f the chap te r , where Der r ida ' s

reading of Kant is in ter rogated . At is sue in that in ter rogat ion is not only

the ques t ion o f a suppres sed h i s to ry bu t the ques t ion o f wha t has beensuppre s sed in tha t h i s to ry . Dec on s t ruc t ion , I w i ll a rgu e , is i ts e lf mo de rn

is t , in ter rupt ive; the aes thet ic f igure of in ter rupt ion is the subl ime. The

provoca t ion o f my read ing o f Der r ida w i l l be the c la im tha t decons t ruc t ion

i s the p roduc t ion /d i s covery o f the t ex tua l sub l ime .

On the t ra i l of th is provocat ion some obvious ques t ions ar ise . I s the

m od ern is t sub l im e s im ply the (aes thet ic) f igure of w ha t res is ts pres enc e,

ph en om en oli za tio n, th e f igure of f igurali ty, or do es i t refer to a m ore

emphat ic a l ter i ty? I f the la t ter i s not the case , how are we to unders tand

why the in te r rup t ion o f the t r ad i t ion mat te r s ? I s under s tand ing to be d i s

p laced before an e th ical ac t , an act exhaus ted in i t s in ter rupt ion of to ta l i ty ,

so tha t decons t ruc t ion wou ld become an e th ica l w i tnes s to the devas ta t ions

of metaphys ics , a face f rozen in dumb horror? And even i f th is were to be

the case , wou ld tha t ho r ro r and s i l ence be comprehens ib le? Emerg ing here

for another t ime is the way in which the aesthetic f igures the categorial

dua l i ty be tween knowing and r igh t ac t ion , t ru th and goodnes s .

ii Pa in t ing wi thout T ru th

At i t s commencement the log ic o f 'Res t i tu t ions o f the t ru th in po in t ing

(pointureY a p p e a r s s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d e n o u g h . D e r r i d a ' s r e a d i n g o f ' O r i g i n '

i s occas ioned by an essay of Meyer Schapiro ' s , 'The s t i l l l i fe as a personal

ob jec t ' , wh ich con ten ds tha t He ideg ger ' s a t t r ibu t i on o f Van Go gh ' s p ic

ture of the o ld shoes wi th laces to a peasant woman is fa lse ; the shoes are

not those of a peasant but of a c i ty dwel ler , indeed they are Van Gogh 's

own shoes a t the t ime he was l iv ing in Par is . Whose shoes are they? A

peasan t woman ' s o r the c i ty dwel le r Van Gogh ' s ? Th is ques t ion ve ry

qu ick ly b roadens ou t in to the ques t ion 'Whose h i s to ry? ' Schap i ro de

d ica tes h i s e s say to the memory o f h i s f r i end Kur t Go lds te in , who had

f i rs t ca l led h is a t tent ion to Heidegger ' s essay . Golds te in f led Nazi

G er m an y in 1933 , hav ing been r e leased f rom pr i son on cond i t ion tha t he

leave th e co un try . H e ar r ive d in Ne w Yo rk in 1936, af ter a one year s tay in

Ams te rdam, to t each a t Co lumbia Univer s i ty , where Schap i ro was a l r eady

teach ing . De r r ida r egar ds the ded ica t ion o f Sch ap i ro ' s e ssay a m at te r fa r

f rom extr ins ic to i t or to the debate wi th Heidegger over the ownership ofthe shoes :

And who is going to bel ieve that th is episode is merely a theoret ica l

o r ph i losoph ica l d i spu te fo r the in te rp re ta t io n o f a work o r the



T H E D E C O N S T R U C T I V E S U B L I M E 14 1

W ork o f a r t ? . . . I n o rde r to r es t i tu te the m , Sch ap i ro b i t t e r ly d i spu tes

possess ion of the shoes wi t h H eid eg ge r . . .who is seen t he n, a ll in a l l,

to have t r ied to put them on h is own feet , by peasant-proxy, to put

t h e m back onto h is man-of- the-soi l fee t , wi th the pathos of the ' ca l l

of the ear th ' , of the Feldweg or the Holzwege which, in 1935-36, was

no t fo re ign to wha t d rove Golds te in to under take h i s long marcht o w a r d N e w Y o r k . . . T h e r e is m u c h t o d i s c h a r g e , t o r e t u r n , t o r e s t i

t u t e , i f no t to exp ia te in a l l th i s . (TP , 272-3 )

Fo r S cha p i ro a t l eas t, bu t m ayb e no t fo r h im a lone , the re i s a m at te r o f

h i s to ry and po l i t i c s he re . Does the pa in t ing ' be long ' w i th o r to ' the com

mon d i s course o f the common enemy ' (TP , 273) , o r does i t be long wi th o r

to the v ic t ims , the nomads , emigres , the c i ty dwel le r s , the d i s course tha t

r es i s t s , o r s t ands fo r wha t r es i s t s , Naz i Germany? Whose h i s to ry? How

does Van Gogh ' s pa in t ing f i t in to the r evo lu t ionary , aes the t i c ized po l i t i c s

o f 'O r ig in ' ? Would a d i f f e ren t r ead ing o f the pa in t ing undermine i t s po l i t i

cal trajectory?

' I owe you the t ru th in pain t ing and I wi l l te l l i t to you, ' says Cezanne

in a l e t t e r to Em i le Ber nard . T o owe the t ru t h i s to ackno wledg e a deb t , to

p lace onese l f un de r an ob l iga t ion . T o w ho m i s the de b t owed , an d how

does one pay i t ? How i s t ru th cond i t ioned by an an te r io r deb t? What i s the

deb t tha t i t can be r e tu rned ' in t ru th ' ? In pa in t ing? Above a l l , we mus t

no w say , in a pa in t in g of a pair of out-o f -wo rk, o ut-of -se rvice , un t ie dsh o es ; shoes doub ly w i thou t use : un t ied and pa in ted . The use o f the shoes ,

the cogn i t ive employment o f them, depends on the i r be ing ou t o f use

( T P , 283) , the i r u se les snes s immedia te ly and immanen t ly r e f l ec t ing the

pa in t ing ' s Kan t ian ' f inenes s ' , i t s be ing purpos ive w i thou t pu rpose : ' I t ' s a

ques t ion o f knowing wha t r evenue i s s t i l l p roduced by the i r ou t -o f - s e rv ice

dere l i c t ion , wha t su rp lus va lue i s un leashed by the annu lmen t o f the i r u se

va lue : outside the p ic tu re , in s ide the picture, and th i rd , as a p i c tu re , or to

put i t very equivocal ly , in their painting truth'. T h i s s u r p l u s v a l u e , D e r r i d a

goes on to sugges t , i s bound, or appears to be bound, to who the shoes f i t ,as i f ' i t ' s a ques t ion of what ghos t ' s s tep , c i ty dwel ler or peasant , s t i l l

c o m e s t o h a u n t t h e m . . . [ o r ] a q u e s t i o n o f k n o w i n g w h e t h e r t h e s h o e s

in ques t ion a re haun ted by some ghos t o r a re ghos t ing / re tu rn ing (la

revenance) i t s e l f ( T P , 2 5 8 - 9 ) . H e i d e g g e r a n d S c h a p i r o b o t h s e e k t o h a l t

the pa in t ing ' s 'w i thou t pu rpose ' ; Der r ida w i l l s eek to r es t i tu te , r ecover

and conf i rm the pa in t ing ' s 'f inenes s ' , to ma ke h i s jud ge m en t o f i t p rope r ly

aes the t i ca l .

T h e gho s t ing , the ghos t- e f fec t o f the un t ied sh oes , m a t te r s s ince bo th

Heidegger and Schap i ro , a lbe i t d i f f e ren t ly , f ind the shoe ' s de tachment

in to le rable (T P , 283) ; and h enc e for bo th , a l th ou gh dif ferent ly , f inding th e

subject , the I , that f i l l s the shoes is connected with the t ru th of the pain t

ing and hence the t ru th o f pa in t ing . Re tu r n in g the shoes to the sub jec t



1 4 2 T H E D E CO N S T R U C TI V E S U B L I M E

then co nnec t s w i th the t ru th o f pa in t in g and , for He ideg ger , the t ru th o f

t r u t h .

Derr ida l ights upon Schapiro ' s essay not because he bel ieves that i t s

cr i t ic ism of Heidegger is correct (a l though i t i s not fa lse e i ther ; the owner

sh ip o f the shoes w i l l r emain inde te rmina te ) ; on the con t ra ry , the ve ry

charac te r o f Sch ap i ro ' s c r i t ique opera tes w i th in the f r amewo rk o f t ru th -as -

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( T P , 3 1 2 - 1 4 ) that Heidegger is in the mids t of ( radical ly)

pu t t ing in to ques t ion wh en the exam ple o f the shoes i s in t ro duc ed . An d a t

a ce r ta in level tha t m akes S cha p i ro ' s c r i t i c i sm na ive ly inapp rop r ia te . A t a

ce r ta in l eve l , and hence no t a l toge ther so ; fo r He idegger ' s a t t r ibu t ion o f

the shoes to the peasant woman is i t se l f pre-cr i t ica l , fa l l ing below the level

o f the c r i t ique in 'Or ig in ' o f r ep re sen ta t ion , expres s ion , r e p ro duc t ion ,

and above a l l the p lace of the subject , the subjectum. Afte r a l l , He idegger ' s

a t t r ibu t ion o f the shoes to the peasan t woman in pa r t l i censes He idegger ' sideological ly loaded descr ip t ion of the shoes , wi th i t s embarrass ing ,

heav i ly coded , ' poe t i cs o f the so i l ' (TP , 3 4 5 ; see also 2 6 2 , 2 9 2 ) , the ea r th ,

ground. Derr ida s ights in th is language of so i l , ear th , ground a s t i l l ac t ive

des i re for res t i tu t ion operat ive in Heidegger despi te , and in the mids t of ,

h is cr i t ique of the subject .

T h e s u b j e c t , subjectum, as a fundamental def in i t ion of being in general ,

is a t r ans la t io n / t r ans fo rm at ion o f hypokeimenon; bu t th i s La t in t r ans la t ion

of the Greek word occur s , accord ing to He idegger , l ike o the r such t r ans

la t ions , 'w i thou t a co r respond ing , equa l ly au then t ic exper ience o f wha t

they [ the Greek words ] s ay ' ; and th i s l ack o f exper ience inaugura tes the

roo t les snes s , ' t he absence-o f -g round (Bodenlosigkeity o f W e s t e r n t h o u g h t .

H en ce , even if He ide gg er ' s d i s course is no t bo un d to the Car tes ian su b

ject , and hence to f i l l ing the shoes wi th a subject as the determinant of

the t ru th o f ( the ) pa in t ing , none the les s a log ic o f r es t i tu t ion and r e tu rn

in fo rms h i s a rgu m ent ; the ou t -o f - s e rv ice shoes need to be r e t u rn ed to

their owner (subject) jus t as the out-of-service , root less language of Wes t

e rn though t needs to be r e tu rned , r es t i tu ted . The des i r e fo r r es t i tu t ion , tore tu rn to the sub jec t and the ' g round ' exper ience p reced ing a l l sub jec

t iv i ty , reveals a des i re for a cer ta in presence.

De r r id a conn ec t s th i s (g rou nd) des i r e fo r a r e tu rn to the g roun d wi th

Heidegger ' s t rac ing of the essence of the usefulness of the shoes as con

di t ioned by an anter ior re l iabi l i ty (Verldsslichkeit), a reliabil i ty that is

ante r ior to and a con di t io n of not jus t the usefulness of any pr od uc t , b ut

equa l ly ( and as a consequence) an te r io r to and a cond i t ion o f the e labora te

me taphy s ica l / con cep tu a l sys tem of fo rm and mat te r . T h e re l i ab i li ty o f

p roduc t s s t ems f rom or engages w i th the i r fundamenta l be long ing to ea r th

and wor ld , a be long ing tha t fo rms a p reo r ig ina l con t rac t tha t is the ' u l t i

mate cond i t ion o f the concre te pos s ib i l i ty o f any reattachment' ( T P , 3 5 3 ) .

Rel iab i l i ty marks an o r ig ina l be long ing o r a t t achment wh ich cond i t ions

and makes pos s ib le a l l o the r ( l a te r? ) de tachments and r e tu rns . He idegger



T H E D E C O N S T R U C T T V E S U B L I M E 143

laces up the shoes , r e s t i tu tes them, p reo r ig ina r i ly , even , pe rhaps , me ta

phys ical ly : 'T h is essent ia l an d ' fu l l ' re l iabi l i ty m ake s poss ib le - res t i tu tes -

no t on ly the m os t 'c r i t i ca l ' , the ' p ro fou nde s t ' go ing-back beh ind the

ph i loso phem es o f m at t e r - fo rm , o f use fu lnes s , o f p ro duc t ion , o f sub je c

t iv i ty , of object iv i ty , of symbol and law, e tc . , but a lso the mos t naively

a rcha ic r eg res s ion in to the e lemen t o f ingenuous t ru th . . . ' (TP , 354—5) .

7

I nh igh l igh t ing the metaphys ica l des i r e fo r p resence in He idegger , Der r ida i s

ob l ique ly p u t t in g us in m in d o f tha t o th e r p reo r ig ina ry log ic o f be long ing

in He idegger , namely , tha t o f Ereignis, the even t o f app rop r ia t io n p r io r to

bo th be ing and t ime in the la te He ideg ger . E l s ewh ere , De r r id a c on ten ds

tha t He idegg er can m ake Nie tzsc he ' s conc ep t o f w i ll ' be lo ng ' to the h i s

to ry of m etaphy s ics on ly by cap tu r i ng i t ahead o f t im e , by r educ in g h i s to ry

to the even t o f Appropr ia t ion (Ereignis). T h i s c a p t u r i n g , D e r r i d a a v e r s ,

occur s beca use the re is in He ideg ger a va lua t ion o f the p rop er , ru nn in g

f rom au then t ic i ty (Eigenlichkeit) t h r o u g h a p p r o p r i a t i o n (Ereignis), that i sn e v e r i n t e r r u p t e d .

8

T h e p reo r ig ina ry ty ing o f the shoes , the i r fund am enta l

be long ing to ea r th and w or ld , ad um br a te s the l a te r be long ing tha t t i e s

Nie tzsche ' s 'w i l l ' t o the h i s to ry o f metaphys ics , and t i e s h i s to ry up as

be long ing to be ing . So un der s too d , h i s to ry s tops be ing ab ou t wh a t o ccu r s

in it.

'R es t i tu t io ns ' i s a poly logu e for n + 1 female voices . In a footno te

Der r ida quo tes an ed i to r ia l no te tha t accompan ied the o r ig ina l pub l ica t ion

of (pa r t of ) the essay in w hic h i t i s s ta ted tha t the essay is a f ic tion D er r id a

had nar ra ted a t Co lum bia Unive r s i ty in the p resence o f M ey er S ch ap i ro ,

am on gs t othe rs ( T P , 272). T h e ' for m ' of th e essay, i ts (Active) f ictionali ty,

is lodged agains t the d iscourse of belonging (especia l ly a d iscourse as

be long ing to a sub jec t ) . The po ly logue canno t r e tu rn to Der r ida , a s

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s u b j e c t , a u t h o r / a u t h o r i t y , a n y m o r e t h a n V a n G o g h ' s

pain t ing , despi te Schapiro ' s ef for ts , as we shal l see , can be re turned to

h im. One o f the goa l s o f 'Res t i tu t ions ' i s to demons t ra te , a s was done in

' T h e p u r v e y o r o f t r u t h ' c o n c e r n i n g t h e m i s s i n g l e t t e r ,9

that a necessary

condi t ion of the poss ib i l i ty of res t i tu t ion and re turn is the poss ib i l i ty ofthe l e t t e r (shoe , t ru th , des t in ing ) no t r each ing i t s des t ina t ion . Th is tho ug h t

is a n a n a l o g ue of H e i d e g g e r ' s m a k i n g u n t r u t h a c o n s t i tu t i v e c o m p o n

en t o f t ru th . In dee d , De r r i da ' s po in t i s the s ame as H e id eg ge r ' s , on ly n ow

e x t e n d e d s o a s t o i n c l u d e , m o r e o v e r t l y t h a n d o e s H e i d e g g e r , c o m m u

n ica t ive mean ing . The pos s ib i l i ty o f mean ing f a i l ing to be communica ted

can no t b e under s too d a r igh t i f f a ilu re i s a lways ex te rna l , m echa n ica l ,

causa l o r by - the -way . I f th i s were p resupposed then the inner connec t ion

b e t w e e n i n d e t e r m i n a c y , u n d e r d e t e r m i n a t i o n a n d p o s s i b i l i t y ( i n i t s o n t o -

logical as wel l as logical sense) would a l l have to be surrendered; and withth em , perh ap s f reedom as wel l . I f th is is so , th en the poss ib i l i ty of no n-

ar r ival (of meaning, t ru th , e tc . ) belongs to the (syntact ica l ) s t ructure of

poss ib i l i t ies governing ar r ival such that ' i t never t ru ly ar r ives there ,



14 4 T H E D E C O N S T R U C T I V E S U B L I M E

[ and] . . .when i t does a r r ive , i t s pos s ib i l i ty -o f -no t -a r r iv ing to rmen ts i t w i th

an in tern al dr i f t ' ( T P , 364; one of th e voices in fact quot ing D er r id a ' s

'Pu rve yo r ' ) . T h i s ' i n te rna l d r i f t ' is D er r ida ' s way o f m ark in g the f ac t tha t

a cer ta in (sense of ) cont ingency, a cer ta in (sense of the) poss ib i l i ty of

fa i lu re mus t ( log ica l ly ) accompany a l l cogn i t ive and communica t ive

succe ss . T h e f in itude of hu m an cog ni t ive and l ing uis t ic ac t iv i ty m us t c ling

(cons t i tu t ively) above a l l to those p laces where i t seems to have been

o v e r c o m e .

O ne o f the r ecu r ren t mo t i f s a id ing th i s de m on s t ra t ion i s the f emale

vo ice ' s r e i t e ra ted ques t ion o f wha t makes any o f the p ro tagon is t s ( inc lud

ing the o ther voices ) so sure that the shoes form a pair , jus t as male and

female fo rm a (metaphys ica l ) pa i r , s ince the p resumpt ion o f the shoes

be ing a pa i r r e s t r i c t s the economy o f ques t ion ing tha t genera tes the shoes '

gho s t ing ef fect, t ha t a l lows the qu es t i on of ow ne rsh ip to be a qu es t io n as

such (TP, 282, 374) . The logic of non-ar r ival appl ies wi th equal force to

the shoes being a pair : 'No more than a le t ter , a pai r i s not indiv is ib le '

( T P , 364) . Acknowledgement o f the in te rna l d r i f t tha t wou ld make even a

pair of shoes not a pair (under the condi t ion , for example , that each of a

pai r , left and r ig ht , are dra w n from a different pa ir - in wh ich case i t

would be d i f f icul t for the ques t ion of whether th is were ' t ru ly ' a pai r to get

a foo t ing , wh ich i s Der r ida ' s po in t ) b reaks , o r be t t e r , cond i t ions the t ru th

con t rac t be tween Heidegger and Schap i ro , mak ing i t s econdary , an e f fec t .

T h e p a i r / n o n - p a i r d o u b l e t p r o v i d e s h e r e , w e m i g h t s a y , t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t econd i t ion fo r de te rmina te c la ims abou t the shoes and who migh t f i l l them.

An ar gu m en t of th is sor t i s v is ib le in 'Res t i tu t io ns ' ; bu t what has been

said so far fa i ls to amount to the detect ion of a s t ructure of double reading

organ iz ing De r r id a ' s t ex t . L e t m e pur sue a hyp o thes i s . I t beg ins w i th the

fact that in our t rea tment of Heidegger we sa id of the Van Gogh that i t

represented a work of ar t drawn f rom the end of ar t , f rom the t ime of the

c losu re and ga the r ing o f the h i s to ry o f be ing , f rom modern i ty . Impl ic i t ly

tha t mean t fo r us , a l though no t fo r He idegger , tha t Van Gogh ' s pa in t ing

be longs to the p rac t i ce o f a r t i s t i c modern i sm. Noth ing we sa id the re abou t

the pa in t ing , however , gave suppor t to tha t p resumpt ion ; the ev idence fo r

i t was drawn f rom epochal h is tory and not the h is tory of ar t : the ar t of the

epoch of technology belongs to the end of great ar t . In h is essay , we want

to c la im, De r r ida i s a t t em pt in g to r es t i tu te Va n Go gh ' s work to a rt i s ti c

m o d e r n i s m , t o painting, where pain t ing is conceived of as a pract ice

adjacent to and cons t i tu t ive of the poss ib i l i ty of the t ru th d iscourse that

occur s on and a round i t w i thou t ever be ing in o r cap tu red by i t . Pa in t ing ,

o r r a the r ' pa in t ing ' , i s an te r io r to , cond i t ion ing and l imi t ing , the d i s courseabou t t ru th and pa in t ing ( as metaphys ica l ly cons t i tu ted ) , the des i r e fo r

res t i tu t ion , w i thou t be ing r educ ib le to th i s d i s course . 'Pa in t ing ' i s the

(excess ive) g i f t that produces the des i re for res t i tu t ion , but to which

no res t i tu t ion i s pos s ib le . Our deb t i s to ' pa in t ing ' , and no t to the

preor ig ina ry r e l iab i l ity o f ea r th and w or ld , the p reo r ig ina ry ' con t ra c t '



T H E D E C O N ST R U C T IV E S U B L IM E 145

be tw een p rod uc t s and ea r th and wor ld p roposed by Heid egg er . Van

Gogh ' s pa in t ing o f the shoes fo rms the p lace in 'Or ig in ' tha t bo th a l lows

i t s d i s course o f t ru th , g round ing and r e tu rn , to occur , and i s the ' o the r '

fo rever exceed ing i t s p lace and ro le the re . The pa in t ing ' f r ames ' He i

degger ' s essay in a language that wi l l become more perspicuous la ter : i t i s

ins ide and outs ide i t , opening the essay to i t s poss ib i l i ty whi le d iv id ing i tf rom itself. Van G og h ' s p a in t ing o f the shoes , wh ich i s an i l lu s t r a t ion

never qu i te e i the r neces sa ry o r r edundan t w i th in the economy o f

Heidegger ' s a rgument , i s the f r ame and supp lemen t o f i t . An ind ica t ion

and an analogy wil l help th is sugges t ion .

The ind ica t ion comes f rom the p re face , 'Pas se -Par tou t ' , to The Truth in

Painting. T h er e De r r id a d i s cus ses fou r senses o f the expres s ion ' the t ru th

in pa in tin g' relev ant t o his work . In the f irst two pa in tin g f igures as a

mo de l for the p resen ta t ion o r r ep res en ta t io n o f t ru th ; t ru th be ing the su b

ject mat ter in these cases and pain t ing anci l lary , a way of get t ing a t t ru th .

The th i rd sense of the express ion asks af ter what per ta ins to p ic tura l i ty

p roper ; wha t i s t ru th as i t occur s in pa in t ing as opposed to any o f the

o t h e r p l a c e s w h e r e t r u t h h a p p e n s ? ' T r u t h i n p a i n t i n g ' w o u l d h e r e m e a n

t ru th as p resen ted o r r ep resen ted in the p ic tu ra l ' p roper ly speak ing , even

if t h i s m o d e i s t o p o l o g i c a l w i t h r e s p e c t t o t r u t h i t s e l f ( T P , 6 ) . D e r r i d a ' s

'eve n i f ra ises a qu es t io n we shal l nee d to com e back to ; i f t r u th in p ain t

ing is top o lo g ic a l w i th r espec t to t ru th i t se l f - i s me re ly me tapho r ica l

t ru th , as is somet imes sa id - how does th is re la te to t ru th in i t se l f? What

i s t ru th in i t s e l f tha t i t can pos ses s 'mere ly ' me taphor ica l modes tha t

are not i t? Does the metaphor ical , t ropological sense of t ru th in pain t ing

divide t ru th ( f rom i tse l f )? Or is the proper of t ru th such that i t makes

pain t ing t ropological in i t s t ru th ef fects?

These ques t ions and concerns t ake roo t in the four th s ense o f the

expres s ion . 'T ru th in pa in t in g ' mig h t be t aken to m ea n , by m ean s o f a

doub l ing o r ' pa ras i t i z ing ' o f the expres s ion ' in pa in t ing ' , t ru th on t h e

ar t which is p ic tura l , the t ru th of the t ru th ( in the th i rd sense of the

expres s ion ) . T h i s s ense o f the expres s ion ins inua tes a r emov a l o f the gapsep arat i ng t ru th as is pr op er to pain t ing , even i f i t i s t ropo logica l , an d

t ru th in d i s course , l anguage (TP , 7 ) .

What a re we now to make o f the p romise to de l ive r the ' t ru th in pa in t

ing ' if the p rom ise is of fered by a pa in t er , i f the pro m ised res t i tu t io n is to

occur in pa in t ing? What now happens to t ru th when the pa ras i t i sm

be tween sys tems i s to inhab i t ju s t one , pa in t ing? I s the t ru th in pa in t ing

' in pa in t ing ' to be an te r io r to the d i ff e rence be twee n t ru th w i th in and

wi th ou t pa in t ing? Th is an te r io r i ty is r equ i red bec ause a pa in t in g ab ou t the

t ru th in pa in t ing , a pa in t ing abou t pa in t ing , tha t is an a l legory of t ru th in

pa in t ing , i s first pai nt in g - befo re , th at i s , i t i s or can be an a l legory:

T h u s o n e d r e a m s o f a p a i n t i n g w i t h o u t t r u t h , w h i c h w i t h o u t d e b t

and ru nn ing th e r isk o f no longer s ay ing any th ing to any one , wo u ld




still not give up p a i n t i n g . And t h i s ' w i t h o u t ' , for e x a m p l e in the

p h r a s e ' w i t h o u t d e b t ' or ' w i t h o u t t r u t h ' , f o r m s one of the l igh t

w e i g h t i m p o r t s of th i s book . (TP, 9).

T h i s d r e a m may be a c k n o w l e d g e d as one of the r e c u r r e n t d r e a m s of m o d

ern i s t art - so F l a u b e r t d r e a m e d of w r i t i n g a b o o k a b o u t n o t h i n g , w i t h ou t r e fe rence ou t s ide itself, w i t h o u t a sub jec t , where the sub jec t wou ld be

near ly invis ib le - the d r e a m of an art t h a t can res is t in terpreta t ion , res is t

b e i n g r e d u c e d to a m e a n i n g i n d e p e n d e n t of the work, res is t being reduced

to its source in h is to ry or sub jec t iv i ty . Th is is K a n t ' s d r e a m of an ex

e m p l a r y w o r k , a d r e a m t h a t D e r r i d a w i ll a t t e m p t to offer back to Van

G o g h ' s p a i n t i n g of the u n t i e d s h o e s , the s h o e s ' w i t h o u t ' use, and also,

t h e r e f o r e , w i t h o u t t r u t h .

L e t us say, as a way of fu r the r ing th i s sugges t ion , tha t the d r e a m of

p a i n t i n g w i t h o u t t r u t h c o h e r e s w i t h , r e v e r b e r a t e s w i t h , D e r r i d a ' s c l a i m in

t h e ' D o u b l e S e s s i o n ' t h a t ' t h e r e is no - or h a r d l y any, e v e r so l i t t le - l i t

e r a t u r e . "0

T h i s w o u l d be so if l i t e r a tu re , l ike pa in t ing , had been sub jec t in

b o t h its c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n (by p h i l o s o p h y ) and its prac t i ce , s ince P la to and

Aris to t l e , to an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of m i m e s i s t h a t p r o c l a i m e d the pr io r i ty of

the ob jec t of imi ta t ion over the act r ender ing tha t ob jec t . The prac t i ce ,

be it of l i t e r a tu re or p a i n t i n g , w h a t e v e r its specif ic character , was to

be cognitively effaced, was the effacing of i tself before the object . To the

d e g r e e to w h i c h p a i n t i n g and l i t e r a tu re acceded to m i m e t o l o g i s m ,

sub juga ted themse lves to the c la ims of p h i l o s o p h y and theo logy , the re was

n o p a i n t i n g or l i t e r a tu re : they ex i s ted , or fe igned to exis t , only in self-

effacement .

Der r ida s ees in the wri t ing p rac t i ces of l i t e r a r y m o d e r n i s m , m o s t

acu te ly in the wri t ings of M a l l a r m e , the subver s ion of logocen t r i sm by

t ex t s tha t appear ' to m a r k and to organ ize a s t r u c t u r e of resistance" to the

ph i losoph ica l concep tua l i ty tha t a l l eged ly domina ted or c o m p r e h e n d e d

t h e m ' .1 1

L i t e r a r y s t r u c t u r e s of r es i s t ance shou ld not be i n t e r p r e t e d , h o w

ever , in t e r m s of t ex tua l p rac t i ces tha t p resume to c a p t u r e and exh ib i t the

specif ica l ly l i terary character of w o r k s of l i t e r a tu re . Formal i s t p rac t i ces of

w r i t i n g t h a t a t t e m p t to ins ta l l and sus ta in the ' l i t e r a r ines s ' of the l i terary

t e x t , t h r o u g h , say, dev ices des igned to reveal a work's fictiveness and the

dev ices by which th i s is a c c o m p l i s h e d , r e d u c e l i t e r a t u r e to its p r e s u m p t i v e

' e s s e n c e ' or ' t r u t h ' , so once again effacing it. L i t e r a r i t y , and by ex tens ion

the essent ia l ly 'pa in ter ly ' , would form but the obver se s ide of m i m e t o l o

g i s m : ' M i m e t o l o g i s m and l i terar i ty are the b i r th and d e a t h of l i t e r a tu re

t h r o u g h p h i l o s o p h y . '1 2

I n o r d e r to be ab le to put p h i l o s o p h y , the des i r es and a m b i t i o n s of

metaphys ics , in to ques t ion , l i t e r a tu re mus t r e fuse wha t wou ld de f ine it,

c a p t u r e and she l t e r it, ex te rna l ly or in te rna l ly . In speak ing of Sol ler ' s

Numbers, Derrida specif ies this refusal in t e r m s of a ' g e n e r a l i z e d p u t t i n g -



T H E D E C O N ST R U C T IV E S U B L I M E 147

in -quo ta t ion -marks o f l i t e ra tu re , o f the so -ca l l ed l i t e ra ry t ex t : a s imula

c rum th rough which l i t e ra tu re pu t s i t s e l f s imul taneous ly a t s t ake and on

s t a g e ' .1 3

R o d o l p h e G a s c h e h a s p u t D e r r i d a ' s t h o u g h t t h i s w a y :

. . . it is by s us pe nd in g i ts being as l i t e ra tu re tha t l i te r a tu re b eco m es

capab le o f cha l l eng ing ph i loso phy ' s dom ina n t ca tegor iza t ion . L i te r a tu re pu t s i t s e l f be tween quo ta t ion marks by opening itself to the absol

ute loss of its meaning, w he the r o f con ten t o r o f fo rm . . . by d i s c la iming

any fo rmal es sence as concerns i t s subs tance o f expres s ion . . . 'L i t e ra

t u r e ' th us ac qu i re s a subver s ive func t ion . . . no t by r es to r in g i t s

specif icity at any cost but, precisely, by recognizing that i t can effect

such a subver s ion on ly by ha rd ly be ing l i t e ra tu re . 'L i t e ra tu re ' [ i s ]

a l m o s t n o l i t e r a t u r e .1 4

O ne m igh t f ee l he re tha t the re is an es sen t ia l d i s eq u i l ib r ium be tw een

l i t e ra tu re ' s (o r pa in t ing ' s ) exposure o f i t s e l f to the abso lu te lo s s o f mean

ing , which exposure re i tera tes in a d i f ferent vocabulary the r isk Kant

de m an de d o f the work o f gen ius , and the a lmos t p rec ious cha rac te r

i z a ti o n o f t h a t e x p o s u r e a s a ' p u t t i n g - i n t o - q u o t a t i o n - m a r k s ' . A n d t h i s

d i s equ i l ib r ium migh t have i t s source in the ben ign ly pur i s t way Der r ida

spec i f i e s the ques t ion o f the r e la t ion be tween ph i losophy and l i t e ra tu re ,

nam ely , p rec is e ly as an in te r roga t io n o f mim eto log i sm and es sen t ia l i sm,

and h enc e o f the m etaph ys ics o f p resen ce in genera l . H en ce whi le D er r id a

concedes that i t i s , for the mos t par t , wi th 'modern ' tex ts that the ' law of

the prev ious f igures ' i s bes t com pr eh en de d, h e does so in a m an ne r th at

ha l t s o r b racke t s th i s s ense o f the 'modern ' , tha t i s , modern i sm, as hav ing

any fundam enta l conn ec t ion w i th i t s h i s to rica l enc losu re , mo de rn i ty . 1 5

A nd th is wou ld accord wi th h is re t ra ct io n of h is tor ical forms fo l lowing o n

from his d is tancing of h imself f rom the eschato logical d imens ions of

He ideg ger ' s tho ug h t . No ne t he le s s , it i s in te res t in g to no te tha t G asc he , in

co m m en t ing on th i s m om en t in D er r ida , feel s cons t r a in ed to spec i fy i t

o the rw ise : 'On ly on the bas i s o f ma rg ina l i ty , wh ich mode rn i ty r ep re sen t swi th r egard to the en t i r e t r ad i t i on , has m od ern i ty , a s tha t wh ich b rea che s

tha t t radi t ion f rom w ith in , bee n able to bec om e manifes t in the f ir st

p l a c e . ' 1 6 W e wi ll r e tu rn to th i s tho ug h t o f m od ern i ty in the A do rno

c h a p t e r s b e l o w . N o n e t h e l e s s , G a s c h e ' s m e n t i o n o f ' m a r g i n a l i t y ' s h o u l d b e

s t r es sed s ince the marg in , l ike the spaces be tween words in Mal la rme ' s

acco un t o f l anguage , wh ich is a l so D er r id a ' s , o r the pos i t ion o f the Va n

G og h in 'O r ig in ' , recal l us to th e fact tha t the mar gin , as opp ose d to the

cen t re and wha t cen t res , i s the s i t e o f decons t ruc t ive r ead ing . Gasche ' s

sugges t ion i s tha t modern i ty i s a t the marg in o f the metaphys ica l t r ad i t ion ,i t s d i s in teg ra ted telos, a n d m o d e r n i s m is a t t h e m a r g i n o f m o d e r n i t y . O n l y

i n m o d e r n i s m ' s m a r g i n a l d o u b l i n g o f m o d e r n i t y , a d o u b l i n g c o n d i t i o n e d

by m od ern i ty , i s the ma rg ina l i ty o f m od ern i ty i t s el f r evea led . D er r ida



148 T H E D EC O N S T R U C T IV E S U B L I M E

ca nn ot jus t d isavow the phi lo sop hy of h is to ry if de co ns tr uc t ion is so

his tor ical ly determined in i t s poss ib i l i ty , i f decons truct ion is a form of

p h i l o s o p h ic a l m o d e r n i s m - p h i l o s o p h y w i t h o u t t r u t h .

At f i r s t g lance Van Gogh 's pain t ing of the shoes seems an unl ikely

cand ida te fo r in te r roga t ing ph i losophy and the ph i losophemes inhab i t ing

ar t cr i t ic ism; i t does not appear to r isk the loss of meaning, the loss ofrep resen ta t iona l s ense , needed to pu t i t s own s ta tus as pa in t ing in to ques

tion. I t is , af ter al l , a painting of s o m e s h o e s . T h e l a b o u r o f ' R e s t i t u t i o n s '

i s to res t i tu te Van Gogh for 'pa in t ing ' , even i f the pain t ing of the shoes

does not specif ically, self-consciously, enjoin that for itself.

i ii T he re i s Paint ing

D e r r i d a ' s a r g u m e n t h a s t h r e e s ta g e s . F i r s t , t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n o f th e

marg ina l i ty o f the p ic tu re o f the shoes in He idegger ' s p resen ta t ion , i t s

s ta tus as a mere ' i l lus t ra t ion ' . Along with th is goes an account ing of the

m arg ina l i ty o f the m arg in a l , tha t i s , a spec i fi ca tion o f He ideg ger ' s a rgu

men t as an a t t empt to so l i c i t a non-metaphys ica l comprehens ion o f wha t i s

useful , a purp osefu l pr od uc t , wi th an i l lus t ra t ion th at i s do ubl y useless : a

pa i n t in g , wh ich is a non -u t i l i t a r i an p r od uc t , o f un w orn , ou t -o f - s e rv ice ,

un t ied shoes . Second ly , Der r ida a t t empts to show how i t i s in virtue of

the do ub le o r even t r ip le ma rg ina l i ty o f the pa in t in g tha t He idegg er can

accede to fu l l or even specula t ive usefulness , reveal ing the t ru th of t ru th

as r evea l ing /concea l ing , aletheia. T h i s s t a g e o f t h e a r g u m e n t , r u n n i n g

through the d iscuss ion of re l iabi l i ty (Verlasslichkeit), does show the p rec i -

p i tousnes s o f He idegger ' s des igna t ion o f the shoes as be ing a pa i r o f

peasan t shoes . Th is p rec ip i tousnes s marks the ex ten t o f the va l id i ty o f

Schapiro ' s cr i t ic ism. F inal ly , Derr ida wi l l reveal the excess of the pain t ing

to the sys tem s o f m etaph ys ics - Sch ap i ro ' s t r ad i t iona l sys tem of sub jec

t i v i t y a n d r e p r e s e n t i n g , a n d H e i d e g g e r ' s a l m o s t n o n - m e t a p h y s i c a l m e t a phys ics o f Ereignis - wh i le s imul tan eous ly r e insc r ib ing bo t h pa in t in g and

sys tems o f though t w i th in the log ic o f pa ras i t i sm and t r a i t b roached ' the

b roach ing o f the o r ig in : tha t wh ich opens , w i th a t r ace , w i thou t in i t i a t ing

an yt hi ng ' : (T P , 11) in h is preface in th e four th se nse of the express ion ' th e

t ru th in pa in t ing ' .

W e c a n u n d e r s t a n d b e t t e r t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h D e r r i d a w a n t s a n d n e e d s

to r evea l Van Gogh ' s pa in t ing as r i sk ing mean ing , r i sk ing the los s o f

mean ing , i f we compare the s t ruc tu re o f a rgument ju s t desc ibed to h i s

ana lys i s o f the mas te r / s l ave d ia lec t i c in 'F ro m res t r i c ted to general ec on

o m y : a n H e g e l i a n i s m w i t h o u t r e s e r v e ' .1 7

Nor is such a compar ison an id le

sea r ch fo r s t ruc tu ra l hom olog ies ; the l anguage o f econ om ics , o f su rp lus

va lue and specu la t ion runn ing th rough 'Res t i tu t ions ' d raws on th i s ea r l i e r

ana lys i s ; and much o f the po in t o f Der r ida ' s a rgument i s to show how




H e i d e g g e r is e m p l o y i n g a t radi t ional Hegel ian d ia lect ica l Aufhebung in his

u se of the Van G o g h . The p a i n t i n g in ' O r i g i n ' has the same p lace in its

a r g u m e n t t h a t d e a t h d o e s in Hegel ' s d ia lec t i c (and tha t dea th does in

Being andTime).™

The in te rna l r e la t ion of m a s t e r and slave, lord and serf, o c c u r s in

H e g e l ' s a c c o u n t as a r esu l t of a ba t t l e for r ecogn i t ion be tween two p r e

sumed se l f - consc iousnes ses . The ba t t l e occur s as a way of e a c h c o m b a t a n t

d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h a t for it life is not the h ighes t good , tha t as a self-

consc ious be ing it t r anscends b io log ica l ex i s tence . Recogn i t ion of o u r

selves as sel f -conscious beings occurs in the f irs t instance when we risk our

biological life in the face of ano ther s e l f - consc ious be ing , ano ther be ing

w h o can d e m o n s t r a t e i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m the dr ive for se l f -p rese rva t ion

a n d d e p e n d e n c e on mere ly s ens ib le goods .

T h e d i r e c t c o n s e q u e n c e of the ba t t l e is the r ecogn i t ion tha t na tu ra l

d e a t h w o u l d be a cance l l ing of all m e a n i n g , n a t u r a l and n o n - n a t u r a l ; andtherefore , natura l l i fe is a neces sa ry cond i t ion of se l f - consc iousnes s .

F u r t h e r , e a c h c o m b a t a n t c o m e s i m p l i c i t l y or expl ic i t ly to r e c o g n i z e

that se l f -consciousness can on ly be s e c u r e d in an in te r sub jec t ive wor ld

o f m u t u a l r e c o g n i ti o n s . H e g e l d e n o m i n a t e s t h i s new wor ld of i n t e r -

subject iv i ty ' sp i r i t ' (Geist); it is a w o r l d of social forms and prac t i ces

with in which se l f -consciousness acts out its (spiritual) life. Biological life is

h e n c e s u p e r s e d e d by spir i tual l ife; the la t ter is the t r u t h of the f o r m e r , its

real iza t ion and c o m p l e t i o n . D e a t h , n a t u r a l d e a t h , is hence cance l led and

p r e s e r v e d ; it c o m e s to s ignify abs t ract negat iv i ty ; it c o m e s to func t ion as a

m o m e n t in the dialect ic where se l f -consciousness is first formed and l ea rns

the t e r r a in in w h i c h its des t iny is to be dec id ed . D er r ida , fo llowing

Bata i l l e , charges Hege l w i th cover ing over the real excess iveness , the

abso lu te , un recoverab le nega t iv i ty of d e a t h on the p r e s u m p t i o n of the

sel f -evidence of m e a n i n g . T h i s p r e s u m p t i o n e n t a i l s t h a t n o t h i n g m u s t be

definitely lost in d e a t h , and fu r the r r educes dea th to the n o t i o n of ' a b s t r a c t

n e g a t i v i t y ' . T h i s s u b m i s s i o n e v e n of d e a t h to the ru le of m e a n i n g is the

h e a r t of Hegel ian on to logy and dialect ics . If, h o w e v e r , n o t h i n g is ever

def in i te ly los t , then there can n e v e r be significant risk or sacrif ice,

' s ac r i f i ce w i thou t r e tu rn ' .

T h e n o t i o n of Aufhebung...i s laughable in t h a t it signifies the

b u s y i n g of discourse los ing its b r e a t h as it r e a p p r o p r i a t e s all n e g a

tivity for itself, as it w o r k s the ' p u t t i n g at s take ' in to an i n v e s t m e n t ,

as it a m o r t i z e s a b s o l u t e e x p e n d i t u r e ; and as it g ives mean ing to

dea th , the reby s imul taneous ly b l ind ing i t s e l f to the baselessness of

t h e n o n - m e a n i n g f ro m w h i c h the bas is of m e a n i n g is d r a w n , and in

which th is bas is of m e a n i n g is e x h a u s t e d .1 9

Derr ida ident i f ies the m o m e n t of d e a t h , d e s t r u c t i o n and sacrifice, all t h a t

is r isked in the risk of life, as the b l ind spo t , the m o m e n t of exces s a round



150 T H E D E CO N S T R U C TI V E S U B L I M E

w h i c h the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of m e a n i n g is organ ized but which cannot i t se l f

be t ru ly inc luded in the s y s t e m .

Van Gogh ' s r i sk of m e a n i n g (= the risk of l ife) , r isking the ut ter loss of

r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l m e a n i n g , t u r n s on the shoes being out-of-service , serv ing

n o end, u n w o r n and u n l a c e d . And it will be t h r o u g h the shoes ' suspens ion

of u t i l i t a r i an purpose (mean ing) tha t He idegger w i l l be able to r evea l , to

s p e c u l a t e , a m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l m e a n i n g and exper ience , nea r ly the very

one tha t wou ld r es to re to l anguage its g r o u n d i n g f r o m out of the r o o t -

l e s snes s consequen t upon the t r ans la t ion of G r e e k w o r d s i n t o L a t i n . The

s h o e s ' b e i n g - u n l a c e d ' a p p e a r s to ' s u s p e n d all e x p e r i e n c e of the g r o u n d ,

s ince such exper ience p resupposes wa lk ing , s t and ing upr igh t , and t h a t a

' s ub jec t ' shou ld be in full possession of his /her / i t s fee t ! ' (TP , 288).

W h e n H e i d e g g e r i n t r o d u c e s the p a i n t i n g he does so in the con tex t of a

q u e s t i o n i n g of the f o r m / m a t t e r d i s t i n c t i o n in t e r m s of th ree - fo ld s chemaof (mere ) th ing , (use fu l ) p roduc t , and (art) w o r k . The schema, wh ich has

a ce r ta in p r iv i l eged s ta tus w i th in the t r a d i t i o n , is i l lusory in its o r d e r l i

n ess : as if one c o u l d get to th inghood (ba re , naked th ings ) by s t r i p p i n g

purposefu lnes s f rom the p r o d u c t ; or get to w o r k s by a d d i n g to the p r o d u c t

the self-sufficiency, the res id ing in- i tse l fness , the dense p ropr ie ty (TP,

298) , of the th ing (purposefu lnes s (p roduc t ) w i thou t pu rpose ( th ing =

p r o d u c t w i t h o u t p u r p o s e ) ) .

The fo rm/mat te r d i s t inc t ion g ives use fu l p roduc t s a cen t ra l i ty wh ich

car r ies over bad ly when th ings and w o r k s are i n t r o d u c e d . H e n c e H e i

degger ' s des i r e to in te r roga te use fu l p roduc t s , to find a way of c o m p r e

h e n d i n g t h e m w i t h o u t r e l i a n c e on the f o r m / m a t t e r d i s t i n c t i o n . In d o i n g so

he offers , s tr ict ly for the p u r p o s e s of i l lu s t r a t ion , 'to facilitate the visual

( in tu i t ive ) r ea l i za t ion ' (OWA, 33), and 'by way of accessory aid' ( o m i t t e d

from the t r ans la t ions ; TP, 309), a p a i n t i n g of the shoes he w a n t s to

(phenomeno log ica l ly? ) desc r ibe , a p a i n t i n g , a work , tha t as work is not at

first at i s sue in the d iscus s ion .

The use fu lnes s of the ' accessory aid' is itself, albei t only rhetor ical ly ,pu t in to ques t ion by H e i d e g g e r : 'As long as we on ly imag ine a pa i r of

s h o e s in genera l , or s imply look at the e m p t y , u n u s e d s h o e s as they mere ly

s t a n d t h e r e in the p i c t u r e , we shal l never d iscover what the e q u i p m e n t a l

b e i n g of the e q u i p m e n t in t r u t h is. F r o m Van G o g h ' s p i c t u r e we c a n n o t

even te l l where these shoes s tand ' (OWA, 33). The p ic tu re does not

over t ly r ep resen t a w o r l d , a c o n t e x t of in ter locking u t i l i t ies , and is t h u s

useless for the c o m p r e h e n s i o n of use. It is H e i d e g g e r , t h e n , who p r e t e n d s

to have marg ina l i zed the p i c t u r e for the p u r p o s e s of the a r g u m e n t , and

w h o r e g a r d s the shoes as devo id of p u r p o s e , w i t h o u t g r o u n d and out-of-u se . ' T h i s u s e l e s s n e s s of the use les s when it c o m e s to t h i n k i n g a b o u t the

usefu l , th i s - a l r eady-doub le use les snes s on ly s tems for the m o m e n t f r o m

t h e b e i n g - d e t a c h e d of the shoes , f rom th e i r be ing aba ndo ned , un la ced .

H e i d e g g e r d o e s not speak d irect ly of the e x h i b i t i n g of the half - loosened



T H E D E C O N S T R U CT I V E S U B L IM E 1 5 1

laces , b u t t h a t ' s w h a t m a t t e r s h e r e ' ( T P , 3 3 9 - 4 0 ) . T h e s t r a n g e m o t i f o f

the l aces , themse lves a m arg ina l e lem en t o f Van G og h ' s pa in t ing , tha t

fo rms the govern ing l e i tmot i f ( the gu id ing th read , the o r ien ta t ion , imag in

a t ive p ro jec t ion o r s chema) o f Der r ida ' s e s say , the i r ty ing and loosen ing

f igur ing a s t ru ctu re of wr i t in g , is revealed as th e (dan gl ing ) fram e of

H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t . U n l a c e d , o u t - o f - u s e , w i t h o u t p u r p o s e ( l i k e t h e

pa in t ing they a re in ) , they ye t adumbra te the pos s ib i l i ty o f mean ing , o f

be ing t i ed and kno t ted , w i thou t ever neces s i t a t ing , r equ i r ing , demand ing

or de te rmin ing i t .

The vo ice o f the po ly logue tha t s t a tes He idegger ' s dependence on the

laces , goes on to suggest that what is at work here is the logic of the cut ( to

be d i s cus sed be low) . Ano ther vo ice in te r rup t s , demur r ing :

The loosening of the laces is not absolu te , i t does not absolve ,un b i nd , cu t . I t keeps an o rgan ized s t r i c tu re . N o t a m ore o r l e ss of

s t r i c tu re bu t a de te rm ined ( s t ruc tu red ) fo rm o f s t r i c tu re . . .T he log ic

of detachment as cut leads to oppos i t ion , i t i s a logic or even a d ia

lec t i c o f oppos i t ion . . .The log ic o f de tachment as s t r i c tu re i s entirely

other. Defer r ing , i t never su tu res . Here i t pe rmi t s us to t ake accoun t

of th is fact : that these shoes are nei ther a t tached nor detached,

ne i the r fu ll no r em pty . A dou b le b in d is he re as tho ug h susp end ed

and imp osed s im ul tane ous ly . . .Any s t r i c tu re i s simultaneously s t r i c -

t u r a t i o n a n d d e s t r i c t u r a t i o n . ( T P , 3 4 0 ) .

T h e l a c es , t h e n , risk meaning ; bu t in mak ing mean ing a mat te r o f r i sk ,

they in t rodu ce the pos s ib i l ity o f the u t t e r lo ss o f me an ing ; and fo r D er r ida

th i s de te rm ines a s t ru c tu re / s t r i c tu re o f inde te rm inacy , o f p lay , be tw een

un ivoca l i ty and equ ivoca l i ty , mean ing and the d i sper s ion o f mean ing ,

which never ge t s t i ed up , one way o r the o the r . On th i s accoun t , then , the

laces p lay the ro le in Derr ida ' s thought that we ear l ier saw ref lect ive

j u d g e m e n t h a d i n K a n t ; p r o v i d i n g t h e i n d e t e r m i n a t e g r o u n d s f o r d e t e r m i

na te th ink ing , a g ro un d in g tha t cu t s de te rm inan cy f rom i t s goa l , de fe r r ing

i t . B ut in so doin g, a t the sam e t ime , i t prov ides a form of wh at mi gh t be

ca l l ed g round les s g round ing , o r even ' g round les s l eg i t ima t ion ' . 2 0

Heidegger ' s tac t i s , a t leas t here (which is to agree that th is i s not so

everywhere ) , to l eave beh ind , specu la te away the moment o f r i sk . And we

migh t we l l have had a p remoni t ion o f th i s in the way tha t He idegger

con t inues the pas sage quo ted above concern ing the use les snes s o f the

pa in t i ng . Af ter havin g jus t sa id that f rom the pai n t in g we can no t even te l l

where the shoes s tand , he pe rempto r i ly iden t i f i e s them: 'A pa i r o f peasan ts h o e s a n d n o t h i n g m o r e ' ( O W A , 3 3 ) . T h e ' n o t h i n g m o r e ' r e h e a r s e s a r i s k

tha t has a l r eady been w i thd raw n . W e know th i s w i thd rawa l of r i sk h as

occ ur red , fo r then fo llows Heid egg er ' s specu la t ive 'An d ye t - ' , f o llowed

by the inc r imina t ing pas sage . However , the pas sage i t s e l f does no t end the




m a t t e r or show the prec i s e charac te r of Heidegger ' s f e in t . And th i s for the

ev iden t r eason tha t the descr ip t ion and the r evea l ing of the e q u i p m e n t a l

charac te r of e q u i p m e n t in reliabil i ty is made wi thou t d i r ec t r e fe rence

to the p i c t u r e - r e fe rence be ing , for Heidegger , i t s e l f pos te r io r to the

ground ing tha t w i l l occur . More p rec i s e ly , He idegger quer ies whe ther

the p ic ture does reveal all the d e s c r i p t i o n of it c la ims to r evea l ; be t t e r , heq u e s t i o n s w h e t h e r w h a t is revealed in the p i c t u r e corresponds to ' s hoes ' :

' B u t perhaps it is only in the p i c t u r e we no t ice all th i s abou t the shoes '

( O W A , 34). The a c u t e n e s s of th is ges ture on H e i d e g g e r ' s p a r t , the s u s

p e n s i o n c o n s e q u e n t u p o n ' p e r h a p s ' , is t h a t it breaks w i th the logic of

c o r r e s p o n d e n c e , p r e s s i n g t h o u g h t b a c k i n t o the p i c t u r e itself. And th i s

going back in to the p ic tu re , th i s cu t t ing off of its r ep resen ta t iona l s ense ,

paral le ls the move back to u l t i m a t e g r o u n d s t h a t H e i d e g g e r is after:

' N e v e r t h e l e s s , in its g e n u i n e l y e q u i p m e n t a l b e i n g , e q u i p m e n t s t e m s f r om

a more d i s tan t source [more d i s tan t , we m i g h t say, t h a n the d is tanceb e t w e e n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n and o b j e c t ] . M a t t e r and form and thei r d is t inct ion

h a v e a deeper o r ig in ' (OWA, 35). By c u t t i n g the p i c t u r e off from the o u t

s ide - a ges tu re l i censed by our aes the t i c concep t ion of art w o r k s as self-

a u t h e n t i c a t i n g , as ar t icula t ing Act ive poss ib le wor lds that can be en te red

in to by a c c e p t i n g w o r k s ' own t e r m s of r e fe rence - H e i d e g g e r o p e n s up the

possibil i ty of a m o r e d i s t a n t ' o u t s i d e ' the p a i n t i n g , an ou ts ide tha t is no

object at all. The s u s p e n s i o n of r e fe rence hence opens on to a space forever

p r i o r to r e fe rence . 'The e q u i p m e n t a l q u a l i t y of e q u i p m e n t was d iscovered .

B u t h o w ? . . . o n l y by br ing ing our se lves be fo re Van G o g h ' s p a i n t i n g . The

painting spoke. In the vicin i ty of the work we were suddenly somewhere else

than we usually tend to be' (OWA, 35; my i ta l ics ) . Again , Heidegger p lays

off the a e s t h e t i c d i s p l a c e m e n t of the e v e r y d a y , as r e c o r d e d in locu t ions

s u c h as ' en te r ing in to (the wor ld of) the p a i n t i n g or nove l ' , for p u r p o s e s

t h a t put in to ques t ion the a s s u m p t i o n s of aes the t i c and r ep resen ta t iona l

' e n t e r i n g in', the v e r y e n t e r i n g t h a t K a n t a t t e m p t s to s e c u r e t h r o u g h

d is in te res tednes s and fo rmal i ty .

N o t h i n g in H e i d e g g e r ' s a r g u m e n t s h e r e , as r e c o r d e d by D e r r i d a , p u t sin to ques t ion the cur ios i t ies we noted ear l ier : that the pa in t ing r evea l s

w h a t the p e a s a n t w o m a n a l r e a d y k n o w s , w h a t she is ' p r i v y ' (OWA, 34)

to in ju s t wear ing the s h o e s (or is it on ly in the m o m e n t she s l ips them

from her feet?); that the a c c o u n t i n g is done i r r espec t ive of the his tor ical

p e r m u t a t i o n s and a l t e ra t ions tha t be fa l l p roduc t s , and tha t the re fo re wha t

is revealed here , as o p p o s e d to by the t e m p l e , is not an his tor ical wor ld , but,

more o r ig ina r i ly as it w e r e , 'the silent call of the e a r t h ' (uberhauptt), and

t h a t in v i r tue of w h i c h the w o m a n can be ' s u r e of her w o r l d ' (OWA, 34).

L e t us put the p r o b l e m t h i s way: a l though Heidegger no tes tha t wor ld and

ear th exis t for the p e a s a n t w o m a n and 'for t h o s e who are w i t h her in her

m o d e of b e i n g ' (OWA, 34), the pa in t ing cou ld not be r e g a r d e d as the




ga ther ing r evea l ing o f tha t world as i t i s in Van Gogh unless i t were

cou n te rpo in ted to the wor ld o f the c i ty dwel le r , un les s the marg in a l i ty , the

app roac h ing su ppres s io n o f tha t wor ld , were al so no ted in and f rom the

pain t ing . Derr ida ' s choice of Schapiro ' s essay would then fa l l in to p lace ,

fo r i t wou ld p rov ide the coun te rpo in t ing absen t f rom Heidegger ' s ana lys i s ,

thereby g iv ing back to the pain t ing a h is tor ical specif ic i ty . This , however ,

is not what Derr ida actual ly does . On the contrary , h is s t ra tegic goal i s to

offer to the pain t ing a p lace or space that fa l ls outs ide any normat ive

accoun t ing , and hence ou t s ide any a t t empt to iden t i fy the r i sk tha t pa in t

ing takes by ident i fy ing i ts recol lect ing and i n te r ru pt i ng of any specif ic

h i s to ry . Were Der r ida to do tha t , he wou ld become jus t ano ther pa r ty to

t h e d e b a t e b e t w e e n H e i d e g g e r a n d S c h a p i r o .

I f Heidegger f l i r t s wi th the loss of meaning in order to make the ty ing

and reat taching of the shoes a l l the more f i rm, then Derr ida mus t f ind a

way of inscr ib ing the dou ble uselessn ess of shoes and p ain t ing tha t doesno t l ead on to sub la t ion , overcoming , Aufhebung; a specula t ive loss of

mean ing fo r the su rp lus va lues o f o r ig ina ry mean ing . How do the use les s

ness of shoes and pain t ing re la te to each o ther , conn ect? O ne of the voices

beg ins to sugges t a way : the tw o de ta ch m ent s shou ld no t be r ega rded as a

pair , pai r ing being a quickly to be surpassed pre l iminary to fu l l res t i

t u t i o n . R a t h e r , t h e d e t a c h m e n t o f t h e o n e ' m a r k s , r e - m a r k s o r o v e r m a r k s

tha t of the o th er . . . the shoes wi th t he ir laces (a l i t tle) un do ne g ive pa in t i ng

to be r emarked ' (TP , 342) . The log ic o f the mark o r r e -mark i s one o f

D e r r i d a ' s q u a s i - c o n c e p t s f o r t h e m o v e m e n t w h e r e b y t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n

s t i tu t ion i s sugges ted and wi thdrawn s imul taneous ly . The r e la t ion o f mark

and re -m ark d i r ec t ly pa ra l le l s the f irst two mo m ent s o f t r ansc end en ta l syn

t h e s i s : apprehens ion in in tu i t ion and r ep roduc t ion in imag ina t ion . As in

K an t , so he re : wh a t is s econd ( r em ark , r ep rod uc t io n ) is p res upp osed by

what comes f i r s t (mark , apprehens ion) ; hence the immediacy o f the f i r s t

moment becomes end les s ly de layed and defe r red .

Re -m ark in g m arks the p lace where a cond i t ion o f pos s ib il i ty is ope ned

wi thou t un iver sa l i ty o r genera l i ty , and hence w i thou t t r ansparency . I tmarks a p lace o f e i the r g round les s l eg i t ima t ion o r non- leg i t ima t ing

g r o u n d i n g : a g r o u n d l e s s g r o u n d , a g r o u n d t h a t m a k e s p o s s i b l e w i t h o u t

secur ing o r de te rm in ing in the m an ne r o f a t r ansc end en ta l g ro un d o r o r i

g in . A mark , such as the pa in t ing , i s r e -marked by the shoes , wh ich a l lows

the f i r s t mark to be the repeatable s ign of some s ignif ied; only in being

re- m ark ed is the f irs t mark f ir st (a m ark ) - here the ma rk of ( inde ter

m inate ly : useless /useful) pain t ing . Al tho ug h the re- m ark ing is wh at f ir st

g ives to the mark i ts poss ib i l i ty of sense , hence the analogy with t ran

scend en ta l g ro und ing , wh a t does the r e -ma rk ing is de tach ab le f rom an d

i n d e p e n d e n t o f w h a t i t d o u b l e s a n d r e - m a r k s . A n d t h a t d e t a c h m e n t , t h e

poss ib i l i ty of detachment that a t taches to a l l re-marking, infects , def la tes ,




withdraws the g round ing s ecur i ty , the r e l i ab i l i ty , in s inua ted by the quas i -

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l m o v e m e n t o f c o n s t i t u t io n p r o v i d e d b y t h e r e - m a r k i n g . I n

h i s mos t e labora ted d i s cus s ion o f the mark , Der r ida s ta tes :

T h e m a r k - s u p p l e m e n t (le supplement de marque) p r o d u c e d b y t h e

text ' s workings , in fa l l ing outs ide of the text l ike an independentobject wi th no or ig in o ther than itself, a t r ace tha t tu rns back in to

a presence (or a s ign) , i s inseparable f rom des i re ( the des i re for

reappropr ia t ion o r r ep resen ta t ion ) . Or r a the r , i t g ives b i r th to i t and

nour ishes i t in the very act of separat ing f rom i t .2 1

Derr ida rehearses the opening of th is des i re ( for res t i tu t ion) in what

follows.

T h e s h o e s give pa in t ing to be r e -marked . Ano ther vo ice in te r jec t s

h e r e , 'T he y g ive? ' , tha t i s , you don ' t rea l ly mea n to r epea t He ideg ger ' s' I t g iv es ' , do you? T h e f i rs t voice conc edes th at it i s the He ideg ger ia n

locut ion , id iom, a t s take: ' I t g ives , there is , es gibt... ,T\\t second voice

re tu rns , s t i l l wor r ied by the l ink ing o f the Der r idean r e -mark w i th the

H e i d e g g e r i a n 'es gibf: ' In an obsole te language, one would say! ' The f i r s t

voice does not re t reat : ' I s there any obsole te language? Like o ld outworn

sh o es , ou t o f use o r ou t o f da te , in a w or d-p a i n te d l angu age? ' Th e ' i t g ives '

w i l l be r e tu rned to s ince wha t Der r ida in tends i s i t s r e insc r ip t ion , a s t a te

men t o f i t o the rwise , a s r e -mark ing . Bu t the s econd vo ice , so anx ious to

get beyond Heidegger and c lose i t s ears to re inscr ip t ion , per fect ly takes

the ba i t o f the des i r e fo r r es t i tu t ion opened by the r e -mark . Th is de

s i re , the a l legory of pain t ing , i s a l l the more seduct ive s ince i t sounds

Derr idean. Textual , or in th is case pain ter ly , a l legory is the form of res t i

tu t ion tha t a t t aches to decons t ruc t ive r ead ing .

. . . the shoes p roduce a d i s course on pa in t ing , on the f r ame , on the

traits. These shoes are an a l legory of pain t ing in pain t ing . Or again :

one cou ld en t i t l e th i s p ic tu re ' the o r ig in o f pa in t ing ' . I t makes a p ic

ture of the p ic ture and invi tes you not to forget the very th ing i t

makes you forget : you have pain t ing and not shoes under your nose

. . .pa in t ing is or ig in ar i ly th is de tac hm en t whic h loses i t s foot ing .

( T P , 342) .

This is far f rom the dream of pain t ing without t ru th noted ear l ier . I t i s

therefore not surpr is ing that the f i r s t voice res is ts th is a l legor izat ion ,

res is ts , that i s , the immediate t rans la t ion of the re-mark in to a l legory ,

without denying the a l legory s ince i t represents one of the ef fects remark ing s e t s in mot ion .

To p lace th i s t r ans la t ion , de - l imi t i t , r e s to re the pa in t ing to i t s 'w i th

ou t t ru th ' , i ts 'i t g ives ' , ' t he re i s ' pa in t ing , Der r id a w i ll com plem en t

H e i d e g g e r ' s a c c o u n t w i t h S c h a p i r o ' s . H a v i n g n o t e d t h e ( i n d e t e r m i n a t e )




scho la r ly g rounds for r e fus ing He idegger ' s in te rp re ta t ion , Schap i ro t akes

the offensive by w i t h d r a w i n g t h e s e s c h o l a r l y c o m p l a i n t s , c o n c e d i n g for

rhe to r ica l pu rposes the l eg i t imacy of H e i d e g g e r ' s a t t r i b u t i o n of the s h o e s

to the p e a s a n t w o m a n , and go ing on to c la im tha t He idegger wou ld s t i l l be

w r o n g . He would have failed to n o t i c e 'the ar t i s t ' s p resence in the w o r k , '2 2

t h e ' p e r s o n a l ' and ' p h y s i o g n o m i c ' a s p e c t of the shoes , thei r fac ing thev iewer as the p o r t r a i t of a f ace migh t - all the s igns and t races that reveal

the shoes as a ' p o r t r a i t ' of the ar t i s t , e.g., 'a por t r a i t of the ar t is t as an old

t h i n g ' (TP, 370). A naive form of expres s ion i s t log ic in fo rms Sch ap i r o ' s

r e a d i n g . T h i s n a i v e t e is b e s t u n d e r s t o o d by the des i r e for r e s t i t u t i o n , for

iden t i f i ca t ion under ly ing it. Because tha t des i r e is an effect , secondary ,

ident i f ica t ion is a l w a y s s u p p l e m e n t a r y : 'the d e m a n d for r e a t t a c h m e n t is by

def in i t ion insat iab le , unsat is f ied , a lways m aki ng a h i g h e r bid' (TP, 368).

S o S c h a p i r o o u t b i d s H e i d e g g e r ; e v e n if the shoes are t h o s e of a p e a s a n t

w o m a n , t h e y are still Van G o g h ' s ; b e t t e r , s i n c e the logic of p a r t and w h o l eis d isp laced in S c h a p i r o ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the shoes expres s 'his w h o l e p r e s

e n c e , ga thered , pu l led t igh t , con t rac ted in to itself, w i t h itself, in p r o x i m i t y

w i t h itself: a parousia' (T P, 369).

S c h a p i r o ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s t a n d s at the o ther po le to H e i d e g g e r ' s

( thereby ref lect ing it); in o p p o s i t i o n to H e i d e g g e r ' s d i s c o u r s e of e a r t h ,

g r o u n d , etc., Schapiro ' s of fers the l a n g u a g e of face and sub jec t iv i ty . And

t h e r e is s o m e a u t h o r i z a t i o n for S c h a p i r o in Van G o g h ' s n u m e r o u s self-

p o r t r a i t s , his p a i n t i n g of per sona l ob jec t s , and his ident i f ica t ion of his

w o r k as a pa in te r w i th a r t i s ana l ac t iv i ty . Schap i ro ou tb ids He idegger , but

n o t w i t h o u t g r o u n d s . F i n d i n g g r o u n d s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s for S c h a p i r o ' s

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , as in s h o w i n g the e x t r a v a g a n c e of the d e s i r e u n d e r l y i n g it,

d o e s not e n t a i l c o n d e m n a t i o n or a u t h o r i z a t i o n : ' N o b o d y ' s b e i n g a c c u s e d ,

or above all c o n d e m n e d , or e v e n s u s p e c t e d . There is pa in t ing , wr i t ing ,

r e s t i t u t i o n s , t h a t ' s all!' (TP, 371). T h e r e is p a i n t i n g , p a i n t i n g w i t h o u t

t r u t h ; p a i n t i n g s u s p e n d i n g its own meaning , r i sk ing the loss of m e a n i n g ;

ever excess ive , ever non- ident ical wi th itself, less than a p a i r and m o r e

t h a n a pa i r ; but a l so , a lways r es t i tu t io ns , r ecup era t ion s , r ea t t a chm ent s .' T h e r e is p a i n t i n g ' is, t h e n , the r e i n s c r i p t i o n of Ereignis; it g ives be ing ,

b e y o n d o w n e r s h i p , p r o p r i e t y , p r o p e r t y and the p r o p e r ; b e y o n d the cha in

of neu t ra l i za t ions which r e tu rn the excess ive g i f t , th is pain t ing , to the

logic of the same ca l l ed metaphys ics .

i v In terrupt ing M etaph ys ics

P a i n t i n g w i t h o u t t r u t h . Why w i t h o u t t r u t h ? W h a t is the g a i n , a d v a n t a g e ,

i n s i g h t p r o d u c e d by loca t ing pa in t ing , th i s pa in t ing , in the n o n - s p a c e of

t h e ' w i t h o u t t r u t h ' ? P e r h a p s t h i s is a way in: ' W i t h o u t t r u t h ' m a r k s out a

space for the o ther tha t is not r e d u c i b l e to the logic of the same; on ly




'w i thou t t ru th ' ( a s co r rec tnes s , s ay ) can the o the rnes s o f the o the r be sus

ta ined . An d D er r id a ' s way o f hand l ing a l t e ri ty does manage to p resen t

something l ike a so lu t ion to the problem of a l ter i ty we noted in Heidegger .

In Heidegger the t ru ly o ther was being, not beings ; i t s o therness guar

an teed th rou gh i t s app ear in g on ly in s e l f -d i sp lacem en t , in w i thdraw al .

An d th is , we c la im ed, cause d a d i ff icul ty in be ing 's con nect io n withbe ings ; the i r f a te , because somehow secondary , became d i r empted f rom

the real fa tefu lness of fa te , the des t in ing of being. Derr ida , refus ing gener

a l i ty , un iver sa l i ty , u l t ima te g rounds , d i spenses w i th the d ream of s ecur ing

both presence and a l ter i ty a pr ior i , once and for a l l . But that dream and

des i r e , and the d i s cu r s ive p rac t i ces adher ing to i t , canno t be d i spensed

with as such ; they m us t p laced and a cco unte d for. The placing and

accounting is the continuation of philosophy beyond m etaphysics, the continu

ation of the project of philosoph y otherwise. Der r ida , l ike He idegger , i s on

the t rack of f in ite t ra nsc en de nc e, of a t ran sce nd ent a l t ha t i s no t eq uiva lent

to or a proxy for the e tern i ty of ideas ; a t ranscendenta l , then , that wi l l

open the (or a) space of the empir ical wi thout , for a l l that , being opposed

(beyond , above o r be low) to the empi r ica l . On ly a g round les s g round , such

as ' ea r th ' , can g ive th ings (h i s to ry , pe r sons , mean ing) , l e t them be , w i th

ou t domina t ing o r w i thdrawing them f rom the i r a l t e r i ty and spec i f i c i ty in

the ve ry ges tu re th rou gh w hich they com e fo r th . De - t r ansc end en ta l i z ing

the t r anscenden ta l , however , i s no t the u t t e r r epud ia t ion o f i t , the d i s

avowal o f th ink ing th rough ' the cond i t ions fo r the pos s ib i l i ty of...'.

D e r r i d a ' s c o n t i n u a t i o n o f m e t a p h y s i c s b e y o n d p r e s e n c e ( a nd h e n c e t h e

axiomat ic of e tern i ty) i s local , specif ic , even empir ical , but s t i l l a cont inu

a t i o n , a q u a s i - t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ( n o n - u n i v e r s a l ) a c c o u n t i n g .

T h e log ic o f the quas i - t r an scen den ta l acc oun t ing invo lves a mom en t

t h a t c a n n o t b e p r e s e n t e d , c a n n o t b e p h e n o m e n o l o g i z e d ; a m o m e n t w e

wil l rehearse again below for the 'wi thout end ' (wi thout purpose) of a

t u l ip . I t i s the ' the re i s pa in t ing ' o f Van Gogh ' s shoes . The non- iden t i ty ,

the o the rnes s , o f the pa in t ing w i th the acco un ts o f i t - He ide gge r ' s ,

Schapiro ' s , the a l legor ical in terpreta t ion of the shoes - i s quas i -

t r anscenden ta l ly accoun ted fo r no t in t e rms o f the de feas ib i l i ty o f pa r t i cu

la r in te rp re ta t ions , no r in t e rms o f the empi r ica l imposs ib i l i ty o f s a tu ra t ing

the work with concepts , both of which would leave the ideal of t ru th in

place; bu t ra ther , in ter m s of the pain t ing b eing a con di t ion for wh at

would ac co unt for i t , as exe m plary work s are an ter io r to wh at wo uld

acc ou nt for them - the paral le l i s prec ise . T h e Van G og h has th is pow er

th rough i t s suspens ion o f be ing and mean ing , th rough the r i sk o f the

un do ne l aces , th ro ug h , tha t is , the r e -m ark i ng o f the de ta ch m en t o f pa i n t

ing in the de tachment o f the pa i r o f shoes . Tha t suspens ion , the o r ig ina ry

gif t of tha t work , a g i ft pr io r to th e exchan ges a nd co ntra cts over i t s t ru th ,

is wh at necessar i ly , b u t a lso as a m at t er of fact, can no t be r es t i tu ted ,

r e tu rned , made p resen t . I t opens the he rmeneu t ica l c i r c le o f wh ich i t i s




also a par t ; opening, i t i s nei ther ins ide nor outs ide the c i rc le . Al ter i ty , the

o thernes s o f the o the r , i s in exces s o f metaphys ics , beyond the p resence

and absence o f mean ing , w i thou t t ru th ; bu t i t i s equa l ly , on the bas i s o f a

con t ingen t ly opera t ive neces sa ry cond i t ion , wha t g ives metaphys ics , p res

ence and absence , iden t i ty and d i f fe rence , the in te rp re ta t ions o f the pa in t

ing and the metaphys ica l p ro toco l s l i cens ing those in te rp re ta t ions . In mod

ernist art, in V an Gogh's painting, we experience, in however defused a way, a

source of meaning exterior to the subject. Modernis t ar t i s the refuge of our

exper ience of generat ive exter ior i ty , of an author i ty beyond the sway of

mere tas te and wil l .

De con s t ruc t iv e r ead ings enac t a power fu l log ic ; a log ic wh ich becau se

no t genera l , no t a un iver sa l , subs i s t s on ly in and th rough i t s enac tmen t .

T h u s D e r r i d a ' s infinite task: the o the rnes s o f the o the r , i t s pa r t i cu la r i ty ,

i t s un ique p rob i ty , i s a p roduc t o f r ead ing , o f demons t ra t ing in each case

where to ta l i ty o r un iver sa l i ty loom, a quas i - t r anscenden ta l moment tha tru ins un iver sa l i ty (metaphys ics ) th rough th e ph i losoph ica l ges tu re o f sup

ply ing the necessary condi t ions for the poss ib i l i ty of the i tem in ques t ion .

Because the demons t ra t ion i s loca l , then no th ing s ecures i t s ' r igh tnes s '

o ther than i ts r ightness 'here ' and i ts analogical i terabi l i ty . That abi l i ty of

be ing r epea ted , wh ich i s ju s t the fact of p lura l readings analogical ly re la ted

to one ano ther , a l so th rea tens to ru in the punc tua l i ty , the ' th i snes s ' o f

r ead ings , a s i f the re were an abso lu te mora l demand , an apore t i c ca tegor i

cal im pera t ive - 'Re ad in such a way th at you a lways t rea t the o ther ( text ,

pe r son , even t ) never s imply as a means , bu t a lways a t the s ame t ime

as en d in i t s e l f - s ub l im ely so l ic i t ing the act of rea din g, p rov idin g

i t s w o r t h . T h i s s u p p r e s s e d m o r a l d e m a n d , t h e e t h i c p r e s c r i b i n g d e c o n

s t ruc t ive r ead ing , r educes such r ead ing to wha t i t opposes . Fur the r ,

to the degrees to which double reading is i t se l f a form a n d a p r o c e d u r e ,

a lbe i t no t an a lgor i thm or a de te rmina te p rocedure , i t mus t co l lude w i th

m e t a p h y s i c s .2 3

As a first appro x im at ion , we mig h t haza rd tha t wh a t is odd abo u t

D er r id a ' s pract ice is h is s i lence on the ques t i on of jud ge m en t . I t is am at te r o f ( aes the ti c ) r e fl ec tive judg em ent aga in , opera t ing w i thou t

ph i losoph ica l guaran tees , w i thou t f i rm c r i t e r i a , w i thou t ' r eason ' , aban

doned in the face of the o ther , but want ing a l l the more to speak, judge,

t ru ly , w i th t ru th . How can th i s judgement en te r ph i losophy? In wha t way

d o e s j u d g e m e n t i n t e r r u p t p h i l o s o p h y a n d m e t a p h y s i c s ? T h e q u e s t i o n o f

jud ge m en t is supp res sed in De r r ida tw ice over . F i r s t , jud ge m en t ap pear s

everywhere in Der r ida , and ye t nowhere , in the gu i se o f ' r ead ing ' , in wha t

con nec t s , w i tho u t ru les o r fo rmal i sm , w i thou t a deco ns t ruc t ive a lgo r i thm ,

form al ism and text . T h e we ight of the very idea of rea din g in D er r id a , i t ss e r iousnes s , i s the s e r iousnes s o f judgement . Second ly , more ind i rec t ly ,

jud ge m en t is a t i s sue in the pr iv i leg e De rr i da g ives to l i ter a tu re and ar t . I f

some ver s ion o f the a rgument so f a r i s co r rec t , then judgement has been




d isman t led , marg ina l i zed by the l eg i s la t ive f r aming o f t ru th -on ly cogn i t ion

and ca tegor ica l r eason . Ju dg em en t on ly appears as judgement in aes the t i c s ,

in ar t and l i tera ture . Aes thet ics , ar t and l i tera ture are a l ready pos i ted in

m ode rn i ty as w i th ou t ( theore t i ca l and p rac t i ca l ) t ru th . So the 'w i th ou t

t ru th ' o f the ' the re i s pa in t ing ' migh t be though t equ iva len t to the t ru th

of judgement ou t s ide theore t i ca l and p rac t i ca l t ru th . Such a hypo thes i smight a t leas t begin to account for why the ' suspens ion ' of being and the

r isk of non-meaning has f i r s t occured in ar t and l i tera ture ; why ar t has

been taken to be the other of reason; why, f inally, ar t (or l i terature) is the

supp lemen t to metaphys ics , in te r rup t ing ph i losophy fo r the s ake o f wha t i t

in ten ds : the o the r - the o the r tha t a ce r ta in h i s to ry (bu t whose?) has aban

doned to a r t .

T h i s h y p o t h e s i s m i g h t h e l p e x p l a i n D e r r i d a ' s c u r i o u s h a n d l i n g o f t h e

Critique of Judgement. R a t h e r t h a n s e e i n g t h e t h i r d Critique a s t h r o w i n g

into ques t ion the metaphys ical pro tocols of the res t of the Cr i t ica l sys tem,

Derr ida reads i t as fu l f i l l ing the metaphys ical ambit ions of the sys tem as a

whole , a s r ad ica l ly exempl i fy ing the metaphys ica l t ru th under ly ing the

sys tem; and in so do ing r epea t ing Kan t ' s own deh is to r ic iza t ion o f r eason ,

the t r a jec to ry o f wh ich we have been a t t empt ing to r ever se . Der r ida goes

on to locate the Critique's d is rup t ion o f the metaphys ics o f p resence in

i so la ted moments , bu t mos t empha t ica l ly in the moment o f sub l imi ty . As

we saw ear l ier , however , the subl ime in Kant i t se l f operates a repress ion

of jud gem ent ; a po in t D er r ida i s ca re fu l to no te (T P , 137) . A do ub le

r e p r e ss i o n o f j u d g e m e n t t h e n , K a n t ' s a n d D e r r i d a ' s . W h a t j u d g e m e n t i s

s u p p r e s s e d i n t h e n o n - j u d g e m e n t o f t h e s u b l im e ? K a n t ' s s u b l i m e , b u t

Der r ida ' s a s we l l . For what is deconstructive reading, the reconnoitring of

wha t cann ot be presented in the text b ut is yet of the text, b ut the produc tion/

discovery of the sublime moment in each text of the tradition? And would no t

th i s en ta i l tha t the decons t ruc t ive sub l ime i s bu t a ' h igher ' , more soph is t i

ca ted r epe t i t ion o f Kan t? Decons t ruc t ion s tand ing to metaphys ics as the

t h i r d Critique s tands to the c la ims of theoret ica l and pract ica l reason? But

then we a re r e tu rned to ou r o r ig ina l ques t ion : o f wha t i s the suppres s ionof judgement , th e cutt ing it off from truth a n d moral Tightness, a s u p

p res s ion? What has been coded so as to become ' aes the t i c s ' ? What a l t e r i ty

is l inger ing there in the aes thet ic terms: b e a u t y , j u d g e m e n t , t h e s u b l i m e ,

sensus communis}

O f c o u r s e , D e r r i d a ' s h a n d l i n g o f t h e t h i r d Critique is typical of his

t r ea tmen t o f t ex t s , such as those o f He idegger and Lev inas , tha t have a

pr ima facie c la im to be regarded as non-metaphys ical . In these cases

Der r ida i s anx ious to po in t ou t the moments o f co l lus ion w i th metaphys ics

in order to le t thei r depar ture f rom the t radi t ion appear less themat ical ly .

Fu r th e r , one shou ld r egard De r r id a ' s p rac t i ce o f r ead ing as an a r t i s ti c

p rac t i ce , a s the c rea t ion o f exempla ry works . Der r ida 'makes ' these works

exem pla ry tho ug h t the c rea t ion /d i s covery o f the i r m om en t o f exces s ,

whose quas i - r e p rese n ta t io n in t e rm s o f non -co nce p ts i s the ana logue of the




un t ied l aces . Der r idean non-concep ts a re ph i losoph ica l dang l ing l aces , and

hence mark (o r r e -mark) the r i sk o f mean ing in Der r idean p rac t i ce . And

this makes h is readings works to be judged, works of genius , ra ther than

ph i losoph ica l t ex t s o f the t r ad i t iona l so r t . To in te rp re t Der r ida in the t r a

d i t iona l way is thu s to su bs um e h i s t ex t s , to r ed uce th em as He ideg ger and

Schap i ro r educe Van Gogh , to the l aw o f the s ame . Der r ida ' s t ex t s do no tsupp res s judge m ent bu t in s i st on it , de m an d i t. De con s t ruc t ive r ead in g is

meant to be compuls ive in the same way as a new pract ice of l i terary

wr i t ing or pa in t ing is com puls ive . In De r r id a a r t i s t i c m od ern i sm bec om es

p h i l o s o p h i c a l , a n d p h i l o s o p h y b e c o m e s m o d e r n i s t . W h a t a b o v e a p p e a r e d

as the i terabi l i ty of Derr ida ' s procedure is but the work of success ion , a

d e m o n s t r a t i o n that a new ru le has been won fo r ph i losophy .

There i s , then , no way in which we can t ake s e r ious ly the ' aes the t i c '

c r i t iqu e of m od ern i ty (p rogres s ive cu l tu re ) w i tho u t a t the s am e t im e

a c k n o w l e d g i n g D e r r i d a ' s a c h i e v e m e n t . E v e r y t h i n g I h a v e b e e n w a n t i n g t o

say in defence of aes thet ic modernism is real ized in decons truct ive read

ing . T h e d if ficul ty w i th h is ach iev em ent , how ever , i s wh eth er we can

under s tand i t . Fo r in a l ign ing h imse l f d i r ec t ly w i th a r t i s t i c modern i sm he

by-pas ses the one ques t ion abou t i t tha t i s in t r ans igen t ly ph i losoph ica l ,

namely , wha t does i t s c r i t ique mean in r e la t ion to ou r dominan t hab i t s o f

knowing? By ph i losoph ica l ly r epea t ing modern i sm Der r ida r educes ph i l

osophy to the marg ina l i zed aes the t i c , the reby acced ing to the a l i ena t ion

of judg em ent f rom t ru th an d mora l i ty . In so do ing he l eaves unkn ow n

the fo rces tha t make the aes the t i c marg ina l , and l eaves un t rans fo rmed

the contemporary regimes of knowing. This is the s ta te of af fa i rs that

D e r r i d a ' s r e a d i n g o f K a n t e x h i b i t s .

In the res t of the chapter I wi l l argue, f i r s t , that Derr ida fo l lows

Heidegger in r educ ing gen ius to metaphys ics . In so do ing he , l ike

Heidegger , d i s s imula tes the ques t ions o f f r eedom and h i s to ry tha t a re the

m om en ts o f excess in Ka n t ' s aes the t i c s . Second ly , a s a con sequ enc e o f th i s

d i s s imu la t ion De r r ida en ds up keep in g the in te r ru p t ion o f m etaph ys ics h e

himself enacts aes thet ica l , c los ing i t of f to i t s ownmost e th ical and pol i t ica lpotent ia l i t ies and s ignif icance. F inal ly , we can comprehend th is self-

l imi ta t ion as a consequence o f Der r ida ' s des i r e to s ecure a ce r ta in ' t r ans

cendenta l ' safe ty , a cer ta in e th ical subl imity , for the procedures of

deco ns t ruc t ive r ea d ing - a s afety and s ecur i ty tha t a re in ten ded as p ro tec

t ion agains t the inclus io n of de con s tru ct io n in the gui l t of th e re pres s ive

c o n s e q u e n c e s o f m e t a p h y s i c s .

v Fram ing the W ithout En d o f Pure Beauty

W i t h o u t t r u t h . W i t h o u t e n d , p u r p o s e , g o a l , telos. K a n t ' s Zweckmassigkeit

ohne Zweck, f inal ity w i th ou t end (as D err ida a nd h is t ran s la to rs have i t ) , i s

a cons t ruc t ion too c lose to Der r ida ' s concep t ion o f the 'w i thou t t ru th ' fo r




him no t to cred i t i t , not to perceive in i t the an t ic ipa t ion or bro ach ing of a

t r ansgres s ion o f the fo rm o f me taphys ica l c losu re tha t r educe s the o the r

to th e sam e. Inde ed , K an t cons truc ts h is analys is of aes th et ic reflective

j u d g e m e n t p r e ci s el y i n o r d e r t o p r o v i d e a n o n - c o m p r e h e n d i n g , r e d u c i n g

form of judgement . The without end of the object of aes thet ic ref lect ive

jud gem ent i s cen t ra l to the m ov em en t wh ereb y the ob jec t ge t s suspen ded ,b racke ted f rom theore t i ca l and p rac t i ca l con cern s . T h e suspens ion p u t s

reason out of p lay , f reeing the object f rom cons iderat ions of theoret ica l

t ru th and mora l wor th ines s . What i s s ign i f i can t in Kan t ' s ana lys i s o f the

without end is that the cut through which i t appears does not enta i l a lack

of any sor t for the subject ; hence i ts wi thout end does not enta i l the need

or the necess i ty for the object to be supplemented in any way. No end

de te rm ines i ts ' o r i en te d mo ve m en t ' (T P , 87 ) , o r ou r app rehe ns io n o f i t a s

s t r a in ing toward the end .

C r e d i t i n g K a n t , D e r r i d a a n a l y s e s t h e ' w i t h o u t ' ( t h e sans) of the w i tho u t

end in t e rms ind igenous to h i s own th ink ing :

The mere absence of the goal would not g ive i t [ the exper ience of

the beaut i fu l ] to me, nor would i t s presence. But the t race of i t s

absence (of noth ing) , inasmuch as i t forms i ts trait in the totali ty in

the guise of the sans, of the w i tho u t -e nd , the t r ace o f the sans which

does not g ive i t se l f to any percept ion and yet whose invis ib i l i ty

marks a fu l l to ta l i ty to which i t does not belong and which hasnothing to do with i t as to ta l i ty , the trace of the sans is the origin of

beauty . I t a lone can be sa id to be beaut i fu l on the bas is of th is t ra i t .

From th is poin t of v iew beauty is never seen , nei ther in the to ta l i ty

nor outs ide i t : the sans i s not v is ib le , sens ib le , percept ib le , i t does

not exis t . And yet there is some of it and i t i s beaut i fu l . I t gives th e

beau t i fu l . (TP , 90 )

T h e p urpo selessn ess of pu re beau t ies perfect ly ins ta l ls the idea of how a

non-p resen t i f i ab le absence can cond i t ion and make a ce r ta in p resence

poss ib le . Th is a lmos t pe r fec t homology be tween pure beau t ies and the

genera l H e id eg ge r /D er r i da acco un t of absenc e as con d i t ion in g p resence

h e n c e s t r u c t u r e s t h e d i r e c t io n o f D e r r i d a ' s a c c o u n t . T h u s h e c o n t i n u e s

by as s imi la t ing the f r eedom of f r ee ( independen t , de tached , vaga) b e a u t

ies, say of a cer ta in tu l ip (CJ , §17, 236) , to the model of Heidegger ian

' e r r a n c e ' ,2 4

and to h is own thes is concerning the poss ib i l i ty of meaning

fai l ing to ar r ive as cons t i tu t ive of i t s (poss ib le) ar r ival . So , for example , he

c la ims tha t f r ee beau ty , the on ly k ind compat ib le w i th judgements o f pu rebeauty , ' i s an indef in i te er rance, wi thout l imi t , s t re tching toward i ts or ient

but cut t ing i tse l f of f f rom i t ra ther than depr iv ing i tse l f of i t , absolu te ly .

I t does not ar r ive i t se l f a t i t s des t inat ion ' (TP, 93) . Al though Derr ida

wi l l come to c r i t i c ize Kan t fo r t e rmina t ing th i s o r ig ina l inde te rmin-




acy , none the les s h i s s t r a tegy h igh l igh t s how an ' aes the t i c iza t ion ' o f t r ans

cend en ta l r e f lec tion i s cons t i tu t ive o f the fo rm o f d e - t r ans cend en ta l i z ing

tha t he and Heidegger r es t l e s s ly pur sue .

In i t i a l ly , then , Der r ida wan ts to in s i s t upon the t r ansg res s ive charac te r

o f Kan t ' s ana lys i s o f pu re beau ty , i t s w i thou t end and i t s e r r ance . The

tul ip is not beaut i fu l f rom the perspect ive of knowledge and sc ience; i f i t s

pa r t s w ere s een as co n t r ib u t in g to i t s r ep ro duc t ive po we rs , i ts f ecund i ty ,

as a bo tan i s t migh t s ee them, then they wou ld no t appear as beau t i fu l .

Nonknowledge i s the po in t o f v iew which g ives r i s e to the beau t i fu l (TP ,

91) ; f rom the pe r spec t ive o f nonknowledge ' the s eed wander s ' , i t i s w i th

ou t goa l o r pu rp ose . 'W ha t is beau t i fu l i s d i s s em ina t ion ' (T P , 95 ) . T h e

t u l i p , Derrida says, is not s ignif icant, i t is not a s ignif ier , even of a lack.

'S t ar t in g from a s ignif ier, one can ac co un t for eve ryth ing exc ept be au ty ,

that is at least what seems t o e n v e l o p t h e K a n t i a n o r S a u s s u r e a n t u l i p ' ( T P ,

95) . Derr ida wi l l go on to contes t th is seeming lack of s ignif ica t ion on thepar t o f the tu l ip ; he w i l l go on to demons t ra te how the apparen t pu r i ty o f

th e pu re cu t that le ts the tu l ip app ea r as a pu re g i ft , is a l ready f ram ed

wi th in a sys tem tha t i s t e leo log ica l ly o r ien ted tow ard the Ka n t i an K in g

dom of Ends . Der r ida ' s po in t i s no t to in s i s t upon wha t everyone a l r eady

knows , namely , tha t the Kan t ian sys tem has th i s t e leo log ica l o r ien ta t ion .

Rather , h is poin t i s that beauty is not what i t in i t ia l ly appears to be in

K an t , e r r an t and d i s sem ina t ing , because the sys tem, a t a d i s tance an d

ind i rec t ly , ' s upp l ies the cour se , de te rmines the vaguenes s ( as l ack ) and

gives sense and d irect ion back to er rancy: i t s des t iny and i ts des t inat ion '( T P , 117). In brief, Der r ida ' s fundamenta l s t r a tegy in r ead ing Kan t i s the

exac t oppos i t e to the one we have been pur su ing . Where we have been

pres s ing the c la ims o f beau ty and aes the t i c r e f l ec t ive judgement aga ins t

the c la ims o f the sys tem, t ak ing them to be an in te r rup t ion in wha t the

Cr i t i ca l sys tem in tends , Der r ida fo lds tha t cen t ra l in te r rup t ion back in to

the sys tem for the sake of , or a t leas t wi th an eye towards , a marginal

in te r rup t ion . Worse , ou r r ead ing i s u t t e r ly exposed befo re the Der r idean

reading s ince i t has turned on a wi l l ingness to interpret Kant , to ask

af ter and to urge the c la ims of the text beyond i ts own sys temat ics .

In te rp re ta t io n , wh ich r equ i re s judg em en t , is a d i s course o f t ru th , o f r es t i

tu t ion . The power fu l fo rmal i sm govern ing Der r ida ' s r ead ing l eaves h i s

pos i t ion s t ruc tu ra l ly unex pose d - no t ru th c la im o r thes i s i s p res en te d -

an d in th is sense wi tho ut r isk (which is no t to den y the in tense sub t le ty

and r i sk ines s in Der r ida ' s pe r fo rmances ) . The space s epara t ing our two

read ings , then , concerns the ques t ion o f r i sk and exposure , o f the p lace o f

r isk in the ques t ion of o therness , and the exposure ( r isk) of se l f in the face

of the o the r in the que s t ion o f m ean ing . W ha t , to r e tu rn to the ques t io n o fart , is i t that the r isk of the loss of meaning r isks , s ignif ies , opens and

closes? The nature of the subl ime wil l be the p lace of th is contes ta t ion .

Before get t ing there , however , le t us quickly sketch the two s teps




wh ereby D er r id a fo lds the in te r ru p t ive m ove m en ts o f K an t ' s aes the t ic s

back in to the sys tem, the w i thou t end o f pu re beau ty and the an t i -

mimet ic , s e l f - t r anscend ing charac te r o f the work o f gen ius .

Two e lemen ts w i th in Kan t ' s ana lys i s adumbra te the r eco l lec t ion o f pu re

beau ty back in to the sys tem, pe rmi t i t s apparen t ly e r r an t charac te r to be

de te rm ine d . O n the one han d , fr ee beau ty , wh ich a l l pu re beau t ies mu s tb e , i s not a l l of beauty , but only one type of beauty; the o ther type being

de pe nd en t beau ty . T h i s imm edia te ly qua li fi e s the pa ra d igm of f ree , pu re

bea u ty , p lac ing i ts e r r ancy w i th in a l a rge r con tex t , a b ro ade r f r amework o f

the beau t i fu l . On the o the r hand , l ike every modern aes the t i c s , a l though

'beau ty is a lways beau t i fu l onc e ' , aes the t i c jud gem ent be ing the n on -

subsumpt ive judgement o f un ique i t ems , the judgement i t s e l f d rags the

s ingu la r i ty o f the t e rm judged in to the domain o f un iver sa l i ty . Th is

d ragg ing i s the pa radox tha t every aes the t i c s mus t f ace : Der r ida i s no t

contes t ing the exis tence of the paradox, only Kant ' s way of so lv ing i t .

Kan t ' s so lu t ion i s bound up w i th the f i r s t e lemen t , the d i s t inc t ion

be tween f r ee and dependen t beau ty . What r equ i res the in t roduc t ion o f

de pe nd en t beau ty in to Ka n t ' s accoun t i s , aga in , m an , for the beau ty o f

man can never be wi thout the concept of an object ive f inal i ty , the end, the

conce p t o f f r eedom , w hich d e te rm ines h i s be ing as a m an . Fu r th e r , a s

dem on s t ra te d by the exam ple o f K an t ' s c la im tha t ho r ses too can on ly be

con s ider ed in term s of th e con cep t of th e object ive f inal ity gov ernin g

them, their being (essent ia l ly) fo r man, h i s sys tem presupposes , and i sorgan ized by , the thes is th at ma n, being an end - in-him self , i s the f inal end

of na tu r e , tha t the 'wh o le sys tem of end s is o r ien ted by h im and fo r h im '

( T P , 107) . So K an t s ays tha t ma n i s the b e ing up on e a r th 'wh o is the

ultimate end of na tu re , and the one in r e la t ion to whom a l l o the r na tu ra l

th ing s cons t i tu te a sys tem of en ds ' . W he n m an i s s a ti sf ied by m eans o f

na tu re and i ts benef icence , h i s end i s de t e rm ined as happ ines s . W he n

m an 's f reedom is th e is sue , h is ' ap t i tu de a nd ski ll for al l m an ne r of end s

for wh ich he ma y employ na tu r e bo th ex te rna l and in te rn a l ' (CJ , §8 3 ,

430) , h i s e n d i s d e t e r m i n e d a s ' c u l t u r e ' . T h e o r i e n t a t i o n to w a r d s m a n ' shapp ines s and cu l tu re o r ien t , g ive p lace and mean ing to , the th ings o f

na tu re and soc ie ty .

T h e concep t o f end ad here s to m an , is non -de ta cha b le f rom h im.

Fur the r , un l ike o the r dependen t beau t ies , man i s capab le o f the idea l o f

beau ty . I t i s th ro ug h an u nd er s tan d in g o f the idea l o f beau ty , and i ts role

in cons t i tu t ing the poss ib i l i ty of universal i ty for aes thet ic ref lect ive judge

m e n t s , t h a t D e r r i d a d e m o n s t r a t e s h o w p u r e b e a u t y g e t s o r i e n te d a n d

f r a m e d .

Aga in , judgements o f t a s te canno t be de te rmined by concep ts , the re a re

no c r i t e r i a in accordance w i th which one can make va l id , un iver sa l ly com

m u n i c a b l e , j u d g e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e b e a u t i f u l . T h e p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r

un iver sa l i ty can on ly be sus ta ined by empi r ica l examples tha t appear




'weak inde ed and scarce suff ic ient ' (C J , §17 , 232) to ra ise the pr es um pt io n

of a 'deep - sea ted and sha red ' g r ou nd for accord . On ly ce r ta in exemplary

products of tas te wi l l be able to f i l l th is ro le . Because tas te is formed

th rough in te rac t ion w i th pa r t i cu la r p roduc t s , the re r edounds to t a s te a

ce r ta in h i s to r ica l , cu l tu ra l , p ragmat ico -an th ropo log ica l charac te r ; and th i s

para l l e l s the connec t ion be tween exempla r i ty and h i s to r ica l i ty we t r aced

ear l ier in the analys is of genius . While the (par t ia l ) cons t i tu t ion of tas te

th r ou gh exem pla ry p ro du c t s en jo ins an hor izon o f h i s to rica l p rod uc t iv i ty ,

the exemplar can g ive i t se l f as an example 'only to the extent that i t

s igna l s , empi r ica l ly , toward a s t ruc tu ra l and un iver sa l p r inc ip le o f accord ,

which i s abso lu te ly ah i sto r icaP (T P , 109). T h is s imul ta neou s op en i ng and

clos ing of the h is tor ical hor izon is m ad e even m or e com plex bec ause the

no t ion o f exem pla r i ty he re is bo un d up w i th ' f ree ' p rodu c t io n . Ta s t e ca n

no t be p rodu ced th r ou gh imi ta t io n ; hence the h ighes t mo de l o f t a s te i s a

'mere idea , wh ich each per son mus t bege t in h i s own consc iousnes s ' (CJ ,§ 1 7 , 232) , em ploy ing i t a s a mo de l to es t imate every th ing which i s an

object of tas te . D er r id a fas tens ou r a t te nt io n on the parad oxica l i ty of th is

t h e s i s :

T he re m us t be a pa t t e r n b u t w i th ou t im i ta t ion . Suc h is the log ic o f

the exempla ry , o f the au toproduc t ion o f the exempla ry , th i s meta

phys ical value of product ion having a lways the double ef fect of

opening and c los ing h is tor ic i ty . S ince everyone produces the idea of

t a s t e , i t i s never pregiven by a concept : the product ion of the ideai s h i s to r ica l , a s e r ies o f inaugura t ions w i thou t p resc r ip t ion . Bu t a s

th i s p rod uc t io n i s spo n ta neo us , fr ee a t the ve ry m om en t wh en , by

i ts f reedom, i t re jo ins a universal fund, noth ing is less h is tor ical .

( T P , 1 0 9 - 1 0 )

Two ques t ions emerge f rom th i s c la im. F i r s t , how does the ' un iver sa l

fund ' c lose of f the h is tor ical i ty opened by the ser ies of inaugurat ions ,

exempla ry p roduc t ions , w i thou t p resc r ip t ion? What cu r ta i l s , ha l t s , sus

pe nd s h is tor ical i ty a t i t s m o m en t of ince pt ion ? Sec ond ly , if wh at i s a t i s suehere is a c los ing off and del imit ing , then what is refused in the manner of

the Kan t ian c losu re , whose r emova l wou ld r eopen the hor izon o f h i s

to rica li ty? I f exem pla ry p ro du c t io n i s the p rod uc t io n o f f r eedom by th e

m ean s of f r eedom, th en wh a t o f f r eedom i s den ied by the K an t ia n an a ly

s is? One would natural ly expect that the answer ing of the f i r s t ques t ion

would l ead to some answer o r engagement w i th the s econd ques t ion .

Der r ida answers the f i r s t ques t ion tw ice over w i thou t engag ing the s econd .

F r ee do m i s r e fused b y De r r id a in the ve ry m an ne r tha t he d i sp laces

Kan t ' s de l imi t ing o f i t . More p rec i s e ly , Der r ida invokes an e r rancy , anon-determinat ion , of man that fa l ls shor t of , i s less than h is tor ical i ty , less

tha n the p rodu c t ion o f f r eedom by m ean s o f f r eedom. T h e bas i s for th a t

refusal in D err id a is h is associa t ion of the au top rod uc t io n of f reedo m with




the s e l f -p resence o f the p roduc ing sub jec t w i th itself, with , that i s , some

vers ion of the m eta ph ys ic s of subject iv iy as se l f -prese nce. D er r id a ' s

refusal becomes less compel l ing , however , i f the opaci ty we have a l ready

seen in Kan t and Heidegger to be an ing red ien t in exempla ry p roduc t ion ,

i ts 'w i tho u t ru l es ' , can be uph e ld . Wh at i f au ton om y i s , to bo r ro w a t e rm

from Derrida, a kind of gif t?R e a s o n ' s in d e t e r m i n a t e i de a is o f a m a x i m u m a c c o r d b e tw e e n j u d g e

m e n t s . S i n c e t h i s m a x i m u m c a n n o t b e r e p r e s e n t e d b y c o n c e p t s , i t m u s t b e

sus ta ined by s ingular presenta t ions , by the ideal of the beaut i fu l . An ideal

of beauty is not , however , compat ib le wi th f ree beaut ies s ince no

th ing wou ld con nec t the m w i th the r a t iona l idea o f a m ax im um accord

be tween judgements . In o rder fo r the re to be such a connec t ion be tween

an idea o f r eason and a s ingu la r p resen ta t ion , the p resen ta t ion mus t be one

of an object pos sessin g an objectiv e con ce pt of finali ty. A nd w ithi n th e

Kan t ian s chema on ly man has an uncond i t ioned end , a fu l ly ob jec t ive con

cept of f inali ty . T h e r e is no bea uty in general , bea uty as suc h, nei th er f ree

nor dependen t (desp i te these be ing p red ica tes o f beau ty ) ; pu re and e r ran t

beau ty i s oppose d to idea l beau ty - opposed th ro ug h m an , wh o can judge

of f ree beau t ies because he forms th e ideal of bea uty . M a n ' i s not er r an t '

( T P , 111) . Because he is no er rant , he is never the object of a pure judge

m en t o f t a s te ; he ' p roh ib i t s a pu re hu m an aes the t i c because , so tha t ,

insofar as the sans of th e pur e cut is effaced in h i m ' (T P , 112) . T h is ,

De r r ida c la ims , i s wh a t is a t s t ake in K an t ' s C op ern i can r evo lu t ion .

To c la im that man is not t ransgress ively f ree in Kant is to c la im that

human f r eedom, tha t wh ich makes man an end in himself, i s t r ansparen t

to itself. An d th i s m us t be taken as equ iv a len t to the thes is tha t in K an t ' s

aes the t ic wr i t ings the re is a d i rec t cu r ta i lm en t of the t ransgress iv e f reedom

of gen ius by r eason . Kan t con tends tha t the p roduc t s o f gen ius mus t

ap pe ar ' as i f f ree f rom th e cons tra in t of arb i t rary ru l e , ' as i f they w ere

pro duc t s o f m ere na tu re ' (CJ , §45 , 306) . W ha t i s the s cope o f th i s ' a s i f ?

In 'Economimes i s ' Der r ida a rgues tha t wha t the a r t i s t imi ta tes i s no t

na tu re ; r a the r , h i s p roduc t ion w i l l r e semble na tu re because i t imi ta tes , no t

natura naturata, bu t ' the ac t s o f natura naturans, t h e o p e r a t i o n s of physis'.

But , Der r ida con t inues , s ince an ana logy has a l r eady made natura naturans

t h e a r t o f a n a u t h o r - s u b j e c t , i n d e e d , p e r h a p s , a n a r t i s t - G o d , t h e n h u m a n

act ion com es to imita te d iv ine act ion: th e imita t io n of one f reedom by

ano th er . Beh ind K an t ' s over t r e jec tion o f mim es i s , the n , the re li es a

d e e p e r m i m e t i c s t r u c t u r e :

T h e poet or gen ius receives f rom n at ure w hat he g ives , of cou rse ,

but f i r s t he receives f rom nature ( f rom God) bes ides the g iven, the

g iv ing , the power to p roduce and to g ive more than he p romises to

m en . . .T he gen ius poe t i s the vo ice o f G od wh o g ives h im vo ice , wh o

gives himself and by giving gives to himself, gives h imself what he




gives , gives h imself the (power) to g ive (Gabe a n d es gibt), plays

freely with himself, only breaks the f in i te c i rc le or contractual

exchange in order to s t r ike an inf in i te accord with himself. (B, 11)

T h e d e e p s t r u c t u r e o f e c o n o m i m e s i s m a r k s t h e p a s s ag e f ro m K a n t i a n i s m

t o H e g e l i a n i s m .E c o n o m i m e s i s r e p r e s e n t s t h e u l t i m a t e e c o n o m i c f r a m e d e t e r m i n i n g t h e

des t iny o f the w i thou t end o f pu re beau t ies , the w i thou t concep t o f

j u d g e m e n t s o f t a s te , a n d t h e w i t h o u t c o n c e p t o f e x e m p l a r y p r o d u c t i o n s .

Derr ida presses h is cases for th is c la im - the second thought we want to

d r a w f r om ' E c o n o m i m e s i s ' - t h r o u g h a d e m o n s t r a t i o n ( r e fe r re d t o i n T P ,

116-17) that Kant ' s repeated c la im in §51 is fa lse - the c la im that h is

c lassi f ica t ion of the h ie rarc hy of ar ts is a m ere a t te m pt , n on -co nc lus ive ,

wi th o ther sys tems of c lass i f ica t ion remaining poss ib le . I t i s fa lse , accord

ing to Der r ida , s ince the deduc t ion i s r egu la ted accord ing to a concep t ionof l anguage and the body o f man which o rgan izes the fundamenta l

humanism of the who le sys tem. More p rec i s e ly , the s t ruc tu re o f ana logy

r e g u l a t i n g t h e m i m e t i c e n c o u n t e r b e t w e e n h u m a n a n d d i v i n e p o e t i c p r o

duct ion has i t s or ig in in the logos: 'T h e o r ig in o f ana logy , tha t f rom which

ana logy p roceeds and tow ards w hich i t r e tu rns , i s the logos, r eason and

word , the source as mou th and as an ou t le t ' (E , 13 ) .

As we have a l r eady s een more than once , the p r iv i l ege o f the human in

Kant depends on an ins ide , an in ter ior i ty that i t se l f i s moral in character .

T h is pas sage to the in te r io r is ann ou nce d even in K an t ' s acco un t o f the

pleasure we take in natura l beauty , where that p leasure is taken as a s ign

or t r ace o f a r egu la r ag ree m en t be tw een na tu re and our d i s t in te re s ted s a t

is fact ion , thus enta i l ing an in teres t akin to the moral . A moral revenue is

hence d raw n from th e u t t e r ly d i s in te res ted co n tem pla t ion o f na tu re ; and

wha t me d ia tes be twee n our co n tem pla t io n and na tu r e i s a l anguage o f

nature . Pure beaut ies , which s ignify nothing, are not s ignif iers , are ' a lso ,

and by that very fact , encrypted s igns , a f igural wr i t ing se t down in

n a t u r e ' s p r o d u c t i o n . T h e without of pure de tachment i s in t ru th alanguage tha t na tu re speaks to us ' (E , 15 ) .

Kan t ' s pos i t ing o f the logos i s v io lent ly in ter jected in to the analys is

when he con tends tha t beau ty in genera l , whe ther na tu ra l o r a r t i f i c ia l ,

may be desc r ibed as ' the expression! of aes the t i c ideas ' (CJ , §5 1 , 320) . W hy

expres s ion? Wi th wh a t r igh t and on wha t g rou nd s is ' expre s s ion ' in

t roduced here? Kan t does no t s ay . Bu t i t i s the in t roduc t ion o f expres s ion

tha t r egu la tes Kan t ' s deduc t ion o f the a r t s . I t en ta i l s Kan t ' s over t de

c is ion , which he takes to be merely convenient , to c lass i fy the ar ts in

accordance w i th the o rgans o f expres s ion in man . Expres s ive l anguage i s

the analogical equivalent p lacing the ar ts . Hence i t does not surpr ise us to

discov er that the ar t that im i ta te s the leas t , and is th us c loses t to d iv in e

spe ech , i s a t the su m m it of the ar ts . But w hat g ives poet ic speech th is




pr iv i lege? Derr ida is in no doubt : i t i s the s t ructure (mouth to ear ) of hear-

ing-one self -speak , th e pre sen ce of the se lf to i t s se l f w i tho ut in te r ru pt i on

or me d ia t ion , w i th ou t t he pos s ib i li ty of m ea n in g beco m ing lost o r de fused

a long the way . Th is s t ruc tu re , and i t a lone , ju s t i f i e s the au then t ic i ty , loy

a l ty , in teg r i ty o f poe t ic p roduc t ion . These quas i -mora l va lues de r ive f rom

th e value of ful l pre se nc e and ful l sp ee ch .2 5

Poetry manages not to deceive by saying that i t p lays , and what is

m ore it s p lay , au to -a f fec t ion e labora t ing appe aran ces w i thou t ex te r

na l l imi ta t ion . . .ma in ta in s i t s e l f s e r ious ly in the s e rv ice of t ru th . T h e

va lue o f fu l l p resence guaran tees bo th the t ru th and the mora l i ty o f

the poe t ic . . .By b reak ing w i th the exchange o f va lues , by g iv ing more

tha n is asked and m o re t ha n i t pro m ises , poet ic spee ch is bo th out of

c i r cu la t ion , a t l eas t ou t s ide any f in i t e commerce , w i thou t any de te r

minate value , and yet of inf in i te value . I t i s the or ig in of value .

(E , 1 8 )2 6

v i F ra m i n g t h e S u b l i m e

K an t ' s h ie ra rchy o f a r t s do es indeed appea r to dep en d up on the va lue o f

ful l p resen ce . No ne the les s , D er r id a ' s genera l a r gu m en t i s no t comp el l ing .

F i r s t ( a smal l po in t ) because , a s he h imse l f s t a tes , the in t roduc t ion o fexpress ion is 'v io lent ' , inser ted , not jus t i f ied . But v io lent wi th respect to

wha t? Only , p resumably , the log ica l and concep tua l r equ i remen ts o f the

a rgument to tha t po in t ; tha t i s , no th ing abou t the c la ims o f f r ee beau t ies ,

j u d g e m e n t s w i t h o u t c o n c e p t s , a n d e x e m p l a r y p r o d u c t i o n e i t h e r p r e s u p

poses or enta i ls the inser t ion of express ion and the value of fu l l speech,

hear ing-onese l f - speak . A v io lence , then , aga ins t wha t? Beau ty? F reedom?

Co m m uni ty? W ha tev er th e exac t answ er , the v io lence i s aga ins t the de -

cen t r ing o f t r anscenden ta l sub jec t iv i ty tha t has governed the ana lys i s to

tha t po in t ; and tha t shou ld wor ry Der r ida .

Second ly , and more over t ly , Der r ida too qu ick ly he lps h imse l f to God

and d iv ine p ro du c t io n in h i s accou n t . T h e o rder l ine s s o f na t u re for K an t

is t r ansce nden ta l ly con s t i t u te d , and hence can on ly be und er s too d f rom

an ep i s temolog ica l pe r spec t ive . Bu t th i s en ta i l s the inappropr ia tenes s o f

e m p l o y i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l o n t o - t h e o l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n natura

naturata a n d natura naturans. T h e r e c a n b e n o physis in Kan t ; such a

na tu r e is neces sa r i ly p re -c r i t i c a l . So whe n K an t is t em pted to b r ing Go d

back in , and th is a t bes t only regula t ively and a t wors t as an act of meta

phys ica l nos ta lg ia , he do es so th ro ug h a s econd - leve l con s ide ra t ion o f

na tu re on ana logy wi th human p roduc t ive ac t iv i ty . Hence an ana logy

b e t w e e n h u m a n a n d d i v i n e p r o d u c t i o n r e d u c e s t o a n a n a l o g y b e t w e e n

h u m a n p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d itself; bu t hu m an p ro duc t iv i ty pos ses ses , even on




the mos t aus te re r ead ing , an inde l ib le opac i ty . Der r ida ' s ana lys i s beau t i

fu l ly de l inea tes the con tour s o f Kan t ' s me taphys ica l imag ina t ion , wh ich i s

theo log ica l , bu t f a i l s to engage the gap be tween the r equ i remen ts o f

K an t ' s a rgum en t and h i s m uc h more t r ad i t iona l me taphys ica l des i r es . I f

the des i r e fo r fu l l p resence haun ts Kan t ' s sys tem, i t s a rgument i s r idd led

wi th ab rup t ha l t s and opac i ty : the th ing in itself, the spon tane i ty o f the

' I th ink ' , e t c .

F ina l ly , and mo s t emph a t ica l ly , the opac i ty o f the hu m an m in d to i t se l f

in i t s mos t fundamental determinat ions , above a l l in respect to i t s f ree

dom, i s dec i s ive ly t r ansmi t t ed in to the accoun t o f a r t i s t i c p rax i s . Exemp

la ry p rod uc t io n i s , f rom the pe r spec t ive o f the p ro du cer , neces sa r i ly

exces s ive to i t s in ten t iona l moment . The va l id i ty o f o r ig ina l p roduc t ions

can no t be de te rm ined th ro ug h re fe rence to the m ind o f the a r t i s t , bu t

r a the r i s a s ses sed , w i thou t r a t iona l c r i t e r i a , th rough succes s ion (wha t

Heidegger cons ide r s under the t e rm 'p rese rva t ion ' ) . Bu t the f ac t tha t theeffor t of genius to take up the burden of human s ignif icance is a lways

cond i t ioned does no t en ta i l tha t ou r voca t ion as au tonomous be ings i s

the r eby in f ringed u po n . Th e po in t i s r a the r tha t neither f r e e d o m nor w h a t

cond i t ions it a r e beyond re f lec tion , beyon d wha t comes o f th em , b eyo nd

whatever s t ance we migh t t ake towards them. We can never pos ses s

our f reedom nor forsake i t ; nor can we af f i rm what g ives our f reedom

uncond i t iona l ly , no r c i r cumven t i t . Or so I sha l l a rgue .

As we have a l r eady s een , exempla ry p roduc t ion /c rea t ion i s the p lace

in Kant ' s tex t where the logic of subject iv i ty , the logic of se l f -presence, i s

mos t fu l ly and decis ively undermined. I f the express iv is t logic of §51 and

§53 are in any sense v io lent , i t i s a v io lence that seeks to tame the incendi

a ry d ia lec t i c o f gen ius . Der r ida ' s d ropp ing o f the ques t ion o f exempla r i ty

runs aga ins t the ac tua l movement o f Kan t ' s a rgument ; bu t th i s i s no t

an id le po in t s ince a l tho ugh bo th exem pla ry works an d dec ons t ru c t ive

read ings r ehear se a log ic o f t r ansg res s ion and g round les s l eg i t ima t ion ,

Kant ' s equal ly sus ta ins a logic of recogni t ion , of the d iscovery of se l f in

o thernes s . Der r ida w i l l in s i s t upon th i s s ame o thernes s wh i le a t t empt ing to suppres s the moment o f r ecogn i t ion , the moment in Kan t and

H e i d e g g e r w h e r e b y w e a r e g a t h e r e d i n t o c o m m u n i t y . D e r r i d a ' s r o u t e t o

sus ta in ing th i s tho ug h t invo lves p res s ing the c la im o f the sub l im e w i tho u t

the co r respond ing cons ide ra t ion o f gen ius .

Der r ida ' s t r ea tmen t o f a r t i s t i c p roduc t ion r a i s es a p rob lem wi th de

cons t ruc t ive r ead ing and any a t t empt to engage w i th i t . Fo r to make

re fe rence he re to the ex igenc ies o f a rgument ( t ru th ) in oppos i t ion to the

e labora t ion and de ta i l ing o f tha t a rgu m en t is to p re sup pos e the d i s course

of t ru th , tha t a t ex t i s mak ing a c la im abou t some sub jec t mat te r ou t s ide

the t ex t . T h i s i s wh a t in te rp re ta t io n i s . I t is a lso wha t dec ons t ruc t iv e r ea d

ing is a t t e m pt in g to avo id . W he n D er r id a s ays in Of Grammatology t h a t

' th er e is no th in g outs ide of the text ' , he is ca l l ing in t o qu es t ion th e




p r e s u p p o s i t i o n of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .2 7

D e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g w a n t s to t r a v

erse texts , in a m a n n e r t h a t is n e i t h e r t h a t of a c o m m e n t a r y ( w h i c h m e r e l y

r e p e a t s and p r o t e c t s the t ex t ) nor t h a t of an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ( w h i c h p r e

s u p p o s e s a s ignif ied outs ide the t ex t ) , by d iscover ing a b l ind spo t in a t ex t

tha t exceeds the a u t h o r ' s i n t e n t i o n s yet g o v e r n s the logic of the tex t . In

th i s way d e c o n s t r u c t i v e r e a d i n g n e e d not d e c i d e , w h a t it wants anyway tocal l in to ques t ion , between exigencies of a r g u m e n t (= p h i l o s o p h y ) and the

wri t ing , de ta i l ing of t h a t a r g u m e n t (= l i t e r a tu re ) . Desp i te the f lam

b o y a n c e of his s ty le , Der r ida ' s r ead ing is r e g u l a t e d by a k ind of t ex tua l

asces is , an asce t i c i sm, in v i r tue of w h i c h he h o p e s to locate a place exter ior

to logocen t r i sm in o r d e r to i n t e r r o g a t e it. W h a t h a p p e n s , h o w e v e r, w h e n

th i s a sces i s depends for its o p e r a t i o n u p o n the r eg i s te r ing of d is t inc t ions ,

as be tween wha t follows in a t r a in of a r g u m e n t and w h a t can only be

r e g a r d e d as a forc ing of the argument , tha t au tomat ica l ly pu t s in to p lay

the d i s course of t r u t h and in te rp re ta t ion? How else can d e c o n s t r u c t i v e

r e a d i n g c o n t i n u e t h a n by v io len t ly suppres s ing the d is t inc t ion be tween

t r u t h and violence it enunc ia tes? How cou ld a dec i s ion be m a d e h e r e w i t h

ou t begg ing the q u e s t i o n ?

I n o r d e r to ga in a per spec t ive f rom which th i s ques t ion can be

b r o a c h e d , we need to fo l low through the r e a d i n g s we are e x a m i n i n g .

A g a i n , a doub le r ead ing w i l l s eek w i th in a t e x t the m o m e n t of excess

o u t s i d e the in ternal ( logocentr ic) logic of the t ex t tha t cons t i tu tes the

poss ib i l i ty of its to ta l iz ing act ion . In The Truth in Painting D e r r i d afocuses on the logic of the f rame as a way of i n t e r r o g a t i n g the idea that art

h as an es sence , an i n t e g r i t y , in v i r tue of w h i c h it is art and no th ing e l s e .

H e w a n t s , in brief, to t h r o w i n t o d o u b t the thes i s tha t the re is a r igid and

una l te rab le l ine ( f r ame) mark ing off w h a t is forever ins ide art f rom wha t is

ou ts ide art. In the p a r a s i t i c m o v e m e n t b e t w e e n Van G o g h ' s p a i n t i n g and

t h e a c c o u n t s of it, we already have before us an e x a m p l e of the kind of

cros s ings be tween ins ide and ou ts ide , r egu la ted but w i t h o u t s t o p , t h a t

D e r r i d a i n t e n d s . Art will always be for D e r r i d a b o t h m o r e t h a n art and

less than art; as phi losophy wil l a lways be b o t h m o r e t h a n (and o ther than)itself, and the reby les s than (and o t h e r t h a n ) itself. N e i t h e r art nor p h i l o s

o p h y can c o r r e s p o n d to our deepe s t (meta phys ica l ) des i r es abo u t them ,

our des i r es for res t i tu t ion , fu l f i lment and p r e s e n c e .

T h e q u e s t i o n of p u r i t y is centra l to aes the t i c r e f l ec t ive judgement . A

j u d g e m e n t of tas te can only be p u r e if it is d e t e r m i n e d by formal

cons ide ra t ions a lone , w i thou t the m e r e s t t a i n t of e m p i r i c a l d e l i g h t in the

ob jec t be ing t aken ; if empi r ica l de l igh t were found , it w o u l d i n t e r r u p t the

d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s and impar t i a l i ty of the j u d g e m e n t . In §14 K a n t w o r k s

t h r o u g h a var ie ty of e x a m p l e s in o r d e r to clarify his p o i n t . N e a r the end of

his d iscuss ion he takes up the q u e s t i o n of p a r e r g a ( o r n a m e n t a t i o n ) . T h e s e ,

he s ta tes , are ' on ly an ad junc t , and not an i n t r i n s i c c o n s t i t u e n t of the

ob jec t ' , wh ich in a u g m e n t i n g the d e l i g h t of t a s te do so only by m e a n s of




their form (CJ, § 14, 226). So it is ' w i t h the f rames of p ic tu res or the d r a p

ery on s ta tues , or the c o l o n n a d e s of p a l a c e s ' . H o w e v e r , K a n t c o n t i n u e s ,

w h e n parerga do not en te r in to the fo rmal compos i t ion of the w o r k , as

m i g h t be the case wi th e laborate gold f rames , then what we have is ' f ine ry '

t h a t , as it invokes empi r ica l charm, sub t rac t s f rom genu ine beau ty .

Parerga, even at face value , are c o n c e p t u a l l y a n o m a l o u s , b e i n ga d d i t i o n s to w h a t is a l r e a d y c o m p l e t e w i t h o u t t h e m . If parerga do a u g

m e n t w h a t t h e y are a d d e d to, how can the or ig ina l ob jec t ( a rg um ent ,

d e m o n s t r a t i o n ) be c o m p l e t e w i t h o u t the a d d i t i o n - c o m p l e t e in ju s t the

sense of r equ i r ing no th ing e l s e for its c o m p l e t i o n ? One migh t es say the

t h o u g h t t h a t a parergon is not necessary for the c o m p l e t i o n of the ob jec t ;

b u t w o n ' t a m e r e l y c o n t i n g e n t a u g m e n t a t i o n t h r o w i n t o q u e s t i o n the p r e

sumed o r ig ina l comple tenes s? The dif ference between the neces sa ry and

t h e c o n t i n g e n t is u n d e r m i n e d by the parergon, and ju s t because it is, by

def in i t ion , nei ther s imply ins ide nor s imply ou t s ide the w o r k (ergon:'Phi losophical d iscourse wi l l a lways have been against the parergon" (TP,

54)) .

P a r e r g a , in so far as t h e y do a u g m e n t a work, reveal a lack or a b s e n c e in

the work , in t r ins ic to it; but the lack or absence is of no th ing e l s e than the

pare rgon , wh ich none the les s r emains ex te r io r to the w o r k . The ' i n t e r n a l

s t ruc tu ra l l ink which r ive t s ' pa re rga to the lack in the in te r io r of the ergon,

reveals that lack as ' c o n s t i t u t i v e of the very un i ty of the ergon 1

(TP, 59).

O n c e the logic of the p a r e r g o n is a c k n o w l e d g e d , the task of k n o w i n g w h a t

b e l o n g s to the in s ide of a w o r k and what be longs to the o u t s i d e b e c o m e s

incomple tab le , ep i s temica l ly imposs ib le .

F r a m e s r e p r e s e n t an e x e m p l a r y i n s t a n c e of p a r e r g o n a l l o g i c . F r a m e s

s t a n d out aga ins t two g r o u n d s : in se t t ing off the work they merge w i th the

genera l background ; wh i le in se t t ing off the work from the genera l back

g round they merge w i th the w o r k . F r a m e s d i s a p p e a r in two d i r e c t i o n s .

' T h e r e is always a form on a g r o u n d , but the p a r e r g o n is a fo rm which has

as its t r a d i ti o n a l d e t e r m i n a t i o n not t h a t it s t a n d s out but t h a t it d i s a p p e a r s ,

b u r i e s itself, effaces itself, m e l t s a w a y at the m o m e n t it d e p l o y s its grea tes te n e r g y ' (TP, 61; for K a n t ' s a t t e m p t to f rame the t h i r d Critique see TP,

71ff) .

I f f rames put e v e r y t h i n g to work , even if in so d o i n g t h e y i m p o s e t h e m

selves in a m a n n e r of apparen t ex te r io r i ty , then the f r ame can n e i t h e r

be f ramed nor d o n e a w a y w i t h . D e c o n s t r u c t i o n is the d e c o n s t r u c t i o n of

ges tures that seek an u l t i m a t e , n o n - i m p o s i t i o n a l f r a m e , and of t h o s e t h a t

d r e a m the s i m p l e a b s e n c e of the f r ame (TP, 73). D e c o n s t r u c t i o n w o r k s

the f r ame , is ne i the r in s ide nor o u t s i d e m e t a p h y s i c s .

W h a t m o m e n t , t h e n , b r e a k s w i t h the f r ame of the a e s t h e t i c ? W h e r e in

K a n t ' s a e s t h e t i c s is its f r aming acknowledged (the u l t i m a t e f ra m e s u p

p l ied ) and su rpas sed? Accord ing to D e r r i d a , the b o r d e r s of the aes the t i c

are broken, severely inf r inged upon, in the s u b l i m e . D e r r i d a d e p l o y s the



170 T H E D E C O N S T R U C T I V F . S U B L I M E

example of the colossal (CJ , §26, 253) as h is poin t or or ienta t ion: 'The

colossal exclude s th e pa rer go n. F ir s t of al l because i t is not a work , an

ergon, and then because the inf in i te is presented in i t and the inf in i te can

not be bordered ' (TP, 128) . But th is i s too s imple , for in order for what is

in f in i t e , w i thou t bo rder s , to show itself, be p resen ted , i t mus t accep t

de te rm ina t io n , f r am ing , o f a so rt .In K an t wh at is pro pe r ly inf in i te is reaso n, the tho ug ht of which is

cal led upon in the face of what defeats the imaginat ion 's power of appre

h e n s i o n a n d c o m p r e h e n s i o n . T h e j u d g e m e n t o f t h e s u b l i m e i s a e s t h e t i c ,

aga in , because ' i t r ep resen t s , w i thou t be ing g rounded on any def in i t e

concept of the object , merely the subject ive p lay of the mental powers

( imag ina t ion and r eason) as ha rmonious by v i r tue o r the i r ve ry con t ras t '

(CJ , §27, 258) . I f there t ru ly is a p lay of mental powers , and not a mere

m ove m ent f rom on e to the o the r , than the ob jec t whose p resen ta t ion

exceeds the powers o f the imag ina t ion r emains on s tage . Or so Der r ida

in tends to r ead Kan t . For on ly by mak ing th i s a s sumpt ion can he con

s ide r the ques t ion o f the sub l ime to be a ques t ion o f p resen t ing the

unpresen tab le . Which i s no t to s ay tha t he i s unaware o f the pecu l ia r i t i e s

o f Kan t ' s accoun t ; on the con t ra ry , wha t in t r igues Der r ida i s the way in

which the sub l ime announces i t s e l f in the s ens ib le , and the s ense in wh ich

t h i s a n n o u n c e m e n t m u s t b e a e s t h e t ic a n d s u b j e ct i v e :

Unl ike tha t o f the beau t i fu l , the p r inc ip le o f the sub l ime mus t besough t in ou r se lves who project (hineinbringen) the sub l ime in to

nature. There is an effect of the colossal only from the point of view

of reason. Such is the reason of the colossal, and such is i t s reason

that no presenta t ion can get the bet ter of i t . The feel ing of the col

ossal , effect of a subjective projection, is the experience of an

inade qua t io n o f p resen ta t ion to itself, or r a the r , s ince ve ry p resen

ta t ion i s inadequa te to itself, of an inadequa t ion o f the p resen te r to

the p resen ted to itself, of an inadequa t ion o f the p resen te r o f p resen

ta t ion (TP , 132) .

T h e aw kw ardn ess of th is , m ark ed in the twis t ing s of th e final sente nce , i s

de r ived f rom the f ac t tha t the ex te rna l ob jec t s announc ing the sub l ime a re

no t themse lves sub l ime; and ye t , i f the judgement o f sub l imi ty i s no t to be

redu ced to a causa l s equenc e th rou gh w hich we a re awak ened to the

inf in i ty of reason w ith in u s , th en th ere m us t be in wh at is prese nte d

an inadequat ion , an excess that i s (a lso) the excess of reason, i t s un-

p resen tab i l i ty . In brief, De r r ida is a t t e m pt in g to r ead the ha rm ony o f

reaso n and im agin at ion 'by v i r tue of the i r very co ntr as t ' , no t as a causal

o rder ing o f the imag ina t ion and r eason wi th r espec t to each o the r , bu t a s

the i r inner a r t i cu la t ion .

Der r ida cons t rues the o rder ing a rgument to be Hege l ' s r ead ing o f the




subl ime. In i t what i s wi thout measure is the inf in i te idea , which does not

le t i t se l f be adequ a te ly p resen ted , and so t r ansc end s wha tever con t inge n t

cond i t ion o f r ep resen ta t ion a t t aches to i t . The ob jec t announc ing the

inf in ite idea , no m at t er ho w large , has a m easu rabl e s ize , ho we ver large

( T P , 133) . Kan t ' s concep t ion o f the sub l ime , in con t ras t , s e t s ou t f rom the

ob jec t , l e ts the an no un ce m en t o f in f in i ty , o f the unpr ese n ta b le , beg in w i th

i t (T P , 133). D er r ida ' s r ead ing o f the sub l im e in ten ds a 'K an t ia n ' c r i t iqu e

of Hege l , a de fence o f the Kan t ian sub l ime aga ins t the Hege l ian in f in i t e

idea .

W ha t wants expla nat io n he re is wh at i t i s ab ou t the colossal tha t defeats

m eas ure m en t ; in v i r tue o f wha t does i t t r anscen d it s ow n p resen ta t ion? T o

press th is search is , for Derr ida , the er ror ; any account of that in v i r tue of

which the colossal defeats measurement wi l l , a for t ior i , involve present ing ,

concep tua l ly cap tu r ing , tha t wh ich i s the de fea t o f a l l p resen t ing and cap

tur ing . I t wou ld be th e drea m of ref ram ing, th e refusal of a ll parerg ona l i ty( T P , 145) , a though t under l ined in Der r ida ' s t ex t by be ing p resen ted , l ike

the who le o f the Kan t e s say , a t the border o f two un jo ined , and them

selves s l ight ly detached, corners of a f rame.

Subl imity is but the working of the f rame, of what is nei ther ins ide

(p resen ta t ion ) no r ou t s id e (w i thou t s i ze /c i s e , and unp resen tab le ) . 'T h e c i s e

o f the co los sus i s ne i the r cu l tu re no r na tu re , bo th cu l tu re and na tu re . I t i s ,

pe rhaps , be tween the p resen tab le and the unpresen tab le , the pas sage f rom

one to the o the r a s much as the i r r educ ib i l i ty o f the one to the o the r ' (TP ,

143). De con s t ruc t ion , the work ing o f the fr ame , is sub l im e . I t p rod uce s /

d i s cover s the sub l im e . Wh at w as the work o f r ead in g 'Or ig in ' bu t th e

d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t V a n G o g h ' s s h o e s w e r e s u b l i m e , n e i t h e r w i t h i n n o r

ou ts ide r ep resen ta t ion , bu t the con t inua l pas sage f rom one to the o the r?

Su bl im ity , the f igure of w ha t is w ith ou t f igure, is th e figure of dec on

s t r u c t i o n . A n d y e t . . .

Kan t ' s sub l ime i s a movement , a s cene and a d rama , a na r ra t ive o f

so r t s . Der r ida , a s we sha l l s ee be low, no tes the e lemen ts and moments o f

th i s na r ra t ive ; on ly , o f cour se , to de -nar ra t iv ize i t s movement , r educe i t toano ther m ove m ent , th a t o f f r aming , the log ic o f the parergon. Yet the

narra t ive is there . A viv id vers ion of i t occurs in Kant ' s Anthropology from

a Pragmatic Point of V iew.

T h e sub l ime i s tha t greatness in s ize or in tens i ty which inspires awe

(magnitudo reverenda): i t s imul taneous ly invi tes us to approach i t ( so

as to make our forces equal to i t) and deters us by the fear that in

compar ison with i t we shal l shr ink in to ins ignif icance in our own

es t imat ion ( thunder over ou r head , fo r example , o r a h igh , rugged

mountain) . When we are in a safe p lace , the gather ing of our forces

to g rasp the appearance , a long wi th our anx ie ty abou t no t be ing ab le

to g rasp the appea rance , a long wi th our anx ie ty abou t no t be ing




able to r ise to i t s greatness , arouses astonishment (a feeling that is

ag reeab le because i t con t inuous ly t r iumphs over pa in ) . . .So the sub

lime is not an object for tas te. I t is rather , the feeling of being s t irred

that has the subl ime for i t s object . But when an ar t is t exhibi ts the

sub l ime to us , by desc r ib ing i t o r c lo th ing i t ( in o rnamen ts , parerga),

i t can and should be beaut i fu l , s ince o therwise i t i s wi ld , coarse andrepu ls ive , and so con t ra ry to t a s te .

2 8

The pare rgon o f the sub l ime i s beau t i fu l a r t , the c lo th ing , f r aming o f the

m on s t ro us ( ' g rea tnes s tha t is con t ra ry to the end ' ) . Bu t the sub l ime i ts e lf

s tands in a cu r ious r e la t ion to Kan t ' s aes the t i c : bo th a moment o f i t ,

formal ly analogous wi th the logic of beauty; and outs ide i t , a funct ion

of a logic that belongs to moral i ty ra ther than aes thet ics . And th is mus t

ra ise the suspic ion that the subl ime too is a parergon, a c lo th ing or

aes the t i c iza t ion o f an exper ience tha t w i t hou t aes the t i c r e f inemen t , the

re f inemen ts o f aes the t i c sub l im i ty , wou ld be 'w i ld , coar se and r epu ls ive ' ,th rea ten ing , an occas ion fo r f ea r and d read . Kan t ' s d rama , desp i te itself,

r ep resen t s ano ther s cene , ano ther space o r p lace o f conf ron ta t ion and

tes t ing .

T h e d ram a , un fo ld in g as a d ram a on ly from a d i s tanc e , from ' a s afe

place ' , i s of a bat t le defer red , f ramed; or bet ter , i t i s the imita t ion of a

bat t le wi th ou t i t s v io len ce. T h e 'safe p lace ' i s th e con di t io n for w hat

unfo lds be ing a d rama; s a fe ty be ing the d i s tanc ing and aes the t i c iz ing o f

the f ea r fu l th rea t occur r ing . The sub l ime ob jec t is not a source of fear;

ra ther i t i s represented as a source of fear . I f dynamical nature were a real

source of fear , then our judgement upon i t could not be aes thet ic (CJ , §28,

2 6 0 - 1 ) . Bu t th is d is tanc e is not th at of an ab solu te spe cta to r for w ho m th e

spectac le is pro vid ed ; the spe cta to r who f ram es th e th rea t is a lso an actor

in the d rama , indeed i t s p ro tagon is t .

W hil e the repre sen ta t i on of the object as fearfu l a nd thre ate nin g is a

centra l ingredient in the drama, we mus t not rush to i t . In order to feel

the f ea r and the th rea t we mus t be in some p rox imi ty to the sub l ime

object ; i t mus t have a l ready come on the scene, perhaps invi t ing us insome way to approach . Wi thou t the inv i ta t ion , the lu re , the ob jec t ' s in te r

rupt ion of our narc iss is t ic se l f -complaisance could not occur . We are

' invi ted ' to approach the o ther in order to 'make our forces equal to i t ' .

T h e re is , th en , a tes t of ou r forces ; and w ha t is the reb y tes ted is wha t ou r

forces are, w h o w e are, o u r being. Tes t ing mus t r a i s e us to an ins igh t in to

our fo rces, in to our na tu re and be ing . So som eth in g o f the o the r inv i tes us

to app roac h i t , and d e te r s us . W e a re th re a ten ed , f ea rfu l; we m igh t sh r ink

in to ins ignif icance; that i s , the o ther threatens us , threatens , a t leas t , our

sense of bodi ly in tegr i ty ; hence i t awakens us to our sens ib le being and the

inde te rmina te vu lnerab i l i ty consequen t upon our be ing s ens ib le be ings ;

we are threatened to the l imit of sens ib i l i ty . In the tes t our mor ta l being is

revealed as mor ta l ; but , a t once, we a lso learn what cannot be conf ined or




reduced to mor ta l being , to l i fe and the dr ive for se l f -preservat ion . Hence,

our vulnerabi l i ty wi l l be accepted and refused; and that refusal wi l l be

ambiguous between a jus t i f ied denia l (we are a lways in excess of our

merely sens ib le being) and complete se l f -denia l (we are no t s ens ib le

be ings , bu t s e l f - l eg i s la t ing , au tonomous c rea tu res p ro jec t ing our se lves

on to a s ens ib le s c reen) . So : 'A t t r ac t ion / repu ls ion of the sam e object...D o u b l e b i n d . T h e r e is a n ex c e ss h e r e , a s u r p l u s , a s u p e r a b u n d a n c e w h i c h

opens an abys s (Abgrund). The imaginat ion is af ra id of los ing i tse l f in th is

a b y s s , and w e s tep back ' (T P , 129) . T h e s tep p ing back i s the fr aming o f

the th rea t and the mas te r ing o f i t ; equa l ly , the s t epp ing back i s the

aes the t i c iz ing o f the th rea t , mak ing i t no th rea t , on ly a r ep resen ta t ion , a

f ic tion . T h e safe p lace is the p lace of reaso n, wh ose t ran sce nd en ce be yo nd

al l sens ib le thre at i s ass um ed f rom th e outs e t (CJ , §29, 265) . Hence the

apparent transition from imagination to reason is made through the determi

nation of reason.

The sub l ime ha l t s the easy p lay o f beau ty and in t roduces an ab rup t

ser iousn ess : 'A v io lent expe r ienc e in whic h i t i s no longer a qu es t io n of

joking, of p laying, of taking (pos i t ive) p leasure , nor of s topping a t the

' a t t r ac t ions ' o f s educ t ions . No more p lay (Spiel) bu t s e r iousnes s (Ernst) in

th e occup a t ion o f the ima g ina t ion ' (T P , 128) . T h e s e r iousnes s o f th e na r

r a t ive i s a d i r ec t conseq uen ce o f the th re a t , the th rea t the ' ima g in a t io n '

feels at the prospect of losing itself, be ing defea ted , s l ayed . Here the

imag ina t ion no t on ly inc ludes our s ens ib le cons t i tu t ion genera l ly , imag in

a t ion and s ens ib i l i ty , a s i t does th roughou t the th i rd Critique, b u t e q u a l l y

s tands in for and assumes the pos i t ion of our bodi ly being in general (as

is arguably the case in the f irs t Critique as we l l ) . On ly on th i s a s sump

t i o n d o e s i t b e c o m e c o m p r e h e n s i b l e w h y d e t e r m i n i n g t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ' s

measure o f the th rea t to i t s e l f i s the measure o f the body : 'The p r imary

( sub jec t ive , s ensory , immedia te , l iv ing) measure p roceeds f rom the body . . .

T h i n g s m u s t c o m e t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f b o d y t o b o d y ' ( T P , 1 4 0 - 1 ; and for

th e me asu re of the bo dy: C J , §26 , 252) . So the tes t i s a con tes t , a s t rugg le

be tween two bod ies , each exceed ing itself, be ing more than body ; and intha t exces s th re a ten ing the o the r (body , tha t is m ore tha n bo dy) .

A t f i r s t g lance , Kan t ' s ba t t l e appear s to be the p r imi t ive ba t t l e be tween

man and na tu re , w i th the exper ience o f the sub l ime rehear s ing na tu re ' s

ob jec t i f i ca t ion , ou r becoming , bo th p rac t i ca l ly and theore t i ca l ly , mas te r s

and pos ses so r s o f na tu re . Bu t th i s suppres ses the inaugura l moment , the

moment o f inv i ta t ion and s educ t ion , and the p lace o f r eason in tha t

s ta r t ing p lace , a s we l l a s the body- to -body s tandard o f measuremen t . We

assume ourselves to be se l f -conscious beings and des i re to have val idated

and conf i rmed tha t s ense o f ou r se lves as t r ansce nd ing o ur na tu ra l de te r m i

na t ion . On ly a com ple te ly c i r cu la r conf i rmat ion w ou ld a r is e f rom K an t ' s

un in te rp r e ted accou n t o f the conf ron ta t ion . Rea l conf i rmat ion can co me

only f rom a not her se l f -consciou s bei ng , a bein g who se sens ib le being an d




i t s co m po r tm en t invi te s , draw s us in . An d th i s i s th e s ignif icance of the

fact th at the im agin at ion uses na tu re as ' a schem a for ide as ' (CJ , §26, 265 ;

§ 5 3 , 326) in the exper ience of the subl ime; only i f nature has ascr ibed to i t

the infinity of reason can i ts threat be sufficient for i ts overcoming to s ig

n i fy our t r anscendence o f ou r na tu ra l de te rmina t ion . So the ba t t l e i s o f

body to body, of bodies both in excess of themselves . And that excess inth e body of the o the r is fear fu l , thre ate nin g to red uc e us to m er e bodie s

and thence to vanqu ish even tha t . Bu t th i s i s a d rama in which we a re

both actors and specta tors ; so , because there is a safe d is tance, the d is tance

of the aes thet ic , we mas ter the o ther ( the subl ime object) , a t a d is tance, in

imag ina t ion . Th e sub l i m e , K an t s ays, i s the cou n te rp o i se o f the beau t i fu l

'because our ef for t and a t tempt to move to a grasp (apprehension) of the

ob jec t awakens in us a f ee l ing o f ou r own g rea tnes s and s t r eng th ' . Tha t

mas te r ing o f na tu re w i th in and wi thou t (CJ , §28 , 264) i s ou r p leasu re , the

pleasure of dominat ing (our fear , i f not i t s object) of f inding ourselvesm ore than wha t th re a ten ed f rom the mea sure o f the body - th rea te ned to

reduce us to mere bod ies , o r worse , th rea tened our bod i ly ex i s tence , wh ich

we are forever m ore tha n and forever bo un d up in .

T h is w ould be ser iou s , a m at t er of l ife an d de ath , again b ut for the safe

dis tance, a safe d is tance which f rames the bat t le , le ts i t p lay , be a p lay , jus t

as a r t f r ames the na tu ra l ly sub l ime , o rn am en t in g i t , m ak ing i t t a s te fu l ,

acceptable , to be hung on the l ibrary wal l or read in v iv id iambics . Ar t i s

the supp lemen t o f the sub l ime , i t s pa re rgon ; and the sub l ime i s the f r ame ,

the pa re rgon o f the l i f e and dea th s t rugg le , the o r ig ina ry ba t t l e cons t i tu t

ive o f the t ru th o f s e l f - consc iousnes s . Wi th in the na r ra t ive o f the sub l ime

is s ec re ted the con t inua l ly r e i t e ra ted and su ppr es se d a cco un t o f the o r ig in

of se l f -consciousness in the exper ience of the threat of a v io lent and sud

den dea th : Descar tes ' s conf ron ta t ion w i th the ev i l gen ius , the th rea t o f

v io len t and sudden dea th in Hobbes ' s d i so rder ly ( sub l ime) s t a te o f na tu re ,

tha t s ame th rea t by the sovere ign in the s econd Critique, and finally the

a w a k e n i n g t o a u t h e n t i c i t y i n b e i n g - t o w a r d - d e a t h i n Being and Time.1"* B u t

in each of these cases we also f ind a suppression of the very alter i tyth r ou gh which s e l f - consc iousnes s i s conf i rmed . S o the sub l im e o the r (ev il

gen ius , d i so rder ly na tu re , sovere ign) becomes , a s the sub l ime does in

Kan t , the mere con t ingen t occas ion fo r s e l f -pos ses s ion . Ye t these oc

cas ions have we igh t , ma t te r , on ly in and th rough the asc r ip t ion to the

oth er of what is d iscov ered as a co nse qu en ce of i t s thr ea t ; the thre at i s

only a thr ea t thro ug h wh at i t a lways a l rea dy has g iven : se l f -con sciousness .

F rom the ou t se t , the v io len t d i s covery o f s e l f - consc iousnes s in modern i ty

has received a n aes th et ic f raming , ma ki ng safe i t s pre sen ta t i on as a re p

resen ta t ion a lways a l r eady nar ra t ive ly con t ro l l ed . Wi th th i s the po l i t i ca lco ns t i t u t io n of subjec t iv i ty beco m es safe ly f ram ed; th e f reedom of self-

consc iousnes s theore t i ca l ly /aes the t i ca l ly l eg i t ima ted a lmos t be fo re i t has

e m e r g e d .




M u s t not th i s be said not ju s t of K a n t ' s s u b l i m e , but also of the

d e c o n s t r u c t i v e s u b l i m e , of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n as sub l imi ty . Does th i s r ead ing

then make decons t ruc t ion a l so a p a r e r g o n , a f r aming , of se r iousnes s , of the

life and dea th s t rugg le? ; its play , ser ious l ike that of the i m a g i n a t i o n , the

in t ro jec t ion and l i t e r a ry /ph i losoph ica l , t ex tua l wr i t ing of tha t o the r s cene ,

the s cene of the o ther? In ask ing th i s ques t ion we m u s t r e m e m b e r t h a t the

safe p lace cons t i tu t ive of s u b l i m i t y , its aes the t i c d i s tance , is a p r o d u c t of

the f r aming of r e a s o n . It is reason that constitutes the approach of the other

in modernity into an aesthetic scene of the sublime.

v i i Subl imi ty or Tragic Pol i t ics?

C e r t a i n l y w h a t is m o s t odd a b o u t d e c o n s t r u c t i o n as a h e t e r o l o g y , a p u r s u i t

of a l ter i ty , of w h a t is o t h e r to the logos® is how t h a t o t h e r n e s s is m a r k e di n t e r m s of the t ex tua l opera t ion of n o n - c o n c e p t s t h a t b o t h o p e n and l imi t

the d i s course of p h i l o s o p h y . S u b l i m i t y in K a n t is c u r i o u s l y a n a l o g o u s ,

s ince it too c o n c e r n s the a t t r a c t i o n of the o t h e r , but wri tes tha t o the r in

t e rms tha t de fea t our c o m p r e h e n s i o n of w h a t t h a t a t t r a c t i o n , s e d u c t i o n ,

l u r e m i g h t be; and fur ther , makes equal ly d i f f icul t an u n d e r s t a n d i n g of

why tha t o the r canno t be p r e s e n t as o t h e r , why it e x c e e d s our g r a s p , and

d o e s not fu l ly appear . Al ter i ty and sub l imi ty in te r s ec t w i th each o the r ,

r ep resen t each o the r , t ake us i n t o the p lace where the o t h e r , w h i c h in its

r ad ica l a l t e r i ty never appear s , appear s .

C o u l d the a t t r ac t ion of the o t h e r be our des ire for its body? Not jus t

t h a t , for the o t h e r is m o r e t h a n its b o d y ; its a t t r ac t ion is of its b o d y in the

m a n n e r in w h i c h it is e x c e e d e d . Our b o d y too is s u c h a s i te , a space of

presen t ing ( expres s ing?) a fo rever non -app ear in g ins ide , in te r io r i ty , o u t

s id e . W h a t c a n n o t a p p e a r in itself, w h a t c a n n o t be m a d e p r e s e n t ( w i t h o u t

t h e t h o u g h t of its be ing s imul taneous ly absen t ) is our a u t o n o m y . As we

have a l r eady s een , the e x e m p l a r y w o r k as the crea t ion of f reedom is b o t h

a p r o d u c t of f r e e d o m , p r e s u p p o s e s it, and t h a t t h r o u g h w h i c h f r e ed o ma p p e a r s . And when f r eedom does thus appear it does so in s o m e d e t e r m i

na te fo rm, some par t i cu la r conf igura t ion tha t is not f r eedom itself. The

m a r k of f reedom not a p p e a r i n g is the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l o p a c i t y , the ta in

t h r o u g h w h i c h and aga ins t the b a c k g r o u n d of which f r eedom is given and

reflected in the e x e m p l a r y w o r k . So, on the one h a n d , t h e r e is the f r eedom

t h a t p r o d u c e s / c r e a t e s the w o r k ; and th i s p resu ppo sed f r eedom m igh t l ead

u s to c o n s i d e r n o n - a p p e a r i n g f r e e d o m as the on to log ica l cond i t ion for

a p p e a r i n g f r e e d o m . Yet, on the o t h e r h a n d , we receive our f reedom from

the work ; where the f reedom received is not a m o d e of it, but the t h i n gitself, t h a t in v i r tue of w h i c h we can act freely.

And th is te l ls us a b o u t the des ire for the o t h e r , for its f reedom also

is not p r e s e n t or i m m e d i a t e . H e n c e the lu re of the o t h e r , its a t t r a c t i o n ,




exceed ing its e m b o d i m e n t , is its a u t o n o m y , its sel f -consciousness ; which

appear s on ly in its n o n - a p p e a r i n g , its r e m a i n i n g a l w a y s in excess of w h a t

ever form or conf igura t ion is given it. So in des i r ing the o t h e r we des ire

i ts f reedom, which can only be its r e c o g n i t i o n of our f r e e d o m . K a n t ' s

a c c o u n t of the s u b l i m e is the parergon of the life and dea th ba t t l e for

pure r ecogn i t ion ; and the m o m e n t of s u b l i m i t y itself, the m o m e n t of

p l e a s u r e t r i u m p h i n g o v e r all pa in bo th r ea l and p o t e n t i a l , our dr ive for

se l f -p rese rva t ion and w h a t can t h r e a t e n it, is the M a s t e r ' s m o m e n t ,

the moment when se l f - consc iousnes s is affirmed in its t r a n s c e n d e n c e

of sens ib le being whi le the h e t e r o n o m y of r e a s o n , the o t h e r in self-

consc iousnes s , r eason as the voice of the o t h e r in the s u b j e c t , is refused.

T h i s is the a m b i g u i t y of the K a n t i a n s u b l i m e : it bo th r ecogn izes the o t h e r

as se l f -consciousness in the use of n a t u r e as a s c h e m a for r eason , and

refuses that recogni t ion in f r aming the ba t t l e in to a sel f -conf i rmingaes the t i c s cene . Th is p lay of r ecogn i t ion and non- recogn i t ion exac t ly

d u p l i c a t e s the m a s t e r ' s r e c o g n i t i o n and n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n of the s lave. The

e x p e r i e n c e of the s u b l i m e is t h a t of the a p p r o a c h of the o ther , where the

f r aming of the scene and the in te rp lay be tween reason and imag ina t ion in

i t reveal that o ther to be the h u m a n o t h e r . T h u s , to th ink radical a l ter i ty is

to th ink the a u t o n o m y of the o t h e r ; a u t o n o m y b e i n g the o t h e r n e s s of the

o ther , tha t in the o t h e r t h a t can n e v e r be m a d e i m m e d i a t e l y p r e s e n t . T h a t ,

a t any r a t e , is the h y p o t h e s i s I w a n t to p u r s u e , a b o v e all because it

exp l ic i t ly r esponds to w h a t we saw was the fault l ine in H e i d e g g e r ' saes the t i c iza t ion of the pol i t ica l .

D e r r i d a ' s way of p u r s u i n g the s u b l i m e , of s u p p r e s s i n g its nar ra t ive and

f igural s t ru ct ur e, el ides the q u e s t i o n t h a t has b e e n the c e n t r e of his a n a l y

sis of b e a u t y : e r r a n c y , j u d g e m e n t w i t h o u t c o n c e p t , a u t o - p r o d u c t i o n - the

s u b m e r g e d q u e s t i o n t h r e a d i n g its way t h r o u g h K a n t ' s a e s t h e t i c s of f ree

d o m and his tor ical i ty . Parergonal logic accedes to a cer ta in h is tor ical i ty by

m e a n s of its se t t ing in m o t i o n an inde te rminacy tha t ha l t s logocen t r i c

c losu re ; but it d o e s so in the absence of f r eedom and a u t o n o m y . Yet iti s a u t o n o m y t h a t is b o t h t h r e a t e n e d and t r i u m p h a n t in the d r a m a of the

s u b l i m e in K a n t . Now we can m a k e s o m e h e a d w a y w i t h D e r r i d a ' s a v o i d

ance of the q u e s t i o n s of a u t o n o m y and his tor ical i ty in his u l t i m a t e

w o r k i n g of the f r ame of the aes the t i c if we r eg i s te r the t h o u g h t t h a t for

h i m a u t o n o m y , as it is in K a n t , is but ano ther ve r s ion of auto-af fect ion ,

o f hea r ing -onese l f - speak . The s t r u c t u r e of auto-af fect ion cons is ts of

' " g i v i n g - o n e s e l f - a - p r e s e n c e " , of m a s t e r i n g all ex te r io r i ty in p u r e in-

t e r io r i ty , by as s imi la t ing and ideal iz ing it, by m o u r n i n g its p a s s i n g ' .3 1

T h r o u g h o u t b o t h ' E c o n o m i m e s i s ' and The Truth in Painting D e r r i d a p e r s is tent ly te l ls us t h a t in ana lys ing beau ty and a e s t h e t i c j u d g e m e n t we are

on the t rack of the work of m o u r n i n g . For e x a m p l e , 'It is in poe t ry tha t

the work of m ou rn i ng , t r ans fo rm ing he te ro -a f fec t ion in to au to -af fec tion ,

p r o d u c e s the m a x i m u m of d is in te res ted p leasu re ' (E, 18). Or. 'Of the par-




e r g o n - g e t o n e ' s m o u r n i n g d o n e . L i k e t h e e n t i r e l y - o t h e r o f h e t e r o -

a f fec t ion , in the p leasu re w i thou t en joyment and w i thou t concep t , i t

p rovokes and de l imi t s the l abor o f mourn ing , l abour in general as labor of

m ou rn in g ' (T P , 79 -8 0 ) . Au to -a f fec t ion , a s an opera t ion o f idea l i z ing the

oth er , thereb y mak ing the o th er fu lly in t ro jectable a nd ma s ter abl e , i s l ike

t h e l a b o u r o f m o u r n i n g a s d e s c r i b e d b y F r e u d .3 2

In so-cal led succcess fu lm ou rn ing the o the r i s a s s imi la ted , idea l ized and in te r io r ized . S ince th i s

in te r io r iza t ion i s a l so memor iza t ion , then mourn ing i s the work o f

i n t e r i o r i z i n g m e m o r y - Errinerung. A s i n t e ri o r iz i n g m e m o r y , m o u r n i n g

succeeds on ly as the suppres s ion o f the o the rnes s o f the o the r .

Der r ida uses the image o f mourn ing as a pa rad igmat ic image o f l abour

(as opposed to c rea t ion ) in genera l . Thus we a re to under s tand the fu l l

impl ica t ion o f the ' a s sau l t ' on the th ing by the metaphys ics o f p roduc t ion ,

which fo r De r r id a i s me taphy s ics as such , th ro ug h the cann iba l i s t i c in t r o -

jec t ion o f the who l ly o the r , the dead o the r , by the mourner . Der r ida

con tends tha t the work o f gen ius , the ac t o f f r eedom by means o f f r eedom,

is the act of ideal iz ing the o ther , of refus ing the o ther ' s a l ter i ty , i t s death .

Equa l ly , my o r ig ina l ana lys i s o f Kan t ' s accoun t o f sub l imi ty can now be

reg ard ed as c la im ing th at i t i l leg i t imately t ran sform ed hetero-a f fect ion in to

au to -a ffec t ion . Con ver se ly , pa re rgona l log ic , a s the de l im i t ing o f au to -

af fect ion , l imi ts the act of mourning, le ts one acknowledge the death of the

other as o ther , as both par t of me and as forever d i f ferent f rom me, and

move on . And , aga in , the sub l ime rep resen t s ju s t tha t non- idea l i zab leo t h e r . D e r r i d a ' s p r a c t i c e a l m o s t e v e r y w h e r e i n v o l v e s d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e

l imi t s o f in te r io r iza t ion , the moment o f mate r ia l i ty o r w i thdrawal (wha t

cannot be ideal ized or in ter ior ized) that condi t ions the act of ideal iza t ion ,

the ac t o f s ense mak ing o r mean ing , tha t den ies in i t s e s sen t ia l movement

wha t makes i t pos s ib le .

For Der r ida , then , au tonomy and au to -a f fec t ion a re the pa rad igmat ic

fo rms o f the metaphys ics o f p resence ; and the decons t ruc t ive sub l ime i s

the in t roduc t ion o f an i r r edu c ib le he te rogen e i ty tha t bo th de l imi t s a nd

con s t i tu tes the poss ib i l i ty of se l f -consciou sness . T h e d if ficul ty , th en ,

i s th i s : in t r ac ing the sub l ime we have d i s covered tha t the sub l imely o the r

i s the au tonomous o the r , and tha t the s cene o f the sub l ime , i t s na r ra t ive , i s

o f the l i f e and dea th ba t t l e be tween two au tonomous s e lves . Th is y ie lds

D er r ida a po in t o f p rox imi ty to and d i s tance f rom He ge l . An d , a s we ha ve

a l ready s een , Der r ida d i s tances h imse l f f rom Hege l on the g rounds tha t in

the Hege l ian ba t t l e , the ba t t l e fo r r ecogn i t ion where the s e l f d i s cover s

i tse l f o ther to itself, the u l t ima te non- idea l i zab le he te rogene i ty , dea th , i s

Aufhebung; d ia lec t i ca l sub la t ion , then , i s the u l t ima te l abour o f p roduc t ion

a n d m o u r n i n g , t h e u l t i m a t e c a n n i b a l i s m a n d a s s a u l t .

And ye t . The Hege l ian ana lys i s d i r ec t ly concerns the ques t ion o f au ton

om y (the cha p te r on se l f - consc iousnes s is sub t i t l ed 'O f de pe nd en t an d

independen t consc iousnes s ' ) , and the open ing o f s e l f - consc iousnes s to



1

1 7 8 T H E D E C O N S T R U C T I V E S U B L I M E

his tor ical i ty , to i t s own his tor ic i ty . This is not the p lace to engage in a

deta i led reading of Derr ida on Hegel ' s d ia lect ic of mas ter and s lave, which

I h a v e b e g u n t o a t t e m p t e l s e w h e r e .3 3

Rather , in de fe rence to the ques t ion

of subl imity , I want to focus on h is handl ing of the ques t ion of r isk , that

is , the r emoving o f the pa re rgona l f r ames tha t r ep resen t the ' s a fe p lace ' o fK a n t ' s a n d D e r r i d a ' s d is c o u r s e o f t h e s u b l i m e .

Aga in , wha t Der r ida ob jec t s to in the Hege l ian accoun t i s the way in

which all loss , al l sacrif ice, is amortized, fed back into the system, profited

from. Specula t ion specula tes on death and gains f rom i t . In Glas, h o w

ever , in the cour se o f r epea t ing th i s l ine o f a rg um en t aga ins t Hege l ,

Der r ida acknowledges tha t the logic of the bat t le , especia l ly in the ear ly

Hegel , does not have th is character is t ic . The r isk of l i fe is rea l :

In ef fect I can ma ke an a t t em pt on o th er s ' l ives - in i t s s ingular i ty -

only in r isk ing m y ow n. T o pos i t oneself as con sciou sness supp oses

expo sure to dea th , en ga ge m en t . . . 'W he n I go for h i s dea th , I pu t in to

p lay my ow n p ro per l if e .' Th i s pu t t in g . . .mu s t , a s every inv es tm en t ,

amort ize i t se l f and produce a prof i t ; i t works a t my recogni t ion by/

th rough the o the r , a t the pos i t ( ion ) ing o f my l iv ing consc iousnes s ,

my l iv ing f r eedom, my l iv ing mas te ry . Now dea th be ing in the

p r o g r a m , s i n c e I m u s t actually r isk i t , I can always lose the profit of

the operation: if I die, but just as well if I l ive. Life cannot s tay inthe inces san t imminence o f dea th . So I lo se every t ime , w i th every

b l o w , w i t h e v e r y t h r o w . T h e s u p r e m e c o n t r a d i c t i o n t h a t H e g e l

marks w i th l e s s c i r cumspec t ion than he w i l l in the Phenomenology.34

Ignore the ques t ion o f c i r cumspec t ion . What i s the con t rad ic t ion? I t i s in

accordance with the same logic that s ta tes that i f the non-ar r ival of mean

ing is a condi t ion of ar r ival , then in a sense even when meaning ar r ives i t

i s f raught wi th i t s potent ia l of not being there . This now becomes : i f r i sk

is real , then the poss ib le loss of l i fe and meaning is cons t i tu t ive of self-

consc iousnes s , to rmen t ing i t w i th an endur ing d r i f t . Dea th , lo s s , haun ts

Hegel ' s sys tem; shadows i t ab id ingly . As soon as the r isk of l i fe is in

c luded, then that r isk , and i ts poss ib le resul t - death — m u s t a d h e r e t o t h e

sys tem. R isk and dea th a re cance l led and prese rved . Der r ida s ta tes th i s

exp l ic it ly : 'Ab so lu te app ropr ia t io n i s abso lu te expro pr ia t ion . On to - log ic

can a lways be reread or rewri t ten as the logic of loss or of spending with

o u t r e s e r v e . '3 5

Der r ida in tends th i s s t a temen t to en ta i l an inv io lab le

e i the r /o r : e i the r the d ia lec t i ca l overcoming o f dea th - abso lu te appropr i

a t ion ; o r spend ing ( r i sk ing) w i thou t r ese rve - abso lu te expropr ia t ion . Ye t

if the logic of the one can always be reread or rewri t ten as the logic of the

o ther , imply ing the es sen t ia l inde te rminacy o f the log ic in ques t ion , then

the e i the r /o r co l l apses : the re i s never e i the r abso lu te appro pr ia t ion o r

e x p r o p r i a t i o n , b u t a l w ay s o n ly a m o v e m e n t b e t w e e n t h e m . T h a t D e r r i d a



T H E D E C O N S T R U C T I V E S U B L I M E 1 7 9

a p p e a r s to g e n e r a t e the cond i t iona l log ic of finitude from the m u t u a l c a n

cel la t ion of two abso lu tes migh t sugges t tha t , as in Kant, f initude is b e i n g

c o m p r e h e n d e d as fa i lure , as the n o n - c o r r e s p o n d e n c e b e t w e e n us and an

infinite ideal . Let us ignore th is poss ib i l i ty for the p r e s e n t and ask aga in :

w h a t is the con t rad ic t ion?

I f the re is a c o n t r a d i c t i o n h e r e , it is not in w h a t is said by H e g e l orD e r r i d a . It is r a t h e r a c o n t r a d i c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t is said and a p r e s u m p

t ion , let us call it the s t a n d a r d r e a d i n g of Hegel , tha t wha t is sa id in tends

t h e o p p o s i t e of w h a t it says . The risk of d e a t h for the sake of r e c o g n i t i o n

rehear ses a s t r u c t u r a l m o m e n t of se l f - consc iousnes s . Its aim is not to d e m

ons t r a te tha t s e l f - consc iousnes s is c o n s t i t u t e d in and t h r o u g h the r e c o g

n i t ion of the o t h e r , an a u t o n o m o u s r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t , b e c a u s e a u t o n o m o u s ,

is forever beyond the will of the self; the d e m o n s t r a t i o n is of the c o n

d i t i o n s t h r o u g h w h i c h t h a t d e p e n d e n c e b e c o m e s r e c o g n i z e d , and its t r u t h

a t t a ined ; r ecogn i t ion does not c o n s t i t u t e the re la t ion between se l f and

o t h e r , the h e t e r o n o m o u s c o n d i t i o n s for a u t o n o m y , but a c k n o w l e d g e s it.

A u t o n o m y , i n d e p e n d e n c e , is the (forever excessive) 'gif t ' of the o t h e r ; it

d e p e n d s on the o ther ' s f r ee r ecogn i t ion ; and it is b e c a u s e the o t h e r ' s

r ecogn i t ion of me c a n n o t be w i l l e d , d e m a n d e d or ob l iga ted by me t h a t

I am d e p e n d e n t on the o ther . Indeed , Hege l t akes g rea t pa ins in the

Phenomenology to e m p h a s i z e the asymmetrical s t r u c t u r e u n d e r g i r d i n g

mutua l r ecogn i t ion : r ecogn i t ion of the judging se l f by the evil self does not

d i rec t ly or immedia te ly b r ing fo r th r ecogn i t ion f rom the j u d g i n g self; the

confess ion of gu i l t by the evil self, its m o m e n t of c o m i n g i n t o its r e la t ion

to the o t h e r , is l e f t hang ing .3 6

R e c o g n i t i o n is always a r isk , an e x p o s u r e of

the se l f to the o t h e r ; and be ing r ecogn ized a lways a g i f t . T h i s a s y m m e t r i

ca l s t ruc tu re is d i rec t ly ana logous to the r e la t ion be tween a r t i s t and w o r k

in the crea t ion of e x e m p l a r y i t e m s . So the r isk of life, like the r isk of c r e

a t i o n , is c o n d i t i o n e d : an ac t ion done for the sake of f r eedom. One r isks in

o r d e r to be at r isk. Risk is the a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t and ac t iva t ion of finitude;

risk is the sel f -conscious act of sel f -d ispossess ion; and d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s is

b u t the aes the t i c iza t ion of risk in a p a s s i v e m o d e , the e x p o s u r e of s u b j e c tivity to what so l ic i ts and conf i rms it (beyond i t s e l f ) .

T h e e x t e r i o r i t y of the self to itself, its being i tse l f only in and t h r o u g h

a b s o l u t e o t h e r n e s s , as a se l f - consc iousnes s , as an a u t o n o m o u s b e i n g , o p e n s

the hor izon of his tor ical i ty ; h is tory being the mani fo ld fo rms and ba t t l e s

for recogni t ion , for i n d e p e n d e n c e , f r e e d o m . And th is too D e r r i d a k n o w s :

' . . .the e th ica l body mus t inces san t ly r epea t the sp i r i tua l act of its u p s u r g e ,

m u s t a l w a y s be reborn , mus t a lways recal l i t se l f to its n a m e and its f r ee

d o m . '3 7

Always .

So Der r ida knows tha t even when Hege l t e l l s the s tory of A n t i g o n e he

is tel l ing the s to ry of t h i s u p s u r g e , the risk and the i n t e r r u p t i o n of h i s t o r y

t h a t m a k e s it poss ib le . On ly the s to ry of A n t i g o n e is dif ferent ; unl ike the

m a s t e r and slave of the or ig ina l upsurge and i n t e r r u p t i o n ( w h i c h is a




phenomeno log ica l abs t r ac t ion fo r Hege l , ah i s to r ica l and s t ruc tu ra l in

s t a tu s ) , she d ies . 'No th ing shou ld be ab le to su rv ive Ant igone ' s dea th .

P lu s no th i ng m or e sho uld fo l low, go ou t f rom h er , af ter her . T h e

an no un cem en t o f he r dea th shou ld soun d the abso lu te end o f h i s to ry . A

g laze(d ) , v i rg in , s t e r i l e t r ansparency . Wi thou t des i r e and w i thou t l abour . '3 8

This v is ion of Ant igone paral le ls exact ly the ' comical ' percept ion of deathin the Phenomenology presen ted above : dea th mus t no t be a l lowed to

mean , to be a source o f mean ing , a means toward mean ing . 'P roper ly '

speak ing , dea th i s the cance l la t ion o f mean ing , i t s ann ih i l a t ion .

Bu t can i t be? Can the o the r on whom we depend van i sh u t t e r ly ,

w i thou t ' t r ace ' ? Has Ant igone no mourner s? Does no one r ecogn ize he r ,

he r l i f e and her dea th? I s he r dea th sheer no th ingnes s , absence , w i th

out shad ow or echo? In saying th is i s D er r id a pos in g an absol ute ,

unconditioned ex te r io r i ty aga ins t Hege l ian in te r io r i ty? Ant igone d ies . She

sacrifices herself, accep t ing he r ( t r ag ic ) f a te . We a re overwhe lmed

with p i ty and ter ror , as the specta tor on the scene of the subl ime is

overw he lm ed wi th t e r ro r , fea r, anx ie ty and a d i s so lv ing m om ent o f

pleasure. In the sublime too there is a sacrif ice, but a safe sacrif ice, a

sacrifice that is an anamnesis of that sacrif ice of self for the sake of the ethi

cal to ta l i ty , the sacr i f ice and r isk that could never know prof i t or res t i

tu t ion , the sacri fice tha t is th e ack no w led ge m en t of se lf in o th ern ess , th e

fa tefu lness of that . The sacr i f ice of the imaginat ion for the sake of reason,

the suppre s sed m om en t o f the o the r in us , is o the r than th i s : s afe (T P ,

1 3 0 - 1 ) . Derr ida would l ike to a t t r ibute th is law of sacr i f ice to Hegel too .

Bu t i t i s no t Hege l who p resc r ibes and ca lcu la tes An t igone ' s dea th , he r

sacri f ice . Ind ee d, f rom t he very be gin nin g of h is caree r He gel op pos ed

considering sacrif ice in terms of an act of expiation for s in, as an act to be

per fo rmed in o rder to ga in some recompense . For h im, s ac r i f i ce i s the

essent ia l pract ice of fo lk re l ig ions ; i t i s an act of love and grat i tude. There

is no reason to bel ieve that he changed h is v iew when he came to cons ider

the fa te of Ant igone; the d igni ty he shows her der ives f rom his perceiv ing

her sacrif ice as an act of love ( ' I was born to share not hate but love' , l ine523) , wh ich is a reco gni t io n of th e e th ical to ta l i ty to wh ich she belong s . T o

calc ulate h er sacrif ice, to trea t i t as an inv es tm en t - for th e sake of, say,

e tern al sa lvat ion - wo uld b e to dep r ive i t of the e th ical force tha t pr oh ibi ts

i t s subsumpt ion under Chr i s t i an and Kan t ian ideas and idea l s o f exp ia t ion

and recompense . (Creon , conver se ly , in de tach ing l aw f rom love , s t ruc tu r

a l ly s e t s l i f e aga ins t dea th , consc iousnes s aga ins t memory : 'Then go down

there , i f you mus t love , and love / the dead . No woman ru les me whi le I

l ive ' , l i n e s 5 2 4 - 5 . )

Hege l acknowledges Ant igone ' s dea th , mourns i t and de l imi t s tha t

m ou rn i ng by ackno wledg ing i t a s con s t i tu t ive o f h i s f ate and our s . T h e

Phenomenology is indeed a work o f m em ory and m ou rn i ng ; we a re no t

d o n e m o u r n i n g A n t i g o n e , a c k n o w l e d g in g t h e d e p e n d e n c e o f o u r d i s c ov e ry




of f r eedom and the me an in g o f f r eedom on her s acr if ice . T h e s ub l i m e

is the recogni t ion and non-recogni t ion of that fa te ; an anamnesis t h a t

remembers , repeats an ear l ier v io lence, but ideal izes i t , makes i t safe , and

hence fo rge ts wha t it is r em em be r in g and r epe a t ing ; and in tha t fo rge t t ing ,

tha t non- recog n i t ion , re fuses to m ou rn o r r em em be r , r e fuses de a th .

As Ph i l ippe Lacoue-Labar the r eminds us in h i s po in ted ana lys i s o f thesub l im e ' s sub ject iv is t r epe t i t ion o f t r agedy , Ar i s to te l ian p i ty and t e r ro r

were not psychological not ions , but pol i t ica l concepts . 'P i ty refers to what

the m od ern age , un de r the nam e o f com pass ion , th inks o f a s the soc ia l

bond. . . : ter ror refers to the r isk of the d issolu t ion of the socia l bond, and

th e pre -em ine nt p lace of tha t f ir st socia l bo nd w hich is the re la t ion with

t h e o t h e r . '3 9

Terror belongs to the ' f i r s t socia l bond ' , the re la t ion to the

o ther , because the o the r r ep resen t s a cond i t ioned abso lu te power over

t h e self, a power which i f no t r ecogn ized ( the cond i t iona l moment ) and

acknowledged, becomes an a l ien force , a b l ind fa te , ac t ing agains t i t . Al l

recognition is r isk, and all r isk sacrif icial; but there is no law of sacrif ice.

Which is why ter ror belongs both to the f i r s t socia l bond and to the r isk of

th e d issolu t io n of th e socia l bo nd .

A ref racted echo of the refusal of t ragic pol i t ics is d imly percept ib le

in Kan t ' s own wr i t ings . I t does no t s eem wrong to s ay tha t fo r h im the

fund am enta l pe r spec t ives des igna ted by the beau t i fu l and the s ub l im e

cor respond to the pe r spec t ives o f the ph i losophy o f h i s to ry and po l i t i c s

r e s p e c t i v e l y .

4 0

The ph i losoph ica l h i s to r ian , in ask ing the ques t ion whe therth e hum an race i s con s tan t ly p rogre s s ing , mus t , in o rde r to answ er t ha t

que s t ion , take up the ' d i s in t e res ted ' s t ance of the ' spec ta to r ' . F ro m th i s

per spec t ive th e g rea t r evo lu t io ns o f pas t and p rese n t ( it i s the F re nc h Re v

olu t ion which is the immediate focus of Kant ' s analys is ) , wi th a l l thei r

' a t roc i t i e s ' and 'mise r ies ' , appear as a ' game ' to such a degree tha t wh i le

no s ens ib le m an co u ld con tem pla te the i r r epe t i t ion , even if succes s w ere

gu ara nte ed , they non eth eles s f ind ' in the hea r ts of a l l spe cta to rs (who are

no t engaged in th i s gam e themse lves ) a w ishfu l pa r t i c ipa t ion tha t bo rder s

closely on enthus iasm, the very express ion of which is f raught wi thdanger ' . The ph i losoph ica l h i s to r ian t akes up the s tance o f the aes the t i c

observer in o rder to t r ans fo rm wha t is empi r ica l ly ug ly and m on s t ro us

in to beaut i fu l 'h is tor ical s ign(s ) ' that reveal the unfold ing te leological

progress of the race . I t i s that s tance that b locks the express ion of the

en th us ias m tha t is f r augh t w i th dan ger - th e danger o f r ea l pa r t i c ipa t io n .

T ho se s ame even ts , whe n su rveyed f rom th e pe r spec t ive of the ' Ide as o f

human jus t i ce ' f i l l the sou l on ly w i th ' ho r ro r ' .4 1

Kant ' s r e fusa l o f the

' su pp res sed ' pol i t ica l is g iven by th is ex trem e sepa rat ion of th e beau t i fu l

and the subl ime, the h is tor ical and the pol i t ica l : revolut ion can be af f i rmed

on ly as an aes the t i c phenomenon co r respond ing to the f r aming o f the

beaut i fu l ; in i ts rea l i ty , in it s t rue ter r or , i t i s a lways cont rar y to the

dic ta tes of moral i ty - moral ly , we mus t be horr i f ied by the execut ions of




the F r en ch m ona rch s . T o ac t aga ins t g iven l aw i s neces sa r ily to ac t aga in s t

r eason . Tra g i c po l i ti c s thus beco m es an imp oss ib le s i te o f ac t ion in K a n t ;

no r is th is surp r is in g if ac t ion m us t be lawful. T h e pol i tica l and t ra gic

sub l ime , the sub l ime o f a t r ag ic po l i t i c s , becomes mere ly aes the t i c in

K an t , and th e aes thet ic subl im e a ' safe ' m oral i ty of reason whose safe ty is

an aes thet ic izat ion of the pol i t ica l ly subl ime, that in ter rupt ion of h is toryfor the sake of an oth er h is tory , the repea ted u ps ur ge of the e th ical b o dy

that recal ls i t ' to i t s name and i ts f reedom' .

Subl ime fear and p leasure are subject iv ized , in ternal ized vers ions of

a poli t ical reali ty that can no longer be l ived, of the r isks of a poli t ical

and h is tor ical l ife tha t are foreclosed a nd refused ; in par t le g i t i

mately , s ince wi thout the foreclosure of Greek e th ical and pol i t ica l l i fe

se l f -consc iousnes s and f r eedom cou ld never have become par t o f o u r

sel f -unders tanding; but a lso i l leg i t imately , s ince the form in which self-

consciousness becomes manifes t involves a d isavowal and occlus ion ofi t s g ro un d in g cond i t ions . Th e su b l im e is the h i s to r ica l fa te o f a t r ag ic po l i

t ics wh ose obl iv ion - cause d by what h is tor ical forces? - i s con s t i tu t ive of

t h e m o d e r n p r e d i c a m e n t , t h e p r e d i c a m e n t o f m o d e r n i t y . A p r e d i c a m e n t

rehear sed and r epea ted , s ed imen ted and fo rgo t ten , in the sub l ime , Kan t ' s

s u b l i m e , a n d t h e d e c o n s t r u c t i v e s u b l i m e . O u r n e e d t o r e m e m b e r a n d

m o u r n i s p r o f o u n d .

To be su re , decons t ruc t ive r ead ings enac t , pe r fo rm, the sub l ime in te r

rup t ion o f the t ex t s o f the t r ad i t ion ; in those r ead ings the phenomena l

g rasp o f the imag ina t ion i s s ac r i f i ced , decons t ruc ted , in o rder tha t he te ro -

af fect ion c an be ack now ledg ed. De co ns tru ct i on is th e sacr if ice of m as ter y ,

the work of s e l f -d i spos ses s ion . F ur th e r , D er r ida wo u ld have no d i r e c t

r eason fo r con tes t in g my read ing o f Heg e l ; it r ep re sen t s a p rec is e m i r r o r

image of a s ignif icant e lement in h is reading of Levinas . 4 2 T h e i s s u e

concerns the mean ing o f the aes the t i c sub l ime , i t s in te rp re ta t ion , o r be t t e r ,

the need and the neces s i ty fo r in te rp re t ing i t , knowing i t , comprehend ing

i t . Le t me concede tha t the p r ice o f ' knowing ' the sub l ime as the

sed imen ted memory o f a t r ag ic po l i t i c s r educes i t s he te rogene i ty , g ivesi t and the h is tory of which i t i s a par t an imposs ib le uni ty . I t does not fo l

low from th is conce ss ion tha t th is h is to ry is no t necessar i ly im pl ic ate d

in wha t g ives decons t ruc t ive r ead ings the i r fo rce , tha t the aes the t i c

and decons t ruc t ive sub l ime i s no t also th i s h i s to ry . In te rp re t ing the

deco ns t ruc t ive sub l im e i s d i s cover ing it s (Heg e l ian ) subs tan t ia l i ty . I n co n

ceding that th is subs tant ia l i ty suppresses the a l ter i ty of the subject iv i ty i t

infor m s , the fun dam en tal apor ia of subject and sub s tan ce is revea led . I t is

the i r be long ing toge ther and incommensurab i l i ty tha t in sc r ibes ou r p re

d icamen t : wha t g ives mean ing and fo rce to decons t ruc t ive r ead ings , thee f fo r t s o f aes the t i c modern i sm, i s a h i s to ry tha t can on ly be compre

he nd ed in a ref lection com plic i t wi th what has dr iven pol i tica l pra xis

in to the p rec inc t s o f the aes the t i c . Tha t complicity, confessing i t , is the




ackn ow ledge me nt o f the impo ss ib i l i ty o f ph i losoph ica l c lean han ds , an

acknowledgement of guilt and responsibility beyond the confines of the will.

This compl ic i ty and gu i l t i s the key to Adorno ' s r ead ing o f the modern i s t

sub l im e . In abso lu t i z ing An t igo ne ' s de a th , in ignor ing it s con d i t ione d and

purpos ive charac te r , Der r ida in te r s he r l i f e w i th he r dea th , p roh ib i t ing the

app ropr ia t ion o f he r ac t , the m ou rn ing tha t is bo th love and gu i l t . In i t sf ideli ty to the c la im of the a es the t ic sub l im e, wh ich we shal l see is no t a

s t ru c tu re of o r ig ina ry w i thdra wa l and hence no t bey ond innoc ence an d

c u l p a b i l i t y , d e c o n s t r u c t i o n m a k e s t h i s p r e d i c a m e n t u n k n o w n a n d u n

knowable . I t i s that refusal of se l f -consciousness , of sacr i f ice and gui l t ,

tha t keeps the sub l im e in te r ru p t io n o f m etaph ys ics aes the t i c .

T h e ae s the t i c iza t ion o f the sub l ime ins ta l ls u s in a cond i t ion we c ann o t

recognize; to repeat our or ig inal reading of Kant in a d i f ferent way, i t

d isavows i ts own his tor ical condi t ions of poss ib i l i ty , which is our h is tory

(a h is tory , we shal l want to say , that mus t be cons trued in order that i t can

be den ied ) . Th is makes the o the r de te rmin ing us , the ve ry h i s to ry which

tu rns t r ag ic po l i t i c s in to the sub l ime , unknown. Der r ida appropr ia tes th i s

u n k n o w i n g , t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i z i n g i t , m a k i n g i t t h e u n k n o w a b l e c o n d i t i o n o f

p rese nce . He repea t s and r egu la r izes , in the fo rm o f dou b le r ead in g , th e

u n k n o w i n g o f t h e a e s t h e t i c s u b l i m e .4 3

T o b e s u r e , t h i s u n k n o w i n g ,

because i t a l so acknowledges the l aw o f dependence , has the capac i ty to

unse t t l e wha tever sys tem of l aw tha t wou ld a t t empt to to ta l i ze exper ience .

So Der r ida s ays : ' decons t ruc t ions have a lways r ep resen ted . . . the a t l eas t

neces sa ry cond i t ions fo r iden t i fy ing and combat ing the to ta l i t a r i an

r i s k . . . '4 4

T h e to ta l i tar ian r isk is th e risk of th e com ing in to being of a

to ta l i t a r i an r eg ime as a consequence o f p r inc ip led , me taphys ica l to ta l i za

t ion , even the p r inc ip le o f f r eedom. On th i s accoun t no d i s c r imina t ion i s

m ad e be twe en ' goo d ' and ' b ad ' ac t s o f to ta l i za tion s ince qu a acts of

to ta l iza t ion a l l en ta i l the same r isk . A r ig id dual i ty between to ta l i ty (h is

to ry as ev i l ) and wha t in te r rup t s i t ( the aes the t i c /decons t ruc t ive sub l ime as

e th ica l innocence) i s the reby genera ted , w i th the consequence tha t a l l

pos s ib i l i t i e s o f apore t i c to ta l i za t ion a re e l imina ted . In Der r ida , r eason doesno t l imi t itself, become se l f - l imi t ing , th rough recogn i t ion o f wha t

cond i t ions i t , bu t i s b l inded .

D er r id a fai ls to ask af ter th e poss ib i l i ty wh ereb y the necessary c on

d i t ions fo r undo ing the to ta l i t a r i an r i sk , by v i r tue o f the i r unknowing ,

s imul taneous ly p roh ib i t wha t wou ld t r ans fo rm soc ie ty . What i f , to be

more p rec i s e , the neces sa ry cond i t ions fo r combat ing the to ta l i t a r i an r i sk

proh ib i t a democra t i c po l i t i c s tha t t akes tha t r i sk by depar t ing f rom l ibe r

a l ism's ( i l lusory) agnos t ic s tance towards the ques t ion of the good l i fe?

W ha t i f the neces sa ry con d i t ions fo r iden t i fy ing a nd com bat ing th e to ta l i

tar ian r isk denude pol i t ica l ac t ion of risk by ins tan t ia t ing l ibe ra l i sm ' s p re -

po l i t i ca l s cep t ic i sm concern ing the pos s ib i l i ty o f knowing the good , and

hence o f po l i t i ca l knowing in genera l? What i f , then , decons t ruc t ion ' s



1 8 4 T H E D E C O N S T R U C T I V E S U B L I M E

neces sa ry cond i t ions fo r combat ing the to ta l i t a r i an r i sk amoun t to no more

t h a n t h e aesthetic i n t e r r o g a t io n o f m o d e r n i t y ? N o n - k n o w l e d g e m a y b e a b l e

to protect us f rom a fu ture to ta l i tar ianism; but can i t a id us combat ing the

presen t?

In the name o f wha t , then , does Der r ida r e fuse l abour and mourn ing ,

gr ief and s t ruggle , r i sk and h is tory? I t i s not the r isk of death , the s t ruggle

with the o ther for the sake of recogni t ion , that opens h is tory for Derr ida ,

but the ' there is ' , ' i t gives ' of the gif t . 'So the gif t , the giving of the gif t ,

t h e p u r e cadeau, does not le t i t se l f be thought by d ia lect ics to which i t ,

however , g ives r ise . The g iv ing of the g i f t unders tands i t se l f here before

t h e for-(it)self, before a ll subject iv i ty a nd ob jec t iv iy . '4 5

The gif t g ives pr ior

to r isk or exposure . Without the poss ib i l i ty of loss in tervening, the pure

gif t i s g iven. There is pain t ing .

I have been sugges t ing through my references to Derr ida ' s inf in i te task

- bu t a lso : h is twis t ing away f rom t he h is tor ical i ty of gen ius , the u nc on -di t ional i ty of death and the g i f t for h im, h is providing a defence of the

Kan t ian sub l ime aga ins t the Hege l ian , h i s r ead ing o f the sub l ime in

Kan t ian mora l t e rms , h i s r eg i s te r ing o f an abso lu te dua l i ty be tween h i s

to ry as to ta l i ty and i t s e th ica l in te r rup t ion - tha t Kan t ian mora l i ty , a

mora l i ty w i thou t knowledge , i s anchor ing h i s p rac t i ce o f r ead ing ; tha t fo r

him, as for Kant , what i s t ru ly subl ime is the moral law as the beyond of

rep res en ta t io n (w hich i t i s and i s no t for Ka n t ) . T h is i s equa l ly D er r ida ' s

s e l f -desc r ip t ion :

I have on several occas ion s spo ken of 'un co nd i t i on al ' a f f irmat ion

or o f ' uncond i t iona l ' appea l . Th is has a l so happened to me in o the r

' con tex t s ' and each t ime tha t I speak o f the l ink be tween decon

s t ruct ion and the 'yes ' . Now, the very leas t that can be sa id of

uncondi t ional i ty (a word that I use not by accident to recal l the

cha racte r of the categor ical imp era t ive in i t s K an t ia n form) is that i t

is ind ep en den t o f every de t e rm ina te con tex t , even o f the d e te rm i

nat i on of co nte xt in general . I t an no un ce s i tse l f as suc h only in th eopening of con tex t . No t that i t i s s im ply pre sen t (exis tent) e lsew here ,

outs ide of a l l context ; ra ther , i t in tervenes in the determinat ion of a

con text f rom i ts very ince pt ion , and f rom a n in junc t ion , a law, a

respons ib i l i ty tha t t r an sce nds th i s o r tha t de te rm ina t ion o f a g iven

con tex t . Fo l lowing th i s , wha t r emains i s to a r t i cu la te th i s un

cond i t iona l i ty w i th the de te rmina te (Kan t wou ld s ay , hypo the t i ca l )

cond i t ions o f th i s o r tha t con tex t ; and th i s i s the moment o f

s t r a teg ies , o f rhe to r ics , o f e th ics , and o f po l i t i c s . The s t ruc tu re thus

desc r ibed supposes bo th tha t the re a re on ly con tex t s , tha t no th ingexists outs ide context , as I have of ten sa id , but a lso that the l imit of

the f r ame o r the border o f the con tex t a lways en ta i l s a c lause o f

n o n c l o s u r e . T h e o u t s i d e p e n e t r a t e s a n d d e t e r m i n e s t h e i n s i d e . T h i s




is what I have ana lyzed so of ten , and so l o n g , u n d e r the w o r d s ' s u p

p l e m e n t , ' ' p a r e r g o n ' . . . T h i s u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y a ls o d e fi ne s the i n j u n c

t i o n t h a t p r e s c r i b e s d e c o n s t r u c t i o n .4 6

D e r r i d e a n u n c o n d i t i o n a l i t y r e p e a t s the duality of the beau t i fu l and the

s u b l i m e , the dua l i ty tha t s epara tes h i s to ry as n a t u r e ( w h i c h b e c o m e s in

D e r r i d a ' t e x t ' or to ta l i ty) f rom the d e m a n d s of m o r a l i t y , the m o m e n t of

sub l ime a l t e r i ty . The m o m e n t of al ter i ty g ives and r u i n s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l

u n d e r s t a n d i n g in K a n t ' s s e n s e b e c a u s e it follows the p a t h of the p r i m a c y

of pract ica l reason, a p r i m a c y r e q u i r e d by the s u p r e m e a u t h o r i t y of the

m o r a l law. As the ' fact of r e a s o n ' the m o r a l law affects reason f rom with

ou t wh i le be ing its g r o u n d i n g c o n d i t i o n . T h u s the self-affection of r eason

w h e r e b y r e v e r e n c e / r e s p e c t / f e a r (the affective responses to the s u b l i m e

a d d r e s s ) for the m o r a l law b e c o m e s o p e r a t i v e , a p p e a r s , is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a

w o r k of hetero-af fect ion . The 'yes' of respect is the re-mark of the original(non-appearing) 'yes' of the moral law itself. It is t h a t r e - m a r k i n g , t h a t

r e p r o d u c t i o n p r i o r to or ig ina l in tu i t ion , tha t ru ins t r anscenden ta l self-

consc iousnes s as s e l f - p r e s e n c e . K a n t s i m p l y t o o k i n a d e q u a t e a c c o u n t of

the fact that the affect ive s ta tes that make the m o r a l law avai lable in the

first place by v i r t u e of the i r s econdary charac te r p roh ib i t those s ta tes

f r o m b e i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s of a self-affection. The self is o p e n e d to its

poss ib i l i t ies as self by w h a t d o e s not b e l o n g to it. M o r a l law and r e v e r

e n c e / r e s p e c t are the two e s s e n t i a l m o m e n t s of the ' s c h e m a t i s m ' of the

e th ica l .

I n so far as D e r r i d a k e e p s the logic of b e a u t y and the s u b l i m e s e p a r a t e

he regis ters the c a t e g o r i a l d i r e m p t i o n of t r u t h and g o o d n e s s ; and th i s

h e m u s t do in o r d e r to sus ta in a ' n o n - s c e p t i c a l ' o v e r c o m i n g of t r u t h

as wha t can be p r e s e n t e d . Truth beyond truth (as representation) is not

unconcealment but unconditional affirmation, yes and yes-yes. W h a t D e r r i d a

d o e s not tell us is how it is tha t th i s uncond i t iona l i ty - w h i c h , r e m e m b e r ,

'def ines the in junc t ion tha t p resc r ibes decons t ruc t ion ' - has c o m e to be

r evea led as presc r ip t ive for us now (at the c losu re of m e t a p h y s i c s ? ) ; ore v e n , how it is tha t th i s uncond i t iona l i ty as the law of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n is

a c k n o w l e d g e d as law o t h e r t h a n t h r o u g h de f ac to r e i t e ra t ion .4 7

The p o i n t

is not jus t that , as H e g e l has it, fa i th wi thout ins ight is b l ind (a b l i n d n e s s

p e r h a p s too unnerv ing ly c lose to Heidegger ' s a f f i rmat ion of u n c o n d i t i o n a l

aff irmation in the 30s), but that th is fa i th is i tself invis ible in D e r r i d a , not

a j u d g e m e n t but the c o n d i t i o n of j u d g e m e n t , the prac t i ce of r e a d i n g t h a t

d e c o n s t r u c t i o n is. Converse ly , An t igone ' s s ac r i f i ce of m a s t e r y is g r o u n d e d

in law, her act, the love of law, reveal ing law as the work of love.

Uncond i t iona l a f f i rmat ion mus t l eave the site of t ragic pol i t ics fore

c losed . Der r ida inver t s the Pla ton ic h ie ra rchy , mak ing the m o r a l (or e t h i

cal in Levinas ' s s ense ) p r io r to k n o w l e d g e and t ru th , fo l lowing the p a t h

impl ic i t in the p r i m a c y of the prac t i ca l in K a n t r e q u i r e d by the s u p r e m e




au tho r i ty a scr ibed t o the moral law. In th is invers ion of P la to , which as an

inver s ion r e ta ins the P la ton ic s t ru c tu r e , po l i t ic s r ema ins as be fo re : on ly

hypo the t i ca l o r cond i t iona l , a ques t ion o f s t r a teg ies and rhe to r ics . And

h is to ry r ema ins a k ind o f cave . D er r ida ' s unco nd i t io na l a f fi rmat ion

prov ides a weak insu la t ion o f sub l ime a l t e r i ty f rom the immanence o f

his tory . I t i s th is that gr ou nd s h is ( t ran sce nde nta l ) forgetfu lness , tha tl i censes h i s r e fusa l to mourn Ant igone and h i s a s sumpt ion o f the

ro le o f a ph i losoph ica l Cre on , p roh ib i t ing Hege l f rom com m em ora t in g

Ant igone - l e t t ing he r f ac t i ca l dea th de te rmine the movement o f h i s

specu la t ive r e flec tion - a s Creo n p roh ib i t ed A nt igo ne f rom bury ing

Po lyne ices .

Der r ida ' s decons t ruc t ive sub l ime in t r igues the in te r rup t ion o f h i s to ry ,

bu t leaves i ts de fo rma t ions a nd r e fo rm at ions su bo rd in a te as s t r a teg ies and

rhe to r ic . Wi th in th i s s cenar io failure i s no longer in t r ins ic to act ion , r isk

no t qui te so r isky , an d the bu rd en of hu m an s ignif icance, h is tory and i ts

s t rug gles , a lways a l ready shel tered with in an un co nd i t ion al af f irmat ion .

Can we acknowledge the sub l imi ty o f the mora l l aw a r igh t i f we do no t

acknowledge Ant igone ' s ro le in the h i s to ry tha t p rec ip i t a ted i t s a r r iva l?

Tha t i t a r r ives as i t does th rough our r emember ing o f he r? A memory

always subject to the powers of forgetfu lness , that s tays a l ive only in v i r tue

of the s t rugg les tha t do r emember and wi l l no t fo rge t? I s no t Hege l ' s ges

tu re the reby po l i t i ca l? Mus t we no t acknowledge tha t a t the ve ry moment

that pol i t ics becomes a h is tor ical s i te , then a long with pol i t ica l praxis and

judgement we requ i re a po l i t i ca l memory? Tha t po l i t i c s can on ly be h i s

torica l by f irst bei ng com m em ora tive ? A nd finally, th at i t is only in vir t ue

of a po l i t i ca l memory tha t the dua l i ty be tween (p r iva te ) mora l i ty and

(publ ic) pol i t ics can be overcome?

What I have refer red to as the ' safe ty ' of the aes thet ic subl ime is the

m o m en t of un co nd i t io na l af fi rmat ion . O f co urse , th is i s no t the safe ty of

t r anscenden ta l knowing : i t does no t g ive us r ea l i ty as a knowab le who le ;

and hence i t does not lead to or enta i l mas tery or the suppress ion of a l ter i ty .

I ts safety is i ts exclusion of radical failure, a failure that would be co-cons t i tu t ive of the ' i t g ives ' . I f radical fa i lure were to adhere to the g i f t ,

the n each g ift w ould a lso be a nega t ion re sp on din g to a con di t ion of lack.

In fact I shal l c la im that the not ion of the ( t ranscendenta l ) g i f t mus t be

dro pp ed ; none the les s in ph ras ing the m at te r in t e rm s o f the cond i t ions for

radical fa i lure (as opposed to t ranscendenta l ' safe ty ' ) , a poss ib le s i te for

lack and negat ion is provided.

The pa t t e rn o f the decons t ruc t ive sub l ime d raws on the wa te r s o f mod

e rn i sm in o rder to t r ans fo rm Kan t ian mora l i ty , t r ans fo rm the ca tegor ica l

imperat ive in to the uncondi t ional g i f t , the g i f t of pain t ing . But Van

G o g h 's pain t in g is no t a sheer g if t , but a h is tor ical creat io n , an in ter

ven t ion and in te r rup t ion o f h i s to ry , r i sk ing the los s o f mean ing for the sake

of ano ther mean ing , ano ther s ense o f wha t mean ing and t ru th in pa in t ing




m i g h t m e a n . D e r r i d a ' s d r e a m o f p a i n t i n g w i t h o u t t r u t h is n o t q u i t e V a n

Gogh 's : h is subl ime, as we shal l see , i s a h is tor ical ly condi t ioned response

to a ce r ta in concep t ion o f beau ty . Thus h i s p rax i s i s more knowing than

Derr ida a l lows: i t engages the h is tory of pain t ing , and the h is tory of which

paint ing is a par t , for the sake of another h is tory whose potent ia l i ty is

recognized and not recognized in the h is tory of the present . The r isk of

the loss of meaning, a r isk never fu l ly recuperable , i s for the sake of the

oth er , for sp ir i tual l i fe , do ne in the face of th e o ther , exp osed .



Constellations of Concept

and Intuition:

Adorno's Aesthetic Theory

A d o r n o ' s p h i l o s o p h y is also a h e t e r o l o g y , a sea rch for the n o n - i d e n t i c a l

(w i th its concep t ) o the r . L ike Der r ida , Adorno regards idea l i sm as the

q u i n t e s s e n c e of p h i l o s o p h y , the d e v o u r i n g r a g e at all t h a t is different from

th e self. Idea l i sm is the ' b e l l y t u r n e d m i n d ' ; e v e n ' the augus t inexorab i l i ty

of the m o r a l law was t h i s k i n d of r a t iona l ized r age at n o n - i d e n t i t y ' (ND,

23). B e c a u s e it is idea l i sm tha t r ep resen t s the fulf i lment of m e t a p h y s i c s ,

w h a t A d o r n o t e r m s ' i d e n t i t y t h i n k i n g ' , t h e n the o v e r c o m i n g of idealism

r e q u i r e s an o v e r c o m i n g of the s t a n d p o i n t of the devour ing sub jec t : 'our

a im is t o t a l s e l f - r e l i n q u i s h m e n t ' (ND, 13). Negat ive d ia lec t i c s and a e s t h e t

ics are the two r o a d s to s e l f - r e l i n g u i s h m e n t . The goal of the fo rmer is 'to

u s e c o n c e p t s to u n s e a l the n o n - c o n c e p t u a l w i t h c o n c e p t s , w i t h o u t m a k i n g

i t thei r equal ' ; th is it can a c c o m p l i s h o n l y by c h a n g i n g the d i rec t ion of

concep tua l i ty , g iv ing it a ' t u r n t o w a r d n o n - i d e n t i t y ' , w h i c h is the ' h i n g e of

nega t ive d ia lec t i c s ' (ND, 10, 12). T r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y t h i n k s of i tself as

h a v i n g an infinite object: God, b e i n g , the a b s o l u t e . It is this belief that

m a k e s s u c h p h i l o s o p h y p a r t i c u l a r and f in i te . Heidegger was cor rec t in s e e

i n g t h a t p h i l o s o p h y r e d u c e d its ' ob jec t ' to a p a r t i c u l a r , a t h i n g , t h e r e b y

g iv ing it the h o p e t h a t the in f in i t e migh t be c a p t u r e d , m a s t e r e d t h r o u g h

c o n c e p t s . But in p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l l y t u r n i n g the ph i losoph ica l th ing in to

a n i n f i n i t e n o n - t h i n g , n o t h i n g , the e v e n t of a p p r o p r i a t i o n , H e i d e g g e r

r e m a i n e d w i t h i n the a m b i t of t r ad i t iona l ph i losophy . The s u b s t a n c e of the

c h a n g e d p h i l o s o p h y s o u g h t by nega t ive d ia lec t i c s 'wou ld lie in the d i v e r

sity of o b j e c t s t h a t i m p i n g e u p o n it and of the ob jec t it seeks , a d iver s i ty

n o t w r o u g h t by any s c h e m a ; to those ob jec t s , ph i losophy wou ld t ru ly g ive

i tse l f ra ther than use t h e m as a m i r r o r in w h i c h to r e r e a d itself, m i s t a k i n g

its own i m a g e for c o n c r e t i o n ' (ND, 13).



C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T A N D I N T U I T I O N 189

Unl ike He idegger and Der r ida , Adorno does no t r egard the s ea rch fo r

n o n - i d e n t i t y as a c o n t i n u a n c e o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y b e y o n d m e t a

phys ics . I f t radi t ional phi losophy made i tse l f f in i te , par t icular and con

c lus ive , by r educ ing th e in f in i t e to a th ing , then a changed ph i lo sop hy ,

accep t ing it s ab an do nm en t to th ing s and h i s to ry , wou ld ins tan t ia te a ' bad '

inf in i ty (N D , 14). T h is bad inf in i ty is for bo th De rr i da and Ad or no a k indof pos t -Hege l ian Kan t ian i sm; however , wh i le fo r Der r ida th i s Kan t ian i sm

repre sen t s the fo rev er - to -b e- repe a ted in te r ru p t ive work o f r ead ing , for

Adorno i t i s the no t -ye t a r r ived Utopia of the concep t .

N o w A d o r n o a v o i d s c o n t i n u i n g t h e p a t h o f t r a n s c e n d e n t a l p h i l o s o p h y

t h r o u g h a d o u b l e a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f w h a t t ra n s c e n d s t h e c o n c e p t . O n

the one hand a l l concep ts , even the ph i losoph ica l ones , r e fe r to noncon-

cep tua l i t i e s ' because concep ts on the i r pa r t a re moments o f the r ea l i ty tha t

r equ i red the i r fo rm at ion , p r im ar i ly fo r the con t ro l o f na t u re ' ( N D , 11) .

Ev en i f the fo rmat ion o f con cep ts by the non con cep tu a l m us t be g ra sped

conceptual ly , hence making that ref lec t ion complic i t wi th what i t i s

s eek ing to overcom e, i t r ema ins th e case tha t i t i s no t co ncep ts them se lves

tha t b lock non - iden t i ty b u t the i r fo rmat ion , w h ich is equa l ly the fo rmat ion

of the sub jec t em ploy in g them . T h is nonc onc ep tu a l i ty , howe ver , i s no t a

q u a s i - t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i t e m , s u c h a s Gestell, bu t the o rder and o rder ing o f

modern soc ie t i e s . For Adorno i t i s cap i ta l tha t now per fo rms the c ruc ia l

work o f fo rmat ion .

Secon d ly , and here aga in m ore l ike He idegg er than D er r i da , A do rnoconceives of the present as a k ind of quas i -eschato logical fu l f i lment of pas t

h i s to r y : ' U n i v e r s a l h i s to r y m u s t b e c o n s t r u e d a n d d e n i e d . . . N o u n i v e r sa l

h i s to ry leads f rom s lavery to hum ani t a r ia n i sm , bu t the re i s one l ea d ing

f r om t h e s li n g sh o t to t h e m e g a t o n b o m b ' ( N D , 3 20 ) . W i t h o u t a p h i l o s

ophy o f h i s to ry the p resen t wou ld be r educed to sheer ac tua l i ty w i thou t

potent ia l i ty , the pr incip le of ident i ty would be a b l ind fa te forever ready

to swal low non - iden t i ty , and th e work o f ph i loso phy redu ced to fo rever

h in t ing a t wha t e ludes i t .

N o n e t h e l e s s , d e s p i t e t h e moments of t r ansc end enc e Ad orn o bu i ld s in toh i s a rgument , they r emain non-dec i s ive p rec i s e ly because they a re

compl ic i t ly concep tua l , ac t s o f ph i losoph ica l mas te ry and domina t ion .

Un les s some concre te in t ima t ion o f non - iden t i ty ex i s ted , som e exp er ience

of non- iden t i ty pos s ib le , then r e f lec t ion ' s work wou ld be ind i s t ingu ishab le

f rom phan tasy ; o r be t t e r , the re wou ld be no r e f lec t ion . Adorno does no t

ru le out the poss ib i l i ty of radical fa i lure . Ref lect ion does cont inue, we are

sol ic i ted by the non- ident ical , but noth ing guarantees th is s ta te of af fa i rs .

For a complex o f h i s to r ica l r easons , modern , au tonomous a r t ca tegor ia l ly

performs (or performed) th is work of so l ic i ta t ion .

Ad orn o ' s aes the t i c s a t t e m pts d ia lec ti ca lly and specu la t ive ly to weave

toge th er the exper ience o f m od ern a r t as the suspens ion o f iden t i ty th in k

ing (in th i s he is l ike De r r id a ) w i th the mo m en ts o f t r an scen den ce tha t



190 C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T AND I N T U I T I O N

would a l low us to c o m p r e h e n d it in o r d e r t h a t a p r a c t i c a l j u d g e m e n t u p o n

t h e p r e s e n t may be had. In th i s chap te r I w a n t to immanen t ly fo l low

t h r o u g h A d o r n o ' s r e i n s c r i p t i o n of the ca tegor ies of aes the t i c s in a c c o r d

ance w i th the d ic ta tes of ar t i s t i c modern i sm, s av ing his t r e a t m e n t of the

m o d e r n i s t s u b l i m e , and h e n c e his r e la t ion to D e r r i d a , for c h a p t e r 5.

i Re inscr ib ing Aesthet i cs :

M o d e r n i s m , A u t o n o m y and S y n t h es i s

A d o r n o s u b m i t s t h a t 'art and art w o r k s are w h a t t h e y may b e c o m e ' (AT,

4 9 1 ; SAT, 533). ' A r t , ' he says, 'is dif ferent f rom empir ical rea l i ty . Now

this difference i tself does not stay the s a m e ; it changes because art

c h a n g e s ' (AT, 3). His to ry t r ans fo rms ce r ta in cu l t ob jec t s in to art, and

d is f r anch ises o the r works p rev ious ly cons ide red art. As a c o n s e q u e n c e ,

phi losophical ref lec t ion on art - what Adorno ca l l s ' aes the t i c s ' w i thou t ,

in so d o i n g , c o m m i t t i n g h i m s e l f to any typical ly aes thet ica l v iews on the

n a t u r e of art - shou ld t ake as its s t a r t i n g p o i n t the mos t r ecen t a r t i s t i c

p h e n o m e n a , r a t h e r t h a n the o t h e r way r o u n d as is the case w i th h i s to ry -

o f - ideas approaches to art. H o w e v e r , the m o s t r e c e n t a r t i s t i c p h e n o m e n o n ,

m o d e r n i s m , is a reflective and crit ical form of ar t i s t i c p rac t i ce whose

voca t ion is b o u n d up with an in s i s t en t in te r roga t ion of the n a t u r e and

m e a n i n gof art.

H e n c eAesthetic Theory

opens w i ththe

cor ros ive p ro b l e m a t i c of modernism f i rmly ins ta l led: 'It is se l f - ev iden t tha t no th ing

c o n c e r n i n g art is any longer s e l f - ev iden t , ne i the r in itself, nor in its

r e la t ion to the w h o l e , not even its r i g h t to ex is t ' (AT, 1; SAT, 9).

M o d e r n i s m is b o u n d - u p w i t h the a u t o n o m y of art from its earlier cult

func t ions , its b e l o n g i n g to socie t ies whose norms were f i rmly meta

phys ical ly or t h e o l o g i c a l l y u n d e r w r i t t e n . Art par t i c ipa tes in the d i s

e n c h a n t m e n t of the wor ld , a lbe i t not u n e q u i v o c a l l y ; it e x t e n d s the

d e s t r u c t i o n of all n a t u r a l b o u n d a r i e s , all ' g i v e n ' s ' and all founda t ions tha t

M a r x c l a i m e d was the civ i l iz ing work of cap i ta l . 'The g r o u n d of m o d e r n

ism is b o t h the a b s e n c e of a g r o u n d and the expl ic i t normat ive re ject ion by

m o d e r n i s m of a g r o u n d , e v e n if the re were one' (AT, 34). Art ' s wi l l to

a u t o n o m y , its forsaking of g r o u n d s ( t h a t , a n y h o w , h a v e d i s a p p e a r e d or

b e e n w i t h d r a w n ) and its normat ive r e jec t ion of them, fo rces art to nega te

not only previous ar t is t ic s ty les and p r a c t i c e s , but equa l ly t r ad i t ion itself.

T h i s n e g a t i o n has a twofo ld s t ruc tu re . On the one h a n d , the nega t ion of

t r ad i t ion is m o t i v a t e d by the search for w h a t w o u l d m a k e a work of art

p u r e l y and jus t art and no th ing e l s e , w i thou t of course ceas ing to be art

( b y b e c o m i n g , say, p u r e d e c o r a t i o n ) .1

In so far as t r ad i t ion is a

s e d i m e n t a t i o n of prev ious answers to the q u e s t i o n ' W h a t is ar t? ' , and in so

fa r as t h o s e s e d i m e n t a t i o n s i n c l u d e h e t e r o n o m o u s d e t e r m i n a t i o n s of art,

t h e n it is o n l y t h r o u g h a cr i t i ca l engagement and reflection on t r ad i t ion




tha t a r t can ach ieve au tonomy. On the o the r hand , s ince the ve ry a t t empt

to ach ieve au tonomy p resupposes tha t the re i s an es sen t ia l na tu re p roper

to a r t , tha t wha t i s in s ide and ou t s ide a r t can r ece ive a de te rmina te answer ,

then th i s p ro jec t a s a who le was doomed to f a i lu re . As Der r ida showed ,

the es sen t ia l ly inner na tu re o f a r t can on ly be g rasped th rough i t s r e la t ion

to the ou t s ide ; the r e la t ion be tween wha t au tonomous ly be longs to a r t and

what i s he te ronomous i s an in te rna l r e la t ion . Hence the p rosecu t ion o f the

sea rch fo r au tonomy becomes jus t the nega t ion o f the t r ad i t ion , tha t i s ,

the negat ion of a l l that ar t has been de te rmined to be . In th i s way the h i s

to r ica l s ea rch fo r au ton om y i s t r ans fo rm ed in to a pu re ly , and app aren t ly

the re fo re empty , t empora l adven tu re ; a r t i s fo rced in to a pa radox ica l

s ea rch for nove l ty . Pa radox ica l because the conc ep t o f m od ern i sm , so

def ined, i s pr iva t ive , 'ind ica t ing f irmly th at som eth ing ou gh t to be neg ated

and wh a t i t i s tha t ou gh t to be neg a ted ' (A T , 30 ) ; w i th ou t , how ever , the r e

be in g a com preh ens i b le t e rm inu s to th i s ques t . T h e nega t ive ly de f inedsearch fo r au t ono m y th ro ug h nove l ty de f ines ach ie vem ent as the a t t a i n

ment of novel ty ; which is equivalent to saying that only what is fu ture ,

wha t is no t -y e t , is a r t . H en ce a r t canno t be rea l i zed . T h is i s wh a t A do rno

means when he s ays 'The new i s the long ing fo r the new, no t the new

itself. T h is i s the cu r se o f every th ing n ew ' (A T , 47 ; s ee a l so 2 4 6 -7 , 339) .

Because the new o f a r t i s t i c mod ern i sm i s cond i t ioned by i ts c r i t ica l func

t ion , i t s top s being a t ru l y h is tor ical ca teg ory , a ca teg ory spel l ing h i s to r

i c i ty , and becomes an ' invar ian t ' , wh ich i s i t s weaknes s (AT, 383) . In so

far as novel ty ident i f ies h is tory ' s not unfold ing, i t i s no longer novel ty butthe s ign of the r ig id i f ica t ion of h is tory .

T ak in g insuff ic ient a cc ou nt of the fact tha t ' ach iev ing ' novel ty , i f only

fo r a moment , i s the ach ievement o f someth ing , th i s f ami l i a r s to ry i s too

severely formal , too on e-s id ed an d abs t r act , even i f th is abs t ra ct io n i tse l f

de f ines the limi t o f m od ern i sm ' s c ri t ica l eng agem ent w i th m ode rn i ty .

A d o r n o c a ll s t h e t e m p o r a r y a c h i e v e m e n t o f n o v e lt y 'n o n - i d e n t i t y ' ; n o n -

ide nt i ty , a t th i s ju nc tu re , def in ing th e case in which a wo rk is ar t bu t in a

manner no t pos i t ive ly de f ined , de te rmined o r l eg i s la ted by the t r ad i t ion .Non- iden t ica l works a re a r t w i thou t be ing wha t a r t has been . Such works

a re ex tens iona l ly equ iva le n t w i th Ka n t i an w orks o f gen ius ; they nega te

previous accounts of what i t i s to be a work of ar t and make enigmat ic

o r ig ina l s ense . A do rno ' s thes i s is tha t we can on ly un de r s ta nd the c la im o f

a r t , the cogn i t ive c la im o f aes the t i c cu l tu re in modern i ty , i f we can cap tu re

and co m pre he nd wha t the c la im o f no n- id en t i ty is . In c la iming tha t th e

search for novel ty can be subs tant ively reformulated as the search for

non - iden t i ty , A do rno i s no t sugg es t ing tha t th i s p ro jec t i s any l es s pa ra

doxical than i ts formal equivalent : ' the new wil ls (intendiert) n o n - i d e n t i t y 'in w i l l ing i t s r e jec t ion o f g rounds and depar tu re f rom t r ad i t ion ; bu t , ' by

wil l ing , [ar t ] inevi tably wi l ls ident i ty . To put i t d i f ferent ly , modern ar t

is cons tant ly pract is ing the imposs ib le t r ick of t ry ing to ident i fy the




n o n - i d e n t i c a l ' (AT, 33). Non- iden t ica l works on ly succeed to the ex ten t

tha t they exceed the i r in ten t iona l g round .

S u c h an abrup t va lo r iza t ion of a p o r e t i c m o d e r n i s m a p p e a r s i l l e g i t i m a t e ;

the p r iva t ive concep t of m o d e r n i s m is a b s t r a c t , and as such p rov ides the

non- ident ical i t se l f wi th only an a b s t r a c t and pr iva t ive s ense . Adorno

agrees . He r egards a r t ' s w i l l to nove l ty as the ' a e s t h e t i c c o u n t e r p a r t(Signum: s ign , token) to the e x p a n d i n g r e p r o d u c t i o n of cap i ta l ' (AT, 31;

S A T , 39); m o d e r n i s m is the cr i t ica l pr incip le of m o d e r n i t y in art, and less .

T h e a b s t r a c t n e s s of the will to novel ty reveals the c o m m o d i t y c h a r a c t e r of

a r t (AT, 336); it is th i s abs t r ac tnes s , the very res t lessness of capi ta l itself,

t h i s p r o d u c t i o n for the sake of produc t ion , tha t g ives to m o d e r n i s m , in its

ear l ies t theoret ica l ar t icula t ions in B a u d e l a i r e , 'a fatalis t ic r ing. The new

i s in t imately re la ted to d e a t h ' (AT, 31). As p r i v a t iv e , m o d e r n i s m m u s t

fo reswear g rounds and pos i t ive ends ; but because only pr ivat ive th is

revoca t ion of g r o u n d s b e c o m e s an inc reas ing ly empty ges tu re , a futile

r a d i c a l i s m .2

S o m e t i m e s A d o r n o w i l l a t t e m p t to r e d e e m the a b s t r a c t n e s s of m o d e r n

ism direct ly ; for e x a m p l e , he a r g u e s t h a t a b s t r a c t n e s s in art s ignals ar t ' s

wi thdrawal f rom object ive real i ty on the g r o u n d s t h a t n o t h i n g r e m a i n s of

the object ive wor ld save its d e a t h ' s h e a d : 'New art is as abs t r ac t as the real

r e l a t i o n s a m o n g men' (AT, 45). For a though t l ike th i s to have force ,

which af ter all offers to art only the s t a t u s of a d e f e r r e d m i m e s i s , A d o r n o

n e e d s to g ive subs tance to the d e f e r m e n t ; and m o r e , to tie t o g e t h e ra r t ' s a u t o n o m y and d e f e r m e n t i n t o a m o r e t h a n p r i v a t i v e c o n c e p t of the

n o n - i d e n t i c a l .

Adorno ' s cen t ra l s t r a tegy for es tab l i sh ing such a c o n n e c t i o n r u n s

t h r o u g h the K a n t i a n a n a t o m y of art; the Kant ian ana lys i s of art is t r u e ,

b u t not as a m e t a p h y s i c s of the e x p e r i e n c e of art, but r a t h e r as a social

insc r ip t ion of the historical fate of art in m o d e r n i t y . A d o r n o t a k e s K a n t ' s

charac te r iza t ion of a e s t h e t i c j u d g e m e n t to be a charac te r iza t ion of m o d e r n

a n d / o r m o d e r n i s t art itself, a m o v e a n t i c i p a t e d in K a n t ' s own a c c o u n t of

ar t works where , by a k ind of c o n t a g i o n , the already es tabl ished analys is of

a e s t h e t i c j u d g e m e n t as judgement - l ike w i thou t ac tua l ly be ing a j u d g e

m e n t , as b e i n g a m i m e s i s of judgement , in f i l t r a tes the charac te r iza t ion of

w o r k s of art as b e i n g e x e m p l a r y , and h e n c e r u l e - g o v e r n e d - l i k e , w i t h o u t

there actual ly being any r u l e w h i c h is the one exempli f ied in the w o r k .

P e r h a p s the bes t inaugura l way to get at A d o r n o ' s t h o u g h t h e r e is to say

t h a t he is s t ruck by b o t h the p r o x i m i t y and the d is tance be tween aes the t i c

reflection on the one h a n d , and j u d g e m e n t (the w o r k of u n d e r s t a n d i n g )

and p rac t i ca l r eason ( au tonomous l eg i s la t ion ) on the o t h e r h a n d ; t h a t it is

as if aes the t i c judgement invo lved a m i m e t i c , and hence i l lusory , re la t ion

to these 'proper ' ac t iv i t ies of m i n d , and h e n c e was being sol ic i ted , invi ted ,

to judge and to legis late while at the same t ime be ing p roh ib i t ed f rom so

d o i n g . The p r o x i m i t y is a mimes i s , wh i le the i l lus ion reveals the d is tance



C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T A N D I N T U I T I O N 1 9 3

tha t makes the mimes i s no t the r ea l th ing , no t r ea l ly judgement o r p rac t i

ca l l eg i s la t ion . The junc tu re o f p rox imi ty and d i s tance , mimes i s and

i l lus ion , i s the index or symptom of a d i f f icul ty ; hence i t i s not aes thet ic

re flec tion as such th a t i s p rob lem at ic , b u t r a th e r i ts cu r io us dou b l in g o f

un der s tan d in g an d p rac t i ca l l eg i s la t ion ; a dou b l ing th a t we s aw in chap te r

1 to be the i s sue in Kan t ' s a t t empts to l eg i t ima te t r anscenden ta l ly aes

the t i c r e f l ec t ion . Transcenden ta l l eg i t ima t ion fo r aes the t i c judgements

cou ld on ly be had if they we re sub sum ed u nd er e i the r un de r s ta nd ing o r

reason ; bu t the p rox imat ing subsumpt ion cou ld on ly succeed a t the cos t

o f u n d e r m i n i n g a e s t h e t i c j u d g e m e n t ' s d if fe r en c e a n d a u t o n o m y f ro m

unders tand ing and p rac t i ca l r eason . And , aga in , a l l th i s i s qu i te in teg ra l to

the s t r i c t ly Kan t ian p rob lemat ic o f aes the t i c judgement , whereby i t i s to

fo rm a b r idge ac ros s the abys s s epara t ing under s tand ing f rom prac t i ca l

r eason , m ind f rom n a tu re , is f rom ou gh t .

One way o f pu t t ing th i s po in t i s to s ay tha t the au tonomy and he te r -on om y of each of ou r cog ni t ive facul t ies is m ad e diff icult an d pro ble m at i c

by the unreso lved au ton om y and he te ron om y o f aes the t i c re f l ect ion ; a

d i f f i cu l ty tha t d i r ec t ly in fec t s the p resumpt ive va lo r iza t ion o f au tonomy

over he te ron om y. A nd th i s has been the l e i tmo t i f o f ou r r e f lec t ions

th roughou t . So He idegger ' s h i s to r ica l and epocha l in sc r ip t ion o f aes the t i c

au to nom y cha l lenged K an t ' s r efusa l o f h i s to ry and mem ory , wh i le r evea l

i n g a r t ' s m o d e r n a n d c o n t e m p o r a r y a l i e n a ti o n f ro m t r u t h . S i m u l t a n e o u s l y ,

we con tended tha t the g la r ing sp lendour o f the ob jec t o f r emembrance in

He ideg ger s eem ed p rovoca t ive ly d i s con nec ted f rom our cu r ren t p red ica men t , a d i s connec t ion tha t was r epea ted in the f a i lu re o f He idegger to p ro

vide an acc oun t of th e con ne ct io n bet we en ar t and tech nolo gy suff icient to

expl icate the poss ib i l i ty of the former being a locus for th inking the la t ter .

And th i s ce r ta in ly sugges t s the pos s ib i l i ty , to be p rosecu ted be low, tha t

He idegger ' s exorb i tan t r emembrance o f Greece i s a l so a r e fusa l o f mem

ory , a s c reen memory fo r someth ing worse .

Der r ida , in con t ras t , l e t s h i s accoun t ing be governed more fu l ly by the

ex igenc ies o f Kan t ' s t ex t and i t s inner p rob lemat ic ; and th i s l eads h im torevea l the immanen t co l l apse o f a r t ' s c la im to au tonomy, and fu r the r , the

d e p e n d e n c y o f t h e a u t o n o m o u s i n s i de o n t h e h e t e r o n o m o u s o u t s i d e .

No ne th e les s , we cou ld no t he lp bu t no te tha t tha t dem on s t ra t io n f a il ed to

account for i t s own discovery; hence the c la im for autonomy and i ts col

lapse ende d by bein g an index only of i t se lf - a de m on s tra t io n of the c lo s

u re o f the metaphys ics o f p resence w i thou t e i the r the h i s to ry o f be ing o r

the epocha l in sc r ip t ion o f t echno logy . Der r ida ' s d i s tanc ing o f h imse l f f rom

Heidegger l eads h im to fo rgo h i s to ry , and so l eave unknown wha t en jo ins

p resence ( even more than i t i s unknown in He idegger ) . F rom our p resen tvantage point we might wel l suspect Derr ida too of a refusal to know and

t o r e m e m b e r .

Fur the r , in the case o f bo th we saw how the i r va r ious a t t empts to



194 C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T A N D I N T U I T I O N

undermine , l imi t , o r go beyond aes the t i c s came to be marked by a d i s

t inc t ly and avo idab ly Kan t ian e lemen t . And th i s shou ld l ead us to the

sugges t ion that whi le each, d i f ferent ly , was correct in thei r des i re to de-

aes thet ic ize ar t and aes thet ics , thei r sense of what is wrong, of what our

situ ati on is , is m ista ke n; b ut m ista ke n in a very p rec ise w ay, for if i t is

indeed Kan t ian concep tua l f igu res - gen ius , sensus communis, the sub l im e -

tha t r e tu rn to haun t the i r endeavours , then , in a s ense to be e labora ted ,

our ac tua l s i tua t ion mus t i t s e l f be more Kan t ian than the s to r ies o f t ech

no logy o r the metaphys ics o f p resence can r evea l o r accommodate . And

th i s i s ju s t the hypo thes i s tha t Adorno pur sues ; h i s s t r a tegy o f r ead ing

Kant ' s aes thet ic ca tegor ies as the h is tor ical ca tegor ies of modern ar t i s jus t

the a t t empt to comprehend h i s to r ica l ly the apor ia i o f Kan t ian aes the t i c s ,

wh ich i s coeva l w i th the apor ia i o f the Kan t ian sys tem as who le , w i thou t

t r anscend ing o r domina t ing the conf igura t ion o f the ca tegor ies o f mode rn i ty w i th ca tegor ies d rawn f rom e l s ewhere .

H er e is a p r im a fac ie unpr om is in g r em ark for su rvey ing the Kan t ian

cons t i tu t ion of ar t : 'Aes thet ics cannot hope to grasp works of ar t i f i t t rea ts

them as he rmeneu t ica l ob jec t s . What a t p resen t needs to be g rasped i s

t h e i r i n c o m p r e h e n s i b i l i t y (Unbegreiflichkeit: i n s c r u t a b i l i t y ) ' ( A T , 1 7 3 ;

S A T , 179). T h e mo s t na tu ra l a s sum pt ion abo u t work s o f a r t fo r us i s tha t

they r equ i re in te rp re ta t ion , dec ip her in g , tha t the re i s , a s G ad am er w ou ld

ins i s t , a p lay o f f ami l i a r i ty and s t r angenes s , o f knowing and unknowing in

our o r ig ina l conf ron ta t ion w i th a work . And tha t wou ld appear to en ta i ltha t wha t i s r equ i red i s in te rp re ta t ion . I t i s , however , equa l ly the case

tha t mo dern i s t w orks o f a r t o ften func t ion th ro ug h ca re fu lly des igned

s tra tegies for refus ing , or a t leas t hal t ing , the work of in terpreta t ion .

Fu r th e r , i t i s genera l ly he ld tha t an in te rp re ta t ion o f a work i s never equa l

wi th i t , tha t , a t bes t , in te rp re ta t io n a l lows the work to be ' expe r ienc ed ' ,

a l lows the in te rac t ion be tween spec ta to r and work to t ake p lace . And tha t

would appear to be equal to the c la im that in terpreta t ion is for the sake of

wha t i s no t commensurab le w i th o r r educ ib le to in te rp re ta t ion . Th is i s wha t

Ad orn o says: a r t works a re wa i ting to be in te rp re te d . T o deny th i s c la im,

to as se r t tha t no th ing in a r t r equ i res in te rp re ta t ion , 'wou ld expunge the

l ine o f demarca t ion tha t s epara tes a r t f rom non-a r t ' (AT, 186) . Adorno

a l so c la ims , however , tha t ' t he be t t e r one under s tands an a r t work the

more may i t r emove the en igma concern ing some d imens ion ; the l e s s ,

how ever , does it i l lum ina te the en igm a wh ich is con s t i tu t in g the a r t work '

( A T , 177 ; S A T , 184). W ha t happ ens to the cons t i tu t ive en igm a we wi ll

d iscuss below. For the present i t i s suf f ic ient to note that a work opens

i tse lf u p to in terp ret iv e reason bec ause ' i t s en igm at ic qual i ty is adef ic iency, a con di t i on of w an t ' (A T , 186) .

One way o f co l l ec t ing these though ts toge ther wou ld be to s ay tha t

he rm ene u t ica l r e fl ec tion on a r t works does no t con c lud e w i th a su bs um p-

t ive jud gem ent , tha t the work o f in te rp re ta t io n i s judg em ent - l ik e , bu t does




no t ac tua l ly i s sue in a judgement ( excep t , pe rhaps , the non-subsumpt ive

judgement : 'Th i s i s beau t i fu l ' ) . En ta i l ed by th i s wou ld be the thes i s tha t

what is specif ic to works of ar t i s thei r qui te d is t inct ive form of

incomprehens ib i l i ty ; an incomprehens ib i l i ty tha t becomes man i fes t o r

p r o m i n e n t a t t h e fin al m o m e n t of i n t e r p r e t a t i o n . T h a t i n c o m p r e

hens ib i l i ty i s a consequence o f a r t ' s d i s tance f rom i t s p rox imate cons t i t u t i o n b y r e a s o n a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g .

'T o be su re , ' A do rno s ta tes , 'works o f a r t a re l ike jud ge m ent s in tha t

they , too , e ffect a syn th es i s . Bu t a r t ' s syn thes i s i s no n- j ud ge m en ta l ' (A T ,

180). Works o f a r t un i fy the i r d ive r se e lemen ts by means o f the i r fo rms ;

bu t the opera t ion o f these fo rms p rov ides less than t h e u n i t y a c c o m p l i s h e d

th rough concep tua l syn thes i s . Genera l ly we take i t tha t concep ts subsume

par t i cu la r s under themse lves ; they ins i s t tha t one (un ique) th ing i s the

same as ano ther . And on ly so , s ays Kan t , can we th ink ; th ink ing i s the r ec

ogn i t ion o f ind iv idua l s ( in tu i t ions ) in accordance w i th wha t they a re no tqua ind iv idua l s , namely , the s ame as o the r ind iv idua l s , and hence d i f f e ren t

f ro m t h e m s e l v e s . T h e w o r k o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g i s t o b r i n g i n t u i t i o n s u n d e r

conc ep ts , iden t i fy ing in d iv idua l s in t e rm s o f the i r (un iver sa l ) p ro per t i e s

or , in the appl icat ion of sor ta ls , in v i r tue of those same proper t ies .

N o t h i n g a p p e a r s u n t o w a r d i n t h i s . H o w e v e r , A d o r n o c o n t e n d s , w e c a n

no t com pre he nd the k ind o f c la im tha t works o f a r t mak e if we accede to

th is v iew, bel ieving that th ings could not be o therwise , that th is i s a l l cog

n i t ion , knowing and judg ing , can be . The in i t i a l ev idence tha t o rd ina ry

concep tua l comprehens ion and i t s ex tens ion in s c ience i s , somehow,

un tow ard , no t the f inal s to ry , i s p rov ided by our ackn ow ledge m ent tha t a r t

works , in accordance w i th the i r inner dynamic , r e s i s t subsumpt ion ,

iden t if i ca tion , exp lana t ion - the b ru te sub ord in a t ion o f the pa r t i cu la r to

the un iver sa l .

. . . the pa in te r pa in t s a p ic tu re r a the r than wha t i t r ep resen t s .

Im pl ied he re i s the idea tha t every work o f a r t spon taneo us ly a im sat being ident ical wi th itself, just as in the world outs ide a fake

iden t i ty is eve ryw her e forc ib ly im pos ed on objects by the insa t iable

subjec t . Ae s thet ic ide nt i ty is d i f ferent , how eve r , in one im po r ta nt

respect : i t i s meant to ass is t the non- ident ical in i t s s t ruggle agains t

the r ep res s ive iden t i f i ca t ion compuls ion tha t ru les in r ea l i ty . (AT, 6 ;

S A T , 1 4 )

C o n c e p t u a l d o m i n a t i o n , t h e r e p r e s s i o n a n d s q u a n d e r i n g o f p a r t i c u l a r i t y

and sensuousness , as we wil l see more fu l ly below, as evidenced by

technological ra t ional i ty and capi ta l is t socia l re la t ions , i s caused by the

reg imen ta t ion o f r eason by the d r ive fo r s e l f -p rese rva t ion under cond i t ions

of socia l dominat ion unt i l , f inal ly , only ins t rumental reason and i ts




c o r r e l a t i v e s ( i n d u c t i v e a n d d e d u c t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n , t h e c o r r e s p o n d e n c e t h e

ory of t ru th , e tc . ) are regarded as possess ing cogni t ive wor th .

T h e thes i s tha t a r t i s no t s imply d i ff e ren t f rom c oncep tua l un de r s ta nd

ing (and pract ica l leg is la t ion) but a protes t agains t i t s present format ion

der ives , aga in , f rom the log ic o f d i s tance and p rox imi ty govern ing the con

s t i tu t ion o f a r t in r e la t ion to under s tand ing and r eason . Ev idence tha t sucha log ic indeed governs a r t wou ld be p rov ided by an accoun t showing tha t

a r t ' s au tono m y f rom the de m an ds o f jud ge m en t and p rac t ica l r eason is

en fo rced , tha t i s , tha t a r t con ta in a he t e ro no m ou s mo m en t , tha t i ts

au ton om y is for the sake of he ter on om y, i t s inco m pren s ib i l i t y is for t he

sake of th e conc ept , for the sake of reaso n and cog ni t io n . I t wou ld be t r ue

to s ay , how ever , tha t such ev idence i s no t imm edia te ly fo r thcom ing . Af ter

all, once a r t had es tab l i shed i t s au tonomy f rom re l ig ion and i t s r edempt ive

t r u t h s , once i t was secular ized , ' i t was condemned, for lack of any hope for

a real a l ternat ive , to of fer to the exis t ing wor ld a k ind of so lace that

re inforced the spel l (Bann) au t on om ou s a r t had wan ted to shake o ff ' (A T ,

2; S A T , 10). A u to no m ou s works , in pos i t ing we l l - roun ded to ta li t ie s

ent i re ly on their own, provide so lace e i ther by creat ing the fa lse

imp res s ion th a t the wor ld ou t s ide a r t is equa l ly w e l l - rou nde d , or by

app ear ing as a cou n te r - r ea lm to the non-un i f i ed w or ld ou t s ide . Su ch

impres s ions g iven o f f by au tonomous works , and the co r respond ing v iews

about ar t that fo l low f rom such impress ions , fa i l to acknowledge the

def ic iency , the wan t and wound o f a r t .

Tha t f a i lu re o f acknowledgement , the wound o f au tonomy, i s fo r

Adorno the po in t o f depar tu re fo r modern i s t a r t , where modern i s t a r t i s

under s tood as the c r i t i ca l , r e f l ec t ive comprehens ion and con t inua t ion o f

t h e p r o j e c t o f m o d e r n , a u t o n o m o u s a r t . T r u e a r t m u s t c h a l l e n g e i t s a u t o n

omous es sence ( au tonomous ly ) , mus t , tha t i s , acknowledge tha t i t s

capac i ty to p ro du ce who les i s g ro un de d in i t s d i s tance f rom em pi r ica l

r ea l i ty , and hence acknowledge i t s who lenes s as i l lu so ry . 'They a re r idd les

(en igmas ) because they deny , a s f r agmented , wha t they r ea l ly wan t to be '

(A T , 184; S A T , 191) . W e are famil iar wi th th is tens ion e xtr ins ical lyth rough the va r ious a t t empts by a r t th roughou t th i s cen tu ry to in f i l t r a te

i t s e l f d i r ec t ly in to the r ea l wor ld , to b reak down the ba r r i e r s be tween a r t

and l i f e . These a t t empts have f a i l ed . 3 Hence the d i lemma ar t f inds i t se l f in

today: ' I f i t le ts go of autonomy i t se l ls out to the es tabl ished order ,

whereas i f i t t r ies to s tay s t r ic t ly wi th in i t s autonomous conf ines i t

becomes equa l ly co -op tab le , l iv ing a ha rmles s l i f e in i t s appo in ted n iche '

( A T , 337) .

T o c o m p r e h e n d m o d e r n i s t w o r k s o f a r t is t o c o m p r e h e n d t h e m o t i o n s

of th i s d i l emma, the symptoms o f the wound o f au tonomy, as an in te rna l

cons t i tuen t o f a r t works , indeed as cons t i tu t ive o f them, and hence cons t i

tu t ive of the c la im works make. But s ince th is c la im is a h is tor ical c la im i t




fo l lows tha t i t s e s tab l i shmen t mus t be in tense ly p rob lemat ic s ince , i f

autonomy is a wound as wel l as a condi t ion for ar t ' s c la iming, then ar t i s a

cr i t iqu e of wh at l ies ou ts id e i t. H ow ev er , the only evide nce offered for

th ing s ou t s ide a r t be ing suc h as to ma ke au ton om y a w ou nd i s the wo und

itself; that th is , and th is a lone, i s ar t ' s h is tor ical fa te . Equal ly , however ,

th is i s the s t rength of the thes is ; i f ar t ' s au tonomy is a wound, i f ar t ' sau tonomy insc r ibes an an t inomic space , then th i s o f fe r s the bes t ev idence

we can have that the wor ld outs ide ar t i s d is f igured by i ts repress ion or

exclus ion of what ar t works exempli fy , of what thei r i l lusory wholeness is

an illusion of.

ii Syn thes i s , I l lus ion and N on - ide nt i ty

Art works a re syn the t i c who les ; they syn thes ize a man i fo ld ; ' t hey have an

im m an en t syn the t i c func t ion wh ich i s to b r ing un i ty to the di ffuse , no n-

c o n c e p t u a l , q u a s i - f r a g m e n t e d m a t e r i a l s i n a r t i s t i c p r o d u c t s ' ( A T , 4 2 3 ;

S A T , 4 5 3 ) . This un i fy ing endeavour i s the work o f r eason in a r t , a r t ' s

logical i ty and conceptual i ty , and hence the sense in which ar t works are

judgement - l ike . None the les s , a r t works a re no t judgements , and th i s in

par t because the i r syn theses occur th rough the med ium of a r t i s t i c ' f o rm '

ra the r than th rough concep ts , p ropos i t ions and sy l log i sms . Form i s the

centra l aspect of ar t , i t i s ' the law that t ransf igures empir ical being (des

SeiendenY ( A T , 2 0 7 ; S A T , 2 1 6 ) . T h e goal of th is t ransf igu rat ion is to re n

der cons is tent and ar t icula te the d i f fuse par t iculars that are a work 's con

ten t ( even thou gh fo rm i t se l f i s bu t s ed im en te d con ten t ) . Bu t th i s i s to s ay

too l i t t le , for the k ind of uni ty or wholeness af ter which ar t works seek is

one in wh ich the e lemen ts (pa r t i cu la r s ) compos ing the work a re no t de te r

m i n e d , m a d e d e t e r m i n a t e b y t h e f o r m s y n t h e s i z i n g t h e m . I n K a n t ' s t e r m s ,

th is is to say again tha t form m us t offer the opp or tun i ty for the im ag in

at ion to survey an aes thet ic idea , whi le not dominat ing the mater ia l in a

m a n n e r t h a t w o u l d e n g e n d e r c l o s u r e o r s u b s u m p t i o n . A n d t h i s a g a i n

po in t s to the ques t ion o f works ' incomprehens ib i l i ty , the i r p rov id ing ' s en s u o u s t r u t h ' ( C J , § 5 1 , 3 2 2 ) r a the r than concep tua l t ru th . What does th i s

incomprehens ib i l i ty s ign i fy?

Fo r Ador no every th ing tu r ns on fo rm ' s p rox im i ty to conc ep tua l i ty in

terms of i t s synthes iz ing funct ion , and i ts d is tance f rom conceptual i ty in

i ts res t ra in t , i t s not subsuming the e lements of a work in i t or under i t ,

and hence i t s no t p rov id ing fo r concep tua l de te rminacy o r c losu re .4

T h e

s i m p l e s t a s s u m p t i o n a s t o w h y n o n - s u b s u m p t i o n m i g h t b e v a l u e d a n d

des i r ed i s tha t someth ing ge t s lo s t o r r ep res sed in subsumpt ion ( and in

p rac t i ca l l eg is la tion , wh ich in Ka n t i s a l so a work o f su bsu m pt i on ) .

A d o r n o c o n t e n d s t h a t a t p r e s e n t t h e d o m i n a n t r e l a t i o n b e t w e e n u n i v e r s a l

and par t i cu la r , theore t i ca l ly and p rac t i ca l ly , is one wh ereb y ind iv idu a l s a re



1 9 8 C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T A N D I N T U I T I O N

s u b s u m e d u n d e r u n i v e r s a l s . U n d e r s t a n d i n g , b o t h t h e o r e t i c a l a n d p r a c t i

cal , i s t aken to be equ iva len t to subsumpt ion , the mas te ry o f ind iv idua l s

by b r ing ing them under concep ts and l aws . What i s lo s t th rough such p ro

cedures i s the s ensuous pa r t i cu la r i ty o f the ind iv idua l in itself. S e n s u o u s

par t icular i ty has been los t to us by the way in which theoret ica l and prac

t ica l r eason have com e to be und er s to od as sub sum pt io n ; and fu r the r ,

once coming to be so under s tood , how they have managed to o rder and

ar rang e the soc ia l wor ld in accordance w i th the d ic ta tes o f tha t un de r

s tand ing . And th i s though t r e la tes d i r ec t ly to the c la im in chap te r 1 t h a t

K an t ' s d if f icul ties arose f rom his redu ct iv e co ns t rua l of wh at was and wh at

was no t s ense -percep t ib le .

T h e inexp on ib le charac te r o f aes the t i c r ep re sen ta t ions , the un in te l l ig i -

b i l i ty of works of ar t , der ives f rom the fact that sensuous par t icular i ty has

been exc lud ed f rom the work o f theore t i ca l and p rac t i ca l r eason . H ow ever ,i f theore t ica l an d p ract ica l reason cov er the po ss ib i l i t ies of cog ni t ion , i f

what i t is for an object to be cognitively s ignif icant is for i t to be either

conceptual ly unders tood or to f igure as an e lement in an act of pract ica l

ref lect ion , w her e pract ica l ref lec tion is take n to opera te in acc orda nce with

genera l i zab le p rocedures , then s ensuous pa r t i cu la r i ty canno t be cogn i t ive ly

s ignif icant . T h e exclu s ion of sen suo us par t icu lar i ty f rom pract ica l and

theore t i ca l comprehens ion , in v i r tue o f wha t theore t i ca l and p rac t i ca l

r eason have become, en ta i l s i t s s i l enc ing , the imposs ib i l i ty o f de te rmina te

p rac t i ca l o r theore t i ca l judgements abou t i t .

Ae s thet ic s ynth eses b ec om e a pro tes t a gains t th is s ta te of affai rs i f and

on ly i f i t can be demons t ra ted tha t to v iew th ings in accordance w i th the i r

s ensuo us pa r t i cu la r i ty bu t non - judg em enta l ly is no t a s t a t ic accom pl i sh

men t o f the p rogres s o f a r t , bu t a s i tua t ion tha t a r t a t t empts to t r ans fo rm.

In o the r w ord s , i t i s to c la im tha t we m isun de r s ta nd the ach ievem ent o f

non- iden t i ty i f we under s tand i t in t e rms o f a c r i t i ca l modern i sm tha t

regards the ques t ion of ar t as one that i s purely in ternal to ar t , say a ques

t ion about the essence of ar t , and not thereby a ques t ion of what ar t i s not .

T h e in te rna l p ro jec t o f ach iev ing non- id en t i ty in a r t i s a r t ' s nego t ia t ion

with what has been ar t and with what is not ar t ; or bet ter , what ar t has

been, formal ly conceived, fa i ls to be non- ident ical because the works of

the pas t become pas t by becoming d i s cu r s ive ly s a tu ra ted ; to become an

e lemen t o f the t r ad i t ion i s to become known, cogn ized , subsumed . So the

re ject ion of t radi t ion is a bat t le wi th cogni t ion for the sake of (an o ther)

cogn i t ion . Th is accords w i th the thes i s sugges ted a t the end o f chap te r 1 ,

th at aes thet ic cu l tu re is s ignif icant thr ou gh i ts po we r of res is tance to p ro

gress ive cul ture . We could make progress in th is thes is i f we could cometo reg ard a r t ' s i l lusory s ta tu s as sub s tan t ia l and p rob lem at i c in a way dis

conn ec ted f rom t r ad i t iona l r ep resen ta t iona l r end er in gs o f the p rob le m ;

that i s , i f we could come to regard i l lus ion now as a h is tor ical ly engen

de red an d ful ly s ignify ing feature of ar t works . H ow ev er , th is tho ug ht can




carry con vict ion o nly i f i t i s a t ta che d to the accou nt of ar t is t ic syn these s

tha t A do rno ' s t r ans fo rm ed K an t ia n s to ry has been e l i c i ting .

Adorno i s r e len t l es s in h i s t r ea t ing o f a r t works as syn the t i c p roduc t s

wi th concep tua l and in tu i t ive moments . However , cen t ra l to h i s t r ans

format ion of Kant is h is equal ly re lent less re inscr ip t ion of the terms of the

syn thes i s , o f wha t concep t and in tu i t ion can be r egarded as be ing .

A do rn o 's poin t in f igur ing a r t is t ic prac t ice as syn thet ic pro du ct s whi le

t rans- f igur ing the terms of that synthes is i s to reveal how the theoret ica l

fo rms ' con cep t ' and ' in tu i t i on ' , wh ich now jo in tly in sc r ibe the unre f lec ted

ca tegor ia l de te rm ina t io n o f s ense -pe rcep t ib i l i ty , a re them se lves the p r o

duc t s of a h i s to ry , a re p ro du ced fo rms and h ence s ed im en te d h i s to r ies ,

whose cu r ren t mutua l exc lus ivenes s and in te rdependence r equ i res r e f l ec

t ion . Ar t is th is ref lect ion , which is what makes ar t phi losophical and re

f lect ion on ar t a lways a ' sec on d ref lect ion ' (A T , 490; SA T , 531) , s ince in

ar t synthes is has taken a d i f ferent d i rect ion than in the wor ld outs ide ar t ; a

d i r ec t ion in wh ich wha t has been exc luded f rom pure cogn i t ive and p rac t i

cal syntheses gets re ins ta ted . The t ransf igured terms of synthes is are th is

r e i n s t a t e m e n t , h o w e v e r a p o r e t i c a n d / o r i l l u s o r y t h a t r e i n s t a t e m e n t m i g h t

b e .

Co nce p t and in tu i t ion a re r ew r i t t en by Ad orn o as fo rm and c on te n t ,

sp ir i t and mimes is , form and express ion . In each case what is a t i s sue is a

ques t ion ing o f the pos s ib i l i t i e s fo r comprehend ing the r e la t ion be tween

un iver sa l and p ar t i cu la r , w here i t i s ag reed f rom th e ou t se t tha t cogn i t ioni s a syn thes i s , tha t the re canno t be cogn i t ion w i thou t concep tua l i ty .

F u r t h e r , A d o r n o c o n c e d e s t h a t as t h i n g s s t a n d th e i n t u it i v e m o m e n t

concerns v i sua l i ty , s ensuousnes s , pa r t i cu la r i ty , immediacy and con t in

gency ; wh i le the con cep tu a l mo m en t r e fe rs to m ean ing , l angu age , m ed ia

t ion , un iver sa l i ty and neces s i ty . Because Adorno regards the cons t i tu t ive

componen ts o f a r t i s t i c p rac t i ce and aes the t i c r e f l ec t ion in t e rms o f un iver

sa l and par t icular , and fur ther conceives of thei r re la t ion in terms of syn

t h e s i s , h is opera t ive under s tand ing o f the p rob lem of a r t i s everywhere

cogn i t ive , a ques t ion o f r eason , r a t iona l i ty , judgement and knowledge .

What Adorno cha l lenges in the t r ad i t iona l v iew i s tha t the dua l i ty o f con

cep t and in tu i t ion i s c losed and unm ed ia te d , tha t the m om en t o f in tu i t io n

always and everywhere lacks meaning (sense) and s ignif icance, and the

m om en t o f conc ep tua l i ty l acks ( s ens ib le ) g ivennes s and mate r ia l i ty . On the

contrary , i t i s jus t the rigid separa t ion o f concep t and in tu i t ion , un iver sa l

an d par t i cu la r , tha t Ad orn o s ees a r t as ques t ion ing .

Ho we ver , m ov ing n ow in the oppos i t e d i r ec t ion , a l thou gh a r t i s a

ref lect ion on the fa te of sense-percept ib i l i ty , th is does not enta i l that i t swork is nar rowly epis temic . Ar t , as a socia l ins t i tu t ion , as a form of socia l

p rac t i ce , has been de te rmined by bo th in te rna l and ex te rna l f ac to r s in

i t s ro le o f engag ing w i th the que s t ion o f s ense -perc ep t ib i l i ty . H en ce

those de te rmina t ions equa l ly spe l l ou t an accoun t o f the f a te o f s ense -




percept ib i l i ty outs ide ar t , that i s , in non-ar t is t ic socia l pract ices , and in the

operat ive ra t ional i ty of those pract ices . In brief, to speak of the fate of

sense-percept ib i l i ty is necessar i ly to speak of the fa te of reason and ra t ion

a l i ty in modern i ty .

Now we have a l r eady s een tha t Kan t a t t empts to exp l ica te the d i f f e rence

between ar t and cogni t ion ( theoret ica l and pract ica l ) by ins is t ing that ina r t t h e i n t u it i v e m o m e n t i s p r i m a r y o v e r t h e c o n c e p t u a l m o m e n t . T h a t

p r imacy , cap tu red in the thes i s tha t aes the t i c ideas a re inexpon ib le

rep resen ta t ions where though t i s bod ied fo r th to the s enses , ne rvous ly

re i t e ra tes the s tan da rd com preh ens io n o f conc ep t and in tu i t ion a t the ve ry

moment i t i s being thrown in to ques t ion . I f i t i s indeed an idea that is

being bodied for th to the senses , then bodying for th cannot be brute ly

in tu i t ive . The sugges t ion tha t a r t a l t e r s , s ay , the ba lance be tween in tu i t ion

and concep t , in f ac t h ides the r e insc r ip t ion these t e rms a re undergo ing ; a

fact h idden by Kant ' s absorpt ion of ar t in to h is facul ty-based theory of

j u d g e m e n t . N o n e t h e l e s s , b e c a u s e w e e m p l o y t h e l a n g u a g e o f c o n c e p t

and in tu i t ion as i t i s formed outs ide ar t in order to unders tand what is

happen ing in a r t , we a re na tu ra l ly l ed to cons ide r a r t a s demand ing a

dominance of the in tu i t ive: ar t ought to a im at v isual i ty , a wr i ter should

' sho w ' wha t i s m ea n t r a the r than t e l l ing .

The des ide ra tum of v i sua l i ty s eeks to p rese rve the mimet ic moment

of ar t . What th is v iew does not real ize is that mimes is only goes onl iv ing through i ts ant i thes is , which is ra t ional contro l by ar t works

over a ll tha t i s hete rog ene ous t o th em . I f th is i s ign ore d , v isual i ty

bec om es a fe t ish . Ac tual ly , th e m im et ic im pu lse a lso af fects the pr o

ces s o f concep tua l med ia t ion . Concepts are indispensable to art as they

are to language, bu t in art they become something other than shared

charac teristics of emp irical objects. To a rgue tha t concep ts a re in te r

spersed with ar t i s not the same as c la iming the conceptual i ty of ar t

in genera l . Art is as little a concep t as it is an intuition (Ansch auu ng);

and just for that reason does it protest against their separation. M o r e over the in tu i t iv i ty of ar t d i f fers f rom empir ical percept ion (sin-

nlichen Wahrnehmung: sensory awareness ) because i t a lways points

beyond empir ical percept ion to sp ir i t . Ar t i s a v is ion of the non-

visual ; i t i s s imilar to a concept wi thout ac tual ly being one. I t i s

in reference to concepts , however , that ar t re leases i t s mimet ic ,

n o n - c o n c e p t u a l p o t e n t i a l . . . The falsehood opposed by art is not ration

ality per se but the fixed opposition of rationality to particularity. ( A T ,

1 4 1 - 2 , 144; S A T , 148, 151; m y i ta l ics )

Succes s in sus ta in ing th i s c la im, in mak ing good the thes i s tha t the mod

ernis t work of ar t hal ts and over turns the def in i t ional dual i ty of concept

and in tu i t ion , and henc e the oppos i t ion o f r a t iona l i ty to pa r t i cu la r i ty ,

r equ i res tha t we reconce ive wha t these moments a re .




Let us begin wi th the concept of mimes is , one of the mos t d i f f icul t in

A do rn o 's oeuvre. F i rs t a nd forem ost i t i s necessary to insis t tha t mim es is is

a cr i t ica l re inscr ip t ion of in tu i t ion , of the ro le of par t iculars in cogni t ion .

In mak ing use o f mimes i s Adorno re l i e s , in a way he r a re ly open ly

acknowledges , on the s eman t ic as soc ia t ions embedded in the t e rm.

M im es i s refers to par t icu lar i ty ; but as a form of and refuge for m im et i cbeha v iour m imes i s cons t rues th e que s t ion o f pa r t i cu la r i ty as a r e la t ion ,

nam ely , of one pa r t i cu la r to ano ther . I n K an t in tu i t ion r e fe r s bo th to the

par t i cu la r r e fe r red to in a jud ge m en t and the r e la tion to tha t pa r t i cu la r . So

Kan t in t roduces h i s concep t o f in tu i t ion th i s way : ' I n wha tever manner

and by wha tever means a mode o f knowledge r e la tes to ob jec t s , intuition is

tha t th rough which i t i s in immedia te r e la t ion to them, and to wh ich a l l

thought as a means is d i rected . But in tu i t ion takes p lace only in so far as

th e object i s g iven to u s ' (A 19) . I f in judg em en t a par t icu lar i s br ou gh t

under a un iver sa l , i f an ind iv idua l uses a concep t to appropr ia te a pa r t i cu

lar wi th respect to h is cogni t ive and pract ica l in teres ts , in mimes is the

s i tua t ion i s o the rwise : one pa r t i cu la r ( the sub jec t ) appropr ia tes ano ther

par t icular ( the object) by l ikening i tse l f to i t . So one takes on the feroci ty

and power of the l ion , in order to bet ter hunt i t , by l ikening oneself to i t .

Tha t example , however , i s no t qu i te ap t , fo r Adorno wishes to d i s t ingu ish

mimes i s f rom mag ic . Once the d i s t inc t ion be tween mimes i s and mag ic was

made , then mimes i s ' t ook on the appearance o f a r es idue : i t i s a s though i t

has long s ince los t i t s funct ion which was t ied up with b io logical layers ofh u m a n l i f e ' ( A T , 4 5 3 ) .

'Mimet ic behav iour does no t imi ta te someth ing bu t a s s imi la tes i t s e l f to

tha t someth ing . Works o f a r t t ake i t upon themse lves to r ea l i ze th i s a s s imi

la t io n ' (A T , 162). M im et ic aff in ity is the pr im it ive form of sy m pa th y an d

com pass ion , w h ich p lay a l a rge ro le in Ado rno ' s ' e th ic s ' . A nd as an ac t o f

com pass ion i s ne i the r r an do m ly con t ing en t no r un iver sa l ly l eg i s la ted , bu t

ra the r the p rec i s e undo ing o f the dua l i ty p resumed by those a l t e rna t ives ,

so mimet ic ac t iv i ty i s moda l ly anomalous . Mimes i s i s appropr ia t ion w i th

ou t subsu m pt io n ; in it the app rop r ia t in g sub jec t l ikens he r se l f to the

ob jec t , r ever s ing concep tua l appropr ia t ion ; i t i s a r e la t ion o f pa r t i cu la r to

par t i cu la r . I n a r t th i s am ou n t s to a non con cep tua l a ff in ity be tw een a su b

jec t ive c rea t ion and i t s unpos i t ed o the r . (What th i s amoun ts to fo r Van

Gogh 's shoes we shal l see below.) This af f in i ty is what g ives mimes is t i t le

to be r ecogn ized as a fo rm o f cogn i t ion . As cogn i t ion , mimes i s acknowl

edges the s ensuous pa r t i cu la r i ty o f the o the r w i thou t dom ina t ing i t. 'W ha t

mimet ic behav iour r esponds to , ' Adorno s ta tes , ' i s the telos of cogn i t ion ,

which i t s imul taneous ly h inder s th rough i t s ca tegor ies ' (AT, 80 ) .

O f c o u r s e , m i m e t i c b e h a v i o u r p r e s u p p o s e s c o n c e p t u a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n ,

the capac i ty to d i s t ingu ish the charac te r iz ing f ea tu res o f the o the r . Bu t

A d o r n o n e v e r m e a n t t o d e n y m e d i a t i o n o r c o n c e p t u a l i t y . I n t h i n k i n g t h e

in tu i t ive m om en t in t e rm s o f a m im et ic po ten t ia l he i s, r a the r , ca l l ing in to

ques t ion the neces s i ty o f cons t ru ing the appropr ia t ion o f pa r t i cu la r s a s




s u b s u m p t i o n a n d d o m i n a t i o n . M i m e s i s is n e v e r p u r e , n e v e r a n i m m e d i a t e

re la t ion of par t icular to par t icular . Mimet ic act iv i ty is a lways shaped by

spir i t .

Sp i r i t , too , i s a s t r ange ca tegory in Adorno , e labora t ing e lemen ts f rom

ideal is t aes thet ics . As mimes is re inscr ibes in tu i t ion , so sp ir i t re inscr ibes

concept . I f we cons ider conceptual ar t icula t ion as that in v i r tue of whichwha t i s no t mean ing fu l i s r end ered s igni f ican t , then A dor no ' s open ing

specif ica t ion of sp ir i t should not surpr ise us : 'The spir i t of works of ar t i s

thei r p lu s or surp lus — the fact tha t in the pro cess of app ear in g they

bec om e m or e than they a r e ' (A T , 128 ; S A T , 134 ; ' p l us ' and ' su rp lus ' a r e

the t r ans la to r ' s e labora t ion ) . In exp l ica t ing th i s p lus o r su rp lus , tha t

th r ou gh w hich a th in g t r anscend s i ts s ensu ous mate r ia l i ty and hence

s ign if ie s , A do rno a t t em pts to con nec t two apparen t ly d i s connec ted

tho ug h ts . O n the one ha nd , sp i r i t i s no t a s eparab le i t em over and ab ove

mater ia l i ty and sensual i ty , but ra ther thei r conf igurat ion , thei r form of

toge thernes s , the i r syn thes i s ; ' i t t r ans fo rms them in to a handwr i t ing ' (AT,

129). An d th i s con nec t s w i th a s t ru c tu re tha t Ad orn o dep loys f rom

H e g e l ' s Logic, namely , tha t o f appearance and es sence . Works o f a r t

appear , they a re phenomena l be ings ; bu t wha t appear s i s e s sence , no t a s

someth ing be low o r under appearances and s eparab le f rom them, bu t a s

their ' law of form' (AT, 138) .

I f Adorno s topped here h i s concep t ion o f sp i r i t wou ld be idea l i s t s ince

essence in ideal is t logic , as i t i s usual ly in terpreted , refers back to the synthe t ic ac t iv i t ies of th e subject ; th is wou ld m ake th e law of form gov ernin g

synthes is the work of the subject . But sp ir i t i s the law of form, not form

itself. I t i s form tha t is ' th e no n-r ep ress ive syn thes i s of d i ffuse pa r t icu lars '

(AT, 207) ; as such, form ' i s the cons is tency of ar tefacts that d is t inguishes

t h e m qua ar t f rom mere ex i s ten t s , no mat te r how an tagon is t i c and d i s

jo in ted tha t cons i s tency may be ' (AT, 205) . Whi le fo rm, thus conce ived ,

' i s a repos i tory for a l l quas i - l inguis t ic (Sprachahnliche) quali t ies of ar t

works ' , i t shou ld no t the re fo re be cons t rued as oppos ing con ten t , a s in

impos i t ional theor ies of conceptual and categor ia l ar t icula t ion; form isi t s e l f ' a s ed imen ta t ion o f con ten t ' (AT, 208 , 209 ; SAT, 217) . To c la im

tha t a r t is a s ed ime n ta t io n o f con ten t , a bec om ing fo rm o f e lemen ts tha t

were content , i s to c la im that in ar t the logical i ty , the k ind of conceptual

cons is tency exempli f ied in works , i s not a t rue logical i ty ; ar t ' s logic s t i l l

ha rb ou rs ' an arch aic uni ty of logic an d caus al i ty ' (A T , 199) ; which is to

say , that in ar t the d i f ference between purely logical or conceptual forms

and empi r ica l con ten t s f a i l s to ho ld . For unprob lemat ic examples o f th i s

cons ide r the t empora l i ty , the s t ruc tu res and modes o f t empora l i za t ion , in

modern i s t nove l s o r mus ic ; o r the connec t ing o f sound and s ense , o r s ense

and spac ing , in modern poe t ry ; o r , more d i r ec t ly s t i l l , the spa t i a l i z ing ,

space -ma k ing , f ea tu res in the work o f a s cu lp to r such as An thon y C aro .

Ar t ' s re jec t ion o f abs t r a c t conc ep tua l i ty , a r t ' s be ing aband oned to

aconcep tua l i ty , i s wha t engender s a r t ' s concern fo r v i sua l i ty , i t s concern




r e leased is a m im et ic po ten t ia l , tha t the con cep t o f a m im et ic po ten t ia l

adeq ua te ly t r ans c r ibes the a r ti s t ic t r ans fo rm at ion o f in tu i t ion . Th e r eason

fo r th i s hes i t ancy i s tha t the re i s an appa ren t t en den t iou s l ine of a rgu m ent

r u n n i n g t h r o u g h A d o r n o t h a t s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e m i m e t i c r e l a t i o n , w h o s e

dem ise is the d i rect object of enl ight ene d ra t ion al izat io n , should be

rever sed . I t i s he re as sumed tha t mimes i s r ep resen t s an independen t ,archaic form of cogni t ion that survives only in ar t . Where th is thes is goes

wr ong is in g iv ing to mim es i s a subs tan t ia l i ty a nd ind epe nde nce i t does

no t pos ses s . Aga in , the ques t ion addres sed by the concep t o f mimes i s i s

that of the ro le of the par t icular in cogni t ion; and one of the mis takes

A d o r n o i s a t t e m p t i n g t o d e n o t e t h r o u g h t h e e m p l o y m e n t o f t h e i d e a o f

mim es i s i s tha t cogn i t ion , conce ived o f a s sub sum pt io n , i s innoc en t . H o w

ever , the re i s no d i r ec t way in wh ich we can s imply s ee tha t subsumpt ion

i s domina t ion (o the r than th rough t r ack ing down the nega t ive e f f ec t s o f

the opera t ion o f a p resumpt ive ly neu t ra l cogn i t ion , wh ich wou ld s t i l l l eaveunanswered the ques t ion why those e f f ec t s shou ld be the consequence

of cog ni t ion i tse l f and no t , say , a cer ta in app l icat i on o f wh at has been

at ta in ed in i t ) . Fo r Ad or no , the ar t is t ic mo dif icat ion of con cep t and

intu i t ion , when i t succeeds in par t icular works of ar t and is cr i t ica l ly

comprehended , i s the es tab l i shmen t o f the thes i s tha t theore t i ca l and p rac

t i c a l s u b s u m p t i o n i s d o m i n a t i o n .

In o rder , then , to fu r the r r ami fy the meta -c r i t i ca l t r ans fo rmat ion o f

in tu i t ion in a r t , Adorno goes on to pa r t i a l ly iden t i fy the mimet ic moment

with express ion . Express ion , for Adorno, i s not of e i ther ar t is t or object ;

on the co ntra ry , expre ss ion is the 'gaz e ' of the ar t work , an 'object if ica t ion

of the non-o b jec t ive , ( A T , 163) , and o f the ' non - sub jec t ive in the sub jec t '

(A T , 165). T h e con jun c t ion o f these two , the non-ob jec t ive and no n-

subje ct ive , leaves only wha t has be en left out of th e process of the m utu al

form at ion of subject and object , what ra t ion al izat io n has ra t ional ized ou t

of subject and object . The in i t ia l implaus ib i l i ty of th is thes is receives cor

rect ion when i t i s noted that Adorno t ies the not ion of express ion , or bet

ter , focuses i t , no t on the obvio us rep rese nta t ion al features of wo rks , bu tra the r on the fo rmal charac te r i s t ic s o f ha rm on y and d i s sonan ce .

H ar m on y , un i ty , wo u ld be the t r i um ph o f sp i r i tua l i za t ion , the rea l i za

t ion of the dr ive for no n-v io le nt syn the s is . B ut w ha t is bein g conceived of

wh en th is c lass ical mo de l of a real ized w ork is proffered? W ha t is the idea

of success presupposed by th is ideal of complete in tegrat ion? And i f th is

real ly is an ideal , how are we to make sense of i t s modernis t re ject ion

(without fa l l ing in to naive romant ic ism)? I t i s a t th is juncture that the

problem of i l lus ion , for the sake of which we began th is t ra in of analys is ,

r e - e n t e r s .

Works of ar t are i l lusory because they g ive a k ind of second-order ,

mod i f ied ex i s tence to someth ing which they themse lves canno t be .




They a re appearance , because a t the end o f a c rea t ive p roces s the

non-exis tent for the sake of which they exis t i s imbued with a t leas t

a d i s con t inuous , in te rmi t t en t k ind o f l i f e . Ar t , however , can no more

ach ieve the iden t i ty o f e s sence and appe arance than can our k no wl

edge o f r ea l i ty . The es sence tha t pas ses in to appearance bo th shapes

and exp lodes the l a t te r . (AT , 160 ; S A T , 167)

T h e es sence tha t shou ld app ear i s the inv io lab le m ean ing o f a s ensuo us

par t i cu la r : a th ing ' s be ing and be ing - thu s . Bu t if e s sence d id appe ar , i f the

gap s epara t ing es sence and appearance were to c lose , then a r t works wou ld

not be i l lusory a t a l l , but real th ings . I f thei r syntheses were cogni t ive ,

the n they wou ld not be wo rks but s ta te m en ts . I f works of ar t were real

uni t ies thei r syntheses would be ( real ) theoret ica l or pract ica l products .

Bu t th roughou t we have s een tha t we can on ly conce ive o f works on the

bas is of a logic of approximat ion and d is tance; thei r synthet ic ac t iv i ty

must be l ikened to theoret ica l and pract ica l synthes is wi thout being i t .

E x p l o d i n g a p p e a r a n c e u n d e r w r i t e s w o r k s ' a n t i n o m i c s t a t u s .

However e l s e a r t i s t i c i l lu s ion may have been though t , o r indeed

have been , p r io r to a r t ' s becoming au tonomous , i l lu s ion now re fe r s to

the d i s tance be tween a r t and empi r ica l r ea l i ty , where empi r ica l r ea l i ty

is def ined in terms of the k ind of ac t iv i t ies producing i t and the forms of

ou r kno wle dge of i t. T o em plo y a wi ld ly over-s impl i f ied form ulat io n , th is

en ta i l s tha t the syn the t i c ach ievements o f modern i s t works o f a r t a re o f

wha t canno t be ach ieved in empi r ica l r ea l i ty . Bu t th i s en ta i l s tha t works o f

ar t are not ' in ' emp ir ical rea l i ty - they s ta nd a t a d is tan ce f rom i t ; bu t i f

not in empir ical rea l i ty , then , in a sense , not ' rea l ' th ings a t a l l . ' I l lus ion

is not a formal but a subs tant ive character is t ic of works of ar t . I t i s the

ves t ige of an in jury that ar t seeks to undo (revozierenY ( A T , 1 5 7 ; S A T ,

164).

H ar m on y , the n , a s an image o f r eso lu t ion and com ple t io n , o f a d i s so l

u t io n of a ll tha t i s he tero ge ne ou s to ar t is t ic form, b eco m es th e mar k o f

i l lus ion , of the pre tense of works being what they are not - rea l th ings .'H ar m on y p res en t s som eth ing as ac tua l ly r econc i led [ i .e . the un i ty o f

ra t ional form an d sens uo us par t ic ula r i ty] whic h is no t . In so do ing i t

v io la tes the pos tu la te o f appear ing es sence which the idea l o f ha rmony

aims a t ' (AT, 161) . I l lus ion is in jury because i t regis ters the d is tance

be tween a r t and empi r ica l r ea l i ty , and hence the cons ignment o f non

v io len t syn thes i s to a dom ain in de pe nd en t o f and ma rg ina l to the cen t ra l

domains o f soc ie ta l r ep roduc t ion , tha t i s , to the domains where r ea l syn

the t i c ac t iv i t i e s t ake p lace . Th is , and th i s a lone , exp l ica tes the an t inomy o f

au t on om y, nam ely , tha t i f a r t l et s go o f i ts au t ono m y i t beco me s im m erse d

in and dominated by the forms of synthet ic ac t iv i ty agains t which i t i s

p ro tes t ing ; wh i le i f i t r emains w i th in i t s au tonomous r ea lm i t s t ays ha rm

less ly independent , and hence socia l ly id le (AT, 337) .



2 0 6 C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T AND I N T U I T I O N

W i t h i n art the sign of t h i s a n t i n o m y , the m a r k e r for the fact that

i l lusion is s u b s t a n t i a l and an in ju ry , is p r e s e n t in the refusal of achieved

h a r m o n y , t h a t is, in d i s s o n a n c e . ' D i s s o n a n c e is the t r u t h a b o u t h a r m o n y .

H a r m o n y is una t ta inab le , g iven the s t r ic t cr i ter ia of w h a t h a r m o n y is s u p

p o s e d to be' (AT, 1 6 1 ) . D i s s o n a n c e , f r a g m e n t a t i o n , and the like spell out

ar t ' s se l f -consciousness of its i l lu so ry charac te r , of w h a t h a r m o n y a i m sat and neces sa r i ly canno t ach ieve . Hence the des i r e for d is sonance is a

c o m p o n e n t of the revol t agains t i l lus ion ref lect ing ar t ' s d iscontent wi th

itself. D i s s o n a n c e , h o w e v e r , is the s a m e as expres s ion , a r t ' s b reak ing

t h r o u g h and a c k n o w l e d g i n g its i l lusory character , however i l lusory that

b r e a k i n g t h r o u g h is. If ar t i s t i c syn thes i s , desp i te itself, is a c o u n t e r -

m o v e m e n t to the progres s of r a t iona l syn thes i s ; if art w o r k s aim to

a c k n o w l e d g e w h a t has been lef t behind in the p r o g r e s s of ra t ional i ty , then

ar t ' s in jury is d o u b l e : it is the in jury of i l lus ion , and the injury of w h a t

that i l lus ion is for. What tha t i l lu s ion is for is at issue in the

t r ans fo rmat ions tha t c r i t i ca l theory works on the t e r m s c o n s t i t u t i n g the

a c h i e v e m e n t of r eason ' s p rogres s : concep t and in tu i t ion . Expres s ion , as

the equ iva len t of d i s s o n a n c e , is a n o t h e r n a m e for i n t u i t i o n . ' E x p r e s s i o n , '

A d o r n o s t a t e s , ' c a n n o t be conce ived excep t as e x p r e s s i o n of suffer ing '

( A T , 1 6 1 ; see also AT, 2 1 ) . Suffer ing is the t r u t h of in tu i t ion as the

u n s u b s u m a b l e o t h e r of the c o n c e p t .

iii W i thou t Purp ose

F o r m and con ten t , sp i r i t and mimes i s , fo rm and expres s ion toge ther con

s t i tu te a ' cons te l l a t ion ' a round concep t and i n t u i t i o n . T h i s c o n s t e l l a

t ion of concep ts does not a t t empt theore t i ca l ly to r ep lace wha t is or ig inal ly

t h o u g h t t h r o u g h c o n c e p t and in tu i t ion ; r a the r , the cons te l la t ion reveals

the field of his tor ical and soc ia l de te rmina t ions tha t have been exc i s ed

from the or ig ina l t e rms of the ana lys i s . Cons te l l a t ions are n o n - s u b s u m p -

t ive reorganizat ions of a conceptual f ie ld ; they unlock and ' d e c i p h e r ' the

' s e d i m e n t e d h i s t o r y ' of an object that has b e e n l o st t h r o u g h s u b s u m p t i v e

t h i n k i n g (ND, 164—5) . Cons te l l a t ions t ake the p lace of sys temat ics .

Cons te l l a t ions are p h i l o s o p h i c a l ' c o m p o s i t i o n s ' ; as such they are the

ph i losoph ica l equ iva len t s of m o d e r n i s t w o r k s of ar t . We shal l r e tu r n in the

nex t chap te r to th i s l ikenes s be tween ph i losophy and art, which s t rong ly

echoes the analogous l ikeness we have a l ready seen at work in D e r r i d a .

T h u s far we h a v e c o n c e n t r a t e d our analys is on the p r o b l e m of s y n

thes is , on Adorno ' s cons te l l a t ive r e insc r ip t ion of syn thes i s and in tu i t ion ,

o n the ques t ion of theore t i ca l syn thes i s . Ano ther , more d i r ec t , ve r s ion of

Adorno ' s in te r roga t ion of the subs tan t ia l i ty of i l lusion and its c o n n e c t i o n

wi th the inscrutabi l i ty of art w o r k s is to be found in his ref lect ions on the

t r ans fo rmat ion of prac t i ca l syn thes i s in art. H e r e , too, A d o r n o w a n t s to



C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T AND I N T U I T I O N 207

p o i n t to the under ly ing soc ia l t ru th of Kant ' s hypos ta t i zed theore t i ca l

f o r m u l a t i o n s .

In d i s cus s ing Ka n t ' s fo rmula tha t aes the t i c r e fl ect ion r ega rds ob jec t s

as in te rna l ly pu rposefu l w i t hou t an ex te rna l end over and above the i r

in te rna l o rder ing , it was n o t e d how the n o n - s u b s u m p t i o n of w o r k s to

ex te rna l ends had the c o n s e q u e n c e of making works ana logues of e n d s in

t h e m s e l v e s . And it was in v i r t u e of th i s ana logue s ta tus tha t aes the t i c

re f lec t ive judgements cou ld at leas t begin to cla im universal i ty for t h e m

selves ; the very r egard of an aes the t i c ob jec t as not for any end or p u r p o s e

e x t e r n a l to itself, the d is in te res ted gaze of the aes the t i c a t t i tud e , o f fe red to

tha t r egard a g r o u n d for c la iming ob jec t iv i ty for itself. T h i s c o n n e c t i o n

b e t w e e n the lack of an e x t e r n a l p u r p o s e and object iv i ty is in K a n t ' s t h e o r y

paras i t i c on the d is t inc t ion he draws be tween re la t ive ends , tha t are p a r

t i cu la r , and e n d s in t h e m s e l v e s , K a n t ' s v e r s i o n of u l t i m a t e e n d s , w h i c hg r o u n d c l a i m s to un iver sa l i ty . Kan t uses the fo rmula ' pu rposefu l but

w i t h o u t a p u r p o s e ' as a way of es tab l i sh ing his vers ion of n o r m a t i v e o b j e c

t iv i ty , namely , the l ink be tween ends in t h e m s e l v e s and u n i v e r s a l i t y . T h i s

l inkage, s ince it bespeaks jus t the so r t of s u b s u m p t i v e t h i n k i n g he is

wri t ing aga ins t , is of no in te res t to A d o r n o (but see AT, 18).

W h a t d o e s s t r i k e A d o r n o a b o u t K a n t ' s f o r m u l a is how it c a p t u r e s the

b e c o m i n g a u t o n o m o u s of art, t h a t is, the v e r y m o v e m e n t t h a t led K a n t to

a t t e m p t to es tabl ish a new ph i losoph ica l sub jec t mat te r , namely , aes the t i c s

( i ts novel ty an a d u m b r a t i o n of the f igure of nove l ty it wil l genera te ) . If, in

the f i r s t ins tance, aes thet ics ref lects the d isa r t i cu la t ion of beau ty f rom

t r u t h and g o o d n e s s as ca tegor ia l sys tems , where the r ise of m o d e r n s c i e n c e

had a l r eady d i s a r t i cu la ted t ru th and goodnes s ( r igh tnes s ) , the c o n s e q u e n c e

of that d isar t icula t ion was the a u t o n o m i z a t i o n of art itself. H e n c e w h a t

was p layed out in K a n t ' s s y s t e m in ca tegor ia l t e rms and facul ty psy

cho logy is worked out by A d o r n o in the m o r e e m p h a t i c t e r m s d e m a n d e d

b y s u b s e q u e n t h i s t o r y , n a m e l y , a r t ' s a u t o n o m y . T h i s is an i m p o r t a n t m a t

te r to w h i c h we shall have to r e t u r n . N o n e t h e l e s s , it exp la ins the of t -no ted

h o m o l o g y b e t w e e n K a n t i a n a e s t h e t i c s and m o d e r n i s t art.

W h a t r e q u i r e s e l a b o r a t i o n in the K a n t i a n ' p u r p o s i v e but w i t h o u t p u r

p o s e ' thes is is why b e i n g w i t h o u t p u r p o s e s h o u l d a p p r o x i m a t e the n o r m of

end- in- i tse l f ; and why tha t s t a tus shou ld be a c c o r d e d to art, to things t h a t

a re works . Accord ing to A d o r n o , art used to be p a r t of a prax i s tha t sough t

to af fect rea l i ty ; subsequent ly , when ra t ional i ty came to the fore , art had to

g o its own way, a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h a t its p r e s u m p t i v e p r a x i s was an exerc i s e

in se l f -decept ion (AT, 202). Rat iona l iza t ion and d i s e n c h a n t m e n t d e p r i v e d

a r t of its p u r p o s e f u l n e s s ; a e s t h e t i c j u d g e m e n t is a blurred ref lect ion of th ish is tor ical event . The asc r ip t ion to w o r k s of art of a p u r p o s e h e n c e c a m e to

signify the f ac t tha t they were dynamic to ta l i t i e s whose moments ex i s ted

fo r the sake of the whole , wh i le the whole had the p u r p o s e 'of fulfilling

t h e m o m e n t s or r edeeming them nega t ive ly ' Conver se ly , works were




purpose les s because they f e l l ou t s ide the means -end re la t ions and

s t ruc tu res cons t i tu t in g the em pi r ica l wor ld . T he se cha rac te r iza t ions

acknowledge tha t ' t he r e la t ion be tween aes the t i c and r ea l pu rpos ivenes s

(Zweckmassigkeit) i s a h is tor ical one: the immanent funct ional i ty of ar t

w o r k s w a s d e t e r m i n e d b y ex t e r n a l c o n d i t i o n s ' ( A T , 2 0 2 ; S A T , 2 1 0) .

W ha t r ema ins unsa id in th i s accou n t is wh y tha t appa ren t ly neu t ra la r t i cu la t ion o f a r t ' s pu rpos ivenes s shou ld so r es i l i en t ly , and en igmat ica l ly ,

cal l a t tent ion to itself. To spec i fy wha t r emains unsa id he re , r e fe rence

aga in mus t be made to cond i t ions ex te rna l to a r t , namely , to wha t has

beco m e of p rac t i ce ou t s ide a r t . Au ton om y i s bu t ano the r t e rm fo r a r t ' s

pu rpose les snes s . Adorno reads au tonomy as doub le : bo th as a r t ' s lo s s o f a

(d irect ) socia l purpose , and as ar t ' s refusal of the k ind of purpos iveness

tha t has come to domina te soc ie ty . Rough ly , in a manner I sha l l r e tu rn to

shor t ly , Adorno ' s concep t ion o f modern soc ie t i e s i s an amalgam of the

M arx ian and W eb er ia n ana lyses , tha t i s, Ad orn o reads the un iver sa l do m i

nat ion of use-value by exchange value as socie ta l ra t ional izat ion , and

soc ie ta l r a t iona l iza t ion as a neces sa ry cond i t ion for the dom ina t ion o f us e -

va lue by exchange va lue . Cap i ta l exchange r e la t ions jus t a re the r a t ion

a l i za tion o f econ om ic li fe , the r edu c t ion o f eco nom ic ac tiv i ty to m e a n s -

ends r a t iona l i ty f r eed f rom ex t ra -economic and ex t ra -means -ends r a t iona l

cons ide ra t ions . The un iver sa l i za t ion o f exchange r e la t ions en ta i l s , a s

mat ter of socia l fac t , the fungibi l i ty of a l l par t iculars , the pr incip le that

a l l th ings can be exchanged fo r o the r th ings . No th ing i s i r r ep laceab le ,

no th in g an end- in - i ts e l f . He nce soc ie ta l pu rpo sefu lnes s com es to m ean

e x c h a n g e a b l e , having a price. Which , o f cour se , i s p rec i s e ly how Kan t

inaugural ly specif ies the d is t inct ion between re la t ive and absolute value ,

a u t o n o m y a n d h e t e r o n o m y , m e a n s a n d e n d s , i n h i s ' m o d e r n ' r e f o r m u

la t ion of the d is t inct ion between praxis and poies is :

In the k ingdom of ends every th ing has e i the r a price or a dignity. I f

i t has a pr ice , something e lse can be put in i t s p lace as an equivalent;

i f i t i s exal ted above a l l pr ice and so admits of no equivalent , then i t

has a d ign i ty .

W ha t i s r e la t ive to un iver sa l hu m an inc l ina t ions and needs has a

market price; what , even w i thou t p resuppos ing a need , accords w i th

a cer ta in tas te - th at i s , w i th sa t isfact ion in th e m er e purp oseles s

play of our mental powers - has a fancy price (Affektionspreis); b u t

tha t wh ich cons t i tu tes the so le cond i t ion under wh ich any th ing can

be an end in i tself ha s no t mer ely a relativ e val ue - th at is , a pric e -

but has an in t r ins ic value - that i s , dignity}

The ' fancy pr ice ' of tas te refers to the fact that having tas te a lone, how

ever valuable , does not enta i l that i t s possessor has d igni ty . In that sense ,

the possess ion of tas te is of re la t ive and not absolu te wor th .




N

O u r in te res t , howeve r , was no t in the purpo se les s p lay o f the im ag i n

a t ion , bu t in the purpose les snes s o f works . Adorno d i r ec t ly connec t s a r t ' s

pu rpose les snes s w i th , on the one hand , works be ing i l lu s ions ( appar i t ions ,

non-ex i s ten t s ) , and , on the o the r hand , w i th tha t f ea tu re o f works g round

ing their res is tence to exchangeabi l i ty :

Non-ex i s ten t appar i t ion a t t aches to ind iv idua l be ing ; i t r ep resen t s ,

i . e . s t ands fo r , the unsubsumable . Thus , appar i t ion de f ies the ru l ing

pr incip le of real i ty , which is the pr incip le that a l l th ings can be

exchang ed for o the r th ings . By con t ras t , the app ear in g o r ap par i t ion

i s no t exchan geab le b ecau se it is ne i the r a to rp id pa r t i cu la r be in g ,

r ep laceab le by o the r pa r t i cu la r be ings , no r an empty un iver sa l ,

subsuming and leve l l ing spec i f i c be ings in t e rms o f some common

character is t ic . Whereas in the real wor ld a l l par t iculars are fungible ,

so the p ic tures of ar t s t re tch out to everyth ing for an o ther , which i t

wou ld be , em anc ipa te d f rom the s chemata o f imp osed iden t if i ca

t i o n s . By the same token, ar t - the imago o f t h e u n e x c h a n g e a b l e -

verges on ideology because i t makes us bel ieve there are th ings in the

wor ld tha t a re no t for exch ange . Ar t mu s t , th rou gh i t s fo rm, on

beha l f o f the unexchangeab le , conduc t the exchangeab le to a c r i t i ca l

s e l f - consc iousnes s . (AT, 1 2 2 - 3 ; S A T , 1 2 8 )

Purp oselessness can insinuate the idea of an end-in-itself only against thebackground of exchangeability. However , tha t pu rpose les snes s wou ld l ack

subs tance i f a r t works were no t ( apparen t ly ) syn the t i c who les , p roduc t s o f

a p rax i s tha t was ak in to the t r ans fo rmat ive , p roduc t ive p rac t i ces ou t s ide

ar t but for the fact that no ' rea l ly ' usable th ing is produced. Ar t works are

exchan geab le , pu re ly so ; bu t the i r fo rm ' con du c t s ' consc iou snes s to an

awarenes s o f wha t l i e s beyond exchange .

Ar t works a re pa r t i cu la r s c la iming us beyond our ab i l i ty d i s cu r s ive ly to

place the m ; they are , or m ore prec ise ly ap pe ar , as excess ive wi th res pec t to

the r eg imes o f empi r ica l p rac t i ce in v i r tue o f wh ich exchangeab i l i ty r e igns .

Th is i s wha t Adorno means when he c la ims tha t wha t i s soc ia l abou t a r t

is not i t s over t pol i t ica l or ideological s tance with respect to real i ty , but

i t s inner dynamic tha t pu t s i t in oppos i t ion to soc ie ty : 'Works o f a r t a re

p len ipo ten t ia r i e s (Statthalter: envo ies ) o f th ings beyond the mut i l a t ing

sway o f exchan ge , p ro fi t and f al se hu m an nee ds ' (A T , 323 ; S A T , 337) . Ar t

works r e fe r us to use va lues , o r to wha t use va lues migh t become, in oppo

s i t ion to exchange-va lue , th rough the i r empi r ica l u se les snes s . Of cour se , a s

we shal l see la ter , uselessness can regis ter aes thet ica l ly only to the degree

to which works ' be ing w i thou t pu rpose approx imates to a s t a te o f self-

d e t e r m i n a t i o n .

T h re e c lar i f ica t ions are nece ssary before we can pro cee d. F irs t , in

speak ing o f i l lu s ion , app ar i t ion , non-ex i s tence , Ador no i s no t engaged in




an ontological analys is of wo rks ; on the co ntr ary , A do rn o is refus ing th e

ontological problemat ic of appearance, rea l i ty and i l lus ion and offer ing in

i ts s tead a h is tor ical analys is . B ut th i s d isp lace m en t is not a red uc t ion of

one fo rm o f que s t ion in g to ano ther ; r a th e r i t a t t em pts to r evea l how th e

or ig inal ques t ion can asser t itself. H e n c e A d o r n o c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e q u e s

t ion whe ther the non-ex i s ten t appar i t ion qua appear ing ent i ty exis ts or i sjus t an i l lus ion prompts phi losophical ref lect ion , and that prompting is the

authority of works (A T , 123). Ph i lo soph y , we m igh t s ay , i s now dep en den t

upon the 'moment ' of ar t for ca l l ing for th the sor t of ref lect ion that was

o n c e , p r e s u m p t i v e l y , p h i l o s o p h y ' s .

Adorno d i r ec t ly connec t s a r t ' s cogn i t ive au thor i ty w i th i t s pu rpose-

lessness . T h e pu rpo se of ar t is re ta i ned as an ' in- i ts e l f fea ture of ar t wo rks

once the i r ex te rna l pu rpos ivenes s has evapora ted . I t i s ju s t th i s tha t makes

ar t works en igmat ic , tha t they a t t a in to pu rposefu lnes s , to mean ing ,

desp i te ( and because o f ) the i r ev iden t l ack o f mean ing . What becomes o fa r t once i ts ex te rna l pu rpo se is gone? 'T h e en igm at ic qua l i ty p r om pts a r t

to a r t i cu la te i t s e l f immanen t ly , acqu i r ing mean ing by g iv ing expres s ion to

i t s g la r ing l ack o f mean ing [o r : a t t a ins empha t ica l ly a mean ing les s mean

i ng ] . If this is so, the enigmatic quali ty is not f inal (Letztes); r a the r , every

au then t ic work a l so sugges t s a so lu t ion fo r i t s in so lub le r idd le ' (AT, 185 ;

S A T , 192) . T h a t a r t deve lops the capac i ty , fo r how ever long , to in s inua te

the idea o f non- iden t i ty occur s th rough the charac te r i s t i c f ea tu res o f a r t i s

t i c p ro du c t io n u nd er cond i t ions whe re a r t i s depr iv ed o f soc ia l m ean ing .

T h a t d e p r i v a t i o n w e d e s i g n a t e i n a r t ' s b e c o m i n g a u t o n o m o u s . A r t w o u l d

no t be en igmat ic i f th ings were o the rwise ou t s ide a r t . Ar t ' s pu rpos ivenes s

w i t h o u t p u r p o s e i s e n i g m a t i c b e c a u s e p u r p o s e h a s i ts e lf b e c o m e p u r p o s e

less , product ion for exchange without end, whi le ar t is t ic pract ice i t se l f s t i l l

has the idea of th e 'wo rk ' , a praxia l pr od uc t io n , before i t . A r t ' s en igm at ic

qua l i ty i s the m od er n equ iva len t o f wo nde r ' in the p resence o f the o the r '

(A T , 184), the c la im o f the o the r (beyo nd exchan ge and sub sum pt ion )

which i t was ph i losophy ' s to in s t i l . How Adorno works th rough th i s

dependence o f ph i losophy on a r t we sha l l examine in more de ta i l in chapter 5.

Second ly , because Adorno regards the ques t ion o f i l lu s ion and purpose-

lessness as h is tor ical and socia l he can provide them with a se t of socia l

r esonances tha t wou ld be ba r red f rom an on to log ica l ana lys i s . In pa r t i cu

lar he conn ects ar t ' s afunct iona l i ty w i th a wh ole range of pre -ar t is t ic

ph en om en a - f ireworks , c i rcus es , m agic , fes t ivals , e tc . - t ha t were th e m

se lves p romises o f happ ines s , r eminder s o f wha t sp i r i tua l i za t ion was fo r

bu t fo rgo t . Fo r exam ple : 'T h e a func t iona l ity o f work s o f a r t has som eth ing

in co m m on with th e superf luou s t ra m ps of a ll ages , averse as they are

to unm ova b le p ro per ty and s eden ta ry c iv i l i za t ion ' (A T , 121) . Fo r Ad orn o

th i s p re -a r t i s t i c moment c l ings to a r t , hence exp l ica t ing bo th the ch i ld i sh

expec ta t ion tha t a t t aches to ou r an t i c ipa t ion o f engag ing w i th a r t works ,

and a r t ' s exposure to the moment o f s i l l ines s , f a tu i ty , k i t s ch (AT, 174-5 ) .




F ina l ly , and mos t impor tan t ly he re , Adorno does no t r egard a r t ' s

oppos i t ion to empir ical rea l i ty - the oppos i t ion that i t possesses as a conse

quence of i t s afunct ional i ty - as enta i l ing that ar t i s not col lus ive wi th

what i t c r i t ic izes . Adorno regis ters th is col lus ion and culpabi l i ty in

a var ie ty of regis ters . M os t s ignif icant amo ngs t these is h is co nte nt io n

that ar t ' s appearance of being in- i tse l f purposeful i s a fetish d i rec t ly cond i t ioned by the f e t i sh i sm o f commodi t i e s . More p rec i s e ly , Adorno con

ce ives o f a r t works as abso lu te commodi t i e s : ' [ au tonomous works ] a re

socia l products which have d iscarded the i l lus ion of being-for-socie ty ,

an i llu s ion t enac ious ly r e ta ined by a ll o the r co mm odi t i e s . An abso lu te

commodi ty r ids i t s e l f o f the ideo logy inheren t in the commodi ty fo rm.

T h e la t t e r p re ten ds i t i s be ing - fo r -o the r wherea s in t ru t h i t i s on ly fo r -

itself, i . e . for the ru l ing in teres ts of socie ty ' (AT, 336) . Ar t ' s being a com

modi ty is both a condi t ion for i t s aes thet ic subs tance, i t s capaci ty to be a

vehic le of cogni t ion , to be e laborated below, and the condi t ion for ar t ' sideological socia l s ta tus , i t s i l lusory appearance of being independent of

the cond i t ions o f mate r ia l p roduc t ion . Ar t works canno t he lp con t inu ing

the work o f r ep res s ive reason s ince they ' con ta in th e mo m en t o f syn thes i s

which he lps o rgan ize a to ta l i ty ' (A T , 423) ; and fu r the r , by p re te nd ing tha t

th i s i s no t so th rough the i r ex i s tence in a s epara te domain , wh ich they

mus t p rese rve fo r the s ake o f the i r c r i t i ca l moment , the i r ' p rac t i ca l impo

tence and compl ic i ty w i th the p r inc ip le o f unmi t iga ted d i s as te r ' (AT, 333)

becom es pa infu lly e v iden t .

Ar t works a re imp oss ib le ob jec t s : i f aes the t i c p rax i s were r ea lly t r a n

s fo rmat ive , then a r t works wou ld be (p rac t i ca l ly o r cogn i t ive ly ) ' t rue ' ,

tha t i s , a r t ob jec t s wou ld be wor ld ly ob jec t s , no t mean ing les s bu t mean

ingful , not purposeless but purposeful ; i f , on the o ther hand, they were

mere objects or ar tefacts , they would be e i ther jus t th ings or meaningless

bu t pu rposefu l . W ork s a re me an ingfu l , they enac t a syn thes i s , bu t no t d i s

cu r s ive ly t rue ; they a re pu rposefu l bu t w i th ou t a p rac t i ca l pu rpo se . T he i r

m ean ing is a s em blanc e o f t ru th w i thou t domin a t ion ; the i r pu rpose les s nes s

a n im a g e o f u s e - v a l u e t h a t c a n n o t b e e x c h a n g e d . T h e i r p u r p o s e l e s s n e s sis thei r form of res is ta nce to exc han ge - a form th at is harass ed an d s u b

ject to defeat . T h ei r non co nc ep tua l form is thei r form of res is tan ce to

iden t i ty th ink ing - a form th at i s hara ssed by the des i re for m ea nin g, for

exam ple in engaged o r com m it ted a r t , and by the w il l to in te rp re ta t io n .

The au tonomy o f a r t i s the p lus , the su rp lus , the exces s , the non- iden t ica l

which a l lows iden t i ty th ink ing to con t inue unharas sed . Ar t i s the r emain

der , the r esu l t o f the exc lus ions which a l lowed en l igh tened r a t iona l i ty and

a n a u t o n o m o u s e c o n o m y t o c e n t r e t h e m s e l v e s w i t h o u t t h e e n c u m b r a n c e s

of the c la ims o f s ensuousnes s o r t e leo logy ( the submers ion o f use -va lue

by exchange va lue ) . In th i s way the Kan t ian though t tha t aes the t i c aware

nes s m imic s the un i fy ing work o f conc ep tua l judg em ent w i th ou t ho wev er

ac tua l ly b r ing in g the a r t ob jec t un de r a concep t beco me s bo th a co nc ep

t ion of ar t is t ic pract ice , of how ar t is t ic form is to deal wi th i t s mater ia ls ,




and a s t a tem en t ab ou t the soc io -h i s to r ica l p re d ic am en t o f a r t r a the r than

an a pr ior i account of i t .

Three ques t ions a r i s e a t th i s junc tu re . F i r s t , how does a r t i s t i c p rac t i ce

re la te to p rac t i ce ou t s ide a r t? What connec t s and s epara tes a r t i s t i c and

empi r ica l p rac t i ce? Second ly , wha t l i censes Adorno in employ ing the

Kant ian analys is of ar t as a key for a socia l inscr ip t ion of ar t? And th i rd ly ,wha t a re the ph i losoph ica l r epercus s ions o f tha t r e insc r ip t ion? We sha l l

take up the f i r s t ques t ion d irect ly , saving our answer to the second and

third for chapter 5 .

i v Art , T ec hn o lo gy and Na ture

Ear l i e r we a rgued tha t H e ide gge r ' s way o f l ink ing a r t and t echno logy i s

inadequa te to the t a sk o f exp l ica t ing the i r un i ty and d i f f e rence in a manner

tha t w ou ld exp la in the pos s ib i l ity o f a r t be ing a cou n te r m ove m ent to

techno logy . Adorno cons i s ten t ly r egards the connec t ion be tween a r t and

techno logy as a d i r ec t one : au tonomous a r t , e spec ia l ly as r ea l i zed in mod

ernis t ar t , i s jus t ra t ional izat ion in ar t ; and the ra t ional izat ion of ar t i s jus t

the un leash ing o f aes the t i c fo rces o f p roduc t ion f rom soc ia l pu rposes

ex te rna l to a r t . Ar t i s t i c t echn ique hence becomes the r epos i to ry o f a r t i s t i c

purposefulness once socia l purposefulness has been ra t ional ized out of ar t

(A T , 308). A do rno ' s thou gh t he re is tha t aes the t i c r a t iona l iza t ion en ta il s

aes the t i c nomina l i sm: the r evoca t ion o f r eady-made p r inc ip les o f a r t i s t i c

p ro duc t ion . In the absen ce o f uneq u ivoc a l aes the t i c un iver sa l s t ech n iqu e

en te r s a s a d i r ec t de t e rm inan t o f a r t i s t i c p ro du c t io n , p rogres s and jud ge

men t : 'Techn ique a lone gu ides the r e f lec t ive pe r son in to the inner co re o f

a r t work s , p rov ided o f cou r se he al so speaks the i r l a ng ua ge . . . Te ch n i qu e is

th e def ineable f igure o f th e enig m a of wo rks of ar t . I t is ra t ional bu t n o n-

c o n c e p t u a l , p e r m i t t i n g j u d g m e n t i n t h e ar e a o f t h e n o n - j u d g m e n t a l ' ( A T ,

3 0 4 ) . Indeed , such i s the sway o f t echn ique in modern a r t tha t much o f

the d ia lec t ic o f pu rposefu lne s s and pu rpose le s snes s can be p layed o u tth r ou gh i t . As aes the t i c nom ina l i sm re leases t ec hn i qu e as a cen t ra l de t e r

m in an t of aes th et ic pract ice , the cr i tica l edg e of technical inno vat io n

beco me s e rode d . He nc e the purposefu lnes s o f t echn ica l innova t ion i t se l f

b e c o m e s p u r p o s e l e s s :

Ar t ' s ind i spensab le r a t iona l i ty , encapsu la ted in t echn ique , works

agains t ar t . I t i s no t that ra t io nal i ty ha s a de ad en ing ef fect on th e

non-consc ious , on the r ea l subs tance o f a r t o r wha tever (on the

con t ra ry : i t i s t echn ique tha t enab les a r t to appropr ia te the non-

consc ious ) ; bu t tha t a cons i s ten t ly r a t iona l and e labora ted work ,

because o f i t s abso lu te au tonomy, wou ld t end to l eve l the d i s t inc t ion

be tween a r t and empi r ica l be ing , a s s imi la t ing i t s e l f to commodi t i e s




wi th ou t d i r ec t ly imi ta t ing them . I t wou ld be ind i s t ingu ish ab le f rom

perfect ly funct ional creat ions except in one respect : i t would have no

purpose , and tha t wou ld speak aga ins t i t . (AT, 310)

Ad orn o sum m ar izes th i s po in t succ inc t ly : 'W hi le t echn i que i s the ep i tom e

(Inbegriff) of the l anguage o f a r t , i t a l so l iqu ida tes tha t l anguage ' (AT,310; S A T , 3 2 3 ) .

For Adorno ' a r t i s t i c fo rces o f p roduc t ion a re no t per se different from

socia l ones . The d if ference l ies in the cons t i tu t ive turn , by the former ,

away f rom rea l soc ie ty ' (AT, 335) . The tu rn away , the absen t ing itself,

f rom real socie ty , again , i s both d iscovered - the 'magical ' concept ion of

ar t as t rans form at ive p ract ic e is se l f -decep t ive - a nd dete rm ine d by the

col lapse of the socia l a pr ior is which sus ta ined ar t is t ic pract ices as

m om en ts o f a to ta l i z ing soc ia l p rax i s . T h e ' d i s en ch an tm en t ' o f a r t

( t enden t ia l ly ) depr ives i t o f g rounds and purposes ex te rna l to those imma

ne n t in i ts t echn ica l un fo ld ing . A r t i s t i c p rogres s i s no t r edu c ib le to t e ch n i

ca l p rogres s , any more than th i s i s the case ou t s ide a r t ; bu t in modern i ty

techn ica l p rogres s becomes a de te rminan t o f a r t i s t i c p rogres s as a who le .

And , fo r be t t e r o r worse , a r t i s t i c modern i sm has made p rogres s in a r t a

de t e rm inan t o f a r t h i s to ry . T h e t echn ica l m om en t , the un i ty and

dif ference of technology in ar t and socie ty , can bet ter be brought in to

focus i f we r e tu rn to a cons ide ra t ion o f the Van Gogh .

In an in te rp re ta t ion o f Van Gogh tha t depar t s marked ly f rom Hei deg ger ' s , F red r i c J am eso n c la ims tha t we ough t to r ecogn ize as the back

g round and raw mate r ia l o f Van Gogh ' s pa in t ing genera l ly ' the who le

object w or ld of agr icul tura l mise ry , of s tark rura l pov er ty ' w he re f rui t

t rees are ' ancient and exhaus ted s t icks coming out of poor so i l ' .6

Agains t

t h i s b a c k g r o u n d ,

the w i l l ed and v io len t t r ans fo rmat ion o f a d rab peasan t ob jec t wor ld

in to the mos t g lor ious mater ia l iza t ion of pure colour in o i l -pain t i s to

be s een as a U top ian ges tu re : a s an ac t o f compensa t ion which endsup p roduc ing a who le new Utop ian r ea lm o f the s enses , o r a t l eas t

of tha t sup rem e sense - s ight , the v isual , the eye - wh ich i t no w

recons t i tu tes fo r us as a s emi-au tonomous space in i t s own r igh t . . .

J am eso n goes on to p rese n t He id eg ger ' s in te rp re ta t ion o f th e peasan t

s h o e s , c la iming tha t i t needs to be comple ted

by ins is tence on the renewed mater ia l i ty of the work , on the

trans form at ion of one form of m ater ia l i ty - th e ear th i tse l f an d i ts

pa ths and phys ic al objects - in to the o the r ma ter ia l i ty of o il pain t

af fi rmed and fore gro un de d in i t s ow n r ight and for i t s ow n visual

p l e a s u r e s .




I t is n o t e w o r t h y t h a t , l ik e H e i d e g g e r , J a m e s o n a b s t r a c t s his a c c o u n t of

V a n G o g h f r o m the h is to ry of p a i n t i n g itself, and further fails to in teg ra te

fully his proper apprec ia t ion of Van G o g h ' s f o r e g r o u n d i n g of the act iv i ty

o f pa in t ing and the mater ia l i ty of pa in t in to e i the r his own or H e i d e g g e r ' s

a c c o u n t . As we saw ear l ier , centra l to p r o g r e s s in m o d e r n i s t art is its

n e g a t i o n of the t r ad i t ion in fo rming it. If we t ake these po in t s in to accoun t ,th ree conseque nces fol low .

F i r s t , Van G o g h ' s c o n c e r n for s o m e old s h o e s or a c h a i r was less a

wil led t r ans fo rmat ion of a peasan t ob jec t wor ld than a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the

proces s of q u e s t i o n i n g the r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n the ( technical) ac t iv i ty of

p a i n t i n g and its sub jec t mat te r . More p rec i s e ly , Van G o g h u n m a s k e d the

paras i t i c au thor i ty tha t pas t art had a t t e m p t e d to cla im for i t se l f through

i t s t r e a t m e n t of augus t even t s , pe r son , and the l ike (AT, 2 1 4 - 1 5 ) . S e c

ond ly , then , a r t ' s au thor i ty , its va lue , now has to be r ecogn ized as in tegral

to its prac t i ce , as a c o n s e q u e n c e of the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n s it has w r o u g h t

u p o n its sub jec t mat te r , no m a t t e r how ord inary . F ina l ly , however ,

because a r t ' s au thor i ty has b e c o m e f o r m a l , has b e c o m e a m a t t e r of its

f o r m s of work ing , then the f o r e g r o u n d i n g of itself, its cal l ing a t tent ion to

the mate r ia l i ty of the p a i n t and its a p p l i c a t i o n to the canvas , func t ions as a

r evoca t ion , a cancel l ing of the ( U t o p i a n ) t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , the bes towal of

au tonomous d ign i ty , wh ich tha t ve ry s ame pa in te r ly act has a c h i e v e d .

A r t ' s a u t o n o m o u s p o w e r to t r ans fo rm its now o r d i n a r y ( d e m o c r a t i z e d )

s u b j e c t m a t t e r , p e r h a p s to w r e s t it from the d o m i n a t i o n of c o m m o d i f i -

ca t ion and exchange equ iva lence , was real ized at the p r e c is e m o m e n t t h a t

i t came to r ecogn ize its r ea l power les snes s w i th r espec t to the object

w o r l d . Its t r ans fo rmat ions were hencefo r th to be c o n s i g n e d to an a u t o n

omous domain whose ve ry d i s tance f rom empi r ica l r ea l i ty , the world of

c o m m o d i t y p r o d u c t i o n , was the pr ice it was to pay for its a u t h o r i t y . W h a t

had been (marginal ly) asser ted and r e c o g n i z e d in prev ious pa in t ing was

now es tab l i shed in the p a i n t i n g s of Van G o g h in a way t h a t m a d e

regress ion d if f icul t . Thus the m o m e n t of Van Gogh para l l e l s the place of

F l a u b e r t in the his tory of the nove l , where s ecu la r na r ra t ive ' s p rev iouslack of r e l i ance on es tabl ished p lo ts , a pr ior i values , and given, ahis tor ical

f o r m s , c a m e to se l f - consc iousnes s th rough the f o r e g r o u n d i n g of the

t r ans fo rmat ive power of w r i t i n g itself.7

W i t h t h e s e t h o u g h t s in m i n d , it is now poss ib le to beg in to c o m p r e h e n d

t h e n a t u r e of the risk invo lved in Van G o g h ' s p a i n t i n g . At bo t tom, th i s

risk is his wil l ingness to let the a u t h o r i t y and cla im of his pa in t ing s tand

u p o n n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n his p e r f o r m a n c e , the act of p a i n t i n g itself. T h i s

r i sk , however , is qu i te d i ff e ren t from M an e t ' s , abo u t w ho m one m i g h t be

t e m p t e d to say s imilar th ings . In M a n e t e a c h b r u s h s t r o k e is empha t ica l ly

also a m o m e n t of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , so tha t pa in t ing and r ep resen ta t ion

a p p e a r as if magica l ly en twined : b rush s t rokes become f lowers . For M a n e t

t e c h n i q u e is sti l l magic and p o w e r : his p e r f o r m a n c e . If we ask how Van



C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T AND I N T U I T I O N 2 1 5

Gogh 's pain t ing offers back to ord inary th ings the i r d ign i ty , the i r non-

iden t i ty , then one m u s t p o i n t to the way in w h i c h , in r eac t ion to M a n e t

p e r h a p s , Van G o g h r e v o k e s the magica l a spec t of t e c h n i q u e by e m p h a t i

ca l ly under l in ing it. The p a i n t and the s t rokes come to have an a l m o s t

a u t o n o m o u s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l f u n c t i o n . It seems a lmos t as if Van G o g h ' s

pa in t ings cou ld su rv ive as n o n - r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l w o r k s , w h i c h is jus t howh is succes so r s in te rp re ted them. But th i s moves too q u i c k l y t h r o u g h

t h e p a i n t i n g s . W h a t is m a r k e d by the a p p e a r a n c e of the poss ib i l i ty of

the pa in t ings hav ing the i r r ep resen ta t iona l a spec t r evoked , is the s e p a r a

t ion of the mater ia l and r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l m o m e n t s . W h a t t h i s s e p a r a t i o n

accompl i shes , however , is the se t t ing up of an affinity be tween conf igura

t ions of p a i n t - o n - c a n v a s and the r ep resen t ing ob jec t . It is the inner affinity

b e t w e e n p a i n t - o n - c a n v a s and p a i n t e d s h o e s , and not e i the r the laces or the

p h e n o m e n o l o g i c a l / r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r of the shoes on t h e i r own,

t h a t d r a w s the in teg r i ty of the shoes f rom their in tent ional object and i n t othe canvas , the i r pa in ted be ing : the a u t o n o m o u s d i g n i t y of the p a i n t i n g

of fe r s au tonomous d ign i ty to w h a t is t h e r e i n p a i n t e d . In brief, Van G o g h

sets up an i n t e r n a l m i m e t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n p a i n t i n g and r e p r e s e n

ta t ion as a m e a n s of p r o d u c i n g the m i m e t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n p a i n t i n g

and wor ld ; tha t in te rna l mimes i s is w h a t p r o v i d e s the work wi th its

' d e p t h ' , its ' in - i tse l fness ' . Van G o g h ' s c a n v a s b e c o m e s a k i n d of t r a n

scenden ta l space in w h i c h the 'affinity of the m a n i f o l d ' (A 1 1 3 ) is e s t a b

l i shed , but es tab l i shed not t h r o u g h t r a n s c e n d e n t a l l a w s but t h r o u g h the

u n f o l d i n g of the mater ia l itself. T h i s i n t e r n a l m i m e s i s b e t w e e n the vis ib le

s t rokes of pa in t on c a n v a s and the r e p r e s e n t i n g t h i n g is prec i s e ly wha t

A d o r n o m e a n s by art b e i n g an objectif ication of m i m e s i s (AT, 165;

W i l l i a m s ' s 'red whee l ba r row ' r ehear ses a s imilar af f in i ty amongs t words ,

work and t h i n g ) .

Van Gogh ' s succes so r s were r igh t in th ink ing tha t he r isked the a u t h

o r i ty of his p a i n t i n g s on the i r ma te r ia l and t e c h n i c a l d i m e n s i o n s ; by

over look ing the i n t e r n a l m i m e s i s in his w o r k s , h o w e v e r , t h e y m i s u n d e r

s tood the place of the t r ad i t iona l r ep resen ta t iona l func t ion at w o r k . In

r e la t ion to M a n e t , one m i g h t say t h a t Van G o g h r e h e a r s e s a t echn ica l

o v e r c o m i n g of the d e t e r m i n a t i o n of p a i n t i n g as t e c h n i q u e . T e c h n i q u e is

the exp l ic i t means th rough which the m i m e t i c i m p u l s e is r e leased . But if

th i s is so, t h e n H e i d e g g e r ' s and Schap i ro ' s ana lyses of the shoes can be

jo ined . Art is m i m e t i c o n l y as ob jec t ive expres s ion . The b e s t m o d e l of

e x p r e s s i o n , A d o r n o c o n t e n d s , is to t h i n k of it in t e r m s of ' o r d i n a r y t h i n g s

and s i tua t ions in which h i s to r ica l p roces ses and func t ions have been

s e d i m e n t e d , e n d o w i n g t h e m w i t h the p o w e r to s p e a k ' (AT, 1 6 3 ) . The

shoes expres s the suffering of the i r h i s to r ica l mi l i eu th rough the i r in s i s t

e n t p a i n t - o n - c a n v a s b e i n g . The v a l u e / m e a n i n g of the p a i n t i n g as p a i n t - o n -

c a n v a s and the v a l u e / m e a n i n g of the shoes , in v i r tue of the w o r k ' s i n t e r n a l

m i m e s i s , s t a n d or fa l l together . Such was Van Gogh ' s r i sk and r ad ica l i ty ;




it was a r isk and radical i ty f i rmly rooted in m o d e r n i s m , and h e n c e

i n c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n of w o r k s .

F o r A d o r n o the a c h i e v e m e n t s of m o d e r n i s m u n d e r m i n e the t r ad i t ion ' s

s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g of itself; and th i s shou ld sugges t to us t h a t m o d e r n i s m

c o m m e n t s u p o n H e i d e g g e r ' s c o n c e p t i o n of grea t art. Adorno def ines wha t

he calls 'aff irmative art' as works that c la im their qual i t ies to be those ofbe ing- in - i t s e l f beyond art. Affirmative art be longs to ar t ' s pas t . A l though

n o t all affirmative art is grea t art in H e i d e g g e r ' s s e n s e , a r g u a b l y all grea t

a rt is affirmative art. About af f i rmat ive art A d o r n o w r i t e s :

I n the p e r s p e c t i v e of the p r e s e n t , the affirmative works of the pas t

are less ideological than they are touch ing . Af te r all, it is not the i r

faul t that the wor ld sp i r i t did not de l ive r wha t it had p r o m i s e d .

The i r t r ans f igu ra t ions were too t r a n s l u c e n t to arouse r ea l r e s i s t ance .

W h a t m a k e s t h e m n e v e r t h e l e s s e v i l is not ideo logy , but the fact that

the i r pe r fec t ion monumenta l i zes fo rce and v i o l e n c e . T h e s e r e p r e s s

ive conno ta t ions are b r o u g h t out in adject ives l ike ' engross ing ' or

' c o m p e l l i n g , ' t e r m s we use to descr ibe g rea t art. Art neutra l izes force

as well as m a k i n g it worse ; its i n n o c e n c e is its gui l t . The new art

w i t h all its b l e m i s h e s and fallibilities is a cr i t ique of success , namely

the succes s of t r a d i t i o n a l art w h i c h was a lways so u n b l e m i s h e d and

s t r o n g . The new art has its bas is in the i n a d e q u a c y of tha t wh ich

a p p e a r e d as a d e q u a t e . . . (AT, 229; SAT , 240)

H e n c e , A d o r n o w i l l c l a i m t h a t w h a t g u a r a n t e e s the au then t ic qua l i ty of

m o d e r n w o r k s of art is 'the scars of d a m a g e and dis rupt ion inf l ic ted by

t h e m on the s m o o t h s u r f a c e of the i m m u t a b l e ' (AT, 34). P r i o r to m o d

ern i ty the s u b l i m i t y of w o r k s , w h a t m a d e t h e m e n g r o s s i n g and c o m p e l

l ing , migh t we l l have opened a w o r l d , but the w o r l d s o p e n e d , and by

e x t e n s i o n o p e n i n g itself, were entangled with force and violence, wi th all

t h a t now m a k e s us r egard those wor lds as l ack ing jus ti ce . T h a t v io lence

m u s t now a d h e r e to the s u b l i m i t y of those works for us. As we shal l see,

m o d e r n i s t s u b l i m i t y is the r e - m a r k i n g of that ear l ier v io lence, and t h u s a

r e t r ea t , wh ich is a k i n d of advance , f rom the k ind of affirmation of pre-

m od ern w orks . Af f i rmat ion , wh ich is c o n t i n u e d in the N i e t z s c h e a n m o d e ,

is violence and gui l t .

A d o r n o c o n t i n u e s the p a t h of th is ref lect ion in to a c r i t i q u e of class ic ism,

w h e r e he s ta tes tha t the ' r ea l ba rbar i sm of a n c i e n t t i m e s - s lavery , geno

c id e , the c o n t e m p t for h u m a n l i f e in genera l - has left virtually no t r ace in

ar t f rom class ical Athens forward . Art has k e p t all of th i s out of its sacred

p r e c i n c t s , a f ea tu re tha t does no th ing to in sp i r e r espec t for art' (AT, 231).

A s we shal l see s h o r t l y , the d i r e c t c o n s e q u e n c e of th is cr i t ique of class i

c i sm and grea t art is an a l toge ther d i f f e ren t concep t ion of the object of

a r t i s t i c m e m o r y .




The concep t ion o f h i s to ry and memory a t work he re d raws heav i ly

up on the wr i t ings o f W al te r Ben jamin whi le dep ar t in g f rom th e m ess ian ic

e lem en ts in Ben jam in ' s th ou gh t . A do rno ' s r em arks he re a re a c lear echo o f

the s even th o f Ben jamin ' s 'T he se s on the Ph i loso phy o f H i s to r y ' , in wh ich

he cr i t iq ues th e idea of ef fect ive h is tor ical con sciou sness , as the pass ive/

p rogres s ive t r ansmis s ion o f t r ad i t ion th rough h i s to ry , by r e fe rence to the

fac t tha t the con t inu i ty o f t r ad i t io n can be es tab l i shed by ba r ba r i sm as

wel l a s cu l tu re . 8 T h u s : 'T h er e i s no doc um en t of c iv il i za t ion wh ich is no t

a t the s ame t ime a document o f ba rbar i sm. And jus t a s such a document i s

no t f ree o f ba rb ar i sm , ba rb ar i sm ta in t s a lso the m an ne r in wh ich i t was

t r a n s m i t t e d f r om o n e o w n e r t o a n o t h e r . ' 9

Adorno res t s the au thor i ty fo r h i s c r i t ique o f succes s no t on a p re

supposed mora l s t andpo in t , no r on mess ian ic v i s ion , bu t on a r t itself, on

the deve lo pm ent o f the fo rmal work o f a r t . T h e fo rmal an d t echn ica l

means of modernis t ar t i s i t s ra t ional e lement , i t s unleashed forces of produc t ion : ' . . . a r t i s pa r t and pa rce l o f the p roces s o f the d i s en ch an tm en t o f

t h e w o r l d . . . I t i s i n e x t ri c a b l y e n t w i n e d w i t h r a t io n a l i z at i o n . W h a t m e a n s

and product ive methods ar t has a t i t s d isposal are a l l der ived f rom th is

nexus ' (AT, 80 ) . I f t echn ica l p roduc t ion ou t s ide a r t , the sovere ign ty

of means -ends r a t iona l i ty , spe l l s domina t ion , in a r t i t i s the means o f

res i s tance to do m ina t io n . 'A r t works oppo se dom ina t io n by numer ica l ly

ad ap t ing to i t. I f they are to pr od uc e som eth ing tha t i s d i f ferent in k ind

f rom the wor ld o f r ep res s ion , they mus t a s s imi la te themse lves to r ep res s

ive behav iour ' (AT, 404) . Tha t a s s imi la t ion i s the r e ign o f t echn ique and

the mas te ry o f aes the t i c mate r ia l s th rough techn ica l fo rm. Because o f the

dominance o f th i s moment in modern i s t a r t such a r t i s ' r a t iona l ' . 'A r t i s

r a t iona l i ty c r i t ic iz ing i ts e lf w i tho u t be ing ab le to overcom e i t s e l f (A T , 81 ;

see also 403).

Tech no log ica l dom ina t io n , wh ich i s a t one w i th cap i ta l in de m an d i ng

the fungibi l i ty of a l l indiv iduals , i s , mos t l i tera l ly , mas tery over nature

( w i t h i n a n d w i t h o u t ) . B e c a u s e A d o r n o r e g a r d s a rt a s a c o u n t e r m o v e m e n t

to ra t ional ized dominat ion , he is sens i t ive to the t radi t ional c la ims forna tu ra l beau ty . None the les s , these c la ims canno t be t aken l i t e ra l ly , in pa r t

beca use na tur e is no t yet w ha t it ap pe ars to be , a s ta te tha t wi l l con t in ue

un t i l na tu re s tops be ing denned exc lus ive ly in oppos i t ion to h i s to ry and

soc ie ty (A T , 97 ) . H en ce th e apprec ia t ion o f na tu ra l beau ty cann o t be l i t e r

a l ly what i t th inks i t se l f to be; a t i t s bes t i t represents ' the recol lect ion of a

non- rep res s ive cond i t ion tha t may never have ex i s ted ' (AT, 98 ) . Such a

rem em bra nc e , wh ich is fo rmal and soc ia l in chara c te r , un de rde te r m ine d as

i t i s by the causal condi t ions necessary for a ' rea l ' , psychological ly or fac

t u a ll y t r a n s m i t t e d m e m o r y , m u s t h e n c e b e c o n s t i t u t e d f ro m e l s e w h e r ethan d i r ec t aes the t i c cogn i t ion o f na tu re .

Ar t canno t be an im i ta t ion o f na tu ra l beau ty because as an app ear in g

qua l i ty such beau ty i s i t s el f an imag e . Ar t ' imi ta tes ne i the r na tu re no r




ind iv idua l na tu ra l be au ty . W ha t it does imi ta te is na tu ra l beau ty in i t s e l f

(A T , 107; S A T , 113) . N atu ra l beau ty is def ined by its undef ina bi l i ty , by

i t s r e s i s t ance to concep tua l de te rmina t ion : 'What the beau t i fu l in na tu re

does is tes t i fy to the precedence of the object in subject ive exper ience.

Natural beauty is perceived a l ike as author i ta t ively val id and as incom

p r e h e n s i b l e ( a s a p r o b l e m a s k i n g fo r a s o l u t i o n ) ' ( A T , 1 0 4 - 5 ) . T h e a u t h

o r i t a t ive va l id i ty and incomprehens ib i l i ty o f na tu ra l beau ty restates and

states originarily the du al i ty of the aut he nt ic work of ar t in i t s autho r i ta t iv e

va l id i ty and incomprehens ib i l i ty , an incomprehens ib i l i ty , however , tha t i s

no t abso lu te bu t a pa r t i cu la r h i s to r ica l fo rmat ion which i t s e l f means and

s ign i f i e s . The l aw govern ing the fo rmat ion o f th i s incomprehens ib i l i ty can

be known; knowledge o f th i s l aw i s wha t s epara tes Adorno f rom the

u n k n o w i n g , t h e b e y o n d o f k n o w l e d g e , o f H e i d e g g e r a n d D e r r i d a . N a t u r e

in i t se l f i s the h is tor ical ly and ar t is t ica l ly produced model to be imita ted

by a r t ; i t i s the 'med ia ted p len ipo ten t ia ry o f immediacy ' (AT, 91 ) . Na tu ra lbea u ty ' s exem pla ry s ta tus is a co ro l l a ry o f the dom ina t io n o f na tu re ,

o f n a t u r e ' s p r e p o n d e r a n c e a n d n o n - e x i s t e n c e . I n c l a i m i n g t h a t w o r k s

of gen ius appear as i f na tu ra l , t r ad i t iona l aes the t i c s acknowledges the

exem pla r i ty o f na tu ra l beau ty and the p re po nd era nc e o f na tu re , wh i le

s imu l taneou s ly ma sk ing the appearan ce chara c te r o f the fo rmer and th e

sca r red phys iognomy o f the l a t t e r . Ye t bo th acknowledgements a re neces s

a ry i f the s e l f -de te rmin ing , and hence p ro lep t ic t r ansparen t f r eedom of the

act of gen ius is to be ha rm on ize d w ith i t s opa ci ty . T h e opaci ty of the w ork

of gen ius i s the opac i ty , and non-ex i s tence , o f na tu ra l beau ty a t oneremove . The f r eedom tha t opposes i t s e l f to na tu re , tha t s eeks to mas te r

and domina te na tu re concep tua l ly ( in s c ience) and p rac t i ca l ly ( th rough

techno logy) can ga the r i t s e l f on ly in appearance , in a r t ; and tha t appear

ance form of f reedom must refer i t se l f to repressed nature for i t s author i ty

an d val id i ty . Fre ed om th us survive s only as she l tere d , as ar t ; which is a

corol lary of the fact that the 'beaut i fu l in nature is h is tory s tanding s t i l l

and r e fus ing to un fo ld ' ( A T , 105) .

Th is i s why works tha t s eek to imi ta te na tu re ' s beau ty d i r ec t ly , fo rge t t ing i t s de r ived s ta tus and the non-ex i s tence o f wha t na tu re appear s to be ,

s t r ike us as k i tsch; such works ignore the scars that dominat ion has lef t on

na tu re for an ap pe ara nc e taken as real i ty . T h a t i s th e source of thei r

s en t imen ta l i ty . In oppos i t ion to k i t s ch , t echno log ica l a r t , a r t tha t su r

renders i t se l f to technique, se t t ing i tse l f agains t subject ive in tent ions (but

rem em be r tha t t echn o logy i t s el f i s bu t congea led sub jec t iv ity : AT , 62 ),

does so in o rder to p ro du ce a non - in te n t io na l , noncon cep tua l and no n-

s ign i f i ca t ive l anguage . Th is l anguage , wh ich i s the modern ana logue o f the

language o f na tu re , s eeks to po r t r ay the po ten t ia l mean ingfu lnes s o f na tu re( A T , 8 9 , 9 9 ) . H e n c e ,

t h o r o u g h l y thesei and human , the work o f a r t i s the r ep resen ta t ive o f

what is physei, what is more than mere subject iv i ty , a th ing in i t se l f



C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T AND I N T U I T I O N 219

in the K a n t i a n s e n s e . The iden t i ty of the art work with the sub jec t

is as c o m p l e t e as the i d e n t i t y of na tu re w i th i t s e l f ough t to b e . . . O n

a n d t h r o u g h the t r a jec to ry of r a t iona l i ty , mank ind becomes aware

t h r o u g h art of what r a t iona l i ty has erased f rom memory . (AT, 93,

99)

A d o r n o i n s t a n c e s the w o r k s of P a u l K l e e h e r e .

Now wha t r a t iona l i ty has erased f rom memory is o v e r d e t e r m i n e d and

a m b i g u o u s in A d o r n o ' s t h e o r y . The difficulty in being c lear der ives f rom

the fact that , on the one h a n d , the idea of ' a r t i s t i c m e m o r y ' , be it in

H e i d e g g e r or A d o r n o , is a lways as m u c h f o r m a l as s u b s t a n t i a l ; and, on the

o t h e r h a n d , b e c a u s e the m e m o r y in q u e s t i o n is cons t i tu t ive and fo rmal it

can opera te w i thou t psycho log ica l r ecogn i t ion , w i thou t , tha t is, b e i n g

no t iced as a m e m o r y of a n y t h i n g . T h i s is to say t h a t s o m e p o r t i o n of the

e x p e r i e n c e of art, of the b e a u t y of art and n a t u r e , is c o n s t i t u t e d by an

element w h i c h is p r o p e r l y m e m o r i a l in c h a r a c t e r but is typ ica l ly e i the r

i g n o r e d or conce ived of dif ferent ly .

One l ine of t h o u g h t e x p l o r e d by Adorno der ives f rom an a t t e m p t to

c o m p r e h e n d the ac t - l ike na tu re of works , the i r s ense of b e i n g s o m e t h i n g

m o m e n t a r y and s u d d e n d e s p i t e the fact of the i r be ing ac tua l i zed as d u r

a b l e p r o d u c t s . A d o r n o s p e c u l a t e s , and th is is the mos t specu la t ive l ine

of in te r roga t ion opera t ive in Aesthetic Theory, tha t s ince works are 'set

in m o t i o n by pa t ien t con templa t ion ' , then the i r ac t - l ike na tu re r evea l sthat ' t h e y are t ru ly a f te r - images of preh i s to r ica l shudder s in an age of

re i f ica t ion , br inging back the t e r r o r of the pr imal wor ld aga ins t a b a c k

g r o u n d of reif ied objects ' (AT, 118). The survival of the p r e h i s t o r i c

s h u d d e r is m e a n t by A d o r n o as the d i r e c t c o m p l e m e n t to his a c c o u n t

of or ig ina ry r ep res s ion in Dialectic of Enlightenment.

T h e r e he and H o r k h e i m e r a r g u e d t h a t the succes s fu l implemen ta t ion of

in s t rumen ta l r eason r evenges i t s e l f upon the r e a s o n e r . T h e y c o n t e n d e d

that a cond i t ion for sub juga t ing ex te rna l na tu re by r eason is the r e p r e s s i o n

of i n t e r n a l n a t u r e ; the i n h i b i t i o n and d o m i n a t i o n of dr ives and des i r es is

a cond i t ion for the s u c c e s s f u l e m p l o y m e n t of d i s c u r si v e r e a s o n . F u r t h e r

th i s s ame rep res s ion of i n n e r n a t u r e p r e c i p i t a t e s the f o r m a t i o n of the

indiv idual ized se l f or sub jec t ; so each v ic to ry over ex te rna l na tu re is pa id

for by a defeat of i n n e r n a t u r e and a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the self as s u b j e c t , a

Strengthening w h i c h is, of course , a lso a defeat . The sacrifice of the se l f for

its own sake - w h i c h is f igured in the imaginat ion 's sacr i f ice wi th in the

K a n t i a n s u b l i m e - is qu ixo t ic s ince the r ep res s ion of inner na tu re en ta i l s

the d is to r t ion and even tua l occ lus ion of the p u r p o s e s for the sake of w h i c h

the d o m i n a t i o n of e x t e r n a l n a t u r e is u n d e r t a k e n . W h a t in cap i ta l i sm is

exempli f ied by the d o m i n a t i o n of e x c h a n g e - v a l u e o v e r u s e - v a l u e , a

dom ina t io n which sys temat ica l ly vo ids the te leological ra t ional i ty of our

produc t ive ac t iv i ty , is, Adorno says , ' a l r eady percep t ib le in the p r e - h i s t o r y

of sub jec t iv i ty ' . He c o n t i n u e s :



22 0 C O N S T E L L A T I O N S O F C O N C E P T A N D I N T U I T I O N

M a n ' s d o m i n a t i o n o v e r himself, which grounds h is se l fhood, i s

a lmos t a lways the des t ruct ion of the subject in whose service i t i s

und er ta ken ; fo r the subs ta nce which is do m ina ted , supp res sed , and

dissolved by v ir tue of se l f -pres ervat io n is no ne o the r tha n that very

l ife as funct ion s of wh ich the achie vem ent s of se l f -prese rvat ion f ind

their so le def in i t ion and determinat ion: i t i s , in fact , what i s to bep r e se r v e d . ( D o E , 5 4 - 5 )

T h e sh ud de r r e leased by the work o f a r t , the expe r ience o f the mo dern i s t

sub l ime , i s the memory o f the exper ience o f the t e r ro r and s t r angenes s in

the f ace o f th rea ten ing na tu re . Shudder i s the memor ia l exper ience o f

n a t u r e ' s t r a n s c e n d e n c e , i t s n o n - i d e n t i t y a n d s u b l i m i t y , a t o n e r e m o v e .

But , as such, i t i s equal ly a memory of the l ib id inous des i res that were

rep res sed in the face o f p r imal na tu r e . Sh ud de r is a m em ory , an a f te r

image , ' o f wh a t is to be p rese rve d ' . 'Con sc iou snes s w i tho u t shud de r is

re i f ied . Shudder is a k ind of ant ic ipat ion of subject iv i ty , a sense of being

touc hed by the o th e r ' (A T , 455 ; S A T , 490) . Sh ud de r i s the addres s o f the

o ther ; i t co r re spo nds to wha t Ga da m er wo u ld iden t i fy as s t r angenes s in

the ob jec t o f under s tand ing , and wha t He idegger th inks o f in t e rms o f the

cla im of being. Above a l l , shudder is the ter ror of the subl ime in Kant , a

ter ror made safe by the re t ract ion of the object as i t s source .

Even i f we f ee l uneasy abou t Adorno ' s specu la t ive an th ropo logy , i t

none the les s po in t s to someth ing tha t does s eem cons t i tu t ive o f ou r exper i ence of ar t , namely , how ar t provides a reminder of what is repressed in the

adv anc em ent o f r eason and techno logy . T h a t r em ind er i s , aga in , fo rmal : i t

has no empir ical object , a l though i t does have an in tent ional object . I t i s

equa l ly more than r e t rospec ted long ing . I t con ta ins the r ep res s ion as we l l

as i t s object , the cru el ty of reason ( in ar t is t ic form ing an d i ts adva nce) a nd

what tha t r eason domina tes ( a r t ' s ma te r ia l moment , wh ich i s fo rmed

na tu re ) . Indeed , i t i s p rec i s e ly the en twin ing o f these two moments in

the work o f a r t tha t i s the source o f the memory . Aga in , d i s sonance , the

techn ica l p ro du c t io n o f the f a ilu re o f p ro duc t ion , expres ses the su ffe ringof the non- iden t ica l a t the hands o f r eason . Bu t the l eg i t imacy o f a t t r ibu

t ing a memor ia l d imens ion to modern i s t works i s ju s t th i s s ame , fo rmal ,

c r i t ique o f succes s . I f the c la ims o f s ensuous pa r t i cu la r i ty , non- iden t i ty ,

lack val id i ty and w or t h o uts ide ar t , a fact that ar t can re gis ter only nega

t ively and in the mode of i l lus ion , then ar t can exper ience that c la im only

as som eth in g tha t has come to be los t or repressed (even i f the s ta te los t has

never ex i s ted ) . T o speak w i th Der r id a , we migh t say tha t the c la ims o f

sensu ous pa r t i cu la r i ty a nd non - ide n t i ty app ear o n ly as a t r ace , a s a firs t

(mark , apprehens ion in in tu i t ion ) a lways a l r eady fo rmed by a s econd

( re -m ark , the r ep ro duc t ive ima g ina t io n ) . Bu t wha t appear s as a t r a n

scenden ta l move in Der r ida appear s in modern i s t a r t a s pa r t o f the log ic o f

i t s fo rms . Ar t r emembers fo rmal ly , tha t i s , w i thou t causa l in te rmed ia r ies ,




because i t s fo rms (which a re themse lves quas i - causa l ly fo rmed in te r

mediar ies ) , as the example of Van Gogh i l lus t ra tes , specify the c la ims of

sensuous pa r t i cu la r i ty as someth ing tha t has been los t o r r ep res sed . 'By

repres s ing the agen t o f r ep res s ion , a r t undoes some o f the domina t ion

inf l ic ted on nature . Contro l over ar t is t ic forms and over how they are

re la ted to mate r ia l s exposes the a rb i t r a r ines s o f r ea l domina t ion . . . ' (AT,

200) . The memor ia l e lemen t in a r t , then , concerns the f a te o f s ensuous

par t i cula r i ty ; bu t the fate of sen suo us par t ic ular i ty is ca tegor ia l ly the fate

; of sense perc ept ib i l i ty , and mater ia l ly the fa te of na tur e an d the o the r .

In our or ig inal d iscuss ion of Kant we c la imed that aes thet ics , by

i def in i t ion as i t were , is con s t i tu te d by a r ep res s ion o f mem ory ; and wh en

| tha t me mo r ia l e lem en t su r faced in the wr i t ings o f He idegg er we qu es -

t t ioned i ts ob jec t, wh e th er i t was no t a s c reen m em ory fo r s om eth in g

I

worse . T h a t 's om eth in g worse ' has now su r faced in Ad orn o ' s c r i t iqu e\ of affirmative art , namely, the violence and suffering that have left no

. m ark or trace on th e wo rks of t radi t io nal ar t , and wo rse , have bee n

' m o n u m e n t a l i z e d ' b y t h e m . F u r t h e r , t h e r e is a n e v i d e n t i n n e r c o n n e c t i o n

< between the fa i lure of wor ld sp ir i t to del iver what i t had promised, and

\ En l igh ten m en t ' s fear tha t the t ru t h whic h s e t i t in m ot io n 'i s go ing to be

) sacri f iced in i t s pro gre ss ' (A T , 118) ; tha t fear i s m ark ed by the des i re to

" r e ta in shudd er : bo th the f ea r and the addres s o f the o the r ,

l S hu d de r is the o the r s ide of suffering; th e la t ter i s the expre ss ion of

\ dom ina te d non- id en t i ty , wh i le the fo rme r is the exper ien ce o f tha t same| non - iden t ic a l o the r in i t s p r im al an tag on ism to the sub jec t . Su b l im i ty is

f th e aes thet ic ized co nc ept ion of sh ud de r and suffering , of res is tan ce to se l f

[ an d in tegr i ty of the o th er . A nd i t i s a t jus t th is jun ctu re tha t A do rn o pa r ts

f ways w i th He ide gger and Der r id a . Because he su rveys h i s to ry f rom the

!

perspect ive of 'wor ld sp ir i t ' , be ing , Heidegger sees only i t s fa i lure , which

i s the r ea l i za t ion o f en l igh tenment and iden t i ty th ink ing . Sens i t ive to the

need ines s o f th i s s t a te bu t deny ing u t t e r ly the r ea l advance o f en l igh tened

modern i ty and thus i t s p romise (o f f r eedom and happ ines s ) , He idegger

can but ascr ibe th is neediness and d is t ress to being (and not the lack

I of f reedom and suffer ing of ind iv i du als ) .1 0

T h i s m a r k s t h e n a d i r o f

I Heidegger ' s f a i lu re to th ink be ing and be ings toge ther .

Derr ida drops the fa tefu lness of being, the h is tory of being, for the sake

of a l t e r i ty , non- iden t i ty . And l ike Adorno , Der r ida p laces non- iden t i ty a t

the 'marg ins ' o f iden t i ty th ink ing , the ou t s ide tha t cond i t ions and makes

the ins ide pos s ib le wh i le s imul taneous ly e lud ing i t s g rasp ( comprehen-

| s ion) . B ut there real ly is no 'o th er ' for D er r id a exce pt in te rm s of th e

I ( t r anscenden ta l ly cond i t ioned) f a i lu re o f iden t i ty th ink ing to to ta l i ze itself,to ach ieve p resence and s e l f -p resence . Hence non- iden t i ty ge t s r educed to

wh a t can no t be abso rbed by r eason and iden t i ty th ink ing : m ad nes s , vom i t ,

; e t c . An d whi le th i s ges tu re t em pora r i ly p rev en ts t r iu m ph a l h i s to ry f rom

I unpro b lem at ica l ly l ay ing c la im to the t roph ie s o f cu l tu re , i t equa l ly




proh ib i t s cogn i t ion o f wha t th e o the r , unde r s ide o f cu l tu r e was and i s . Th e

moments o f exces s in t ex t s a re ha rd ly equ iva len t to the comprehens ion o f

those t ex t s a s equa l ly documents o f ba rbar i sm, even i f we concede tha t ,

p e r h a p s , differance e tc . a re t r anscenden ta l marker s fo r tha t o the r h i s to ry .

I f Der r ida , then , does no t qu i te s ide w i th ' g rea t a r t ' , the decons t ruc t ive

ges ture can do no more than in ter rupt ef fect ive h is tor ical consciousnesswhi le mak ing the l aw govern ing tha t h i s to ry neces sa r i ly unknown and

u n k n o w a b l e .

I f the o the r i s wha t g ives neces s i ty to decons t ruc t ion , no th ing marks

tha t neces s i ty . And no th ing can mark tha t neces s i ty because the o the r i s

a lways reduced to 'o therness as such ' , a l ter i ty as such. And 'as such ' ,

Derr ida conf la tes absolu te o therness , the very idea of o therness , wi th

se r ious o the rnes s , the c la im o f o the rnes s , the an t i c ipa t ion o f sub jec t iv i ty

re leased through the touch of the o ther in shudder and i ts express ion of

suffer ing in d issonance.

Sh ud de r , w i th in w hich sub jec t iv i ty i s a l r eady s t i r r ing , w i tho u t ye t

ex i s t ing , i s the touch o f the o the r . Adorno con t inues : 'The aes the t i c mode

of behaviour ass imila tes i t se l f to that o ther ra ther than t ry ing to subdue i t .

I t i s th is cons t i tu t iv e or ie nta t ion of th e subject to wa rds object iv ity w hich

jo ins e ros to knowledge ' (AT, 455) . Th is o r ien ta t ion , wh ich i s r e f r ac ted

th rough a r t ' s hand l ing o f i t s ma te r ia l s , a l lows Adorno to c la im tha t ' a r t

com ple tes cogni t ion con cer nin g that f rom w hic h it [cogn i t ion] is c losed

off ; in so doing, i t undermines i t s [cogni t ion 's ] univocal i ty vis-a-vis k n o w l e d g e ' (A T , 80 ; S A T , 87) . Sh ud de r and mim es i s a re d i ff e ren t a spec t s o f the

s a m e m o m e n t . T h r o u g h t h e m t h e r e o c c u r s a j o i n i n g o f e r o s t o k n o w l e d g e

which i s a r t ' s a r t i cu la t ion o f e th ics and know ledge .

Shudder , a s d i s sonance (AT, 124) , i s s t aged , aes the t i c ized , sub l ime

fear. I t is the affect ive ac kn ow led gem ent of th e o ther nes s of the o t he r .

Un l ike Kan t , Adorno does no t t r anspose th i s f ea r in to pure mora l i ty ,

which is the revenge of nature on subject iv i ty for i t s repress ion; nature

re turns in Kant as the force of reason turned agains t the nature i t was

to r e lease as happ ines s . Ra ther , Adorno approaches f ea r aes the t i ca l ly ,

mim et ica l ly in h i s s ense o f the t e rm . H e thu s und er l ine s wha t K an t

re t reats f rom: that subl ime fear is not jus t fear in i t s natura l is t ic sense , but

a lso awe and respect in the face of the natura l o ther . The d isentangl ing of

fear f rom awe and respect , which have their or ig in in fear , i s one, thus far

d i s to r ted , accompl i shmen t o f sp i r i tua l i za t ion .

Shudder , and the awe and respec t tha t fo l low upon i t o r a re in te rming led

wi th i t , come f rom the non- iden t ica l o the r . So-ca l l ed d i s in te res tednes s i s

no t an uncon d i t ion ed p ro du c t of sub jec t iv i ty ; on the con t ra ry , shu dd er in

the face of subl imity condi t ions the aes thet ic space label led d is in teres ted

by in te r rup t ing , th rough fea r , awe and respec t , the s e l f - aggrand iz ing na r

c iss ism, the re i f ica t ion , of ra t ional ized subject iv i ty . P laus ib ly enough, only

someth ing tha t con ta ins th i s moment o f f ea r can accompl i sh th i s in te r rup-




t ion , f ractur ing our in teres ted gaze and opening us up to what is o ther

than subject iv i ty in i t s pet r i f ied s ta te . Shudder , then , i s the generat ion of

dis tance and angle with respect to the other: fearful awe is the affective

' spac ing ' o f the o the r a s a t a ' d i s t ance ' f rom us and as ' above ' u s . He igh t

and d i s tance r ep resen t the a f f ec t ive geomet ry o f non- iden t i ty .

W e have a l ready seen th is geom etry a t work in ch ap ter 1 in our d i s cuss ion of Kant on love and respect , the formal jo in ing of beauty and sub

l imi ty . Adorno l inks e ros ( aes the t i ca l ly : mimes i s ) and shudder he re as we

en tw ined love and r espec t the re . W ha t compl ica tes th i s s to ry , and w ha t we

fai led to say then, i s that Kant does a l low the uni ty of love and respect to

be exempli f ied; he labels thei r union ' f r iendship ' . Kant ' s ident i f ica t ion is

t rou b l ing because he acknowled ges and f ail s to acknow ledge bo th tha t

f r iendsh ip is no t yet an d tha t even if i t we re to exis t i t wo uld no net he less

con ta in a m om ent o f non - ide n t i ty ( asym m et ry ) w i th in i t s r ec ip roca l ( sym

met r ica l ) s t ruc tu re . Of cour se , he r eads these moments o f d i f f i cu l ty , h i s to r ica l absence and apor ia , s t r a igh t fo rward ly as dep ar tu res f rom th e ideal

of f r i endsh ip . Bu t h i s accoun t s ays o the rwise . F i r s t , because he p roduces

h i s ana lysi s a s a com m ent a ry on Ar i s to t l e ' s apore t i c s t a tem en t o f the co n

cep t of f r iend ship: ' M y d ear f r iends , th ere is no such th ing as a f r ie nd. '

Seco nd ly , because in the cour se o f a t t e m pt in g to p rov id e f r i endsh ip

wi th a f i rm mora l moment he mus t acknowledge tha t i t ' i s someth ing so

delicate (teneritas amicitiae) that i t is never for a moment safe from

interruptions...'" K an t conce ives o f these in te r ru p t io ns as gene ra ted by

em ot iona l f r i end sh ips ' l ack o f a f irm m ora l g roun d . Ho we ver , w ere th i s

g round to be p resen t , then the en twin ing o f love and r espec t tha t f r i end

sh ip is me an t to exempl i fy w ou ld be un de rm ine d .

Because he fears the fragil i ty of fr iendship that follows on i ts lack of an

a p r io r i bas i s , and so the in te r ru p t io n in to sub jec t iv i ty tha t f r i endsh ip

man i fes t s , Kan t mus t equa l ly eschew the s ens ib le , non-ca tegor ica l cond i

t ions tha t make soc ia l l i f e pos s ib le : good-na tu rednes s , mutua l love and

resp ect , af fabil ity and pro pr i e ty , sociabi l i ty , gen t lene ss , e tc . T he se , K an t

says , are 'only outworks o r b y - p r o d u c t s (parerga), which present a fa i ri l lus ion of something l ike v i r tue , an i l lus ion which a lso deceives no one,

s ince everyone know how to t ake i t . ' 1 2 Such i l lus ions of v i r tue are ' smal l

change; yet they promote the feel ing of v i r tue i t se l f by [arous ing] a

s t r iv ing to br ing th is i l lus ion as near as poss ib le to the t ru th ' . We do not

need to r epea t Der r ida ' s pa re rgon a rgument to s ee tha t he re Kan t i s cas t

ing as i l lus ion the sens ib le express ion of v i r tue in favour of i t s non-appear

ing r ea l i ty (however o the rwise t ru ly decep t ive the appearance o f v i r tue can

b e ) . 1 3 What is s t r ik ing for our purposes is the fact that now socia l i ty

appears only in the domain of i l lus ion , an i l lus ion that becomes in t ime the

subs tant ive i l lus ion of the work of ar t .

Socia l i ty sens ib ly red ra w n as aes th et ics is ma nifes t in sh ud de r a nd

mimes i s ; shudder , aga in , mark ing the non- iden t i ty o f the aes the t i c ob jec t ,



2 2 4 C O N S T E L L A T IO N S O F C O N C E P T A N D I N T U I T I O N

a n d m i m e s i s t h e c o m p o r t m e n t o f a r t i st a n d s p e c t a t o r ( A T , 2 0 3 ) . Because

aes the t i c behav iou r has a mim et ic mo m en t , mim es i s now c lea r ly the he i r

of d is in tere s ted del igh t , A do rno can rega rd the affect ive ge om etry of n on -

ident i ty as proto-cogni t ive , as the re turn of the l ink between eros and

know ledge . Bu t A do rno ' s po in t in m ak ing th i s c la im i s to r evea l the

affect ive geometry a t work in ra t ional ized cogni t ion as wel l : i t i s cons t ruc ted f rom a pos i t ion wh ere the sub jec t i s ' abo ve ' the ob jec t, s ub su m

ing the object under i t , i t s cogni t ive des i re squander ing the d is tance

be tween sub jec t and ob jec t , de r iv ing p leasu re f rom mas te ry and con t ro l .

At bes t , subject ive reason manifes ts an indif ference to the object ; a t wors t ,

i t manifes ts a rage a t the object - the rage real ized in ideal ism. The rever

s al o f th i s pa t t e rn o f kno win g requ i res a d i f fe ren t c om po r tm en t to th ings ,

a c o m p o r t m e n t w e e x p e r i e n c e i n a r t w h e r e d i s s o n a n c e m a r k s t h e o b j e c t ' s

be ing sub l imely r a i s ed up to addres s us f rom a he igh t ; i t s incom

mensurab i l i ty w i th g iven concep tua l r eg imes p rov ides i t w i th a d i s tance

from th e c la ims of ra t iona l ized subject iv i ty ; i ts in ter rup t io n of in teres ted

subject iv i ty a l lows us to ap pro ach i t m im et ica l ly , lovingly , as we m igh t

approach the needs and concerns of f r iends and fe l low ci t izens had any

such ex i s ted .

Fo r Ad orn o the re i s a ques t ion ab ou t t ru th , in the emp ha t ic s ense ,

because there is an is sue , o ther than the fa i lure of the t radi t ional project of

ph i loso phy , a t s take in non- ide n t i ty . Ad orn o wan ts to r a i se the ques t ion o f

t ru th b ecau se the o t he r m at t ers , i s suf fering . A nd i t i s th is suf fering o the rtha t is f igured in the m od er nis t work of ar t , an o th er forgot ten by great ar t

and by ph i losophy .

Surely i t would be bet ter for ar t to vanish a l together than to forget

suffering, which is art's expression and which gives substance to its

form. Suffering, not positivity, is the hum ane content of art. If the art

of the fu ture were to become pos i t ive once again , one would be

jus t i f i ed in suspec t ing tha t nega t iv i ty had no t been ob l i t e ra ted . Th is

susp ic ion i s eve r -p r ese n t , ju s t as eve r -p rese n t a s the r ea l dange r o f

re laps ing in to negat iv i ty ; for f reedom - the f reedom from, among

oth er th in gs , pr op er t y - can no t be ow ne d for ever . I t is d if ficult to

imag ine wha t wou ld become o f a r t a s h i s to r iog raphy i f i t w iped ou t

t h e m e m o r y o f a c c u m u l a t e d s uf fe ri ng . ( A T , 3 6 9 ; my italics)

Arguab ly , the h i s to ry o f be ing and the an t i -h i s to ry o f decons t ruc t ion por

tend the e rasu re o f th i s memory . For Adorno , in con t ras t , ' t he need to

lend a voice to suffering is a con di t io n of a ll t r u t h . ' H e cont in ues : 'F o r

suffering is object iv i ty t ha t weighs upo n th e subje ct ; it s m os t subject ive

expe r ience , i ts expre s s ion , i s ob jec tive ly co nvey ed ' ( N D , 18) .



5

Old Gods Ascending:Disintegration and Speculation

in Aesthetic Theory

i Rat ion al izat ion, Dif ferent iat ion and Ca tegories

Throughou t ou r r e f l ec t ions we have cons i s ten t ly d i s covered tha t a ce r ta in

though t o f modern i ty i s r equ i red in o rder to under s tand the p rob lem of a r t .

Even in Kan t we saw the neces s i ty o f mak ing r e fe rence to a p re -c r i t i ca l

t ime in o rder to p lace aes the t i c s , to genera te an under s tand ing o f a r t and

aes the t i c s tha t was d i s c re te and d i s t inc t f rom t he unde r s ta nd ing o f theo ry

and (m ora l ) p rac t i ce . T h is neces s i ty wou ld ob ta in even if one de m ur re d

f rom the memor ia l hypo thes i s and r egarded p re -c r i t i ca l t ime as p remised

up on ca tegor ia l confus ion , on an am phib o ly o f the con cep ts c on cern ed .

Bu t i t i s no t ju s t some accoun t o f modern i ty tha t i s r equ i red in o rder to

u n d e r s t a n d t h e p r o b l e m o f a r t , b u t a q u i t e p a r t i c u l a r t h o u g h t o f m o d

e rn i ty , namely one which t akes the Kan t ian ca tegor ia l d i f f e ren t ia t ion

be tw een t r u t h , mora l wo r th an d aes the t i c r e fl ect ion as i t s gu id ing th re ad .

The r eco i l and r evenge o f the an t inomies and apor ia o f Cr i t i ca l ph i losophy

back on to the ana lyses o f He ide gge r and De r r id a ce r ta in ly m ake i t appea r

as i f m e taph ys ics i s too b roa d a conce p tua l i za t ion o f wh a t t roub le s aes t he t

ics, even i f one were to con ced e tha t a t leas t the s t ruc tu ra l d i sp l acem en ts

ga thered toge ther under the idea o f the metaphys ics o f p resence a re pe r t i

n e n t . H e n c e A d o r n o t o o i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e m e t a p h y s i c s o f p r e s e n c e ,

with the reduct ion of d i f ference to ident i ty and the o ther to the same.

Ide n t i ty th ink ing is an o th er na m e fo r m etaph ys ics . Ho we ver , the ov er coming o r d i sp lacemen t o f iden t i ty th ink ing as such i s no t a t t em pte d b y

Adorno; ra ther , he focuses on a specif ic format ion of ident i ty th inking,

namely , tha t a t work in Kan t ' s Cr i t i ca l ph i losophy .



226 O L D G O D S A S C E N D I N G

What , then , g rounds Adorno ' s cho ice o f Cr i t i ca l ph i losophy as the

gu id ing th re ad fo r the ana lys is o f m od ern i ty w h ich wou ld exp la in the

pow er of Cr i t ica l ph i loso phy to recoi l on the tho ug ht of analyses wh ich

a t tempt to by -pas s i t , l eap over i t towards a more encompass ing ph i lo

soph ica l comprehens ion o f the t r ad i t ion? An ev iden t p remise o f Adorno ' s

p ro ced ure i s tha t the ques t ion o f wh a t a co r rec t acc oun t o f m ode rn i ty i smak es a d i ff e rence because the s t ruc tu res o f m ode rn i ty con d i t ion ou r

thought about i t ; which is why a recoi l occurs when the specif ic i ty of mod

e rn i ty i s ignored by ph i losop her s . I f the reco i l i s Ka n t ia n , then th e o pera t

ive ass um pti on is tha t mo de rni ty i t se l f i s K an t ia n in som e sense . At f ir st

g lance, i t i s far f rom obvious how Adorno could accept th is thes is g iven

the ro le o f Marx ian theory w i th in h i s work ; a ro le wh ich appear s to make

cap i ta l exchange r e la t ions quas i - causa l ly r espons ib le fo r the domina t ion o f

iden t i ty th ink ing w i th in modern i ty . Befo re th i s charge can be answered ,

we need to exam ine , if on ly br ie f ly , the ou t l ines o f Ad orn o ' s un de r s t an ding o f iden t i ty th ink ing . Th is under s tand ing i s bes t had by look ing aga in

a t the cen t ra l l ines o f a rg um en t govern ing h i s and H ork he im er ' s Dialectic

of Enlightenment.

A c c o r d i n g t o A d o r n o a n d H o r k h e i m e r , e n l i g h t e n m e n t i s f ro m t h e v e r y

b e g i n n i n g a n t i - e n l i g h t e n m e n t ; i n d e e d , e v e n p r i o r t o t h e c o m m e n c e m e n t o f

the over t s t r a teg ies o f en l igh ten m ent , the m yt hs aga ins t wh ich en l igh te ned

th ink ing compor ted i t s e l f were themse lves impl ica ted in the s t r a teg ies o f

i d e n t i t y a n d r e p e t i t i o n , m a s t e r y a n d d o m i n a t i o n : ' M y t h i n t e n d e d r e p o r t ,

nam ing , the na r ra t io n o f the Beg inn ing ; bu t a l so p rese n ta t ion , con

firmation, exp lana t ion ' (D oE , 8 ) . M y th suc cu m bs to en l ig h ten m ent , wh i le

en l ig h ten m ent inev i tab ly r ever t s to m yth . T h is r ever s ion o r engu l fm en t

o f e n l i g h t e n m e n t i n m y t h , e n l i g h t e n m e n t ' s b e c o m i n g ' a n i m i s t i c m a g i c '

(D oE , 11 ) , i s con sequ en t up on i t s adop t ion o f the ' p r inc ip le o f imm a

nen ce , the exp lana t ion o f every even t a s r epe t i t ion ' (D oE , 12 ), wh ich i s the

p r i n c i p l e o f m y t h itself. What a l lows th is d ia lect ic to escape the charge of

fact i t iousn ess , th e charg e of bein g pre m ised up on a f ragi le and s imp l is t ic

rhe to r ic of inver s ion , i s Ad orn o ' s and H ork he im er ' s con ten t ion tha t thefa ta l i t ies of reason are premised upon and have their foundat ion in the

dr ive for se l f -preservat ion; a dr ive for mas tery and contro l which governs ,

in d i f ferent ia l ways and to d i f ferent degrees , wi th greater or lesser

ef fect iv i ty , the logics of myth and reason. What has come to be cal led

i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n , t h e r e d u c t i o n o f c o g n i t io n t o m e a n s - e n d s c a l c u

la t ion and he nce to in s t ru me n ta l i ty , is g ro un ded in the an th ropo log ica l

found a t ions o f the hu m an spec ies . W e und er s ta nd th e r a t iona l i ty of

ins t rumen ta l r eason by r evea l ing i t s p lace w i th in the human cond i t ion ,

w i th in , tha t i s , the an th ropogenes i s o f human cogn i t ion . We come toun de r s ta nd the i r ra t iona l i ty of in s t r um en ta l r eason when we see how a

( legi t imate) par t of reason came to be taken for the whole , and how that

h is tor ical metonymy involves a d is tor t ion of that in the service of which i t



O L D G O D S A S C E N D I N G 227

op erate s . H en ce w hat m ig ht a pp ear a t f ir st as a rheto r ical s t ra teg y is in fact

a work of detect ion , a genealogy of reason that a l lows us to g l impse the

r o u g h c o n t o u r s of m a s t e r y a n d d o m i n a t i o n b e n e a t h t h e g l i m m e r i n g s u r

face of mythic p lay and epic wander ings .

As we saw in the p rev ious chap te r , the cen t ra l t rope he re i s the in t ro

version of sacrif ice, the sacrif ice of desire for the sake of i ts realization.This repress ion of des i re g ives over to what i t was sacr i f iced for , namely

cogn i t ive dom ina t ion , a na t u ra l fo rce . T h e r e tu rn o f the r ep res sed p ro

vides reason with a force of fa tefu lness equivalent to what i t opposed.

Ka n t ia n , au ton om ous sub jec t iv i ty , w h ich a t first s igh t app ear s as the r e jec

t ion o f in s t ru m en ta l r a t iona l i ty fo r the sake o f som e h igher r eason , hen ce

comes to appear in the l ight of genealogy as the crys ta l l ized perfect ion of

the suppres s ion o f inner na tu re . Ha pp ine s s , the e l imina t ion o f su ffe ring

and the s a t i s f ac t ion o f des i r e and need , become a de tached pos tu la te o f

wha t the r ea l i za t ion o f au tonomous r eason ough t to p rov ide . Happ ines sough t to be p ropor t iona l to mer i t and wor th ; bu t i t l acks an independen t

cla im upon reason. Categor ical ra t ional i ty ' s logical indif ference to ends

thereby comes to echo exchange-value ' s logical indif ference to use—value.

Categor ical ra t ional i ty is hypothet ical ra t ional i ty as an end in itself; a n d

tran sce nde nta l subject iv i ty th e re i f ica t ion of subject iv i ty det erm ine d by its

' ow n ' r a t iona l i ty . Tr an sce nd en ta l sub jec t iv i ty is a m om en t o f ob jec t iv i ty a t

the hear t of the subject ; only , s ince i t rea l ly is object ive and not subject ive ,

i t works agains t the c la ims of the subject .

T o e n l i g h t e n r e a s o n a b o u t itself, which i s wh a t genea logy in te nd s ,

r equ i res a dem ons t ra t ion to th e e ff ec t tha t w ha t now app ear s as the who le

and quintessence of reason is only a d is tor ted par t of reason; even i f i t , the

par t , i s a l l we have avai lable in order to make th is demons tra t ion . But th is

par t i a l i ty has no t ye t been d em ons t ra te d . T w o fea tu res o f ou r s i tua t ion

mi l i t a te aga ins t the pos s ib i l i ty o f a d i r ec t de m ons t r a t ion . F i r s t , the h i s to r i

cal fact that d iscu rs ive rea son as i t i s now is ins t ru m en tal ra t ion al i ty ;

which i s wha t genea logy demons t ra tes . Second ly , log ica l ly , we take the

min imal un i t o f r a t iona l though t , the concep t o r , wha t i s the s ame , thes ign-un i t , a s e s sen t ia l ly o r by the i r na tu re subsumpt ive , a s e i the r cog-

ni t ively ( real ism) or vol i t ional ly (nominal ism) equat ing d if ferent i tems ,

mark ing the d i f f e ren t a s the s ame . The log ic o f iden t i ty , wh ich Adorno

wa n ts to a rgue is a log ic o f dom ina t io n an d sup pres s io n , appe ar s in te rna l

to the ve ry na tu re o f the concep t . The concep t in i t s pu r i ty expres ses

no th ing bu t a r e jec t ion o f immediacy , a r e jec t ion tha t makes pos s ib le the

separat ion of the actual ( the g iven) and the poss ib le , the g iven in terms of

i t s charac te r i s t i c s , i t s powers and po ten t ia l i t i e s . Adorno in no way de

m ur s from th i s thes i s . W ha t he den ies is tha t the m ed ia t ion a l pow ers o f

the concep t en ta i l , in and o f themse lves , the p resen t fo rmat ion o f d i s cu r

s ive reason.

Aga in , Adorno employs a genea log ica l approach in o rder to make h i s




p o i n t . D e s p i t e the potent ia l i t ies bui l t in to the nega t iv i ty of the c o n c e p t , its

capac i ty to n e g a t e the given as g iven , a c r u c i a l m o m e n t in its h is to ry ,

w h i c h for w a n t of a b e t t e r n a m e can be ca l l ed 'P la ton i sm ' , marked it off

fo r a dif ferent des t iny:

T h e u n i v e r s a l i t y of ideas as d e v e l o p e d by d iscur s ive log ic , domin a t i o n in the c o n c e p t u a l s p h e r e , is ra ised up on the bas is of ac tua l

d o m i n a t i o n . The d is so lu t ion of the magica l he r i t age , of the old

diffuse ideas , by concep tua l un i ty , expres ses the h ie ra rch ica l cons t i

t u t i o n of l i f e de te rmined by those who are free. The indiv idual i ty

tha t l ea rned o rder and s u b o r d i n a t i o n in the sub jec t ion of the w o r l d ,

soon who l ly equa ted t ru th w i th the r e g u l a t i v e t h o u g h t w i t h o u t

whose f ixed d is t inct ions universal t ru th cannot exis t . (DoE, 14).

N o t e t h a t A d o r n o ' s t a r g e t h e r e is not c o n c e p t u a l t h o u g h t as s u c h , but the

r e g i m e n t a t i o n of it in to un iver sa l i ty , deduc t ion , sys tem and c o r r e s p o n

d e n c e ; in o ther words , those f ea tu res of our concep tua l sys tem tha t spe l l

o u t its even tua l r e jec t ion of his tor ical i ty . The m o m e n t of the or ig inal t r i

u m p h of i n s t r u m e n t a l r a t i o n a l i t y is a m o m e n t of d o m i n a t i o n . A l t h o u g h

t h e r e are n u m e r o u s m e d i a t i o n s m i s s i n g f r o m t h i s a c c o u n t c o n c e r n i n g who

a n d u n d e r w h a t c o n d i t i o n s c o n c e p t u a l d o m i n a t i o n p e r p e t u a t e d and

d e e p e n e d r e a l d o m i n a t i o n , it r e m a i n s the case tha t it al lows us to perce ive

t h e r o u g h o u t l i n e s of how r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g is i m m a n e n t l y b o u n d

u p w i t h d o m i n a t i o n ; and fu r the r , how the coerc ive aspec t of r e p r e s e n

t a t i o n a l t h o u g h t is the m o m e n t of the iden t i ty . Tha t l inkage l ays the f o u n

d a t i o n s for the i n d i r e c t , s t r u c t u r a l d o m i n a t i o n of m o d e r n i t y .

C o n v e r s e l y , A d o r n o is e m p h a t i c in not ident i fy ing the m o m e n t of d o m i

na t ion w i th the c o n c e p t itself. As he clear ly s ta tes some pages la ter : 'what

i s a b a n d o n e d [by s u b j e c t i v e or fo rmal r a t iona l i ty ] is the whole c la im and

a p p r o a c h of k n o w l e d g e : to c o m p r e h e n d the given as s u c h ; not mere ly to

d e t e r m i n e the a b s t r a c t s p a t i o - t e m p o r a l r e l a t i o n s of the facts which allow

t h e m to be g r a s p e d , but on the c o n t r a r y to conce ive of t h e m as superficies ,a s m e d i a t e d c o n c e p t u a l m o m e n t s w h i c h c o m e to fulf i l lment only in the

d e v e l o p m e n t of thei r socia l , h is tor ical , and human s ign i f i cance ' (DoE,

2 6 - 7 ) . C o n c e p t u a l t h o u g h t in the form of subject ive reason betrays the

m e d i a t i o n a l p o w e r s of the c o n c e p t b e c a u s e it i n s t i t u t e s a s e c o n d i m m e d i

acy as its goal , a m a k i n g p r e s e n t of the w o r l d in un iver sa l t ru th ; and h e n c e

forfeits the i n n e r i m p u l s e of cogn i t ion to k n o w w h a t is o t h e r as s u c h , in its

a l t e r i ty , wh ich , in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h the i n n e r c h a r a c t e r of concep tua l i ty

itself, invo lves ac tua l i ty and po ten t ia l i ty . Nega t ive d ia lec t i c s , the p r o

d u c t i o n of c o n s t e l l a t i o n s , is precise ly the a t t e m p t to conce ive of th ings as

' superf ic ies , as m e d i a t e d c o n c e p t u a l m o m e n t s w h i c h c o m e to fulf i l lment

only in the d e v e l o p m e n t of thei r socia l , h is tor ical , and human s ign i f i

c a n c e ' . It is t h e s e p o s i t i v e and nega t ive aspec t s of the c o n c e p t t h a t s t r u c -



O L D G O D S A S C E N D I N G 2 2 9

tu re Adorno ' s c r i t i ca l en te rp r i s e , and make i t po l i t i ca l f rom the ou tes t . I t

i s not meta phy s ics bu t a v io len t h is tor ical me to ny m y th at is a t i s sue; and

ana lys ing the fu l f i lmen t o f tha t me tonymy in modern i ty fo rms the es sen

t i a l background to Adorno ' s aes the t i c theory .

Adorno conce ives the s t ruc tu re o f the modern economy and s ta te , and

the i r r e la t ion to one ano ther , in Marx i s t t e rms . The Marx i s t ana lys i sdemons tra tes how, a t the socie ta l level , the logic of ident i ty achieved and

sus ta ins i t s hegemony . However , he r eads the log ic o f the deve lopment

o f modern i ty in t e rms o f a N ie tzschean genea logy o f r eason , o r , wha t i s

the deve loped soc io log ica l equ iva len t o f tha t comprehens ion , in t e rms o f

ra t iona l iza t ion . Wi th Max Weber , Adorno conce ives o f ' t he in s t i tu t iona l

f r amework o f the cap i ta l i s t economy and the modern s ta te . . . no t a s r e

la t ions of pr od uc t io n that fe t ter the potent ia l for ra t ion al iza t ion , b u t as

subsys tems o f pu rpos ive - ra t iona l ac t ion in wh ich Occ iden ta l r a t iona l i sm

develops at a societal level. '1

A l t h o u g h A d o r n o s u p p o r t s M a r x ' s a n a l y s i so f m ode rn i ty , he de m ur s f rom the ph i losophy o f h i s to ry in wh ich M ar x

places h is account on the grounds that i t fo l lows the path of ident i ty .

Ra t iona l iza t ion exp la ins and comprehends , however apore t i ca l ly , the p re

c i s e h i s t o r i c a l m e t o n y m y t h a t A d o r n o a n d H o r k h e i m e r a t t e m p t t o r e v e a l

genealogical ly in Dialectic of Enlightenment.

I f a t the socie ta l level ra t ional izat ion involves the d i f ferent ia t ion of

the cap i ta l i s t economy f rom the modern s ta te , a t the cu l tu ra l l eve l r a t ion

al iza t ion also involves a prog ress iv e d i f ferent ia t ion , a be co m ing au to n

omous of the value-re la ted spheres of ac t iv i ty ; which enta i ls and is

en ta i l ed by the i r p rogres s ive fo rmal iza t ion and g round ing o r va lue in ten

sification (Wertsteigerung). The two rec ip roca l ly cond i t ion ing s ides o f cu l

tura l ra t ional izat ion , d i f ferent ia t ion on the one hand and formal izat ion and

value in tens i f ica t ion on the o ther , rehearse as a moment of the logic of cul

tura l development the ref lect ive se l f - in ter rogat ion of Cr i t ica l thought . I t i s

no acc iden t then tha t Weber shou ld s ee th i s p roces s o f d i f f e ren t ia t ion as

revo lv ing a round the Cr i t i ca l t r i ad o f t ru th (knowledge) , r igh t and good

ness ( law and moral i ty) , and beauty (ar t and tas te) ; or , in the mater ia lmode , s c ience and techno logy , ind iv idua l i s t i c e th ics and fo rmal l aw , and

a u t o n o m o u s a r t . Critical philosophy is modernity's philosophical comprehen

sion of itself, a p o i n t r e c e n t l y u n d e r l i n e d b y H a b e r m a s :

In Ka nt ' s co nce pt of a formal and in tern al ly d i f ferent ia ted reason

there i s ske tched a theory o f m ode rn i ty . T h is i s chara c te r ized , on

the one hand , by i t s r enunc ia t ion o f the subs tan t ia l r a t iona l i ty o f

inher i t ed r e l ig ious and me taphys ica l wor ld v iews and , on the o the r

han d , by it s r e l i ance upo n a p roc edu ra l r a t iona l i ty , f rom wh ich our

jus t i f iable in terpreta t ions , be they per t inent to the f ie ld of object ive

knowledge , mora l -p rac t i ca l in s igh t , o r aes the t i c judgment , bo r row

their c la im to val id i ty . 2




Hence Ra t iona l iza t ion invo lves the becoming and the 'mak ing consc ious

[o f ] the internal and lawful autonomy of the ind iv idu a l sph ere s ' , bu t th i s

p roces s does no t occur un t roub led accord ing to Weber , fo r by becoming

au tonomous these spheres ' d r i f t ' i n to ' t ens ions which r emain h idden to

the or ig inal ly naive re la t ion to the external wor ld ' .3

Fo r W eb er the tens io n , th e c lash , i s be twe en ' t he re l ig ion of bro fher l i -n e s s ' and the ' o rde r s and va lues o f th i s wor ld ' ;

4

or, to s tate the same in

m o r e m u n d a n e t e r m s , b e t w e e n t h e b i n d i n g c h a r a c t e r o f c o m m u n i t y itself,

what the young Hege l ca l l ed ' l i f e ' , and the t e rms , cogn i t ive , p rac t i ca l and

ar t is t ic , in which that b indingness re la tes to i t se l f and to the external

wor ld . Now the g round fo r my t r ans la t ing ' the r e l ig ion o f b ro the r l ines s '

a s the b ind ingnes s o f communi ty i s tha t Weber cons i s ten t ly dep loys

the fo rmer exp res s ion as the bac kgro und as su m pt io n aga inst wh ich Oc c i

den ta l r a t iona l iza t ion i s under s tood . I f ' t he r e l ig ion o f b ro the r l ines s ' i s no t

so t r ans la ted , then the fu ll apor ia o f m od ern i ty ske tched by W eber

co l lapses : the b in d ing fo rce o f co m m un i ty i s a t one w i th i ts im m ane n t

in te l l ig ib i li ty - only e th ical subs ta nt iv e ra t ional i ty is cap able of sus ta in ing

a ra t ional life; r a t iona l iza t ion spe l ls the end o f bo th com m uni ty and

in te l l ig ib i l i ty . The r e l ig ion o f b ro the r l ines s i s Weber ' s sensus communis;

on ly aga ins t the background o f the los t sensus communis, ethical l ife, does

dif ferent ia t ion appear as f ragmentat ion , and ra t ional izat ion spel l out a k ind

of metonymy. Because Weber does no t adequa te ly theor ize the ca tegor ia l

features of the re l ig ion of brother l iness , he tends to see ra t ional izat ion as

f ragme nta t ion bu t no t a s the t r ium ph o f pa r t fo r who le .

W e b e r ' s a p o r e t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n d e p e n d s u p o n m o r e t h a n a s i m p l e c o l

l apse o f the me an ingfu ln es s o f l ife conse que n t up on secu la r iza t ion ; r a th e r ,

that col lapse mus t der ive i t s force f rom the re la t ion between d if ferent ia

t ion and w ha t ge t s d i f f e ren t ia ted . Ra t iona l iza t ion tokens a dou b le m ov e

men t : a r ea l inc remen t in r a t iona l i ty , and a co r respond ing and s imul

taneous loss of meaningfulness ( the wor th of ac t iv i t ies in the separate

spheres ) and in te l l ig ib i l i ty ( the cogni t ive connect ion of value-re la ted

sphere s o f ac t iv ity w i th one ano th er ) : ' cu l tu r e ' s every s tep fo rward s eemscondemned to an ever more devas ta t ing s ense les snes s . '

5

' S ense les snes s '

h e r e e q u a l s t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f a u t o n o m i z a t i o n .

I f any th ing , we rea l i ze aga in today tha t someth ing can be s ac red no t

only in sp i te of i t s not being beaut i fu l , but ra ther because and in so

far as i t i s not beaut i fu l . . .And, s ince Nietzsche, we real ize that some

th ing can be beaut i fu l , not only in sp i te of the aspect in which i t i s

not good, but ra ther in that very aspect . You f ind th is expressed in

t h e Fleurs du Mai, as Baude la i r e named h i s vo lume o f poems . I t i s

commonplace to obse rve tha t someth ing may be t rue a l though i t i s

not beaut i fu l and not holy and not good. Indeed i t may be t rue in

precise ly those aspects . But a l l these are only the mos t e lementary




cases of the s t ruggle that the gods of the var ious orders and values

a re engaged in .6

Each value-re la ted sphere asser ts i t se l f for i t se l f and agains t i t s r ivals .

K a n t ' s p r e s u p p o s e d a n d p o s t u l a t e d u n i t y o f r e a so n b e c o m e s t h e m u c h

m ore equ ivoca l ' un i t y o f r a t iona l iza t ion ' ; a un i ty whose t ru th i s d i f f e ren

t i a t ion . Th is d i f fe ren t ia t ion en ta i l s a new po ly the i sm, a po ly the i sm wi th a

d i f f e rence , fo r un l ike the o ld po ly the i sm our gods a re d i s enchan ted : 'Many

o ld gods ascend f rom the i r g raves ; they a re d i s en cha n ted and he nc e t ake

the form of impersonal forces . They s t r ive to gain power over our l ives

and aga in they r esume the i r e te rna l s t rugg le w i th one ano ther . '7

K a n t ' s

Cr i t ica l phi losophy, in v i r tue of i t s inevi table fa i lure to harmonize the

th ree Cr i t iques , comes to r ep resen t and exp l ica te th i s new po ly the i sm. I t

i s not a peaceable d iv is ion of labour that Kant of fers us , but a bat t le of the

g o d s .Weber cons t rues the au tonomy o f a r t in the s ame fo rmal manner as does

Adorno, namely , as involving a ref lect ive , inward turn which a l lows i t to

develop in accordance with i t s own inner logic (Eigengesetzlichkeit), an

inner logic which Adorno ident i f ies wi th the ra t ional ized forms a t ar t ' s

d i sposa l . In accordance w i th h i s new po ly the i sm, Weber r egards the

development of th is inner logic as a se l f -conta ined enterpr ise ; indeed, as so

se l f - con ta ined tha t fo r h im none bu t fo rmal ques t ions abou t a r t a re appro

p r ia te . Aes the t i c s can no t ques t io n th e mea n ing o f a r t , bu t on ly , g iven i ts

exis tence, the necessary condi t ions for the poss ib i l i ty of that exis tence.

Aes thet ics can only be a t ranscendenta l d isc ip l ine jus t as socio logy can

only be an empir ical d isc ip l ine; nei ther is in a pos i t ion to pose the

ques t ions of meaning or in te l l ig ib i l i ty . And s ince a l l o ther d isc ip l ines work

under the p rov i s ions o f the i r godhead , they too a re ba r red f rom ask ing the

ques t ions o f mean ing o r in te l l ig ib i l i ty . For Weber , the re i s no subs tan t ive

un i ty among the va r ious d i s c ip l ines , and each d i s c ip l ine mus t r emain

b l ind to the s ign i fi cance a nd w or th o f i t s ende avou rs . Hen ce , ' ae s the t i c s

does no t a sk whe ther the re should be works o f a r t . ' 8 But th is asser t ion res ts

upon a g ros s over s igh t ; in p rac t i ce a r t i s t i c modern i sm per s i s ten t ly asks

that very ques t ion , answer ing prolept ical ly the exis tent ia l—his tor ical

ques t ion of i t s very being. So, again , Adorno 's Aesthetic Theory, in full

r egard o f i t s dep end enc y on m od ern a r t , beg ins : 'T od ay i t goes w i th ou t

say ing tha t no th ing concern ing a r t goes w i thou t s ay ing , much les s w i thou t

th ink ing . Every th ing abou t a r t has become p rob lemat ic : i t s inner l i f e , i t

re la t ion to socie ty , even i ts r ight to exis t . '

O n W eb er ' s v iew , each d i f f eren t ia ted dom ain , a s a con sequ enc e o f the

autonomy of the logic governing i ts pract ices , necessar i ly operates a pol icyof non- in te r fe rence w i th r espec t to o the r cu l tu ra l domains ; no r i s any

domain in a pos i t ion to in ter rogate the wor th or the in te l l ig ib i l i ty of e i ther

i ts own or o ther sphere-specif ic pract ices . Value- in tens i f ica t ion entaila t h e




s u b l i m a t i o n of the q u e s t i o n s of w o r t h and in te l l ig ib i l i ty in to the logical

p r o s e c u t i o n of the ra t ional i ty of each s epara te cu l tu ra l p rac t i ce . But th i s

t ra jectory of en l igh tened r a t iona l i ty shor t - c i r cu i t s to the p o i n t of occlus ion

the se l f -ref lect ion w hich pro vid ed, and c o n t i n u e s to p r o v i d e , the i m p e t u s

a n d m o t o r of r a t iona l iza t ion . To e n l i g h t e n E n l i g h t e n m e n t a b o u t itself,

a b o u t its own i r r a t iona l i ty , is to c o n t i n u e the self-reflection of en l igh tenedreason aga ins t its c u r t a i l m e n t in the d i f f e ren t ia ted va lue spheres . Such is

the r eason , aga ins t ' r eason ' , cons t i tu t ing Adorno ' s ph i losoph ica l p ro jec t .

T h i s p r o j e c t is apore t i c s ince no va lue sphere has been h is tor ical ly

e m p o w e r e d to e n g a g e in a reflection on r eason in its s ta te of d isper s ion .

W h a t d i s t i n g u i s h e s art f r o m o t h e r d o m a i n s of c u l t u r e is that such a

reflection on r eason in its d isper s ion is a p r e c i p i t a t e of its ra t ional izat ion;

b u t a n o n - d i s c u r s i v e p r e c i p i t a t e , and h e n c e not immedia te ly r ecogn izab le

as a r e f l ec t ion . Ar t ' s cogn i t ive d imens ion appear s as non-cogn i t ive ; th i s is

a n o t h e r a s p e c t of its r es i s t ance to en l igh tened r a t iona l i ty , its p r e s u m p t i v e

u n i n t e l l i g i b i l i t y . M o d e r n i s m c o n t i n u e s the proces s of d i s e n c h a n t m e n t and

t h e ' s t r a i n i n g t o w a r d m a t u r i t y ' , but in fo rms tha t appear i r r a t iona l , even

chi ld ish , f rom the per spec t ive of a r a t iona l i ty 'too nar rowly conce ived of in

t e r m s of a p r a g m a t i c i n s t r u m e n t ' . If art w e r e not ' r a t i o n a l ' , an o b e y i n g of

laws and log ic p roper to its own d o m a i n , if it did not con ta in its own

s t a n d a r d s of r i g o u r and t e c h n i c a l a c h i e v e m e n t , if the re were not poss i

bil i t ies of c o m p r e h e n d i n g the u n f o l d i n g of that logic and r i g o u r in a r t ' s

h i s to r ica l deve lopment , then art c o u l d not o p e n up a per spec t ive on

r a t iona l i ty ou t s ide itself. ' Such i r r a t iona l i ty in the p r i n c i p l e of reason [the

i r r a t iona l i ty of the fetish of m e a n s i n t o end] is u n m a s k e d in the avowedly

ra t iona l i r r a t iona l i ty of art and at the s a m e t i m e in its m o d e s of b e h a v i o u r '

( A T , 64; SAT, 71). For A d o r n o , the fact ' tha t art has a crit ical edge in

r e la t ion to socie ty is i t se l f socia l ly determined ' (AT, 48; SAT, 56). T h a t

cr i t ica l edge is given over to art, however b r ie f ly , th rough wha t

ra t iona l iza t ion ou t s ide art exc ludes . Track ing aes the t i c r a t iona l iza t ion thus

b e c o m e s a t r a c i n g of the r e m n a n t of a knowing tha t h i s to ry has left

b e h i n d .

M o d e r n i s t w o r k s of art are cogn i t ive and r a t iona l , but not in ways

t h a t are e i the r d i r ec t ly r ecogn izab le or d iscur s ive ly r ecuperab le w i thou t

r e m a i n d e r . 'Art works talk l ike the good fair ies in ta les : if you w a n t the

u n c o n d i t i o n e d , it will be b e s t o w e d to you, but on ly unkenntlich, i n d e c i -

p h e r a b l y . By c o n t r a s t , the t r u t h of d iscur s ive knowledge , wh i le unve i led ,

is precisely for t h a t r e a s o n u n a t t a i n a b l e ' (AT, 183). A d o r n o c r e d i t s the

Enl igh tenment w i th hav ing been aware , however ob l ique ly , tha t wha t

' r eason wan ts to seize wi thout vei l tends to v a n i s h ' (AT, 124); tha t is,

r e a s o n ' s a t t e m p t to g r a s p the o t h e r in its al ter i ty and par t i cu la r i ty w i thou t

r e m a i n d e r , to fu l ly appropr ia te the o t h e r to itself, leads to the r ecogn i t ion

tha t someth ing a lways ge t s l e f t beh ind in the p r o g r e s s of r a t iona l cog

n i t ion . Adorno usua l ly iden t i f i e s th i s r emainder as the K a n t i a n t h i n g - i n -




itself; the concep t o r idea o f th ings - in - themse lves i s the acknowledgement

of the l imits of a reason that because i t emanates f rom the subject can but

cons t i tu te the object in i t s own image, impose i t se l f on the object , and

there by leave beh ind the ob jec t in i t s own 'he te ro no m ou s ' in teg r i ty . T h e

conn ec t ing o f in s t ru m en ta l r eason wi th s e lf -p rese rva t ion p rov id es the l ink

that jus t i f ies the ident i f ica t ion of Copernican reason, reason and ra t ional i tyas em ana t ing f rom the ( t r anscend en ta l ) sub jec t, w i th ins t ru m en ta l r eason .

Cogn i t ion ' s a s sau l t ' upon the ob jec t , a s He idegger has i t , de r ives f rom a

h i s to rica l ly com preh ens ib le r es t r i c t ion o f r eason r a the r than f rom some

rem ote des t in ing o f be ing . I f we can r ecogn ize in He ideg ger ' s d i s cou rse on

techno logy a s eco nd-o rder , t r ansce nden ta l i zed p rese n ta t ion o f wha t i s bes t

und er s to od in t e rm s of W eb er i an r a t iona l iza t ion , then th e di ff icu lt ie s we

have previous ly noted in Heidegger ' s pos i t ion fa l l in to p lace .

F rom the pe r spec t ive o f modern i sm, en l igh tened r eason r evea l s i t s e l f a s

i n s t r u m e n t a l r e a s o n , m e a n s - e n d s r a t i o n a l i t y ; b e c a u s e i n s t r u m e n t a l , t h e n

there fo re as sub jec t ive ; because n o t th e who le o f r eason , the re fo re as p a r

t icular ; and because i t c la ims to represent the whole of reason, indeed i t

appe ar s in p rac t ice as the w ho le of r eason , then the re fo re i r r a t iona l . Su ch

a r eason ' needs spur ious i r r a t iona l enc laves and t r ea t s a r t a s one o f them' ;

that i s , ar t per forms the same socio logical ro le that i s per formed by the

Kan t ian idea o f the th ing- in - i t s e l f in ph i losophy . And l ike the pa radox

tha t r ever t s on to ph i losoph y w hen th e the th ing- in - i t s e l f i s no ted , the

same occur s when the complex o f a r t , r eason and soc ie ty a re b rough t in to

cons ide ra t ion : one can no t en te r in to the r a t iona l i ty o f m od ern soc iety

wi thou t t ak ing cogn izance o f a r t i s t i c ' i r r a t iona l i ty ' , a r t ' s exces s beyond

soc ie ta l r a t iona l i ty ; bu t wh en a r t is acknow ledged , on e can no t r em ain

wi th in the conf ines o f soc ie ta l r a t iona l i ty . So Adorno con t inues : 'Even

so , ar t i s the t ru th about socie ty in the sense that in i t s mos t authent ic

c rea t ions the h idden i r r a t iona l i ty o f a s eeming ly r a t iona l wor ld i s b rough t

to l igh t . In a r t , denunc ia t ion and an t ic ipa t ion a re syncopa ted ' (AT, 124 ;

S A T , 1 3 0 ) .

ii D is inte gra t ion , Sacrif ice and T ru th

In so f a r a s un iver sa l and par t i cu la r d ive rge (because subsumpt ion s e t s

the m in to oppo s i t ion w i th each o th e r ) , the re i s no f r eedom ( A T , 62 ; SA T ,

69). That lack of f reedom is over t and par t icular in the or ig inal ac t of real

and concep tua l domina t ion ; i t becomes impl ic i t and un iver sa l when the

dom ina t io n o f conc ep t over pa r t i cu la r is r ea l ized in r a t iona l ized m o d

ern ity . All tha t is left of freed om is self-reflection (with w hic h i t be ga n) ;

and a l l that i s lef t of se l f - ref lect ion is ar t . Freedom has become the

though t o f f r eedom; the work o f gen ius the sus ta in ing o f tha t though t . I t

i s th e radical a t te nu at io n of freedom in ar t th at so eas i ly pe rm its f reedom




to be dropped f rom what ar t ref lec ts . Fur ther , the remnant of f reedom is a l l

bu t ind i s t ingu ishab le f rom tha t o f the au ton om ou s sub jec t p ro po un ded

by m od ern i ty . A subs tan t ia l i llu s ion o f f r eedom, th a t o f the a u to no m ou s

subject , in tersects wi th an i l lus ion of subs tant ia l f reedom in the work of

m o d e r n i s t a r t .

What Ar i s to t l e and Hege l spec i f i ed w i th r espec t to e th ics , namely , tha ta good man could exis t only in a good socie ty , i s how Adorno conceives of

f r eedom - bu t w i th more cause g iven tha t ind iv idu a l f reedom c anno t be

comprehended ou t s ide the chang ing conf igura t ions o f the soc ia l (un iver

s al ) and the ind iv idua l . F r ee do m re qu i re s a ' f r ee ' soc ie ty ( N D , 299) . T o

imag ine a sub jec t ' s ' non - iden t i ty w i tho u t s ac ri fi ce ' ( N D , 281) to the soc ial

universal i s to conceive of the absolute , or what Adorno th inks of as

reconc i l i a t ion : U top ia . Hen ce the conc ep t o f ' u to p ia ' figures A dor no ' s

under s tand ing o f r econc i l i a t ion .

G iven tha t the d ive rgence be tween un iver sa l and par t i cu la r , concep t

and in tu i t ion , s e rves as a m easu re of un f re edo m , th i s wou ld appe ar to

en ta i l tha t a r t shou ld s eek a ha rm on ious syn the s i s be tw een these tw o

elements in order to f igure the idea that reconci l ia t ion , and hence f reedom,

are (s t i l l ) poss ib le . Such a v iew is wrong-headed because i t s impl i f ies the

e lemen ts f a l l ing under the head ings o f ' un ive r sa l ' and ' pa r t i cu la r ' . Th i s i s

why Adorno con tends tha t ' a r t shou ld no t and canno t be s chemat ica l ly

r e d u c e d t o t h e d i c h o t o m y (Polaritat) o f m i m e s i s a n d c o n s t r u c t i o n ' ( A T ,

6 5; SAT, 72) . ' I f Adorno iden t i f i e s cons t ruc t ion w i th soc ia l un iver sa l i ty ,and expres s ion , the mos t p rominen t spec i f i ca t ion o f in tu i t ion in a r t , w i th

the (he lp les s ) ind iv idua l , g iv ing h im the reby a f a l s e s ense o f impor tance ,

he does not bel ieve that one can unders tand ar t f rom a juggl ing of these

ca tegor ies . O n the con t ra ry , the i r dom inan ce wo u ld l ead to m ak ing c on

s i s tency and ' uncompromis ing e labora t ion and in teg ra t ion ' the t e s t o f

aes the t i c au then t ic i ty . B u t th i s is no t the case . T o s ee th i s r equ i re s

recogn iz ing the impor tance o f t ru th con ten t over cons i s tency , fo r on ly on

tha t p re supp os i t ion can we unde r s tan d h ow an a r t is t i s ab le to mob i l i ze ,

r i sk , the m om en t o f d i s in teg ra t ion , the m om en t wh en , like P ros pero , thear t is t puts down his magic wand, having t raversed the f ie ld of in tegrat ion ,

and r e leases in to the work wha t canno t be in teg ra ted in i t . La te Bee thoven

m arks the co m m en cem en t o f th i s s e l f- consc ious push ing o f in teg ra t ion

beyond i t s e l f in modern a r t (AT, 67 ) .

Adorno ' s shor t way wi th th i s though t i s to s ay tha t ' t he h ighes t

p roduc t s o f a r t a re condemned to f r agmenta r ines s [ the deve loped fo rm o f

dis in tegrat ion] , which is thei r way of confess ing that even they do not

have wha t the immanence o f the i r fo rm c la ims (prdtendiert) t h e y h a v e '

( A T , 1 3 3 ; S A T , 1 3 9 ). T h e i m m a n e n c e o f f o r m , w h i c h is b u t a n o t h e r

concep tua l i za t ion o f au tonomy, i s wha t pe rmi t s and r equ i res works to

secure the i r au th or i ty , an au tho r i ty wh ich i s now ' aes the t i c ' , im m an en t

a n d a u t o c h t h o n o u s . I m m a n e n t f o r m , t h e n , i s w h a t g r o u n d s t h e p o s s ib i li ty




of works be ing purpos ive w i th in themse lves w i thou t hav ing an end be

yond them se lves . T h e goa l o f s ecur ing im m ane n t va l id i ty r ep re sen t s the

or ig ina l impu lse govern ing the h i s to r ica l deve lopment o f au tonomous ,

rationalized art . I t is the rationalization of art . Nor is i t diff icult to see

how the c r i t e r i a o f in teg ra t ion , cons i s tency , ha rmony , c losu re , e labora t ion

(ar t icula t ion) and the l ike fa l l out as d i rect corol lar ies of th is concept ion ofar t . Equal ly , however , i t i s jus t these ra t ional ized aes thet ic ideals that

secure for ar t cr i ter ia of val id i ty that are autonomous f rom s tandard

con cep ts o f t ru th and m ora l r igh tne s s . As such , aes the t i c bea u ty becom es

the aes the t i c mode whereby the s epara t ion o f spheres i s l eg i t ima ted . The

(still) aesthetic challenge to these criteria of artistic worth h ence represents,

not just the transform ation of the concep t of validity in art, bu t n ecessarily

refers to norm ative concep ts left behind by the rationalization of art.

Ad orn o ' s de fense o f m od ern i sm and h i s a t t em pt to d i r ec t aes the t i c th eory

back to th e qu es t i on s of t r u t h an d cog ni t ion are d i f ferent s ides of th e sam ea r g u m e n t .

D i s i n t e g r a t i o n , re c o g n i t i o n a n d a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t o f t h e h e t e r o g e n e o u s

mater ia ls which aes thet ic in tegrat ion is for , cur ta i ls the c la ims of formal

beau ty . L ike Der r ida , Adorno regards sub l imi ty as the inher i to r o f the

c la im o f a r t ; bu t no t sub l imi ty as Kan t charac te r ized i t . Ra ther , the

K an t ia n sub l im e ant ic ip ates the logic of d is in tegr at ion th at befa l ls ar t af ter

K an t ; tha t i s , the m ov em en t from in teg ra t ion to d i s in teg ra t ion th a t

governs the unfo ld ing o f a r t f rom i t s t r ad i t iona l au to no m ou s shape to

m o d e r n i s m i s b e s t u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f a d i a c h r o n i c m o v e m e n t w i t h i n

a r t tha t l eads f rom beau ty and tas te to the sub l ime . 'Works tha t t r anscend

the i r aes the t i c shape under the p res su re o f t ru th con ten t occupy the p lace

tha t aes the t i c s used to r ese rve fo r the sub l im e ' (A T , 280 ; S A T , 292) . Su b

l i m i ty h as t e n d e d t o f u n c t io n a s w h a t t r a n s c e n d s t r u t h - a s - s u b s u m p t i o n ,

an d he nce as a cou nte r for ce t o a ful ly cogn i t ive con cep t ion of ar t . A do rn o

rever ses th i s a rgument , s ee ing au tonomous beau ty as the marker fo r aes

the t i c va l id i ty w i thou t t ru th an d good nes s , and the m ode rn i s t sub l im e as

the ( st il l aes the t i c ized ) a t t em pt to genera te a m om en t o f ' t r u t h ' beyo ndbeau ty . T h i s fo rms the p rec i s e po in t o f con tes ta t ion be tw een Ad orn o and

Der r ida . For bo th the sub l ime marks the s i t e where the c la ims o f iden t i ty

and prese nce are res is ted; for bot h sub l im ity is the f igure of an a l ter i ty

t h a t e l u d e s c o n c e p t u a l c a p t u r e . H o w e v e r , f o r D e r r i d a t h e d e c o n s t r u c t i v e

sub l im e , as a genera l i zed ph i losoph ica l r e in sc r ip t ion o f the aes the t i c s ub

l i m e , cor res pond s to a r e insc r ip t ion o f the t r anscen den ta l , the p lace w here

i t i s r ea l i zed and ru ined a t once . Whi le fo r Adorno the sub l ime remains

an over t and expl ic i t creature of aes thet ic d iscourse; h is cons te l la t ive

re insc r ip t ion r e fe r s the sub l ime to an empha t ic concep t ion o f t ru th in

o p p o s i t i o n t o a ll t r a n s c e n d e n t a l s t r u c t u r i n g a n d d e s t r u c t u r i n g . The

philosoph ical reforma tion of the concepts of aesthetics, in accordan ce with the

transition from beauty and taste as constitutive of 'aesthetics' to sublimity as




the overcoming of 'aesthetics 'from within, is the determ ining historical gesture

of Adorn o's aesthetic theory. I t s va l id i ty depends a lmos t who l ly on h i s

ident i f ica t ion of ' aes thet ic ' a r t as the ra t ional ized , d isenchanted form of ar t

in modern i ty , and modern i s t , sub l ime a r t a s i t s c r i t i ca l ex tens ion . I t i s

equa l ly th i s connec t ing o f ' aes the t i c ' a r t and Kan t - s ty le aes the t i c s w i th

ra t iona l iza t ion tha t underwr i tes the modern i s t sub l ime ' s r e f l ec t ive in te r rogat ion of ' aes thet ic ' a r t as forming a cr i t ica l in ter rogat ion of ra t ional iza

t ion as a whole .

Despi te the fact that the modernis t subl ime is a t ravers ing of the f ie ld

of the aes thet ic in the d i rect ion of cogni t ion , i t i s s t i l l subsumption ,

sp i r i tua l i za t ion as sub jec tive do m ina t io n , tha t is to be overcom e he re .

Which i s why na tu re , bo th as domina ted and as a fo rce r es i s t ing subsump

t ion , con t inues to r everbera te w i th in Adorno ' s aes the t i c s . More p rec i s e ly ,

the oppos i t ion be tween a r t and na tu re , beau ty and the sub l ime , becomes

an in te rna l cons t i tuen t o f a r t works themse lves - the in te rac t ion be tween

the in teg ra t ive ( cons t ruc t ive ) and d i s in teg ra t ive (mimet ic /expres s ive )

m om en ts o f the work - a s sp i r i tua l i za t ion p rogre s ses , incorpo ra t ing in to

w o r k s e l e m e n t s i n c a p a b l e o f b e i n g a c c o m m o d a t e d b y t h e p r o d u c t i v e

imag ina t ion . The in teg ra t ion o f a d i s in teg ra t ive moment in to works fo rms

t h e c o r e o f A d o r n o ' s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e risk of m ean ing - because

of the r i sk o f every th ing tha t has been r ecogn ized as cons t i tu t ing aes the t i c

va l id ity - t aken by m od ern i s t wo rks . T h a t r isk is h i s to rica l ly cond i t ioned :

i t i s not poss ib le a lways or everywhere; i t i s the unique r isk that opens the

e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n a r t - in - i t s - h i s t o r i c a l - b e i n g - a n d - m e a n i n g a s w h a t h a s

been r e jec ted , and w ha t is p rese rved in au ton om ou s a r t . M od ern i s t w orks

po la r ize sp i r i t and mate r ia l , on ly to un i te them aga in . The i r sp i r i t i s

unab le to dep ic t i t s e l f in s ensuous t e rms and the i r ma te r ia l s eems

inco m pat ib le w i th the un i ty o f the work . Th e con cep t 'work o f a r t '

i s no more appl icable to Kafka than is that of the re l ig ious . The

ma te r ia l , and espec ia l ly . . . the l anguage , becom es deso la te , t r a ns

paren t , naked . I t imbues sp i r i t w i th a qua l i ty o f s econd-o rder

abs t r ac t ion . Kan t ' s doc t r ine o f the sub l ime , under s tood as an

emot ion , desc r ibes more p roper ly the k ind o f a r t tha t t r embles

(erzittert) by sus pe nd in g i tse l f for the sake of a no n- i l lu sory t ru th

content , whi le s imul taneous ly being unable to s lough off i t s i l lusory

qua l i ty as a r t . (AT, 280 ; SAT, 292)

Sub l ime , modern i s t a r t i s the k ind o f a r t tha t suspends itself, that i s ,

suspends i t s cons t i tu t ion by the aes thet ics of the beaut i fu l , for the sake ofwha t does no t f i t the d i s course o f beau ty , the d i s course o f r ep resen ta t ion

a n d i l lu s io n . T h i s s u s p e n s i o n is c o m m o n t o b o t h A d o r n o ' s a n d D e r r i d a ' s

under s tand ing o f Van Gogh . Der r ida , aga in , s ees i t in the un t ied l aces ;

Adorno wou ld s ee i t in the in te rna l mimes i s be tween shoes ( sp i r i t ) and




bru sh s t rokes (mate r ia l ) . Bo th s ee it a s the suspen s ion , and in te r ru p t io n , o f

' a r t ' a s an a l r eady cons t i tu ted d om ain . De r r ida comes up on tha t r ead ing

of Van Gogh th rough i t s r e la t ion , and r es i s tance , to the d i s courses o f

H e i d e g g e r a n d S c h a p i r o ; A d o r n o c o m e s b y i t t h r o u g h c o g n i z i n g t h e h i s

to ry s ed imen ted in the pa in t ing . Der r ida r es to res , r e s t i tu tes , the sub l imi ty

of the Van Gogh f rom ou t o f i t s cap tu re by He idegger and Schap i ro , wh i leAdorno a t t empts to un leash i t s o r ig ina l appearance . In r evea l ing the

c o n d i t i o n e d n e s s of V a n G o g h ' s p a i n t i n g , A d o r n o , o n m y r e c o n s t r u c t i o n ,

reveals what i t s fa i lure would h is tor ical ly mean, and how that fa i lure can

be inscr ibed in to the poss ib i l i t ies the work i tse l f re leases .

Accomplishing the t raversal of the f ie ld of in tegrat ion for the sake of a

non- in teg ra ted t ru th con ten t i s pos s ib le on ly th rough the con t inua t ion o f

the ra t ional izat ion pro cess wi th in ar t , tha t is , th ro ug h an in tens i fica t ion of

th e fo rmal i s t t r a jec to ry . T h i s in tens if i ca tion o f fo rmal i sm app ear s in m od

ern is t ar t aes thet ica l ly as cru el ty . Cr ue l ty , as th e emerg enc e of nak ed form

in works , r epesen t s a coun te rmovement to the spe l l o f beau ty : 'Crue l ty i s a

resul t of the se l f- reflect ion of m od er n ar t , wh ich despa ir ingly real izes th at

i t would f ind i tse l f in the ro le of a henchman of the powers that be ,

i f i t were no t c rue l bu t conc i l i a to ry ins tead ' (AT, 74 ; SAT, 81) . The

m o v e m e n t o f d i s i n t e g r a ti o n h e n c e w o r k s t h r o u g h i n t e g r a t i o n ; t h e m o r e

in teg ra ted works a re , the more pure ly fo rmal the i r in ten t , the more

d i s i n t e g r a t e d , h e t e r o n o m o u s , a r e t h e i r c o n s t i t u e n t e l e m e n t s t a k e n s e p a r

a te ly (AT, 78 ) . I t i s th i s s t a te Adorno has in mind when he s ta tes tha t

'a r t i s t rue to the extent to which i t i s d iscordant and antagonis t ic in

i ts language and in i t s whole essence, provided that i t synthes izes those

d i r e m p t i o n s , t h u s m a k i n g t h e m d e t e r m i n a t e i n t h e i r i r r e c o n c i l a b i l i t y '

( A T , 2 4 1 ; S A T , 2 5 1 ). D e t e r m i n a t e i r re c o n c il a b il it y is t h e A d o r n o e s q u e

equ iva len t o f Der r idean inde te rminacy . Whi le the l a t t e r des igna tes a p lace

of col l is ion between the des i re for presence and i ts absence, the former

des igna tes an i l lu so ry escape f rom he te ronomy, and by ex tens ion an image

of s e l f -de te rm in ing sp i r i t . Af te r a l l, i f the d i s in teg ra t ive mo m en t co r

responds to a r isk whereby works are re leased f rom subject ive contro l , theru le o f cons t ruc t ion , then they mus t t ake on the appearance , i l lu s ion , o f

'm ea n in g ' au to nom ous ly : ' a r t i s an emp i r ica l ex i s ten t de te rm in in g i t s e lf

as sp i r i t ' (A T , 47 1 ; SA t , 511) . De te rm ina te i r r econc i lab i lty e labora tes th e

finali ty-without-end asp ect of w or ks to th e po in t w he re th ey im age

f reedom a nd au tono m y; they a re the il lu so ry appe ar ing o f f r eedom . M o d

ernis t works in thei r subl imity thus real ize what was pos i ted but not ac tual

G er m an Idea l i s t aes the t i c s o f the beau t ifu l : fr eedom in ap pe ara nc e .1 0

Converse ly , the idea o f beau ty as ha rmonious in teg ra t ion o f pa r t s to

whole comes h is tor ical ly to appear as the u t ter pacif ica t ion and subju

gat ion of i t s cons t i tuent e lements : ' aes thet ic reconci l ia t ion proves fa ta l for

t h e e x t ra - a e s t h e t ic o t h e r ' ( A T , 7 7 ; S A T , 8 4 ) . T h e ' e x t r a - a e s t h e t i c o t h e r ' ,

wh ich is a lways an e le m en t in ar t , res is ts pacif ica t ion , un free do m and




d e a t h in the d i s i n t e g r a t i v e m o m e n t , the m o m e n t of e x p l o d i n g a p p e a r a n c e

a n d i n d e t e r m i n a c y (the laces , the brush s t rokes ) . For b o t h D e r r i d a and

A d o r n o t h i s m o m e n t has a s imilar logic : re-mark and m i m e s i s . It is

t h r o u g h the w o r k i n g s of th i s log ic tha t sub l imi ty comes to se rve as 'the

c o u n t e r - i m a g e of mere l i f e ' (AT, 281; SAT, 293). H o w e v e r , it r e m a i n s

u n c l e a r why r e - m a r k i n g s h o u l d h a v e t h i s p o w e r to fo rm a c o u n t e r - i m a g eof mere l ife if it d o e s not h a v e at leas t some of the a t t r i b u t e s of m i m e s i s .

A l te rna t ive ly , it is u n c l e a r why r e - m a r k i n g s h o u l d m a t t e r in its secur ing

of a l ter i ty unless a c o u n t e r - i m a g e to mere l ife is f o r m e d . T h i s is the

junc tu re where a l t e r i ty as 'it g ives pa in t ing ' conf ron t s the al ter i ty of self-

d e t e r m i n i n g s p i r i t , w h e r e q u a s i - t r a n s c e n d e n t a l c o n s t i t u t i o n c o n f r o n t s the

inde te rmina te exchange be tween i l lu s ion and t r u t h . In a t t e m p t i n g to

dec ide be tween these two a c c o u n t s we m i g h t ask w h e t h e r the unt ied laces

cou ld p lay the r o l e D e r r i d a a t t r i b u t e s to t h e m if they were not a p a r t of a

V a n G o g h p a i n t i n g , w h e r e p a i n t i n g is s u i t a b l y f o r e g r o u n d e d . Is the logic

o f mark and r e - m a r k too d is tan t , because too t r anscenden ta l ly syn tac t i ca l ,

from the p h e n o m e n o n it g r o u n d s in c o m p a r i s o n to the logic of i l lusion and

t r u t h , m i m e s i s and cons t ruc t ion?

T h r o u g h its h o l d i n g t o g e t h e r of the m o m e n t s of in teg ra t ion and

d i s i n t e g r a t i o n m o d e r n i s m a c k n o w l e d g e s its p a r t i c i p a t i o n in d o m i n a t i o n in

t h e s a m e g e s t u r e in w h i c h it a t t e m p t s to specify and twist free from it.

Twis t ing f r ee occur s th rough se l f - impl ica t ion , tw is t ing more fu l ly in to and

b e c o m i n g an e l e m e n t of w h a t it is c r i ti c i zi n g . T h e r e is no outs ide pos i t ionfo r art to tw is t in to ; hence , it is o n l y t h r o u g h a s t r u c t u r e d i m m e r s i o n , the

c o n t i n u a t i o n of r a t iona l iza t ion , tha t art real izes its dis tance f rom mere l i fe .

Modern i s t works themse lves accompl i sh th i s end t h r o u g h t r a c i n g the h i s

to ry f rom beau ty to subl imity , f rom tas te to t r u t h . E a c h m o d e r n i s t w o r k

m u s t r e p r e s e n t the m o m e n t of b e a u t y it cou ld have had but forwent .

B e c a u s e b e a u t y has been avai lable but res is ted , th is t rac ing is equal ly an

e th ica l ges tu re .

In i t ia l ly hos t i le to expres s ion , the fo rmal na tu re of beau ty ha l f

t r iu m ph an t ly t r ans fo rm s it se l f in to a k ind of expres s ion where in the

m e n a c e of d o m i n a t i o n of n a t u r e is w e d d e d to a sense of yearn ing for

the de fea ted v ic t ims of t h a t d o m i n a t i o n . T h u s t h i s e x p r e s s i o n is one

of g r ie f abou t sub juga t ion and its v a n i s h i n g p o i n t , i.e. d e a t h . . . T h e

gr ie f tha t art expresses resul ts f rom the fact that it real izes unreal

r econc i l i a t ion at the e x p e n s e of r ea l r econc i l i a t ion . All t h a t art is

c a p a b l e of is to gr ieve for the sacrifice it m a k e s , w h i c h is the self-

sacrifice of art in the s ta te of p o w e r l e s s n e s s .. . W h i l e the idea of works

i s mode l led on i m m o r t a l i t y and eternal l i fe , the road to tha t des t i

na t ion is s t r ewn wi th the annihi la ted l i fe of p a r t i c u l a r s . (AT, 77 -8 ;

S A T , 83)




Art 's sacrif ice of itself, w h i c h is its grief, is formal ly its d is in teg ra t ive

m o v e m e n t ; h e n c e a l s o its a t t e m p t to o v e r c o m e the a u t o n o m o u s l y b e a u t i

ful: 'For the sake of the beau t i fu l , the re canno t be a beaut i fu l any m o r e :

b e c a u s e it has s topped be ing beau t i fu l ' (AT, 79; SAT, 84). Art s tops be ing

beaut i fu l , or be t te r , beau ty s tops be ing beau t i fu l when its h a r m o n y and

t r anqu i l l i ty appear as s y n o n o m o u s w i t h the very forces that make art ac o u n t e r - i m a g e to mere l ife in the f irs t instance. It is equal ly th is gr ief that

r e q u i r e s the s u p p r e s s i o n of tha t o the r g r ie f over pa rad i se lo s t : 'Au then t ic

w o r k s m u s t w i p e out any m e m o r y t r a c e of r econc i l i a t ion - in the in te res t

o f r econc i l i a t ion ' (AT, 333; SAT , 348).

Art ' s gr ief and socia l culpabi l i ty (AT, 208), and its a t t e m p t to a t o n e for

i t s cu lpabi l i ty , are but the ethical face of its b e c o m i n g ' c o n s c i o u s of the

n o n - i d e n t i c a l in [its] m i d s t ' (AT, 194; SAT, 202). We have a l r eady no ted

the p lace of sacrifice in the logic of the s u b l i m e . A d o r n o ' s a c c o u n t h u g s

the shore l ine of the K a n t i a n s u b l i m e w h i l e t r a n s f o r m i n g it: w h a t was the

sacrifice of the i m a g i n a t i o n for the sake of r e a s o n b e c o m e s the sacrifice of

the mate r ia l equ iva len t of the unify ing work of the t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i m a g i n

a t i o n , i.e. aes the t i c beau ty , for the sake of the t ru th ( r eason) tha t wou ld

r e d e e m it. O n l y a logic of th is k ind can exp la in the e th ica l we igh t we are

w o n t to asc r ibe to the r isk taken in m o d e r n i s t w o r k s . The risk of m e a n i n g

is more p rec i s e than Der r ida a l lows : it is the risk of a e s t h e t i c b e a u t y . And

the r i sk mat te r s as r isk because of w h a t it depar t s f rom. The sacrifice of

b e a u t y , h o w e v e r , is e th ica l in ano ther s ense because it is not i n n o c e n t , an

i n n o c e n c e t h a t w o u l d a d h e r e to it from the per spec t ive of r e - m a r k i n g and

quas i - t r anscenden ta l cons t i tu t ion . Der r ida ' s N ie tzschean a f f i rmat ion , 'i t

g iv es ' loosens the his tor ical gui l t a t taching to the p a i n t i n g , ' u n t y i n g ' the

pa in t ing f rom its his tor ical locale as well as its d e r i v i n g its p o w e r to i n t e r

rup t h i s to ry f rom wha t has made tha t h i s to ry one of suffering. It t h e r e b y

m a k e s the pa in t ing ' s ges tu re t r anscenden ta l ly ecs ta t i c r a the r than h i s to r i

cally tragic. By m a k i n g the modern i s t sub l ime ' s s ac r i f i ce h i s to r ica l Adorno

locates its i n t e r r u p t i o n of h is to ry for the sake of ano ther h i s to ry w i th in a

historical field of forces capable of t r a n s f o r m a t i o n . But t r a n s f o r m a t i o n isposs ib le on ly th rough the gu i l t of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in w h a t has a l r eady fo rmed

h i s t o r y a g a i n s t n o n - i d e n t i t y . W i t h o u t the confess ion of gu i l t , wh ich is

equa l ly the den ia l of uncond i t iona l a f f i rmat ion , the d e c o n s t r u c t i v e s u b l i m e

is guilty a second t ime; it is the beaut i fu l soul of m o d e r n i t y .

F o r A d o r n o , Van G o g h ' s p a i n t i n g is an i l lu so ry Ant igone ; but it is the

w o r k ' s c a p t u r e in an i l l u s o r y d o m a i n , and h e n c e in a d o m a i n q u i t e o t h e r

t h a n the t ragic pol i t ica l space of a n c i e n t G r e e c e , t h a t d e t e r m i n e s the

c h a r a c t e r of its eth ical act. Can we u n d e r s t a n d t h a t act as o t h e r t h a n

m a r k i n g the a b s e n c e of a po l i t i ca l communi ty? The Van G o g h can succeed

o n l y t h r o u g h the d is so lu t ion and t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the very s t ruc tu res tha t

allow his p a i n t i n g to be. The d e e d of the p a i n t i n g s u m m o n s up ju s t the




se l f -de te rmin ing sp i r i t tha t An t igone ' s deed exempl i f i ed and r equ i red

f rom the Greek polis. Her deed , l ike h i s , t r ansg res ses the boundar ies

cons t i tu t ing the r e levan t domain o f p rac t i ce because tha t domain does

not preserve but squanders the very l i fe i t seeks to suppor t . Both deeds

rehea r se an exchange o f r ecogn i t ion an d no n- rec ogn i t ion , an d o f a c lash

be tween apparen t ly au tonomous spheres ( r e l ig ion and s ta te , a r t andempir ical l i fe) . Non-recogni t ion (as death and i l lus ion) a lways involves the

supp res s ion o f the s e l f -de te rm in ing sp i r i t expres sed in the e th ica l deed .

Both deeds ar ise f rom the margins of thei r respect ive socia l wor lds :

Ant igone ' s f rom the marg in o f f ami ly and woman , Van Gogh ' s f rom a r t .

In bo th cases the sph ere in que s t ion is the locus of a sup pre ssed sensu ous

par t icular i ty and of a so l idar i ty (pol i t ica l love) los t to the wor ld . Pol i t ica l

love is what underlies the sacrif ice at work in both cases: of l ife and beauty

( the i l lus ion of l i fe) . Confess ion , the admiss ion of culpabi l i ty , s tems f rom

love ; that is what makes art the rose in the cross of the present; i t sacrif ices

wil l ingly , af f i rming the wor ld , the l ives contor ted in i t , in the only way

tha t can acknowledge wha t has been d i s to r ted . Tha t i s a r t ' s pa in fu l

p leasure , i t s p leasured pain . The ' joy ' or af f i rmat ion in sacr i f ice der ives

not f rom future recompense, but f rom i ts ac t ing out of love of the wor ld as

it is.

In bo th cases , then , the va l id i ty and au tonomy o f the marg ina l i zed

sphe re is i l lu so ry . Van G og h ' s pa in t ing canno t s ay wha t t r ans fo rmat ion

of the spheres o f modern i ty wou ld r edeem i t s s ac r i f i ce , any more thanA n t i g o n e c o u l d . W h a t H e g e l a t t e m p t e d f o r A n t i g o n e , A d o r n o i s a t t e m p t

ing fo r the modern i s t sub l ime . The ana logy be tween the i r e f fo r t s p resen t s

th e pos s ib il i ty th a t m ore th an an ana logy is a t work , tha t Ad orn o is r epe a t

ing the Hege l ian work o f specu la t ion , tha t he too i s r emember ing

An t igon e . H e mo ur ns Ant igo ne because tha t is wh a t the g r ief s ed im en ted

in the mo dern i s t sub l im e expres ses . T h e mo m en t o f An t igone is the

m o m e n t w h e n t h e r e c o g n i t io n o c c u r s t h a t o n l y a c o m m u n i t y o f 'f r e e '

subjects could real ize the potent ia l i ty for e th ical l i fe impl ic i t in the dual i ty

be tween re l ig ion and polis. T h e m o m e n t o f t h e a e s t h e t i c s u b l i m e i s t h em om en t whe n the ' ha r m on y ' be tw een a r t and em pi r ica l li fe is r ea li zed to

be a d is ha rm on y, a conf l ic t in wh ich th e marg inal iz ed sp he re is not an

in teg ra ted moment in the to ta l i ty bu t the r e fuge and r epos i to ry fo r wha t

empir ical l i fe re jects . Now we have nei ther f ree subjects nor an e th ical

co m m un i ty , on ly the i l lu s ion o f bo t h in a r t . T h e mo de rn i s t sub l ime is a

t r ag ic a r t . As t r ag ic bu t only ar t , in a way that ancient t ragedy was not , i t

mus t f igu re bo th the exc luded o the r and the communi ty tha t wou ld

recognize i t . In i t s gr ief ar t becomes the s tand- in for a pol i t ics that has

n e v e r b e e n .

I t i s impor tan t to r ecogn ize a l l the e lemen ts a t work in the s t ruc tu res

we have been out l in ing - aes thet ic ( f rom beauty to subl imity , and f rom

in teg ra t ion to d i s in teg ra t ion ) ; cogn i t ive ( f rom tas te to t ru th ) ; and e th ica l




in f ac t , Adorno genera l ly l inks h i s ana lyses o f modern i sm and the modern

i s t sub l ime to the wr i t ings o f Samuel Becke t t , to whom Aesthetic Theory

was to be dedicated . So, for example , epis temical ly , which is to say , in

terms of ar t ' s character of being i l lus ion and semblance, in terms of i t s

'suggestion of m ean ing am id a genera l lo s s o f m ea n in g ' , (A T , 222 ; SA T ,

2 3 1 ; my i t a l i c s ) ,1 2

we f ind: ' aes thet ic t ranscendence [ the t ru th c la im of them od ern i s t sub l im e] and d i s e nch an tm en t [ the c la im o f aes the t i c fo rmal

i sm w hich i s the co nseq uen ce o f r a t iona l iza t ion ] ach ieve un i son in the

speech les snes s tha t charac te r izes Becke t t ' s work ' (A T , 117 ; S A T , 123).

E th ica l ly too Becke t t ' s work fo rms the pa rad igm of a r t caugh t by the log ic

of culp abi l i ty and sacri f ice .

By fo l lowing the dynamic of se l f -sameness to the end, ar t works

as s imi la te themse lves to the non- iden t ica l . Th i s i s the s tage o f deve l op m en t mime s i s has r eached today . Reco nc i l i a t ion as m eth od o r

m od e o f co nd uc t i s d i s ce rn ib le a t the p res en t t im e in those w orks

which have ab and one d th e t r ad i t iona l idea o f r econc i l i a t ion , works

where the fo rm p resc r ibes inexorab i l i ty . Such unreconc i led r econ

ci l ia t ion in the form , how ever , h as as a co nd i t ion th e unr eal i ty of ar t ,

wh ich keeps th rea ten ing to invade and ideo log ize them. . .By the i r

very a pr ior i assumption or idea , i f you prefer , works of ar t become

par t o f the con tex t o f cu lpab i l i ty . When they succeed they t r anscend

blame, only to f ind themselves having to a tone for t ry ing to escape.

Every work is a 'desecrat ion of s i lence ' (Becket t ) wishing i t were

p o s s i b l e t o r e s t o r e t h a t s i l e n c e . ( A T , 1 9 4 - 5 ; S A T , 2 0 2 - 3 )

The p resence o f s i l ence ( absence) , wh ich pe rvades Becke t t ' s work , i s p ro

vided b y Ad orn o w ith a r igorou s sense . Ae s thet ica l ly , s i lence is the d i rect

r esu l t o f a r t ' s r a t iona l iza t ion in to an au tonomous sphere ; cogn i t ive ly , aes

the t ic s i lence is do ub led or repeate d in the formal c la im of the w ork

bey ond aes the t i c c la iming - the s il ence o f the mo der n i s t sub l im e; andeth ical ly s i lence s ignif ies the innocence depar ted f rom by ar t ' s necessary

par t i c ipa t io n in r a t iona l iza t ion , dom ina t ion and sub juga t ion o f the no n-

ident ical o ther , in the very aes thet ic ac t , the only one avai lable to i t ,

th ro ug h wh ich i t r eg i s te r s i t s d i s s en t f rom ra t iona l ized dom ina t io n . Aes

thet ic s i lence is both a h is tor ical fa te and a form of refuge, a pos i t ion to be

cr i t i c ized and the cond i t ion fo r tha t c r i t ique be ing lodged . Which i s why

cr i t ique a lways recoi ls on itself, why, tha t i s , c r i t ique i s imposs ib le w i thou t

sacr i f ice . S i lence mus t be g iven voice , suf fer ing expressed: the r isk of

m e a n i n g i s a l w ay s a c o m i n g - t o - p r e s e n c e , b e i n g p r e s e n t . W h a t A d o r n o s ay s

of Benjamin 's phi losophy holds for ar t as wel l : phi losophy and ar t can be

more than ' bus t l e ' on ly where they run ' the r i sk o f to ta l f a i lu re ' (ND, 19) .

Is the r isk of total fa i lure appl icable to the re-marking of the unt ied laces?




Ca n to ta l f a ilu re be tho ug h t w i th in a t r ansc end en ta l ph i losophy? Do es no t

uncondi t ioned af f i rmat ion b lock the spectre of fa i lure?

T h e e n t w i n e m e n t o f t h e v a l u e s p h e r e s of t r u t h , g o o d n e s s a n d s u b l i m i t y

(a l ias beauty) in s i lence, for ca tegor ia l reasons the only way they can now

be en tw ine d, is the categor ia l and h is tor ical c la im of th e m od ern is t wo rk .

S ince aes thet ic s i lence is the resul t of ra t ional izat ion , i t i s what modernis t

(enigmat ic) s i lence opposes ; and s ince e th ical s i lence is paras i t ic on epis -

t emic s i l ence , then the u l t ima te va l id i ty o f the modern i s t work tu rns on

the va l ida t ion o f i t s ep i s temic c la im. However , s ince a r t ' s capac i ty to r eg i s

ter th is c la im turns on i ts a pr ior i concept or idea , the concept or idea of

sensuous par t icular i ty , i t fo l lows that no fu l ly d iscurs ive val idat ion of ar t ' s

c la iming i s pos s ib le . What i s equa l ly ev iden t , however , i s tha t a r t ' s

categor ia l se l f -consciousness , and i ts ref lec t ive d isplacement of enl ightened

categor ia l ar t icula t ions , only regis ter i f they are d iscurs ively , p hi l os o

ph ica l ly , in te rp re ted . A do rno too , the n , l ike De r r id a , mu s t a t t em pt togenerate a logic of paras i t i sm, a logic of in teract ion between ar t and phi l

osoph y . And fo r h im too a r t exceeds ph i losoph ica l d i s cu r s iv i ty . A do rn o ' s

paras i t i c log ic , how ever , is no t t r a nsce nde n ta l b u t d ia lec ti ca l and spec u la t

ive; or r a the r , A do rno m us t b e thou gh t o f a s opp os ing a d ia lec t ica l and

specu la t ive accoun t o f the r e la t ion be twe en a r t and ph i lo soph y to a pa ra

s i t i c one . The s t ronger accoun t o f the r e la t ion be tween a r t and ph i losophy

in Adorno der ives f rom h i s pe rcep t ion o f the s t ronger c la im the a r t work

m akes , on the one ha nd ; and the f act tha t the c la im i s m ore h i s to r ica l an d

concre te on the o the r . For Adorno , the a r t work does no t w i thdraw f rompos i t ive mean ing bu t in te r roga tes i t th rough r i sk ing ano ther ( a lways

i l lu so ry ) pos i t iv ity . H e does no t pu r su e the idea o f con t inu i ng t r an sce n

den ta l r e fl ect ion be yond m etap hys ic s , beyo nd iden t i ty th ink ing ; r a th e r , fo r

h im ph i losophy ' lives on (N D , 3 ), in pa r t con sum ed wi th c r i t i c iz ing i t s

cons t i tu t ive des i re and cogni t ive dr ive for ident i ty , and in par t as a second

re flec tion up on w ha t o f i t se l f in t e r r up t s iden t i ty th ink ing an d sub jec t ive

reaso n - ar t .

T h i s r ead ing o f A do rno i s no t beyon d cha l lenge . Co ns ide r , fo r exam ple ,h i s p ro jec t fo r a m od ern i s t ph i loso ph y ,

1 3

or the aes the t i c iza t ion tha t theory

u n d e r g o e s i n Aesthetic Theory where f r agmenta t ion , the upse t t ing o f log i

cal subordinat ion and the use of rhetor ical f igures a l l p lay an essent ia l ro le .

Aga ins t the background o f h i s v i s ion o f modern i sm ' s dy ing , to be d i s

cussed in the f inal sect ion , a l l these factors poin t to a project whereby

phi losophy numer ical ly ass imila tes i t se l f to i t s (dying) object . This would

make Adorno ' s theory the d ia lec t i ca l tw in o f Der r ida ' s . Ye t the moments

o f pos i t iv i ty in Adorno , however apore t i c they may be , po in t to a ve r s ion

of apore t i c specu la t ion (which l eaves unques t ioned how apore t i c o r non-apore t i c H ege l ' s own conc ep t ion o f specu la t ion was ) a s expres s in g th e

inne r mov em ent o f h i s tho ug h t ; and on ly th i s conc ep t ion i s ade qu a te to

mee t the cha l l enge , i f tha t i s the co r rec t word , o f decons t ruc t ion .




Art c r i t i ca l ly and ca tegor ia l ly in te r rup t s iden t i ty th ink ing . Ph i losophy ,

which possesses that capaci ty for in ter rupt ion only weakly and der ivat ively ,

nee ds ar t for the sake of i t s c la ims to no n- ide nt i ty , as ar t nee ds phi los

ophy in o rder to e labora te wha t i t a lone can accompl i sh : 'The ob jec t o f

aes the t i c s de te rmines i t s e l f a s inde te rminab le (unbestimmbar), nega t ive .

Tha t i s why a r t needs ph i losophy to in te rp re t i t . Ph i losophy says wha t a r tcannot say , a l though i t i s ar t a lone which is able to say i t : by not saying

i t ' (A T , 107 ; S A T , 113) . Ar t and ph i loso phy s tand to one ano th er

as in tu i t ion to concep t , pa r t i cu la r to un iver sa l . Bu t the concep t does no t

here ra ise the in tu i t ion to itself; aes the t i c t ru th i s no t sub la ted in to

ph i losoph ica l t ru th in Adorno . On the con t ra ry , because i t i s s ensuous

par t i cu la r i ty tha t has become domina ted by the r e ign o f sub jec t ive

reason - in s t ru m en t a l r eason and cap i ta l excha nge re la t ions - wh ich

en ta i l s the s i l enc ing o f non-subsumpt ive knowing and judg ing ; and

because the d i s to r t ion incur red by d i s cu r s ive knowing th rough i t s s epar

a t ion f rom non-subsumpt ive knowing on ly ca tegor ia l ly appear s f rom the

per spec t ive of no n-s ub sum pt i ve k now ing , it fo llows th en tha t ph i losophy i s

provided with i t s evidence and force by ar t . Aesthetic Theory i s the t racing

of the poss ib i l i ty of ar t being the saying of what phi losophy can no longer

say . I t hence inver ts the re la t ion between ar t and phi losophy (because i t i s

p h i l o s o p h y i n it s a u t o n o m o u s m o d e t h a t h a s e n d e d : N D , 3) w h i c h h a d

been th e theore t i ca l cen t re o f He ge l ' s accou n t o f the dea th o f a r t . Because

the re has been no p rogres s in the consc iousnes s o f f r eedom, because the re

has been 'no progress in the real wor ld ' , a r t remains the p lace of our

consc iousnes s o f needs , das Bewusstsein von Noten ( A T , 2 9 7 ; S A T , 3 0 9 ) .

Ar t r emains a p lace o f mourn ing fo r Adorno , bu t the g r ie f i t expres ses i s

not over an ideal pas t or i t s own pass ing; ra ther , ar t mourns over i t s par

t i c ipa t ion in r a t iona l ized dom ina t io n ( and the v ic t ims o f tha t dom ina t ion )

that has lef t i t the repos i tory of our consciousness of needs .

T w o e lem en ts , then , a re invo lved in A do rno ' s theo ry o f t ru th in a r t :

f i r s t , he mus t e laborate an account of the modernis t subl ime as having a

t r u t h c o n t e n t t h a t t r a n s c e n d s a u t o n o m o u s a e s t h e t i c c l a i m i n g ; a n d s e c ond ly , he mus t p rov ide an accoun t o f how tha t c la iming i s a r t i cu la ted

ph i losoph ica l ly . W ha t t roub les bo t h accoun ts i s tha t a r t ' s t ru th c on te n t

is no t r ep res en ta t ion a l , no t a t ru th c la im abou t som e s t r a igh t fo rward ly

empi r ica l sub jec t mat te r , but a categorial truth claim, a claim about art and

the nature of truth (reason) in modernity. The fu l l oddnes s o f Adorno ' s

pos i t ion becomes v i s ib le when we ask why a r t r equ i res ph i losoph ica l

e l u c i d a t i o n . W h y s h o u l d n ' t a r t c r i t i c i s m , i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a n d c o m m e n t a r y ,

r emain the veh ic le th rough which a r t r eaches d i s cu r s ive a r t i cu la t ion? A

cr i t ic ism of Adorno 's pos i t ion on th is mat ter has been forceful ly lodged by

A l b r e c h t W e l l m e r :

The a t t empt to un rave l the t ru th con ten t concea led in the work o f

a r t i s fo r Adorno no th ing bu t the a t t empt to r escue the t ru th o f a r t ,




which would o therwise be los t . What, howe ver , i s r e scued here

th ro ug h co ncep tua l a r t i cu la t ion i s the po lemica l-Utopian c o n c e p t o f

ar t as such - ar t ' s re la t io n to reconc i l ia t ion as som eth ing w hic h is

knowable: i t i s a t ru th about ar t and no t the t ru th con t en t o f the pa r

t icular works of ar t . I t i s only because for Adorno the two levels of

1) an analysis of the concept of the t ru th o f a r t and 2 ) the appropr i a t ion of each concrete t ru th of ar t , co incide , that he has to conceive

of aes thet ic knowledge as phi losophical ins ight and the t ru th of ar t

a s ph i losoph ica l t ru th . (T S R , 106) .

W e l l m e r is c o r r e c t: A d o r n o ' s a c c o u n t d o e s t u r n o n m a k i n g t h e t r u t h a b o u t

a r t over lap w i th the t ru th con ten t o f pa r t i cu la r works . Hence aga ins t

Adorno Wel lmer o f fe r s an accoun t o f a r t a s p rov id ing a t r ans fo rmat ion o f

perc ep t io n , a t r ans fo rm at ion tha t m us t be pe rce ived and recogn ized ' no t

in the way that the t ru th of a s ta tement is recognized, but in the way a

face is r ecogn ized ' ( T S R , 107) . W el lm er ' s o ften de l i ca te ana lys i s (T S R ,

107-10) a l lows h im to main ta in a d i s t inc t ion be tween aes the t i c va l id i ty

and cogn i t ive t ru th whi le exp lo r ing how the fo rmer can be t aken up in the

la t t e r th ro ug h the in te rm ed ia ry o f a t r ans fo rm ed sub jec t iv i ty , a 'r ea l

expan s ion o f the bo rde r s o f the sub jec t ' (T S R , 103) . H en ce whi le We l lm er

concedes tha t t ru th , t ru th fu lnes s ( aes the t i c va l id i ty and au then t ic i ty ) and

norm at ive r igh tn es s a re bo un d up in the work o f a r t , they a re so bo un d up

on ly metap hor ica l ly ; how ever , th e w ork o f a r t , as a symb ol ic cons t ru c t , i s

a t the same t ime an object of exper ience, an object for an embodied sub

jec t ac t ive in a com plex w or ld , in wh ich the th ree d im ens io ns o f t r u t h

(cogn i t ive , aes the t i c and mora l ) a re unmetaphor ica l ly l inked (TSR, 109) .

Fo r W el lme r , whose ac cou n t i s a r ecogn izab le ca tegor ia l ex tens ion o f

hermeneu t ic c r i t i c i sm, modern i sm d i f f e r s f rom t r ad i t iona l a r t on ly in

deg ree ; in i t the m om en t o f the t r ans fo rm at ion o f pe rc ep t ion th rou gh ae s

t h e t i c e x p e r ie n c e ' b e c o m e s i n c r ea s i n g ly d o m i n a n t ' ( T S R , 1 08 ). T h i s , h o w

ever , leaves ou t o f acc oun t how re flect ive and p rob lem at ic mo de rn i s t a r t

is , how much i t does concern i t s e l f w i th the question of i t s own na tu re andpurpose , a ques t ion ing tha t p roceeds p rec i s e ly th rough the suspens ion o f

aes the t i c mean ing . T o the degree to wh ich tha t ques t ion i s do m ina n t , to

the degree to wh ich the ach ievement o f au tonomy invo lves a con t inua l

a r t i s t ic in te r roga t ion in to the n a tu re and p lace o f a r t in m od ern i ty - an

in te r roga t ion accom pl i shed th rou gh a con t inua l c r it i ca l d ia logue w i th t r a

d i t io n and the h is tory of ar t - a nd to the deg ree to wh ich ar t is t ic achiev e

men t invo lves a r e insc r ip t ion o f the border s o f art, to tha t degree the t r u t h

con ten t o f pa r t i cu la r w orks o f a r t do over lap w i th the t ru th a bou t the

na tu re of ar t . T o b e sur e , even in a work l ike Endgame, which invo lves an

over t ref lec t ion on the re la t ion between meaning as i t cont inues in ar t , in

the ' refuge ' , and i ts lapse outs ide ar t , there exis ts as wel l a ref lect ion on

cer ta in ' subject mat ters ' : subject iv i ty , famil ia l t ies , the c la ims of nature ,

e tc . However , the c la ims abou t these sub jec t mat te r s t ake the i r p lace




with in the work by con t inua l ly be ing d raw n in to the o rb i t o f the work ' s

categor ia l se l f - ref lect ion .1 4

And this is as i t must be if the dis tort ions of

these exis tent ia l s t ruc tur es is a co nse qu en ce of ra t iona l izat ion and i ts

d i s to r t ion o f ca tegor ia l a r t i cu la t ions . Modern i s t a r t canno t be a r t unprob-

lema t ical ly ; each mo de rn is t wo rk is a d i f ferent ia ted respo nse to the

ques t ions 'What i s a r t ? ' and 'Why i s a r t ? ' ; a r e sponse tha t in tu rn r eac t s on

whatever apparen t sub jec t mat te r w i th which the work i t s e l f dea l s .

Wellmer ' s refusal of modernism's se l f - ref lect ive character , h is refusal

to acknowledge the na tu re o f the r i sk o f mean ing enac ted by modern i s t

works , has i t s proximate cause in h is assumption of the val id i ty of the

Habermas ian ve r s ion o f Cr i t i ca l Theory . H is genera l l ine o f a rgument

t u r n s o n t h e t h o u g h t t h a t t h e A d o r n o e s q u e p a r a d i g m o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n

ough t to be r ep laced by the Habermas ian v i s ion o f d ia log ica l r e la t ion

sh ips be tween hu m an ind iv idua l s in a l ibe ra l soc ie ty , tha t i s , the im age

of the non -v io len t toge the rnes s o f the man i fo ld imaged in au th en t ic a r tworks p roper ly p re - f igu res an uncor rup ted in te r sub jec t iv i ty , a 'mu tua l

and cons t r a in t - f r ee un de r s ta nd ing am on g ind iv idua l s who com e to a

com puls ion- f ree un de r s ta nd ing w i th them se lves - soc ia tion w i tho u t

r e p r e s s i o n ' . 1 5 The reason p ro f fe red as to why we ough t to make t h i s s u b

s t i tu t ion is tha t the ph i losoph y o f consc iou snes s w i th in which Ad orn o

works r es t r i c t s the comprehens ion o f r a t iona l i ty to in s t rumen ta l r a t ion

a l i ty ; thu s i t can no t ac tua l ly nam e o r ana lyse wh a t i s des t royed th rou gh

ins t rumental reason. Mimes is as a f igure of what is los t sugges ts ' a re la t ion

be tween per sons in wh ich one accommodates to the o the r , iden t i f i e s w i th

t h e o t h e r , e m p a t h i z e s w i t h t h e o t h e r ' , 1 6 bu t can do no more . Hence wha t i s

o the r than ins t rumen ta l r eason r emains opaque to r a t iona l i ty , and a

l ibera ted socie ty becomes s imply the o ther of th is socie ty . This is

A d o r n o ' s ' a b y s s (Abgrund) b e t w e e n p ra x i s a n d h a p p i n e s s ' ( A T , 1 7 - 1 8 ;

SAT, 26) . A l te ra t ion to a communica t ion -based theory a l lows the r a t iona l

co re o f the mimet ic ach ievements o f a r t to be un locked in t e rms o f

c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a l i t y . ' T h i s Utopian p r o j e c t i o n , ' W e l l m e r a r g u e s ,

' does no t desc r ibe the "Other" o f d i s cu r s ive r eason , bu t i t s own idea o f

itself. Because th i s Utopian pro jec t ion r emains a t t ached to the cond i t ions

of language, what i s a t i s sue here is an inner-wor ld ly - in th is sense

" m a t e r i a l i s t " - Utopia' ( T S R , 9 9 ) .

W ha t is s ignif icant abo ut aut on om ou s ar t , th en , i s again i t s funct ional

capaci ty for a l ter ing in tersubject ive re la t ions and re leas ing t h e c o m m

un ica t ive po ten t ia l r ep res sed by cap i ta l ' s in t rus ion in to a r t i s t i c d i s t r ibu t ion

and r ecep t ion . Wel lmer ' s de fence o f a he rmeneu t ica l accoun t o f a r t i s t i c

cogn i t ion , and h i s r e fusa l to engage w i th mo de rn i s t a r ti s t i c p ro duc t io n

w ith i ts categ orial self-reflection - w hi ch does not d i rec t ly image a nonv io len t toge thernes s o f the man i fo ld , but i n c l u d e s a n e m p h a t i c m o m e n t o f

d i s sonanc e - i s r equ i red by his accep tance o f th e W e b e r - H a b e r m a s t h e

s is that the categor ia l separat ion of t ru th in to knowledge, moral Tightness




and aes the t i c va l id i ty r ep resen t s th e c o g n i t i v e a c h i e v e m e n t o f m o d e r n i t y .

W ellm er is suff ic ient ly 'm ate r ia l is t ' in h is ap pro ac h to ack now ledg e tha t

were a r t is t i c p rod uc t io n d i s to r ted in the way tha t the ins t i tu t iona l iza t ion

of ar t d is tor ts i t s re la t ions of d is t r ibut ion and recept ion , then h is defence

of ca tegor ia l modern i ty wou ld co l lapse . And wi th tha t co l l apse the re

wou ld fo llow as wel l the co l l apse of W el lm er ' s and H ab erm as ' s d e fence o fa cont inuis t concept ion of h is tor ical change f rom capi ta l to i t s successor

socia l format ion . Nothing, however , speaks in favour of the e l is ion of

modern i s t a r t i s t i c p roduc t ion f rom cons ide ra t ion ; and no th ing tha t

H a b e r m a s o r W e l l m e r s a y a b o u t a r t i s t i c m o d e r n i s m s u p p o r t s t h e h y p o t h

es is that i t does not involve categor ia l se l f - ref lect ion , an in ter rogat ion in to

the na tu re and purpose o f a r t in modern i ty tha t ques t ions i t s inc lus ion

wi th in an au ton om ous sp here o f va l id i ty . " O n the con t ra ry , the conces s ion

tha t in mo dern i ty a r t i s t i c r e la t ions o f d i s t r ib u t ion and r ecep t io n bec om e

dis to r ted , de fo rmed , i s un in te l l ig ib le un les s a r t is t i c p ro du c t io n i s inc lu ded .O ne can no t sus ta in an acc oun t o f an a l te ra t ion in r ecep t ion w i th ou t th a t

acco un t com ing to in fect a r t i s t i c p ro du c t io n . An d , o f cou r se , every th ing

Adorno says coheres w i th the t r ad i t iona l mate r ia l i s t idea tha t p roduc t ion i s

p r im ary over r ecep t ion . I f the r e is an apore t i c mo m en t in m od ern i s t a r t ,

tha t mo m en t s t em s f rom the chang ed pos i t ion o f a r t i s t i c p rodu c t io n .

Noth ing Wel lmer s ays d i r ec t ly cha l l enges th i s thes i s .

W el lm er and H ab er m as w an t to p rese rve a co re o f r eason and r a t io n

a l ity tha t r em ains un tou ch ed by r a t iona l iza t ion . T h is is the n eo -K an t ia n

m om en t o f the i r tho ug h t . T he i r f ea r is tha t were the re to be a r e in te

g ra t ion o f spheres then pow er and r eason wou ld aga in becom e fused ;

'm er e ' ideology and t ru t h cou ld no longer be con t ras ted as such . H en ce

t h e y to o w a n t a n u n c o n d i t i o n e d a ff ir m at iv e m o m e n t . T r u t h ' s e n t a n g l e

m en t w i th power , wh ich i s inde ed wh a t keeps dom ina t ion on the po l i t ica l

and h i s to r ica l agen da , is wh a t a l lows t ru th to ma t te r . Tr u th d i s c r im ina tes

aga ins t un t ru th ; tha t i s t ru th ' s non- to le rance . Tru th ' s l ack o f to le rance , i t s

en tang lemen t w i th power , i s po l i t i ca l ly the non-de tachab i l i ty o f ju s t i ce

and goodnes s . I f ju s t i ce does no t judge , i t canno t be good . Un iver sa l i sm( jus t i ce ) w i thou t goodnes s thus l acks h i s to r ica l fo rce , and the reby repea t s

th e v io lence i t wou ld oppo se . Co m m un ica t ive r a t iona l i ty i s no t bad per se,

a n y m o r e t h a n h a r m o n y o r u n i t y i n w o r k s i s ; b u t i n k e e p i n g c o m m u n i

c a t io n p u r e , i n t h e n o r m s o f c o m m u n i c a t i v e r a t i o n a li t y , H a b e r m a s a n d

Wel lmer r emain bound to the log ic o f beau ty , a log ic o f i l lu s ion tha t does

no t recognize i tse l f in i t s no n- id en t ica l o ther . I t thereb y forfe its th e n o n -

iden t i ty i t wou ld p rom ote . Co m m un ica t ive r a t iona l i ty i s ano ther beau t i fu l

sou l .

Aes the t i ca l ly , the consequence o f the i r accep tance o f such a (quas i -

t r a n s c e n d e n t a l ) c o r e is t h e p r e s u m p t i o n t h a t m o d e r n i s m is a n u n e q u i v o c a l

cogn i t ive advance beyond the t r ad i t ion when v iewed f rom the ang le o f

a r t i s t ic p rod uc t io n . N o t on ly i s the a t t e m pt to in su la te a r t i s t i c p ro du c t io n



248 O L D G O D S A S C E N D IN G

f rom i ts ins t i tu t ional izat ion in a separate ar t wor ld misguided; i t makes

opaque the connec t ion be tween deve lopments in a r t i s t i c fo rm and a r t

m ov em en ts tha t ma de the fact o f in s t i tu t iona l iza t ion p a ra m ou n t , such as

the Avan t -garde . Tha t opac i ty i s bu t the r ever se s ide o f the a t t empt to

p ro tec t en l igh tened r eason in the fo rm o f com m unic a t ive r a t iona l i ty f rom

con tag ion by the des t ru c t ive fo rces o f m ode rn i ty . Suc h p ro tec t ion c anno tbe had (A T , 109) ; worse , the em pha s i s on com m un ica t i on , however

impor tan t i t migh t be , d i sp laces the cen t ra l ro les o f r e f l ec t ive judgement ,

c rea t ive p rax i s and sub l imi ty which , we have been a rgu ing , p rov ide the

rea l con tour s , the ca tegor ia l an t i c ipa t ions , o f an in te r sub jec t iv i ty wo r th

h a v i n g .

iv Tr uth and Spec u la t ion

I f a r t canno t d i r ec t ly escape i t s au tonomized p lacemen t in modern i ty , then

i t can t r anscen d tha t p lacem en t on ly th rou gh th e em plo ym ent o f the ve ry

ar t is t ic forms that render i t au tonomous in the f i r s t ins tance. And th is i s

equ iva len t to s ay ing tha t modern i s t works mus t fo rce the concep ts o f aes

the t i c va l id i ty to su rmoun t themse lves towards t ru th . Aes the t i c va l id i ty

thus becomes d if ferent to i t se l f in i t s modernis t guise . By means of aes

the t i c va l id i ty , then , modern i s t a r t mus t in s inua te i t s des i r e to be more

than a r t ; i t mus t inc lude w i th in i t s e l f a moment o f an t i - a r t , a moment

in which ar t i s r i sked for the sake of what ar t promises (AT, 464) . The

tradi t ional subs tance of ar t , that i s , those e lements of ar t that account

for the poss ib i l i ty of aes thet ic val id i ty , are col lected under the heading

of ' i l lus ion ' . I l lus ion , again , qual i f ies or brackets a work 's appearance of

bein g a th ing- in - i tse l f . I f a work w ere a th in g- in - i tse l f i t wou ld be a

wor ld ly ob jec t , un sup po r ted by the b rac ke t in g o f m ean ing and p urpo se

cons t i tu t ive of the aes thet ic sphere; the se l f -suff ic iency of works , engin

ee red th rou gh fo rm, is i t se l f the fo rm up on wh ich i l lu s ion r es t s (A T , 425) .

W hic h i s why one can no t com pre he nd the i llu so ry chara c te r o f a r t w i tho u ta t the s am e t ime inves t iga t ing the ca tegor ia l de te rm ina t ion s o f a r t , tha t

is, the categor ies cons t i tu t ive of aes thet ic val id i ty as opposed to those

cons t i tu t ing epis temic and moral val id i ty . What is rea l or i l lusory is a lways

a ca tegor ia l ma t te r . Which i s no t to deny tha t a r t works a re r ea l th ings ;

their rea l and i l lusory d is ta nce f rom wh at is con s ide red em pir ical exis ten ce

i n s t i t u t e s t h e i r a n t i n o m i c c h a r a c t e r . T h e a v a n t - g a r d e e x c h a n g e b e t w e e n

ar t works and r ea l th ings i s the pas sage th rough i l lu s ion in i t s au tonomous

signif ication.

Aes the t i c t ru th i s the ' t r anscenden t d imens ion o f i l lu s ion in wh ich

i l lu s ion t r anscends itself. T h e t ru th o f work s o f a r t is ne i the r the i r m ea n

ing nor the in ten t ion beh ind them, bu t ' t he t ru th we ga in th rough the

med ium of a r t ' (AT, 398 ; SAT, 423) . Because the t ru th o f a r t i s wha t




occurs ' th rou gh ' the me d iu m of a r t , t ru th is no t an e lem en t o r com po nen t

o f works : 'A r t moves towards t ru th . I t i s no t d i r ec t ly iden t ica l w i th t ru th '

(A T , 394 ; S A T , 419) ; ' t ru th con ten t is no t one fac tua l g iven am on g o th er s

in a wo rk ' (A T , 398 ; S A T , 423) . T o sup pose the con t ra ry o f th i s v iew

would enta i l le t t ing i l lus ion , which is subs tant ia l in ar t , be t rue as such.

This would make a l l ar t works af f i rmat ive . Because the medium of ar t andthe med ium of i l lu s ion a re un i ted in a r t , the cogn i t ive e lemen t o f works

c a n n o t b e d i r e c t l y o r i m m e d i a t e l y i m m a n e n t t o t h e m . T h i s t h e s i s , h o w

ever , i s not equivalent to the idea that works have ' impl ied t ru ths ' , or

to the thes is that the t ru th of works is the t ru th of a poss ib i l i ty . Both

impl ied - t ru th theor ies and t ru th -o f -pos s ib i l i ty theor ies a re des igned in

o rder to exp la in how a r t works can have a cogn i t ive e lemen t wh i le s imul

taneous ly g ran t ing the va l id i ty and hegemony o f s t andard accoun ts o f

t ru th -as -c o r re spo nde nce and ra t iona l i ty . So im pl ie d - t r u th theor ies a l low

the t ru th of works to be t rue i f and only i f the propos i t ions impl ied by theworks a re ( s t andard ly ) t rue . Ar t works a re the reby depr ived o f any

in te rna l cogn i t ive d imens ion . What i s worse , i t r emains unc lea r why , in

accordance w i th impl ied - t ru th theor ies , aes the t i c ' r igh tnes s ' p rov ides good

reasons fo r cons ide r ing the p ropos i t ions impl ied by works as cand ida tes

for em pir ical con s ide rat ion . Re ply ing to th is d i ff iculty involves d em o n

s t r a t ing tha t aes the t i c fo rms a re s imul taneous ly soc ia l fo rms ; bu t once th i s

move i s made , the charac te r o f the s epara t ion be tween aes the t i c and

empi r ica l r a t iona l i ty p resupposed by impl ied t ru th theor ies co l l apses .

Tru th -o f -pos s ib i l i ty theor ies acknowledge works as ac t s o f p rac t i ca l

reaso n; for them t he in te rnal con s is tenc y of work s is a m ark in th em tha t

the ' imag ined ' pos s ib i l i t i e s in sc r ibed o r po r t r ayed by the work a re r ea l

pos s ib i l i t i e s , ones 'wor th ' cons ide r ing . Such theor ies a re sub-ca tegor ia l .

The pos s ib i l i t i e s they acknowledge accep t the ca tegor ia l t e rms o f r e fe rence

operat ive in empir ical rea l i ty as providing the in i t ia l condi t ions for the

imag ina t ive inves t iga t ion o f the work . As a consequence , they canno t p ro

v ide an accoun t o f the r e la t ion be tween the in te rna l cons i s tency o f an aes

the t i c pe r fo rmance and an ac t o f p rac t i ca l cogn i t ion . Indeed , such theor iesp rov ide no accoun t o f the idea o f aes the t i c cons i s tency , bu t r a the r t ake

some fo rm o f a r t i s t i c r ea l i sm as« the i r no rm, and s imply cons t rue a work ' s

per form an ce as an act of pract ic a l ref lec tion . In brief, bo th types o f theory

are reduct ive , tak ing t ru th and reason as proper ly fu l ly d iscurs ive and

d isa l lowing the tho ug h t tha t the non-d i scu r s iv e mo m en t o f work s can

i tse l f be cogni t ive .

None the les s , a s we sha l l s ee , Adorno ' s pos i t ion i s ak in to bo th impl ied -

t ru th theor ies and t ru th -o f -pos s ib i l i ty theor ies . The s imi la r i ty to the fo r

m er is evid ent in the way he con nec ts ar t is t ic prac t ice and phi lo soph ical

in te rp re ta t ion ; wh i le the s imi la r i ty to the l a t t e r i s invoked when Adorno

employs works as indexes of ca tegor ia l potent ia l i t ies la tent in ar t is t ic prac

t ice but not e lsewhere ( for the t ime being) in moderni ty . For a l l that ,




the cen tre of A do rn o 's end eav ou r is to sus ta in the cogni t ive s ignif icance

of w ork s ' incom prehe ns ib i l i ty , the i r m om en t of non -d i scu r s ive cogn i t ion

( A T , 4 7 6 ) .

Sus ta in ing the m om en t of non-d i scu r s ive cogn i t ion can be und er s too d

in terms of sus ta in ing the cogni t ive s ignif icance of i l lus ion , where , again ,

i l lus ion m us t be in ter pre ted as the ( i llusory) uni ty of an aes the t ic pe rfo rmance . Th ink ing th i s pos s ib i l i ty invo lves pe rce iv ing the r idd le o f a r t , a

r idd le wh ich i s to be un der s tood bu t no t d i s cu r s ive ly u n t ied .

A metaphys ics of ar t today has to centre on the ques t ion of how

someth ing sp i r i tua l l ike a r t can be man-made o r , a s they s ay in ph i l

osoph y , m ere ly po s i t ed , wh i le a t the s am e t ime b e ing t rue . . .T o ask

how an ar tefact can be t ru e is to pose th e ques t ion of how i l lusion -

the il lu sion of t ru th - can be r ede em ed . T ru th con ten t canno t be an

ar te fac t . There fo re every ac t o f mak ing in a r t i s an end les s endeav

our to a r t i cu la te wha t i s no t makeab le , namely sp i r i t . (AT, 191 ;

S A T , 1 9 8 )

Like He idegger , and un l ike the Marx i s t he i s supposed to be , Adorno

a lways den ies tha t t ru th can be under s tood as someth ing made o r p ro

duc ed . Ind ee d , fo r h im th e me taphy s ics o f p ro duc t ion i s the m etaphys ics

o f iden t i ty th ink ing s ince made o r p roduced t ru th ' dup l ica tes the sub jec t ,

however co l l ec t ive , and def rauds i t o f wha t i t s eeming ly g ran ted ' (ND,376) . Tra nsc en den ta l sub jec t iv i ty , as r espon s ib le fo r the constitution of

the necessary condi t ions for the poss ib i l i ty of exper ience, i s thereby the

fulfi lment of the met aph ys ic s of pr od uc t io n; and negat iv e d ia lect ics the

at te m pt to 'us e the s t re ng th of the subject to brea k thro ug h the fa llacy

of cons t i tu t ive su b jec t iv i ty ' ( N D , xx) . T h e q ues t io n o f sp i r i t i s equa l ly a

ques t ion o f c rea t ion fo r Adorno ; bu t the ques t ion o f c rea t ion i s no t

t ranscendenta l s ince there has never been e i ther a subject or an object that

could be ' f i r s t ' : ' the subject i s never qui te the subject , and the object never

qui te the object ; and yet the two are not p ieced out of any th i rd thatt r ansc end s them , (N D , 175) . T h e des i r e for a non- re f lec t ive th i rd , w ha t

t r anscenden ta l a f f i rmat ion mus t a lways be , e i the r r epea t s the log ic o f p ro

duc t ion o r aes the t i c izes the h i s to r ica l to ta l i ty (o r bo th ) . On ly th rough

ackno wled g ing t he l ack o f a t r ansc end en ta l th i rd can h i s to r ica l succes s and

fa i lu re ach ieve fu l l immanence .

What is not makeable , sp i r i t , i s the in te l l ig ib le s t ructure of recogni t ion

of non- iden t ica l o the r s . Sp i r i t , r ecogn i t ion , canno t be w i l l ed o r pos i t ed .

This l imi t of vol i t ion is one we have seen before in o ther guises : in theup take o f works o f gen ius , in the r e la t ion be tween be ings and be ing , and

in the deco ns t ruc t iv e r e fusa l of the p ro b lem of f r eedom and au to nom y.

Each acknowledges in thei r own way, a l imi t to what can be achieved

th r ou gh ra t iona l , s e l f -de te rmined ac t ion in i ts sub sum pt iv e o r p ro du c-




t ionis t guise . Each ins is ts on a moment of heteronomy. Ar t i s for a l l a

mat r ix o f th i s p rob lem s ince a r t works a re in ten t iona l p roduc t s whose

s ign i f i cance t r anscends wha t i s in ten t iona l ly pos i t ed in them. Modern i s t

a r t ' s in sc r ip t ion o f tha t p rob lem i s un ique in tha t i t r a i s es tha t moment o f

a r t in to the cen t re , mak ing i t the cons t i tu t ive c la im o f works . Th is occur s

as a consequence of ar t ' s p lacement in socie ty , which is why th is c la imingcan be de tec ted in a r t i s t i c p rac t i ces ( su r rea l i sm, Dada) and theor ies ( such

as ins t i tu t ional theor ies of ar t ) whose immediate c la ims are qui te d i f ferent .

As we have a l ready seen, Adorno 's theory d if fers f rom those previous ly

exam ined in see ing in m od ern i s t a r t the goa l o f r ede em ing th e p rom ises

o f the En l igh tenment , above a l l the p romises o f f r eedom and happ ines s .

Fu r th e r , the ve ry f ac t o f a r ad ica l i zed aes the t i c dom ain , tha t is , a do m ain

in socie ty enact ing in an i l lusory mode the h is tor ical se l f -determinat ion of

a f ree socie ty , i s taken as a regis ter of the gap between the idea of f reedom

an d i ts rea l i ty . I t i s f rom th is theo ret ica l cons te l la t ion th at Ad or no der ives

the thes is that the process enacted by every ar t work is a 'model for a k ind

of p rax i s whe re in a co l lec t ive sub jec t i s con s t i tu te d ' ( A T , 343) . E l s ew here

he pu ts the m at te r th is way: 'E ns hr in ed in ar t is t ic object i f ica tion is a col

lec t ive W e. Th is W e is radical ly d i f ferent f rom the extern al W e of socie ty .

I t i s more l ike a res idue of an actual ly exis t ing socie ty of the pas t . The fact

that ar t addresses a col lect iv i ty is not a cardinal s in ; i t i s a corol lary of

the l aw o f fo rm ' (A t , 338 ; SAT, 353) . The l aw o f fo rm in au tonomous a r t

addresses a col lect iv i ty because in i t empir ical (mater ia l ) form and logical

fo rm a re no t opp osed ; a fo rm th a t i s quas i - em pi r ica l , wh ich i s a s m uc h

mate r ia l and s ensua l a s concep tua l , i s one whose mean ing i s con tex t -

de pe nd en t , and thu s a fo rm tha t can m ean on ly if i t i s our f o r m . A d o r n o ' s

W e i s t h e d i r e c t d e s c e n d e n t o f K a n t ' s sensus communis; i t s character as a

' r e s id ue ' r e fe r s to a r t ' s mem or ia l m om en t , wh i le i t s ena c tm en t o f the c on

s t i tu t ion of a W e specifies both w hat i t does and wh at it ad um br at es . I t

h i g h l i g h ts t h e h e t e r o n o m o u s m o m e n t i n t h e c o n s t i t u t io n o f a p e o p l e ,

a m om en t in i r r econc i lab le conf li ct w i th Kan t ian m ora l au ton om y an d

l ibe ra l , r igh t s -based , po l i t i ca l theory . Ar t works r ehear se the momentw h e r e i n p r a x i s e n t w i n e s w i t h m e a n i n g .

T h e r e i s , t h e n , a p e r h a p s s u r p r i s i n g i n t e r n a l c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t

Adorno wan ts to s ay abou t i l lu s ion and t ru th on the one hand , and wha t

needs to be s a id abou t the l imi t s o f in ten t iona l ac t ion on the o the r . What

provides for the conf luence of these two i tems , which one might have

though t to be a des ide ra tum fo r a genera l theory o f a r t and the aes the t i c i f

one were poss ib le , are the processes of ra t ional izat ion conjoined with the

fo rm they t ake when harnes sed to cap i ta l exchange r e la t ions . The s epar

a t ion of spheres of val id i ty and the tendent ia l ins tant ia t ion of universal

fung ib il i ty mak e d i s e nc ha n tm en t en ta i l the supp res s ion o f au t on om y, an

autonomy whose categor ia l inscr ip t ion l ives on in ar t is t ic praxis . The two

converge th rough the d ive rgence be tween un iver sa l i ty and par t i cu la r i ty as




de m an ds ; fung ib il i ty i s an i llu so ry acknow ledg em ent o f bo th un iver sa li ty

and par t i cu la r i ty . En l igh tened modern i ty acknowledges the c la ims o f

non- ident i ty in pr incip le but not in fact . Pace H e i d e g g e r a n d D e r r i d a ,

the h is tor ical ly developed dominat ion of the d i f ferent by the same is the

supp res s ion o f hu m an f r eedom ; a l thoug h the f r eedom suppres sed i s , o f

cou rse , not equ iva lent to the fu ll idea of au ton om y and se l f -de term inat ioninsc r ibed by the t r ad i t ion . Tha t no t ion o f f r eedom suppres ses the moment

o f he t e ron om y tha t is a cond i t ion and no t an ex te rna l cons t r a in t on au ton

omy. That i s what the concept of recogni t ion , spel led out a t the end of our

discuss ion of Derr ida , i s in tended to be a recogni t ion of .

T h e t r u th o f m ode rn i s t w orks , wh ich i s aga in the i r c r it i ca l su rp lu s

beyo nd t r ad i t iona l au ton om ous a r t ' s concep t ion o f aes the t i c va l id i ty , t r an

scends t r ad i t iona l aes the t i c Tightness in d i r ec t p ropor t ion to the capac i ty

o f works to t r anscend the i r fo rmal cons t ruc t ion . In o rder to make tha t

cons truct ion speak agains t i t se l f a work mus t aes thet ica l ly d issolve pre

v ious modes o f aes the t i c o rder ing . The d i s so lv ing , d i s in teg ra t ing agen ts

a re : se lf - re f lec t ion , i ro ny , pa rod y , d i s sona nce , f r agm enta t ion , m on ta ge ,

e tc . Bec ause th is d issolu t ion is ' aes the t ic ' , beca use wh at is involved h ere is

an act of se l f -overcoming by ar t , through the r isk of ' se l f -re l inquishment ' ,

and b ecau se wh at is to be ove rcom e is fun dam enta l ly a categor ia l d is tor

t ion o f cogn i t ion r eq u i r in g a r ig id jux tapos i t ion o f r a t iona l i ty and par t i cu

lar i ty , then the consequence o f modern i s t a r t i s t i c r e f l ec t ion mus t be a

cogni t ive c la im by the work that cannot be i t se l f d iscurs ively redeemed.

So the r ede m pt io n o f i l lu s ion is no t equ iva len t to a d i s cu r s ive r e dem pt io n

of the work , but ra ther the phi losophical ref lect ion on the c la im of the

worjc th at al lows i t to be recog nize d as a co gn itiv e claim . Ae sthe tics in the

Adornoesque mode , in the f i r s t in s tance , does no t r es t i tu te the t ru th o f a r t

works themse lves bu t that a t ru th c la im is what is being made. Aes thet ics

ins ta l l s modern i s t works , by t r ans fo rming the d i s course o f aes the t i c s

th rough them, in an apore t i c space in wh ich the s e l f - su rmoun t ing o f aes

the t i c va l id i ty can and m us t be under s too d as lodg ing a c la im to t ru th .

The c la im to be regis tered , however , i s s t i l l the c la im of the work itself.

Works c la im us beyond our capac i ty to r edeem them d i scu r s ive ly . In

A do rn o 's w r i t ings th is thes is i s g iven an au s ter e rea din g per ta in ing only to

the c la iming o f works be long ing to the modern i s t sub l ime . The aus te r i ty

o f Ad orn o ' s acco un t tu rns on the fac t tha t the t r u t h o f m ode rn i s t works

is res t r ic t edly th e t r u th of a neg at ion : 'N o t ru th in works of ar t w i tho ut

de te rmina te nega t ion ; today aes the t i c s has th i s to expound ' (AT, 187 ;

S A T , 195); or , 'Actu al ly , only wh at does not f it in to th is wor ld is t ru e '

( A T , 86; S A T , 92) . T o say e i the r of thes e two th in gs is jus t to say: ( i) that

a work does c la im our cogni t ive a t tent ion; and ( i i ) that the c la iming

t ransp i re s th rou gh the ( aes the t i c / sub l ime) neg a t ion o f a ll p rev ious

m od es - forms - of aes th et ic ord er in g . In so far as a work accom plishes

these two tasks , i t appears as meaningful o therwise , that i s , as meaningful




in a way not sanct ioned by what has been recognized as meaningful ,

cogni t ively s ignif icant , here tofo re . T h e work, th en , app ea rs as excess ive to

ra t iona l ized mean ing , bu t none the les s mean ingfu l ; i t in te r rup t s wha t we

had t i l l now cons ide red as p rov id ing the g rounds fo r r ecogn i t ion .

In so fa r a s m ode rn i s t w orks pe r fo rm a de te rm ina te n ega t ion o f the t r a

d i t ion , then they become the condi t ion for the poss ib i l i ty of fu ture d is

course on a r t . In th i s r espec t Der r ida ' s accoun t o f the r e la t ion be tween the

Van G og h and the d i s courses su r rou nd ing i t is co r rec t . Der r id a ' s ve r s ion

of the ' i t g ives ' i s , of course , a s t ra ightforward logical extens ion of the the

ory of genius . What Derr ida ' s account fa i ls to do is expla in how a work

com es to acqu i re tha t g ro un d in g r e la t ion to wha t wou ld concep tua l ly

dominate i t except to say that as a condi t ion i t wi thdraws f rom cogni t ion .

D er r id ean s cep t ic i sm is the d i r ec t conse quen ce o f i t s con t inua nce o f

t r ansce nde n ta l ph i losophy . W hi le de te rm ina t e nega t ion f ai ls a s a genera l

acc oun t of the poss ib i l i ty of h is tor ical t ru th - for A do rno 'd ia lect ic s is theon to logy o f the wrong s ta te o f th ings ' (ND, 11) - i t does match the h i s to r

i c i ty o f a r t i s t i c modern i sm.

Ad orn o ' s aus te re p resen ta t ion o f t ru th con te n t i s pa ras i t i c on wha t he

regards as the aus ter i ty of modernis t ar t in i t s formal ambit ions . At the

centre of th is aus ter i ty is the l inking of the process of aes thet ic negat ion ,

and the consequen t c la im o f the work tha t su rv ives th rough and desp i te

tha t p roces s . Th e com plex p roces s of aes the t i c nega t ion insc r ibes the a rea

where cri t ical at tention can s t i l l f ind a place for itself. T h e r e s u l t a n t c l a i m

is the enigm a of th e work , i t s inco m preh ens ib i l i ty or s ilence, wh ich cal ls

fo r th ph i losoph ica l r e f l ec t ion whi le r emain ing beyond d i s cu r s ive r edemp

t io n ( A T , 1 7 7) . W h a t e n t i tl e s A d o r n o t o e m p l o y t h e i de a o f ' d e t e r m i n a t e

neg a t ion ' is tha t au th en t ic works a re ne i the r s cep tica l no r r es igned ; they

do more than abs t r ac t ly nega te the t e r r a in o f the i r ac t iv i ty . Ra ther , aes

thet ic negat ion is the condi t ion cons t i tu t ive of such works being works ; as

wo rks , s t il l and d esp i te ever yth ing , they 'end u p havin g a s imila r i ty to

m ea ni ng . . .Ar t i s i l lus ion in that i t can not escape the hypn ot i c sugg es t ion

o f m e a n i n g a m i d a g e n e r a l lo ss o f m e a n i n g ' ( A T , 2 2 1 - 2 ; S A T , 2 3 1 ). T h e

s i l ence and /o r mean ing les sn es s o f m od ern i s t works i s mea n ingfu l an d

de te rmina te , a lbe i t no t de te rminab le , because they r emain works d e s p i t e

and in v i r tue o f the i r nega t ions ; and in so do ing they in t im ate a po ten

t i a l i ty fo r mean ingfu lnes s incommensurab le w i th the t r ad i t ion ' s de te r

mina t ions o f wha t migh t coun t a s pos i t ive mean ing . The de te rminacy o f

works of ar t i s thei r lawfulness , thei r obedience to the demands of form;

t h e i r n o t b ei n g c o m m e n s u r a b l e w i t h d e m a n d s o f d i s c u r si v e d e t e r m i n a t i o n

i s the i r be ing w i thou t l aw . De te rmina te i r r econc i lab i l i ty i s Adorno ' s

re in scr ip t ion of lawfulness w i tho ut law.Becau se aes the t ic neg at ion inv olves a con t inu an ce of ra t ional iza t ion

and d i s enchan tmen t in to a r t , ca r ry ing ' the empi r ica l p roces s o f the d i s

appe aranc e o f m ean ing in to th e t r ad i t iona l ca tegor ies o f a r t , nega t ing them




concre te ly and ex t rapo la t ing new ca tegor ies from n o t h i n g n e s s ' , a n d b e

cause in so doing i t recapi tu la tes and ref lect ively ar t icula tes that empir ical

process , then the success fu l accomplishment of that ac t iv i ty involves a

t r ac ing o f the h i s to ry o f mean ing and an engagement w i th 'mean ing-

lessness in i t s h is tor ical genes is ' (AT, 220; SAT, 230) . I t i s th is connect ion

of aes th et ic negat io n with h is tory and h is tor ical i ty tha t expla ins how wo rkscan car ry out the fu l ly cogni t ive task of inscr ib ing h is tor ical ac tual i ty and

po ten t ia l i ty . The ' po ten t ia l i ty fo r mean ingfu lnes s ' r e leased by modern i s t

wo rks is no t to be ident if ied wi th th e pos tu la t io n of an imaginat ively

conc eived poss ib i l i ty , th at i s , i t i s no t equi va len t w i th wha t is logically

possible given init ial conditions; rather , i t specif ies a his torically real if

suppre s sed po ten t ia l i ty . As such , wh a t A do rno c la ims for m od ern i sm , and

what expounds i t , accords a t leas t in par t wi th what has been thought to

be invo lved in a c r i ti ca l theory o f soc ie ty . Fu r th e r , h i s accoun t o f m od ern

i sm bes t exp la ins the p re - theore t i ca l in tu i t ion tha t modern i sm s tands in apar t icular cr i t ica l re la t ionship to socie ty in v i r tue of i t s impl ic i t h is tor ical

s e l f -consc iousnes s . M od er n i s m i s , fo rmal ly , the en l igh ten in g of en l ig h t

e n m e n t a b o u t itself.

Modernis t ar t ca l ls for th phi losophical ref lec t ion because i t concerns the

ca tegor ies , aes the t i c and non-aes the t i c , o f mean ingfu lnes s . The t ru th con

ten t o f modern i s t works i s a c r i t ique o f r a t iona l ized t ru th . S ince tha t i s

the on ly concep t ion o f t ru th ava i l ab le , no p resen t ly opera t ive concep tua l

mate r ia l can succeed in r edeeming the t ru th con ten t o f these works . Whatspeaks for these cont en ts is aes the t ic necess i ty ; that nec ess i ty is one p ro

v ided by the works themse lves : 'Works o f a r t a re the i r own s tandard o f

judgement . They themse lves s t ipu la te the ru les they then fo l low ' (AT,

243 , S A T , 254). T h i s neces s ity i s exper ien ced th rou gh the 'shee r w e igh t '

o f w o r k s ' ' h e r m e t i c u n i t y a n d t h e c e r t a i n t y o f [ t h e i r ] b e i n g - t h u s - a n d - o n l y -

t h u s ' (AT, 114 ; SAT, 121) ; o r : 'The mark o f au then t ic i ty o f works o f a r t i s

th e fact tha t thei r i l lus ion shines for th in suc h a way that i t can not po ss

ib ly be prevar icated , and yet d iscurs ive judgement is unable to spel l out i t s

t ru th ' (AT , 191 ; S A T , 199) . T h e t ru th o f a work cance l s the m om en t ofi l lus ion; i f i l lus ion were not cancel led , then what works non-discurs ively

say could not be t rue . Equal ly , however , because aes thet ic necess i ty is

nega t ive and incapab le o f d i s cu r s ive a r t i cu la t ion , the t ru th o f works a re

exposed and f ragi le . Adorno takes th is predicament to be the inverse of

the p re d ica m en t f ac ing ph i losoph y ; because i t i s conc ep tua l , it s de te rm i

na te nega t ion o f the t r ad i t ion ends up s ta t ing t ru ths , wh ich hence a f f i rm

the t r ad i t ion . Adorno ' s ph i losoph ica l p rac t i ce , however , be l i e s h i s concep

tion of i t .

What is a t i s sue here is the precise s ta tus of Adorno 's c la ims about ar t ,

and hence the s ta tus o f h i s mos t exposed concep ts , Utopia a n d r e c o n

c i l i a t ion . Can an aus te re accoun t o f these be made tha t wou ld be compat

ib le w i th the aus te r i ty o f h i s concep t ion o f t ru th in t e rms o f de te rmina te




nega t ion? In h i s c r i t ique o f Adorno , Wel lmer ha l f pe rce ives the aus te r i ty

o f de te rmina te nega t ion , bu t in te rp re t s i t in t r ad i t iona l t e rms as a s ecu la r

ver s ion o f nega t ive theo logy . Tak ing h i s l ead f rom the d i s cus s ion in 'F rag

m e n t o n M u s i c a n d L a n g u a g e ' , w h e r e A d o r n o t a k e s t h e l a n g u a g e o f m u s i c

- wh ich can be r ega rded as a m eto ny m y for the langua ge o f m od ern i s t a r t

as a whole - and d iscurs ive language as phi losophical ly exempli f ied to be' to rn halve s ' of an in tegral lang uag e that would be able to ma nifes t the

a b s o l u t e , W e l l m e r c o m m e n t s :

The l anguage to mus ic and d i s cu r s ive l anguage appear as the l ace r

a ted ha lves o f ' t rue l anguage ' , a l anguage in wh ich ' the con ten t i t s e l f

wou ld become man i fes t ' a s Adorno pu t s i t . The in t r ins ic idea o f

such a l anguage i s ' t he f igu re o f the d iv ine name ' . The apore t i c r e la

t ionsh ip o f a r t and ph i losop hy sub la tes a theo log ica l pe r spec t iv e : a r t

a n d p h i l o s o p h y c o m b i n e t o fo r m a n e g a t iv e th e o l o gy . ( T S R , 9 3 - 4 )

In ca r ry ing th i s though t fo rward in to the an t inomy o f a r t itself, W e l l m e r

urges the though t tha t a r t mus t show i t s e l f to be the 'O ther ' o f un recon

ci led real i ty . I t can accomplish th is task , i t can only be ' t rue ' in th is sense ,

by reveal ing real i ty

as unreconc i led , an tagon is t i c , f r agmented . Bu t i t can on ly do th i s

by le t t ing real i ty ap pe ar in the l ight of recon ci l ia t ion th ro ug h the

non -vio lent aes th et ic synth es is of the d i ffuse - a syn thes is w hich

p r o d u c e s t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . T h i s m e a n s , h o w e v e r ,

tha t an an t inomy i s ca r r i ed in to the very interior of aes the t i c syn

t h e s i s : aes thet ic synthes is can , by def in i t ion , only succeed by turning

agains t i t se l f and cal l ing i ts own pr incip le in to ques t ion - i t mus t do

th is for the sake of t ru th which may not be had except by means of

th i s p r inc ip le . (TSR, 95)

Wel lmer i s no t a l toge ther c lea r in spec i fy ing where in the p rob lem wi thAd orn o ' s accoun t l ie s for h im. I t m igh t be con tend ed tha t Ad orn o

presupposes the s t andpo in t in v i r tue o f wh ich r ea l i ty appear s as f r ag

men ted . Bu t th i s canno t be co r rec t s ince even fo r Wel lmer the pe r spec t ive

of reconcil iat ion is a result, t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f d e t e r m i n a t e n e g a t i o n , t h e

'nega t ive ' o f a p resumed nega t ive theo logy . Perhaps , then , the ob jec t ion

l ines in what is revealed: 'what ar t makes manifes t i s not the l ight of

redempt ion i t s e l f bu t reality i n t h e l i g ht o f r e d e m p t i o n ' ( T S R , 9 4 ). B u t

th is cannot be the source of d i f f icul ty e i ther s ince the idea of reconci led

r e a li ty is e v en m o r e e m p h a t i c a l l y p r e s e n t in t h e W e l l m e r / H a b e r m a s

scheme, in the idea o f communica t ive r a t iona l i ty and the idea l speech s i tu

a t ion , than i t i s in Adorno.

In fact , for Wellmer the crucia l object ions to Adorno are those a l ready




canvassed, namely , h is d iscont inuis t concept ion of h is tor ical change, for

which th e concep t o f ' u top ia ' is a m arker , and h i s app aren t main ta in ing o f

a ph i losophy p remised upon the mode l o f the p roduc ing sub jec t r a the r

than com mu nica t iv e r e la t ions , r e la t ions o f in te r sub jec t iv i ty . H ow ever ,

H ab erm as ' s and W el lm er ' s s t rong concep t ion of h i s to r ica l con t in u i ty r e l ie s

on two du b io us as su m pt ion s : (i ) tha t the ca tegor ia l d i f fe ren tia t ion o f mo de rn i ty mus t be accep ted ; and ( i i ) tha t the idea o f communica t ive r a t ion

al ity is a qu as i - t ra nsc en de nta l co ndi t ion for all l inguis t ic pract ice . Clear ly ,

( i i ) p resupposes ( i ) s ince i t p resupposes Habermas ' s p rogres s ive ph i los

ophy of h is tory; but ( i ) i s jus t what Adorno 's ent i re project ca l ls in to

ques t ion . And, as we have jus t seen , i t i s not t rue that Adorno 's theory

opera tes on the p re sum pt i on o f a s ing le o r co l l ect ive sub jec t 'ma k ing '

r ea l i ty . For Adorno too r ea l i ty mus t be l ingu is t i ca l ly med ia ted ; where

language , a t a g iven t ime , r ep resen t s the s ed imen ted ach ievements o f a

communi ty . Because fo r Adorno the re i s no ex t ra -h i s to r ica l (o r t r an

scendenta l ) space f rom which real i ty can be perceived, l inguis t ica l i ty and

in te r sub jec t iv i ty never appear as such , in the i r own name; r a the r , l anguage

and in tersu bjec t iv i ty are a lways bo un d to th e actual i t ies and potent ia l i t ies

of a g iven h is tor ical community . This is so even for ar t : 'Paradoxical ly , ar t

has to a t tes t to the unreconci led whi le never theless tending to reconci le ;

th i s i s pos s ib le on ly th rough i t s non-d i scu r s ive l anguage . In tha t p roces s

a lone does the W e concre t i ze i t s e l f (A t , 241 ; S A T , 251). Ad orno does no t

lack a concept ion of h is tor ical potent ia l i ty ; ra ther , h is Utopian, d i s c o n

t inuis t concept ion of h is tor ical change der ives f rom his analys is of the

ca tegor ia l de fo rm at ions o f m ode rn i ty coup led w i th h is em pha s i s on the

he t e ron om ous m om en t in the con s t i tu t ion o f social f r eedom. Sp i r i t can

no t be made o r p roduced ; hence h i s to r ica l change tha t wou ld r e lease

the p romises o f en l igh tened modern i ty canno t occur th rough ra t iona l ,

m e a n s - e n d s c a l c u l a t e d a c t i o n . T o c l a i m t h a t A d o r n o m a i n t a i n s a c o n c e p

t ion of a se l f -producing col lect ive subject misses one of the centra l poin ts

o f h i s a r g u m e n t .

T er m in g Ad orn o ' s p rac t i ce a s ecu la r ized ve r s ion o f nega t ive theo logy

also seems exact ly wrong. In negat ive theology, a t leas t as t radi t ional ly

under s tood , the mos t adequa te p red ica t ive ana lys i s o f God i s ach ieved

s t r i c t ly th rough the nega t ion o f p red ica tes wh ich wou ld l imi t H im: He

is nei ther spat ia l ly nor temporal ly locatable , nei ther sens ib le nor non-

sens ib le , e tc . Negat ive theology turns on d iscr iminat ing the f in i te and the

inf in i te though a negat ive comprehens ion of the f in i te ; and does so for

the s ake o f summoning the mys te ry o f God in a manner tha t wou ld no t

re ins cr ib e Hi m in 'o t he r ' f in ite ca tego r ies . N ot hi ng l ike th is i s t ru e of

A d o r n o ' s p r o c e d u r e .

The s imi la r i ty be tween Adorno and nega t ive theo logy s tops a t the po in t

wh ere wha t i s t e r m ed the ' ab so lu te ' can be ga the red on ly as a r esu l t of

nega t ions ; fo r Adorno these nega t ions a re de te rmina te and no t abs t r ac t .




Because these negat ions are determinate the resul t i s f in i te . Wel lmer is

correct in what th is resul t a l lows , namely , the comprehens ion of real i ty as

f r a g m e n t e d . The wh ole work of Adorno's philosophy is for the sake of the

appearan ce of this 'as'. The po in t o f th i s p rocedure , wh ich t akes i t s o r ien

ta t ion f rom the mov em en t and charac te r iza t ion o f e lem en ts o f r ea l ity

itself, i s to avoid legis la t ing or pos i t ing , in the manner of a Kant iant r anscenden ta l ' ough t ' , the ' o the r ' o f th i s soc io -h i s to r ica l r ea l i ty . What i s

o ther is revealed in terms of the h is tor ical ly dynamic actual i t ies and

potent ia l i t ies of the present . Potent ia l i ty appears wi th the ' as ' of ' as

f r a g m e n t e d ' .

Fur ther , i t can hardly be sa id of Adorno that he leaves the o ther of th is

h i s to r ica l fo rmat ion u t t e r ly inde te rm ina te . W ha t i s r ep res sed by iden t i ty

th ink ing and the soc ia l mechan isms tha t concre t i ze i t i s s ensuous pa r t i cu

la r ity . On ly in v i r tue o f the sub sum pt iv e mo de l does the ind iv idua l a ppe ar

as th e s tar t ing poin t of socia l prac t ice an d not as an - indiv idua l ized -

ach iev em ent . Co l lec t iv i ty , the W e, f ails to app ear in it s ow n nam e in m od

e rn i ty . Th is en ta i l s mak ing a l t e r i ty and he te ronomy a l imi t r a the r than a

cond i t ion fo r au tonomy. The mos t s a l i en t ca tegor ia l s t ruc tu re sus ta in ing

this perspec t ive is th e separa t ion of the val id i ty sph ere s of t r u t h , m ora l

Tightness and beau ty . I t i s a s a con sequ enc e o f th i s ca tegor ia l de fo rm at ion

tha t the r ig id jux tapos i t ion o f pa r t i cu la r i ty and r a t iona l i ty occur s . The

prev ious epis tem ic un i ty of reaso n and par t icu lar i ty , as exem pli f ied by

Aris to te l ian phronesis, r eappear s in modern i ty pa rad igmat ica l ly as aes the t i c

re flect ive judg em ent ( A T , 203) . H en ce the d is cu r s ive r a t iona l i ty o f m o d

e rn i ty and i t s non-d i scu r s ive o the r , when v iewed f rom the pe r spec t ive o f

the deve lop m ent o f the sph ere in wh ich non- id en t i ty th in k ing su rv ives ,

appear as ' torn halves of an in tegral f reedom, to which , however , they do

n o t a d d u p ' .1 8

W ha t m akes A do rn o ' s ana lys is appe ar abs t r a c t i s i t s l eve l o f

analys is : i t deals s t r ic t ly wi th categor ies .

Adorno ' s wr i t ings a re s t r ewn wi th p ropos i t ions to the e f f ec t tha t two

i t e m s , in each case one s ignify ing the moment of ( socia l ) universal i ty and

the o the r the moment o f pa r t i cu la r i ty , be long toge ther bu t a t p resen ts tand o pposed to each o the r , such as ph i loso phy and a r t , r a t iona l i ty an d

par t i cu la r i ty , the a r t o f the cu l tu re indus t ry and au tonomous a r t , ph i los

oph y and soc io logy . Hege l t e rm ed p ropo s i t ions o f th i s so r t ' s pecu la t ive

pro po s i t io ns ' ; they s ta te a un i ty of iden t i ty and d ifference. Bec ause

Adorno cons t rued the concep t o f un i ty he re as s t a t ing an iden t i ty

a c c o m p l i s h e d t h r o u g h t h e s u b s u m p t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l u n d e r t h e u n i

versal , he con s is tent ly in ter pre ted h is con cep t ion of neg at ive d ia lect ics as

depar t ing f rom Hege l a t ju s t th i s po in t .1 9

Whether he was r igh t o r wrong

about Hegel i s here bes ide the point . He employs what is c lear ly a vers ion

of specu la t ive p ropos i t ions tha t do not r e tu rn to the p r inc ip le o f iden t i ty

c r i t i c ized . On the con t ra ry , because Adornoesque specu la t ive p ropos i t ions ,

which p roper ly a re the en t i r e sys tem of demons t ra t ions tha t a l low them to



2 5 8 OLD GODS ASCENDING

appear, result not in a statement of true identity ( A = B ) , but in an 'as' that

elicits a 'belonging together' of the items in question, a belonging that

is perceived through their state of diremption, the result is aporetic:

difficulty is comprehended as difficulty but not transcended.

Formally, speculative propositions assert the identity and non-identity

of the terms linked by the copula.20

But subject and predicate grammatically are subject and substance materially. Thus all reflective elucidations

of sedimented substantiality (such as the recovery of the tragic politics

within the aesthetic sublime) and all dialectics of mimesis and rationality

are incipiently speculative. Speculative propositions are most easily under

stood as forms of essentialist predication where the relation between sub

ject and predicate is set into motion as a consequence of the discovery that

the so-called predicate is the content, the reality, the substance of the sub

ject - the subject cannot be comprehended without it. Subject and predi

cate exchange positions when what initially appeared as an attribute comes

to stand in the subject position - a position that is then discovered to be in

its own way ineliminable. Now in this experience of the undermining of

the stability of the subject position, the experience that the grammatical

subject must be turned towards its substantiality, the reading subject's

progress from subject to predicate is 'checked' and 'suffers' a 'coun-

terthrust'. The 'loss of the [grammatical] subject' experienced in the read

ing of speculative propositions is equally the loss of the reading subject to

itself. Speculation is self-dispossession. The reading subject can only come

to itself by losing itself, by coming to recognize itself, its substantiality, in

what was an external other, a contingent attribute perhaps predicable of

a substantial subject. Reading speculative discourse forces the reading

subject to give up its external position with respect to what is being

read about in precisely the same way that the abstract subject position

of the grammatical subject is overcome by its attributes. Speculation,

then, draws the reading subject into what is being read about; thus the

representational relation is dispersed. Self-implication is realized in the

self-reflection of speculative thinking.

Speculation is reflective self-dispossession. It is the work of reflective

distancing that draws the subject into the ethical totality of which it is a

part. That totality is the subject's 'own', which is why it is responsible for

what does occur and has occurred in it; and not its 'own', it neither

'belongs' to nor is it within the control of the subject. In speculative

reflection the ethical position of the subject is revealed to be non-identical

with the subject's will. That is why all speculation is tragic: the deed that

fractures the ethical whole (including, for example, the collective deed of

capital appropriation) is the subject's deed, a deed for which it is respon

sible, even though it is not its intentional act. Speculative truth is tragic

recognition: philosophy's abstract universality recognizes its partiality and

culpability in the exploded essence of works; and they, in turn, seek the




universal i ty they s t ruggle agains t . I t i s because the uni t ies that specula t ion

revea l s des t roy p resumed innocence by en tang l ing the sub jec t in a wor ld

beyond wi l l , tha t i t canno t be v iewed as suppres s ing non- iden t i ty . On the

co ntr ary , only i f the su bjec t i s ca tegor ia l ly respo ns ib le for a wo r ld i t has

no t w il led can non - ide n t i ty be p rese rved . B u t how e ls e than th ro ug h

spec ula t io n , thro ug h a ref lection tha t t races the con s t i tu t i on of the subjec tin the wor ld , i s the re levant 'ownness ' of wor ld to se l f now to be e l ic i ted?

Agains t the g ra in o f Adorno ' s own s ta temen ts abou t h i s p rac t i ce , I am

c l a i m i n g t h a t n o n - i d e n t i t a r i a n t r u t h a p p e a r s twice in h i s the ory . O n the

one hand , the t ru th con ten t o f pa r t i cu la r works o f a r t i s the i r c la im to

cogni t ive a t tent ion in excess of the categor ies and concepts which

pres ent ly ex hau s t cogni t ive s ignif icance. T h is c la im is ca tego r ia l or re

f lective becau se i ts c la im is tha t me an ing and t r u t h is poss ib le o th erw ise

than how they are conceived of now. I f that were a l l Adorno could p lace

befo re us h i s theo ry wou ld l eave unreco nc i led r ea l i ty un kn ow n, a nd ,indeed , under l ine i t s unknowab i l i ty . Our f a te wou ld be incomprehens ib le

to us . Th ere fo re , o n the o the r han d, he m us t a llow that ar t it se l f has a

specu la t ive moment , and th i s specu la t ive moment r eaches cogn i t ion , in

the fo rm o f specu la t ive th ink ing , in ph i losophy . Ph i losophy can know and

say wh at ar t can no t say; b ut th e veraci ty of ph i lo sop hy 's saying is dep en

dent on the t ru th content of ar t ; phi losophy 's second ref lect ion fo l lows the

h i s to r ica l pa th s ed imen ted in works . Second re f lec t ion the reby becomes a

w o r k o f n a r r a t i o n a n d m e m o r y , t h e r e b y s u p p l e m e n t i n g c r e a t i o n w i t h

exp lana t ion . Such ac t iv i ty does ' do v io lence to the works , bu t they canno t

su rv ive w i thou t i t ' (AT, 480 ; SAT, 521) .

Ph i losophy and a r t over lap , bu t do no t co inc ide , in the idea o f t ru th

con ten t : ' T h e p rogres s ive ly unfo ld ing t ru th o f a work o f a r t i s no ne o the r

tha n the t ru th o f the ph i losoph ica l conc ep t ' (A T , 190 ; S A T , 198) . A do rno

ampl i f i e s th i s though t thus :

Aes the t i c s is no t so m eth ing abov e and bey ond a r t ; i t has to r e t r ace

the dynamic l aws o f a r t o f wh ich the works themse lves a re unaware .Ar t works a re en igmat ic in so f a r a s they r ep resen t the phys iognomy

of an object ive sp ir i t that i s opaque to i t se l f a t the moment when

i t bu r s t s fo r th in to appe ara nce . . .Th e i r en ig ma i s the tw i l igh t zon e

be tween the una t ta inab le and wha t has ac tua l ly been accompl i shed .

( A T , 1 8 6 - 7 ; S A T , 1 94 ).

T h e ' un a t t a inab le ' is the ca tegoria l po ten t ia l i ty in s tan t ia ted by the w ork ' s

aes the t i c nega t ion o f 'wha t has ac tua l ly been accompl i shed ' . The work i s

enigmat ic because of i t s form: h is tor ical potent ia l i ty only appears in the

incom ple te s e l f - su rm oun t ing o f aes the t i c i l lu s ion . Se l f - su rm oun t ing , the

e f fo r t o f de te rmina te nega t ion , i s incomple te , apore t i c , because made in a

work of ar t .




The c la im tha t un iver sa l and par t i cu la r have become d i r empted i s sues

f rom th e pa r t i cu la r - a r t ; the com preh ens ion o f tha t c la im, the unfo ld ing

of the d i remption of par t icular and universal , mus t nonetheless fa l l to

phi loso phy . A r t ca nn ot say the ' as ' of f rag m enta t ion exce pt by not saying

i t , which is the law of form in ar t now; whi le phi losophy mus t br ing that

d i r empt ion o f i t s e l f f rom par t i cu la r i ty ( a r t ) to concep tua l a r t i cu la t ion .However , ph i losophy ' s mode o f concep tua l a r t i cu la t ion , i t s speak ing

specu la t ive ly , does no t d i rec t ly be t r ay s ensuo us pa r t i cu la r i ty , a s Ad orno

somet imes assumes . I t i s not a betrayal because i t s specula t ive t ru th is

nei ther legis la ted , pos i ted , nor a reduct ive s ta tement of fact . I t i s a be

t rayal only because i t m us t speak d iscurs ively . Spe cula t ion is the poin t

where r edempt ion and be t r aya l speak toge ther . Specu la t ion ' s s t a temen t o f

the be long ing toge ther o f un iver sa l and par t i cu la r , o f ph i losophy and

ar t , i s what Adorno mys t i fy ingly ident i f ies as the l ight of redemption .

N o n e t h e l e s s , w h e n h e s t o p s u s i n g t h e l a n g u a g e o f r e d e m p t i o n , A d o r n oinvar iably reveals the s t ructure of h is analyses as the e laborat ion of a

specu la t ive p ropos i t ion : ph i losophy and a r t a re one ; o r au tonomous a r t

and mass a r t r ep resen t two ha lves o f an in teg ra l f r eedom, to wh ich , ho w

ever , they do no t add up . T h er e is no concep tua l way of de m ons t ra t ing

the f ragm enta t ion o f m od ern i ty w i th ou t p resup po s ing o r me re ly pos i ting

i t s nega t ion excep t th rough the demons t ra t ion o f the an t inomies in fec t ing

t h e o p p o s e d m o m e n t s . T h e i r o p p o s i t i o n a n d m u t u a l b e l o n g i n g a r e t h e

conc lus ion of the de m ons t ra t io n .

Specu la t ive knowing does no t t r ansg res s the demand tha t Utopia, th e

abso lu te , mu s t no t be r ep resen ted . W ha t is kno wn i s on ly the p re sen t

as f r agmented ; the abso lu te , the be long ing toge ther o f the s epara ted

ca tegor ia l do m ains , app ear s as the nega t ion o f the i r f r agmenta t ion . W her e

specula t ive cogni t ion appears mos t vulnerable is in i t s apparent lack of an

eth ical moment , an awareness of i t s complic i ty wi th the fa te being

expounded. But th is i s a fa lse impress ion s ince what is c la imed by phi los

ophy is i ts lack of self-sufficiency. By s iding with the concept, against i t ,

phi l oso phy is culp able . Self -con sciousne ss cann ot avoid se l f - im pl icat ion .Thus what spel ls the l imit to t ranscendenta l ref lec t ion and ru ins i t , the

empi r ica l moment , e th ica l ly impl ica tes the sub jec t in wha t i t wou ld t r an

scend. The re i tera ted gui l t and complic i ty of ar t a lso belongs to i t s second

ref lect ion . Derr ida a t tempts to avoid se l f - impl icat ion by taking

t ranscenden ta l though t beyond se l f - r e f lec t ion ; Adorno con t inues the pa th

of se l f- reflect ion again s t the t ran sce nd en ta l . In ter ru pt io n , th e g i ft of ' i t

g iv es ' , i s not beyond good and evi l , but everywhere impl icated in thei r

d e f o r m a t i o n t h r o u g h i d e n t i t y .

Of course , that phi losophy mus t s ta te i t s inner insuff ic iency makes i t s

fa te worse , more culpable , than ar t ' s ; af ter a l l , i t i s sensuous par t icular i ty

tha t i s r ep res sed and do m ina ted . N one the le s s , the d i s to r t ion of one

m om en t mu s t equa l ly invo lve a d i s to r t ion o f the o the r . T o tha t degree




bo th ph i losophy and a r t a re in the s ame p red icamen t . For bo th i t can be

said that ' the uni ty of the logos i s caught up in a complex of b lame because

i t t ends to mut i l a te wha t i t un i f i e s ' (AT, 267) . Adorno cons ide r s Homer ' s

accoun t o f Pene lope unrave l l ing a day ' s weav ing as the mos t po ignan t

exem plif ication of thi s fate.

The woman ' s cunn ing mut i l a tes the a r te fac t s made by he r , bu t in

so do ing she ac tua l ly mut i l a tes herself. A s e e m i n g ly u n i m p o r t a n t

episode in the Homeric epic , th is s tory points to a cons t i tu t ive aspect

of ar t , which is that ar t i s unable to br ing about the ident i ty of the

one and the many , and incorpora tes th i s inab i l i ty as a moment o f

un i ty . (AT, 267)

This work of se l f -mut i la t ion is a lso that of specula t ive phi losophy; i t i s theself -mut i la t ing work of Aesthetic Theory. In i t the inabi l i ty to br ing about

the iden t i ty o f the one and the many i s incorpora ted as a moment o f un i ty ,

a un i ty that i s a com plex of b lam e.

v Sp ecu lat ion , Art and Pol i t ics

T h e re dem pt ion o f i l lu s ion is the specu la t ive p ropos i t ion th a t a r t and ph i l

osophy a re one , tha t they be long toge ther ; where the i r be long ing toge theris not to be cons trued as a pre lude to e i ther an aes thet ic izat ion of the

ph i losoph ica l o r a concep tua l i za t ion o f the aes the t i c . What we now mean

by the aes thet ica l an d the phi loso phica l refers to a ca tego r ia l defo rm at ion

of the r e la t ion be tween un iver sa l and par t i cu la r in modern soc ie ty . Hence

aes the t i c iza t ion wou ld on ly l ead ph i losophy in to the p red icamen t o f mod

e rn i s t a r t ; wh i le concep tua l i za t ion jus t i s the neu t ra l i za t ion o f the m od er n

is t subl ime. Phi losophy, then , can only speak i ts separat ion , i t s loss of the

capaci ty cogni t ively to engage sensuous par t icular i ty , i f i t ever possessed

such, aporet ica l ly .

This is revealed in the analys is of the separat ion of phi losophy 's nega

t ive d ia lect ic f rom a r t ' s aes the t ic negat ion , tha t i s , in the con ce pt ' s a t te m pt

to overcome i tse l f in the d i rect ion of sensuous par t icular i ty , and ar t ' s

a t tempt to overcome i tse l f in the d i rect ion of sensuous reason. But i t i s ar t

tha t l eads ph i losophy to an apore t i c concep t ion o f itself; which is a lso to

say that works of ar t draw their author i ty f rom ' the fact that they cal l for th

ph i losoph ica l r e f l ec tion ' (A T , 123 ; S A T , 129) . T h i s thes i s r e t u r ns us to

our s t a r t ing po in t , namely , the c la im tha t Aesthetic Theory i s pr imar i lyc o n c e r n e d w i t h r e i n s c r i b i n g K a n t ' s , a n d m o d e r n i t y ' s , u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d

social s t ruc tu r ing o f conc ep t and in tu i t ion . Fo r K an t concep ts w i th ou t

in tu i t ions a re empty , in tu i t ions w i thou t concep ts a re b l ind ; ca tegor ia l syn

t h e s i s , the syn the t i c ac t iv ity o f the t r ansce nden ta l ego , un i tes co ncep t and



2 6 2 O L D G O D S A S C E N D I N G

in tu i t io n in a jud gem ent . A do rno ' s ana lys i s in i ti a l ly soun ds s imi la r: ph i los

oph y wi th ou t a r t is em pty , a r t w i th ou t ph i loso phy i s b l ind . T he i r un i ty ,

however , i s specu la t ive and apore t i c ; and th i s because the Kan t ian

cons trual of in tu i t ion fa i ls to respect the in tegr i ty of sensuous par t icu

lar i ty , of the non- ident ical o ther . Phi losophical ly , th is fa i lure f i r s t emerges

in the an t inomies o f aes the t i c au tonomy in Kan t ' s aes the t i c s ; cu l tu ra l ly ,th i s s ame fa i lu re becomes pe rcep t ib le in the an t inomies o f the modern i s t

sub l ime . Revea l ing the concep tua l , l ingu is t i c , t echn ica l , and genera l ly

fo rmal f ea tu res o f a r t works demo ns t ra te s the r esources o f s ensu ous pa r

t i cu la r i ty tha t make them capab le o f t empora r i ly r es i s t ing theore t i ca l sub

sumption . In so far as ar t i s cut of f f rom discurs ive ra t ional i ty , however , i t

can say wh at i t w ant s to only by not (d iscurs ively) saying i t . T o be able to

speak and c la im without d iscurs ively speaking and c la iming is ar t ' s

s t re ng th a nd m isery . I t i s tha t wh ich m ake s ar t a f ie ld of cul tu ra l c on

tes ta t ion , car ry ing a weight of cul tura l s ignif icance that s tands in inverse

propor t ion to i t s abi l i ty to af fect anything.

Throughou t th i s cen tu ry , th i s usua l ly ina r t i cu la te s ense o f a r t ' s cu l tu ra l

s ignif icance has been the spur to a t tempts , both theoret ica l and ar t is t ic , to

d raw a r t d i r ec t ly in to po l i t i c s . F rom Adorno ' s pe r spec t ive , i t i s ev iden t

that ar t ' s pol i t ica l moment res ides in i t s refusal of immers ion in g iven pol

i t i ca l p rogrammes fo r cu l tu ra l r e fo rm. Indeed , Adorno ' s de fence o f th i s

refusal , and h is d ismissal of engaged ar t , has been the mos t cr i t ic ized

e lemen t o f h i s theory . Such c r i t i c i sms over look the pa thos o f AestheticTheory; i t s summoning up o f the c r i t i ca l charac te r o f modern i s t a r t i s

made a t the ve ry moment when a r t ' s capac i ty to r es i s t neu t ra l i za t ion had

begu n to d is so lve : m od er n a r t is g row ing o ld (A T , 5 5 ) . This s ense o f the

i m m a n e n t d i s a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e o n e d o m a i n i n m o d e r n i t y t h a t w a s

categor ia l ly ass igned the task of ref lect ion cond i t ion s bo th Ad orn o 's

com preh ens io n o f m od ern i sm and h i s con t inua l s ense o f i t s dep end ence on

p h i l o s o p h y .

Fo r Ad orn o the d ia lec t ic o f m ode rn i sm was a lways degen era t ive . T h i s

degenera t ive t endency was a l r eady ev iden t in my o r ig ina l s t a temen t o f the

d ia lec t i c o f the new. Because the new i s p roduced th rough nega t ion , a r t

s taying a lways only a half s tep ahead of the wi l l - to- in terpreta t ion of

the a r t - c r i t i ca l communi ty , the des i r e fo r the new tends toward s tas i s .

The incessant repet i t ion of the new makes i t o ld ; the very sharpness of the

d icho tomy be tween iden t i ty and non- iden t i ty t enden t ia l ly makes the

appearance o f the non- iden t ica l i t s e l f an image o f the t r iumph o f iden t i ty .

T h e d icho tom y be tw een iden t i ty and no n- ide n t i ty is the t ru t h of the r ad

ica l dua l i ty be tween au tonomy and imi ta t ion in Kan t ; Kan t ' s incend ia ry

d ia lec t i c o f gen ius does no t s t a te a metaphys ica l t ru th abou t au tonomy and

he te ronomy, bu t a soc ia l t ru th abou t the appearance o f f r eedom in modern

soc ie t i e s . F reedom appear s on ly as the r evea l ing o f the unf reedom of

wha t l i e s ou t s ide a r t ; bu t s ince every appearance mus t y ie ld to i t s com-




prehens ion , ou r g rasp ing a t ou r f r eedom th rough works immedia te ly ru ins

i t. T h e com m uni ty o f the work , the co m m un i ty o f the ' a r t wo r ld ' tha t i s

ga the red th rough works , i s a s i l lu so ry and as suscep t ib le to neu t ra l i za t ion

as the works themse lves .

Modern i sm ' s degenera t ive d ia lec t i c i s a d ia lec t i c o f subs tance and sub

jec t ; subs tan t ia l i ty i s equ iva le n t to the m om en t o f m ime s i s and expres s io n ,

and sub jec t iv i ty is equ iv a len t to the m om en t o f r a t iona l iza t ion , co ns t ruc

t ion and tec hn iq ue . Bec ause mo de rn i sm i s r a t iona l iza t ion in a r t , sub s tanc e

rem ains a live on ly th rou gh th e dev e lop m ent o f i ts opp os i t e , con s t ruc t ion

and techn ique . Th is i s the empha t ic a spec t o f the log ic o f degenera t ion :

h i s to r ica l subs tan t ia l i ty and s ensuous pa r t i cu la r i ty become inc reas ing ly

a t t e n u a t e d t h r o u g h w h a t is m e a n t t o s u s t a in t h e m . T h e n a t u r e of t h i s d i a

lec t i c in pa in t ing i s impl ic i t in the t r ans i t ion f rom Van Gogh ' s in te rna l

m imes i s be tween pa in t -o n-ca nva s and pa in ted ob jec t to abs t r a c t a r t ' s

p a i n t - o n - c a n v a s . T h e p a t h f ro m V a n G o g h t ra c e s t h e d i s a p p e a r a n c eof subs ta nce f rom a r t , wh i le the deve lopm ent o f abs t r ac t ion ( in to the

ap t ly named 'min imal i sm ' tha t , a t wors t , conf la tes mate r ia l i ty w i th s en -

suousness , and a t bes t uses mater ia l i ty as a reminder of a loss of sen-

suousnes s ) t r aces an inc reas ing los s o f s ensuo usnes s . T he se two losses

toge ther come to en ta i l the d i s appearance o f a r t a s a de te rmina te nega t ion

of the re i f ied socia l wor ld : 'desubs tant ia l iza t ion of ar t i s not only a s tage in

the l iqu ida t ion o f a r t bu t the logical deve lop me nt o f a r t ' (A T , 117 ; S A T ,

123). T h e pa th o f m od ern a r t is f rom a de t e rm ina te to an abs t r ac t nega t io n

of the ca tegoria l s t ruc tu re s o f m od ern i ty . Bu t abs t r ac t nega t ion con ta insnothing to inhib i t i t s turn ing in to i t s oppos i te ; which to a large extent i s

the fa te that has befal len modernis t ar t : i t has become the token of what i t

or ig inal ly refused.

Some c r i t i c s have wan ted to s ay tha t the l iqu ida t ion o f a r t in modern

ism is real ly jus t the l iqu ida t ion of A do rn o 's p hi lo sop hy of ar t . Af ter a l l ,

modern a r t has gone e l s ewhere s ince the heyday o f h igh modern i sm; and

where i t has gone has nothing to do with the not ion that progress in ar t

fo llows the cou rse d ic t a ted by the m os t advanc ed ar t is t ic m ate r ia ls - ar t ' stechnical forces of product ion . And i t i s t rue that a t f i r s t g lance the thes is

o f the mos t advanced a r t i s t i c mate r ia l s appear s to over lap w i th the accoun t

of modernism as the search for what is t ru ly essent ia l to any par t icular

domain of ar t is t ic pract ice . Both analyses do legis la te a l inear , quas i - logical

c o u r s e o f a r t i s t i c d e v e l o p m e n t . S i n c e t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f p o s t - m o d e r n i s m

has refu ted the cr i t ica l v is ion of ar t reaching out towards i t s immanent

telos, tha t deve lopm ent can equa l ly be s een as r e fu t ing A do rno ' s ph i los

o p h y o f m o d e r n i s m . A d o r n o ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f a d v a n c e d a r t i st i c m a t e r i a l s ,

however , has noth ing to do with the search for the essent ia l ly pain ter ly ,l i t e ra ry , mus ica l , e t c . As opposed to Kan t ian theor ies o f a r t tha t r egard

ar t ' s inward tu rn as con t inuous w i th modern i ty ' s s e l f - consc ious pur i f i

cat ion of i t s ca tegor ia l terms of reference, Adorno regards ar t ' s inward




turn , i t s autonomy, as something forced upon i t f rom the outs ide by socia l

determinants legis la t ing agains t what br ief ly was categor ia l ly sa lvaged in

a r t . T h u s w hen A do rno n o tes tha t the l iqu ida t ion o f a r t is pa r t o f i t s log i

ca l dev e lop m ent , he is c la iming th a t the ve ry idea o f logica l d eve lo pm ent ,

of a h is tory of determinate negat ions , i s how the t r iumph of the logic of

p ro du c t io n appe ar s in the dom ain o f au ton om ou s a r t . Ar t ' s shor t h i s to ry

of de te rminan t nega t ion i s the t r iumph o f the ve ry log ic he ph i losoph ica l ly

opposes : d ia lect ic is the ontology of the wrong s ta te of th ings . Ar t ' s l iqui

dat ion , the end of (h igh) ar t , i s i t s end as a ca tegor ia l ly s t ructured and

cu l tu ra l ly sys temat ic p ro tes t aga ins t r a t iona l ized modern i ty ; the log ic o f

a r t ' s un fo ld ing no longer makes i t the consc ience o f a de fo rm ed reason .

Cer ta in ly , no one wou ld wa n t to c la im ca tegor ia l pe r sp icu i ty for p os t

m o d e r n i s t a r t . F o r A d o r n o , p o s t - m o d e r n i s m ' s t e n d e n t i a l o v e r c o m i n g o f

the gap be tween h igh a r t and the a r t o f the cu l tu re indus t ry i s ano ther ve r

s ion o f the t r iumph o f iden t i ty th ink ing because i t does no t p rov ide fo r asubstantial r e in teg ra t ion o f un iver sa l i ty and s en suou s pa r t i cu la r i ty . 2 1

Over the pas t two decades , ar t ' s l iquidat ion has led to i t s cr i t ica l

moment to pas s to ph i losoph ies , theor ies , tha t a re themse lves self

consc ious ly modern i s t in the i r ou t look and p rocedures . Ph i losoph ica l

writing has become the a t t empt to p roduce t ex t s tha t a re to be judged

the way works were judged : pu rposefu l h i s to r ies w i thou t ex te rna l ends

(Foucau l t ) , in te rven t ions in the t ex t s o f the t r ad i t ion tha t w i thdraw the i r

referent ia l i ty in a ge s tur e that reveals thei r d i f ference f rom them selve s

( D e r r i d a ) , o r f r a g m e n t a r y w r i t i n g ( A d o r n o ) .2 2

Phi losophy has come to

d i savow i ts conce p tua l i ty th rou gh a s e l f - su rm oun t ing in the d i r ec t ion

of par t icul ar i ty . Phi loso phica l par t ic ula r ism ha s th e goal of m akin g i ts

t ex t s sub l im e ins tances , abso lu te a l t e r i t ie s oppo sed to conc ep tua l exchan ge

re la t ions . Adorno ' s s econd re f lec t ion exp la ins why these ph i losoph ica l

p rogrammes have come to mat te r in the way they do , why the i r pa r t i cu la r

i sm app ear s as som ehow neces sa ry and t rue d esp i te th e fac t o f the i r l eav

ing ' t ru th ' beh ind . Ph i losophy has bo th au tonomous ly and paras i t i ca l ly

be en ca ug ht u p in the logic of m od er ni sm . An d i t i s th is fact tha t exp la ins

bo th the compuls ive charac te r o f these ph i losoph ies , why the i r c la iming

now i s a s s t rong as the c la ims o f modern i sm were , and the i r ev iden t

fragil i ty.

Even i f we ignore the cr i t ic ism that these phi losophies have fa lse ly

su r r end ere d the pa t h o f s e lf - re f lec t ion , tha t they have w i l led an u nk no w

ing as a condi t ion for thei r c la iming, i t remains the case that there is no

reason to be l i eve tha t ph i losoph ica l modern i sm i s immune to the log ic o f

desubs tan t ia l i za t ion tha t l ed to the l iqu ida t ion o f a r t . On the con t ra ry ,

w h e n w e c o n s i d e r t h e m o v e m e n t fr o m p h e n o m e n o l o g y to f u n d a m e n t a l

on to logy to decons t ruc t ion we canno t he lp bu t pe rce ive the mimet ic

moment ( ' the th ings themse lves ' , He idegger ' s ex i s ten t i a l ana ly t i c ,

Lev inas ' s phenomeno logy o r , in a d i f f e ren t r eg i s te r , Lukacs ' s ph i losophy o f




prax i s ) a s be ing sus ta ined and l iqu ida ted by the moment o f cons t ruc t ion

(He idegg er ' s poe t ic th in k in g , the fo rmal i sm o f D er r ida o r , d i f fe ren t ly ,

A d o r n o ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o m p o s i t i o n s ) . D e r r i d a ' s f o r m a l i s m a n d t h e o p e r

a t ion of the degenerat ive logic of the new in the texts of Adorno are par t

o f the log ica l dev e lop m ent o f ph i losop hy and i ts l iqu ida t ion . I t w as the

dim f igure of the de gen erat iv e logic of m od er ni sm at work in these textstha t l ed m e to the r ead in g o f the m in t e rm s of con cep ts d r aw n f rom

K a n t ' s ' m o d e r n i s t ' a e s t h e t ic s . T h e a n t i n o m i e s o f K a n t ' s a e s t h e t ic s w e r e

the f i r s t ha rb inger s o f the degenera t ive d ia lec t i c o f modern i sm, a d ia lec t i c

tha t came to in fo rm a r t i t s e l f and then r e tu rned to ph i losophy . The d ia lec

t ic of aes thet ic cul ture and progress ive cul ture f i r s t appears as the

categor ia l d iv is ions of the cr i t ica l sys tem; i t becomes the d ia lect ic of ar t is

t i c m od ern i sm , which i s r epe a ted a t the concep tua l l eve l in the unfo ld ing

of modern ph i losophy . A log ica l h i s to ry cond i t ions and ru ins the

ca tegor ia l p ro tes t aga ins t i t . W hic h i s no t to deny tha t aes the t i c m od er n ism real ly is (or was) the s i te that opens moderni ty to i t s ca tegor ia l fa te

and cal ls i t in to ques t ion .

A l ign ing ph i losoph ica l m od ern i sm w i th a r t i s t i c m od ern i sm equa l ly

exp la ins why the re i s a gap be tween the s ensed , impl ic i t r ad ica l i ty o f

these theor ies , tu rn ing on the i r fo rmal r esources (d i f f e rance , power , s ty le ,

e tc . ) fo r r es i s t ing subsumpt ion and iden t i ty th ink ing , and the i r exp l ic i t

and over t apo l i t i ca l and o f ten cu l tu ra l ly conserva t ive charac te r . The i r

subs tan t ia l i ty (Dase in ana ly t i c , c las s consc iousnes s , e tc . ) was a lways con

d i t ioned by the i r con s t ruc t ive , r a t iona l iz ing m om en t ; a s the l a t t e r

over takes the fo rmer subs tance , w i th i t s med ia ted immediacy , i t becomes

so a t tenuated , so lacking in d i rect ' reference ' to what gets lef t behind

th rough ra t iona l iza t ion , tha t modern i s t fo rm ( the logic o f d e c o n s t r u c t i v e

read ing o r nega t ive d ia lec t i c ) a sympto t ica l ly approaches i t s oppos i t e .

Compl ic i ty i s unavo idab le ; however , we a re r igh t ly more susp ic ious o f

th is complic i ty when i t occurs in phi losophy s ince , unl ike ar t , here i t

r ep re sen t s no t on ly a m om en t in the degenera t ive log ic o f m od ern i sm bu t

equa l ly a refusal of se l f - ref lect ion . H ow ev er wel l m ot iv ate d , tha t refusalcan but appear as an e th ical faul t .

The dua l i ty be tween fo rmal r ad ica l i ty and man i fes t neu t ra l i ty o r con-

se rva t iv ism in m od ern i s t ph i loso phy i s he igh tened by the fac t tha t m od

e rn i s t a r t ' s capac i ty fo r r es i s t ance was in pa r t dependen t on modern i ty ' s

d i s avowal o f i t s own h i s to r ica l i ty , i t s own moment o f non- iden t i ty . Le t me

exp la in . Th u s f ar we have spoken as i f m od ern i ty ou t s id e a r t t ru ly obeyed

an unprob lemat ic iden t i ty log ic , s ay the log ic o f p rogres s ive cu l tu re , and

henc e was d i r ec t ly th ro w n in to ques t ion by the in te r ru p t iv e log ics o f m od

e rn i sm. I f th i s were the case , then the on ly i s sue f ac ing the modern i s t

s u b l i m e w o u l d b e w h e t h e r i t c o u l d m a n a g e a n i n t e r r u p t i v e m o m e n t .

Th is s cenar io too eas i ly r educes the log ic o f cap i ta l i s t deve lopment to

ra t ional izat ion . Capi ta l is t socie t ies are h is tor ical ; the logic of capi ta l i s the




des t ruc t ion of all natural b o u n d a r i e s , all g iven t e leo log ies . Cap i ta l i sm ' s

c o n s t r u c t i v e m o m e n t , its d e v e l o p m e n t of the forces of p r o d u c t i o n for the

sake of indef in i te expans ion, and its c o n s e q u e n t d r i v e for universal i ty ,

entail the radical iza t ion of all c o n t e n t s , all subs tan t ia l i ty , in to a sys tem

w h o s e r e p r o d u c t i o n r e q u i r e s e x p a n s i o n : all t h a t is so l id mus t mel t in the

air . Since the end of the las t war capi ta l has b e g u n to proc la im, r a the rt h a n a t t e m p t to d e n y , its p o w e r to dissolve all n a t u r a l b o u n d a r i e s ; it has

b e g u n to display its own m o m e n t of s u b l i m i t y , its own activity of c o n t i n

ual se l f - t ransgress ion , its own e v e r - r e c u p e r a t e d n o n - i d e n t i t y w i t h itself.

T h e d o m i n a t i o n of exchange—value over use-value makes capi ta l a vast ,

non- te leo log ica l des i r ing mach ine . Non- iden t i ty and sel f -d ispossess ion are

a s m u c h a p a r t of the logic of c a p i t a l i s t d e v e l o p m e n t as t h e y are of the

logics that a t tempt to o p p o s e it.

T h i s is why non-ca tegor ia l ly r e f ined concep t ions of n o n - i d e n t i t y ,

a c c o u n t s of non- iden t i ty tha t r e fuse the cr i t ica l in terp lay between socia l

m o d e r n i t y and a r t i s t i c m o d e r n i s m , s u d d e n l y a p p e a r as even more com-

plicit with the cla ims of m o d e r n i t y t h a n had the acknowledged cu lpab i l i ty

o f m o d e r n i s t art a p p e a r e d in Adorno ' s eyes . Indeed , non-ca tegor ia l ly

ref ined concept ions of n o n - i d e n t i t y , c o n c e p t i o n s of n o n - i d e n t i t y t h a t

fo reswear dependence on a socio logical ly informed analys is of m o d e r n i t y ,

that refuse the b u r d e n of self-reflection and the sacrifice of i n n o c e n c e , are

complic i t wi th capi ta l ' s subl imity in a way m o d e r n i s t art was not. S u c h

theories of n o n - i d e n t i t y go u n d e r the tag of ' p o s t - m o d e r n i s m ' . P o s t

m o d e r n i s m is a runn ing conf la t ion of the m o d e r n i s t s u b l i m e w i t h the s u b

limity of capi ta l ; it fails to separa te theore t i ca l ly cap i ta l ' s non- iden t i ty w i th

i t s e l f f rom non- iden t i ty p roper . Cap i ta l ' s r e s t l e s s , s e l f - t r ansg res s ive move

m e n t is the fo rm th rough which it con t inua l ly dena tu ra l i zes i t s e l f and all

t h a t a t t e m p t s to res is t it. Ho we ver , th i s s e l f - tr ansg res s ive mo vem ent ,

wh ich to be s u r e is a m o v e m e n t o p p o s e d to h i e r a r c h y and subs tan t ia l p res

en ce , is equa l ly a m o v e m e n t of universal iz ing fungibi l i ty . In brief,

capi ta l ' s synthet ic ac t iv i ty is the h is to r ic iz ing of all c o n t e n t s , but t h a t

act iv i ty i t se l f remains formal ly cons t i tu ted , a fo rm oppos ing andsubsuming empir ical l i fe . The logic of to ta l i ty and i n t e r r u p t i o n is the logic

of capi ta l , what opens the to ta l i ty that capi ta l is no t h i n g or idea but the

uncondi t ioned af f i rmat ion of p r o d u c t i o n , a p r o d u c t i o n t h a t d e p e n d s on a

s u p p r e s s e d c r e a t i v e m o m e n t for its c o n t i n u a n c e . As s u c h , d e c o n s t r u c t

io n can be c o m p r e h e n d e d as the r e f l ec t ive appropr ia t ion of the self-

t r ansg res s ive moment of capi ta l , a m i m e t i c a s s i m i l a t i o n to it that a lso

repea t s cap i ta l ' s in t r ans igen t and o p a q u e f o r m a l i t y - the formal i ty we first

saw in the form of K a n t ' s t r a n s c e n d e n t a l u n i t y of a p p e r c e p t i o n . B e c a u s e

in t r ans igen t and o p a q u e , the formal i ty of d e c o n s t r u c t i o n , l i k e the form of

capi ta l reproduct ion , b locks the real se l f - t ransformat ive act iv i ty that its

se l f - t r ansg res s ive moment con t inua l ly appears to be in t r igu ing . Cap i ta l ' s

uncond i t ioned a f f i rmat ion canno t be fu l ly d i s t ingu ished f rom decon-




s truct ion 's af f i rmat ion , i t s 'yes , yes ' , ' i t g ives ' , wi thout knowing and

ref lect ion . On ce , ho we ver , the pa th of se l f -ref lect ion is em bra ce d the

poss ib il i ty o f d i s cover ing an unc ond i t ion ed open ing d i s app ear s . I f ' f i r s t'

ph i losophy can on ly be pur sued t r anscenden ta l ly , then s e l f - r e f l ec t ion

spel ls the end of f i r s t phi losophy.Pos t -modern i s t a r t and cu l tu re fo r i t s pa r t r ea l ly does a t t empt to over

com e the dua l i ty be tween a u to no m ou s a r t and th e m ass a r t o f the c u l tu re

ind us try , bu t th is i s only to say th at i t i s an ar t wh ich is se l f -conscious ly in

tune w i th bo th cap i ta l ' s s e l f - t r ansg res s ion o f a l l na tu ra l boundar ies , a l l

p rese nce , and w i th cap i ta l ' s un na tu r a l na tu ra l i sm , i t s fo rmal r ed uc t ion

of par t icular i ty to fungibi l i ty for the sake of fur ther capi ta l expans ion,

fu r the r s e l f -t r ansg res s ion . Po s t -m od ern i sm , l ike dec ons t ruc t io n , r epea t s

t h e J a n u s - fa c e d a m b i g u i t y o f c a p i t a l, e m a n c i p a t o r y a n d d o m i n a t i n g a t t h e

s a m e t i m e . H e n c e t h e c o n f u s i o n s s u r r o u n d i n g p o s t - m o d e r n i s m c o n c e r n i n gi ts pol i t ica l or ienta t ion .

Art i s or was a pr iv i leg ed socia l space for cr i t ique b eca use i t a lon e, a m on g

the ra t ional ly d i f ferent ia ted specia l ized spheres of pract ice (cogni t ive ,

pract ica l , aes thet ic) , suf fers or suf fered that d i f ferent ia t ion . Any a t tempt to

mi t iga te tha t su f fe r ing , fo r example th rough keep ing a r t aes the t i c o r

p rematu re ly l e t t ing a r t r ea l i ze i t s des i r e fo r non-a r t ( the f a l s e modern i sm

o f p o s t - m o d e r n i s m ) , m u t e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f n o n - i d e n t i t y a n d w i t h i t t h e

ques t ion o f t ru th . He idegger and Adorno , the oddes t o f coup les , jo in

fo rces over the r ecogn i t ion t ha t th e ques t ion s o f m ode rn i ty , h i s to ry and

t ru th m us t be posed toge ther o r the ques t ion o f t ru th can no t be posed a t

all . T h e d e m a n d f o r a n e m p h a t i c , n o n - a d e q u a t i o n , c o n c e p t i o n o f t r u t h

sepa rates thei r cr i t iq ue f rom i ts pra gm at is t spectra l image . I t i s, of cou rse ,

t ru ly ter r ib le and ter r i fy ingly i ronic , and hatefu l because th is recogni t ion

con ta ins an i ron ic moment , tha t the human su f fe r ing and mise ry tha t i s

both the suff ic ient and f inal cause for Adorno 's cr i t ica l engagements ,

sho uld f ind i ts cogn i t ive ech o in the margin al ized p ract ice s of h ig h - bo ur

geo i s - a r t . M od ern i ty ' s m arg ina l i ty w i th r espec t to p rev iou s h i s to ry hasen ta i l ed tha t in i t the exc lus ion /marg ina l i za t ion o f the a r t o f the v ic to r

has been a cond i t ion fo r i t s r econc i led in te r sub jec t iv i ty , wh ic h hen ce pu t s

h igh a r t in the pos i t ion o f the v ic t im. Th is d i s junc t ion be tween the v ic t ims

of modern i ty and the a r t tha t i s the consc iousnes s o f the i r needs i s p layed

ou t in Ad orn o ' s theory in the an t in om y o f engaged con ten t and r ad ica l

fo rm. E qu an im i ty over th i s f ateful d i s junc t ion , wh ich i s a s m uc h the d i s

junct ion of h igh ar t f rom mass ar t as i t i s the d is junct ion of h igh ar t f rom

what i t i s for , hence equanimity over h is tory ' s i roniz ing of fa te in to i rony,

can only be had a t the pr ice of unconsciousness . This is the pol i t ica lunconsc iousnes s o f pos t -modern i sm. Bu t tha t po l i t i ca l b l indnes s i s ne i the r

ran do m nor w i lfu l; i t i s the cons t i tu t ive a n t in om y o f a r t ' s aes the t i c

n e g a t i o n o f m o d e r n i t y .

W ha t goes wro ng , then , w i th the po li t ica l in te r rog a t ion o f the cu l tu ra l




s ignif icance of ar t i s that i t fa i ls to perceive that s ignif icance as dependent

on and a marker for an absent pol i t ics . Impl ic i t ly or expl ic i t ly , that absence

has surfaced in each and every one of the wr i ters examined: in the dual i ty

o f beau ty ( as con templa t ion ) and sub l imi ty ( as mora l l aw) in Kan t ; in the

end of great ar t , and the ident i ty of great ar t and the polis in Heidegger ; in

the t r ag ic po l i ti c s tha t i s the subs tan t ia l i ty in fo rm ing th e sub l im e in D er r id a ;and , mos t fo rmal ly and mos t weak ly , in the oppos i t ion be tween the

c o m m u n i t y - c r e a t i n g i l l u s i o n r e h e a r s e d b y t h e m o d e r n i s t w o r k a n d t h e

c r i t iqu e o f engag ed a r t in Ad orn o . Ar t can no t be d i r ec t ly po l i t ic ized

because a r t deve lops as a c r i t i ca l domain on ly th rough and in con junc t ion

with the depol i t ic iz ing of what has come to be cal led 'pol i t ies ' . Each

accoun t invo lved the acknowledgement tha t subs tan t ia l pos s ib i l i t i e s fo r

socia l t ransformat ion have been c losed off , and that whatever remains of

the impu lse fo r and mean ing o f h i s to r ica l overcoming has devo lved in to

works and wha t can be l ike them. Beau ty be reaved , the mourn ing over

be au ty ' s a l ienat ion f rom tr u t h and a ll th at a l ienat ion has co m e to s ignify ,

i s consummated in the be reavement over the los s o f the po l i t i ca l . Th i s i s

t h e u n s p o k e n , t h e s u b t e x t o f m o d e r n p h i l o s o p h y ' s e n t a n g l e m e n t w i t h a rt

and the aes the t i c . I t r emains unspoken because a l l tha t can be s a id abou t i t

ap pe ars in wha t is sub s tan t ia l and categor ia l ly legi t im ated in it s own r ig ht ,

namely , a r t and the d i s course o f aes the t i c s . Wi thou t a genea logy o f l ibe ra l

ism , a genealog y tha t wo uld g ive h is tor ical su bs t an ce to th e fabled s up

press io n of th e pol i t ica l of fered in th e In t ro du ct io n , pol i t ics berea ved

rem ain s an abs t ra ct io n . Ye t wi th ou t th e ef for t to real ize ar t ' s ro le as a

s tand- in for that absent pol i t ics , such a genealogy would lack categor ia l

reach. Only as ar t does the absent pol i t ica l achieve categor ia l presence in

m o d e r n i t y .

In d i f f e ren t ways , a l l the ph i losopher s we have been examin ing a t t empt

to undo the g iven h ie ra rchy o f un iver sa l and par t i cu la r by us ing the

exper ience of ar t as a demons tra t ion of the cogni t ive s ignif icance of

sense -p ercep t ib i l i ty beyon d the l imi t s l a id ou t by K an t ' s ( t r anscen den ta l )

s epara t ion o f t r ansc end en ta l an d emp i r ica l ; an a t t em pt tha t i s mo t iva ted

by the f a i lu res and succes ses o f Kan t ' s own aes the t i c theory . Adorno ' s

advan ce over the ana lyses o f He idegg er and D er r ida can be sum m ar ized in

tw o theses . F i rs t , if h is to ry m at te rs , if h is to ry and h is tor ical i ty have

bec om e the a rena fo r ques t ion s o f a sup pres s ed p rax i s , then bo th m od

erni ty , as the specif ic format ion and exper ience of universal and par t icular

that i s ours , and ar t is t ic modernism, as the specif ic form in which the

cha l lenge to tha t fo rmat ion t akes p lace , m us t be g iven p rom inen ce . M od

e r n i t y a n d m o d e r n i s m m u s t b e t h o u g h t t o g e t h e r o r a r t ' s c h a l l e n g e t o t h e

o ry w i l l be r educed to a moment o f theory . Second ly , Adorno does no t

refuse the moment of ref lect ion , but a t tempts to in tens i fy and radical ize i t

bey ond i t s p res en t s t an dpo in t . Ph i losop h ica l r e f l ect ion , a s p rac t i ced b y

Adorno, i s an extens ion of the ref lect ion impl ic i t in ar t works themselves .




Ad orn o ' s p rac t ice o f de t e rm ina te nega t ion and specu la t ive r e flec tion

at tem pts to e l ic i t the precise fourfo ld de pa r tu re of ar t is t ic reason f rom

sub sum pt iv e r eason : a r t ' s c la im fo r the in teg r i ty of un iqu e i t ems aga ins t

th e h ierarchic al dual i ty of univ ersal and pa r t icula r ; i ts leg i t im at ion of

sensuousnes s (happ ines s and embod imen t ) aga ins t abs t r ac t un iver sa l i ty ;

i t s leg i t imat ion of creat ive act ion , genius as praxis , agains t product ive ,in ten t iona l ac t ion ; an d a r t ' s exempl i fi ca t ion o f concre te kno win g , aes the t i c

reflection as phronesis, aga ins t subs um pt iv e knowing . Ar t i s the o the r o f

reason, but i t i s not an abs t ract negat ion of reason. This pract ice is

diff icult bec ause i t is a s t an d- in for an abs en t poli t ic s , a pla ce ho lde r for i t ,

and hence i t i s a lways and necessar i ly less pract ica l , less 'pol i t ica l ' than the

reaso n and praxis i t i s exem pli fy ing . T o pol i t ic ize ar t is to em plo y th e

rationali ty i t refuses for the sake of the rationali ty i t enjoins .

T o c la im th at ar t i s a s ta nd - in for an abs en t pol i tics is equ ivale nt to

cla iming that , specula t ively , ar t and pol i t ics are one, that they belong

toge ther , and tha t we can bes t under s tand the inab i l i ty o f modern i ty

to unfo ld , i ts r e s i s t ance to r ea l t r ans fo rm at ion , th r ou gh t he s epara t ion o f

a r t and po l i t i c s. W e have s een nu m ero us adu m bra t ion s o f th i s tho ug h t

th roughou t these pages : in the cha l l enge the sensus communis offers to the

Categor ica l Imp era t ive , an d in K an t ' s r e fusal o f the m em ory an d h i s to ry

s i tua t ing the new d i sc ip l ine o f ' aes the t i c s ' ; in He idegger ' s accoun t o f the

wo r ld - foun d ing o f the g rea t work o f a r t ; in ou r acco un t o f the sub l im e as a

t r ans fo rm ed c iphe r o f t r agedy and i t s po l i t i c s ; and in the thes i s th a t m od

ernis t w orks of ar t rehe arse t he prax is th ro ug h wh ich a col lect iv i ty is

fo rmed . The ca tegor ia l c la im o f the specu la t ive p ropos i t ion tha t a r t and

pol i t ics are one del ineates ref lect ively what has been thought confusedly in

the demand for e i ther a pol i t ic izat ion of aes thet ics or an aes thet ic izat ion of

the pol i t ica l ( th is la t ter i s arguably one feature of fascism) . Only by

eschewing an immedia te as s imi la t ion o f a r t to po l i t i c s , however , can the

tru e s ignif icance of ar t for pol i t ics be co m pr eh en de d. T h is w as the d i ff icult

pa th pur sued by Adorno ; bu t a pa th tha t comes c lea r ly in to v iew when we

no t ice , w i th some su rp r i s e , tha t , un l ike He idegger , Adorno ' s de fence o f a r tm a k e s no cla ims about what the fu ture of ar t i s to be . The aes thet ics of the

modern i s t sub l ime exhaus t s i t s e l f in i t s specu la t ive comprehens ion : 'As

em inen t ly co ns t ruc ted and p rod uc ed ob jec t s , works o f a r t , inc lu d ing l i t e r

ary ones , poin t to a pract ice f rom which they abs ta in : the creat ion of a jus t

l i f e . ' 2 3

I f ar t and pol i t ics are one, and ar t ' s chal lenge to theory is bes t under

s tood in t e rms o f the four fo ld depar tu re ou t l ined above , then the po l i t i ca l

s ide of the specu la t ive p ropos i t ion w ou ld nee d to de m on s t ra te , s ay in

te rms o f a c r i t i ca l genea logy , tha t the l ibe ra l s t a te , g rounded on the p re

cept of equal respect whereby each indiv idual i s f ree to pursue h is or her

own concept ion of the good l i fe , operates a fourfo ld neutra l iza t ion or

evacua t ion o f the po l i t i ca l r ea lm. Th is neu t ra l i za t ion occur s fundamenta l ly




th rough the s epara t ion o f pub l ic and p r iva te , r e lega t ing the empha t ic

cla ims of par t icular i ty , sensuousness and e th ical praxis to the pr ivate

realm. I t thereby leaves the publ ic and pol i t ica l wor ld to concern i t se l f not

with concrete indiv iduals , but wi th formal or legal persons , general ized

o ther s v iewed as bea re r s o f abs t r ac t r igh t s and en t i t l emen ts ; no t w i th the

concrete needs and des i res of o thers , but wi th legal c la ims of equal respect

before the law; not wi th praxis concerning the e th ical fu ture of the com

muni ty as a who le , bu t w i th t echn ica l ac t ions which w i l l p ro tec t the pub l ic

wor ld i t s e l f and u nd erw r i te the pos s ib i li ty of fu tu re c ap i ta l r ep r odu c t ion .

F inal ly , because pol i t ica l ac t ion has become technical , then pol i t ica l cog

ni t ion is reduced to the inves t igat ion of means for achieving a l ready g iven

e n d s . In summary, l ibera l pol i t ics is a pol i t ics wi thout e th ics (a concern

for the good and for happiness ) , knowledge or praxis . This c la im has force

on ly on the cond i t ion tha t the c la ims o f a r t i s t i c modern i sm have fo rce ; the

force of those c la ims being, again , the specula t ive uni ty of ar t and pol i t ics .T o see be t te r wh at is a t i s sue in th is specula t ive prop os i t ion , le t us co n

s ide r aga in the c la ims o f s ensuousnes s . One o f the cen t ra l theses o f Hege l ' s

aes the t i c s ado p te d by Ad orn o i s the fo rm er ' s v iew tha t aes the t i c s m us t be

p laced a longs ide the human consc iousnes s o f needs : 'And as long as these

needs pe r s i s t , a r t w i l l pe r s i s t . . .Speech les s by themse lves , needs r e ly on a r t

to g ive expres s ion to the i r be ing ' (A T , 473 ; S A T , 512) . W hy a re needs

speech les s? Needs , des i r es and wan ts a re speech les s because they a re

legis la t ively ass igned and res t r ic ted to the pr ivate realm, an ass ignment

ph i losoph ica l ly underwr i t t en a t the beg inn ing o f the modern age by

Descar tes and Hobbes who res t r i c ted knowing to f ac t s , l eav ing des i r e to

fo l low i t s own course : r eason as knowing and con templa t ion was to be the

s lave o f the unreasoned ends o f pas s ion . In accordance w i th the apparen t

respect the l ibera l s ta te has for each, the a t tempt to draw the needs ,

des i res and feel ings of indiv iduals in to the publ ic realm would count as an

in ter ference with their autonomy, thei r r ight to def ine the good l i fe as they

p lease so long as they r espec t o the r s ' r igh t to do the s ame . Th is i s wha t

the p r imacy o f r igh t over good in modern i ty means .

H a b e r m a s , w h o fo r t h e m o s t p a r t p r e s u m e s th e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h i s m o d

e r n a c c o m p l i s h m e n t , l a b e l s ' a e s t h e t i c - e x p r e s s i v e '2 4

the forms of d iscourse

in which our need in te rp re ta t ions a re themat ized , and whose s eman t ic

content def ines happiness and the good l i fe . This coheres wi th the idea

tha t the goo d l ife is a ( sem i-)pr iv ate af fa ir , tha t is non -uni versa l izab le and

cu l tu ra l ly spec i f i c , and hence ou t s ide the bounds o f e i the r t ru th o r ex te r

nal moral i ty ( legal i ty and jus t ice in thei r modern sense) . In brief, th i s

l abe l l ing r evea l s , wha t ou r a rgument to he re has been sugges t ing , tha t the

pr iva t i za t ion o f soc ia l mean ing - wha t in p re -modern soc ie t i e s was r ep res

e n t e d b y ethos an d (popu lar ) re l ig ion - i s equ ivalen t to the pr ivat iza t ion ,

the s i l enc ing o f des i r e and need ; a s i l enc ing tha t becomes ha rboured

ma te r ia l ly in the dom es t ic sub jec t and fo rmal ly in a r t . Ado rno ' s thes i s tha t




ar t mu s t forsake hap pin ess for the sake of ha ppi ne ss is gr ou nd ed in th e

thes i s tha t the p r ice pa id fo r genera t ing the cond i t ions tha t acknowledge

each a right to happiness is the obl iv ion of the goal . And th is for the pre

c ise reason that those condi t ions are the l iquidat ion ( that i s , re i f ica t ion)

of the se l f for wh ose sake the h is tor ical journe y of m od ern i ty h as b een

under taken . The marker fo r tha t l iqu ida t ion o r d i s in teg ra t ion , wh ich i sobvious ly socio logical ly and empir ical ly contes table , i s the fa te of ar t and

the aes the t i c in modern i ty . Adorno ' s apparen t ly hyperbo l ic ana lys i s o f

modern i ty , an ana lys i s tha t cu t s ac ros s modern i ty ' s mos t s angu ine self-

pronouncements , on ly makes s ense i f i t i s under s tood in ca tegor ia l t e rms .

An o the r pas sage th ro ug h w hich a ca tegor ia l ana lys is o f the r e la t ion

be tween po l i t i c s and a r t mus t t r ave l concerns the p rev ious ly ana lysed d i s

solu t ion of praxis in to gen ius . Aga in , the c la im here was tha t praxis, as

under s tood by Ar i s to t l e , r e fe r red to ac t ions done fo r the i r own sake , tha t

is , for the sake of ends in ternal to the act ion . In i t s Kant ian analys is ,

gen ius i s f r ee o r au tonomous ac t ion minus the fo rmal cons t i tu t ion o f

a u t o n o m y b y t h e C a t e g o r i ca l Im p e r a t i v e . G e n i u s is a u t o n o m y w i t h o u t

formal i ty . But i t i s more , for the work of genius is a lso wi thout external

purpose o r end ; i t s mean ing , a s an even t , i s in te rna l to i t . Gen ius , then ,

invo lves a dou b le t r ans fo rm at ion o f praxis: f i r s t , in accordance with the

un iq ue ly mo de rn conce p t ion o f f r eedom a nd l ibe r ty , gen ius t r an sc r ibes

p rax ia l ac t ion in to the ac t ion o f in te r rup t ing ex i s ten t mean ingfu lnes s fo r

the sake of some other concept ion of meaningfulness ; genius is pol i t ica l

p rax i s become se l f - consc ious ly h i s to r ica l . Second ly , however , praxis

r eaches modern i ty on ly as a r t , a s i l lu s ion . Gen ius i s praxis h is to r ic ized and

aes the t i c ized .

T h i s l a t t e r m om en t i s dea l t w i th op t imis t i ca l ly in K an t because he

fai led to not ice that the not ion of aes thet ic ideas involves the aes the-

t ic izat ion of socia l meaningfulness , the aes thet ic izat ion of our col lect ive

iden t i ty and under s tand ing o f the good (which i s why the ' h ighes t good ' in

K an t appear s as an imag ina t ive p ro jec t ion , a pos tu la te , neces sa ry for b u t

ex te rna l to the mora l i ty sub tend ing i t ) ; hence the d i sp lacemen t o f praxisin to a r t , wh ich makes a r t ' s p rax i s a pseudo-p rax i s , p rax i s a s i l lu s ion and

the i l lus ion of praxis , i s the cons ignment of socie ty ' s h is tor ical i ty wi th in a

de l imi ted and non-empi r ica l sphere . Th is i s why a r t becomes the in te r

rup t ion o f soc ia l mean ingfu lnes s without the abi l i ty to begin h is tory anew.

Ar t images the idea o f co l l ec t ive s e l f -de te rmina t ion tha t i s the p resumpt ive

pr iv i lege of l ibera l democracy; but because the la t ter separates the legal

f rom the e th ica l , wh ich i s bu t ano ther ve r s ion o f the s epara t ion o f pub l ic

and pr ivate , i t leaves out of cons iderat ion any se l f that might mat ter in the

way o f s e l f -de te rm ina t ion . A r t ' s p seudo-p rax i s r ehear ses s e l f- consc ious ly

l i b e r a l d e m o c r a c y ' s b l i n d p s e u d o - p r a x i s . N o n e t h e l e s s , a r t ' s p s e u d o - p r a x i s

at least gives an idea of what true praxis might be l ike.

T h e specu la t ive wr i t ing o f the u n i ty o f a r t and p h i losoph y i s the s to ry




of the d i ff icult pr axis of 'a es th et ic the ory ' : the aes thet ic iz at ion of the ory is

i t s becoming p rax ia l , incomprehens ib le in the way tha t the modern i s t sub

l ime is inc om pre he ns i b le ; the theoret ica l te l l ing of th is co nt in ua t ion of the

ref lect ive movement of ar t i s the poie t ic revela t ion of praxis . Under these

c i r cum s tance s specu la t ion com es to app ear as a fo rm o f jud gem ent tha t

accep t s tha t because o f f r agmenta t ion wha t was judgement (phronesis) andpraxis are no longer poss ib le . And th is , again , i s why ar t works can but

reh ears e the praxis tha t i s the co ns t i tu t ion of a col lect iv i ty . A r t and ph i l

osophy a re p rax i s and judgement in the absence o f p rax i s and judgement ;

they are pol i t ica l or e th ical s tand- ins for an absent pol i t ics . Hence they are

and are not that of which they speak.

I t i s pe rhaps t empt ing a t th i s junc tu re to th ink tha t we migh t d i r ec t ly

concep tua l i ze in concre te t e rm s , tha t i s , w i th ou t th e ind i rec t ions invo lved

in h is tor ical ref lec t ion and specula t ion , what has been s i lenced in the

aes thet ic izat ion of praxis and socia l meaning, and in the pr ivat iza t ion of

d e s i re a n d n e e d . I n a w o r k t h a t a t t e m p t s to s u p p l e m e n t H a b e r m a s ' s

de fence o f the s tan dpo in t o f the genera l ized o th e r , the s t andpo in t o f

r igh t s and e n t i t l em en ts th a t r ep rese n t the fu l fi lmen t o f the mora l po in t o f

v iew , Sey la Benhab ib cons t ruc t s the s tandpo in t o f wha t she ca l l s the ' con

c r e t e o t h e r ' . T h i s s t a n d p o i n t r e q u i r e s u s

to v iew each and every ra t ional being as an indiv idual wi th a con

c re te h i s to ry , iden t i ty , and a f fec t ive -emot iona l cons t i tu t ion . Our

re la t ion to each o ther is governed by the norm of complementary reci

procity; each is en t i t led to expect and to assu m e f rom th e o the r

fo rms o f behav iour th rough which the o the r f ee l s r ecogn ized and

conf i rmed as a concrete , indiv idual being with specif ic needs , ta lents ,

and capac i t i e s . T h e nor m s o f in te rac t ion a re . . . th e norm s of so l i

da r i ty , f r i endsh ip , love , and ca re .2 5

This s t andpo in t , Benhab ib s ta tes , has been s i l enced , even suppres sed by

the l ibe ra l po l i t i ca l t r ad i t ion . Fur the r , th i s suppres s ion , she c la ims , has

been abe t ted by the soc ia l and ep i s temic exc lus ion o f woman ' s vo ice and

ac t iv i ty f rom the pub l ic sphere .2 6

W ha t goes wro ng wi th Be nh ab i b ' s con s t ruc t ion is tha t she appear s

to bel ieve that i t can be regarded as ' jus t ' a ra t ional supplement to

H ab er m as ' s theo ry , wh ich i s to s ay , ' j u s t ' a sup p le m en t to m ode rn i ty in it s

o w n s e l f - u n d e r s t a n d i n g . Pace B e n h a b i b , w e c a n n o m o r e d i r e c t l y a p p r e

hend wha t i s tokened by the s i l enc ing o f woman ' s vo ice than we can

d i rec t ly apprehend the incomprehens ib i l i ty o f the work o f a r t ; no r can we ,

wi th any r igour , s epara te these two s i l ences . They a re pa r t o f the s ame

s i lence. That s i lence is complex; i t s e lements are : the aes thet ic izat ion of

p rax i s and soc ia l mean ing ( r e l ig ion and ethos); the pr ivat iza t ion of des i re




and n eed ; and th e exc lus ion o f the non- iden t ica l o the r (wom an , l abo ur ,

o the r r aces , e tc . ) . T o con s t ruc t concep tua l ly the mis s ing s tan dpo in t

forgets what ra t ional izat ion has done to so l idar i ty , f r iendship , love and

ca re . Which i s why Adorno was so s cep t ica l abou t theor ies tha t a t t empted

to r es to re th rough theore t i ca l dec ree wha t h i s to ry has f r agmented and

t rans fo rmed : 'The concep t o f the pe r son and i t s va r ia t ions , l ike the I -

T h o u re la t ion sh ip , have as su m ed the oi ly tone o f a theo logy in wh ich one

has los t f a i th ' (ND, 277) . How can we avo id cons ide r ing the s tandpo in t

o f the concre te o the r a s bu t ano ther ve r s ion o f the I -Thou re la t ionsh ip ,

another l ibera l pol i t ica l theology?

Art and pol i t ics are one; th is specula t ive and aporet ic propos i t ion is the

vo l i t iona l ana logue o f Adorno ' s govern ing specu la t ive p ropos i t ion tha t a r t

and ph i losophy a re one . The absence o f a concre te po l i t i ca l p rogramme in

Adorno i s a d i r ec t consequence o f h i s v iew tha t the de fo rmat ions o f soc ia l

l i f e b rough t abou t by r a t iona l iza t ion have d i sp laced the e lemen ts tha t'belong ' to pol i t ica l l i fe and act iv i ty . Hence h is approaches to the o ther

a re never d i r ec t , and r a re ly made in t e rms co te rminus w i th the now

defo rm ed d i s course o f the in t im ate sphere . Ra the r , he speaks o f sh ud de r ,

m ime s i s , a ff in ity. No ne t he l es s , it m us t be conc eded tha t A do rno ' s c en t re

of a t te nt io n fel l squ arely on the apo r ia affect ing co gni t io n an d r a t ion al i ty

ra the r than on the deep ly ana logous , and deep ly en twined , apor ia a f f ec t ing

vol i t ion .

P e r h a p s t h e g r a d u a l a n d c o n t i n u i n g d i s s o lu t i o n o f t h e m o d e r n i s t s u b

l ime and the ar r ival of a pol i t ica l and theoret ica l feminism, which is i t s

he i r , mak es Ad orn o ' s p reocc upa t ions app ear da te d . Bu t i f f emin i sm i s

th e he i r of the mo der n i s t su b l im e , if to th ink and ac t in con t inua nce w i th

Adorno ' s p ro jec t we mus t tu rn away f rom a r t and the aes the t i c toward

gender and race , then th is pol i t ics and i ts th inking wil l of necess i ty be

specu la t ive and , apore t i c . Spec u la t ive p ropo s i t ions a re ne i t he r s t a te m en ts

o f f ac t no r p resc r ip t ions . How, then , a re they to be under s tood? Aes the t i c

judgement , we c la imed , was the sub l imated and aes the t i c ized r emnan t o f

phronesis. Phronesis cou ld no t su rv ive once the soc ia l bonds tha t sus ta ined

i t d i s appeared . Au tonomous a r t p rov ided an i l lu so ry c losu re in wh ich

phronesis could f ind the suppor t necessary for i t . Ar t works , we might say ,

are an i l lusory polis, or an ana logo n of r e l ig ious co m m un i ty . In th ink in g

ou r fa te now no such i l lusory sup po r t i s poss ib le ; the 'w e ' th at wou ld su s

ta in po l i t i ca l judgement and p rax i s has d i s appeared f rom d i rec t v iew; 'we '

do no t know, d i r ec t ly o r immedia te ly , who 'we ' a re . Our 'we ' has gone

underg round , appear s on ly th rough the theore t i ca l t r ac ing o f the f a te tha t

has r end ered u s s t r ang er s to one ano the r . 'W e ' com e to kno w ourse lves

and recogn ize who we a re on ly th rough the med ia t ion o f theory . By ex ten s ion , pract ica l ins ight in to that s i tuat ion wil l be equal ly and necessar i ly

theo ry me d ia ted . T h i s is the co ro lla ry o f works o f a r t ' c r ea t in g ' co m m u

ni t ies of thei r own: the sensus communis as p res upp ose d a nd ye t to be




a c h i e v e d . J u d g e m e n t m u s t m i g r a t e i n t o t h e o r y . S p e c u l a ti v e p r o p o s i t io n s

a re modern i ty ' s theore t i ca l ve r s ion of what once was phronesis, j u d g e m e n t .

T h e c o n t i n u a n c e of sel f- reflect ion be yo nd t ra nsc en de nta l se l f- reflection ,

which enac ted a s u p p r e s s i o n of j u d g e m e n t , is the m e a n s and m o d e in

w h i c h j u d g e m e n t b e c o m e s r e i n s t a t e d . We c a n n o t r e t u r n to j u d g e m e n t

d i rec t ly - the id le hope of m o d e r n n e o - A r i s t o t e l i a n s - since the c o n d i t i o n s

fo r it h a v e b e e n e r a s e d . J u d g e m e n t now occurs on ly in and t h r o u g h self-

reflection. Self-reflection is c o n s u m m a t e d and ach ieved in the e labora t ion

of specu la t ive p ropos i t ions tha t u t t e r our c a t e g o r i a l p r e d i c a m e n t .

T o r e s c u e m e a n s to love th ings ; th is is e x p e r i e n c e d by consc iousnes s

b o t h in t e r m s of the marred f igu re of w h a t we shou ld love , and w h a t the

spel l , the e n d o g a m y of consc iousnes s , does not p e r m i t us to love (ND,

191). This po l i t i ca l love , the u n i t y of eros and k n o w l e d g e , was exempli f ied

in art w o r k s in t h e i r m i m e t i c m o m e n t , and in p h i l o s o p h y ' s self-

r e l i n q u i s h m e n t of i t se l f ( ident i ty th inking) in the face of art - w h i c h

mas the marred f igure of w h a t we shou ld love , and w h a t the spel l of

consc iousnes s ( sub jec t iv i ty ) did not p e r m i t us to love. Aes thet ic negat ion

and second (specula t ive) ref lect ion , the m o v e m e n t of se l f -overcoming in

a r t and ph i losophy respec t ive ly , were the d isc ip l ine , the law of th is love,

the i r l awfu lnes s w i thou t law. The law of love and the love of law are the

'more ' sub jec t iv i ty neces sa ry for the o v e r c o m i n g of s u b j e c t i v i t y .

2 7

Thepropos i t ions s ta t ing the u n i t y of p h i l o s o p h y and art, and art and pol i t ics ,

were th i s s e l f - r e l inqu ishment and its c o m p r e h e n s i o n , b o t h l o v e and law.

P e r h a p s w h a t is r e q u i r e d now is the w r i t i n g of new specu la t ive p ropos i

t ions t r ac ing the fate of sub jec t and s u b s t a n c e ; p e r h a p s p h i l o s o p h y and

w o m a n are one, and pol i t ics and w o m a n are one. Since these specu la t ive

p r o p o s i t i o n s w o u l d be n e i t h e r s t a t e m e n t s of fact nor p r e s c r i p t i o n s of w h a t

o u g h t to be, t h e n we mus t acknowledge tha t such specu la t ive th ink ing

w o u l d be, as s u c h , a fo rm of pol i t ica l ins ight , pol i t ica l wisdom, phronesis,

a n d a p r a x i s . In our a c k n o w l e d g i n g t h i s we w o u l d not be ( just) followingan in fe rence or o b e y i n g an ob l iga t ion ; r a the r such an a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t

w o u l d be diff icult , aporetic - an a n x i o u s act of pol i t ica l love.



N ot e s

I n t ro d u c t i o n Aes t h e t i c A l i en a t i o n

1 Ji irgen Ha berm as, The Philosophical Discourse of Mod ernity, tr. Frederick

Lawrence Cambridge: Pol i ty Press , 1988) , p . 95.

2 By post-posi t ivist phi losop hy of sc ience I mea n, for exam ple: Th om as Ku hn ,

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (London: Un ivers i ty o f Ch icago Press ,1970); Imre Lakatos, 'Falsif ication and the methodology of scientif ic research

programmes' , in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, ed. I . Lakatos and

A. Musgrave (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Un ivers i ty Press , 1970) ; Dud ley

Shapere, Reason and the Search for Know ledge (Dordrecht : D . Re ide l

Publishing, 1986). For the sort of categorial implications of these pre

supposed in my claims see: Gerald Doppel t , 'Kuhn's epistemological relat iv

i sm: an interpretation and defense' , Inquiry, 21 (1978) , esp . p . 41.

3 T he phrase com es from Gad amer; see below, chapter 2, note 37.

4 Se e J. Ha berm as, 'Philo sop hy as stand -in and interpreter, ' in After Philo

sophy: end or transformation, ed . Kenneth Baynes , Jam es Bohm an and

Tho m a s McCarthy (Lond on: M I T Press , 1987) , pp . 29 6- 3 15 ; and chapter 5,

sect ion i below.

5 For an attem pt at ma king this history available to E nglis h-sp eak ing

phi losophers , see Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: from Kant to

Nietzsche (Manches ter : Manches ter Un ivers i ty Press , 1990) .

6 Charles Tay lor, Sources of the Self (Cam bridge , MA: Harvard Univers i ty

Press , 1989) , p . 510. The sympathies of th is present work to Taylor's wi l l

becom e obvious . In dee d, my dou bts about how far a l inguistic or com m un i

tarian turn in philosophy can take us echoes Taylor's cautioning wordsagainst the language of commitment and Habermas' theory of language (pp.

509-10) . Where I depart from Taylor i s that he employs the d iscourses of



N O T E S TO PP . 1 0 - 2 8

artistic modernism directly (chapters 23-4), while I believe that it is not the

contents of these works which is most significant but their forms, which allows

them and not philosophy to be the place where alternative conceptualizations

of self, world and community are germinating (or as I believe, hibernating).

Taylor makes too little of the fact that it is in art and aesthetics that he finds

'epiphanies' of sources of moral meaning beyond the self. In so doing he

leaves open the charge that these epiphanies are just imagined, mere possi

bilities without cognitive purchase on us.

T. W. Adorno, Prisms, tr. Samuel and Shierry Weber (London: Neville

Spearman, 1967), p. 34.

H. Arendt, On Revolution (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books,

1973), p. 52. See also her The Human Condition (Garden City, New York:

Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959), pp. 64-6 .

Adorno, Prisms, passim.

Arendt, The Human Condition, passim; G. W. F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right,

tr. with notes T. M. Knox (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 10.H. Arendt Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. with an interpretive

essay by Ronald Beiner (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1982).

Chapter 1 Memorial Aes t h e t i c s :

Kant's Critique of Judgement

1 Mary Mothersill, Beauty Restored (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 210.

2 Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (London: Harvard University

Press, 1979), pp. 3 2 0 - 1 .

3 See, for example, ibid., pp. 322-3; R. K. Elliot, 'The unity of Kant's

"Critique of Aesthetic Judgement'", British Journal of Aesthetics 8, 3 (July

1968), p. 245; Ralf Meerbote, 'Reflection on beauty', in Essays in Kant's Aes

thetics, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (London: University of Chicago

Press, 1982), p. 81; Salim Kemal, 'Aesthetic necessity, culture and epistem-

ology', Kant-Studten, 74 (1980), pp. 203-4.

4 For a detailed reconstruction and criticism of this argument see Guyer, Kant

and the Claims of Taste, ch. 8. For the argument which follows see esp.

p . 295, and Elliot, 'Unity', p. 245.

5 See, for example, Elliot, 'Unity'; Kemal, 'Aesthetic Necessity'; Donald W.

Crawford, Kant;s Aesthetic Theory (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,

1974), chs 6-7; Kenneth F. Rogerson, 'The Meaning of Universal Validity

in Kant's Aesthetics', The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 40 (1981),

p p . 301-8.

6 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, p. 146.

7 Ibid., p. 143.

8 F. Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals, tr. Walter Kaufmann and R. J.

Hollingdale (New York: Vintage Books, 1969), third essay, section 6.9 See Ted Cohen, 'Why beauty is a symbol of morality' and Dieter Henrich,

'Beauty and freedom: Schiller's struggle with Kant's aesthetics', both in

Cohen and Guyer (eds), Essays in Kant's Aesthetics. Both these excellent

essays pursue a reading of Kant's aesthetics along the lines I am intending to



N O T E S TO PP. 2 8 - 5 5 2 7 7

follow, without, however, connecting their analyses to the status of the third

Critique as a whole.

10 For detailed criticism of this line of interpretation see Guyer, Kant and the

Claims of Taste, pp. 351-7; and Jeffrey Maitland, 'Two senses of necessity

in Kant's aesthetic theory', The British Journal of Aesthetics, 16 (1976),

p p . 347-53.11 See Elliot, 'Unity' , p. 258; and Crawford, Kant's Aesthetic Theory, pp. 133-

42 .

12 See n. 10 above.

13 Eva Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University

Press, 1979), ch. 4, 'Free and dependent beauty', passim.

14 I. Kant, 'What is orientation in thinking?' in Immanuel Kant: Critique of

Practical Reason and other writings in moral philosophy, ed. and tr. Lewis

White Beck (New York: Garland, 1976), p. 294.

15 Francis X. J. Coleman, The Harmony of Reason: a study in Kant's aesthetics

(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1974), pp. 109-11.

16 P. de Man, 'Phenomenality and materiality in Kant', in Hermeneutics:

Questions and Prospects, ed. Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica (Amherst: Univer

sity of Massachusetts Press, 1984), pp. 121-44.

17 I. Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, tr. Mary J. Gregor (Philadelphia: University

of Pennsylvania Press, 1971), p. 448.

18 Ibid.

19 My way of formulating the issues in this section has been heavily influenced

by my reading of Meerbote, 'Reflection on beauty'.

20 I. Kant, Logic, tr. Robert S. Hartman and Wolfgang Schwarz (Indianapolis,

The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974), p. 100.

21 Meerbote, 'Reflection on beauty', p. 58.

22 Gilles Deleuze, Kant's Critical Philosophy: the doctrine of faculties, tr. Hugh

Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1984), pp. 5 9 -

60. For a detailing of this thought in terms of Kant's theory of schematism

see Meerbote, 'Reflection on beauty', pp. 62-8.

23 That Kant's account of aesthetic judgement is finally psychological in charac

ter is the ultimate view of Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste.

24 This is the argument of sections V and VI of the 'Introduction' to the third

Critique, which is worked out in more detail in I. Kant, First Introduction to

the Critique of Judgement, tr. James Haden (New York: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,

1965).

25 Meerbote, 'Reflection on beauty', p. 70.

26 Ibid., pp. 74, 79 -8 0.

27 Ibid.

28 I. Kant, Reflection, 686, as quoted in P. Guyer, 'Pleasure and society in

Kant's theory of taste', in Cohen and Guyer (eds), Essays in Kant's Aesthet

ics, p. 42. For the following objection see ibid., p. 52.

29 Kant, 'What is orientation in thinking?', p. 303.

30 Arendt, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, esp. 'Sessions' 6, 7, 12 and

13 .

31 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, p. 97. For the following thesis, pp. 9 7 -

8.



2 7 8 N O T E S TO PP 5 6 - 8 8

32 Th e 'looseness of fit' between the transcendental and empirical levels in

Kant's epistemology has been the core of Gerd Buchdahl's valuable writings

on Kant. See his Metaphysics and The Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Basil

Blackwell, 1969), ch. 8, esp. pp. 651- 65 . The 'looseness of fit' underwrites

the significance of the teleological element in Kant's philosophy of science,

which itself makes Kant's epistemology begin to look a great deal more

Hegelian than is usually supposed.

33 Henry Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism (London: Yale University

Press, 1983), p. 225. For a critique of the idea of Kant as a phenomenalist,

see pp. 30-4.

34 Meerbote, 'Reflection on beauty', pp. 72ff.

35 Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste, pp. 251, 252.

36 See J. M. Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel: Lukacs, Marxism and the

dialectics of form (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1984), pp. 101-2.

37 This objection was pointed out to me by Robert Pippin.

Chapter 2 The Genius of B e i n g : Heidegger's

'The Origin of the Work of Art'

1 For an underlining of this see, Jacques Taminaux, Recoupements (Bruxelles:

Ousia, 1982), chs 1- 2.

2 M. Heidegger, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, tr. James S. Churchill

(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 194.

3 John Llewelyn, 'Heidegger's Kant and the middle voice' , in Time and Meta

physics, ed. David Wood and Robert Bernasconi (Coventry: Parousia Press,

1982), pp. 87-120; and his Derrida on the Threshold of Sense (London:

Macmillan, 1986), pp. 117-18.

4 M. Heidegger, Being and Time, tr. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson

(New York: Harper and Row, 1962), sections 72-7.

5 Hegel's Aesthetics, tr. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975),

p. 103.

6 This is the standard misreading of the essay; it construes Heidegger as

offering an atemporal definition of what art is. For example see: David

Halliburton, Poetic Thinking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981),

ch. 2; and Sandra Bartky, 'Heidegger's philosophy of art', in Heidegger: the

man and the thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing,

1981), pp. 257-74.

7 For a Heideggerian reading of Kant's aesthetics that follows on from Kant

and the Problem of Metaphysics, see Jeffrey Maitland, 'An ontology of

appreciation: Kant's aesthetics and the problem of metaphysics', Journal of

the British Society for Phenomenology, 13, 1 (1982), pp. 4 5-6 8.

8 Gerald Doppel t, 'Kuhn's epistemological relativism: an interpretation anddefense', Inquiry, 21 (1978), esp. p. 41.

9 Reiner Schiirmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting: from principles to anarchy,

tr. Christine-Marie Gros and Reiner Schiirmann (Bloomington: Indiana

University Press, 1987), p. 56.

10 On this see Michael Allen Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of



N O T E S TO PP. 8 9 - 1 2 1 2 7 9

History (Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 171; and David

Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity: Hegel, Heidegger and after (Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 227.

11 Schurmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting, p. 280.

12 See Mary McCloskey, Kant's Aesthetics (London: Macmillan, 1987), p. 108.

13 Ibid., p. 133 for a similar view.

14 Christopher Fynsk, Heidegger: thought and historicity (London: Cornell Uni

versity Press, 1986), pp. 132, 135.

15 On Kant's genius-to-genius argument see Timothy Gould, 'The audience

of originality: Kant and Wordsworth on the reception of genius', in Essays

in Kant's Aesthetics, ed. T. Cohen and P. Guyer (London: University of

Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 187-90. It was Gould's article and Guyer's

'Autonomy and integrity in Kant's aesthetics', Monist, 66 (1983), pp. 167-

88, that first directed me toward the implications of Kant's theory of genius

and its connections to artistic modernism. Gould ends his piece by saying:

'...I suppose that the idea that a serious work of art must instruct its audi

ence, that the instruction will tend to take the form of provocation, and that

the effort to create works that bear the burden of human significance runs the

risk of a radical failure of sense, are all articulations of modernism' (p. 192).

16 Ibid.

17 For a defence of art and 'progressive culture' see Salim Kemal , 'The im

portance of artistic beauty', Kant-Studien, 71 (1980), pp. 488-507; and his

'Aesthetic necessity, culture and epistemology', Kant-Studien, 74 (1983),

p p . 176-205.

18 Guyer, 'Autonomy and integrity in Kant's aesthetics', pp. 165-186.

19 Ibid.

20 S. Cavell, Must We Mean What We Say? (New York: Charles Scribner and

Sons, 1969), p. 52.

21 John McDowell, 'Virtue and reason', Monist, 62 (1979), p. 332.

22 For a sharp defence of the view that Heidegger takes his idea of a new

(second) beginning from Descartes, see Robert Bernasconi, 'Descartes in the

history of being: another bad novel?', Research in Phenomenology, 17 (1987),

pp . 75-102.

23 Kolb, The Critique of Pure Modernity, p. 145.

24 On the epoch of technology as the eschatological fulfilment of metaphysics

see Gillespie, Hegel, Heidegger, and the Ground of History, pp. 135-6, 144,

149-64.

25 For the necessity of linking art and technology in this way in Heidegger see

Otto Poggeler, '"Historici ty" in Heidegger's late work', tr. J. N. Mohanty,

Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 4 (1973), p. 64.

26 Fynsk, Heidegger, p. 134.

27 For the most complete account of 'earth' in Heidegger see Michel Haar,

Le Chant de la Terre: Heidegger et les assises de THistoire de TEtre (Paris:

L'Herne, 1985).28 On the rift see Fynsk, Heidegger, pp. 142ff; J. Derrida, 'Le retrait de la

metaphore', Poesie, 7 (1978), pp. 103-26; and Rodolphe Gasche, 'Joining

the Text: from Heidegger to Derrida', in The Yale Critics: deconstruction in

America, ed. Jonathan Arac et al. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

Press, 1983), pp. 156-75.



280 N O T E S TO PP. 123-9

29 Fynsk, Heidegger, p. 144.

30 Gregory Schufrieder, 'Heidegger on community', Man and World, 14, 1

(1981), p. 34.

31 M. Heidegger, Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer

Verlag, 1953), p. 102; An Introduction to Metaphysics, tr. Ralph Mannheim

(Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961), p. 113. Translation here and

for the next quote follows Schufrieder, p. 35.

32 Heidegger, ibid., Einfuhrung, p. 117; tr. p. 128; Schufrieder, 'Heidegger on

community', p. 36. For a delicate presentation of the Hegelian account of

this same issue see Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (London: Athlone

Press, 1981), pp. 124-6.

33 Following the implicit hint in the writings of Gadamer and Arendt, Robert

Bernasconi and Jacques Taminiaux have been tracing this work of retrieval

in Heidegger's thought: Robert Bernasconi, 'The fate of the distinction

between praxis and poiesis\ Heidegger Studies, 2, pp. 111-39; Jacques

Taminiaux, 'Poiesis and praxis in fundamental ontology', Research in Phen

omenology, 17 (1987), pp. 137-69.

34 My departure here from the reading of Heidegger by Bernasconi and

Taminiaux is grounded in the view that they read Arendt too naively. While

it is certainly true that her concept of 'action' in The Human Condition

(Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959) is an attempt at

retrieving Aristotelian praxis, her placement of action in the polis is dubious.

As becomes evident in her On Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,

1973), esp. ch. 1, her attribution to 'action' of freedom and a concern for new

beginnings draws heavily on the modern experience of revolution, one which

•she relates back to the new science and Descartes (p. 46). In brief, Arendt's

The Human Condition operates the same backward-looking projection onto

Aristode that I am claiming Heidegger operates, a lapse made good in On

Revolution.

35 Heidegger, Being and Time, §74; the translation here follows that in Phillipe

Lacoue-Labarthe, 'Transcendence ends in polities', tr. Peter Caws, Social

Research, 49 (Summer 1982), p. 426.

36 This primacy of the speculative and theoretical over the political in

Heidegger has been elegandy documented in Lacoue-Labarthe, ibid.,passim.; and in Taminiaux, 'Poiesis and praxis in fundamental ontology',

p p . 157-62. This suppression of the political is a direct consequence of

Heidegger's treatment of freedom. In his excellent 'Dawn and dusk:

Gadamer and Heidegger on truth', (Man and World 19 (1986), pp. 21-53)

Francis J. Ambrosio correcdy states that for Heidegger freedom 'is thought

in terms of EreignisjAletheia, understood as giving Time (extending the

Open) and Being (destiny) and thereby binding and guiding thought to itself

as the matter to-be-thought...Ereignis\Aletheia. ..frees time and Being by

appropriating them first to each other and then secondarily to Dasein...' (pp.

48-9) . For a literal application of this thought to the question of justice, see

N, 165-9.

Recent work on Heidegger's politics do not seem to me to have added any

thing substantial in particular Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, Heidegger and

Modernity, tr. Franklin Philip (London: University of Chicago Press, 1990);



N O T E S TO PP. 1 3 0 - 7 281

Jean-Francois Lyotard, Heidegger et 'Les Juifs' (Paris: Galilee, 1988); and

Lacoue-Labarthe, Heidegger, Art and Technology, tr. Chris Turner (Oxford:

Basil Blackwell, 1990). This last falls short of what Lacoue-Labarthe had

achieved in his essay on the same topic, although on pp. 56-60 and 64-74

there are some suggestive comments on the whole question of the aesthe

ticization of the political in Heidegger.

The claim that the overcoming of modern futility requires a reconstituted

political realm is essential to the argument of Arendt, The Human Condition.

I have tried to say something more about nihilism and political/aesthetic

legislation in my 'Autonomy and solitude', in Nietzsche and Modern German

Thought, ed. Keith Ansell Pearson (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

Space prohibits me from providing a detailed account of Gadamer's concep

tion of aesthetic alienation. Nonetheless, three points should be metioned. (i)

Gadamer regards Kantian aesthetics as a work of subjectivization. At bottom,

this subjectivization is for Gadamer a work of consciousness, its abstracting

or differentiating the work from the world (TM, 73-8). (ii) What is subjec-tivized in aesthetic discourse is the discourse, language and practice, of civic

humanism. This humanist tradition is thus the explicit and concrete histori

cal instantiation of the lost common sense I proposed in chapter 1. In provid

ing this historical substance to aesthetic subjectivity, Gadamer is attempting

to reconnect art and life, to return art to the world and cognition, (iii)

Gadamer's account fails quite simply because he fails to take the separation

of art and world in modernity seriously enough, a fact adumbrated in his

making aesthetic alienation a fact of consciousness. Nonetheless, it should be

clear to the reader that the path I am pursuing owes much to Gadamer's

diagnosis and analysis.

Meyer Schapiro, 'The still life as a personal object: a note on Heidegger

and Van Gogh', in The Reach of the Mind, ed. M. I. Simmel (New York:

Springer Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 203 -9 . This will be discussed in

chapter 3, sections ii and iii below.

See M. Heidegger, 'Art and space', tr. Charles H, Seibert, Man and World,

6/1 (Feb. 1973), pp. 3-8. For a commentary on this stretch of Heidegger's

thought see Kathleen Wright, 'The place of the work of art in the age of

technology', Southern Journal of Philosophy, 22, 4 (1984), pp. 565-82. While

I find myself in agreement with Wright's analysis of modern sculpture on

p. 576, it reads to me as modernist in an Adomoesque sense. Conversely,

I find her invocation of a dwelling place with respect to the Van Gogh

unpersuasive; worse, it drifts very close to the idea of affirmative culture.

Nonetheless, Wright is one of the few authors who place Heidegger's writ

ings on art in the appropriate context.

Chapter 3 The Deconstructive S u b l i m e :

Derrida's The Truth in Painting

M. Heidegger, On Time and Being (New York: Harper Torch books, 1972),

p. 9.



282 N O T E S TO PP. 1 3 7 - 6 0

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid. On this in relation to Hegel see Robert Bernasconi, The Question of

Language in Heidegger's History of Being (London: Macmillan, 1985), ch. 1.

4 J. Derrida, 'Sending: on representation', Social Research, 49, 2 (1982),

p p . 317-22.

5 Rodolphe Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror: Derrida and the philosophy of

reflection (London: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 242-6.

6 Maurice Blanchot, Le Livre a Venir (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1959),

p. 320. Olivier Serafinowicz drew this passage to my attention and provided

the translation. On the movement from being to text, see Rodolphe Gasche,

'Joining the Text: from Heidegger to Derrida', in The Yale Critics:

deconstruction in America, ed. Jonathan Arac et al. (Minneapolis: University

of Minnesota Press, 1983), pp. 156-75.

7 See John Llewelyn, 'Belongings', Research in Phenomenology, 17 (1987),

p p . 117-35.

8 Jacques Derrida, Spurs: Nietzsche's styles, tr. Barbara Harlow (London: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 115- 19 .

9 Jacques Derrida, The Post Card: from Socrates to Freud and beyond, tr. Alan

Bass (London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 468-78.

10 Jacques Derrida, Dissemination, tr. Barbara Johnson (London: University of

Chicago Press, 1981), p. 223. My account follows Gasche, The Tain of the

Mirror, pp. 256-62.

11 Jacques Derrida, Positions, tr. Alan Bass (London: Athlone Press, 1982),

p . 69.

12 Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror, p. 257.

13 Derrida, Dissemination, p. 291.

14 Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror, pp. 258-9.

15 Derrida Positions, p. 69.

16 Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror, p. 261.

17 Jacques Derrida, 'From restricted to general economy: an Hegelianism with

out reserve', in Writing and Difference, tr. Alan Bass (London: University of

Chicago Press, 1978).

18 See Christopher Fynsk, Heidegger: thought and historicity (London: Cornell

University Press, 1986), ch. 1 for a splendid account of this, esp. pp. 3 4-9.

19 Derrida, Writing and Difference, pp. 256-7. On this see J. M. Bernstein,

'Lukacs' wake: praxis, presence and metaphysics', in Lukdcs Today, ed. T.

Rockmore (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1988).

20 Th e phrase is Jonathan Lear's, in 'The disappearing "we"', Aristotelian

Society suppl. 58 (1984), p. 233.

21 Derrida, Dissemination, p. 258; see Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror, pp. 212-

24.

22 Meyer Schapiro, 'The still life as a personal object: a note on Heidegger and

Van Gogh', in The Reach of the Mind, ed. M. I. Simmel (New York:

Springer Publishing Company, 1968), pp. 206-7.

23 Derrida, Spurs, p. 111.

24 See Jacques Derrida, 'On the essence of truth', in Basic Writings, ed. David

F. Krell (London: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 13 5-6.



N O T E S TO PP. 1 6 6 - 8 4 2 8 3

25 J. Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, tr. David B. Allison (Evanston: North

western University Press, 1973), pp. 48-87.

26 The 'non-transcendentalizable' other of this reading of the beautiful

concerns disgust and vomit (E, 22-5). In Glas, tr. J. P. Leavey, Jr and

R. Ravel (London: University of Nebruska Press, 1986), pp. 150 and 162,

Derrida thinks the non-transcendentalizable other generally as 'the system's

vomit'. How such relates to Platonic mud and hair is a moot question.

27 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology, tr. G. C. Spivak (Baltimore: Johns

Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 158. See Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror,

pp . 279-82.

28 I. Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, tr. Mary J. Gregor

(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), §68, pp. 11 0-11.

All the following quotes from this text are from these pages.

29 I. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, tr. L. W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-

Merrill Co., 1958), p. 30. On the awakening of self-consciousness through

the threat of violence see P. Hoffman, Doubt, Time and Violence (London:University of Chicago Press, 1988).

30 Gasche, The Tain of the Mirror, ch. 6.

31 Ibid., p. 231.

32 S. Freud, 'Mourning and melancholia', in On Metapsychology: the theory of

psychoanalysis, Pelican Freud Library, vol. 11 (Harmondsworth, Middlesex:

Penguin Books, 1984), pp. 245-68.

33 J. M. Bernstein, 'From self-consciousness to community: act and recognition

in the master-slave relationship', in The State and Civil Society, ed. Z. A.

Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).

34 Jacques Derrida, Glas, tr. John Leavey and Richard Rand (Lincoln: Univer

sity of Nebraska Press, 1986), p. 139 (all references are to the left-hand

column).

35 Ibid., p. 167.

36 G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, tr. A. V. Miller (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 402-7.

37 Derrida, Glas, p. 102.

38 Ibid., p. 166.

39 P. Lacoue-Labarthe, 'On the sublime' , ICA Documents 4: Postmodernism

(London, 1986), p. 9. See also his Typography (London: Harvard University

Press, 1989), pp. 109-10ff.

40 This is elegandy argued in the second part of William Booth's Interpreting

the World: Kant's philosophy of history and politics (London: University of

Toronto Press, 1986).

41 I. Kant, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, tr. John Ladd (New York:

Bobbs Merrill Co., 1965), p. 321.

42 Derrida, Writing and Difference, p. 126.

43 Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism, pp. 162-9.

44 Jacques Derrida, 'Like the sound of the sea deep within a shell: Paul deMan's war', Critical Inquiry, 14 (Spring 1988), p. 62. The following argu

ment was suggested to me by Olivier Serafinowicz.

45 Derrida, Glas, p. 243.



2 8 4 N O T E S TO p. 185

46 Jacques Derrida, Limited Inc. (Evanston: Northwestern University Press,

1989), pp. 148-9. For a less autobiographical statement of the same, see Of

Spirit: Heidegger and the question, tr. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel

Bowlby (London: University of Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 129-36. Much of

what Derrida says here in making affirmation logically prior to reflection

and questioning is plausible, for example 'Language is already there, in

advance...at the moment at which any question can arise about it. This

advance is, before any contract, a sort of promise or originary alliance to

which we must have in some sense already acquiesced, already said yes, given

a pledge.. .whatever may be the negativity or problematicity of the discourse

which may follow' (p. 129). Given this plausibility, let me clarify the direc

tion my questioning will take. What 1 am attempting to question is the pro

viding of this 'yes' with a transcendental status, a priority that is resistant to

what, historically and empirically, comes of it. Part of my doubt concerns the

way in which this affirmation voids history of its constitutive effects. But

even this would not matter if it were possible to decipher what Derrida'spre-originary affirmation, 'pledge', 'promise' or 'faith' was an affirmation of

or faith in. What Gillian Rose says of Foucault (Dialectic of Nihilism, p. 207)

applies with equal force here: 'Neither positive nor negative, such affirmation

is without determination or characteristic; it does not represent an encounter

with the power of another but an ecstasy of blind laughter or blinding tears,

which...is simply that old familiar despair.' Certainly, what Derrida says

here about language does not help to give any direction or determination to

this (transcendental) affirmation. Thus even if it is the case that affirmation is

in some sense conditional for undertaking certain or all activities, that we

make this affirmation concrete only as a result of specific entanglements, that

actual affirmations are empirical, defeasible and a result, deprives the idea of

pre-originary affirmation of any force - or rather its meaning and force is so

utterly dependent on what comes of actual affirmations or their opposite that

the pre-originary disappears as an identifiable kind of relation. To believe

otherwise would be to separate the event of affirmation from its effects, its

meaning from its reception. And while believing in this radical separation

may simplify our ethical lives, it also radically falsifies it. This, of course, is

just the Hegelian challenge to the transcendental/empirical distinction, whose

most emphatic presentation is to be found in his account of the 'causalityof fate'. I have discussed this, among other places, in my 'The causality

of fate: modernity and modernism in Habermas', Praxis International, 8, 4

(Jan. 1989), pp. 407-25. As will be clear from that, to deny pre-originary

affirmation is not the same as denying pre-thematic involvements that do

matter to our ethical lives.

I should add that I doubt that the Kantian self-description that Derrida

now offers actually does apply to his work of the 1960s; and hazard that the

long footnote in Of Spirit which is a biographical tracing of affirmation in

Heidegger is also a kind of autobiographical apologia.47 My colleague Simon Critchley will argue in a forthcoming book on Derrida

and Levinas, The Ethics of Deconstruction, that: (i) deconstruction is a reading

of the texts of the tradition of metaphysics at its closure; (ii) the ethical force



N O T E S TO PP . 1 9 1 - 2 2 1 2 8 5

of deconstructive reading is and must be, Levinasian; and (iii) no significant

politics can emerge from the ethics of deconstructive reading.

Chapter 4 Constellations of Concept andI n t u i t i o n : Adorno's Aesthetic Theory

1 The conception of modernism as a Kantian categorial quest for the auton

omous meaning of some artistic domain is best worked out in the writings

of Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried. For an account of their work in

the context of philosophical modernism see Stephen Melville, Philosophy

Beside Itself: on deconstruction and modernism (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1 9 8 6 ) , ch. 1.

2 Jean-Francois Lyotard considers that the sublime presentation of theunpresentable affirmatively exhausts the meaning of modernity and post

modernism. See his The Postmodern Condition (Minneapolis: University of

Minnesota Press, 1 9 8 4 ) .

3 Peter Burger, The Theory of the Avant-Garde, tr. Michael Shaw (Min

neapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1 9 8 4 ) ; and J. M. Bernstein The

Philosophy of the Novel: Lukacs, Maxism and the dialectics of form (Hassocks:

Harvester Press, 1 9 8 4 ) , pp. 2 1 7 - 2 0 (on Mann).

4 At AT 201 Adorno states that art is not a synthesis. Procedurally, Adorno is

always intent on demonstrating the limits of theoretical classifications. This

is part of what is involved in acknowledging the non-identity of the phenom

ena discussed.

5 I. Kant, The Moral Law: Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, tr.

H. J. Paton (London: Hutchinson, 1 9 4 8 ) , p. 96 .

6 Fredric Jameson, 'Postmodernism, or the cultural logic of capital', New Left

Review, 146 (July/August 1 9 8 4 ) ; all references are to pp. 5 8 - 9 .

7 See Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel, pp. 1 2 0 - 2 , 1 3 9 - 4 5 .

8 See J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, tr. Frederick

Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1 9 8 7 ) , p. 14.

9 T. W. Adorno, Illuminations, tr. Harry Zohn (London: Fontana Books,

1 9 7 0 ) , p. 258.

1 0 On this see Michel Haar's superb 'The end of distress: the end of tech

nology?', Research in Phenomenology 13 ( 1 9 8 3 ) . On the account I am pressing

here Heidegger's difficulty is that he cannot sustain finitude except by

anchoring it; being is that anchoring. Thus our neediness becomes depen

dent upon being's, and thereby secondary. Heidegger cannot explain why

our suffering matters except as derivative from being's - which then makes

ours not matter, unable to enter into the narrative of need. While it may be

tempting, therefore, to think that when Heidegger says 'A regard to meta

physics prevails even in the atempt to overcome metaphysics. Therefore our

task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itsel f (On Time and

Being, p. 24 ), he is opening up the possibility of a vision of finitude without

support, this takes too little heed of both how difficult such a vision is, and



2 8 6 N O T E S TO PP. 2 2 3 - 3 1

above all why he thought that the language of lack needed displacing by

some form of affirmation. Turning is following being in its withdrawal; this

resolute passivity is the opening to transcendence in Heidegger. It is also the

moment that leaves subjects bereft.

11 I. Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, tr. Mary J. Gregor (Philadelphia: University

of Pennsylvania Press 1971), p. 470.

12 Ibid., p. 472 for this and the next quote.

13 But see Derrida's 'The politics of friendship', The Journal of Philosophy, 85,

11 (Nov. 1988), pp. 632-44. For a hint as to how he might read Kant, see

p. 640.

Chapter 5 Old Gods A s c e n d i n g : Disintegration

and Speculation in Aesthetic Theory

1 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I: Reason and the

Rationalization of Society, tr, Thomas McCarthy (London: Heinemann,

1984), p. 144.

2 J. Habermas, 'Philosophy as stand-in and interpreter', in After Philosophy:

end or transformation?, ed. K. Baynes, J. Bohman and T. McCarthy

(London: M I T Press, 1987), pp. 298-9.

3 H. H. Gerth and C. W. Mills (eds). From Max Weber (Oxford: Oxford Uni

versity Press, 1969), p. 328.

4 Ibid. On the clash between the religion of brotherliness and the 'unbrotherly

aristocracy of the intellect', see p. 356. For the beginning of a substantive

account of Weber along the lines suggested here, see Stephen Kalberg, 'Max

Weber's types of rationality', American Journal of Sociology, 85, 5 (1989),

p p . 1145-79.

5 Ibid., p. 357.

6 Ibid., pp. 147-8.

7 Ibid ., p. 149.

8 Ibid., p. 144. If the argument I am pursuing here is right then Richard

Rorty's claim in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1989) that 'The vocabulary of self-creation is necessarily

private.. .[and] the vocabulary of justice is necessarily public and shared' (p .

xiv) misplaces the difficulty that private and public, art and politics have

become for us; how, above all, that division leaves the privte futile and the

public empty. Indeed, Rorty is a perfect example of how refusal to reflect on

just such categories as public and private, politics and art, leaves the

deformations of those realms of experience invisible, and thus the anxieties

attaching to them unreflected. As if we knew and were content with our pri

vate self-creations; as if these had not become a source of bewilderment and

frustration through their continuing inability to deliver their promise; as if,

finally, who I fashion myself as can be sensible, above all to me, apart from

questions of suffering and justice. Rorty's irony is not so much false as too

easy; his sense of contingency too absolute. See here the concluding

arguments to chapter 4 above.



N O T E S TOPP . 2 3 4 - 7 0 287

9 For an examination of the role and limits of form-giving (construction) and

mimesis in the novel see J. M. Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel:

Lukacs, Marxism and the dialectics of form (Hassocks: Harvester Press,

1984).

10 Dieter Henrich, 'Beauty and freedom: Schiller's struggle with Kant's

aesthetics', in Essays in Kant's Aesthetics, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer

(London: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 244.

11 T. W. Adorno, Philosophy of Modern Music, tr, Anne G. Mitchell and

Wesley V. Blomster (London: Sheed and Ward, 1973), p. 126.

12 The 'loss of meaning' at issue here has the precise Weberian/Nietzschean

sense of traditional categories of meaningfulness losing their authority

through the fragmentation dislocating particular forms of practice from the

totality.

13 For a brief account of Adorno's project for a modernist philosophy see

J. M. Bernstein, 'The causality of fate: modernity and modernism in

Habermas', Praxis International 8, 4 (Jan. 1989), pp. 413-15. A revised ver

sion of this will appear in J. M. Bernstein, The Fate of Critical Theory from

Habermas to Adorno (London: Routledge, forthcoming).

14 I have attempted to explicate some of Adorno's comprehension of Beckett

and provide an Adornoesque reading of Endgame in J. M. Bernstein, 'Philos

ophy's refuge: Adorno in Beckett', in Philosophers' Writers, ed. David Wood

(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1990). For an analogous reading of the

play see Stanley Cavell's 'Ending the waiting game', in his Must We Mean

What We Say} (New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1969), pp. 115-62.

15 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, p. 391.

16 Ibid., p. 390.

17 See Bernstein, 'The Causality of Fate', pp. 407 -2 5.

18 Aesthetics and Politics: debates between Block, Lukdcs, Brecht, Benjamin,

Adorno (London: New Left Books, 1977), p. 123.

19 Most notably in T. W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, Part III, Section II,

'World spirit and natural history'.

20 All the quotes here are from G. W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit,

tr. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 37-9. The best

single piece on speculative propositions in Hegel is Jere Paul Surber,

'Hegel's Speculative Sentence', Hegel-Studien, 10 (1975), pp. 212-30.

21 See the introduction and essays in J. M. Bernstein (ed.), The Culture Indus

try: selected essays by T. W. Adorno on mass culture (London: Routledge and

Kegan Paul, 1990).

22 See note 21 above.

23 T. W. Adorno, Aesthetics and Politics, tr. Thomas McCarthy (London:

Heinemann, 1984), p. 194.

24 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. I, p. 238. For an excel

lent interrogation of Habermas on this matter, see Thomas McCarthy,

'Reflections on rationalization in The Theory of Communicative Action', inHabermas and Modernity, ed. R. J. Bernstein (Cambridge: Polity Press,

1985), pp. 177-91. The inadequacy of Habermas's views here has also been

subject to a thorough discussion in David Ingram, Habermas and the dialectic

of reason (London: Yale University Press, 1987), pp. 172-88.



2 8 8 N O T E S TO PP. 2 7 2 - 4

25 Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia (New York: Columbia Univer

sity Press, 1986), p. 341.

26 Ibid., p. 409. For an extended critique of Benhabib see J. M. Bernstein, 'The

politics of fulfilment and transfiguration', Radical Philosophy, 47 (Autumn

1987), pp. 21-7. This essay also will appear in Bernstein, The Fate of Criti

cal Theory.

27 I borrow this phrasing from Gillian Rose.



Index

A d o r n o , T h e o d o r W . 1 1 , 1 5 ,

1 8 8 - 274

a e st he ti c a li en at io n 4 - 5 , 1 0 , 1 3 ,

6 7 - 8 , 1 1 4 - 1 6 , 1 3 0 - 5 , 2 1 1 - 1 2 ,

2 3 0 - 3 , 2 4 1 - 2

aes the t i c , ideas 33 , 9 5 - 6 , 165 ;

v a l id i ty 2 3 5 - 7 , 2 4 5

a e s th e ti c s 9 , 6 4 , 6 6 - 7 , 7 2 - 3 ,

7 9 - 8 0 , 82-3 , 190 , 194 , 259 ;

o v e r co m i n g 3 - 4 , 6, 7 2 - 8 9 ,

1 3 0 - 5 , 2 3 5 - 4 1

a f f i r m a t i o n 1 8 4 - 5 , 2 1 6

A n t i g o n e 1 7 9 - 8 0 , 2 3 9 - 4 0

A r e n d t , H a n n a h 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 3 , 2 80

A r i s t o t l e 1 2 , 7 9 - 8 0

a r t 4 , 1 2 , 7 1 , 7 8 , 9 0 - 4 , 1 1 4 , 1 9 0 ,

2 1 7 - 220; af f i rmat ive 216-17 ;

a u t o n o m o u s 1 9 0 - 1 , 1 9 6 - 8 ,

2 0 5 , 2 0 7 - 8 , 2 1 1 , 2 3 0 - 2 , 26 7 ;

e nd of 5 , 6 7 - 8 , 7 3 , 1 0 9 - 1 0 ,

144, 244 ; g rea t 8 3 - 9 , 93 , 108 ,

1 1 8 , 1 3 1 - 3 , 216 ; and h i s to ry

6 6 - 7 , 9 2 - 4 ; see also m o d e r n i s m

as, t h e c a te g o ri a l 7 5 - 6 , 2 5 7

assau lt , categ orial 76, 112, 233

beau ty 3 , 1 8 - 2 3 , 35, 54 , 63 , 80 ,

181 , 2 3 5 - 9 ; d e p e n d e n t 3 3 - 4 ,

62 ; empi r ica l in te res t in

5 0 - 3 ; f ree 33 , 16 0 -2 ; in

G r e e k a rt 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 , 1 1 4 ,

1 2 5 - 6 ; i de al o f 3 6 - 8 , 1 6 2 - 3 ;

a n d lo ve 4 1 - 3 ; a n d m e m o r y

1 7 - 1 8 , 6 0 - 2 ; a n d m o r a l i ty2 3 - 9 , 3 0 - 1 ; n a tu ra l 2 1 7 - 1 8

Becke t t , Sam uel 242

Be nh ab ib , Sey la 272

B e n j a m i n , W a l t e r 2 1 7

c a p i t a l i s m 2 6 5 - 6

c a te g o ri c al i m p e r a t i v e 3 9 - 4 0 ,

4 3 - 4 , 9 1 , 1 5 7 , 1 8 4 - 5 , 2 7 1

Cav el l , S tan ley 102

c o g n i t io n , a n d p l e a s u r e 4 6 - 8 ,

50, 5 5 - 6 ; t r u t h -o n l y 2 - 4 ,

9 - 1 0 , 4 9 , 6 6 , 7 4 , 7 6 , 8 0 ; see

also j u d g e m e n t , d e t e r m i n a t e

and r e a s o n , i n s t r u m e n t a l

c o m m o n s e ns e 2 1 , 5 8 - 6 1 , 6 3 - 5 ;

see also c o m m u n i t y and sensus

communis



290 I N D E X

c o m m u n i c a t i o n 5 1 - 4 , 2 4 8

com m unic a t ive r a t iona l i ty 247

c o m m u n i t y 1 0 1 - 2 , 1 07 , 1 2 5,

129, 246 ; see also sensus

communis

conc ep t 19 9-2 00 , 206 , 244 , 261c o n c e p t u a l i t y 1 9 7 , 2 0 2

cons te l l a t ions 206

creat i on , as op pos ed to

p r o d u c t i o n 8 6 , 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 1 2 ,

1 2 3 - 4 , 128

cruel ty 237

c u l t u r e , a e s t h e ti c 1 0 1 , 1 0 5 - 7 ,

129, 198; pro gre ssiv e 10, 101,

129, 198

deduc t ion , o f judgement o f t a s te

1 9 - 2 9

D e r r i d a , J a c q u e s 1 0 , 1 4 - 1 6 ,

1 3 6 - 8 7 , 1 9 1 , 1 9 3, 2 2 0 - 2 ,

2 3 5 - 9 , 253 , 265 , 284

dialect ic , nega t ive 188, 228 , 253 ,

264d is in teg ra t io n , log ic o f 2 3 4 -6 ,

2 6 2 - 4

d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s 2 4 - 7 , 4 9 - 5 0 ,

76 , 82

d is sonance 206 , 222 , 252

dis tan ce 43 , 172, 223

e a r t h 1 1 9 - 2 0 , 1 4 4

e n l i g h t e n m e n t 2 2 6

e q u i p m e n t 7 5 - 6 , 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 , 1 4 2 ,

150

e x e m p l a r it y 3 5 , 9 2 - 4 , 9 9 - 1 0 1 ,

163

exp ress ion 204, 206, 238

fo rm 7 8 - 9 , 1 5 0 , 2 0 2 - 3 , 2 6 7

f ra m e s 6 9 , 1 6 8 - 9 , 1 7 3 - 4

f r e e d o m 1 4 , 3 7 , 6 2 , 7 1 - 2 , 8 9 ,

9 1 - 3 , 9 5 , 101 , 126-8 , 164 , 167 ,

1 7 5 - 6 , 2 3 3 - 4 , 2 3 7 , 2 6 3 ; se e

also g e n i u s

F r e u d , S i g m u n d 1 77

f r iendsh ip 223

f un g ib il it y 2 0 8 - 9 , 2 5 1 - 2

G a d a m e r , H a n s - G e o r g 7 9 , 2 81

G a s c h e , R o d o l p h e 1 47g e n i u s 1 4 , 7 1 , 8 9 - 9 5 , 9 9 - 1 0 1 ,

1 2 6 - 7 , 130, 164, 167, 191, 271

gu i l t ( and com pl ic i ty ) 11 ,

1 8 2 - 3 , 2 3 9 - 4 0 , 2 6 0 - 1

G uy er , Paul 101

H a b e r m a s , J u r g e n 2 , 5 , 2 2 9 ,

2 4 6 - 7 , 256, 270

happ ines s 210

h a r m o n y , a e st h e ti c 2 0 4 - 6 , 2 3 5 ;

o f imag ina t ion a nd

u n d e r s t a n d i n g 2 0 - 2 , 3 8 , 5 5 ,

170

H e g e l , G . W . F . 5 , 1 0, 7 2 - 3 ,

1 7 7 - 8 0 , 2 4 4 , 2 5 7 - 8

H e i d e g g e r , M a r t i n 1 4, 6 8 - 9 0 ,

9 7 - 9 , 1 0 3 - 4 4 , 1 5 0 - 5 , 2 1 2 - 1 4 ,2 1 6 , 233

h is to r ic i ty 70 , 82 , 8 4 -9 0 , 93 ,

127, 136-7 , 176 , 178

his to ry , phi lo sop hy of 13 , 67 ,

8 0 - 2 , 136-7 , 189 , 193

i l l u s i o n 2 0 5 , 2 0 9 - 1 0 , 2 4 8 - 9 ,

2 5 1 - 4 , 256, 261

i m a g in a ti o n 4 7 - 8 , 6 8 - 9 , 7 1 ,

1 7 3 - 5 ; see also s c h e m a t i s m

i m i t a t i o n 9 4 ; see also g e n i u s and

m i m e s i s

insc ruta bi l i ty 194, 198, 210 , 232

i n t u i t i o n 1 9 9 - 2 0 0 , 2 0 6

i r r e c o n c i l a b i l i t y , d e t e r m i n a t e

253

J a m e s o n , F r e d e ri c 2 1 3 - 4

j u d g e m e n t 1 5 7 , 1 9 5 , 2 0 1 , 2 1 1 ;

a u t o n o m y o f 2 8 , 3 1 ;

d e t e r m i n a t e 4 9 , 5 7 - 9 , 2 0 4;



I N D E X 291

ref lec tive 4 4 - 54 , 5 7 - 8 , 64 ; o f

tas te 1 8 -2 8 , 32 , 34 , 38 , 55 ,

6 1 - 2 , 82, 168

K a n t , I m m an u el 5 - 8 , 1 7 - 7 1 ,

80, 9 0 - 1 0 8 , 1 4 6 , 1 5 8 - 7 5 ,1 8 1 - 2 , 18 4- 6 , 193 , 200 , 207 ,

2 6 1 , 2 6 5

ki tsch 218

K u h n , T h o m a s 8 7

L a c o u e - L a b a r t h e , P h i l l ip e 1 81

langu age 98, 139, 154

lawfulness (wi thou t law) 48 ,1 0 1 - 2

l o v e 4 2 - 3 , 1 8 0 , 2 2 3 , 2 7 4

m an , beau ty of 33 , 37 , 164

m a r k , a n d r e - m a r k 1 5 3 - 4 , 2 3 8

m e a n i n g 1 4 3 - 4 , 1 5 0 - 1 , 153 ,

1 5 5 - 7 , 199, 254

m i m e s i s 1 4 6, 1 6 4, 2 0 1 - 4 ,

2 2 2 - 4 , 246 ; an d affinity 215

m o d e r n i s m ( in a r t ) 6 , 1 3 9 ,

1 4 6 - 7 , 159, 182, 190-2 , 196,

2 3 2 - 3 , 2 3 6 - 7 , 2 6 2 - 4 , 26 8

m ode rn i ty 147; a s ca tegor ia l

d i f ferent ia t ion 2 , 5 - 6 ,

2 2 5 - 3 3 , 2 4 1 , 2 6 7 - 8

m o r a l i t y 2 3 - 4 , 2 6 - 3 1 , 6 1 ; a n d

ex te rna l i ty 8 -9m o u r n i n g ( an d m e m o r y ) 1 3 , 1 7 ,

5 5 - 6 , 6 0 - 4 , 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 1 35 , 1 38 ,

1 7 6 - 7 , 180, 193, 219, 221, 240

n a t u r e 3 9 , 1 0 0 - 2 , 1 2 2, 2 0 3 ,

2 1 7 - 1 9 , 221

needs 270

n ew ( th e) 9 5 , 1 9 1 - 2 , 2 6 2

N i e t z s c h e , F r i e d r i c h 1, 2 5 - 6 ,

97

n o n - i d e n t i t y 1 8 8, 1 9 1 - 2 , 2 2 1 ,

2 2 3 - 4 , 239, 242

p a i n t i n g 1 4 1 - 2 , 1 4 4 - 6 , 1 5 5 ,

195, 2 3 9 - 4 0

parerega 1 6 8 - 9 , 2 2 3

p h i l o s o p h y , a n d a r t 2 4 2 - 3 ;

m ode rn i s t 67 , 159 , 242 ,

2 6 4 - 5phronests 13, 104, 126, 274

P l a t o 1 1 - 1 2 , 7 9 - 8 0

p l e a s u re 1 7 , 1 9 - 2 0 , 4 6 - 4 9 , 2 2 ,

5 1 , 5 5 - 6 , 6 1 , 65 , 82 , 131 ,

1 8 1 - 2 ; see also c o g n i t i o n

p o e t r y 9 7 - 9 , 1 66

polis 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 2 5 - 6

po l i t ic s , and a r t 6 , 1 1 -1 3 , 53 ,

1 2 9 - 3 0 , 1 8 1 - 2 , 2 6 8 - 9 , 2 73

p o s t - m o d e r n i s m 2 6 7

praxis 12-13 , 104 , 126 , 129 ,

2 7 1 - 2

p r e se n c e , m e t a p h y s i c s o f 8 0 - 1 ,

138, 143, 156

p u r p o s i v e n e s s , w i t h o u t p u r p o s e

( e n d ) 1 5 6 , 1 5 9 - 6 1 , 2 0 7 - 9 ,

212 , 235

ra t iona l ity 200 , 213 , 229 , 2 4 7 - 8

r a t i o n a l i s a t i o n 2 0 3 , 2 0 7 - 8 ,

2 2 9 - 3 2 , 236

r ea d in g , d o u b le 1 5 7 - 8 , 1 6 8

reason 30 , 38 , 49 , 53 , 1 7 3 -5 ;

i n s t r u m e n t a l 2 1 9 , 2 2 6 - 8 , 2 3 3

reconc i l ia t ion 205 , 234, 242 ,246 , 2 5 4 - 6

reflection, seco nd 16, 189, 259

risk 106, 12 1, 1 4 7 - 5 1 , 156, 161,

1 7 8 - 9 , 214, 234, 236, 239, 242,

246

Ro se, Gi l l ian 284

S c ha p ir o, M e y e r 1 4 0 - 2 , 1 5 3 - 5

s c h e m a t i s m 6 9 , 9 6 - 9 , 1 0 3 ,

1 2 2 - 4 , 130

sc ience , pos t -pos i t iv i s t p h i loso phy

of 6 , 84 -5 , 87



292 I N D E X

s e n s e - p e r c e p t i b i l i t y 5 7 - 9 ,

1 9 9 - 2 0 0 , 2 2 1

sensu ous pa r t i cu la r i ty 195 , 198 ,

2 2 0 - 1

sensus communis 69, 7 1 , 102—3,129, 230, 251

s h u d d e r 2 1 9 - 2 2 3

s i l e n c e 2 4 2 - 3

s p i r i t 2 0 2 - 4 , 2 5 0

subject iv i ty 8 , 49 , 69 , 78 , 124,

143, 2 1 9 - 2 0 , 2 2 2 , 2 5 0

sub l ime 15 , 3 8 - 4 1 , 4 3 - 4 , 1 2 3 ,

140, 1 7 0 - 5 , 1 8 1 - 2 , 1 86 , 2 2 0 ,

2 3 5 - 9 , 2 4 1 , 2 52

s u c c e ss i on 9 3 - 4 , 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 167

suffering 206 , 215 , 2 2 0 - 1 , 224 ,

242

T a y l o r , C h a r l e s 2 7 5 - 6

t e c h n i q u e 2 1 2 - 1 5 , 2 1 7 - 1 8

t e c h n o lo g y , a n d a r t 1 1 1 - 1 7 ,

2 1 2 , 217 ; se e t e c h n i q u e

t h e o l o g y, n e g a t iv e 2 5 5 - 6

t r a g e d y 1 8 1 - 2

t ru th , a r t and 1 ,4 ,74 ,77 ,84-8 ,

110, 1 20 , 1 4 1 - 2 , 1 4 5 - 6 ,

1 5 5 - 6 , 210 , 224 , 241 , 2 4 4 - 6 1 ;s p e c u l a t i v e 2 5 7 - 6 1 , 2 6 9 ,

2 7 3 - 4

un de r s ta nd ing ( the ) 27 , 30 , 38 ,

4 9 , 5 3 , 5 6 - 7

V a n G o g h , V i n c e n t 1 4 - 1 5 , 1 08 ,

1 1 0 - 1 1 , 1 3 1 - 5 , 1 3 9 - 4 2 ,

1 4 4 - 5 , 1 4 7 - 8 , 1 5 0 - 7 , 1 8 6 - 7 ,

2 1 3 - 1 5 , 2 3 6 - 4 0 , 2 5 3 , 2 6 3

W e b e r , M a x 2 , 2 2 9 - 3 3

W e l l m e r , A l b r e c h t 2 4 4 - 7 ,

2 5 5 - 7

w o r ld 5 6 , 8 5 , 1 1 9 - 2 0 , 1 2 2 - 3 ,

144

works s ee art