beyond a divided cyprus: a state and society in transformation

Beyond a Divided Cyprus

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Beyond a Divided Cyprus

A State and Society in Transformation

Edited by Nicos Trimikliniotis and Umut Bozkurt

beyond a divided cyprusCopyright © Nicos Trimikliniotis and Umut Bozkurt, 2012.

All rights reserved.

First published in 2012 byPALGRAVE MACMILLAN®

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Beyond a divided Cyprus : a state and society in transformation /edited by Nicos Trimikliniotis and Umut Bozkurt.pages cm1. Cyprus—Foreign relations—1960– 2. Cyprus—Ethnicrelations—Political aspects. 3. Cyprus—Politics andgovernment. I. Trimikliniotis, Nicos, editor of compilation.II. Bozkurt, Umut, 1976– editor of compilation.DS54.55.B49 2012956.9304—dc23 2012016917

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

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First edition: November 2012

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

ISBN 978-1-349-34153-5 ISBN 978-1-137-10080-1 (eBook)DOI 10.1057/9781137100801

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2012 978-0-230-33854-8

The crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the newcannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid

symptoms appear.Antonio Gramsci

Realizing they will never be a world power, the Cypriots have decided tosettle for being a world nuisance.

George Mikes

Contents

List of Figures and Tables ix

Acknowledgments xi

Abbreviations xiii

Introduction: Beyond a Divided Cyprus, a Society in a Stateof Transformation 1

Nicos Trimikliniotis and Umut Bozkurt

1 The Cyprus Problem and the Imperial Games in theHydrocarbon Era: From a “Place of Arms” to an EnergyPlayer? 23Nicos Trimikliniotis

2 Rethinking the Postcolonial Cypriot Statehood: TheCyprus Problem, Class Struggles, and Ethnic Conflict 47Umut Bozkurt and Nicos Trimikliniotis

3 Border Dialectics: Cypriot Social and HistoricalMovements in a World Systemic Context 67Andreas Panayiotou

4 Cyprus and the West: A Critical Perspective on Britishand US Foreign Policy and Strategic Interests in Cyprus 83Ed Rooksby

5 Greek and Greek-Cypriot Political Strategies onIndependence: Class, Nation, and Statehood 99John Milios and Tasos Kyprianidis

6 Turkish-Cypriot Nationalist Drive toward State-Building:Politics, Violence, and Political Economy 119Hakan Arslan

7 Making Sense of Turkey’s Changing Cyprus Policy: TheEU Factor and the Shifting Preferences of the Power Bloc 135Emine Tahsin

viii C O N T E N T S

8 AKEL: A Sociopolitical Profile of Greek-CypriotCommunism 151Giorgos Charalambous

9 Turkish-Cypriot Left: A Historical Overview 169Niyazi Kızılyürek

10 Transformations of the Greek-Cypriot andTurkish-Cypriot Right: Right-wing Peace-makers? 185Neofytos Loizides

11 The Potential for Reconciliation, Forgiveness, and SocialTransformation 201Dilek Latif and Ari Sitas

12 A Political Economy of Division, Development, andCrisis: Envisioning Reunification Beyond the CyprusEconomic Miracle 217Nicos Trimikliniotis, Elias Ioakimoglou, and PanayiotisPantelides

Bibliography 249

Notes on Contributors 277

Index 281

List of Figures and Tables

Figures

12.1 GDP growth, 1996–2012 232

12.2 Unemployment rate (percentage), 1995–2011 232

12.3 Current account deficit as percentage of GDP 233

12.4 Real wage and private consumption 235

Tables

8.1 Electoral results of AKEL (1960–2008) 159

8.2 Composition of AKEL’s affiliates: Social class 160

8.3 AKEL’s and the popular movement’s membership 162

10.1 Electoral cleavages in Greek-Cypriot politics 189

12.1 Basic features of Cyprus economy for 2008 221

12.2 Economic interdependence between Greek-Cypriots(GC) and Turkish-Cypriots (TC) after 2003 andaccording to the Green Line regulation (million ¤) 223

12.3 Migration movements, 2000–2010, in the RoC 229

12.4 Employed non-Cypriots in the RoC 229

12.5 Determinants of structural competitiveness 237

Acknowledgments

This book is a result of a truly collective effort. It grew out of a com-mon concern amongst scholars and activists in Cyprus that what we arewitnessing in this part of the world must be analyzed and articulated toa wider audience and across the divide. It aims to speak of worlds in themaking. We saw the so-called “frozen conflict” in Cyprus becoming morefluid and ingrained in the transformations sweeping across the barbedwire dividing the country: all that was solid begun to melt into air. Yet, astime went by we realized that much deeper and wider global transforma-tions were unfolding. The economic crisis is spreading and deepening:a crisis of cohesion in the euro zone is accompanied by rising unem-ployment and austerity measures imposed on both sides of our dividedcountry. Yet mass action and mobilizations are changing the landscape.The eruptions of revolts in the Arab world are changing the region inuncertain directions. Meanwhile, the discovery of hydrocarbons in com-bination with regional geopolitical sovereignty games is pulling Cypruscloser to the nucleus of other regional contestations.

In this era of uncertainty, this volume reflects on the upheavals of con-tradictory transformations within and around the country. It is informedby a sense of engagement to rethink what is happening around us; it ishoped that these reflections can serve as useful pointers for future researchand political agendas.

Different people have helped us in different ways; it is impossibleto thank all of them individually. We want to express our gratitude tothe friends who shared their ideas, concerns, and companionship, andencouraged us. In particular, we would like to thank Sebnem Oguz, BerchBerberoglu, Avishai Ehrlich, Floya Anthias, Toumazos Tsielepis, GregorisIoannou, Costas M. Constantinou, Panayiotis Pantelides, Sotiris Kattos,and Alex Apostolides. Also we want to express our appreciation to DaphneTrimikliniotis Mavrovouniotis and Marios Trimikliniotis for great art-work for the cover of the book. Having a mother and a brother who areartists is a great resource!

xii A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S

A very special thank you must go to our respective families for endur-ing us during the time of preparing this manuscript: to Corina, for puttingup with a partner; to Stella and Manos, for bearing with their busy andabsent-minded father in what seemed a never-ending project; and to par-ents Andreas and Daphne and brothers Michael, Anthony, and Mariosfor their understanding and backing. On the other part of the divide, lov-ing parents Gülsen and Özkan and wonderful brother Dogus made thisproject possible through their love and endless support.

We dedicate this book to those people of Cyprus, the region, and theworld who dare to think that another world is possible, and relentlesslystruggle against capitalism, racism, nationalism, and hatred. As for ourisland, we dream of a reunified future and salute all the unnamed heroeswho are persisting in their battle for reconciliation, coexistence, and peace.

Abbreviations

ADESOK Aνανεωτικó Δημoκρατ ικó Σoσ ιαλιστ ικó K ινημα(Reformist Democratic Socialist Movement)

AKEL Aνoρθωτικó K óμμα Eργαζ oμενoυ Λαoυ(Progressive Party of Working People)

AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and DevelopmentParty)

BDH Barıs ve Demokrasi Hareketi (The Movement for Peaceand Democracy)

CBM Confidence building measuresCENTO Central Treaty OrganizationCIA Central Intelligence ServiceCR Conflict resolutionCTP Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (Republican Turkish Party)DEK Δημoκρατ ικó Eθνικó Kóμμα (Democratic National

Party)DEIK Dıs Ekonomik Iliskiler Konseyi (Foreign Economic

Relations Board)DHP Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People’s Party)DIKO Δημoκρατ ικó K oμμα, (Democratic Party)DISK Devrimci Isçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (Revolutionary

Workers Union Confederation)DISY Δημoκρατ ικóςΣυναγ ερμóς (Democratic Rally)DMP Demokratik Mücadele Partisi (Party for Democratic

Struggle)DP Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party)ECtHR The European Court of Human RightsEDEK Eνιαια Δημoκρατ ικη Eνωση K εντρoυ (United

Democratic Union of the Centre)EDMA Eνιαιo Δημoκρατ ικó M ετωπo Aναδημιoυργ ιας

(The United Democratic Front for Re-creation)

xiv A B B R E V I AT I O N S

EDON Eνιαια Δημoκρατ ικη Oργ ανωση Nεoλαιας(United Democratic Youth Organization)

EDY Eνωμενoι Δημoκρατες (United Democrats)EEC European Economic CommunityEOKA Eθνικη Oργ ανωση Kυπριων Aγωνιστ ων (National

Organisation of Cypriot Fighters)EU European UnionGAP Güneydogu Anadolu Projesi (Southeastern Anatolian

Project)GDP Gross Domestic ProductGIAD Kuzey Kıbrıs Genç Isadamları Dernegi (North Cyprus

Young Businessmen’s Association)GKK Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlıgı (Command of Security

Forces)G8 The Group of 8. Russia, USA, United Kingdom, France,

Japan, Germany, Canada, Italy are members withadditional participation by the European Union

Halk-Der Halkla Dayanısma ve Kültür Dernegi (Association forCulture and Solidarity with the People)

IKTTC Istanbul Kıbrıs Türkler Talebe Cemiyeti (The IstanbulAssociation of Turkish Cypriot Students)

IMF International Monetary FundISAD Kıbrıs Türk Isadamları Dernegi (Cyprus Turkish

Businessmen Association)ISO Istanbul Sanayi Odası (Istanbul Chamber of Industry)ITO Istanbul Ticaret Odası (Istanbul Chamber of Commerce)KATAK Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlıgı Kurumu (Turkish Minority

Institution of the Island of Cyprus)KKK K oμμoυνιστ ικó Kóμμα K υπρoυ (Communist Party

of Cyprus)KÖGEF Kıbrıslılar Ögrenim ve Gençlik Federasyonu (Cypriots

Federation of Education and Youth)KTIBK Kıbrıs Türk Isçi Birlikleri Kurumu (Organization of

Turkish Cypriot Workers’ Unions)KTSO Kıbrıs Türk Sanayi Odası (Cyprus Turkish Chamber of

Industry)KTTO Kıbrıs Türk Ticaret Odası (Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of

Commerce)MÜSIAD Müstakil Sanayici ve Isadamları Dernegi (Independent

Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association)NATO North Atlantic Treaty OrganizationNE.O N εoι Oριζ oντες (New Horizons)NGO Non-governmental organization

A B B R E V I AT I O N S xv

OEB Oργ ανωση Eργ oδoτ ων και Bιoμηχανων (CyprusEmployers and Industrialists Federation)

PAK Πανγ κυπριo Aπελευθερωτικó K ινημα (PancyprianLiberation Movement)

PAKOP Πανγ κυπριo Aπελευθερωτικó K ινημα γ ιαEπιστρoϕη Πρoσϕυγων (Pancyprian LiberationMovement for the Return of Refugees)

PEO Πανγ κυπρια Eργατ ικη Oμoσπoνδια, (PancyprianFederation of Labor)

PKK Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdish Workers Party)PSE Πανγ κυπρια Συνoμoσπoνδια Eργατων

(Pan-Cypriot Confederation of Labor)SBA The Sovereign Base AreasSEK Πανγ κυπρια Eργατ ικη Συνoμoσπoνδια

(Pancyprian Labor Confederation)SEV Συνoμoσπoνδια Eλληνων Bιoμηχανων (Hellenic

Federation of Entreprises)TEB Türk Ekonomi Bankası (Turkish Economy Bank)TIP Türkiye Isçi Partisi (Workers’ Party of Turkey)TKP Toplumcu Kurtulus Partisi (Communal Liberation Party)TMT Türk Mukavemet Teskilati (Turkish Resistance

Organization)TOBB Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi (The Union of

Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey)TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern CyprusTÜSIAD Türk Sanayicileri ve Isadamları Dernegi (Turkish

Industrialists’ and Businessmen’ Association)UBP Ulusal Birlik Partisi (The National Unity Party)UNFCYP UN Force in CyprusUS United StatesUSAID Ulusal Sanayici ve Isadamları Dernegi (The Association of

National Industrialists and Businessmen)USSR Union of Soviet Socialist RepublicsWW1 World War 1WW2 World War 2YDP Yeni Dogus Partisi (New Birth Party)

Introduction: Beyonda Divided Cyprus,a Society in a Stateof TransformationNicos Trimikliniotisand Umut Bozkurt

This book aims to contribute to global and regional debates on, andbeyond the boundaries of, a small post-colonial divided country—Cyprus. In these debates, the size of the country is a relevant considera-tion, and the question of “scale” has also been used and abused in differentways—to ridicule, deny, or justify claims to nationhood/statehood or theoperation of “small battalion” states.1 Yet small states have a significantrole to play in the world and their study contributes to understandingglobal and regional issues related to social formations and the state system.

Over the last 50-odd years, the question of Cyprus neither receivedattention in the international (essentially Anglophone) literature nor gen-erated academic or research interest, save for the last decade and forprimarily research by those with a connection to Cyprus. After all, inthe modern times neither the size of this island state, covering an areaof 9,250 sq. km (3,571 sq. miles), nor its scarce natural resources2

make Cyprus intrinsically significant; any imperial interest in the coun-try derived from its geographical position3 and its usefulness as a pawnin the imperial games (Varnava, 2006, pp. 35–60). After all, this inter-pretation, which can be referred to as strategic or geopolitical imperialism,was expressed by a former governor of Cyprus, Sir Roland Storrs, whoexpressed that the British “occupied Cyprus for strategic and imperialpurposes.”4 In the 1960s and 1970s the western intelligence servicestook some interest, commissioning a number of studies on Cyprusand communism.5 Those were the days when policy-makers and the

2 N I C O S T R I M I K L I N I O T I S A N D U M U T B O Z K U R T

US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intelligence servicesinitiated operations to keep the country in check6 fearing ascendancy ofcommunism in Cyprus, hence the references to the danger of Cyprusbecoming a “Cuba of the Mediterranean.”7 Since the discovery of sig-nificant reserves of hydrocarbons off the southern coast of the island,the geopolitical considerations are changing significantly, particularly inthe context of global energy issues at a time of economic turbulence (seechapters by Trimikliniotis; Bozkurt and Trimikliniotis; and Panayiotou inthis volume).

This book aims to contribute to rethinking the multiple transforma-tions taking place in Cyprus and beyond by adopting a holistic and criticalapproach. It challenges mainstream approaches by opening up thinkingspaces for research and political agendas aiming to re-conceptualize thesocioeconomic, ideological, and political dimensions of profound soci-etal transformations and potential alternative pathways to the future.It examines the ideological, sociopolitical, and socioeconomic factors thatperpetuate the division of Cyprus, factors that operate as obstacles to asettlement and reconciliation. The book does not discuss in any detailthe efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem, past and future, or the nego-tiations to resolve it; it addresses the transformations of the institutionsand actors that influence the prospects for the future, including a solu-tion to the Cyprus problem.8 There is a political and theoretical urgencyin bringing together various efforts to study how particular social, politi-cal, and economic institutions are being transformed and are contributingto the changes taking place, and studies that question knowledge thathas historically ethnicized categories in a way that reproduces negativeperceptions, distortions, and biases about the “other.” This book alsoattempts to rethink the transformations and considers the potential forreunification and reconciliation in the post-Annan and post-accessionera—in a period when the political climate of Cyprus seems to havebeen temporarily “stabilized” without a settlement, in an uneasy sense of“unsettlement.”

One can identify various sources driving the transformation in Cyprus;the “global” or “international”/“regional” factors are often perceived as“external” factors. However, in this book we illustrate that the “global”is articulated with the “local” and “national” contexts even though thereare overpowering forces that come crushing in, particularly on small coun-tries like Cyprus. Nonetheless, we venture to argue that matters are highlycomplex and require an understanding of the theoretical nuances to cap-ture the social, economic, political, and ideological processes in play;Lilliputian states may “compensate” for their smallness and marginalityin the global state system by exercising authoritarian power within their

B E Y O N D A D I V I D E D C Y P R U S 3

boundaries or directing it against specific groups. In any case, studying thetransformation of Cyprus, which of course is a Lilliputian state, allowsus to learn something about the region in the context of the globe (seeIngebritsen, 2006).

In this volume, even in the chapters that deal with the role of other“external” powers, such as the United States, Britain, Turkey, and Greece,the relations are located within the specific historical contexts that illus-trate the interplay among different factors. A starting point for this bookis the critique of the politics derived from the binary “geopolitics versusethnic conflict” approaches. The critique of the binary “geopolitics versusethnic conflict” aims to unravel the role of imperialism in shaping andreproducing the conflict/division of Cyprus over time from the vantagepoint of the reality today State-related processes are crucial to the creationand continuation of the conflict and the social situation thus generated.Political parties are also crucial institutions in the shaping of political andsocial realities (see chapters by Kızılyürek, Charalambous, and Loizides inthis volume). The question of reconciliation must be placed within thespecific social and political aspects that shape the reality as we understandit (see Latif and Sitas in this volume). Also, crucial are the socioeconomic,class, ethnicity, and migration issues, particularly in the context of thecurrent economic crisis which is here to stay for a long time.

The total population of Cyprus is just over one million, but the coun-try attracts over two and a half million visitors per year. The population inthe Republic of Cyprus (RoC) controlled area (south) is 838,897, whilstthe population in the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus(TRNC) is a hotly debated issue—estimates vary between 300,0009

(International Crisis Group, 2010, p. 2) and 500,000 (Cole, 2011).Today, the total number of non-Cypriot nationals living in the southernpart of the country is estimated to be about 200,000 persons, includingthe estimated number of irregular or undocumented migrants from thirdcountries.10 The numbers of migrants and settlers in the northern partof the country is difficult to ascertain: estimates vary from 120,000,11

220,000 up to 230,000, depending on their perspective and method ofestimation (see chapter by Trimikliniotis, Ioakimoglou, Pantelides in thisvolume). A problem with the population discourses in northern Cyprus isthat they tend to lump together persons into one category as if they makea homogenous group; in fact there are different groups, who enjoy differ-ent legal status and rights in a real but unrecognized regime; they came atdifferent times and in different settings; they perform different jobs anddo not behave in the same political manner. Not all are “settled” and totreat them all as “settlers” when the vast majority are precarious workers inthe informal sector, might be intentionally misleading (BILBAN-IKME,


2008; Hatay, 2006, 2007; Faiz, 2008). The immigrant population hasbecome an important component of the labor force in the RoC. Out ofthe 376,300 employed persons, 114,425 were European Union (EU) orthird country nationals, comprising 30.4 percent of those who are gain-fully employed.12 These sectors were among the hardest hit during theeconomic crisis of 2009, and although further research is needed, thedecline in the number of third country nationals (TCNs) in the construc-tion sector is comparable to the decline in employment in that sectorof Cypriots (Greek and Turkish) and of Europeans13 (see chapters byTrimikliniotis, Ioakimoglou and Pantelides in this volume).

The Cyprus Problem: A Geopolitical Gambleor an Ethnic Conflict?

The many perspectives on the Cyprus problem, despite their differentideological and methodological outlook, can complement one another,thus providing the basis for theorizing the particularity/globality dialecticsof the Cypriot postcolonial condition. Other perspectives are incompat-ible, negating each other. What is often missing is a holistic reading thatwould critically string such perspectives together in a manner that couldgrasp the vitality and actual agency of the local dynamics and potential forsocial-political action within its regional and global context. There is a needfor an understanding of the complex ways in which global and regionalforces and struggles dialectically intersect and intertwine with internalsocial forces and struggles. Most readings are not concerned with suchissues, as they are either interested in recording the specificity within the“global” or the “regional,” or unable to go beyond the fact that the situ-ation in northern Cyprus is so fundamentally different in terms of theunrecognized state formation highly dependent on Turkey, leading totheir failure to grasp the wider processes within which to locate this stateformation.

The assumed “common sense” readings of the Cyprus question, repro-duced in textbooks and journalistic studies, lead to two sets of readings:Cyprus is either perceived as a problem of historic enmity between Greeksand Turks, manifested as an identity conflict over control of a state, oralternatively as the manifestation of geopolitical conflicts reflected in theexternally imposed rigid constitutional structure, which imploded into frag-ments due to foreign machinations. The first approach is the liberal conflictresolution model and the second is the global/regional geopolitics model.Both approaches essentialize certain aspects but they ultimately fail tocapture the essence of the Cyprus problem in a holistic manner. Even themore sophisticated approaches, which do attempt to synthesize different


dimensions, ultimately portray one of the two as the “dominant” and theother as the “subordinate” or “main cause” and “effect” or as the “core”and “epiphenomenon.”

The policy implications of the thinking produced by both schools ofthought contain implicit assumptions about the power relations of theglobal/regional system and what Cypriots must or must not do, leavinglittle room for maneuver or choice in terms of the struggles for a com-mon future transcending the ethnic/state divide and the partitionist statusquo. Without a radical transformation of the balance of global/regionalgeopolitical forces, any resolution of the problem would inevitably reflectand condense these wider forces, which the people of Cyprus are essen-tially powerless to do anything about. For the liberal conflict resolutionmodel, it is a matter of fine-tuning the demands of the two sides to reachan optimum settlement; for the global/regional geopolitics model the gen-uine concerns of Cypriot independence would be subordinated, either byaccepting their subordination to the “Empire,”14 or by rejecting it, whichwill also mean accepting the power of the “Empire” via the consolidationof partitionism. The conservative and right-wing versions are often legal-istic,15 and/or take the form of international relations and/or politicalworks16 or journalistic type of best-seller conspiracy theories.17 Left-wing geopolitical readings18 reflect Perry Anderson’s approach,19 whichfail to grasp the complex interaction between the local, the regional andthe global forces, and they undervalue the significance of political andclass relations and contradictions that exist within Cyprus, which areconnected to regional and global class interests.

We argue that both schools of thought are disabling and contain fal-sities in their assumptions and political implications, which underminethe real potential available. History is the result of fierce contestations;nothing is predetermined even if there is disequilibrium of forces.

Placing Cyprus within a Global and RegionalSetting of Transformations

There are difficult questions to be addressed, which cannot rely on sim-ple or schematic reductions; neither can the conventional distinctionsbetween the disciplines of politics, economics, international relations, orsociology serve us well in grasping the totality of the Cypriot transfor-mations. We cannot therefore reduce these complex processes to simpleschematic readings, which depend on dogmatic approaches that artifi-cially separate “politics” from “economic” or the “political economy” fromthe “social” or the “ideological” or the “cultural” dimensions. Also insuf-ficient, if not misleading, are the approaches that try to translate and read


into foreign policy shift’s pure internal or external economic or politicalmotives. The “relative” autonomy of politics from economics is but astarting point, but it remains a mere metaphor and nothing more.

In the case of Cyprus, we are dealing with a complex encounter of mul-tiplicity of social formations in a country riddled with contradictions andcontestations. The Greek-Cypriot social formation, an integral part of theEU, “encounters” the Turkish-Cypriot social formation which is deeplyingrained within the Turkish social formation. Yet, there is a residueof Cypriotness on both sides of the barbed wire, despite politics beingplayed on a broader “battle-ground” framed by a complex treaty whichbalances the strategic interests of three NATO allies (Britain, Greece andTurkey). This takes place in close proximity to the Middle East where bigglobal and regional power-games are played out. The recent discovery ofgas reserves in the southern shores of the RoC makes matters even morecomplicated.

The transformation of Cyprus is entangled in global and regionalgeopolitics, including transformations of Turkey itself in the era of aslow decline of US power as well as internal transformation withinCyprus. Cihan Tugal’s reading of Turkey’s “passive revolution” as a pro-cess of absorbing the Islamic challenge to capitalism and how this in turnshapes and tailors capitalism with its own Turkish Islamic characteris-tics is not confined to internal societal transformations (Tugal, 2009).It is extended beyond the realm of domestic policy-making or articula-tions which incorporate, integrate and absorb the subaltern classes intothe hegemonic project. Erdogan’s discourse is best understood as part of aregional geopolitical hegemonic project in the Middle East vis-à-vis Israel:it is a claim to the moral and political leadership in the Muslim world tospeak on their behalf to the NATO command. In the context of post-Annan plan period, the new vigor in Ankara’s regional hegemonic projectcomplicates matters further in search for a settlement in Cyprus. It seemsincreasingly untenable for Ankara to simultaneously maintain contradic-tory positions: first, addressing diplomatic circles, Ankara reiterates thatin 2004 it supported the Annan plan and its commitment to the UnitedNations (UN) sponsored negotiations. Second, it maintains that until asettlement is found it will continue bolstering, financially and militarily,the TRNC regime. Ankara had backed the unilateral declaration of inde-pendence with a claim to protect the Turkish-Cypriots who are faced withthe Greek-Cypriot quest for domination and aggression. High-rankingTurkish Government officials, such as the Foreign Secretary and theEuropean Affairs Minister, refer to “Plan B” should the negotiations fail,including annexation to Turkey, which triggers strong Turkish-Cypriotreactions.20 In the meantime, Turkey is economically, demographically


and culturally overpowering the northern part of the country. The imageof Erdogan’s Turkey as a modernizing force that is “one step ahead” oftheir neighbors and the willingness to do business to establish order andstability in the region seems to be evaporating. In 2011, Erdogan’s per-sonal handling of the Turkish-Cypriot mass demonstration revealed theauthoritarian face of the leader, who is increasingly relying on “dominancewithout hegemony” (see Guha, 1997).

Turkey’s intervention in 1974 was greeted by the vast majority ofTurkish-Cypriots with jubilation and relief; yet today, an increasing num-ber of Turkish-Cypriots is frustrated by Turkey’s overpowering presence.As Ankara-backed authorities in the TRNC of the Ulusal Birlik Partisi(UBP) (Nationalist Unity Party) is embarking on a neoliberal package ofausterity that includes privatization and cutting down on subsidies to theunrecognized state, it can no longer incorporate the Turkish-Cypriot mid-dle classes and labor aristocracy, who are feeling the squeeze. Recentresearch shows that their presence and role are gradually being eroded;Turkish-Cypriot workers in the public sector are feeling the pressure ofbeing unemployed or the curtailing of their rights in an economy whereinsecure working conditions or precariatization21 prevails as the normin labor relations within the private sector.22 Turkish-Cypriot discontentthat became manifest in the mass mobilizations of 2011 is plural in formand content. It ranges from a strong trade union presence, at the fore-front of who are Left-wing trade unions. Its mass base is premised ona “Cypriotist” identity, very much part of the tradition of the Turkish-Cypriot Left (see Kızılyürek in this volume). The opposition to Turkey’soverpowering presence reflects a combination of communal-cultural andeconomic concerns and it is led by trade unions, mostly in the publicsector, which are connected to political parties of the Left. However,disillusionment is increasingly drawing support from all walks of life,including some political groups on the traditional pro-Ankara Right ofthe ideological spectrum.23 The area under the control of a regime notrecognized by anyone else other than Turkey, the TRNC, operates as thebuffer and a double periphery.

History, Geography, and Politics

Cyprus has a complex social and political history. It is the third-largestisland in the Mediterranean; its geographical position, in the far easternpart of the Mediterranean Sea, historically adjoining Europe, Asia, andAfrica, has been both a blessing and a curse. Invaders and occupiersfor centuries sought to subordinate it for strategic reasons, followedby British colonial rule. Upon independence in 1960, Turkish-Cypriots


constituted 18 percent of the population, whilst the smaller “religiousgroups,” as referred to in the Constitution—consisting of Armenians,Latins, Maronites, and others (such as Roma)—constituted 3.2 percentof the population.

The country became an independent republic for the first time sinceantiquity, albeit in a limited way (see Attalides, 1979). The anticolo-nial struggle as a popular mass movement started in the 1930s:24 by1931 there were the first riots against the British which ended withthe burning of the Governor’s residence, known as the “Octovriana.”In the 1940s, the Communist Left had risen as a mass movement andcompeted with the Church for leadership of the anticolonial movement(Katsiaounis, 2007). In the 1950s the Church-led campaign ended with afour-year armed campaign by the Greek-Cypriot Eθνικη OργανωσηK υπριων Aγωνιστ ων (EOKA) (National Organisation of CypriotFighters) (1955–1959) for enosis (union with Greece) and the Turkish-Cypriot response for Taksim (partition).

Independence granted in 1960 was essentially regime of “supervised”or “guaranteed” independence, with three foreign “guarantor” nations(the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Greece). The three treaties of theZurich–London Agreements of 1959 established limited “independence.”The “Treaty of Guarantee,” made Britain, Greece, and Turkey “con-stitutional guarantors” with a right to intervene, with the sole aim ofre-establishing the status quo created by the treaty. This treaty also pro-hibited ethno-nationalistic projects, the Greek-Cypriot project for enosis(union with Greece) and the Turkish Cypriot project for Taksim (parti-tion). The “Treaty of Establishment” allowed Britain to retain 99 sq. km ofCyprus territory and 32 other spots as military bases, as “sovereign Britishsoil.” Finally, the “Treaty of Alliance” ensured the permanent presenceof Greek and Turkish troops on the island to “protect the commu-nities.” The Cypriot Constitution, adopted under the Zurich–LondonAccord of 1959, contains a rigorous bi-communalism, whereby the two“communities” Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots shared power in aconsociational system.25

Peaceful coexistence between the island’s two communities, theGreek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots, has a long history. How-ever, intercommunal conflict started in 1958. Conflict erupted in 1963,only three years after independence, which forced large numbers of theTurkish-Cypriots to withdraw into Turkish militia-controlled enclavesin isolated and squalid conditions. Following a Greek-Cypriot pro-posal for amendment to the Constitution, the Turkish-Cypriot politicalleadership withdrew or was forced to withdraw from the government.Intercommunal strife continued to erupt until 1967. In 1964, the


Supreme Court ruled that the functioning of the government mustcontinue on the basis of the “law of necessity” or, better yet, the “doc-trine of necessity,” in spite of the constitutional deficiencies created bythe Turkish-Cypriot leadership’s withdrawal from the administration.26

The short life of consociation did not allow the generation of a strongenough intercommunal or transcommunal citizenship. Although de jurethe young Republic continued to exist as a single international entity, withthe collapse of the consociational power-sharing in 1964, the Republic hasbeen controlled by the Greek-Cypriots ever since. The Turkish-Cypriotleadership exercised de facto power within small enclaves throughout theterritory of the Republic.

In the postcolonial years, intercommunal strife and foreign interven-tion of one kind or another continued until 1974, when a coup by theGreek military junta and local paramilitaries27 was used as a pretext foran invasion by the Turkish army and the subsequent division of theisland. Turkey occupies 34 percent of the territory, whilst 162,000 Greek-Cypriots remain displaced in the southern part of the country and 80,000Turkish-Cypriots remain in the northern territories.

Intercommunal talks between the leaders of the two communities havebeen agreed in the High Level agreements of 1977 and 1979. Theseguidelines have been reiterated over and over again by UN resolutionsas well as the agreements by the two sides brokered by the UN: a “bizonalbicommunal federation with a single sovereignty, citizenship and interna-tional personality.” However, attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem havefailed. In 1983 the regime in the north unilaterally declared independenceas the TRNC; only Turkey has recognized it.

The most significant failed effort was the Annan plan undertaken bythe UN Secretary General: on April 24, 2004, the plan was rejected by76 percent of the Greek-Cypriots, despite being accepted by 65 percent ofthe Turkish-Cypriots. The RoC acceded to the EU; the implementationof the EU Acquis Communitaire (i.e., the EU legal norms) in northern partof the country was suspended. Even after the rejection of the UN planby the Greek-Cypriots, the basis for the solution has been reiterated bythe leaders of the two communities to be the same, bizonal bicommunalfederation in line with the high-level agreements.28

During this 40-odd-year period, the de facto partition meant that ineffect there were two separate official “stories,” that of the Greek-Cypriotsand that of the Turkish-Cypriots. In reality there are multiple stories andperspectives, as intracommunal differences of opinion are often sharperthen intercommunal. Up to April 2003 there were few opportunities forordinary Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to meet: Greek-Cypriotsdid not have access to the northern areas, whilst Turkish-Cypriots were


prohibited by the authorities in the north from entering the southern areacontrolled by the Republic, unless special permission was granted. In thepost-1974 period the RoC paradoxically reinforced its legitimacy pre-cisely due to the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern part ofCyprus. On April 23, 2003, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots check-points opened and the two communities were able to meet each other.The Republic maintains that Turkish-Cypriot citizens enjoy equal rightsunder the Republic’s Constitution, save for those provisions that haveresulted from the “abandoning” of the governmental posts in 1963–1964and the consequences of the Turkish invasion, including their abandonedproperties; however, the reality of the current state of limbo is far fromsatisfactory for Turkish-Cypriots.29 The “doctrine of necessity” was statedto apply only to the extent that it would allow for the effective function-ing of the state, whilst the relevant provisions of the Constitution wouldbe temporarily suspended, pending a political settlement.30 The rightsof displaced Greek-Cypriots from the northern part of the country aredenied: they can only obtain limited compensation for the lands but arecertainly not welcomed by the TRNC. After all, it is a “state of excep-tion” (see Bozkurt and Trimikliniotis in this volume; Trimikliniotis andBozkurt, 2010; Constantinou, 2008), claiming to realize the “embodi-ment the right of the Turkish-Cypriots to self-determination” (Tamkoc,1988). Ironically, Turkish-Cypriots feel more and more disillusioned asthey feel squeezed between a domineering and overpowering ‘mothercountry’, which threatens to swallow them on the one hand, and a Greek-Cypriot dominated Republic of Cyprus which has rejected them since1963. The slogan of the Left-wing “This Country is Ours,” platformunder whose banners the Turkish-Cypriots demonstrated en masse in2002–2004, which was directed against Ankara and the Greek-Cypriots,is more valid than ever.

The Euro-Cypriot Conjuncture: State of Limboand Transformation

Around the millennium, a number of international forces began to con-verge in questioning the status quo in Cyprus. The transformations withinTurkey, Turkey’s EU accession process and its new Cyprus policy since2002 opened the possibilities for an agreement on Cyprus to be material-ized; hence there has been an increased interest in studying the “troubledtriangle between Cyprus, Greece and Turkey” (Aktar et al., 2010). Thepublication of the first version of the Annan plan in late 2002 trans-formed the terms of the debate by specifying the terms of the solution,bringing about multiple ruptures within political forces to the north andsouth of the barbed wire in Cyprus. The plan appeared when the Cypriot


society was rapidly changing; it coincided with the final stages of Cyprus’accession to the EU and the beginning of Turkey’s accession process.The plan was the culmination of 30 years of interrupted UN nego-tiations, which eventually resulted in an accelerated process momentsbefore Cyprus’ EU accession; however, the agreed process empoweredthe UN Secretary General to fill in the final plan to be put to sep-arate referenda without the consent of the community leaders. It wasdesigned to by-pass the intransigent Turkish-Cypriot leader Rauf Denk-tas. Moreover, Turkey’s own European accession positively affected thecontradictory internal socioeconomic and political transformations tak-ing place after the collapse of the bipolar world and the EU eastward(Trimikliniotis, 2006). The year 2004 was a watershed: accession tothe EU would coincide with reunification, as Cypriots were called tovote in a referendum on a comprehensive UN plan. The plan failed tounite the country following the overwhelming rejection by the Greek-Cypriots, following an impassioned call by President Papadopoulos, theGreek-Cypriot leader, calling for a resounding “No” (Trimikliniotis,2006; Perikleous, 2009; Michael, 2009). Turkish-Cypriots said a resound-ing “Yes.” This disparity added considerable tension and suspicionto the relations of the two communities. Following the referendumfailure, Cyprus entered the EU as a divided country in a state oflimbo. This has significantly shaped Cyprus’ relations with and posi-tion within the EU, as its unresolved problem and its tensions withTurkey have become a constant source of problems for the EU–Ankararelations.

This book does not deal with the content of the plan, as the pros andcons have already been debated exhaustively (see Varnava and Faustmann,2009), except noting some relevant aspects that are crucial to the futureand which can help us learn from the past. First, the references to thenature of “the state to emerge” were left deliberately vague and a methodwas adopted of using meaningless neutralities to refer to the future suchas “the state of affairs.” From a constitutional point of view, the post-Annan “new state of affairs,” if the plan was approved, would have beena bicommunal, bizonal federation, but there would be “symbolisms” andambiguities that would have allowed those opposed to it to exploit (Palley,2005; Trimikliniotis, 2009; Varnava and Faustmann, 2009). The idea of“virgin birth,” advocated by the British envoy Sir David Hannay (2005),to explain in neutral terms the “emergence” of “the new state of affairs”proved to be a means of abuse and distortion which played on the secu-rity fears of Greek-Cypriots that would have left them without a state oftheir own, and thus without a future. The UN plan was designed not as apopular reconciliation and societal integration project and had little scopefor citizen involvement in the design, legitimization, and public debate,


which was an additional failure. In an effort to remedy this problem andto acquire legitimacy and to inspire loyalty and support, the subsequentagreements were very specific in naming the solution as bizonal bicommu-nal federation; they now avoided the use of the controversial “constructiveambiguity” in favor of legal certainty to acquire loyalty and legitimacy byan untrusting community. Second, the UN documents since reiterate thatthe process is Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-led.

A stalemate followed in the immediate aftermath of the Annanplan. In the February 2008 presidential elections, hardliner TassosPapadopoulos was defeated by Dimitris Christofias, the leader ofAνoρθωτικó K óμμα Eργαζoμενoυ Λαoυ (AKEL) (Progressive Partyof Working People) who assumed office. This gave impetus for a newround of negotiations. For two years Christofias negotiated with Talat,31

the Left-wing Turkish-Cypriot leader who headed the break-away TRNCuntil 2010. Three crucial factors need to be taken into account: First,we are not in the same situation today as we were in 2004; Turkey’s EUaccession lost its momentum, Erdogan’s Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)(Justice and Development Party) has consolidated power in Turkey, andthe economic crisis and the transformations in the Arab world are reshap-ing the geopolitical map: Ankara’s commitment to a settlement in Cyprusdiminished as the broader geopolitical concerns in the region becamemore important. Second, precious time was wasted as Christofias insistedon starting from point zero, rather than negotiating the points of disagree-ment of the Annan plan, and Talat overestimated his hold on Ankara andthe EU, hoping to reap benefits from the good relations with the EU.A last minute chance was floundered, when they both failed to lock andcapitalize on the remarkable progress on Governance, one of the crucialchapters of the Cyprus problem: this was the first time ever that the leadersof the two communities agreed on the parameters of sharing power in thebicommunal bizonal federation with a system of weighted cross-votingand rotating presidency for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. Never-theless, Christofias was under immense pressure from his hawkish govern-ment partners and the main opposition party leader, Nicos Anastasiades,who up to that point acted as a “right-wing peace-maker” (see Loizides inthis volume) refused to endorse the convergences. During his presidentialcampaign, Anastasiades has since adopted a hard-line position.

The political elites on both sides were poised to sabotage any prospectof an agreement: paradoxically, the hostile Greek-Cypriot political estab-lishment with the full backing of the media moguls and the increasinglydisinterested Ankara combined with the new vigor of the ascendingTurkish-Cypriot Right meant that the political Right and nationalismwere becoming hegemonic once more. Nominally, the Left in bothcommunities was in the driving seat of the negotiations; in practice they


were in retreat. No interim agreement was signed when the UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-Moon visited Cyprus in March 2010; in Shakespearianterms, once more, time went out of joint. In the meantime, on theGreek-Cypriot side there was little popular participation and activitieslaying the ground for a federal compromise in an educational system andmedia system hostile to a compromise. On the Turkish-Cypriot side themovement that ousted Denktas and brought in Talat was demoralized.Turkish-Cypriot disillusionment informed by a disappointment with therealization of promises of accession/reunification and the massive divi-sions within the mass social-political movement led to the replacement ofthe Left-wing leader in the elections in April 2010. The veteran right-wingDervis Eroglu was marginally elected.32

Since 2008 the leaders have had over 120 meetings; however, the nego-tiations are yet to yield results: following his electoral victory and contraryto his pre-election pledges, under pressure from Ankara, Eroglu statedthat he accepts what his predecessor pledged to continue on the sameroute. Yet, he soon began to undermine the basis of the convergencereached over governance issues, as he opposes cross-voting in the electionof the president and vice-president in a future federal state, which hadbeen previously agreed upon by Christofias and Talat. Also, he opposesany concession on property, territory, and Turkish guarantees and pres-ence in a post-solution Cyprus. As the post-Annan hopes were reseedingwith the end of yet another cycle of talks between the two communityleaders, the discovery of hydrocarbon reserves in the southern coast ofCyprus presented a new twist to the problem. There is renewed inter-est in the Cyprus question with posturing and squaring up between theregional actors, threats, and moves to contain the situation. The stakes areagain high and “closure” in terms of “freezing” the conflict is no longer aviable option. There is a de facto “freeze” during the Presidency of the EU.

Time and time again there have been promises of a breakthrough in thestalemate of the past 40 years and yet none is forthcoming. Nonetheless,the urgency for a solution cannot be overstated. The loss of momentum isbecoming increasingly visible to Cypriots, who are gradually losing theirhope and feeling disappointed with their respective leaderships. Unlessthere is a breakthrough in the immediate future, pessimism and cynicismis likely to dominate; this is fertile ground for regional geopolitics gamesas well as ideologies of hatred, racisms, and nationalism on the ground.

Negotiations came to effective halt in the second half of 2012, whenthe Republic of Cyprus assumed the Presidency of the EU: Ankararefused to negotiate the substantial issues during the EU Presidency;hence only technical and side issues were addressed, effectively freezingthe UN-sponsored talks, with the failing to exercise any pressure for


substantive negotiations to continue. Christofias pledged that he wouldnot run for re-election in the February 2013 Presidential elections, as therehas been no substantive progress in the efforts to finding a solution thatwould justify him continuing after his first term in office.

The last UN effort was the summit in New York33: this was the fifthmeeting between the leaders of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriotcommunities with the UN Secretary General, since the current UN-facilitated talks were initiated in 2008. This time, after so many UN-ledmeetings, the two leaders discussed all aspects of the problem. There hasbeen convergence on the economy, EU relations, and governance, save forcertain thorny issues.34 However, on some chapters (for example, prop-erty, territorial adjustments, and security) little, if any, convergence hasbeen achieved. Serious gaps exist despite moving into what the UN Sec-retary General calls “the final phase” of the talks. On January 25 2012,the UN Secretary General reported “limited progress was achieved” andurged the leaders of the two communities to “make decisive steps towarda final agreement on the Cyprus problem.”

Whilst he reiterated that “the process is Cypriot-owned and Cypriot-led” and that “the UN is not here to impose solutions upon the sides,”he established the road map needed for the continuation of the nego-tiations. After a review of the process, and may this be positive, and“consistent with relevant Security Council resolutions and following con-sultations with the two sides,” the UN chief expressed his intention “tocall a multilateral conference in late April or early May.” This is timedone month before Cyprus assumes the presidency of the EU. However,the two sides have adopted different approaches to the talks and offereddifferent interpretations of the processes. In the current climate few areoptimistic.

Latest Developments and SocietalTransformations

In July 2011 a massive blast occurred at a munitions dump at theEvangelos Florakis naval base near the coastal village Mari, which wastriggered by the ignition of hundreds of confiscated containers of seizedIranian munitions since 2009. It was the county’s worst peacetime mil-itary accident. Thirteen people died, including the Cypriot navy officerin charge of the base and six firefighters. Also, the blast destroyed theVassiliko power station, the island’s largest power station, resulting inwidespread power cuts. The vast majority of the media and oppositionpoliticians turned against Christofias, blaming him personally for failingto ensure that the ammunition is properly stored or decommissioned.


Δημoκρατ ικη Eνωση Kεντρoυ (EDEK) (United Democratic Union ofthe Centre) and Δημoκρατ ικó K oμμα (DIKO) (Democratic Party)35

quit the coalition government; only AKEL and a small political partyEνωμενoι Δημoκρατες (EDI) (United Democrats) remain in govern-ment until the 2013 elections. There were protests with people gatheringoutside the presidential palace calling for the president’s resignation;many thousands on the Left rallied in support of the president.36 Mat-ters escalated when the independent investigator, appointed by PresidentChristofias,37 blamed the president of being aware of the risk yet takingno precautions.38 The report was based on the controversial hypothesisthat the president was exercising “de facto power,” ignoring the fundamen-tal principles enshrined in the Cypriot constitutional system, which grantsexclusive authority to the ministers and the council of ministers. The pres-ident rejected the conclusions as unsubstantiated, politically motivatedand violating the mandate granted. The police inquiry led to chargesagainst two former ministers and six army and fire service officers.39

Greek-Cypriot politics became even more polarized when the eco-nomic crisis in the euro zone, particularly the banks’ exposure to theGreek bonds and Greece in general, hit Cyprus. Upon pressure and threatsmounted by the EU Commission and the opposition parties, the Left-wing government was forced to introduce three sets of public sectorausterity measures to reduce the public debt and deficit. Things couldhave been worse had the cash flow problem not been resolved with alow-interest Russian bailout.40 Successive ratings agencies downgradedCyprus and the two largest commercial banks because of the banks’ expo-sure to Greek Government bonds41 and to Greek residents, that totals29 billion euro (3,898,469,0289 dollars) or 160 percent of Cyprus’ grossdomestic product (GDP); even the International Monetary Fund (IMF)considers this exposure as the Cypriot economy’s “weak link.”42 A mas-sive rescue package for saving the two private banks was agreed upon; inJuly 2012 the Government was forced to apply for financial assistanceto the EU bailout mechanism (EFSF/ESM). A delegation of the Troika(European Commission, the IMF and the European Central Bank) visitedCyprus on a fact-finding mission in a bid to assess the capital requirementsof the country’s public and banking sector. The conditionalities imposedfor the bailout will almost certainly be austerity measures; questions aboutthe exact package and whether the Government will accept this and howsocial partners will react remain to be seen.

Meanwhile, in the north of the barbed wire, the Turkish-Cypriot com-munity experienced its own serious discontent with the imposition ofausterity measures that became manifest with three massive rallies held inJanuary, March, and April 2011 and a series of strike actions. To reiterate,


the reasons for the discontent were economic as well as political. Therallies were triggered by the austerity measures put in place to cut thebudget deficit and rein in public finances by reducing the public sector,slashing salaries and privatization of state economic enterprises includingsome strategic sectors such as electricity operators and telecom. Currently84 percent of the budget is allocated to wages of civil servants and retiredpersonnel;43 the austerity measures cut civil servant wages up to 40 per-cent (Lehtinen, Southeast European Times in Istanbul, February 2, 2011).These measures were coupled with simultaneous rises in taxes as well asextra costs on petrol, electricity, alcohol, imported cars, and many otherthings. The austerity package is typical of a structural adjustment pro-gram, similar to the one lately imposed in Greece to “manage” the crisisin the euro zone and the so-called sovereign debt crisis of the country.44

The austerity measures are imposed by Turkey; hence, protestersshouted out slogans blaming Turkey for the austerity measures that resultin a higher cost of living and fewer jobs, driving young people off theisland (Lehtinen, Southeast European Times in Istanbul, February 2, 2011).Ankara is unwilling to pick up the bill of an unsustainable economicstructure which it itself created. Turkey channels between US$400 mil-lion and US$900 million per annum to the Turkish-Cypriot economydepending on the year–thereby providing a third of the TRNC gov-ernmental budget (Murat, North Cyprus Daily News, August 9, 2010).However, the discontent cannot be reduced to a reaction against the aus-terity measures only. Slogans chanted and banners waved in the ralliesare directed against Ankara,45 revealing the political dimension to thisdiscontent. Since Turkey’s military intervention in 1974, which led tothe de facto partition of the island, the relationship between the Turkish-Cypriot community and the “motherland” probably has never been sosour. Turkey is criticized for creating an administration in north Cyprusthat is entirely dependent on Turkey itself in political and financial terms.

How does the current discontent compare to the mobilizations of2002–2004 which culminated in the downfall of the nationalist leaderRauf R. Denktas and the Ulusal Birlik Partisi, leading to the overwhelm-ing “yes” vote to the Annan plan? Are there traces in the current discontentof an overall disillusionment with the system that may trigger a processthat would contribute to a reunification of the island? There are strikingresemblances between the two periods as well as differences. Just like thecurrent one, the discontent of the early 2000s was triggered by economicreasons. A banking crisis that erupted in December 1999 led to six bankscoming under government control. Later, four of these banks were closedby the decision of the Council of Ministers. Following the banking crisis,Eroglu’s government sought financial aid from Turkey. Yet Turkey was


not willing to provide unconditional support and imposed an economicausterity package that faced widespread resistance from the oppositionparties, trade unions as well the business community. As a result of thisopposition, the government could not implement the package, which ledto a shortage of funds. The consecutive delay in the payment of salaries inthe public sector and the suspension of payment of compensation to thevictims of the bank crisis contributed to an increasing discontent withinthe Turkish Cypriot community (Sonan, 2007).

Hence the banking crisis brought about a radical shift in the attitudeof the Turkish-Cypriots toward a settlement of the Cyprus problem andthe EU. In an environment where the economic crises not only curbedthe distributive capacity of the state, but also generated social unrest, theAnnan Plan with its prospect of immediate membership in the EU consti-tuted a promising alternative for a new, concrete social project to replacethe defunct politico-economic structure (Sonan, 2007, p. 5).

What seems to be missing today is this promising alternative in anenvironment shaped by a sense of Turkish-Cypriots’ disillusionment withthe peace process as well as disappointment with Left-wing parties as cred-ible alternatives: when they were in power they invariably adopted similareconomic policies. In fact these factors provide credible explanations forthe return of the hardliner UBP back to power in 2009, which paved theway for the election of the party’s leader Eroglu to the presidency in 2010.

Turkish-Cypriot politicians, even those on the mainstream Left, wereat pains to distinguish the latest Turkish-Cypriot mobilizations from thoseof 2002–2005. Are we witnessing exceptional political moments whichmark rupture in the normal order and opens up the potential for a newCyprus, or is there a closure in this contestation, a momentary lapse thatpassed its moment? Time will tell.

Meanwhile, the depth and volume of regional transformations areimmense. Regional transformations cannot leave Cyprus unaffected: First,the Middle East and Arab world is in a turmoil as Syria is in the midstof a bloody civil war; the new Egyptian army rulers are unstable as theMuslim Brotherhood won the elections, and although redrafting of theconstitution is taking place, the social issues are not addressed; the “phonywar” between Israel and Iran is escalating dangerously. Related to thisis the challenge to the US grip on the world and regional actors tryingto assert their presence in the regions: Turkey and Israel are in a seriousantagonism in the region. Second, the economic crisis is threatening thenucleus of the EU, the euro zone: the collapse of the periphery of Europeand the new austerity experimentation in Greece are putting to test theneoliberal governance whilst the social degradation is radicalizing andpolarizing the society. In this context the Turkey–EU relations are in the


process of restructuration and the Cyprus problem is being transformedaccordingly.

Cypriots are faced with stark choices: Any attempt to move toward aninternational conference without a convergence of the basic parametersof the internal aspect threatens another rejection of the agreement. Yet,any further prolongation of the talks reflecting the absence of progressinevitably fosters further pessimism amongst the people on both sidesof the divide. This, along with the economic euro-crisis and the riseof unemployment has generated fertile ground for nationalist and racistforces. Cyprus is facing the direct and indirect effects of a dire socioe-conomic situation in the Euro-zone, Greece, and Cyprus—both thesouthern part, which is experiencing a sharp rise in unemployment, andthe northern part of Cyprus, which is faced with severe austerity measuresimposed by Ankara.

The stalemate in the efforts to find a solution is fertile ground forhatred, xenophobia, and intolerance. Assisted by irresponsible populistpoliticians, and exploiting the fears and job insecurity generated by thecurrent economic crisis, new forms of fascisms are appearing. It has tobe pointed out that the neo-fascist party polled only 1 percent in the lastparliamentary elections; yet there is an increasingly xenophobic climateand intolerance toward migrants and whoever is “otherized.” There arealso more reported incidents of racial attacks in the last five years.46 At thesame time there is new vigor and resistance amongst more radicalizedyouth. There is an increasing polarization in Cypriot politics on bothsides of the divide.

The Content of the Volume

This volume deals with some of the most important aspects of the Cypriottransformation as an instance of the regional and global changes: it mapsthe sociopolitical realities and articulations embedded in the local contextwhich are simultaneously closely interwoven with regional factors, par-ticularly in the triangle with Greece and Turkey and the EU. Fifty yearsafter independence and with the visible signs of a global and Europeaneconomic crisis, the rethinking of the processes that gave birth to theRepublic of Cyprus, which had a short life as an effective bicommu-nal state lasting only for three years (1960–1963), seems quite timely.This is particularly important if we are to engage in a serious discus-sion on reunification and reconciliation. Geopolitical transformationsneed to be examined in conjunction with internal transformations, suchas party apparatuses, ideologies and social actors, social struggles, andmobilizations. Finally, the book examines the potential for reunificationand reconciliation in the era of turmoil and economic uncertainty andcrisis.


Notes

1. See Nairn (1997) on the significance of “Small Battalions” in the globaliza-tion era.

2. There was copper in the ancient years; there are remnants of asbestos miningby the international companies.

3. See O’Malley and Craig (1999). Cyprus measures 240 km latitudinally and100 km (62 mi) longitudinally, with Turkey 75 km (47 mi) to the north.Other neighboring territories include Syria and Lebanon to the east (105and 108 km [67 mi], respectively), Israel 200 km (124 mi) to the southeast,Egypt 380 km (236 mi) to the south, and Greece to the west-northwest:280 km (174 mi) to the small Dodecanesian island of Kastellórizo, 400 km(249 mi)

4. In his book Orientations, p. 488.5. See Adams (1971); Adams and Cottrell (1968).6. Anti-communist funds were channeled via the Greek junta.7. Nixon is alleged to have referred to Makarios as “Castro on a cassock”

(Dunphy and Bale, 2007, p. 293).8. See Perikleous (2009); Trimikliniotis (2010a); Varnava and Faustmann

(2009); Michael (2009).9. See International Crisis Group (2010, p. 2).

10. An estimated 200,000 migrants reside in the RoC.11. Hatay (2007) refers to 42,000 Turks as naturalized citizens, including 16,000

born in Cyprus and who have voting rights, plus another 78,000 migrantworkers of whom 70,000 are from Turkey.

12. Figures from October 2010, see Trimikliniotis (2010b, 2011a) andTrimikliniotis and Demetriou (2011a).

13. The main areas of employment are domestic work, service industry (tourism,trade), manufacturing industry, agriculture, and construction.

14. We use the term “Empire” not uncritically; for a useful critique of Hardt andNegri’s Empire, see Balakrishnan (2003).

15. See Palley (2005).16. See Coufoudakis (2004).17. See Ignatiou et al. (2005).18. See Fouskas and Tackie (2009); Fouskas (2010); Kostantakopoulos (2009);

see also Rooksby, in this volume.19. See Anderson (2008).20. Turkey’s European Affairs Minister Egemen Bagis said Ankara considers

annexation of northern Cyprus to Turkey as an option to end the Cyprusdispute if Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots fail to reach an agreementon the reunification of the island, or establishment of two independentstates through a deal, see Press news, at http://presstv.com/detail/230171.html (accessed March 10, 2012).

21. Precariat is a neologism that combines the meaning of the adjective precari-ous and the noun proletariat.

22. Research by Faiz underscores the gradual disappearance of the Turkish-Cypriot middle classes. We thank Muharrem Faiz.


23. For instance, the Democratic Party of Serdar Denktas, son of the late RaufDenktas, the Right-wing Turkish-Cypriot leader who founded the TRNC,participated in the demonstrations in March 2011.

24. The 1920s saw the radicalization of workers and the rise of the trade unionmovement (largely Greek-Cypriot but bi-communal from its inception); alsothere was radicalization of the Greek-Cypriot Right (see Panayiotou in thisvolume). By the mid-1950s the Church re-established its authority withEOKA the Greek-Cypriot nationalist organization which started a guerrillacampaign against the British colonial rule aimed at self-determination andunion with Greece (enosis).

25. Recognition as a national minority was extended to the Roma through theThird Periodic Report submitted by Cyprus under the Framework Con-vention for the Protection of National Minorities, received on April 30,2009, page 23. The Roma are nowhere mentioned in the Constitution andwere deemed to belong to the Turkish Cypriot community, due to their(presumed) common language and religion.

26. The case was Attorney General of the Republic v Mustafa Ibrahim and Others(1964), Cyprus Law Reports 195.

27. EOKA B was an illegal terrorist organization launched allegedly to campaignfor enosis, that is, union with Greece; it carried out bombings, murders ofcivilians, and tried several times to assassinate President Makarios.

28. The agreement of July 8, 2006, between Papadopoulos and Talat andthe subsequent agreements on the settlement by Christofias and Talat onMarch 21, and May 23, 2008, refer to these very terms (S/2008/353).

29. For the legal regime on property and resettlement in the RoC, seeTrimikliniotis and Demetriou (2011b); for the regime in the north, see Gurel(2011).

30. However, Turkish-Cypriot citizens of the Republic had been denied theirelectoral rights since 1964, a policy found by the European Court of HumanRights (ECtHR) to be in violation of the European Convention on HumanRights. A new law was passed in May 2006, which at least partially reme-died this problem but the wider spectrum of the ECtHR decision againstCyprus was not fully addressed by the government. See Aziz v RoC (ECHR)App. No. 69949/01, (accessed May 30, 2012), http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Press/2004/June/ChamberJudgmentAzizvCyprus220604.htm.

31. He headed the Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP) (Republican Turkish Party),Turkish-Cypriot sister-party of AKEL. See the chapter by Kizilyurek in thisvolume.

32. He was elected from the first round with 50.3 percent votes.33. Greentree Summit (II) was held at Long Island at January 23 and 24, 2012.34. In regard to governance, there is disagreement on issues of election to the

presidency and the right to make international agreements.35. DIKO party had stayed on after the May 2011 elections; EDEK aban-

doned the coalition in early February 2011, accusing President Christofiasof making concessions in his reunification talks with Turkish-Cypriot leaderMehmet Ali Talat.


36. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/today/hi/today/newsid_9558000/9558751.stm(accessed January 12, 2012).

37. Lawyer Polyvios Polyviou.38. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-15159826 (accessed January

12, 2012).39. They were charged with manslaughter and causing death through a

negligent act for their involvement in the events leading up to theJuly 11 explosion, see P. Pantelides. See Cyprus Mail, January 25, 2012,available at http://www.cyprus-mail.com/incompetence/former-ministers-face-manslaughter-and-negligence-charges-mari-naval-base-blast (accessedJanuary 13, 2012).

40. “Russia ‘bails out’ cash-strapped Cyprus,” Euractiv.com, October 6, 2011,http://www.euractiv.com/europes-east/russia-bails-cash-strapped-cyprus-news-508182 (accessed December 15, 2011).

41. Marfin Popular Bank announced a record net loss of 3.3 billion Euros(US$4.4 billion) in 2011 after incorporating a 62 percent “haircut” on toxicGreek bonds; net losses of 2.5 billion Euros (US$3.4 billion) due to Greekgovernment bond restructuring, Marfin said in a statement. Bank of Cyprusreported losses of 1.01 billion Euros (US$1.34 billion), which is 60 percenton its Greek bonds holdings, amounting to 1.32 billion Euros.

42. Michele Kambas (2009) “ ‘Cyprus’ exposure to Greece is ‘weak link’ in econ-omy, says IMF,” Cyprus Mail, November 29, 2011, http://www.cyprus-mail.com/cyprus/cyprus-exposure-greece-weak-link-economy-says-imf/20111129(accessed December 15, 2011). P. Pantelides, “Former ministers facemanslaughter and negligence charges for Mari naval base blast,” Cyprus Mail,January 25, 2012, http://www.cyprus-mail.com/incompetence/former-ministers-face-manslaughter-and-negligence-charges-mari-naval-base-blast(accessed December 15, 2011).

43. “Row over austerity measures in North Cyprus,” Radio New Zealand,nobreak February 13, 2011, (accessed March 15, 2011) http://www.radionz.co.nz/news/world/68405/row-over-austerity-measures-in-north-cyprus.

44. See Laskos, Milios, and Tsakalotos (2012).45. These include slogans such as “Ankara, take your hands off us; this

motherland is ours, we will run it”; “This is our country, let’s run it our-selves”; and “Take your hands off Turkish-Cypriots”, see Vela J. Lehtinen A.,“Turkish Cypriots protest austerity measures”, Southeast European Times inIstanbul, February 2, 2011.

46. The stabbing of the Turkish-Cypriot musician Sertunc Akdogu in Larnacaat the Rainbow festival in November 2011 marks an escalation of racialviolence, see Trimikliniotis and Demetriou 2010.

C h a p t e r 1

The Cyprus Problemand the ImperialGames in theHydrocarbon Era:From a “Place ofArms” to an EnergyPlayer?Nicos Trimikliniotis

Introduction

The recent discovery of natural gas off the southern shores of Cyprus hasadded a new dimension to the debates on the “value” of the country, par-ticularly as we are entering an era of energy scarcity and economic crisis.1

The geopolitical and economic importance of Cyprus is radically chang-ing and this inevitably impacts on the conflict as well as the terms ofits resolution; it may deepen the divide, or maybe it is a factor pushingtoward cooperation. This chapter examines the role of the transforma-tions of colonialism and imperialism in the formation of the Cyprusproblem and the impact of the regional and geopolitical considerationson the problem. When Cyprus was colonized by the British, it was notdue to its natural resources but rather due to the significance of its geo-graphical position in the imperial games in the region. The system of“guaranteed independence” of postcolonial nonaligned Cyprus was con-tained in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) framework of afine balance between Greece, Turkey, and Britain. Within the country, the

24 N I C O S T R I M I K L I N I O T I S

control of the state by the two conflicting nationalistic projects completedthe picture: the ethno-nationalist ideology was the modality around whichthe various sections of the ruling cliques competed. The history of theconflict is closely connected to the geopolitical regional games of the ColdWar era. This took a new twist in the post–Cold War era, as the global andregional architecture of the world is being transformed. As imperial hege-mony2 is in a process of long-term decline, some more powerful regionalactors are raising the stakes, whilst others are declining. The contestedclaims to, and security aspects of, energy resources for the purposes ofeconomic exploitation and geopolitical sovereignty games are character-istic of an era of turbulence, regional restructuring, and economic crisis.As imperialism and the sub-imperialist geopolitical games are reloaded,this is transforming the Cyprus problem as we understand it.

The Hydrocarbon Factor: Transformationsof the Geopolitical Map and the Cyprus Problem

Today, in “the era of the hydrocarbon-man” (Shaffer, 2009, p. 60), fewwould doubt the geopolitical significance of Cyprus; however, the defi-nition of the significance of the island varied over time. Cyprus was notperceived by the British as an economic asset; it was occupied due tothe island’s strategic significance in the eastern Mediterranean and wastreated with “benign neglect” by the colonialists (Worsley, 1979, p. 10).Scholars’s description of the significance of the island vary; the islandhas been described as a “mere pawn,” as an “inconsequential possession”(Varnava, 2006, 2009), a “place of arms” (Stephens, 1966) to be turnedinto “unsinkable aircraft carrier” (Nicolet, 2001), as an integral part of the“empire of bases.” The importance of the country assumed greater signif-icance in the 1950s with the advent of the Cold War with the rise of theUnited States as the leader of the world’s capitalist camp and the declineof the British empire: Britain’s new role as a junior partner in a worldwidesystem meant that Cyprus was caught in the Cold War games between thesuperpowers, as it was in a contested region, the Near Middle East. Fromthe perspective of the present, the significance of Cyprus has certainlyincreased even more, for the global and regional powers that be, in whatcan be described as “imperialism of our time” (Panitch and Leys, 2004).

As the architecture of the global hegemony is in the process of transfor-mation and reorientation, which renegotiates the roles of global, regional,and national forces in the region, the fault-lines, frontiers, and terms ofcontestations also transform. The “bidding” of regional powers test thelimits of their claims vis-à-vis their regional competitors/rivals and thedeclining superpower, that is the United States. Alternative explanations

I M P E R I A L G A M E S I N T H E H Y D R O C A R B O N E R A 25

have been offered on the renegotiation and contestations taking place,3

particularly in the energy-producing regions.4 One does not need toadopt the argument of the “fall of the US empire” to recognize that thereis process of shifting in the “imperial order” which is redefining the fault-lines (Fouskas and Gökay, 2012). In these regional geopolitical, energy,and security contestations, one can connect the notion of “vital nationalinterest” to the Marxian logic of “social capital,” which reflects the total-ity of social relations within each social formation on the basis for socialreproduction, along the lines of the global imperialist chain (Milios andSotiropoulos, 2009).5

In the context of Cyprus, the key question to be asked today is howdoes the discovery of gas reserves affect the geopolitical factors in andaround Cyprus? How is the discovery of gas transforming the geopoliticalimportance of the country? Is Cyprus, the “useless pawn” and “place ofarms” transformed into an intrinsically significant energy post? How isthis affecting the conflict and does it tell us something about the wayimperialism and anti-imperialism has been understood and articulated?How are the terms that make up the Cyprus problem being transformed,both in terms of complicating the conflict and generating the poten-tial for a settlement? Such questions are difficult to address as we arestill in the very early days of the discovery of hydrocarbons, where thetechnical, financial, and economic aspects of extractions are still to beresolved, agreed upon, and organized. Regional actors are still formulat-ing their responses and negotiating; also the instability and uncertaintyin the Middle East with various escalating interconnected wars and con-testations in the region make such predictions impossible: geopoliticalgames and realignment of forces in the region turn such an endeavor intoa speculative game of “scenariology.”

There is little doubt, however, that the discovery of hydrocarbons offthe southern coast of Cyprus is radically transforming crucial aspectsof the geopolitical contestations in the region as well as the prospectsfor economic speculation of the reserves.6 One of the fields off the coastof Cyprus is said to hold as much as 8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas,which is the first discovery off the divided country. Results indicate from5 to 8 trillion cubic feet of gas, with a gross mean of 7 trillion cubic feet.Field 12 covers about 40 square miles (100 square kilometers) and requiresadditional appraisal drilling before development. The Houston-basedcompany, Noble Energy, operates the well with a 70 percent workinginterest and the Israeli-based companies each hold a 15 percent stake.7

In light of this, the geopolitical and economic importance of Cyprusas a potential energy reserve has grown massively. These geopolitical,security, economic, and environmental aspects connected to the discovery


are reshaping the nature of the Cyprus problem, as we have understoodit so far. The geopolitics of energy security is increasingly becoming anaspect of the Cyprus problem; in this sense the Cyprus problem is increas-ingly becoming regionalized within the European Union (EU)–MiddleEast energy geopolitics and globalized within the power-game system ofsecurity and energy.

It is recognized that the energy question is amongst the top globalissues in the twenty first century. Apart from the exploitation of morethan half of the world energy reserves by the Global North (United States,Western Europe, Japan, and the rest of the G8), the emerging powersof the Global South (China, India, Brazil etc.) are also using up energyreserves. Energy needs are growing: scarce reserves are used up and climatechange is causing unexpected crises, so the dependency on oil and naturalgas is not diminishing, despite the growth of renewable energy resources.In the context of the EU and the eastern Mediterranean, the geopoliticsof energy security is interconnected to the heavy dependence for gas onRussia and the wider dependence on the Middle East. A note of caution isnecessary here. It is possible to be carried away into speculations based onwhat may prove to be false assumptions about how the “future game” willunravel; inevitably, we base our estimates on the assumptions of currentknowledge, in terms of the technological and technical frontiers aroundcurrent and future projections of energy needs, extraction, processing, anduses of energy resources.8

The discovery of gas reserves in Cyprus is already reshaping the energymap of the region, a matter that has knock-on effects on the politics ofthe region. The so-called “pipeline diplomacy” is essentially a question ofpipeline geopolitics (Iosifides, 2011) whereby the power games need towork along a fine balance of international law of the sea, the politics ofinternational relations, and economic interests. In this context, it is notsurprising that the president of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) expressedhis intention to grant permission to Russian and Chinese companies todrill for gas in the sea off Cyprus.9 The goal, apart from allowing theoffshore drilling, is that “such vicarious super-power involvement couldoffer Cyprus a measure of deterrence against Turkish threats over searights.”10 This perhaps tends to confirm the conclusion that small statesare not mere pawns in the international relations game “in a world struc-tured around a narrow definition of state interests” (Ingebritsen, 2006,p. 289). However, the dice has not been cast yet; the new game is onlynow beginning and once a small or big actor enters such a game, it isalmost impossible to withdraw without incurring costs.

Turkey, the regional superpower, has reacted with threats against theRepublic, challenging the rights of the Greek-Cypriot administered RoC


to exploit the reserves, without the participation of the Turkish-Cypriotcommunity, what is perceived as cofounder of the RoC. Immediatelyit sent a Turkish research ship Piri Reis put out from Izmir claiming toexplore further off the northern shore of the island.11 Secondly, Ankarais also keen to be involved in Cyprus’ offshore bonanza, Turkey’s deputyprime minister, Bülent Arınç, openly admits: “Turkey cannot just sit backand observe what is happening. We also have economic interests. We willuse our right to search for oil in these waters.”12

In these “sovereignty games” (Constantinou, 2011), Ankara is caughtin an embarrassingly paradoxical position: having invaded and occupiedthe northern part of Cyprus and supported the secession of the “TurkishRepublic of Northern Cyprus” (TRNC), it now claims rights over theother part of the country. Moreover, it recognizes no such rights for theGreek-Cypriot community over the share of resources under the de factocontrol of the TRNC with which Turkey has signed an illegal maritimeagreement; nor has she ratified the International Convention on the Lawof the Sea:13 Turkey is entitled to refuse to sign the 1982 Sea Convention;however, she cannot disregard the substantive rules of the Convention,which are now customary international law and binding also on states thathave not signed the Convention. In the absence of a settlement, a way outof the escalation is to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice;yet both the RoC and Turkey are unwilling to do so (see Constantinou,2011).

The current situation is laden with tensions, which may escalate as weapproach the extraction time of the gas in the next 5 to 10 years, partic-ularly if the current negotiations fail or are put to some kind of “freeze”after the RoC assumes the EU presidency on July 1, 2012.14 We cantherefore speak of two potentialities: there is a danger of intensificationof the geopolitical contestation in the increasingly Europeanized Cyprus–Greece–Turkey triangle; on the other hand this present danger requiresthat more political energy be invested in it so that a settlement is found.As the stakes are now higher for all those forces with interests in the con-flict and a potential settlement, the urgency for some sort of resolutiongrows. The cost of non-solution and most notably the risks of escala-tion in the conflict are becoming a serious issue in the inflammable widerregion which is in turmoil.

The danger of escalation in the near Middle East is threatening tospill over into the other contestations in the turbulent Middle East regionand reload the explosive Arab upheavals. However, there is now also thedanger of things to work in the opposite direction: the Middle Eastconflicts and phony wars to spill over into a “revamped Cyprus con-flict” as the discovery of hydrocarbons is reshaping the economic, energy,


and geopolitical alliances. The Arab revolts are reshaping the regionand its political map; there are popular revolts against unpopular andundemocratic regimes, but there are also old conflicts between ethnic,religious, and secular groups as well as regional powers in their own proxywars. The outcome is uncertain; the organized forces ready to take overafter the uprisings are often themselves neither secular-democratic noropen. There are contestations between various factions, ethnic groups,army fractions, and/or Muslim brotherhoods and the big regional andglobal forces (United States/NATO, Iran, Turkey, and Russia etc.). Thereis a shift in the role of the United States and NATO with their disparateallies such as Israel, Turkey, and a number of Arab states (Saudi Arabia,the Gulf states, Jordan etc.) against Iran and its allies. In the Muslimworld of the region there are three poles emerging: Iran, Saudi Arabia,and Turkey. Turkey maintains relations with the rivals Iran and SaudiArabia, whilst it is connected to the West/NATO. These transforma-tions are producing new forms of opposition and throwing up variouscontradictions.

The turmoil in the region is increasingly threatening the stability ofwhat is now part of the southeastern border of the EU. The gradualdemise of US hegemony combined with the absence of a settlement andany attempt of the Republic of Cyprus or the unrecognized TRNC and/orAnkara by proxy to play a role in the energy game, threatens to dragCyprus into the regional geopolitics, in the regional cleavage and hege-mony contestations between Turkey and Israel. The relations betweenthese countries have deteriorated, from being military allies into regionalrivals, as Erdogan’s Turkey is reorientated in regional geopolitics to estab-lish a hegemonic leadership in the Muslim populations in the MiddleEast. As against Iran which assumed a leadership role over Shiite Muslimsin the region, Turkey is trying to appeal to Sunni Muslims. Israel isthe other western-backed bastion against Iran’s influence in the region;with the support of United States-backed Muslim states15 the UnitedStates managed to “contain” the situation under its sphere of influence.Relations came close to an all-time low after the Israeli commandos con-troversially killed Turkish activists challenging the blockade on the MaviMarmara flotilla in May 2010.16

Cyprus is in close proximity to the ongoing wars and contestations inthe region. Even if Cyprus remains neutral, it may well be dragged intounthought-of situations related to wars and conflicts: first, the Britishbases are used by NATO for operations in the region; second, it is thefirst place of refuge for refugees. The civil war in Syria is also a proxywar between Israel/West versus Iran; this has serious repercussions forLebanon, where the all-powerful Hezbollah is supplied with arms and


funds by Tehran via Damascus. Moreover, Turkey’s new role of realigningitself with Muslim neighbors, which the Turkish Foreign Minister AhmetDavutoglu (2010) referred to as Turkey’s “strategic depth,” may excitethe Muslims populations, but brings the chills to Israel and the West andcauses rifts in NATO. The closer identification of RoC with Israel as a bul-wark against Turkey will inevitably bring Cyprus closer to the instabilityand dangers in the ongoing contestations in the Middle East undermin-ing the country’s “neutrality”. The unresolved Palestinian question, theuncertainty of post-Mubarak Egypt, the crises in the NATO-occupiedregimes (Afghanistan and Iraq) as well as West-backed regimes (for exam-ple, Pakistan) along with the collapse of various authoritarian secularregimes in the region, drag Cyprus closer to the conflict zones, if it is per-ceived as being too closely identified with Israel and/or if Ankara movesdeeper as leading into a Muslim-based alliance.17 The US pullout of Iraqis proving to be a nightmare, whilst the impact of the occupation hasproved highly problematic. The United States maintains effective con-trol in the oil-rich Kurdish northern Iraq; the country is now headed bya Shiite Government, which has sympathies with Iran, whilst the Kurdskeep the balance with the Sunni minority. The region is highly unstable.

The RoC as an EU member abides by the broad EU foreign policyon the Middle East to the extent that there is a clearly defined policygiven the fluidity of the situation; however, there are also national inter-est considerations. Cyprus has historic links with its neighbors; in thedecolonization era, it formed close relations with non-aligned membersand built close foreign relations with other decolonized countries. More-over, after 1974, Greek-Cypriots identified with the Palestinians whoalso suffered from occupation, particularly as Turkey collaborated mil-itarily with Israel. Turkish-Cypriots also identified with Palestinians asthey are feeling increasingly overwhelmed by Ankara’s grip on the north.Aνoρθωτικó K óμμα Eργαζ oμενoυ Λαoυ (AKEL) (Progressive Partyof Working People) has traditionally been one of the most pro-Palestiniansupporters in the country; yet it is fully in tune in with the governmentpolicy to “bring in” major international players as stakeholders in sharingfuture profits from the gas, including the United States and Israel. Thisvery much reflects the logic of small-state strategies in international rela-tions (see Ingebritsen et al., 2006). The announcement of the discoveryof hydrocarbons was greeted with jubilation amongst the Greek-Cypriotpolitical forces, with few marginal exceptions. The Left-wing president ofthe RoC spoke of the historic day that puts Cyprus on the energy map ofthe world and that the reserves provide a sense of optimism in the days ofgloomy economic crisis. However, the government is careful to distanceitself from the hardline Greek-Cypriot nationalists who celebrated the gas


discovery combined with the new closeness with Israel as to be herald-ing the beginning of a historic “geopolitical overthrow” at the expenseof Turkey18 and also from those who are driven by geocultural and anti-Islam agendas.19 There are still technical difficulties to be overcome beforethe actual extraction of gas begins, which is expected in the next 5–10years.20 The role of the Greek-Cypriot opposition to the Cyprus–Israel–Greece axis has been marginal and it came from the far Left21 and ahandful of commentators.22 Of course this is the case as there are veryfew who believe that there would be a breakthrough in the negotiationsin the coming months. A possible settlement may enable both communi-ties to benefit from the fruits of this discovery as it would allow pipes togo via land to the north of Cyprus and from there to Turkey to realize theNabucco strategy23 (Antoniadou et al., 2009; Iosifides, 2011; Perikleous,2011). Private companies from Israel have invested in northern Cyprus; itremains to be seen whether the enhanced cooperation between the RoCand Israel on the extraction of hydrocarbons would have an impact ofsuch investments in the northern Turkish occupied part of the country.Nevertheless, Israel does not want to provoke a complete break-up withTurkey as they have enjoyed military cooperation and also have commoninterests in many respects—not to mention their common alliance withthe United States and the West, whose attention and recognition they arecompeting over.

Finally, it must be noted that the environmental aspects are hardly dis-cussed by anyone in the public discourse, including the Left on both sidesof the barbed wire. This is a vital aspect for public debate and research.

It is therefore essential to disperse three false assumptions: First, themere discovery of hydrocarbons in the offshore of the Republic does notsomehow automatically translate into economic and geopolitical “value”for Cyprus, even if the very discovery is certainly transforming the stakesof those interested in exploiting the reserves for profit and regional power.By the same token, neither is it automatically negated by tit-for-tat reac-tions by Turkey. Secondly, the reductionist reading of “energy wars,”which perceive only competition in “pipeline wars” between alternativepipelines needs to be problematized: various multinationals such as Gasprom, Chevron, EXXON MOBIL etc. are at one level competitors pursu-ing alternative strategies which they control; but at another level they maycollaborate amongst themselves and what appears as “alternative strate-gies” may actually be complementary. Corporations choose to have sharesin different locations for reasons of diversification. Thirdly, reducing orconflating multinational corporate interests of corporations based in dif-ferent countries to so-called ‘national interests’ of particular states is acommon problematic assumption: in the disputes over the sovereignty


issue in Cyprus corporate interests certainly play a role but they cannotbe equated with or automatically translated into policies in favor of oneside over the other. A typical erroneous reading is the one that conflatesthe private interests of an Israeli- or US- or Russian-based multinationalcooperation with the “national interest” of that country. The old saying of“what is good for General Motors, is good for America”24 is a reductionistthinking which may not hold: there are situations in which the sectionalor private interests, no matter how massive they may be and how highlyinfluential they may be, might be “sacrificed” for the wider interests of thepower bloc, which may take a longer-term perspective and/or regional andglobal stability on the whole. Even the global “Hegemon” may be forcedto make such choices that may sacrifice private interests, or even wider“national interests,” in the interest of perpetuating the hegemonic systemof the imperialist chain as a whole. Finally, geopolitical transformationsare deep, contradictory, and longer-term processes. Alliances based on thenotion that “your enemy’s enemy is your friend’ are highly problematic.Utilizing inter-imperialist contradictions is what “small players” do; how-ever, there are serious dangers if Cyprus is to be closely identified withIsrael: it may be caught in the cross-fire and at the same time push thesolution farther away.

The chapter will now focus on the Cyprus question from a historicalperspective to analyze the unfolding of the transformation process sincethe days of colonialism.

Cyprus, the Imperial Order and the NationalQuestion

Turning the clock back to the time Cyprus was occupied in 1878, theisland was given to the British from the declining Ottoman Port inexchange for security from the Russians. Despite the fanfare and jubi-lation by the British over the acquisition of Cyprus at that time, it was, atleast in the first part of British occupation, for one historian an “incon-sequential possession”: it is argued that the British colonial policy-makerserroneously considered Cyprus to be significant as a strategic location andas part of their imperial chain (Varnava, 2006, 2009). Challenging thedominant approaches that looked at Cyprus as an important geopoliticalasset, Cyprus was a “useless pawn” strategically. Flawed are, accordingto the same scholar, the “conspiracy approaches” such as “the Cyprusconspiracy” (O’Malley and Graig, 2001), who underscores both Britishpassivity and a United States-led alliance actively colluding with Turkey inthe invasion, paving the way for the de facto partition. Varnava critiquesthe taken-for-granted liberal accounts that accept the basic position that


the British aimed at dividing Cyprus (for example, Mallinson, 2011).25

Others challenge the conspiracy thesis as a poor reading, if not mis-reading, of the declassified documents from the US and UK archives:“any possible suggestion of collusion, whether British and/or American,with Turkey in its subsequent invasion, can now be largely dismissed”(Constandinos, 2011, p. 17).26 Such criticisms can be levied againstgeopolitical readings from the Left (Anderson, 2008, 2009),27 as well asthose from the nationalist Right.28 This chapter argues that the debateover conspiracy, policy failure, or inability is missing the point of howstructural issues frame policy choices in ways which generate logics ofconflicting articulations of interests, political priorities, and choices.29

Many accounts on the general history of the British Empire makeonly brief and passing, if any, references to Cyprus,30 whilst studies onthe US “new imperial” empire hardly mention it (for example, Johnson,2004). There is little doubt that the geopolitical significance of Cyprusgrew as the British colonial power was declining. With the ascendanceof the Cold War, Cyprus was “a pawn” rather than “the jewel in theCrown,” but in the game of chess, as well as in politics, a pawn at a strate-gically important chessboard position may threaten the King or becomea Queen. With the receding British Empire and its gradual displacementby the United States, Cyprus joined the “new” imperial reality, an “empireof bases” (Johnson, 2004, pp. 151–186). There is convergence amongstscholars that “Britain shed its empire to a junior partner in the estab-lishment of America’s” (James, 2005, p. 671). It is not surprising in thiscontext that for Cyprus, amongst other territories such as Aden, Malaya,Kenya, and Iran, “British rule was underwritten by the US” (Ferguson,2007, p. 958).31 The Cold War transformed the significance of countriesdepending on the specific fault-lines.32 The significance of Cyprus wouldnaturally be amplified in the case of a war.33

After independence, with the Treaty of Establishment, Britain wouldretain two bases as “British sovereign soil” to be used for the wider expedi-tions in the region, not only of the United Kingdom but also for the wholeof the United States-led NATO alliance. The British bases in Cyprus34 arepart of the wider global imperial system of empire of bases. Hence, twomonths before the invasion of Iran, the largest British naval mobilizationsince the Falklands war consisting of 15 vessels headed by the Navy’s flag-ship HMS Ark Royal would arrive off Cyprus. A senior military officerof the Royal Marines would openly state: “The bases on Cyprus offer aunique blend of logistic support, as well as Eastern Mediterranean coastalenvironment.”35

The role of the British bases was crucial from the 1960s onwards: Theyhave played a role in local peacekeeping as well as NATO, the Gulf Wars,


Lebanon and the Middle East in general. Their role in Western globalsurveillance also seems crucial, be it in terms of the powerful radar systemin Mount Olympus, or the most recent Echelon intelligence-gatheringnetwork (Constantinou and Richmond, 2005, p. 78).

It is too narrow a focus to concentrate only on the bases; we needto understand the broader role of imperialism: Cyprus must be properlylocated in the region geopolitically and be located within the periodiza-tion from colonial to postcolonial times, the Cold War, and post–ColdWar era (see chapter by Rooksby in this volume). Significant transforma-tions in strategic terms have taken place over time: the island had simplybeen “a place of arms” (Stephens, 1966), ever since it was occupied by theBritish in the pre-aviation time. It was turned into an “unsinkable aircraftcarrier,” which made the colonialist proud, offering important militaryfacilities (Nicolet, 2001, p. 34). Many theories on imperialism fail to rec-ognize the changing policies of imperial powers due to changing realities,priorities, and interests (see the introductory chapter in this volume).

Simplistic assumptions about the “general approach” are assumed tobe in place all the times in all contexts; matters are however far morenuanced and complex in reality. There were significant policy dilemmasand fluctuations between various alternative positions, precisely becauseit had a great number of options that essentially served the vital strate-gic goals of the superpower.36 The United States’ initial support forindependence shifted away from supporting independence toward plan-ning partition and “double union” of the country (mostly with Greeceand partly with Turkey via different versions of the Acheson Plan) by1964 (Coufoudakis, 1977, pp. 112–116; Nicolet, 2001, pp. 251–289;Constantinos, 2011). Whilst opposed to the UN special envoy’s PlazaReport, which boosted independence and sovereignty of the Republic, theUnited States restrained Ankara from invading. Then the United Statessimultaneously supported two conflicting political processes aiming at dif-ferent goals: they backed the talks between two NATO allies, Greek andTurkey, which essentially aimed to calve up Cyprus between them, whilstthey also backed the intercommunal talks (1968–1974), which aimed atrestoring the constitutional order and making the bicommunal republicfunction again as such. The Americans could benefit from any eventualityin this way. From 1968, the United States no longer regarded Makariosas “Castro in a Cassock” or “Cuba of the Mediterranean”;37 instead theysaw him as “a stubborn negotiator,” useful “as long he is in power,” andyet was ultimately “an obstacle to the resolution of the conflict” (Nicolet,2001, p. 457). The war in 1974 exemplified the new balance of forces:the United States allowed Ankara to invade and occupy the northernpart of the country; the gain being curbing what it saw as Greek-Cypriot


intransigence. The idea was to turn the “Cypriot crisis into an Americanopportunity” (Coufoudakis, 1977, p. 130). The policy of leaving matterstake their course, for the theory and praxis of realpolitik as understood andexecuted by the “master” of US foreign policy-making, Henry Kissingerand his strategic planners, was to allow the space for “rationalizing movetoward a new equilibrium of forces in the region”: “Kissinger did not careabout the eventual outcome of the conflict,” so long as there was no full-fledged Greek–Turkish war that would disrupt southern–eastern flank ofNATO, “a better balance of forces than before the Greek coup” (Nicolet,2001, p. 457) or a “rebalance of Greek-Turkish relation” (Fouskas, 2003,p. 76). Research based on declassified documents released rightly con-cluded Kissinger, who single-handedly run the US policy around 1974,“cared little about the domestic developments on the island and as longas American interests were not affected he was happy continuing with hispolicy of non-involvement” (Constandinos, 2011, p. 33).

The key goals of US policy-makers were the following: (i) stability inthe region as a bulwark toward containment of communism, (ii) eco-nomic development and orientation toward the west, (iii) unrestrictedusage of surveillance and communication, and (iv) the British bases wouldbe available for NATO and the United States (Nicolet, 2001, p. 454;Coufoudakis, 1977, pp. 108–109; Fouskas, 2003, p. 76). Therefore, the1974 balance sheet was characterized by the US policy of tolerance,if not encouragement, of de facto partition as a means to stabilize theNATO order in the southeastern Mediterranean.

The introductory chapter has referred to the three treaties of theZurich–London Agreements of 1959 that established limited “indepen-dence.”38 The RoC was declared as “independent and sovereign Republic”(Art. 1, Constitution). These treaties regulate the external-strategic pro-visions relative to the Republic and “safeguarding” the “constitution.”Leaving political and moral considerations aside, the provisions thatestablished the Cyprus Republic seem incompatible with internationallaw and practice under article 1 of the UN Charter, which providesfor the principle of “Sovereignty” and “equality of States.” The Treaties“resolved” the Cyprus question in a way that took care of the interestsof all the three NATO antagonists of Cyprus. It was “an example of end-ing colonialism in strategically important areas, without harming Westerninterests” (Kızılyürek, 1993, p. 63) or some went so far as to suggestthat the treaties allowed “the retention of colonial rule, albeit differentform,” whereby the indigenous people may have “formal state power”but “the three treaties gave the autonomy to local politics and gave theright of interference to three foreign powers” (Anthias, 1987, p. 186). TheConstitution set up a unitary consociational state (geographically and in


international personality), which entailed a rigorous bicommunalism anddualism in all State structures, such as the civil service, security forces,army, and all levels of government.39 Apart from the divisiveness in cit-izenship, the Constitution imposed a disproportionate representation ofTurkish-Cypriots in the State institutions.40 The Constitution was “exter-nally imposed which did not satisfy the perceived needs [or] . . . desires ofneither of the two main ethnic groups” (Anthias, 1987, p. 186).41 Whenthe Greek-Cypriot President Makarios proposed to revise the constitutionin 1963, with the encouragement of the British (Attalides, 1979), a fierceintercommunal strife broke out. Turkey bombed parts of the north ofCyprus and about a third of the Turkish-Cypriots withdrew to enclaves,controlled by Turkish-Cypriot militia and the stationed Turkish troopsunder the 1960 Zurich accord. Although there were no intercommunalincidents from 1967 and 1974, with the coup by the Greek junta andthe para-fascist EOKA-B in 1974, Turkey invaded the island. In 1983 the“TRNC” was proclaimed but is only recognized by Turkey.

The internal-constitutional structure reflected to a great extent theinternal and external peculiarities. The constitutional and treaty provi-sions were complex, confusing, and could be easily manipulated. At thesame time these legal-constitutional provisions were perceived and inter-preted differently by the ethnic-nationalist leadership of the two commu-nities. It is this interaction between the competing nationalist projectsover the State, exploiting the Republic’s structures, with the foreign State(or State-assisted) agencies intervening, that gave the Cypriot State itsshape(s). The Cyprus State cannot be perceived as a “passive” or “neutralspace,” not just a “battlefield” over which the conflict took place. Ratherit is an active participant in the affair. For the Turkish-Cypriots, the con-stitution was perceived as having a federal character that necessitated literalinterpretation and strict implementation, for protecting their rights. Forthe Greek-Cypriots, it was a “trap,” a system representing the interests ofTurkey and “other foreign powers.” The Greek-Cypriot leadership aimedto create a more unitary integrated State system.

In the post–Cold War era there have been radical changes. The col-lapse of the bipolar system has left the United States as the hegemon, thesole superpower in decline with regional actors, including Russia, in a rela-tively stronger position. Russia seems to be in a relatively stronger positionsince 1990. The borders and fault-lines have radically changed and so arepolicy priorities, methods, technologies of war, power, and governance.Within the state borders, the social formations are formed on the basis ofthe condensation of the social and class struggles; they are not insulatedfrom what is going “outside” the borders, particularly in the currentneoliberal global system. However, the particular arrangements in states


are the outcomes of the class/social struggles in the specific social forma-tions, as influenced by the regional and global changes. Similar ideologicalforces are structured within each formation, hence the transformation ofthe balance of socioeconomic and political forces in a region have a kindof “domino effect.” The transformations in the world and the region havemassively affected the United States, NATO, Greece, and Turkey. To whatextent have these transformations affected the United States, NATO,Turkey, and Greece as regards Cyprus? Does Turkey remain the regionalsuperpower? These are open questions for further research as well as polit-ical strategy; these questions must certainly inform any anti-imperialiststrategy in resolving the Cyprus problem.

Mother Country’s Imperial Concerns:Greece and Turkey

The role of Turkey and Greece is today increasingly addressed withina triangular relation with the EU (see Aktar et al., 2010; introduc-tory chapter in this volume). However, they must also be addressed intheir own right as well as each of the countries in a historical context(see Chapters 5, 6, and 7 in this volume). Also, they cannot be seenin isolation of the ideologies and structures of nationalisms installedand autonomously developed within the country (Trimikliniotis, 2000,2010a; Anagnostopoulou, 2010; Kızılyürek, 2010). The role of the so-called “mother countries” as imperial forces in Cyprus has significantlychanged over time. The role of Greece vastly diminished since 1974;today, a time when the country is subjected the most humiliating aus-terity package imposed by the EU as a “rescue” program, we cannot speakof any real role in terms of active foreign policy in Cyprus. The oppositeis true of Turkey, which is a regional superpower pulling the strings in thenorthern part of the country and stationing 35,000 troops there.

Modern Greece, like many other Balkan states, emerged from the rab-bles of Ottoman Empire as an expansionist state eastwards, the “MegaliIdea” (“the great idea”) that would make Greece a country of “three con-tinents and five seas.” This idea was politically killed off in 1922 withthe Asia Minor catastrophe and the subsequent Lausanne Treaty, whichput an end to the demands of Greece, and Turkey, for that matter, onCyprus. However, the idea of “enosis” or union with Greece was rekin-dled in Cyprus as a result of Greek-Cypriot agitation, particularly in the1950s. A key moment was the turn toward independence, which wasessentially “guaranteed independence.” The strategy of the Greek stateto annex a large a part of Cypriot territory (see Chapter 5 in this volume)was a contradictory process: Ankara had to be satisfied in the broader


context of the NATO framework, whilst any settlement had to be accept-able to the Greek-Cypriots, the vast majority of whom would settle fora Greek-Cypriot-dominated independent state, rather than concede ter-ritory to Turkey. Sadly, Turkish-Cypriots were viewed as mere “pawns ofAnkara.” The Greek state had to deal with what it perceived as “Greek-Cypriot intransigence,” that is, rallying behind Makarios’s strategy of“genuine Enosis.” First, Makarios in 1958 turned toward a bicommu-nal independent state, abandoning the Enosis policy but retaining it as apopular ideology. Then, the new policy in the immediate aftermath ofindependence became “genuine Enosis”: this policy would re-emerge tomarginalize the Turkish-Cypriots and the Communists, so as to create aGreek-Cypriot-dominated state of exception, under the leadership of ahegemonic block (Church, the newly installed regime cadres, and the rul-ing classes). There was another turn in 1968: from the “desirable” (Enosis)to the “feasible” (independence), even if that meant allowing some con-cessions to the Turkish-Cypriots (see Attalides, 1979; Anagnostopoulou,2010). The ruling cycles in Greece resented the power of Makarios andthe sense of independence Greek-Cypriot wielded. Athens was consid-ered as “the National center,” the core decision-making center of thenation and Nicosia had to obey to achieve the “common aim” of Enosis.A letter of the Greek premier George Papandreou contained the new“doctrine” of Greek foreign policy on Cyprus.42 In the 1960s and early1970s, officers in Cyprus speaking for the Greek state43 de facto behavedas hegemonic rulers in Cypriot territory, with the exception of the Turkishmilitia-controlled enclaves; however, ultimately the Greek state had toreckon with the superior force of Turkey, as well as the balance of forceswithin NATO, which it heavily relied upon. The advent of the mili-tary junta in 1967, who made Greece a colonel’s pro-American “BananaRepublic,” following a foreign policy that was very much American, asstated above.44

After the Greek junta intervention in Cyprus with the coup and theshort-lived declaration of Enosis, and the subsequent Turkish invasion andoccupation, the crushing defeat of Greece was overwhelming. Greece’srole was vastly diminished; the current economic crisis has made its roleeven more insignificant.

Turkey, on the other hand, is a country with the fourth largest armyin the world and an economy with a 10 percent economic growth ratewhen the growth of the EU in 2011 was 0.5 percent, has undoubtedlybeen strengthened, both in Cyprus and the region. Turkey is particularlysensitive to its “soft underbelly,” where the small island is located. Notthat Cyprus, whose population of under a million, can pose a serious


threat to Turkey, but Ankara justifies its actions on the basis of its own“vital interests” as well as the Turkish-Cypriot community in Cyprus.Pro-Turkey scholars underscore how “for Turkey Cyprus is also a strategicmatter” (Dodd, 1998, p. 5); the Turkish prime minister himself, TurgutÖzal, stated:45 “Cyprus is an island that crosses Turkey like a knife. It isextremely vital for our security. That island must never fall in enemyhands. The presence of Turks in the north Cyprus is a guarantee for thisdirection.”

Ankara invoked the contention of the protection of the Turkish-Cypriots from “Greek expansionism” (Alemdar, 1993, p. 77); oddlyenough this is a mirror image of what Greek-Cypriots and Greeks claimsabout Turkish expansionism (Papadakis, 1996). The declaration of Enosisby the puppet “President” of the Greek Junta and EOKA-B after the coupwas the pretextthat prompted the Turkish invasion. If “a hostile country”annexed Cyprus, it would “menace the vital southern part of Turkey,”which he refers to as “the soft underbelly of Turkey.”46 Turkey’s partition-ist policy was designed to retain the use of Cyprus as a strategic base, aprotectorate, in the same way as Britain and the United States want touse it, due to the wider interests of Turkey in the eastern Mediterranean.However, as the problem remains unresolved, the identification of theTurkish-Cypriot leadership with Turkey and the allegiance of the northto Turkey created contradictions: first, the conditions favor closer identi-fication of the Greek-Cypriots with Greece. Second, Turkish-Cypriots feelincreasingly overwhelmed by the large numbers of Turkish settlers.

Turkey’s military presence paradoxically strengthened the recognitionof legitimacy and sovereignty of the de facto amputated RoC and legit-imized the presence of Greek troops in the south. This is a contradictionin the Turkish policy as Ankara certainly does not want to open anotherregion of conflict with Greece, the EU, and other players in the region.Ankara presents itself as a pro-American state in the region and does notwant to “share” with anyone the benefits of “serving” the United Statesand Europe in the region. Ankara’s intention has not been to occupy thewhole of Cyprus as such, unless the costs of doing so are very low or thecosts of not doing so are too high.47 The question remains as to what sortof solution Turkey considers as the ideal solution for Cyprus. For manyyears it was thought that status quo is an acceptable solution, but thisis no longer the case. In the post–Cold War era, Cyprus is still seen as“an unsinkable aircraft carrier”;48 the solution to the problem needs to beaddressed in a new light of the changing regional environment.

Significant transformations occurred in the northern part of Cyprusfrom the millennium onward: there was a great fervor in the country


and the conflict in the run up to, and in the aftermath of, the rejectionof the UN plan to resolve the Cyprus problem, known as the “Annanplan,” in 2004. The transformations within Turkey, Turkey’s EU acces-sion process and its new Cyprus policy since 2002 seemed to have openedpossibilities for reaching an agreement over Cyprus. With the dawningof the new millennium, the “Euro-Cyprus conjuncture” resulted in theconvergence of international forces leading to the conclusion that the“status quo” is no longer sustainable: changes in priorities, strategies, andlong-term and short-term goals are necessary in the post–Cold War era(see Trimikliniotis, 2006; 2010a). There has been such a transforma-tion of the political, social, and economic priorities that it created themomentum for a settlement in Cyprus and thus created the conditionsfor the UN plan to emerge. Turkey’s own internal and contradictorytransformations are deep-rooted processes described by Tugal (2009) asa “passive revolution”: Turkey seems to be “absorbing the Islamic chal-lenge to capitalism.” The Kemalist statist domination is being graduallydiminished with Erdogan’s incursions; with the state reorienting itself toaccommodate the rising Islamic-centered bourgeoisie (Moudouros, 2012)A vehicle for change was the EU accession process; however, the acces-sion prospects are becoming more distant because as the EU is facingits own crisis in the euro zone, central European countries see a rise inanti-immigration and anti-Turkish opinion. On the other hand, Turkeyis becoming more Euro-skeptic as the EU anchoring targets are becomingincreasingly difficult to meet. Moreover, there is the internal oppositionto economic reform liberalization, which creates turbulence amongst thepoorer sections of the population, and there is opposition to political,constitutional, and human-rights reforms which undermine the privi-leged position of the authoritarian Kemalist Army. Also, the long-lastingstandoff between the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) (Justice and Devel-opment Party) and the army is in a process of being settled in favor of theformer; but Erdogan is appearing increasingly authoritarian, both inter-nally and toward Turkey’s neighbors in various postures he is making.49

The Kurdish question has been rekindled, enhancing the political roleof the military, whilst the NATO alliance with the West against “fellowMuslims” prompts unrest amongst those populations that form the socialbasis of AKP and the popular Erdogan leadership. The United States andthe EU require Turkey’s accession route to remain on course in orderto retain Ankara as a regional secular force of stability in this turbulentregion: Even after the rejection of the UN plan it might in some ways beeasier to deliver a solution to the Cyprus problem than to deliver inter-nal political reform in connection with the Kurdish question or economicimprovements.


Conclusion

This chapter has shown some crucial transformations as regards the roleof international actors in the shaping and evolution of the Cyprus prob-lem. The most significant development is the discovery of hydrocarbonsoff the southern coast of Cyprus. The chapter illustrated that the imperialpolicies on Cyprus must be closely scrutinized and properly understoodin the specific historic context and within the processes they are articu-lated within Cypriot social formations. It critiqued the binary “geopoliticsversus ethnic conflict.” The “Cyprus problem” consists of multiple setsof conflicts, laden with local, regional, and international contradictions.It is a condensation of a complex set of local/global factors, which can-not be reduced to one-dimensional readings but must be understoodas a systemic whole, that is, it must be read as a local problem withinthe global/regional context. With the transformations in the architectureof the global, the roles of global, regional, and national forces in theregion, the fault-lines, frontiers, and terms of contestations are also beingtransformed. The declining US hegemony increases regional rivalries andredefines the fault-lines in regional geopolitical, energy, and security con-testations. A small state like Cyprus may not be a mere pawn but gettingtoo close to the regional rivalry between Turkey and Israel may bring itcloser to the conflict zones in the Middle East.

An important issue is how we conceptualize power games inthe regional and global context. The current hydrocarbon issue in theregional/global order cannot be understood as a simple utilization of thetraditional centers of territorialized power but it adds new dimensions:we are witnessing transformations and a multiplicity of contestations,which are not confined to the territorialized logic—the interplay and shiftbetween the de-territorialized networks (Hardt and Negri, 2000) with theassertive regional forces who are aiming to re-territorialize and “colonize”in new ways the sea, is indicative of an imperialism reloaded, redefined,and reshaped; whether this is a “new imperialism,” as Harvey has it, ora de-centered and de-territorialized network redefining sovereignty, a cri-sis of world’s systems (Wallerstein) or a re-constituting of the imperialchain, only time will show. No matter what the future holds, with thehydrocarbon discovery, Cyprus is drawn to the center of these new gamesin the region.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Andreas Panayiotou, Avishai Ehrlich, Umut Bozkurt,and Costas Constantinou for their insightful comments on earlier versionsof this chapter.


2. Here I use the Gramscian term hegemony in its simplest form to meanconsent ultimately backed by coercion. However, this is adapted in globalcontext in two ways. First, it takes Lenin’s notion of the imperialist chain.Secondly it is informed also by Cox’s neo-Gramscian definition as a globalorder that ensures supremacy of leading states and social classes but to acertain extent also takes into account the interests of junior partners. Thehegemonic system must ensure the reproduction of the chain as a whole;therefore the hegemonic forces may forgo short-term or sectional interests toensure long-term benefits or reproduction of the system. This is always anunstable system full of contradictions; the outcome is determined by socialand class struggles and contestations.

3. Wallerstein (1989), Frank (1998), and Arrighi (2007) theorize the decline ofUS power; the global world economy is relevant here. The recent rethink-ing of imperialism has connected the debates over the years (see Harvey,2004; Callinicos, 2009). Milios and Sotiropoulos (2009) propose a radi-cal reformulation and re-reading of the concept of Marx’s original workDas Kapital. They consider the debates shaped by the liberal economichistorian Hobson’s study of Rudolf Hilferding’s Finance Capital (includingLuxemburg, Bukharin, Kautsky) right through to neo-Marxist “dependencytheory,” “world-system theory” (Wallerstein), neo-Gramscian “global politi-cal economy” and “new imperialism” (Harvey, 2003; Callinicos, 2009) andpost-Marxist approaches to geopolitics and globalization (Negri and Hardt,2000) as “a non-solution to a non-problem.” The key argument here is thenotions of “world economy,” “global system,” “global capitalism” etc. missthe central Marxian ideal that capitalist reproduction can only occur withinspecific social formations, even if there is massive interdependence. They rejectthe schema of the world economy in favor of the imperialist chain schema,which reproduces itself as a whole, a notion Lenin coined, when he radicallybroke with his own previous allegiances: They defend the Marxian logic of“social capital” as the reflection of the totality of social relations within eachsocial formation on the basis of social reproduction of capital, along the linesof Lenin’s classic imperialist chain. Lenin devised the schema on the impe-rialist chain of states to explain how different states are connected, whenthe reproduction of the capitalism occurs within each social formation. Thesocialist task was to break the imperialist chain at its weakest link.

4. I thank Avishai Ehlich for his insightful analysis of the global and regionalcontext. See Ehrlich (2012).

5. Milios and Sotiropoulos (2009) embark on a similar project to whatAlthusser did in reading capital again: contra the efforts to address the so-called “latest stage” of capitalism, they offer a reading based on the logicof capital. They critique efforts to “correct” and “update” Das Kapital inorder to meet the conditions of the “latest developments”; such attemptswere made ever since Marx’s death, as a fundamental failure.

6. Noble Energy announced that they discovered natural gas at the CyprusBlock 12, offshore the Republic of Cyprus. The Cyprus A-1 well located


in Block 12 encountered approximately 310 feet of net natural gas payin multiple high-quality Miocene sand intervals. The discovery well wasdrilled to a depth of 19,225 feet in water depth of about 5,540 feet. Resultsfrom drilling, formation logs and initial evaluation work indicate an esti-mated gross resource range (1) of 5–8 trillion cubic feet (Tcf ), with a grossmean of 7 Tcf. The Cyprus Block 12 field covers approximately 40 squaremiles and will require additional appraisal drilling prior to development.See “Noble Energy Announces Significant Natural Gas Discovery OffshoreRepublic of Cyprus,” at http://investors.nobleenergyinc.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=635912 (accessed January 7, 2012).

7. Delek Drilling LP and Avner Oil Exploration LP, both companies are part ofDelek Group Ltd.

8. In turn projections about costs, investment, and future profits are based onthese. Security politics and geopolitical games are premised on such specula-tions and articulations of various nation-states in their capacity of securing“vital national interests.”

9. He told this to Israel’s Binyamin Netanyahu in Nicosia who was the firstprime minister to visit Cyprus on Thursday, February 17, 2012. See “Israeland Cyprus, Getting friendly,” The Economist, February 18, 2012, http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2012/02/israel-and-cyprus (accessedFebruary 1, 2012).

10. See “Israel and Cyprus, Getting friendly,” The Economist, February 18,2012, at http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2012/02/israel-and-cyprus (accessed February 1, 2012).

11. This has taken place some 80 kilometers from where the Greek-Cypriots aredrilling.

12. “Gas tensions rise between Turkey and Cyprus,” at http://www.euronews.net/2011/09/27/gas-tensions-rise-between-turkey-cyprus/ (accessed Febru-ary 20, 2012).

13. See http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm (accessed February 20, 2012).

14. The Turkish-Cypriot leader Eroglu, who has the full backing of Ankara,threatens that peace talks will freeze unless settled by July (see “TurkishCyprus Says Peace Talks Will Freeze unless Settlement by July”, at http://www.todayszaman.com/news-272527-turkish-cyprus-says-peace-talks-will-freeze-unless-settlement-by-july-1.html (accessed February 27, 2012).

15. Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, Jordan, Pakistan, and the occupied /quasi-occupied regimes such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

16. A UN report says Israel used “excessive force” in its raid on a Gaza-boundaid flotilla last year, but said the naval blockade was legal (see NeilMacfarquhar and Ethan Bronner “Report Finds Naval Blockade by IsraelLegal but Faults Raid,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/02/world/middleeast/02flotilla.html?_r=2and hp) (accessed May 25,2012).

17. See the analysis of Ehrlich (2012).


18. All political parties represented in the House of Representatives with theexception of AKEL criticize the Christofias government for not goingfar enough and signing a defense pact with Israel. Even the old third-worldist EDEK, which was one of the most vociferous pro-Arabic andpro-Palestinian parties in the 1970s and 1980s, has now become oneof the most pro-Israel pact parties. The academics using geopolitics areon the hard-liners usually on the nationalist right. They see Israel asa strategic ally and speak of a Cyprus–Greek–Israel axis that wouldblock Turkish expansionism. In this school of thought we find Greece-based academics such as Evriviades, Giallourides, Ifestos, Karambelias, andothers.

19. For instance in the interview of Ioannis Mazis, professor of geopolitics atthe University of Athens, with the newspaper Simerini (January 9, 2012)under the catchy heading “Away from the Turks-Muslims,” he asserted that“the transportation of the Cypriot-Israeli natural gas to Europe must notpass via Turkey or with the involvement of the Arab-Muslim element”(see http://www.sigmalive.com/simerini/politics/reportaz/453788, accessedFebruary 20, 2012).

20. This can be done either with the construction of liquidization installations,or the extremely costly, risky, and highly questionable technically speakingbuilding a pipe system from the gas fields in Cyprus in deep see waters toEurope via Greece (see Perikleous, 2011; Iosifides, 2011).

21. Only small Left-wing groups voice their opposition in press announcementsmade.

22. For instance, Perikleous (2011).23. The Nabucco strategy, stalled since 2009 would be revitalized: A pipe sys-

tem from the gas fields to the Karpas peninsula in northeastern Cyprus andfrom there to southern Turkey’s Ceyhan), and thence to Europe through theNabucco pipeline.

24. This statement is attributed to Charlie Wilson, then chairman of GeneralMotors Corp, who was secretary of defense, who stated, when asked dur-ing a hearing as the secretary of defense whether he could make a decisionadverse to the interests of General Motors, Wilson answered affirmativelybut added that he could not conceive of such a situation “because for yearsI thought what was good for the country was good for General Motors andvice versa.” See http://www.crossingwallstreet.com/archives/2009/06/whats-good-for-general-motors-is-good-for-america.html (accessed February 20,2012).

25. Cyprus, Diplomatic History and the Clash of Theories in International Relations.26. For instance, see Movement for Freedom and Justice in Cyprus (2009).27. See, for instance, Anderson (2008, 2009); Fouskas (2002); Fouskas and

Tackie (2009), and other nationalist anti-imperialist variants.28. See, for instance, Coufoudakis (1977, 2004); Kyriakides (2006a, 2006b).29. This chapter does not engage in a detailed historical study as to whether

the reading by the British colonialists was real, imaginary, or falsely assessed,


but how to read the Cyprus problem today. See Varnava (2009, pp. 8–44),who attempts to historicize the contexts of the historic possession of Cyprusbetween 1878 and 1915, and Katsiaounis (1996) for the foundations of theBritish rule and the development of politics, labor, and class in Cyprus duringthe second half of the nineteenth century.

30. For instance James (2004) makes less than a dozen references, whilstFerguson (2007) makes only two.

31. Ferguson’s celebratory and sympathetic account of the British Empire forinstance can be interpreted as a revisionist reading in the context of aneffort to repackage the legacies of “Britishness” of some kind of open “coolBritannia,” see Bradley (2007).

32. By 1954 the British Chief of Staff would say the following on the strategicimportance of Cyprus: “It is the only British Territory in the Middle Eastwhere our combined headquarters and center of intelligence can be located,and where we can keep troops in peace to exert British influence and tomeet sudden emergencies of any kind. It is geographically convenient for thispurpose and also has airfield facilities which could receive reinforcementsfrom the U.K. strategic reserve and operate reinforcing aircraft in case ofneed” (see Kyriakides, 2006a, p. 9).

33. This is what H. Lovegrave, the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committeestated:

In war, if the forward strategy now being prepared is a practicaloperation, the use of the Cyprus airfields will prove an importantadjunct to those in Turkey, Jordan and Iraq. In addition they will giveadded flexibility to the strategic bomber force. Furthermore Cyprus liesathwart our sea route through the Eastern Mediterranean and is capa-ble of supporting to a limited extent small numbers of light navalforces.

(Kyriakides, 2006a, p. 9)

Formerly “Top Secret” now declassified Annex to a Note by H. Lovegrave,the Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Strategic Importance ofCyprus,” September 13, 1954, COS (54) 303, PRO CAB 134/801, quotedby Kyriakides (2006a, p. 9).

34. See Kyriakides (2006a, 2006b).35. Major Hugh Milner of the Royal Marines interviewed by the Cyprus Mail,

January 28, 2003, quoted by Kyriakides (2006a, p. 13).36. Coufoudakis (1977, pp. 129–131) makes this point superbly, quot-

ing a scholar who observed Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic policy: “inany international negotiation [. . .] a statesman generally recognized theexistence of a greater number of options than were seen by thosewho lacked his vision” (Stephen R. Graubard quoted by Coufoudakis,1977, p. 130).

37. Nixon is alleged to have used these terms to describe Makarios (Dunphy andBale, 2007, p. 293).


38. The Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Alliance, and the Treaty ofGuarantee.

39. The Cypriot Constitution was described by one constitutional expert as“tragic” and “absurd” and “perhaps the most rigid constitution in the world”(de Smith, 1964, pp. 282–285).

40. This gave the Turkish-Cypriots 30 percent representation in parliament(over-representing their 18 percent of population), elected exclusively byTurkish-Cypriots and requiring separate majorities in most areas of policy.A Greek-Cypriot president and Turkish-Cypriot vice president with separateveto powers; a separate justice system and separate municipalities (even inmixed areas) and separate family law.

41. AKEL perceived this as a “crippled independence” (AKEL, 1976,pp. 188–191). Others saw the Zurich–London Accord as a compromise ofthe Greek-Cypriots under duress, as the threat of partition was always onthe agenda (Kitromilides, 1981, p. 453). The community leaders were notinvited to participate in the drafting of the treaties or the constitution, butmerely to formally sign and legitimize the package agreement (Kizilyurek,1993).

42. As Kanidiotis, who was later to become foreign undersecretary, “The theoryof the ‘National Center’ was—especially during the dictatorship period—the basis of Greek policy and heaped successive misfortunes upon Cyprus”(Kranidiotis, 1982, p. 453).

43. The ambassador, the Greek contingent, and the officers sent by Greece.44. After all, the Junta “strongman” George Papadopoulos was probably a

CIA agent, as he served as a “liaison officer between the Greek Intelli-gence Service and the US CIA.” Stern quoted by Attalides (1979, p. 147).Macdonald (1990, pp. 255–315) points out that “the colonels” dictatorshiphad two objectives: eradication of communism and attainment of Enosis,unification with Greece. Its approach to the former was anachronistic andthe latter chauvinistic”.

45. Stated in Turkish national daily Milliyet in November 1983; quoted inLygeros (1993, p. 66).

46. The port in Iskenderun, in the southern coast of Turkey, is seen as “a vitallifeline for the economy to the outside world” (Alemdar, 1993, p. 77). Theeffect of the invasion in Cyprus also had dramatic effects within Turkish pol-itics, transforming Ecevit into “a national hero” and “a man of action” anda nationalist fervor swept across Turkey. Eventually the Government fell asthe coalition partners fell out, opening the way for a Right-wing and nation-alist alliance to rule, in a climate of protest and neo-fascist violence by oneof the coalition partners, the Nationalist Action Party (see Ahmad, 1993,pp. 164–166).

47. If she did occupy the whole she would have the problem of what to do withthe 800,000 Greek-Cypriots. It is a difficult problem internationally, so it islikely that she would be content with what she has.

48. As Birand (1998a) points out: “Cyprus is still a giant aircraft carrier, just likeit was from the 1950s to 1980. Whichever side maintains authority on this


aircraft carrier will take this strategic point in the Mediterranean under itscontrol.”

49. These include various threats against Israel over the sponsored flotillaagainst the Israeli blockade of Gaza, United States, and Cyprus, firstagainst the Turkish-Cypriots for their protests and then against theGreek-Cypriots.

C h a p t e r 2

Rethinkingthe PostcolonialCypriot Statehood:The Cyprus Problem,Class Struggles,and Ethnic ConflictUmut Bozkurt andNicos Trimikliniotis

Introduction

This chapter aims to provide a rudimentary outline for the re-conceptualization of the Cyprus state form as enmeshed in the “Cyprusproblem” within its national, regional, and global contexts. It doesso by contextualizing the state question within a historical perspectiveand analyzing the terms of class conflict within the Cypriot formation.A Lilliputian country containing multiple asymmetrical state-related for-mations within a conflict-ridden context, Cyprus remains a puzzle, whichlends itself to alternative interpretations. Is it an example of modern legal-rational authority (Navaro-Yashin, 2003, 2006) or does it constitute an“anomaly” (Dunphy and Bale, 2007)? Is it a system of multiple “statesof exception” (Constantinou, 2008; Trimikliniotis, 2007, 2010a) and/or“postcolonial quasi-stateness” (Constantinou, 2010)? These are but someformulations of the state/conflict situation in Cyprus, which we intend toscrutinize.

48 U M U T B O Z K U R T A N D N I C O S T R I M I K L I N I O T I S

The chapter will analyze some key class and ideological issues thatframe the “Cyprus problem.” It continues from the contention withwhich the introductory chapter dealt with in this volume, which critiquesthe politics derived from the binary “geopolitics versus ethnic conflict”.It takes matters further from the questions related to imperialism in shap-ing and reproducing the conflict/division of Cyprus, also discussed in thisvolume.1

The chapter examines the perpetuation of the divide of postcolonialCyprus, by focusing on the role of class and social and political conflictwithin the Cypriot social formation. In this way it attempts to counter-balance the failures of many mainstream and alternative models, whichnot only disempowered social and political forces within Cyprus butalso failed to make sense of the state formation and the dispute itself.In that sense, the weaknesses of the liberal conflict resolution model andthe global/regional geopolitics model in making sense of the Cyprus dis-pute are related to both approaches’ sharing the main assumption of theRealist theory in international relations, which conceptualizes states asrational unitary and autonomous actors, each moving toward their ownnational interest.2 Only if the alleged “unitary actors” are unpacked canwe understand the underlying political, economic, and social relations.Our argument is that in all class societies, conflicting interests contin-uously struggle to influence the state to gain the upper hand and statedecisions that are taken at any particular moment in history reflect notthe “putative national interest” but a particular solution to conflictingclass interests and the interests of other internal and external actors atthat particular conjunction. In that respect, foreign and internal pol-icy shifts are results of particular solutions to conflicting internal andexternal interests, priorities, and strategies. This framework is employedto make sense of the Cyprus state form as enmeshed in the “Cyprusproblem.”

We question the adequacy of the theorization of the Cypriot state formplus conflict as we are nearing the end of the current conjuncture thatinitiated global geopolitical transformations following the collapse of theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and her allies.

Class Relations, the National Question, andEthnic Conflict

Class relations and class-based articulated political projects and ideologyare closely connected to the national question in Cyprus. The class struc-ture and the positioning vis-à-vis the political structures of power providethe basis around which ethnic/national articulations are made. National

R E T H I N K I N G T H E P O S T C O L O N I A L C Y P R I O T S T AT E H O O D 49

aspirations cut across class boundaries; there are nonetheless clear-cutdifferences between the various class-based articulations by different polit-ical parties. An analysis of class-related politics within the “nationalquestion,” however, requires first a brief concrete analysis of the classstructure in the Cypriot society. The two levels of analysis, although inter-related in the sense that the structure provides the context, must not beconflated. At one level we examine the political economy and sociology ofclass relations and how these structured the national liberation struggle.The “political” is often autonomous from the immediate socioeconomic,what Antonio Gramsci referred to as the “corporate interests,” and thereis interdependence between the two, as a mutuality, rather than a one-wayrelationship.

We are dealing with a postcolonial country that was transformed froma rural economy into a tourism and tertiary sector society and econ-omy by the mid-1980s. The emergence of the capitalistic class structurein the Cypriot society can be traced back to the nineteenth century.This involved the gradual transition of the semi-feudal power relations,with hegemony of the kojabashi (the noble landowners) and the high-ranked clerics, under the Ottomans’ millet system, into the hegemony ofthe “historical bloc” around the bourgeoisie under British colonialism.The Ottomans ruled using the millet system, which was basically rec-ognizing the religious leaders of the flock and cooperating with themin the administration (Hill, 1940; Grecos, 1980/1991; Kyrris, 1996,pp. 253–267). Such were the privileges granted to the Greek OrthodoxChurch of Cyprus that the archbishop had direct recognition from theSultan, as an Ethnarchic leader, the millet bası (community leader). Con-trary to the persecution of the Orthodox Church by the Venetians, theOttomans recognized and re-established the Orthodox Church (Kyrris,1996, pp. 263–264). The archbishop effectively ruled over the Christianpopulation, together with the “kojabashides,” who were as a rule “elected”as communal lords “πρóκριτoι”. The Sultan recognized the archbishopand the bishops as protectors of the Christians, who also had respon-sibility for collecting taxes with police escort. Afterwards, the Beylerbeyi(the Muslim governor), the most powerful person in Cyprus, was theArchbishop. The third most important person in the power structurewas another Christian, the Dragoman, who acted as an intermediary andtranslator3 between the archbishop and the Beylerbeyi but also had cru-cial powers regarding economic affairs, taxation, and population census;he even prepared the budget and had direct access to the Sultan. TheDragoman would come from the kojabashis class. The vast majority ofCypriots, from both faiths, were poor peasants whilst their relationshipwas one of “peaceful coexistence” (Kyrris, 1977).


With the advent of British colonialism in 1878, the Muslim rul-ing elites/class of landowners lost their privileges and gradually losttheir influence. The 1881 census puts the Greek/Christian populationto 137,631, whilst the Turkish/Muslim population was 45,458. At theend of the nineteenth century, one can locate six main groups: High-ranking clerics, who controlled the large areas of land owned by theChurch and the oligarchy of the large land owners (kojabashis), whoformed the ruling class (Katsiaounis, 1996; Hadjikyriakou, 2011). Therewas a small section of merchants, mainly Greek-Cypriots, who formedthe embryonic bourgeoisie and became attached to the British estab-lishment. A small layer of petty-bourgeoisie, namely intellectuals andmainly teachers, were attached to Athens and Hellenic nationalism. Thevast majority of ordinary people were peasants, most of whom ownednegligible plots of land. Finally, there was a numerically small group ofartisans/craftsmen, the embryo of the working class. The vast majorityof people lived in conditions of poverty and was largely illiterate (Lefkis,1984).

On the other hand, during the late nineteenth and early twentiethcenturies Turkish-Cypriots were largely confined to traditional, unskilledoccupations. Turkish-Cypriots were fully dependent on Greek-Cypriotsfor their vital needs such as law and health. Furthermore, Turkish-Cypriottown dwellers were dependent on Greek-Cypriot traders for the provisionof consumption goods, while Turkish-Cypriot peasants were dependenton Greek-Cypriot merchant-usurer capital for both the realization oftheir produce and the provision of subsistence goods. Thus, one frequentsource of complaint was the extraction of the surplus generated by theTurkish-Cypriot peasants by the Greek-Cypriot town-based commercialcapital (An, 1996, pp. 1–40). Hence the Turkish-Cypriot ruling elite wererelatively underdeveloped in comparison to their Greek-Cypriot counter-parts; this is often explained as a result of the late development in theformation of a Turkish-Cypriot bourgeoisie out of the ruling class. Onlyafter the Kemalist revolution in Turkey were the processes put in motionfor the modernization within the community that enhanced the condi-tions for the formation of a Turkish-Cypriot bourgeoisie and later massnationalism.

On the arrival of the British colonialists in Cyprus, one could notdistinguish a middle class as such as the merchants were essentiallyingrained in a tradition of honor and transactions of aristocratic nature(Katsiaounis, 1996, p. 16). This code of honor was conserved through tra-dition, but was only valid amongst the aristocracy, as the ordinary people,the “reayas”4 were not considered to be worthy or credible of this treat-ment, something the British colonialists found alien (Katsiaounis, 1996,


pp. 16–17). The legal developments, from a system of estate, based on acode of honor to a contract system based on written agreements and com-mercial profit illustrate the transformation in the class relations, wherebythe newly emergent bourgeoisie becomes more prominent. It was Britishcolonialism that “modernized” the social structures in an authoritarianmanner from without. However, the old institutions, instead of disap-pearing, as would have happened in a revolutionary scenario, were, byand large, transformed and adapted to the new order (Constantinides,2011; Katsiaounis, 1996).

By the beginning of the twentieth century, conditions changed withthe creation of a small bourgeoisie consisting of merchants, who mus-tered around them intellectuals and professionals, such as doctors andlawyers. Although this was the overall schema, the class boundaries werenot very clear as the landowners would many times also be involved incommerce and merchants would invest in land. Nonetheless, there was nohomogeneity in the group; for example, the merchants/brokers of Britishproducts had close ties with the British, were generally pro-British andconservative, whilst the professionals had a liberal Enosist and nationalisttendency (Katsiaounis, 1996, pp. 34–35). There were both tendencies inall the groups, with the most radical, coming from the merchant side, thefree masons, who were acting like a “Jacobin” force as the vanguard ofnationalism (Katsiaounis, 1996).5

It was after 1931, with the October uprisings that the class-nationalquestion became more apparent: a popular uprising, largely spontaneous,against the British yoke, with a social content (Grecos, 1994, 1991).One interpretation is that the 1931 uprising marks the victory of thebourgeoisie over the old oligarchy of landowners (Constantinides, 2011).This event prompted the British to create a “loyal bureaucratic intelli-gentsia,” rather than relying alone on the merchant/broker class (Adamsand Cottrell, 1968).

However, the class structure and class conflict became much moreimportant in the national question with the growing independence oflabor. The labor struggles by the militant labor, organized en masse in the1940s and 1950s in �αγκυπρια �υνoμoσπoνδια Eργατων (PSE, thePan-Cypriot Confederation of Labor),6 and later�αγκυπρια Eργατικη

Oμoσμπoνδια, (PEO, the Pan-Cypriot Labor Federation), came inconflict with the “ruling bloc.” The latter consisted of the Church,merchants, and foreign owners of mines and industry, who had the back-ing of the colonial authorities (Anthias and Ayres, 1983; Lefkis, 1984;PEO, 1991).

Interestingly, very few studies exist that attempt to incorporate a classanalysis within the national question in Cyprus. The historical account


elaborated above reveals that the interplay between national/domestic andthe international constantly reproduces anew the domestic political, eco-nomic, social, ideological, and legal issues, which form the core of theso-called Cyprus problem (Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 1977, 1979;Anthias and Ayres, 1979, 1983; Trimikliniotis, 2000, 2010).

Studies connecting class and national question often fail to prop-erly integrate the agency, mediation, and articulation processes by whichclass locations-interests are “translated” into political projects and policies,producing mechanical and reductionist readings (Constantinides, 2011).Such perspectives fail to appreciate the genuine oscillation between thedifferent political alternatives in the context of what seemed actually real-izable and the best political option for the different political groups at thetime. Hence arbitrary interpretations are made about “tactical retreats,” orautomated “class choices.” In this process, class factors are crucial; how-ever, these are mediated via institutions and are manifested as articulationsin the class and wider social struggles. In any case, empirical proof isrequired; otherwise conclusions are arbitrary analytical leaps, with a miss-ing link between the class interests and the particular policies. It does notseem plausible to argue that pro-independence was the dominant viewwithin the ranks of the Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie and Greek-Cypriotpolitics at large, given the pro-Enosis policy of the entire Greek-Cypriotpolitical spectrum after independence, albeit by other longer-term means.This was the policy up to 1967, when the policy of the “feasible” (“τoεϕικτó ”) was adopted.7

Ethnic-national struggles operate in parallel with class struggles, asclass politics has been articulated within ethnic claims, but not nec-essarily at the same moment, in competition with class struggles.Class struggles implanted horizontal alliance between Greek-Cypriotsand Turkish-Cypriots (Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 1977; Anthias andAyres, 1983). Social and political institutions involved in the conflictperpetuated or reformulated either intentionally or as a consequence oftheir practice, the ethnic-racial segregation between the two communities.These institutions include the Church, the Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie,the Turkish-Cypriot elites, schooling, and the class-based Leftalternative.

Undoubtedly the Church or the “Ethnarchy” was a traditional politicalleader, whose head, the archbishop, led the flock under the millet sys-tem, remains to date a mass landowner and has vital commercial interests.The Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie or at least its dominant fraction, whichincluded the landed aristocracy and commercial interests, were closelytied with the Church and the political parties of the Right. Tradition-ally, the Church had the allegiance of the petty-bourgeoisie and mainly


teachers/intellectuals, who formed the other elements of the hegemonichistorical bloc. There were two elements in the Greek-Cypriot intelli-gentsia prior to the 1940s and 1950s: one was attached to London,the other to Athens. By the 1950s, however, they largely turned to therhetoric of nationalism and the Church, as a result of the challengeby the Left. This attachment continued after independence, though bythe late 1960s most turned their allegiance to the Cypriot Republic outof pragmatism and self-interest (Attalides, 1979; Constantinides, 2011).However, the influence of the Church waned since the death of the last“Ethnarch,” Archbishop and President Makarios. The Church no longer“leads” the hegemony of the historical bloc as it has been relegated toone of having a symbolic and ideological role, with large commercialinterests.

Schooling was segregated and personal and literature used was frommainland Greece and Turkey (Anthias, 1992, p. 43). On the Greek-Cypriot side the Church in collaboration with the umbrella of Church-orientated intellectuals organized education. It was via this “ideologicalstate apparatus,” to use Althusser’s concept that nationalism spread inthe country: the Church led the anticolonial struggle, until the appear-ance of Koμμoυνιστ ικó Kóμμα Kυπρoυ (KKK) (Communist Partyof Cyprus), which challenged the Church authority (Anthias and Ayers,1983). It was only after the 1930s, more specifically in the 1940s and1950s, that the Enosis nationalism became the hegemonic Greek-Cypriotsconsciousness, whilst the Turkish-Cypriot nationalism would developinto a mass following in the 1950s (Attalides, 1979; Kızılyürek, 1994).

Ethnicity/nationalism and class are intercrossing; class is potentiallyan alternative articulation to nationalism, but this is not necessarily con-tradictory to nationalism. The particular construction of Greek-Cypriotethnicity was such that it suited the Church leadership, allied closely withthe bourgeoisie. The Church/and the nationalist historical bloc on theGreek-Cypriot side and the Turkish-Cypriot nationalistic elite consoli-dated their hegemony in their respective communities by undercutting“the expression of horizontal class alliance between Greek Christians andMoslem Population” (Anthias, 1989, p. 49).

Class elements and programs were articulated within ethnicity; assuch the workers’ claims in the late 1940s were articulations of classinterests in the anticolonialist struggle (Anthias and Ayres, 1983, p. 65;Panayiotou, 1996; 1999). In this sense then “ethnicity can be seen to havethe ability to articulate different ideological discourses and to representdifferent class political interests” (Anthias and Ayres, 1983, p. 65). Theclass element, however, can be undermined as it may “obfuscate themthrough the submergence of the political representative of a class—the


working class party (AKEL)8—within the ethnic struggle” (Anthias andAyres, 1983). Furthermore, elements of rural cooperation between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, through “traditional coexistence” persisted,though diminished greatly, up until 1974. The most important links,however, between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots were mainlythrough trade unions and class-based action (Attalides, 1979; Anthias andAyres, 1983). This potential alternative could surpass and penetrate theethnic boundaries, but was never realized due to the overwhelming powerof the segregationist forces, importing also the “Cold War syndrome.”

The symbolic and ideological significance, apart from the crudely“material” role of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Britain,Turkey, and Greece, cannot be ignored or underestimated. It seemedinconceivable for a small island to oppose great powers, especially whenthose who did resist were assassinated by paramilitaries funded and armedby these same forces.9

The Cyprus problem cannot be reduced to a conflict of nationalisms,although the question of nationalism is a significant aspect of the con-flict. As such “nationalism” is conceptualized and related to the Cyprusproblem using a contextual perspective.10 The role of constitutional/administrative processes can be crucial in the construction of ethnicityin different ways. They may generate or be actively utilized to buildupon them politically, and thus “politicize” in a nationalist-exclusivistdirection of ethnic and religious-cultural divisions. This process begunprior to independence; in fact the division along ethnic lines was inmany ways strikingly similar to the representational level with the mil-let system, which the Ottomans had exercised when they ruled the island(Kitromilides, 1977). With the advent of British colonialism these becameformal-legal with deadly effects (Kitromilides, 1977; Pollis, 1979, 1998;Anthias, 1992). The role of British colonial policy in structuring theparticular development of nationalism in Cyprus is well documented(Attalides, 1979; Kitromilides, 1979; Anthias, 1992, p. 41). The Britishconstitutional system “was founded upon the assumption of persis-tent ethnic conflict, formalized ethnic divisions and was conducive tolaying the seeds for bi-national consciousness” (Anthias, 1992). Fur-thermore, this meant the bonds between ordinary Greek-Cypriots andTurkish-Cypriots under the Ottoman Empire, the “traditional coexis-tence” (Kyrris, 1977), broke down (Pollis, 1979; 1998). It is apparentfrom the constitutional structure in the representation of the two main“ethnic groups” in the legislative council the colonialists played onecommunity against another to ensure that their policies prevailed.11

The post-independence regime in Cyprus was comprised of twoopposing nationalist élites, which had to rule together. In practice,


Eθνικη Oργανωση Kυπριων Aγωνιστων (EOKA) (National Organ-isation of Cypriot Fighters) supporters and fighters who became ministersof the new Republic, without restraint spoke in public about the con-tinuing struggle for Enosis until the end.12 Even the Left (AKEL), theonly party that had bridges with the Turkish-Cypriots, was advocatingself-determination-Enosis, but stressing the need for Greek-Cypriot andTurkish-Cypriot cooperation. AKEL was isolated, effectively excludedfrom political influence, and a Cold War type anti-communist suspi-cion “restrained [AKEL] to a defensive strategy” (Kitromilides, 1981,p. 459; see also chapter by Panayiotou, Kızılyürek, and Charalambousin this volume). The “dialectic of intolerance” (Kitromilides, 1979),within and between the two communities was the major characteristicof the political life in Cyprus. It did not allow Cypriots to debate andsee the potential alternatives of confrontation, to the “predeterminedroute to disaster,” such as the creation of a Cypriot consciousness, overand above their narrow racial or ethno-religious and linguistic-culturalidentities/consciousness.

Post-independence Cyprus was a newly established state under a“guarantor system” of three NATO “allies” which oddly belonged tothe non-aligned movement. At the international scene, the president ofthe country played one superpower against the other to outmaneuversuccessive efforts to shed this strip of land between two expansionistmother-countries, which threatened the stability of the eastern flankof NATO. Internally, the fine balance contained in the power-sharingconsociation collapsed by 1963 and the ethnic conflict war threatenedto wreck the country apart: the Greek-Cypriot power elite conqueredthe bicommunal state, as the Turkish-Cypriot chauvinist elite imposedits siege mentality on the enclaves it controlled. Those who defied theethnic division and insisted on intercommunal cooperation in a commonstate were silenced, were murdered, marginalized, or ignored. By 1974,the Greek coup and Turkish invasion completed the de facto parti-tion of a fragmented country, which remained in a state of limbo untilour days.

Soon after the 1974 disaster, Nairm (1979) wondered whether twofactors would shift the sand: first, the realization by the Turkish-Cypriots that their interests diverged from Turkey’s as the Greek-Cypriotscame to realize in the 1960s with respect to Greece. Secondly, therole of the European Community presented itself as a possible outsideforce that could alter the relations in the triangle of Turkey–Greece–Cyprus and create conditions for a settlement. These two factors didindeed materialize and produce powerful results, but have not yet ledto a solution. Together with Turkey’s internal transformation and the


regional/global context, these factors are operative today and are push-ing history forwards. We cannot predict the outcome of this historicalprocess but we do know that the forthcoming reality will not resemble thecurrent one.

In order to make sense of Cyprus within the world, particularly asregards the theorizing the state form in Cyprus, we need to map theparameters of what is acknowledged by many scholars as the peculiarityof Cyprus’ historically speaking “the peculiarity of Cyprus, 1878–1931”(Holland and Markides, 2008). They start their account with a colo-nial office minute of November 28, 1901: “we are hampered on allsides by the peculiar position of Cyprus” (Holland and Markides, 2008,p. 162). These authors refer to “the unusual limitations in the age ofdecolonization” imposed on the Republic and they trace the roots of thedifferent historical path when compared to Greek islands which unitedwith Greece. The story for Holland and Markides stops in 1960 as thetravails of the resulting Republic are not their concern; they refer to thefact that “the island was always surrounded by externalities, uncertaintiesand ambiguities.” We venture to propose that the big political questionto research for the current conjuncture lies precisely in bringing the storysince independence to the present; the idea is to re-evaluate such con-tentions today. The so-called “peculiarity” entails one of the theoreticaland ideological traps: “exceptionalism,” which blurs our conception of thepolitical reality as a part of the world at large. The argument that we dis-pute is one that takes this “peculiarity” as a given without questioningit: the notion that our case is so sui generis that makes it incomparableto anything else is but smokescreen that aims to result in hindering thepotential for learning by comparison.

State Theory: Conceptualizing the Statein its Global Context

The state question in Cyprus is an instance of a specificity that is simul-taneously reflective of a broader regional and global reality. States incapitalist societies necessarily differ from one another and there can beno general theory of the State13 (Jessop, 1990, p. 44). We resist the anal-ysis that perceives the Cyprus case exclusively as an exception to the norm,whilst we simultaneously refuse to succumb to the exact opposite trap,which is the typical assumption that Cyprus is but an instance of geopoliticalinterests where all is played at a global/regional map, where Cypriots have norole or significance.

We note the long-standing difficulty in theorizing the state forma-tion[s] in Cyprus. This is hardly surprising; there is an inherent difficulty


of moving from a descriptive theory to a genuine theory of the state as thedescriptive theory is but “a phase in the constitution of theory” (Althusser,2001, p. 93).14 A theory as such requires that we deepen our insightsinto the apparatus of the state to go further “in order to understand themechanism of the State in its’ functioning.” In the context of Cyprus,whilst there has been a serious advancement of empirical studying of theCypriot state formation(s), the theory of the Cypriot state formation(s),with some notable exceptions, remains at the descriptive phase. What weprovide here is a rudimental basis for a theorization, in what could becalled a prolegomena to a theorization of the state formation[s] in Cyprus.

The classical readings of the state can guide our attempt to con-ceptualize the state. Two broad theoretical approaches can be cited:first, the Weberian or organization-analytic approaches and secondly, theMarxist or class-analytic approaches15 Weberian or organization-analyticapproaches emphasize the ways in which states constitute autonomoussources of power and operate on the basis of institutional logics anddynamics with variable forms of interaction with other sources of powerin society. Marxist or class-analytic approaches anchor the analysis of thestate in terms of its structural relationship to capitalism as a system of classrelations (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987).

The Weberian conception of a state as an autonomous apparatus thatshould not be imprisoned by social forces strongly informs the literatureon Cyprus. The argument that the state in Cyprus is hardly a rationalstate that acts as a neutral arbiter but embodied and exacerbated thecontestation between the two communities is widely shared by others.16

On the other hand, regarding the state formation in the north, it isnoticeable that overall, the literature produced in Turkish and Englishis dominated by empirical findings with little theorization of the state.As Arslan’s chapter in this volume elaborates, most often Cyprus isdescribed as a problem that belongs to the realm of international relations,and studies that focus on the domestic dynamics of the Turkish-Cypriotsociety is rather sparse.

Certainly, TRNC’s relationship with Turkey further complicates thescholarly endeavors to theorize the state formation. The key question is,can the TRNC lay claim to sovereignty on its territory—which is thedefining characteristic of a modern state—when the administration innorth Cyprus is dependent on Turkey in political and financial terms?Whilst it is correct to state that the relationship between the TRNCand Ankara is one of dependency and that the TRNC regime is not alegal entity according to international law, it is rather unconvincing topresent the TRNC as a mere “puppet” of Ankara as has been done in someGreek-Cypriot accounts (Ioannides, 1991; Yennaris, 2003). Furthermore,


TRNC is not a system solely based on military might. But this does notamount to saying that the TRNC is a normal functioning state. Rather,as Navaro-Yashin argues,

The “TRNC” can be studied as a two-tiered system, whereby there is a stateadministration with procedures, laws and regulations much on a par withlegally recognized states, but the functions of this administration are limitedby dependence on Turkey’s military sovereignty in Northern Cyprus . . .The“TRNC”, if unrecognized under international law, is a state which has beenformed through the practices and procedures of modern legal states . . . In otherwords, this illegal state is not without legality in its practices, in its modes ofgovernmentality.

(2006, p. 290)

Note that Yashin, despite her criticism of contemporary accounts’ asso-ciating bureaucracy with lack of effect (Yashin, 2006, p. 282; 2012),employs a Weberian conception of bureaucracy as a “rationalizing appara-tus that instigates discipline” (2006, p. 282). It is noticeable that there area number of scholars analyzing the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) or TurkishRepublic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) that are employing Weber’s con-ceptualization that distinguishes the state formations in Cyprus from amodern state based on legal-rational authority. For example, Faustmannargues that the deep-seated political patronage in RoC undermines theprinciple of meritocracy (2010, p. 269), whereas Sonan (2007) depictsthe system in the north as “constituency clientelism and patronage.” Kızı-lyürek (2010) shares Sonan’s assessment in categorizing the system as apatronage system.

Such conceptualizations entail a number of problems. First of all, mostof the theorizing on the state in Cyprus is made in terms of contrastswith ideal-typical forms. Mostly the Cypriot state formation(s) is (are)criticized for not conforming to these ideal types. This position glossesover the fact that the Weberian ideal type is a mental construct, and treatsthe ideal type of Western capitalist state (that is legal-rational state) asif it corresponded to the empirical reality of developed capitalist soci-eties (Yalman, 1997, p. 91). The state is seen as a neutral arbiter, aneutral agent of social transformation, independent of social classes andWeber’s conception of idealized bureaucracy—which is the key vehicle ofthe state as a neutral arbiter—constructs bureaucrats as totally depoliti-cized, socially disembodied, and in rational pursuit of a self-evidentnational interest (Pempel, 1999, p. 144). Yet there is a need to underlinethat even if bureaucrats make their own rules, these rules are developedand enforced with the interests of certain groups within the society inmind. Every decision implemented by bureaucrats has socioeconomic


foundations. It is absurd to claim that policies devised by bureaucratsin modern nation states operate in pursuit of self-evident and unprob-lematic national goals, whereas policies implemented by bureaucracy insettings like Cyprus are merely about pleasing different sections in thesociety.

The “institutional materiality” of the Cypriot State Formation(s)

A key issue is how to examine the “institutional materiality” of the Cypriotstate formation as the different forms and phases it passed reflect variousstruggles/conflicts. When examining the particular way the Cypriot stateformation took place and the role its colonial predecessor has played inthe ethnicity–class conflict and in anticolonialism, this constitutive roleof the state is particularly relevant.17

This basic notion of postcoloniality was taken up explicitly as wellas implicitly in describing and theorizing the “moments” or aspects ofCypriot administrations and power structures. The literature of the imme-diate post-1974 period up to the early 1980s, mainly from Greek-Cypriotscholars, viewed the Cyprus problem in a critical manner and particu-larly critical of the role of NATO, British policies, and the role of Britishcolonialism. Some Turkish-Cypriots, however, reached similar conclu-sions (see Salih, 1977); however, most Turkish-Cypriot scholars originallytreated the advent of the Turkish army and partition with relief. Theirapproach is assertive of Cypriot independence from Western dependency,promoting reconciliation between the two communities and linkingCyprus to the Non-Aligned Movement, in line with the postcolonial and“Third Worldist” tradition. In the post-1974 period, insightful and cre-ative works provided the basis for the rethinking of policy on Cyprus.18

Some of the texts placed emphasis on the internal dynamics of Cypriotsociety, without ignoring the international factors. Other works look atthe role of nationalism and ethnic conflict in Cyprus (Loizos, 1974;Stavrinides, 1978). The “dialectic of intolerance” was perceived as apostcolonial remnant, and the legacy of colonialism was the ideologicalframework of political life, which was characterized by an absence of seri-ous dissent that would challenge the dominant social and political life ofCyprus, which resulted in the weakening of social critique (Kitromilides,1981, pp. 451–453).

The later versions of theorizing of “state and society” refer essentially tothe Greek-Cypriot controlled state and society. In the literature on RoC,undemocratic elements, and deficiencies in observing the constitution(Ierodiakonou, 2003; Attalides, 2006), a so-called “atrophy of civil soci-ety” and “clientelist neocorporatism” as a characteristic of Greek-Cypriot


society have been underscored (Mavratsas, 2003, pp. 119–157). Thereare strong elements from “modernization” theory, many with a Weberian-derived logic: this is circular argument that assumes that the state has not[yet] acquired the bureaucratic logic of the “rational-legal” paradigm dueto the inherently insufficient and institutionally deficient modernizationof the state/country. Accession to the EU will eventually achieve this, theargument goes.

Gramsci’s contribution to the study of civil society provides anapproach different from the dominant Western approaches (Gramsci,1972), which was proved quite influential and innovative in the devel-opment and renewal of Cypriot sociological thought. A number ofstudies that open up thinking against the dominant Weberian-pluralistmodel have drawn on Gramscian thinking. The essential features ofthis difference contained in Gramscian and other radical perspectivesis that such perspectives are critiques to the dominant perspectives, intheir liberal and conservative variants, from the vantage point of draw-ing out the potential for, or the structural constraints to, radical socialtransformation. Gramscian reading have been instrumental in openingroutes for rethinking and activating social and political transformationvia empowering the subaltern, renewing radical thought and praxis, aswell as liberating it from reductionist and dogmatic (mis)readings ofMarxism which was dominant in the Stalinist era. Such readings areparticularly fruitful when trying to rethink the state and the global:there is a vast literature and different disciplines from social history,to cultural, subaltern, and postcolonial studies to international politicaleconomy.19

In the context of Cyprus, Gramscian-inspired critiques led to avariety of ideological and political orientations and approaches fromMarxist, to anarcho-syndicalist to post-structuralist and postcolonial read-ings (Trimikliniotis, 2000, 2010). Moreover, Panayiotou (1999, 2005;2006) adopts a Gramscian reading of the Cypriot context in what isthe most comprehensive study on the role of the Left within civil soci-ety, and sketches out an alternative view of civil society, modernization,and development of Cypriot/Greek-Cypriot political culture: the Left hashistorically played a crucial role in Cyprus’ own route to modernity inthe twentieth century, but the contest for hegemony between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot elite resulted in a distorted public sphereand shaped the civil society accordingly. There are others who have beeninfluenced by Gramsci.20 Another type of theorization can be consideredto be deriving its inspiration primarily from the critical, postcolonial the-ory:21 these are Greek-Cypriot readings of the RoC—the “stronger” stateof a “weak” postcolonial regime.


The Cypriot States of Exception: New Insight intoTheorizing the State in Cyprus?

Constantinou aptly refers to “the Cypriot states of exception”(Constantinou, 2008, pp. 145–164) to exemplify the multiple excep-tionalism that defines the political-legal order of Cyprus, where oneexception generates another. This brings us to the heart of “the Cyprusproblem,” which cuts across the country and naturally intersects withthe operation of the acquis in a de facto divided country. The invo-cation of exception is blurring the distinctions between legality andillegality, normality and abnormality. It opens up “opportunities” forthose in power to extend their discretion in what Poulantzas referred toas authoritarian statism (1980) or exceptional regimes (1974) or as CarlSchmitt (2005) underlined, long-established regimes of exception allowthe sovereign to decide when and how to invoke the emergency situa-tion. In emergency situations, the normal democratic order and rightsare suspended; power is exercised by the forces that actually control anddetermine on the ground that it is an emergency situation. This may lastindefinitely.

In this sense, Cyprus is a bizarre case in which the distinction betweenthe “exception” and the “norm” is not easy to decipher. When “norm”and “exception” are so intertwined and interdependent, the “grey zones”of edges, or what is assumed to be the edge, become the core. Agamben(2005, p. 1) argues that current global reality is characterized by a gen-eralized state of exception, then we ought to examine the intersectionbetween norm and exception in the specific EU context: “the question ofborders becomes all the more urgent,” indeed. The reference here is that atthe “edges” of law and politics, there is “ambiguous, uncertain, borderlinefringe, at the intersection between the legal and the political.”22 The ana-lytical insight into the ambiguity and uncertainty of “the no-man’s landbetween the public law and political fact” and between the judicial orderand life must move beyond the philosophical and the abstract to the spe-cific legal and political context, if it is to have a bearing on the socio-legaland political reality that is currently reshaping the EU.

There is an abundance of literature which is essentially apologeticof each of the ethnic states of exceptions, following the collapse ofthe bicommunal regime in 1963–1964. It was this collapse that gen-erated the RoC state of exception, known as “the doctrine of neces-sity.” This doctrine was legitimized via the Supreme Court in thefamous case of Mustafa Ibrahim—the court considered this extraordi-nary excerpt to be so significant that it was put as part of the summaryjudgment (p. 97):23


This court now, in its all-important and responsible function of transforminglegal theory into living law, applied to the facts of daily life for the preserva-tion of social order, is faced with the question whether the legal doctrine ofnecessity discussed earlier in this judgment, should or should not, be read inthe provisions of the written Constitution of the (RoC). Our unanimous view,and unhesitating answer to this question, is in the affirmative.

Apologist-type studies often are, as Constantinou (2008) aptlypoints out,

legalistic in character, safely assuming the jurisprudential basis of the doctrine,and simply looking at its interpretations and applications. Such works takethe Roman maxim salus populi suprema lex (people’s safety is the supreme law)for granted, without being concerned with “whose safety” is secured and atwhat price.

Greek-Cypriot apologist accounts, which argue that the “doctrine ofnecessity” is a valid system of law,24 as there are equivalent Turkish-Cypriot accounts that argue the complete opposite for the doctrine ofnecessity but are apologist accounts for the TRNC.25 However, a num-ber of critical studies are making their appearance (Constantinou, 2008;Trimikliniotis, 2007, 2010a, 2010b). The fact that a number of cri-tiques to the state of exception in Cyprus have been published and arebeginning to have some influence on public debates opens up ways ofviewing the state in Cyprus in a more critical manner (Constantinou,2008; Trimikliniotis, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Trimikliniotis and Demetriou,2008, 2011). Constantinou’s (2008, p. 145) starting point is

Certain states of exception are more comfortable than others. Even while theyappear problematic or absurd to those experiencing them they can still bejudged preferable—less bad, less risky—than available alternatives.

The basic argument elaborated elsewhere is that the Cypriot states ofexception, in the forms of the Greek-Cypriot “doctrine of necessity,” the“TRNC,” the British “sovereign bases,” the “Green line” are undergoing aprocess of long-term erosion and de-legitimization, in spite of the effortsto re-legitimize them, an aspect Constantinou perhaps overstates. We maybegin to talk about an “organic crisis of the Cypriot state of exception,”26

but as Gramsci would have it, “the old is dying but the new is yet tobe born”. Moreover, the logic of exceptionalism is to justify authoritarian“solutions” and it thrives even when the doctrines invented as apologeticsare under crisis.


Conclusions

Many perspectives on the Cyprus problem, despite their very differentideological and methodological outlook, can complement each other andset out various aspects, albeit in a fragmental manner, and thus providethe basis for theorizing the particularity/globality dialectic of the Cypriotpostcolonial condition. However, what is missing is a holistic reading thatwould try to critically string such perspectives together in a manner thatwould properly grasp the vitality and actual agency of the local dynamicsand potential for social-political action. Most readings are not concernedwith such issues, as they are either interested in recording the specificitywithin the “global” or the “regional,” or cannot go beyond the fact thatthe situation in northern Cyprus is fundamentally different in terms ofthe unrecognized state formation highly dependent on Turkey, as a resultof which they fail to grasp the wider processes within which to locate thisstate formation.

This chapter aimed to locate gaps in knowledge and critiqued theapproaches to the theorization of state formations in Cyprus. It offereda rudimentary frame of understanding of State formations in Cyprus,arguing for the need to further elaborate a theorization of the state inCyprus beyond the descriptive and empiricist accounts. It then placedthe theorizations of the state formations within the conflict in the coun-try. In addition, via such a rethinking the chapter aimed to illustrate thatthe interest in the case of Cyprus is not confined to its contextual speci-ficities of area studies, because it lends itself as an interesting instancein comparative politics, state formation, and international political econ-omy of a localized condensation of local, regional, and global conflicts.The case of Cyprus is a subject of study that extends beyond local inter-est, not so much due to the divisions of the past, but due to the processesunleashed at the moment, which create the potential for a new Cyprusdrawing from the lessons of the past fragmentations. Only via a multi-layered and complex theory that assesses the role of “imperialism” today,nationalism, class, and other social conflicts, inter- and intra-regional stateprojects and rivalries, can we gain the insight to appreciate it and devisethe necessary strategies and tactics.

Notes

1. See the relevant chapters by Trimikliniotis, Panayiotou, Rooksby, and Arslanin this volume.

2. Realism relies on the problematic argument whereby the state is perceived asa single actor capable of identifying goals and preferences and determining


their relative importance (Pease, 2010). In that sense, it conceptualizes ratio-nal state as a potent actor that can override the many conflicting interests insociety and act as an autonomous power, in the name of a “putative nationalinterest.”

3. The term δραγoμανoς also means “translator” today.4. “Pαγ ιας ,” which was a derogatory term referring to Greeks as well as all

non-Muslim subjects as slaves during the Ottoman Empire. It derives fromthe Turkish raiyye, taken from the Arabic ra‘iyah herd, flock

5. In the 1926 Legislative Council, out of the nine Greek members, four wereusurers, three were lawyers, one was a landowner and the other was a bishop,which goes to show the kind of people who were in the administration(Storrs, 1945). “Money lending” was a thriving business in an environmentof mass poverty of ordinary people, who were forced to put as security theirlittle personal property, to borrow on extortionate interests. The result of thiswas the accumulation of mass property in the hands of moneylenders (Lefkis,1984). The Church as well as the Evkaf was also involved in moneylending(Constantinides, 2011).

6. This is the first trade union organized in Cyprus, not to be confused withSEK, the right-wing trade union organized in reaction to Left-wing PEO.

7. For instance Constantinides argues that class processes are not properlyempirically backed in the situation in 1974, prior to the coup and the inva-sion. He argues that the support of the bourgeoisie for Makarios was waningin favor of Grivas, which led to an increasing need of Makarios to rely onAKEL and EDEK. He is conflating here the crisis in the military elites andregime in Greece and the EOKA-B ramp in Cyprus with the (Greek-Cypriot)bourgeoisie. In fact the junta regime in Greece was undergoing a severe inter-nal crisis at the time and in early 1974 EOKA-B, was according to mostanalysts, destitute. The coup was a desperate move of the junta to “com-plete” its “plan” to get rid of Makarios, and his Communist supporters, and“unite” Cyprus, or at least part of it with Greece, even if it meant grantingpart of it to Turkey. The Pentagon was fully aware of these moves and didnothing to prevent them (Hitchens, 1984; Attalides, 1979).

8. AKEL, Aνoρθωτικó K óμμα Eργαζ oμενoυ Λαoυ (Progressive Party ofWorking People).

9. Constantinides (2011) for instance consistently underestimates this. Heseems to overstate the importance of domestic over international affairs andwhen he does discuss the international he deals primarily with Greece andTurkey, and little with the United States and Britain. He also overstates theconflict of interests between the United States and Britain, which may bedifferent at times. However, it is misleading to see them as having funda-mentally opposing interests; there may be a difference in emphasis ratherthan conflict of interest as such. After all NATO is an umbrella, which maybe dominated by the United States, but Britain and other western Europeancountries are part of it. When discussing the forces supporting independencefor example, he fails to specify what kind of “independence”. He states for


example that “the British favored independence,” as did the dominant fac-tion of the Cypriot bourgeoisie (commercial-broker section) and that laterAKEL became a consistent supporter of independence. However, all politi-cal goals cannot be painted with the same thick brush simply because one’sfailure to distinguish between the different independence scenarios. Thereis a qualitative difference between a Zurich–London type of independence,which is NATO-supervised or fettered independence with foreign troops andbases, and a genuine political independence, without foreign bases, troops,and guarantees.

10. The study of the phenomenon referred to as “nationalism” has undergone aprocess of drastic expansion over the last 20 years, but this note only refersto those studies relevant to this thesis.

11. Representation of nine Greek-Cypriots, three Turkish-Cypriots, and sixBritish officials with the Governor having the casting vote. Only oncea Turkish-Cypriot Member of the Council, a Kemalist who was friendlytoward the Greek-Cypriots, was when he voted against the taxation proposal.Soon after that the British dissolved the Legislative Council.

12. On the radio, for example (Attalides, 1979, p. 55).13. We use capital letter for “State” whenever we want to emphasize it or when

it is a subject of enquiry, unless it is quoted otherwise.14. In his famous article “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus (Notes

Toward an Investigation),” pp. 92–94; see Althusser (2001).15. The variety of conceptualizations of the state mostly draws on one of these

two main approaches.16. This is the typical reading of legal scholars such as Tornaridis (1982;1982b),

Chrysostomides (2000), and Soulioti (2006), as well as political and soci-ology scholars such as Kyriakides (1968), Markides (1977), and Attalides(1979).

17. This dynamic perception provided by Poulantzas (1985, 1980, 1975) is usedto consider the construction of the Cypriot State form.

18. We are referring to the works of Attalides (1977, 1979), Kitromilides (1977,1979, 1981a, 1981b), Markides (1977), Coufoudakis (1976), Salih (1977),Pollis (1977, 1979), Hitchens (1979), and Anthias and Ayres (1979, 1983);Anthias (1987).

19. The oeuvre of Gramsci has inspired diverse thinkers such as Eric Hobsbawn,E. P Thompson, Edward Said, Louis Althusser, Nicos Poulantzas, andRobert Cox.

20. A few examples include the following: Kattos (1999) uses all the basicGramscian conceptual tools to advance his reading of the state, labor,and capital in Cyprus. Niyazi Kızılyürek’s work on the conflict inCyprus, the Turkish-Cypriots, and Turkey has strong Gramscian influences.Agathangelou’s global political economy of sex draws on neo-Gramscianthinking; Rolandos Katsiaounis’s brilliant study of labor, class, and politics inthe late-nineteenth-century Cyprus, which is influenced by E. P. Thompson’sclassic, The Making of the English Working Class, also draws on Gramsci.


21. Vassos Argyrou (1994) offered a postcolonial anthropological reading thataimed to counter Eurocentric biases, whist M. Constantinou (2006, 2002;2003a) advanced the notion of quasi-stateness as the central element ofhis postcolonial sociological theorization of the Cypriot state, whilst CostasConstantinou (2008) offers a critical postmodern reading of a postcolonialstate. Papadakis (2007) narrates this postcolonial condition as an ethno-graphic personal journey in his “echoes of the dead zone.”

22. Agamben here quotes Fontana (1999, p. 16).23. The Attorney-General of the Republic v Mustafa Ibrahim and others, Crim-

inal Appeals No. 2729, 1964 Oct. 6, 7, 8, Nov. 102734, 2735, (1964)CLR 195.

24. We are referring to the Greek-Cypriot legal scholars, such as Tornaritis(1982a, 1982), Chrysostomides (2000), Pikis (2006), Papaphilippou (1995),and Soulioti (2006).

25. For instance, Tamkoç (1988), Necatigil (1989), Moran (1999), Özersay(2005); the last author is certainly more critical but it remains within thesame school of thought.

26. Elsewhere it was argued that there is a long-term process of demise of theCypriot State of Exception and that the organic crisis may lead to transcen-dence of the “doctrine of necessity.” See Trimikliniotis (2007, 2009, 2010,2010b).

C h a p t e r 3

Border Dialectics:Cypriot Social andHistorical Movementsin a World SystemicContextAndreas Panayiotou

The aim of this analysis is to explore the interaction of social movementswith external geopolitical shifts and internal class and cultural transfor-mations. The broader framework of the analysis poses two questions:

1. The possible historical continuity of social movements and thus theemergence of forms of historical consciousness.

2. The possible configurations of non-Western political forms of themodern in postcolonial contexts.

Incorporation: Peasant and Urban PoorMobilizations

According to Wallerstein (1989) while the European world economywas expanding in the eighteenth century, four new areas were “hooked”in the process of incorporation—among them the Ottoman Empire towhich Cyprus belonged. That period, in Cyprus, was characterized byan intense series of peasant (and sometimes of the urban poor) mobi-lizations against taxation. There have been uprisings before, but in this

68 A N D R E A S PA N AY I O T O U

period the uprisings and mobilizations were characterized by an eco-nomic focus while earlier uprisings were either pro-Western/Catholic inthe first years of the Ottoman rule, or uprisings of the troops against thecentral authority (Kyrris, 1984). The increasingly class-oriented focus ofthe mobilizations was accompanied and caused by a new historical forceamong the upper classes—the emergence of a new social group of taxcollectors that could qualify as an early form of the local bourgeoisie.The wave of class revolts did not succeed in a formal way. What changeddramatically, though, was the way the upper classes dealt with the lowerclasses. By the 1830s, consensus seems to have emerged that reforms wereurgently needed.

In the context of intersecting pressures (there was, also, a broader effortat reforms in the Ottoman Empire, called the Tanzimat (reforms) Cyprusemerged actually as a part of the empire where reform was successful. Oneof the most significant outcomes of the class revolts seems to have beenthe prevention of the spreading of the çiftlik (ranch) system. When theBritish came it was apparent that the island was comparatively better thanneighboring areas, with a widespread regime of small owners: a colonialreport estimated to 90 percent the proportion of the population who were“peasant proprietors” (Katsiaounis, 1996). In broader terms, the periodbetween the end of the peasant class revolts of the period 1760–1833, andthe new wave of class confrontations in the first decades of the twentiethcentury, seems to have been a period of an internal class compromise thatbenefited the lower classes.

During this transitional phase laboring people in general, whether skilled orunskilled, in town and country, were less situated in a position of dependencein earning a living than they had ever been before or than they were to be atthe dawn of the 20th century and the introduction of the factory system inCyprus.

(Katsiaounis, 1996, p. 118)

Thus the first conclusion of this early wave of class revolts in modernitywas an indirect form of partial, de facto, success—as an effort to containthe peasant riots. The geographic position and the historical dynamicsof the region at that conjuncture explain in part the success of the lowerclasses: the east Mediterranean was in a transitory stage, moving out of thecontrol of the Ottoman Empire—in Egypt, for example, Muhammed Alicreated a semi-autonomous regime between Western and Eastern influ-ences. This fluid geopolitical context allowed for internal reforms as theOttoman Empire tried to modernize while the West (and Russia) claimed“rights” of intervention. A possible cause for the success of reforms inCyprus was the lack of religious conflicts1 which, if happened, may have

B O R D E R D I A L E C T I C S 69

been used by inside or outside forces. In this context allowing the appro-priation of communal lands (held by the Sultan nominally) was a way ofredistributing wealth so that forms of local solidarity could be preserved.The local Orthodox Church, for example, had a long history of actingboth as a force of exploitation but also as a force of cohesion for the localOrthodox Christians. Thus it could be said that the locals reached a formof compromise in a changing geopolitical context and the agent of changethis time were the lower classes—as one might expect of modernity.

In 1878 Cyprus was granted by the Ottoman to the British Empireas a part of an agreement against Russian expansion in the region. Forthe British, Cyprus was a valuable asset in the strategic route to Indiavia the Suez Canal—and by the beginning of the twentieth century itwould become more significant due to the political and economic inter-ests of the West in the Middle East. This transformation of external ruleimplied also internal transformations leading to the development of newcultural and institutional frameworks in the economy and politics. Andthese institutional changes created new forms of class politics.

The official legal end of the Ancien Regime came with the granting ofthe island to the British, yet the hegemony of the Ottoman traditionalupper classes (Christian and Muslim) persisted for the first decades. Butthe diffusion of capitalist relations with the full integration of the islandwith the periphery of capitalist world economy created a new reality of“deepening” capitalist development—and thus of analogous reactions.The new cultural and institutional frameworks, which developed withBritish rule, allowed new movements and repertoires of mobilizationto develop in different sections of society, which expressed a fluidity ofexpectations and frustrations.

This fluidity intersected with two other processes: the centralizationof political power and the expansion of forms of political-cultural inter-vention and influence from two neighboring states—Greece and theOttoman Empire/Turkey. In that context there were two directions forlower-class resistance: residual forms of “primitive rebellion,” such associal banditry (Cassia, 1993; Katsiaounis, 1996) and political mobi-lizations of the Greek-Cypriot urban lower classes under the banner ofnationalism.

Banditry, which was a bicommunal practice, had its roots in whatmay be called traditional residuals in the emerging world of modernity.These kinds of lower-class “resistance to central authority” persisted untilthe 1940s without leaving, however, a political legacy. They were thelast forms of localist resistance against the centralization of power. Thenationalist movement had a more lasting impact since it was a productof the new age both culturally and politically. As Greek nationalism was


exported to Cyprus during this age of empires, Greekness acquired theform of an “imagining of the modern” (Bryant, 2004). The conflict of thetraditionalists (adhering to a more religious identity) and the moderniz-ing nationalists culminated in the archbishopric issue at the beginning ofthe twentieth century (Kitromilides, 1989). On the surface the nation-alists won. But nationalism was a secularizing ideology and by fightingfor dominance within the Church it diluted its modernism and it becameadapted to local power structures. Thereby it came to express local dynam-ics in a strange language—it spoke of Greekness while it was increasinglyreferring to local Cypriot issues. Thus Greek-Cypriot nationalism becamethe hegemonic ideology in the Christian community and the educationalsystem was the primary vehicle for its diffusion. This was followed soon bythe emergence of Turkish nationalism, which assumed cultural and polit-ical hegemony in the Turkish-Cypriot community after 1930. In bothcases the language of modernity was borrowed and its subversive effect waslimited since it invoked an external power, as the force of modernizationand “emancipation.” Cypriot natives were thus conceived as “branches”that needed to become, again, part of the “trunk” of the national tree.Both nationalisms were not anti-Western. Greek nationalism, especially,conceived itself as an ally of the British Empire and potentially the localrepresentative of its world hegemony.

Despite the transitional and soon conservative cultural and politicalrole of imported nationalism, the period of mobilization under its bannerprovided the lower classes with new techniques of organization and mobi-lization (demonstrations, petitions, voting)—mostly adaptations from theWestern political context and repertoires. The most significant gain of theperiod was the localization of modern democracy—the climactic momentcame when the British intervened in the first riots they witnessed inCyprus, in 1908, among the two Greek-Cypriot factions over the thenarchbishopric, and passed a law through parliament that permitted theuniversal male suffrage in Church elections. In this sense the Churchwas modernized by the colonial parliament and subsequently the Churchbecame the hegemonic framework within which Greek-Cypriot politicsdeveloped. Thus the colonial framework provided both adaptations tothe existing forms of power and new ways of organizing resistance.

The Emergence of Modern HistoricalConsciousness: The Cypriot Communist Movement

and the Leftist Subculture

The modern working class movement emerged in the interwar period andbecame a major actor on the public scene in the 1940s when the party of


the Left, Anorthotiko Komma Eryazomenou Laou, AKEL (Progressive Partyof the Working People), was formed and came to express the “people’smovement” as the Left calls the broader subculture around the party. Theroots of the movement can be traced in the convergence of dynamics onthree levels: economic, cultural, and political-institutional.

On the economic level the Left can be traced to the impact of thediffusion of capitalist relations. By the 1920s the colonial institutionalframework had removed most traditional controls of the processes of cap-italist accumulation.2 Thus the economic crisis in the agrarian sector,which followed World War I, was followed by a social crisis that led toa near-collapse of the regime of small ownership instituted de facto afterthe peasant revolts of the nineteenth century. The 1920s were character-ized by a mass expropriation of peasant-land by money lenders. The levelof popular frustration raised concerns even among the colonial author-ities. The transformations were signaling the beginning of a new erafor both power restructuring and resistance. If the Cypriot lower classeshad established a de facto regime of small ownership as a compromisein the nineteenth century, now the situation demanded, one may say,a different—more conscious—approach. If the peasant revolts indicatedthe coalescing of class alliances against local elites, the new movementhad to discover the forces that shaped the island’s fate—and these forceswere global as colonialism and imported nationalism indicated. And thisnew consciousness demanded by historical circumstances was locally bornamong the new class formations created by capitalism.

Two groups played a key role in the formation of the Cypriot Left—a culturally modernist current that appealed to youth and intellectualsections of the middle class, and the new working class born from theprocess of proletarianization—with the mining industry representing akey sector for the formation of the proletarian experience and conscious-ness. The first trade unions that led to the formation of the communistparty were made up mostly of artisans—a situation indicating the trans-formation of traditions, routines, and networks of mobilization, on thebasis of the historical and work experience of artisans as has happened inthe West in analogous moments of modernization. But it was the massesflocking to the urban centers that made the forces of the mass Left in the1940s—and its activists were drawn from people with experience in themines. Its strength was clearly in working class urban centers and in placesof links with the “outside”/broader world—the coastal towns and workingclass villages around mines or towns. In more rural traditional villages, theLeft was a minority based on lower-class peasants and modernist middlepeasants. These forces expressed new needs (such as the control of capital-ism) but they did not signal any desire for returning to the past. For them,


as Marx would have it, “their somber look” on reality and their relationswith other people, was a product of demystification.

This becomes clear when one looks at the dimension of culturaltransformation. Modernization was advocated by the British but it wasalso a contested issue internally. Nationalism, as noted earlier, offered atransitional form of the modern—and was adopted as a defensive compro-mise, by structures (such as the Church) that were disposed to avoidingthe diffusion of modernist themes. It thus became conservative in the spanof a few decades. The emerging Left was more consistently modern—itwas a rebellion against the past. As P. Loizos (1986) put it while discussingthe confrontation of the Church with the Left in the 1940s: “If the churchhad fathers who claimed that they knew more, the Left was full of rebelsons” (Loizos, 1986, p. 104).

The modernism of the communists was a critique of the sacred—evenof its transitionally modern transformation into a national form whereGreece became the new sacred with which the natives were supposed tobe reunited (as modern emancipation) as humans were supposed to bereunited with the divine in the Orthodox Christian theological narrative.The communists emphasized instead a materialist focus on the existingreality—and thus advocated, from the 1920s, independence and becamesubsequently the major force upholding a Cyprocentric3 position. Theirpro-independence stance was initially justified on the basis of the hege-monic function of the mythological “redemption” offered by the ideologyof enosis (union with Greece), and the need to preserve the unity of thelower classes irrespective of religious or ethnic-national background. Sub-sequently, in the 1940s when enosis became a policy goal even of the partyof the Left, Cyprocentricism was expressed in the focus of the “people’smovement” on the need of de facto political and economic change/reform“here and now.”

The forces that created local modernism were products of modern his-torical developments: after the first wave of imports (British, Greek, andTurkish) a local version of modernism started maturing by the 1930s.The intellectual current that coalesced with the radical artisans in the1920s was a form of local avant garde. By the 1930s a series of literarymagazines refocused attention on Cyprus as an active subject for mod-ern concerns. Even though this shift was done within the hegemonic—bythen nationalist (Greek and Turkish)—frameworks, yet the new Cypriotfocus of local modernism brought together the intellectual-middle -classadherents of the cultural promises of modernity and the victims of capi-talism’s proletarianization. In this sense the Cyprocentricism, which cameto characterize the Left as one of its most consistent features after inde-pendence in 1960, was the product of historical forces (the emergence


of local forces embracing modernity) and expressed a form of historicalconsciousness: the realization that change could come from the Cypriotswho had to confront their problems themselves.

If we look at the development of repertoires of organizing and mobi-lization of the lower classes internally, there was definitely a furtherdiffusion of new techniques often adopted or utilized from the modern-colonial legal-institutional framework: trade unions, political parties,strikes, the diffusion of the use of petitions, creating de facto rights(such as with mass demonstrations without permission from the author-ities), challenging authoritarianism in courts, and invoking internationalsolidarity. In this context the British institutional framework broughtunexpected consequences. If the incorporation in the British Empireaccelerated local exploitation, it also furnished means and ways for con-fronting it. It is significant here to dwell on what may be called thestructural solidarity of historical movements—for example, the relationof the British Labour Party, and the historical British labour move-ment, with AKEL and the Cypriot people’s movement. On the faceof it the two movements represent polar opposites in the frameworkof the historical labor movement in modernity: AKEL is a commu-nist party while the Labour party is an exemplary case of a reformistlabor movement in which the influence of Marxism has been limited.Yet in practice both parties have been reformist—despite again defend-ing (and thus clashing over) the geopolitical interests of their respectivecountries.

The two movements came in touch from the 1920s in two ways: asLabor rose to power (and thus became integrated in the British politi-cal system) it had to deal with the colonies (among whom Cyprus waspeculiar in being half-west half-east/south), and as Cypriot immigrantsmoved to the colonial metropolis, a link was established with the Britishlabor movement and leftist political circles. The very vehicles throughwhich the communist vanguard managed to diffuse its messages (and cre-ate mass organizations) among the “people,” is indicative of the utilizationof frameworks facilitated by the link of Cyprus to London’s alternative tra-ditions. Cooperatives were actively encouraged and laws on trade unionswere enforced due to pressure from the colonial metropolis. When sub-sequently the British tried to provoke the Left in a confrontation at theend of the World War II, in 1945, the Left responded with what maybe termed nowadays “civil disobedience.” There was no pacifist theorybehind the move—it was a practice of collective action which was withinthe framework of available means for political claims making. And theBritish, despite their formal abolition of the constitution after the 1931riots,4 did expand, under pressure, the boundaries of rights due to the de


facto reality created by the mobilizations. And it is this framework (andthe increasing links of Cypriots in Britain) which prevented the Britishfrom banning the Left totally. In 1945 they tried to ban the trade unions,which responded with mass mobilizations, court action, and internationalsolidarity. In 1955 they banned the organizations of the peoples’ move-ment affiliated with AKEL but this time they could not ban the tradeunions.

For Cypriot leftists, communism expressed anticolonial/anti-imperialistmodernization. Geopolitics made the Cypriot Left to tread the bound-ary of confrontation carefully. Not only because the experience/tragedyof Greek communists in the 1940s was a vivid example of repression,but the very existence of two religious-which-became-national commu-nities implied possible internal violence. Thus in Cypriot communism’shistorical imagery, the road to modernization (with its Marxist-Leniniststages) had/has as its goal the vision of a sovereign/independent secular-tolerant, social democratic regime in modernization. And this vision andthe reformism that accompanied the radical ideology was a product of thelocal meeting the global (Panayiotou, 2006). There were radical groupsand tendencies within the Left, which represented a more confrontationalattitude: the communist circles before the 1940s were definitely moreprovocative in their rhetoric, in the 1940s there was a vibrant Trotskyitecurrent in the trade unions, while in 1948 and in 1958 there were groupsof workers who disagreed with the policy of restraint in the dealing withstrikes or with attacks from the Right wing. But these tendencies even-tually remained within the subculture of the Left, which came to revolvearound AKEL and its mass organizations after the 1940s.

The rise of the people’s movement was halted in 1948, which in Cypruswas marked by a major class, political, and cultural-ideological con-frontation (Katsiaounis, 2000). After that confrontation the Left foundit excluded from power almost by an invisible regime of “negative integra-tion” as G. Roth described the analogous regime in pre-1918 Germanyin which the working class movement was allowed to function legally butwas excluded from power. The Cypriot Left found itself legal but undera regime of possible violent repression. The means of “protection” of theCypriot Left came from two opposing sides from the outside: from theresidues of people’s rights spreading in the British Empire as a result ofinternal struggles in the colonial metropolis, and by the Soviet Union asan implicit protector of the island’s independent republic as a member ofthe United Nations after 1960.

It was another regime of compromise. The Left’s positions before1960 (especially on the economy but also on the need for non-Westernalliances in the context of global decolonization) were vindicated, and its


suggestions spread to other political groups—but the Left as a party anda subculture were treated by the dominant Greek-Cypriot Center-Rightpolitical hegemony as some form of second-class citizens even thoughAKEL’s support was one-third of the population, while its “sympathizers”in the Center parties put its possible influence at 40–50 percent.5

The interesting phenomenon here is the vindication of the positionthat the oppressed in capitalism become carriers of historical conscious-ness due to their position in the organization of the economy and theproduction of wealth. If Cyprus, as a geographical–geopolitical space, wasthe most valuable asset of the collectivity of the natives, then the identifi-cation of the lower classes with communism as a geopolitical strategy andwith forms of political Cyprocentricism, was a claim and a defense of theirinterests—which could be identified with the interests of the collectivityof the natives in relation to their land/space (Panayiotou, 2003). Theseinterests, which pointed to the need for affirming sovereign independence(in the given historical and geopolitical context), were a “reality” censoredfrom public discourse by the dominant nationalist hegemony. And as thetwo nationalisms came in direct confrontation in the late 1950s,6 theLeft, as a historical proponent of independence in the 1920–1940 periodand of self-government in 1947–1948, was presented as “suspect” by theRight for the degree of its loyalty to the new sacred of the nation. Butin the 1960s the inevitability and desirability of the regime of indepen-dence was supported (even if still censored in the public sphere wherea regime “of emergency” took hold after 1963–1964) by a widespreadpopular feeling codified as “Cypriot consciousness” (Attalides, 1979).

The Anti-imperialist Democratic “Moment,”1960–1980, as a Transition

Independence came in 1960 almost as an unexpected blessing as thetwo dominant national ideologies clung to their focus on the neighbor-ing states—as models of modernization and as forms of the sacred inmodernity. But it was not an unknown possibility/option for Cypriots.Despite its official censorship independence was the only possible out-come of the conflict of rival nationalisms and the form of politicalorganization that “was to be expected” in the context of decoloniza-tion. This fact became increasingly evident as the Greek-Cypriots cameto face the dilemmas of annexation versus independence. After 1963 theGreek-Cypriots emerged victorious in an internal ethnic conflict—buttheir victory vis-à-vis the Turkish-Cypriots brought them face to face withthe Greek state, which demanded obedience from the natives. Given thetime and the age (the period of the Cold War and decolonization in the


Middle East), the conflict soon acquired ideological and geopolitical sig-nificance. The regime in Athens was a product of the defeat of the Leftin the civil war of 1945–1949 and was thus a pro-Western dependentstate. Cyprus, on the other hand, had a mass communist movement andthe armed phase of the anticolonial conflict (1955–1959), which pit-ted the Greek-Cypriot Right against the British created strong feelingsof anti-Western resentment even among the local Right-wing allies ofthe West.

After 1968, when the Greek-Cypriot president, Archbishop Makarios,was re-elected on a platform of accepting independence (as a positive real-istic solution—rather than as a transitory stage toward the national idealof enosis (the unification with Greece)), the conflict between Athens andNicosia acquired new dimensions. The “masses” (and the leftists were themost well organized in these forms of collective action) started mobilizingon the street on the one hand, while on the other, a violent campaign ofterrorizing the population was initiated by the extreme Right wing withthe support of the Greek state. The conflict climaxed in 1974 with theintervention of Turkey after a Greek-led coup against Makarios.

There were interesting shifts in the repertoires of mobilization also.Most of the techniques of modern activism had already been developedduring the colonial period. Since the 1950s, however, Makarios developeda new form of mass demonstration centering on his charismatic appeal:mass rallies in which his speeches veered around the boundary of the reli-gious and the political. But after 1968 the demonstrations in support ofMakarios as a symbol of independence, developed also tactics of “peo-ple power” on the streets. Thus the resistance to the coup involved bothmobilizations in the street and armed resistance.

It is necessary to disentangle two dimensions (the external-geopoliticaland the internal-local democratic) in order to get a clearer view ofthe contradictory forces that emerged as global and local dynamicsintersected.

1. Geopolitical anti-imperialism.Cyprus was a country that emerged from colonialism with anambiguous sovereignty regime. On the one hand it was indepen-dent, and on the other, the “Guarantor regime” put it in a statusof limited independence, under the surveillance of three NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries: Britain, Greece,and Turkey. In this context, despite ideological differences, the vastmajority of Greek-Cypriots perceived this regime as unsatisfactory.One side claimed that the nationalist goal of enosis was betrayed andsaw independence as a form of “corruption.” But as independence


became a reality in everydayness, the majority that supported thepresident, Makarios, saw itself struggling to safeguard indepen-dence from external intervention. It is this dimension that putCyprus on the global map as a site of anti-imperialist confrontationin the world system. And it is in this context that the Repub-lic of Cyprus, even after the state has been monopolized by theGreek-Cypriots, enjoyed the strong support of Arab anti-imperialistregimes in the context of non-aligned solidarity. This struggle, theexternal anti-imperialist one, was understood by sections of theTurkish-Cypriot community (leftists, for example), but that com-munity found itself, after 1964, confined to enclaves. Thus whilethe majority engaged in anti-imperialism internally the situationwas complex—the anti-imperialist majority was clearly oppressingthe minority. One should note that a large section of the majority,the Left, disagreed with the treatment of the minority but being in aregime of loyal opposition in the context of “negative integration,”it could not do much.

2. Internal democratic politics.The Greek-Cypriot Left was excluded from power, as noted, but ithad been influential in two directions—foreign policy and the con-struction of an internal welfare system based on its struggles andsuggestions since the 1940s. Yet the internal regime lacked civic-democratic expansion analogous to the emancipatory potential ofexternal anti-imperialism. The exclusion of the Turkish-Cypriotminority was actually foreshadowed by the exclusion of the Leftfrom the 1940s from Greek-Cypriot institutions of power. In effectinternally, in Cyprus as a whole, a minority in the total popula-tion (factions of the Center and the Right of the Greek-Cypriotcommunity) administered the state—in a segmented population aminority can even claim to be the majority if it controls power inthe majority community. The period 1968–1974 became a periodof convergence of struggles for democracy and anti-imperialism inthe Greek-Cypriot community. The intervention/invasion of theGreek state on July 15, via the military coup, was in effect a dou-ble move: an effort to extend the Right-wing military regime ofGreece to Cyprus and an effort to bring a rebellious population ata valuable juncture in the world system under control. The coupwas met with significant resistance and this moment of conver-gence of democratic anti-fascism and anti-imperialism became amajor force on the streets after 1974—and helped in the imple-mentation of major reforms and shifts (in discourse and hegemonicparadigms) in the Greek-Cypriot community. The Greek-Cypriots


were defeated but they emerged as representatives of politicalCypriotness against external interventions. There was also a sense ofidentity politics even though it was not yet clearly articulated: inde-pendence, bicommunality, and some form of Cyprocentric focusstarted becoming either hegemonic (independence) or at least artic-ulated as necessary (bicommunality) positions in the public sphere.In the Turkish-Cypriot community, the Left started emerging afterthe period of the enclaves and affirmed a strong Cyprocentric posi-tion since it found itself in a space patrolled by the Turkish armyand in front of migration seemingly organized by Turkey.

Thus the Left, as a modern subculture of the historical working-classmovement, found itself in the middle of the political spectrum. In rela-tion to anti-imperialism (in the Greek-Cypriot community), the Leftcould ally itself with the “patriotic” (but often Greek-Cypriot- rather thanbicommunally orientated) Center, while on the issue of democratization itcould ally with the liberals. And as far as the ethnic division is concerned,it was again the political force that had support from segments of bothcommunities and expressed more clearly the need for rapprochement.

Postmodern Alternative Initiatives and MassMobilizations/Movements

AKEL managed in the period following 1974 to subvert the regime ofnegative integration, advance its positions, and gain entrance in the exist-ing power structures. Through its alliances with the parties of the Center,a new hegemonic agenda was established, which solidified the Cypriotform of the welfare state and the multipolarity of Cypriot foreign pol-icy. But from the 1970s AKEL had to confront a leftist critique fromthe youth of the socialist party—which was dominated by Trotskyite cur-rents. In the 1980s, new groups emerged, which created an autonomousalternative historical tradition. In the north, among the Turkish-Cypriots,the Left of communist descent re-emerged through a Left-Kemalist party,Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, CTP (Turkish Republican Party), in a context,however, in which there were also other Center-Left parties. The inter-nal organization of the Turkish-Cypriot community had elements of awelfare state—funded, though, from the outside (Turkey). Trade unionsof the public sector, in this context, remained significant—and especiallythe Teachers’ union came to play a key role in articulating oppositionaldiscourses and activism.

The post-80 framework seemed to signal a move toward a post indus-trial economy internally in the Greek-Cypriot administered Republic of


Cyprus, and a “move” to an exclusive club of the core of the world sys-tem externally, via integration in the European Union. In this frameworka new set of groups and trends started emerging in the south: in the1980s there was a libertarian (anarchist and alternative) scene in Limassolwhile in Nicosia there was the development of a Left-wing scene basedon Trotskyism or other forms of “new social movement” activism. Thesetrends continued and matured in the 1990s.

In terms of mobilizations, this new period saw the progressive rise offestivals (of playfulness and the coexistence of difference in mass gath-erings) as a form of mobilization. In terms of themes there were threesignificant dimensions.

1. In the context of the Cyprus problem as a form of hegemonicideology for national unity (since the “national issue” had to beabove all and linked to all issues according to hegemonic ide-ology), the non-institutional Left either tried to de-mystify orredefine the focus and confront nationalism, or to create new bondswith the Turkish-Cypriots. This trend for new historical bonds wasenhanced dramatically with the opening of direct communicationin 2003.

2. The opening up of society to “difference.” Beginning with mobi-lizations in the late 1980s for “the right to be different,” the alter-native scene focused increasingly on internal marginalized groups(motorcycle subculture, deviant youth, gays, Turkish-Cypriots inthe south). The focus on this dimension expanded in the 1990s,and especially after 2000, with a focus on immigrants and on theacceptance of Cyprus as a multicultural society.

3. Redefining space. A series of initiatives and mobilizations emergedfrom the 1980s, which had the form of movements to preservecertain “ecological” areas from the “development” of the tourismindustry, or of areas and buildings in the city as signs of history andlived experience against commercialization and commodification.

The most fundamental shift, though, occurred in the Turkish-Cypriotcommunity in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In that periodas the discussions on the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to theEuropean Union accelerated, a double (internal and external) dynamicswas created: On the one hand the Turkish-Cypriot Left, after a long timeof being marginalized and isolated, became increasingly the focus of for-eign (Western and Turkish) interest since it was the force that could helpmove toward a solution. On the other, there was an interesting reversalwhereby internal events in Cyprus abetted transformations in Turkey. The


rising mobilizations in the Turkish-Cypriot community (which startedas economic and democratic mobilizations independently of the EUdynamic), in the period 2000–2004, had an impact on Turkey—andone may see this “reverse impact” as analogous to what happened inGreece after the failure of the intervention of the military government in1974. The Turkish-Cypriot mobilizations, and eventual electoral victoryof the Turkish-Cypriot Left in 2004, instigated questioning the power ofthe establishment/ “Deep state” in Turkey and paradoxically (given thestaunchly pro-secular position of the Turkish-Cypriot Left) helped thedemocratizing effort of Erdogan’s Islamic party in Turkey.

The patterns of the mobilizations of the Turkish-Cypriot uprising wereinteresting in their historical imagery and shifts in the repertoires ofmobilization. The main organizing forces were the trade unions (a phe-nomenon that has not occurred since the 1940s in either community) andthe central slogan was clearly Cyprocentric—“This country is ours.” Themass mobilizations seemed to exemplify a postmodern sense of pluralismand street power. On the other hand, however, the Turkish-Cypriot Leftremained divided in a manner reminiscent of modern leftist factional-ism. A central issue of debate that emerged in this period was (and toa degree still is) the position of Turkish-Cypriot movement(s) in rela-tion to Turkish immigrants. And this intersected with the broader issueof class relations, political relations with Guarantor powers, and identitypolitics.

Eventually, when the Greek-Cypriot Left managed to elect also itsleader as president in 2008, for two years (in 2010 the Turkish-Cypriotleftist leader lost the elections) Cyprus had two leftist leaders debat-ing the Cyprus problem: there was substantial progress, especially inthe administration of power and a new constitutional framework thatallows the two communities to vote together for president and vice pres-ident. If one compares the positions of the two modern leftist parties,then the Greek-Cypriot Left seems to have a more geopolitical empha-sis with a focus on preserving the independence/autonomy of the islandon the borderline of multiple/competing forces and influences, while theTurkish-Cypriot Left seems to emphasize more the need for internal plu-ralism and autonomy—against a possible tyranny of the majority. Thealternative Left on the other hand, seems to emphasize more the defacto reunification of the island and issues that revolve more intenselyon identity politics. In this framework, however, the positions of theformal parties are reversed: it is the Turkish-Cypriot new Left thatemphasizes more the autonomy of Cyprus, while the Greek-Cypriotstended to show more consideration for the flow of immigrants on theisland.


Conclusion: Border Experiences and Dynamics

What can one say of this historical trajectory?There is clearly a trend that can be called modern in the broader sense,

and which has emerged first in the West: the coalescing of forms of dissentand mobilization into a historical movement (the Left) that confronts anegalitarian secular discourse on political power and the impact of cap-italism. In this context the Cypriot communist Left came to embodyelements of both the democratic and the socialist movements as theyappeared consecutively in the Western experience. But the colonial andpostcolonial contexts also created a protracted form of “situations ofemergency” on the basis of the “national question,” which limited theexpansion of democratic practices.

On the other hand, the historical trajectory reveals cleavages thatare peculiar to non- Western contexts and of the specific area inparticular. The transformation of internal class conflict of the period1920–1950 into a democratic anti-imperialist phase (1960–1980) isindicative of these transformations. What is more significant is the cleav-age that emerges between internal and external dynamics. This dialectic,whose systemic roots have to be traced to the “value” of the borderlinegeopolitical position of the island, has created the conditions for a peculiarform of historical consciousness that focuses on space as a key variable—economically, politically (as the modern Left has demonstrated), andculturally (as the postmodern Left indicates).

The question of the future centers inevitably on how Cyprus, as theeastern border of Europe with historical-cultural, political, and recently-ties with Russia will fare, and what role will it play, in its region in a periodof local and global transformations. Internally one may expect institution-alization of sections of the Left as the alternative Left becomes an agent ofhistorical consciousness in new forms.

Notes

1. When the Greek war of independence broke out in 1821, the Muslim elitein Cyprus used the opportunity to get back at the Christian elite which hadbeen rising in influence and power. But the events of that year (hanging of thearchbishop and other notables) did not spread among the popular classes andthe uprisings of 1833 were again bicommunal.

2. As was the prohibition of the expropriation of the land, if a debtor failed topay his debt (Katsiaounis, 1996).

3. The term Cyprocentric is used to denote a focus on Cyprus—politically orculturally. It has to be seen as one of the poles of emphasis in political culturewith the other two being Greekocentric and Turkocentric. The three poles


refer to Cypriot society as a whole both currently and historically: in the GreekCypriot community the two poles are Greekocentric and Cyprocentric whilein the Turkish Cypriot community the corresponding ones are Turkocentricand Cyprocentric.

4. In 1931 there was the first major uprising against British rule. The causes ofthe uprising were economic and political but the slogans and its leaders (whocame from the existing political elite) identified it with enosis.

5. In the elections of 1970 AKEL received 34 percent as party votes while itsadditional votes from “horizontal voting” made it reach 40 percent. In theelections it chose to contest with its own presidential candidate (1988, 1993,1998, 2008) its candidate received around 50± percent in the second round.

6. In 1955 a Church-organized guerrilla group started a violent campaign withthe goal of enosis—and more realistically to press the British into negotiationson the post colonial regime of the island. The Turkish-Cypriot Right wingresponded with its own armed group seeking partition, and soon there wasintercommunal conflict—and attacks by both groups on the Left.

C h a p t e r 4

Cyprus and the West:A CriticalPerspective onBritish andUS Foreign Policyand StrategicInterests in CyprusEd Rooksby

It is impossible to comprehend the current political conjuncture inCyprus without an understanding of the history of British and Americanimperialism on the island. A significant feature of the island today isthat large areas are still directly administered by its old colonial master.277 sq. km of the 9,250 sq. km island is given over to British mil-itary bases under the sovereign control of the United Kingdom (UK)government—the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). Britain also controls sev-eral “retained sites” from which it conducts electronic surveillance andintelligence operations. Furthermore, the Americans enjoy access to theintelligence the British sites gather (O’Malley, 2006, p. 473). The pres-ence of these facilities indicates the continuing strategic importanceof the island to the British and Americans. Indeed, Anglo-Americanimperial policy has fundamentally shaped modern Cypriot history. Theconcept of Anglo-American imperialism should not be taken to implythat British and American imperialism are identical, but they are,however, closely intertwined. It is difficult to speak of clearly defined

84 E D R O O K S B Y

“distinct British interests” on the island today because since the endof World War 2 (WW2), Britain’s imperialist role in Cyprus (as else-where) has been, in essence, to act as a semi-autonomous lieutenant ofUS hegemony.

In this chapter I trace the development of British—and from 1945,British–US—imperial interests on the island from 1878 to the present.I show how these have shaped British and US policy in relation to Cyprusand how this policy has, in turn, contributed to the making of the cur-rent political conjuncture on the island. A critical question that needs tobe addressed is whether British, and later British and American, imperi-alism had a coherent policy on Cyprus that continued throughout. Is itpossible, for example, to talk about an essentially “partitionist” positionon Cyprus? In other words, was partition historically “essential” to British/British–American strategy? My argument is that this is not the case andimperial interests in Cyprus have shifted over time in relation to the worldimperialist context. These shifts can be analyzed in terms of three majorphases. Thus, in what follows I first outline briefly a periodization of cap-italist imperialism on the global stage. The following sections are thenstructured around this periodization.

Phases of Imperialism

Capitalist imperialism has taken several different forms historicallyaccording to the particular configuration of the politico-economicconjuncture in any given period and also according to the particular bal-ance of forces in any given imperial state and any given dominated state.Alex Callinicos provides a useful periodization, dividing the history ofmodern capitalist imperialism into three phases: “Classical Imperialism”(1870–1945), “Superpower Imperialism” (1945–1991), and “Imperial-ism after the Cold War” (1991 to the present day).1 This provides helpfulcontext for an analysis of imperialism in Cyprus. Of course, modernimperialism on the island has its own distinct history with its own partic-ular turning points and definite phases. Nevertheless, modern imperialdevelopments have closely reflected the changing forms taken by cap-italist imperialism on the world stage. It makes sense, then, to stickwith something similar to Callinicos’s three phases in our investigationof modern imperial history in Cyprus and thus the following analy-sis follows his periodization. Each of the following sections begins witha discussion of the world imperialist context in the period concernedand then moves to an analysis of developments in relation to Cyprusspecifically.

C Y P R U S A N D T H E W E S T 85

1878–1945: Cyprus as a British Colony in the Ageof Classical Imperialism

Britain’s acquisition of Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 cameat a time in which the imperial possessions of European powers wereexpanding at an unprecedented rate. This was a phase of imperial-ism in which economic and military competition were closely boundup together. This was also a time in which imperial domination oftentook a colonial form—more or less direct political control over foreignpossessions. Until 1914, Britain performed a hegemonic role “in the inter-national system both in organizing the world economy and in regulatingconflicts between the Great Powers” (Callinicos, 2009, p. 142).

Situated at the cross-roads between three continents, the possession ofCyprus was seen to afford to its owner, in the words of the British PrimeMinister Benjamin Disraeli, “the Key of Western Asia” (Varnava, 2009,p. 85). Disraeli’s government was keen to establish a “new Gibraltar” inthe Eastern Mediterranean from which to resist Russian expansionism andto secure Britain’s interests in, and supply routes to, the Near East andIndia. Though Disraeli intended to turn Cyprus into a fortified base forwarships and troops (Varnava, 2009, p. 1), these plans were soon scaleddown. Cyprus was never fortified or turned into a naval base. In 1882,the British took control of Egypt, and Alexandria provided much betterconditions for stationing warships than anything Famagusta could offer—Cyprus’ status as an imperial backwater was effectively confirmed for thenext few decades. By the outbreak of World War 1 (WW1), in fact, theBritish were keen to get rid of the island—in 1915 Cyprus was offeredto Greece to encourage the latter to join the Entente, but Greece refused(Holland and Markides, 2006, pp. 177–178).

Cyprus’ strategic value was to increase after WW1 with the adventof air power as a major component of British strategy in the EasternMediterranean and beyond. With British control of large swathes ofthe Middle East after the war, Cyprus became an important base fromwhich these holdings could be defended. Greece’s request for the islandin 1919 was rejected—the strategic value of the island had been trans-formed in only a few years. Cyprus proved to be valuable to the Britishin WW2, serving as an “airbase, refueling station and naval supportcentre for operations in South East Europe, North Africa and the MiddleEast” (Joseph, 1997, 170, n. 1). This increase in Cyprus’ imperial strate-gic value, however, coincided with growth in anticolonial feeling on theisland.

This was related to the institutional structures and practices thatBritish rule established which profoundly transformed the way Cypriots


saw themselves and helped generate the sectarian divisions that cameto dominate twentieth-century politics on the island. When the Britisharrived in the late nineteenth century, the vast majority of Cypriotsdid not think of themselves as Greek or Turkish, but in terms of reli-gious affiliation—Orthodox Christian or Muslim. The British broughtto Cyprus the idea of “race” that often accompanied nineteenth-century colonialism. The British were in thrall to a romanticized ideaof “Greekness” and tended to see Cyprus as part of a mythologized“Hellenic” world (Varnava, 2009, pp. 45–64). As such, the British weredetermined to attribute “Greek” ethnic identity to Cypriot Christians.Similarly, “Turkish” identity was attributed to Cypriot Muslims. Thedivision of Cypriots into separate “races” and nationalities was reflectedin, and reinforced by, the institutional structures of colonial adminis-tration. Since the population of the island was predominantly Christianand regarded as more or less European by the British (Varnava, 2009,p. 158), Cypriots (unlike most other subject peoples of the BritishEmpire) were allowed, from 1882, a partially elected legislature. How-ever, the legislature was divided along ethnic lines and this tended topoliticize previously non-existent divisions amongst Cypriots (Varnava,2009, p. 34). National and ethnic identity came to dominate Cypriotpolitics. On an island inhabited, according to British racial classification,by two distinct national groups, the emergence of nationalist politics wasa recipe for sectarian conflict. The particular course of development ofGreek-Cypriot nationalism became acutely problematic for the colonialauthorities—Greek-Cypriot politics came increasingly to pivot on theidea of enosis (unification of the island with Greece).

1945–1990: Imperial Domination Reconstituted

The phase of “Superpower Imperialism” was a period in which “the worldwas partitioned geopolitically and ideologically between two blocs headedrespectively by the United States and the Soviet Union” (Callinicos, 2009,p. 138). In this period the United States replaced Britain as the majorinternational hegemon. Since most Western states were incorporated intoa United States-led alliance against the Eastern Bloc, economic competi-tion between them was not usually translated into military rivalry. Previ-ously autonomous Western imperialisms, including British imperialism,became “sub-imperialisms” which could not function wholly indepen-dently of American support or approval. Colonial occupation was largelyabandoned and replaced with a non-territorial form of imperialism.

British imperial policy in Cyprus was, of course, affected by this widershift, becoming bound up with US interests and objectives. The island


had, by now, acquired major strategic importance. There were two majorreasons for Cyprus’ considerable strategic value in this period: oil andthe Cold War. By the end of WW2 the Middle East was becoming amajor producer of oil. Cyprus provided a conveniently situated militarybase from which Western access to Middle East oil could be defendedfrom Arab nationalist movements and from the Soviet Union. Cyprusalso provided a platform from which to defend southern Europe fromSoviet expansion. The Americans were anxious about the relatively weaksoutheastern flank of the NATO alliance—Greece and Turkey—whichthey feared might fall to internal and/or external communist forces.

Having outlined the imperial geostrategic context, the chapter willnow proceed with elaborating major developments in relation to Cyprusby focusing on three mini-phases: 1945–1960, 1960–1974, and lastly theperiod of the Turkish invasion and its aftermath.

1945–1960: Direct British Rule Challenged and Abandoned

From the end of WW2 until the early 1950s, US grand strategy effectivelyinvolved a delegation of responsibility to Britain for the policing of theMiddle East on behalf of Western interests. However, with the ejectionof the British from Palestine in 1948 and with Britain’s grip on its Suezbase slipping by the early 1950s, the United States lost confidence in theUK’s ability to perform this role and began to assume direct responsibilityfor the defense of Western interests in the Middle East (Stefanidis, 1999,p. 184). By late 1956, in the wake of the Suez debacle, Britain reluctantlyaccepted that it could no longer act unilaterally in the region withoutUnited States backing. It is no coincidence that from the late 1950s espe-cially, British policy in Cyprus became increasingly hard to distinguishfrom that of the United States.

However, British policy in Cyprus was certainly not wholly determinedby “external,” international political developments. We must also payclose attention to internal developments on the island. Two developmentsshould be mentioned: the rise of Moscow-aligned Aνoρθωτικó K óμμαEργαζ oμενoυ Λαoυ (AKEL) (Progressive Party of Working People)2

and the rise of Greek nationalism, which sought enosis and which con-fronted the British with an armed Greek-Cypriot nationalist insurgencyfrom 1955 onwards.3 From this point a major strategic objective for theBritish (and later the Americans) became the containment of thesethreats to their military and intelligence facilities. It is often claimed thatthe British intentionally stoked up intercommunal violence in Cyprus(Fouskas and Tackie, 2009, p. 16; Newsinger, 2002, pp. 84–107). Thereis no doubt that the British deliberately encouraged Turkish-Cypriots


to identify with Turkey as a counterweight to enosis from at least 1948when the colonial administration set up the “Special Turkish Commit-tee” with the “objective of establishing closer relations between Turkeyand the Turkish-Cypriot community” (Kızılyürek, 2006, p. 323). Fur-thermore, it is clear that the colonial authorities were more lenienttoward the Turkish-Cypriot paramilitary group, Türk Mukavemet Teski-lati (TMT) (Turkish Resistance Organization) than EθνικηOργ ανωσηK υπριων Aγωνιστ ων (EOKA) (National Organization of CypriotFighters) (Kızılyürek, 2006, p. 324). It is doubtful, however, that theBritish actively encouraged intercommunal violence on the island—civilwar would not have been in the interests of security of military facil-ities on Cyprus. Indeed, British generals warned government ministersin 1955 that an outbreak of sectarian violence could “seriously impairthe efficiency of Cyprus as a base” (O’Malley, 2006, p. 477). Therelative leniency shown toward Turkish-Cypriot terror groups can beexplained with reference to Britain’s desire not to antagonize the Turkishgovernment (Kızılyürek, 2006, p. 324).

1956 brought a historic shift in terms of Britain’s world imperial statusand strategy and led to a concomitant shift in British policy in Cyprus.With the decision to give up on the idea of an independent imperial strat-egy in the Middle East, the British government no longer possessed anoverriding reason to maintain Cyprus as a crown colony. British thinkingshifted toward the idea that the possession of military bases on Cyprus,rather than occupation of the entire island, would be enough for thepreservation of its major Cypriot interests. This shift in British thinkingconverged with a shift in the strategy of the leader of the Greek-Cypriotcampaign for self-determination, Archbishop Makarios III—by 1958 hestarted to call for independence rather than enosis—and put the islandon the road to nominal “independence.” From 1959 formal negotia-tions were conducted in relation to the establishment of an “independent”Cypriot state, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC).4

The Americans had favored such a solution for a while. Maintenanceof the current British colonial status quo was clearly becoming unten-able, but the United States was reluctant to countenance the unificationof Cyprus with Greece because this would exacerbate tensions betweenGreece and Turkey. Independence, it was hoped, would safeguard impe-rial military assets on the island while also removing a source of conflictbetween NATO allies.

1960–1974: The Republic

The negotiations produced a series of treaties and a constitution for theRoC, which came into effect in 1960. The main focus of the Treaty of


Establishment was the safeguarding of British interests. It provided fortwo SBAs—one at Akrotiri and the other at Dhekelia. The first of thesebases contained an airfield intended to “accommodate four squadronsof strategic bombers” (O’Malley and Craig, 1999, p. 81) equippedwith nuclear bomb carrying capacity, major electronic intelligence facil-ities and housed the Middle East Air Force and Middle East LandForce headquarters. The Dhekelia base accommodated further militarytelecommunications and intelligence stations. The Treaty of Establish-ment also made provision for Britain to retain 31 other sites outside ofthe SBAs. These sites included further intelligence and transmitting facil-ities. Furthermore, Britain was granted use of Cypriot roads and ports,the right to use Cypriot airspace and Nicosia airfield without restriction,and the right to commandeer the air-traffic control system.

The RoC’s constitutional arrangements, however, were a recipe forpolitical deadlock in a state marked by sectarian division. The British andAmericans, furthermore, became increasingly concerned about Makarios’sstrategy of courting the Communist Bloc and non-aligned countries in abid to gain international support for his attempts to alter the constitu-tion and, beyond this, for Cypriot self-determination (on Greek-Cypriotterms). In 1963, constitutional deadlock spilled over into violence, lead-ing to Turkish-Cypriot withdrawal from the joint Republic and theirtaking refuge in Turkish-Cypriot enclaves. The fighting and emergenceof an embryonic para-state system in the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves pre-sented the British and Americans with a problem—clearly the bicom-munal republic was now dead. Furthermore, it was becoming clearthat the Turkish government preferred partition—at the very least com-plete autonomy for the Turkish-Cypriot population—in order to ensurethe protection of Turkish-Cypriots.5 Indeed, in 1964 President LyndonJohnson, fearing war between Greece and Turkey, had to block prepa-rations for a Turkish invasion of the island designed to secure such anoutcome. As Britain’s and America’s most powerful NATO ally in theregion, Turkey’s preferences carried much weight. Only four years afterthe creation of the republic, American and British strategic thinkingshifted again and started to favor permanent institutionalization of thede facto partition of Cyprus.

By 1964 it became explicit that the United States favored some formof partition. The various plans canvassed by US Assistant Secretary ofState, George Ball, and former US Foreign Secretary, Dean Acheson, fromabout this time focused on the formal political division of the island—or, at least, in the case of the Acheson Plan, unification of most of theisland with Greece and the ceding to Turkey of a large area of Cyprusfor a military base. It is more convincing to regard this strategic shift onthe part of the United States (followed passively by Britain) as an ad hoc


response to the changing conditions on the island, guided by the corestrategic priority of safeguarding the SBAs and retained sites, rather thanas an expression of a long-held, overriding commitment to partition as avalued end in itself. US strategists would have looked for the most viablesolution—the form of settlement that would, in their judgment, mostquickly and efficiently re-establish order and stability on the island andalso dampen down the dispute between Greece and Turkey. Given theserious breakdown in Greek-Cypriot–Turkish-Cypriot relations and theemergence of de facto partition, a formal partitioning of the island wouldhave looked the most suitable settlement by 1964.

Makarios successfully out-maneuvered these plans, however, andCyprus settled into an uneasy peace in which informal division ofthe island gradually solidified. With the return of relative stability, theurgency of the requirement to broker a new political settlement becameless pressing. As long as Western assets were relatively safe, the UnitedStates was content to accept the new post-1963–1964 status quo. Never-theless, the volatility of the new status quo meant that a more permanentsolution involving partition would have been preferable and plans for suchan outcome were certainly not scrapped.

The Turkish Invasion and Aftermath

There can be little doubt that the Turkish invasion would not have goneahead without tacit United States approval. Opinion differs in relation tothe extent of American involvement in Ankara’s decision to invade and itis hard to disentangle the facts from various conspiracy theories deeplyembedded in popular mythology on the island and reflected in manyhistorical narratives. It is difficult to believe, however, that the invasionwould have gone ahead without a “green signal” from Washington.

Clearly, the United States was happy with the post-invasion politicalsituation—several key US objectives had been achieved whether by designor accident. First, Makarios was now out of the picture. Secondly, after aperiod of rapprochement between Turkey and the Soviet Union (drivenby Turkey’s irritation at America’s prevention of its planned 1964 inva-sion) (Constandinos, 2011, p. 20), Turkey had now been wooed backfirmly into the NATO fold, having been allowed to take territory onCyprus. Thirdly, the Cypriot political situation was more stable and pre-dictable after 1974 than it had been from 1963 to 1974. The Britishmilitary sites, too, had been left largely intact. Britain lost 12 of its 31facilities on Cyprus as a result of the invasion but maintained control overthe most important sites including its two SBAs. Unsurprisingly, perhaps,little effort was put into any attempt to reunite the two communities for


some time. Yet this did not mean that the United States or UK wouldgo as far as to officially recognize the new Turkish-occupied part of theisland, which declared itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus(TRNC) in 1983.

Foreign intervention in Cyprus in the era of “Superpower Imperial-ism,” then, was largely shaped by the exigencies of Cold War rivalry.Imperial strategy underwent several fundamental shifts in this period inresponse to the changing internal and external pressures on core imperialinterests—direct colonial occupation was abandoned in favor of supportfor qualified “independence,” which then shifted to acquiescence in a con-dition of de facto partition and finally changed to tacit support for (or atleast acceptance of ) a more permanent form of partition at the hands ofthe Turkish invasion force. In all of these shifts imperial strategy pivotedon a core, non-negotiable interest—security of Western access to mili-tary and intelligence facilities on Cyprus must be maintained. A second,central objective was keeping Turkey firmly within NATO. These wereimportant strategic objectives for the United States and UK in the widerimperial context of struggle against the Eastern Bloc and in defense ofWestern access to Middle East oil.

Recent Developments: Holbrooke,the Annan Plan, and the EU

The imperial landscape since 1991 has been marked by US primacy, butalso by “a shifting global distribution of economic power” (Callinicos,2009, p. 138) that has underpinned certain centrifugal tendencies inthe geopolitical situation. The relative fluidity of the current geopoliticalconjuncture has arisen as an effect of the collapse of the Eastern Blocwhich destroyed a major factor contributing to the post-WW2 rationalefor US hegemonic leadership. US strategic planners have been concernedwith the tasks of keeping powerful allies firmly within the US ambit andseeking to contain actual or potential rivals that are only partially incorpo-rated within the US hegemonic system—Russia and China in particular.The United States has also been determined to maintain and extend itscontrol over major reserves of oil and gas in the Middle East and CentralAsia and this goal has clearly been a major factor in the “War on Terror.”6

Cyprus remains a valuable asset in this new imperial context. Theisland is still an important military base for British and American forcesand has been used in support of several operations in this period—inKuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans, for example (Kyriakides,2006b, pp. 530–531). RAF Akrotiri has been particularly valuable as astaging post in support of operations in the Middle East. Indeed, given


the continuing importance of the Middle East in terms of oil productionand Cyprus’ close proximity to the region, it is not surprising that the mil-itary significance of the island remains high. Arguably the most importantstrategic value of the SBAs and retained sites remains the intelligence facil-ities they provide. Cyprus houses sophisticated long-range radar antennaeat Akrotiri and a GCHQ listening station in the Ayios Nikolaos area ofthe Dhekelia base, for example.

It is important, furthermore, to situate the importance of Cyprus inthis period within the context of the grand strategic approach with regardto the Eastern Mediterranean formulated in the mid-1990s by US Under-Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke. Holbrooke undertook a review ofUS policy in the Eastern Mediterranean region in the wake of the col-lapse of the Soviet Union. His strategic approach would closely informUS policy right up to the present day. Holbrooke identified Turkey as a“pivotal state” in the region, which was central to US hegemony. Therewere two major reasons for this. The first had to do with energy supplies.For Holbrooke it was imperative that the United States enjoyed securityof access to major energy sources in the Middle East and the Caucuses.Maintaining close relations with Turkey was crucial in relation to thisaim. The second major reason was that the secularist state in Turkey con-stituted a bulwark against the spread of Islamic fundamentalism. It was,furthermore, the only broadly Islamic country in the region with “thepotential to become integrated in the Western political system, and conse-quently to function as a lever” (Perikleous, 2009, p. 23) for US hegemonywithin the wider Middle East. The full integration of Turkey into the“Western political system,” for Holbrooke, “meant integration into theEU” (Perikleous, 2009, p. 28). For Holbrooke, however, this required afar-reaching process of internal democratization and reform within theTurkish state and also the “normalization of its relations with Greece”(Perikleous, 2009, p. 28)—this latter requirement required, in turn, asolution on Cyprus.

The Holbrooke strategy entailed significant shifts in US policy in rela-tion to Turkey and Cyprus. From the mid-1990s the United States exertedpressure on Turkey to reform its internal political system and lobbied forTurkish accession to the EU. There was also a reversal of policy towardCyprus. From 1974 until the 1990s US policy on Cyprus had been tacitdefense of the post-invasion status quo. Holbrooke believed, however, thata solution on Cyprus was essential for the removal of a key source ofpotential instability in the region and, further, that accession of Cyprus tothe EU would function as a catalyst for such a solution (Perikleous, 2009,p. 29). We must bear the Holbrooke strategy in mind in the followinganalysis of the recent history of Cyprus.


Toward the Annan Plan

In 1990 the RoC applied for EU membership on behalf of the wholeisland. The EU appeared initially reluctant to organize Cypriot accessionwithout a prior solution. This had changed by the mid-1990s, how-ever, when the EU came under diplomatic pressure from the UnitedStates—in line with the Holbrooke strategy—to organize its accession.7

As Holbrooke had suggested, the accession process gave new impetusto the search for a solution to the “Cyprus problem.” Further impetuswas added when in 1999 the British and Americans pushed a resolu-tion through the G8, which called upon the UN to arrange negotiationsin relation to such a settlement—the UN complied and UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annan took charge of talks.

Two major shifts in the balance of political forces in Turkey and theTRNC from 2002, helped to accelerate this process. First, the victory ofthe pro-EU Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) (Justice and DevelopmentParty) in the Turkish elections of 2002 opened up the possibility of imme-diate reform along the lines Holbrooke saw as necessary for the integrationof Turkey into the “Western” political system. The AKP’s support for EUmembership made it willing to compromise on Cyprus. This develop-ment was intertwined with another major shift. Between 2000 and 2003a mass uprising against the president of the TRNC, Rauf Denktas, tookplace in northern Cyprus. Among other demands the protesters called forreunification of Cyprus on the basis of a federal solution. These transfor-mations of the political landscape helped to create promising conditionsfor the implementation of a settlement on the island in the shape of theAnnan Plan. They also converged with wider US strategic planning aimedat reinforcing its hegemony in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The Annan Plan and After

The Annan Plan was put to an island-wide referendum in April 2004.It represented the first realistic chance for a breakthrough in relation to thepolitical impasse decisively established in 1974. The Annan Plan bitterlydivided the Left in Cyprus: AKEL eventually rejected the plan8 whilstCumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP) (Republican Turkish Party) wholeheart-edly endorsed it.9 The plan was denounced by some quarters of the Left(and beyond) as transparently imperialist,10 whilst others saw it as thebasis for lasting settlement overcoming the divide.11 Certainly the planfitted closely with the imperial objectives of the United States and Britain.As we have seen, US pressure for a solution on Cyprus converged withthe Holbrooke strategy. Further, it is clear that the plan was designed


to smooth the way for Turkish entry into the EU—a key United Statesand British strategic objective. In addition, the incorporation of the 1960treaties into the plan cannot be explained without reference to Britain’sand the United States’ desire to ensure that the SBAs and retained sitesenjoyed absolute legal and political security under new constitutionalconditions.

Though the plan intertwined closely with US and British imperialobjectives, it would be too crude to suggest that it was wholly reducibleto imperialist interests. Anti-imperialist critics of the Annan Plan typ-ically overstate its allegedly malign elements and the extent to which itsimplementation was necessary for imperialist interests to prevail. As againstwhat Perry Anderson (2008) suggests, for example, it is clearly not thecase that the continued security of the SBAs and retained sites in thecontext of EU accession depended on the implementation of the AnnanPlan. As we will see, the rejection of the plan has not put these militarysites in jeopardy. In addition these critics typically underplay, or ignore,the existence of significant bases of support for the Annan Plan amongCypriots of both communities (Perikleous, 2009, p. 313). For those onthe Left who supported the plan, the question was and remains essen-tially a tactical one: despite shortcomings and elements that may serveimperial interests, to what extent does a bizonal bicommunal federationsettlement like the Annan Plan serve the interests of the Cypriot people?To what extent can such a settlement provide a political framework inwhich common, intercommunal democratic and labor struggles amongGreek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots for socialist objectives are realizedand facilitated?

The Annan Plan was rejected by 76 percent of Greek-Cypriots whereas65 percent of Turkish-Cypriots accepted it. The RoC acceded to the EUin May 2004 without a settlement having been achieved. Trimikliniotisrightly characterizes the post-Annan period as “an uneasy sense of ‘unset-tlement’ ” (2007, p. 124) and a “protracted state of limbo” (2007, p. 123).

As against what anti-imperialist critics such as Anderson suggest, it isdifficult to see that the rejection of the Annan Plan amounted to a blowagainst imperialism. The SBAs and retained sites look to be as secureas they have ever been. The accession of Cyprus to the EU without asettlement has not thrown up any problems for the continuing presence ofthese bases. Indeed, the SBAs remain fully functional cogs in the Westernmilitary machine. Recently, RAF Akrotiri has been used as a staging postfor support aircraft engaged in military intervention in Libya (BBC News,2011). It is also vital for the support of military operations in Afghanistan(Taylor, 2011). For Britain and the United States, then, reunification ofCyprus along the lines of the Annan Plan would have been, and still is,


preferable, but was, and is, certainly not essential in terms of their currentstrategic interests on the island.

The United States and UK and, indeed, the United Nations andEuropean Union, remain committed to the Annan Plan as the basis forany search for a solution on Cyprus. There have been several attemptsto restart the negotiations process since 2004 but none has yet beensuccessful. Since the referendum the UK has put significant effort intoseeking to alleviate the political and economic isolation of the TRNC—lobbying for the lifting of trade embargoes and for the establishing ofdirect trade between northern Cyprus and the EU, for example (Potier,2006, pp. 616–618). In doing so, it has sought to keep the AnnanPlan on the agenda—rewarding Turkish-Cypriots for the “yes” voteand putting pressure on Greek-Cypriots to reconsider their rejection ofthe plan.

We have seen that imperial involvement in Cyprus since the 1990shas been shaped by US post–Cold War grand strategy (with the UK as ajunior partner). In this period previous US tacit support for the divisionof the island shifted to support for reunification as wider developments inthe global imperial context led to a change in US policy toward Turkeyand its occupation of northern Cyprus. The Holbrooke strategy, in partic-ular, brought significant shifts in the political situation on the island andcontributed strongly to the formulation of the Annan Plan. The UnitedStates and Britain remain committed to the Annan Plan as the basis forany settlement on the island. They would certainly prefer reunificationof the island on the terms of the Annan Plan, but we have also seenthat it is not essential for their strategic interests that such a solution isachieved.

Conclusion

This chapter has aimed to show that British and American imperialismhas played a fundamental role in shaping the modern history of Cyprus.Indeed, Western imperialism has always been a central component of the“Cyprus problem.” The “Cyprus problem” is not reducible to British orUS imperialism, but British and, from around 1945, US, foreign policyhas been deeply bound up with most of the major historical developmentson the island in modern times. As we have seen, British colonial policycontributed in no small measure to the emergence of social and politicaldivision along ethnic lines that was to have such terrible consequences.British and American imperialism also played a key role in the reformu-lation of political structures in Cyprus in 1960, which was effectively areconfiguration of the mode of imperial domination. Further, one cannot


see the Turkish invasion in isolation from the wider context of contem-porary American interests. In addition, the formulation of the AnnanPlan must be understood in the context of post–Cold War US strategicplanning.

One of the major arguments in this chapter has been that the nature ofimperial domination in relation to Cyprus has corresponded closely withthe changing nature of the world imperialist context. Thus, the islandwas first acquired by the British in the age of “High Imperialism” at atime of competitive scrambling among European powers for colonial pos-sessions. Post-WW2 imperialism in Cyprus was deeply conditioned byCold War confrontation. In this period the need to preserve access tothe island as a base for military and intelligence operations in the battleagainst communism and for the defense of oil supplies shaped imperialpolicy. From 1991 the strategic significance of the island was transformedagain. Cyprus became a useful strategic tool in the projection of Americanhegemony across the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East as cen-trifugal tendencies born out of the collapse of the Soviet Union threatenedto weaken the protectorate alliances it had built during the Cold War.With the formulation of the Holbrooke doctrine Cyprus became, for awhile, of pivotal importance for US grand strategy in the Middle East.It was this development in US strategy that, in large part, led to the for-mulation of the Annan Plan—although, as we have seen, the Annan Planwas certainly not reducible to imperial interests. At the same time, nation-alist chauvinism cannot masquerade as anti-imperialism to disguise classinterest or state-based, ethno-racial or other chauvinist ideologies. Thetwo communities can build a common future based on a political systemthat safeguards genuine communal and individual equality once they doaway with ideologies which attempt to justify Greek-Cypriot dominationover the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriot partitionism. It is for theCypriot people to devise such a system; a bizonal bicommunal federationis what they have opted for, even though they are yet to agree on thedetails.

The common thread running through each of the three periods interms of core imperial interests is that Cyprus has been regarded asa strategic asset in pursuit of the projection of military power acrossthe Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East in defense of key strategicresources and in order to contain rival powers and threats. For most ofthe first period, the strategic importance of the island to Britain was rel-atively small—despite the initial assessment of Disraeli’s cabinet. In thesecond and third periods, however, Cyprus became of great strategic value.The overriding concern of Britain and the United States in Cyprus since


around 1945 has been maintenance of the military and intelligence baseson the island and their defense from both external and internal challenges.

A second important interest has been America’s relationship withTurkey—policy in relation to Cyprus has been significantly shaped bythis relationship. The major objective in this respect has been the main-tenance of a close United States–Turkey alliance in order to strengthenUS hegemony in the region. The various shifts in imperial policy towardthe island since WW2 on the part of the United States and Britain havebeen made with these core objectives and interests in mind. Imperial strat-egy in Cyprus has—from 1960 especially—been marked by flexibilityin pursuit of these objectives. Various “solutions” compatible with theseaims have been brokered, imposed, or otherwise tried out whenever thesecurity of the bases and retained sites appeared to be endangered andwhenever US strategy in relation to Turkey demanded a shift. As againstmany conspiracy theory type accounts of Western imperialism in Cyprus,partition, then, whenever this has indeed been deliberate policy on thepart of Anglo-American imperialism, was only ever functional for, ratherthan essential to, Western imperialist interests. There has never beenany essential commitment to partition on the part of American andBritish imperialism. Imperial policy has, from WW2, pivoted on the coreobjectives identified above—thus, as political circumstances internal andexternal to the island have changed, imperial policy in relation to Cyprushas changed accordingly in pursuit of central objectives. Imperial policyon Cyprus has been marked much more by ad hoc responses to vari-ous shifting pressures than it has by any unchanging master plan—butthese ad hoc shifts have been underpinned by long-running core strategicinterests.

These central objectives are still of key importance to British andAmerican imperial strategy today. The SBAs and retained sites remaina major feature of the Cypriot political (and geographical) landscape.They are likely to remain so for a long time to come unless Cypriots—ofboth communities—can find a way together to pressure the British (andAmericans) to withdraw. A reunified Cyprus would provide more favor-able conditions for such a campaign than the current situation of division.But, certainly, for as long as the bases remain, British and Americanimperialism will continue to constitute a major facet of the ongoing“Cyprus problem.” The key is seeking a settlement that would allowGreek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to further their common strugglesby articulating the interests of the subaltern classes and challenging theimperial remnants in the country. These very elements are destabilizingthe whole region. Resolving the problem would move history forward.


Notes

1. See Callinicos, (2009), pp. 137–187. Callinicos’s particular conceptualiza-tion of imperialism is not shared by all theorists, of course—even withinthe current Marxist tradition. Indeed the editors of this book are critical ofCallinicos’s approach. For other recent Marxist theorizations of imperialism,see, for example, Wood (2003), Panitch and Gindin (2003), and Milios andSotiropoulos (2009).

2. See Charalambous’s chapter in this volume.3. See Milios and Kyprianidis’s chapter in this volume.4. For more, see Milios and Kyprianidis’s and Aslan’s chapters in this volume.5. Some observers suggest that Turkey had favored partition since the 1956

Erim report—see Ellis (2010). For an overview of Turkey’s strategy towardCyprus, see Mallinson (2009), pp. 109–112.

6. For more on US imperial strategy today, see Callinicos (2009), pp. 188–227.7. On the EU’s initial reluctance and Holbrooke’s efforts to push his strategy,

see Perikleous (2009), pp. 26–31.8. See Trimikliniotis (2006) and Chapter 2 in this volume.9. See Kizilyurek’s chapter in this volume.

10. See Anderson (2008) and Fouskas and Tackie (2009), for example.11. See Trimikliniotis (2006, 2010a) and Tombazos (2010).

C h a p t e r 5

Greek andGreek-CypriotPolitical Strategieson Independence:Class, Nation,and StatehoodJohn Milios and Tasos Kyprianidis

Introduction

Our aim is to conduct a detailed analysis of the political power balanceand the strategies of the leading political Greek-Cypriot groups in Cyprus,and also the political strategy of the Greek state, chiefly in the period pre-ceding the agreements of Zurich and London, the founding documentsof the Republic of Cyprus. Our assertion is that the establishment of theCypriot state was determined primarily by the dynamics of the class andpolitical power balance in Cyprus and secondarily by the dynamics ofbalance of forces at the international level that shaped developments inCyprus.

First Phase: “Enosis” or Union with Greecethe Common Strategy of Greek

and the Greek-Cypriot Leadership (1945–1957)

The Pre-History and the Political Context in Cyprus

Cyprus was ceded to Great Britain in 1878 following an agreement withthe Ottoman Empire, the island’s previous rulers. Yet until October 1914

100 J O H N M I L I O S A N D TA S O S K Y P R I A N I D I S

when Turkey entered the First World War on the side of the CentralPowers and Britain annexed Cyprus in return, it did not assert absolutesovereignty on the island. Indeed, initially the British rulers in Cypruswere simply tributaries of the Ottoman Sultan, who was recognized as the“supreme sovereign” of Cyprus.

At the economic level the status of tributary to the Sultan for theCypriots translated into high taxes, imposed by the British to help thempay their “rent” to the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman system forrepresentation of the subject Christian population (of Greek-Cypriots)was retained after the “absolute” annexation of Cyprus by Britain. Thisarrangement involved recognition of the religious leader, the Archbishopof Cyprus, as the political representative of the Greek-Cypriots. In 1754the Sultan in fact bestowed further privileges on the Greek-CypriotArchbishop, essentially extending his power to cover the Turkish-Cypriotpopulation also (Psyroukis, 1975, p. 179). Thus, from the very first dayof British sovereign rule, the Greek-Cypriots had their own system ofpolitical representation and their own representative (the religious politi-cal Ethnarchy) to counterpose to the rulers. After 1914, the Archbishopwould be elected by a body of 66 electors, 33 secular and 22 clericals inaccordance with the “Statutory Charter” of 1914.

Furthermore, Greek-Cypriots almost totally dominated the island’sdomestic economy, marginalizing the Turkish-Cypriot minority (18 per-cent of the total population). Until the First World War, the “Ethnarchy,”de facto the Greek-Cypriot population’s only “party,” exerted simulta-neous political and social power of such strength as to enable it appar-ently to represent the “will of the Cypriot people” and not just of theGreek-Cypriots.

The British governed Cyprus through a system of “joint administra-tion” based on two councils (the “Legislature” and the “Executive”). After1925 there were 12 elected Greeks, three elected Turks, and nine Britons(the so-called “official members”) in the Legislature. This system of gov-ernment enabled them to secure “proportional representation” of theisland’s two communities without ever permitting any leeway for ques-tioning of British domination. It is, however, characteristic of the capacityfor “political expression” of the national communities within the Britishgovernmental system that “the desire for enosis had in many cases beenproclaimed from the rostrum of the Cypriot Parliament” (Kranidiotis,1981, p. 17).

The system was supplemented by yet another “democratic institution”:free elections at the municipal level, which made it possible for Greek-Cypriot mayors to be elected in almost all of the island’s municipalities

G R E E K A N D G R E E K -C Y P R I O T P O L I T I C A L S T R AT E G I E S 101

and communes. Finally, both Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots par-ticipated in the Cypriot police and administration.

The economic and social developments in Cyprus throughout thetwentieth century together with the indirect influence of the ideolog-ical developments in Greece and the impact of October Revolutiongave birth to alternative Greek-Cypriot political and social movements.The most important of these organizations was the K oμμoυνιστ ικóK óμμα K υπρoυ (KKK) (Communist Party of Cyprus), which wasfounded on August 15, 1926, in Limassol (Mastrogiannopoulos, 1981,p. 12). The KKK put itself in the frontline of the trade union and socialstruggles of the Greek-Cypriot workers and rapidly acquired influence.The KKK also played a pioneering role “in establishing agricultural co-operatives and other farmers’ associations, cultural societies et cetera”(Mastrogiannopoulos, 1981, p. 17). In 1941 the KKK established theAνoρθωτικó K óμμα Eργαζ oμενoυ Λαoυ (AKEL) (Progressive Partyof the Working People), with which it merged completely in 1944.

As a result, “Ethnarchy” now became only representative of the conser-vative segment of Greek-Cypriots but retained its “institutional” characterwithin the British colonial system and continued to be recognized by theBritish administration as “the” representative of the Greek-Cypriots.

In October 1931 the Greek-Cypriot population rose in rebellion withthe demand for enosis of Cyprus with Greece,

The 1931 uprising was put down and a state of terror and dictatorshipwas imposed on the people of Cyprus . . .The regime of absolutism, of“Palmerocracy” that followed the events of October introduced new dictato-rial laws that prohibited all political activity and organization and all politicalfunctions, abolished freedom of the press, freedom of association, freedom tomarch, freedom to teach Greek history, raise the Greek flag, and much else.

(AKEL, 1952, in L.T., AKEL, Psyroukis, 1977, p. 35)

At the same time two prominent members of the ecclesiastical hierarchyin Cyprus were sent into exile, resulting in suspension of the proceduresfor electing the Archbishop from 1933 until 1947. In 1937 in fact lawswere passed providing that candidates for the Archiepiscopate had to beapproved by the colonial government.

With Greece’s entry into the Second World War on the side of theAllies, the emergency measures in Cyprus were relaxed. The exiled leadersof the uprising of 1931 were allowed to return to Cyprus, the OrthodoxSynod was reconstituted, and in 1943 the political parties were legalizedand free municipal elections were proclaimed, in which the now legal


AKEL achieved significant gains. In 1946 the religious laws of 1937 wererepealed. In 1943 the political leadership called upon the Greek-Cypriotsto enlist as volunteers in the British army and around 25,000—30,000Greek-Cypriots responded to this appeal (Mastrogiannopoulos, 1981,p. 20; AKEL, 1952).

The Period of “Preparation” for the Enosis Struggle(1945–1949)

The first five-year period following the end of the Second World War is ofdecisive importance for the shaping of the political forces but also for theformation of the policy of the Greek state in relation to Cyprus. What iscrucial is that despite internal divisions within Greek-Cypriot scene andsharpening divisions between Greek and Greek-Cypriot political leaders,there was a consensus around enosis of Cyprus with Greece. Furthermore,the enlistment of Greek-Cypriots in the British army and the lifting of thecolonial government’s emergency measures created an impression that the“national aspirations” of the Greek-Cypriots could be fulfilled.

With the “restoration of constitutional order” municipal and commu-nal elections were held in Cyprus in which the candidates of “NationalCollaboration,” supported by AKEL, were elected in the island’s fourbig municipalities. The backbone of the Right was the Church and the“Ethnarchy,” within whose organizational structures (Ethnarchy Council)secular activists also participated. Thus the balance of forces and the ten-dencies formed in the upper echelons of the Church are of more decisivepolitical importance than the orientations of the unequivocally politicalor trade union movements.

Though the ideological climate in Greece characterized by the head-oncollision of Right and Left was transmitted to Cyprus, the two camps inCyprus still managed to coexist on the basis of the shared strategy of enosis.Thus the Leftist mayor of Nicosia participated in the Ethnarchy Council.Through his presence he legitimized a political institution as represent-ing all Greek-Cypriots, which in essence functioned as the “party” of theCypriot Right. In early 1947 a common Representation “Embassy” wasestablished, headed by the suffragan bishop occupying the archiepiscopalthrone, who went to London to submit to the British government thedemand for enosis.

The British government did not accept the Greek-Cypriot demandsand made the counterproposal of granting a “Constitution of Self-Government” under the suzerainty of the British governor. The“Ethnarchy” immediately rejected this proposal, while AKEL accepted itbecause they regarded the constitutional reform as a step toward enosis.


This period witnessed the struggle between AKEL and Ethnarchy forpolitical hegemony. The refusal of the Ethnarchy to enter into the consti-tutional framework established by the colonial Government and AKEL’sparticipation in it strengthened the influence of the Ethnarchy overGreek-Cypriots at the expense of AKEL. Until after march 1949, whenAKEL decided to refuse all participation in the colonial governmentalsystem, boycotting also all the functions of the Ethnarchy (apart fromthe referendum of January 1950, see below), as a result of a change ofleadership, AKEL continued to extend legitimacy to the Church andthe “Ethnarchy.” It participated in the procedures for election of theArchbishop-Ethnarch that took place in May 1947 that led to the elec-tion of “moderate” Metropolitan of Paphos Leontios and in the electionof Metropolitan of Kyrenia, representative of the Cypriot far Right inDecember 1947.

During the period under examination (1945–1949) the policy ofGreece in relation to Cyprus could be characterized as one of non-involvement due to the civil war and her aspirations for entry into thepolitical and military system of the advanced capitalist countries of theWest. Greece also aimed to ensure non-involvement of Turkey in Cyprusas the non-involvement of Greece and Turkey would amount to Cyprusconflict being perceived as a disagreement between Great Britain and the“Ethnarchy” as the representative of the “overwhelming majority of theCypriot people”, who were aspiring to “self-determination.”

This common Greek and Greek-Cypriot strategy involved a certainfutility insofar as it left out of account both the persistent refusal of Britainto countenance direct acceptance of the “Cypriot people’s right to self-determination” and the reaction of the Turkish-Cypriots.

The Escalation of the Struggle under the Hegemonyof the “Ethnarchy” (January 1950–October 1955)

This period is significant as the “Ethnarchy” secured absolute politicalhegemony of the Greek-Cypriot political forces. A key feature of thisperiod turned out to be the escalation of the diplomatic and politicalactivities of the Greek state, in which the Ethnarchy engaged in closecollaboration.

This particular phase started with the referendum organized by the“Ethnarchy” on January 15, 1950, supported by the Left. As muchas 95.7 percent of the adult Greek-Cypriot population voted in favorof enosis of Cyprus with Greece. The referendum served to legitimizethe “Ethnarchy” as the undisputed representative of the Greek-Cypriotpeople.


This period is also significant because British government exhibitedher decision to categorically refuse enosis by putting forward the strategicimportance of the island for the British Empire. It thus became clear thatthe strategy of “non-intervention” by the Greek state had exhausted itspotential. Britain’s “intransigent” stance necessitated more dynamic Greekinvolvement to change the balance of political forces in Cyprus.

Precisely at this moment the archiepiscopal throne in Cyprus fellvacant again with the death of Archbishop Makarios II. The electionwas won by the Metropolitan of Kition Makarios on October 20, 1950.Although he did not belong to the new far-right tendency in Kyrenia,the new archbishop, Makarios III, seemed at that time to be a “dyed-in-the-wool nationalist” (N. Kranidiotis, 1981, pp. 45–46). AKEL boy-cotted the archiepiscopal elections, characterizing them as a “chauvinisticfarce.”

Hence the Ethnarchy re-established close contact with the Greek gov-ernment and the Greek opposition parties with a view to establishingtactical coordination. This led to forming a common decision-makingcenter and joint headquarters for directing the struggle for enosis, with theaim of marginalizing the Cypriot Left politically and thereby diminishingits role in resolving the Cyprus problem.

The chosen policy would be carried out through two methods:(a) internationalization of the Cyprus question, chiefly through secur-ing recognition from the UN of “the Cypriot people’s right to self-determination” and (b) intensification of the conflict in Cyprus, includingrecourse to armed struggle.

(a) The policy of internationalization was launched in 1953 by theGreek government under general Papagos. Greece submitted apetition on the Cyprus problem to the Ninth General Assemblyof the UN (September 1954) but the General Assembly resolvedto engage in “no further examination of the subject.” The nextGreek petition to the 10th General Assembly of the UN inSeptember 1955 met with a similar fate.

The United Nation’s resolution not to implement the “princi-ple of self-determination” in the case of Cyprus was a reflectionof the position that the Cypriots are not a “distinct people”but a population comprising Greeks (the majority) and Turks(the minority) and that therefore any attempted solution ofthe Cypriot problem should derive from a peaceful settlementbetween the three interested parties: Great Britain, Greece, andTurkey. This rationale was supported by the Western countrieswho sought to keep Cyprus within the framework of the North


Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and it was also shared byThird World countries, which saw the Cyprus problem more as adispute among three NATO countries than as a question of colo-nial oppression. Turkey’s intervention played a decisive role here.According to Turkey, what was presented by Greece as the “rightto self-determination of the Cypriots” was in reality a demandfor territorial annexation by a particular country that would denythe Turks living in Cyprus their “right to self-determination.”Thus, contrary to the expectations of the Greek and Greek-Cypriot leadership, the Greek-Cypriots’ struggle for enosis didnot, in this phase, obtain substantial international recognitionand legitimization.

Simultaneously with international diplomatic activity on thepart of Greece, mass mobilizations were stepped up in Cyprus.The “Ethnarchy” and AKEL rejected every proposal by the colo-nial authorities that they should participate in a “constitutionalsystem of government.” The mobilizations and strikes intensi-fied, reaching a peak when Greece’s appeal for recognition of theCypriots’ “right to self-determination” was rejected by the UnitedNations (UN) General Assembly.

Internationalization of the Cyprus problem and the activesupport of Greece for the demand of “self-determination andenosis” on the one hand aggravated the reactions of Turkish-Cypriots and on the other led to a more energetic involvementof Turkey in the question of Cyprus. Immediately after Greecesubmitted its appeal to the UN, Turkey declared its inten-tion (and its “right”) to participate together with Greece in thedecision-making process for the future of Cyprus.

(b) In parallel with the policy of internationalization, Greek-Cypriotand Greek policy was becoming oriented, from the early 1950s, toorganizing an armed struggle in Cyprus as a means of forcing theBritish (and also the Turks) finally to accept a political settlementon the basis of “self-determination.”

Only two months after the election of Makarios, in December1950, G. Grivas met in Athens with General G. Kosmas, head ofthe General Staff of the Greek Armed Forces, and secured his con-sent for the launching of the armed struggle in Cyprus (Grivas,1961, p. 15). In October 1952, Grivas arrived in Cyprus and inMarch 1953 the final decision was taken for the armed struggleto commence.

The armed organization established in Cyprus by G. Grivas,EθνικηOργ ανωση Kυπριων Aγωνιστ ων (EOKA) (National


Organisation of Cypriot Fighters), was an irregular military orga-nization entirely subordinated to the policies and the diplomaticinitiatives and orders that came from the joint political leader-ship in Athens and Nicosia (Ethnarchy). The ideological pro-file of the organization was, of course, crystal clear: enosis andanti-communism (Kranidiotis, 1981, p. 74).

The armed struggle finally got under way on April 1, 1955. Theappearance of EOKA was duly followed by the appearance of theTurkish-Cypriot armed organization Volkan (Volcanoe) and the TürkMukavemet Teskilati (TMT) (Turkish Resistance Organisation) (Grivas,1961, pp. 50–51 and 91) but also by reorganization of the Cypriotpolice, with mass exit of Greek-Cypriots and mass appointment ofTurkish-Cypriot policemen.

Plans for Resolving the Cyprus Question and the Sharpeningof Conflict (October 1955–March 1957)

This period was characterized by Great Britain’s political initiatives andcertain “plans for resolution” in response to the balance of forces in Cyprusand international dynamics. The negotiations Makarios conducted withthe Governor of Cyprus, Harding, which started in October 1955 andlasted until March 1956, marks the beginning of the new period.

The Harding Plan included providing for “broad self-government” ofthe people of Cyprus. Makarios counterproposed a three-point plan:

1. Recognition by the British government of the Cypriot people’s right toself-determination is the indispensable foundation for any solution to theCyprus question. 2. Following such official recognition (of the right to self-determination), the Archbishop would be willing to work together with theBritish government to elaborate a constitution for self-government and put itinto immediate application. 3. The time for implementation of the principle ofself-determination would be a subject for discussion between the British gov-ernment and the representatives of the Cypriot people who would be electedon the basis of this constitution.

(Kranidiotis, 1987, p. 17; Kranidiotis, 1987 and Kranidiotis, 1981,pp. 112–180)

In the negotiations that followed, the British positions gradually cameto approximate the above-mentioned plan of the Greek-Cypriots. TheBritish declared that they agree to recognize the Cypriots’ right to self-determination, detach the non-immediate cession of that right from


British and NATO interests and provide verbal guarantees that in thearrangements for self-government there will be provision for a Greek-Cypriot prime minister, a Greek-Cypriot ministry with participation ofonly one Turkish-Cypriot minister and that in the parliament there willbe proportional representation of the two communities. Verbal guar-antees were also to be provided that there will be an amnesty for theEOKA fighters. The British Governor would exercise the function of“regulator of the polity,” would retain powers over questions concern-ing external policy and defense and would also continue to exert powersin relation to “public security,” “for such time as this is considerednecessary.”

This framework for resolving the Cyprus problem was accepted bothby the “Ethnarchy” (see Kranidiotis, 1987, pp.167–170 and 92–94)and by the Greek government (Kranidiotis, 1987, pp. 27 and 57–58). ButMakarios was continually insisting on improvements to the text, almostall having to do with the “constitutional regime of self-government.” Thisled finally to breakdown of the talks. There followed declarations bothfrom the “Ethnarchy” and from the Greek government, officially rejectingthe Harding Plan.

The rejection of the British proposals was a result of the internal bal-ance of forces both in Cyprus and in Greece. Hence the Harding Planwas rejected because it was impossible to directly challenge British powerin Cyprus and force the British to withdraw and that the internationaland domestic balance of forces precluded elimination of the Turkish-Cypriots and the Turkish factor. Given the non-existence of a single“Cypriot people,” the principle of self-determination would most likelybe interpreted as self-determination of each nationality separately, that isto say “dual enosis” and partition of Cyprus. This solution was now openlysupported by the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey. Turkey put forward itsdefense requirements in response to the Greek argument that two-foldself-determination was “unenforceable” because there was no territorialseparation of the two nationalities, so that there would have to be popu-lation displacement. Since Cyprus is only 40 miles away from Turkey, itsannexation by Greece without concessions to Turkey would amount toa radical alteration of the strategic balance between the two countries.Therefore, the Greek strategy, through this transitional phase of self-government, aimed at effecting a radical change in the strategic balancebetween the two countries (first of all in Cyprus), so that enosis—withoutany trade-offs with Turkey—would become feasible.

In the meantime, as negotiations continued, conflict was escalating tounprecedented levels in Cyprus. On November 26, 1955, a state of emer-gency was declared “on account of the tension from the terrorist violence,”


and AKEL and all the trade unions and other mass organizations linkedto it were outlawed and Left newspapers were closed. Yet the mass ral-lies, demonstrations, clashes with the police, and the activity of EOKA allcontinued.

Rejection of the Harding Plan led to a sharpening of the conflictbetween the British administration and the Cypriot political leadership,with an accompanying rapprochement between the different tendenciesof the Greek-Cypriot Right (the “Ethnarchy” and the “hard-liners” ofKyrenia). In March 1956, “in the interests of the promotion of peaceand order,” Makarios, the Metropolitan of Kyrenia Polykarpos Ioannidesand the Secretary to the Metropolitan of Kyrenia were arrested and exiledto the Seychelles.

On December 19, 1956, a draft constitution for “self-government”under which the Governor would be given increased powers, referredto as the Radcliffe Plan, was announced, with accompanying relax-ation of the emergency measures in Cyprus. The most significantelement in the British initiative was not the framework for “self-government” but the explicit clarification by the British Government thatthe Cypriot people’s future “self-determination” would have the char-acter of “self-determination” of each nationality separately (Kranidiotis,1981, p. 239 ff.).

The Greek government rejected the British plan without any discus-sion. The Cyprus question was discussed in February 1957 in the UNGeneral Assembly, with Britain, Greece, and Turkey reiterating their cus-tomary positions. The General Assembly adopted a resolution expressingthe hope that “a peaceful, democratic and just solution” would be foundand the hope “that negotiations for that purpose would be resumed andcontinued” (Kranidiotis, 1981, p. 245).

On March 20, 1957, the British government announced its inten-tion to release Makarios, declaring that it was examining a new planfor resolution of the problem of Cyprus within the framework ofNATO. Soon after, Makarios, Kyrenia leaders, and the political prison-ers from the AKEL and “Ethnarchy” that were held in Cyprus, were allreleased.

The release of Makarios inaugurated a new phase of the Cyprus ques-tion. The Greeks and Greek-Cypriots, in their attempt to transform thepolitical balance to their own advantage were finally to adopt the solutionof “independence.” The problem was that they did not have a shared strat-egy. While the Greek State saw “independence” as a transitional regimethat will lead to enosis, “independence” was increasingly becoming an“ultimate desideratum” for the Greek-Cypriot political leadership as thenew strategy for acquisition of power.


The Shaping of New Strategic Options(April 1957–August 1960)

From the Release of Makarios to the Zurich and LondonAgreements. The Transitional Period (April 1957–February 1959)

Following the release of Makarios, the Leftist leaders, and the cadres of the“Ethnarchy,” Britain revealed its intention to impose a “common con-sent” settlement in Cyprus that would end British colonial dominationover the island. Initially Greek and Greek-Cypriot political leadershipwas oriented toward a cessation of the armed struggle in exchange forresumption of negotiations on the basis of the proposals that had beenoutlined in the Harding Plan, the key emphasis being the establishment ofa transitional regime of self-government that would consider the questionof “self-determination.” However, it became evident as early as mid-April1957 that the existing balance of forces both in Cyprus and internation-ally would not permit such a settlement. The “dual enosis” was alreadybeing recognized by Great Britain and by NATO as the only solution thatcould brighten the prospects of long-term peace on the island.

In May 1957, the Greek side therefore decided to continue the activityof EOKA as well as to internationalize the Cyprus question through theUN while in parallel rejecting the NATO framework for resolution of thedispute that is the tripartite talks, given that the NATO framework repre-sented partition as the only viable solution (Grivas, 1961, pp. 169–174;Kranidiotis, 1981, pp. 265–276). Yet, soon afterward a potential impasseconfronted this policy because Athens and Nicosia started seeking newdirections: The Greek government tended to favor direct dialogue withTurkey, aiming to sideline both Britain and the Turkish-Cypriot politicalleadership and achieve de facto retreat of the Turkish side from the posi-tion of “dual self-determination.” The “Ethnarchy” attempted initially toturn EOKA chiefly against the Turkish-Cypriots, aiming to weaken theresolve of their political leaderships through large-scale massacres of theTurkish-Cypriot population.

Ethnarchy’s policy of physical extermination of Turkish-Cypriots wasnot implemented until the establishment of the Cypriot state, becauseGreek government, fearing that massacre of Turkish-Cypriots wouldundermine Turkey’s ability to compromise, disapproved it. From thebeginning of the period under examination, the Ethnarchy started focus-ing on independence as an alternative solution to the Cyprus problem inthe event that Greek-Cypriot “self-determination” should prove unattain-able. The Greek government opted for “independence” based on thecalculation that it offered the best prospects as an indirect route towardenosis. The Greek government was holding behind-the-scenes talks with


the Turkish government, which rejected independence as a solution onthe grounds that

a) the independent state will sooner or later be united with Greece, b) no inde-pendence guarantee can withstand changes in international conditions . . . c)when the Cypriot state becomes independent it will be dominated by fanati-cized Greek-Cypriots and whatever guarantees it might give to the minority,they will not enjoy security.

(Letter from Averof to Grivas, August 26, 1957, Kranidiotis, 1981, p. 283)

The opposition coming from the Kyrenia group within the Ethnarchyand AKEL (Kranidiotis, 1981, pp. 286–290) and from Greek oppo-nents that united around the slogan of “self-determination” initiallydiscouraged the Athens–Nicosia political center from publicizing its newstrategic proposal of “independence.” Thus at the 12th UN GeneralAssembly in September 1957, Greece again supported the solution ofself-determination (Kranidiotis, 1981, pp. 299–303).

Grivas’s initial attempt to exterminate the communist leadershipthrough assassination of cadres was suspended soon as a result of Greekgovernment’s intervention and Grivas reoriented toward creating a “patri-otic political party” and organization of passive resistance against theBritish political and economic presence in Cyprus. At the same time hedeclared to the Greek government that he disagreed with the prospectof “independence,” instead proposing the withdrawal of Greece fromNATO and its entry into the non-aligned group of countries as ameans of pressuring for solution of the Cyprus problem (Grivas, 1961,pp. 285–286, 291). Grivas only encountered the open disapproval of theGreek government when he decided to replace “passive resistance” withopen armed terror against Greek-Cypriot importers of British products.

But while passive resistance appeared to yield certain results, at leastin economic terms, the organization of a political party under Grivasfailed because he never obtained practical support from the “Ethnarchy”and the Greek government. Nevertheless, the close political relationshipbetween the Greek government, the “Ethnarchy,” and Grivas enabledGrivas to function in Cyprus as the highly active support base for theexiled Makarios (Grivas, 1961, pp. 175–176).

In January 1958 the new British governor of Cyprus, Hugh Foot,released a plan for resolving the Cyprus problem, which provided for(a) a transitional period of self-government lasting between five and sevenyears, (b) guarantees that at the end of this period a definitive solu-tion would be sought that would be acceptable to both Greeks andTurks, (c) immediate lifting of the emergency measures and the return


of Makarios to the island, (d) the commencement of negotiations withthe leaders of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities towork out a constitution for self-government (Kranidiotis, 1981, p. 307).“The Foot Plan” was rejected by the Turkish-Cypriots and by Turkey,which refused any form of “self-government” under the control of the“Ethnarchy” of Makarios, insisting on the solution of partition. But a lit-tle later it became known, off the record, that Turkey was prepared toretreat from the demand for “separate self-determination of the Turkish-Cypriots” (partition) if the Greeks would allow it a military base on theisland. After consultation with the “Ethnarchy” the Greek governmentrejected this demand as well (Kranidiotis, 1981, pp. 308–311; Grivas,1961, p. 230).

With both intercommunal strife and civil/intracommunal conflict(between Greek-Cypriots) intensifying, Britain in June 1958 put for-ward the Macmillan Plan for resolution of the Cyprus problem, inwhich dual enosis was clearly projected as the final solution (for details,see Kranidiotis, 1981, p. 320 ff.). The Greek government immediatelyrejected the plan, but ordered Grivas to call a new EOKA ceasefire. He, ofcourse, complied. Notwithstanding the Greek rejection, the British gov-ernment announced its decision to implement the Macmillan Plan by allmeans at its disposal.

Intensive diplomatic activity developed over the following months,which was spearheaded by the NATO Secretary-General Paul-HenriSpaak. This initiative appeared to support a solution more favorable forGreece than partition. Greece accepted Spaak as an intermediary, pressur-ing Makarios to accept as well. Spaak on September 23, 1958, in Athensput forward his proposals for resolution of the Cyprus problem, whichentailed a seven-year transitional government with a Greek majority, a sin-gle parliament and two subsidiary assemblies for unequivocally communalissues, and a five-member conference (Britain, Greece, Turkey, Greek-Cypriot community, Turkish-Cypriot community) to determine the finalarrangements for the island. The Greek and Greek-Cypriot side acceptedthe Spaak proposals, declaring support for independence as the ultimatesolution but Spaak’s attempted mediation failed because it was rejected byBritain and Turkey.

On September 27, 1958, Makarios officially communicated the pro-posal for independence to the British government. From that pointonward independence was to constitute the official political strategyboth the “Ethnarchy” and the Greek government even though it wasseen by the latter as a stepping stone to enosis. But the Greek-Cypriotand Greek plan for independence encountered categorical refusal fromBritain (Kranidiotis, 1981, pp. 346, 347, 348, 349, 354; Grivas, 1961,


pp. 307–308). Now taking the political initiative, the Greek governmentembarked on bilateral talks with Turkey, not including Britain, on thebasis of the independence plan. The Turks initially insisted on beinggiven a military base on the island because they considered that “whateverguarantees are given and whatever type of polity is established, Cypruswill become united with Greece at the first sign of any relaxation fromTurkey, and Turkey wants at least to be certain that they will retain abase for the purpose of their own security” (Letter from Averof to Grivas,4/2/1959, Grivas, 1961, p. 353). The Turks eventually abandoned thesedemands.

On the basis of the draft agreement between the two countries, atripartite conference (between Britain, Greece, and Turkey) was held,starting on February 6, 1959, which on February 11, 1959, finalized thewell-known Zurich Agreement (between Britain, Greece, and Turkey).February 19, 1959 saw the signing of the London Agreement (betweenBritain, Greece, Turkey, the Greek-Cypriot community, and the Turkish-Cypriot community). The Zurich and London agreements of February1959 established the framework for the independence regime of theRepublic of Cyprus.

From the Zurich and London Agreements to Independence.Beginning of the Parting of Ways between the Two Strategies(February 1959–August 1960)

The Zurich and London agreements provided for a presidential repub-lic with a Greek president and a Turkish vice president, in which theGreek-Cypriots would exercise executive power. The Turkish-Cypriotswould be provided with a number of guarantees against Greek-Cypriotpower (requirement for a separate Turkish-Cypriot majority for draft leg-islation on economic matters and for amendment of the Constitution;Turkish vice president’s right of veto on defense matters, foreign policy,and public security). The Turkish-Cypriots were thus acquiring a higherlevel of representation in the government, the parliament, public admin-istration, the army etc. (30 percent) than their demographic strength inthe Cypriot population (18 percent). Finally Greece, Turkey, and GreatBritain were designated guarantor powers for the agreements (Kranidiotis,1981, pp. 373–378, 534–556).

In comparison to the position of the Greek state, the “Ethnarchy”perceived the independence regime not as an intermediate goal but asthe final goal. As became evident in the following years, the strategyof the Greek-Cypriot leadership was for hellenization of the Cypriot state,through violation and de facto abolition of the agreements on the basis


of which it had been established, while simultaneously retaining indepen-dence from Greece. But this combination of nationalism on the one hand,and on the other spurning of the pretensions of the “national center” forabsorption into the main body of the “national state,” proved to be anexceptionally inflammable political mix.

With the signing of the agreements, the political initiative passedalmost entirely into the hands of the “Ethnarchy.” The next task wassecuring the consent of the dissidents such as the Kyrenia group, AKEL,and Grivas, to the agreements. Eventually, Grivas, following a delugeof letters from the Greek government and Makarios (Grivas, 1961,pp. 347–410), was obliged on March 9, 1959, to declare “suspension ofthe struggle” and to call upon the Greek-Cypriots “all together, to rallyround their Ethnarch” (Grivas, 1961, p. 403).

In order to impose its hegemony within the Greek-Cypriot com-munity, the “Ethnarchy” made use of the facts that independence wasthe only feasible solution for Cyprus due to the rejection of dual “self-determination” and that independence could under certain conditionscomprise the stage prior to enosis. By drawing on the second sector,Makarios established contact with basic cadres of EOKA, sideliningGrivas, initially securing the unity of the “patriotic party” while at thesame time isolating the extreme right-wing faction in Kyrenia.

Makarios founded a new political party (the United DemocraticFront for Re-creation—EDMA) in March 1959 in which most of theEOKA cadres participated. On April 2, 1959, the first provisional govern-ment was formed. The opposition (of the enosis supporters and Grivas) tothe political leadership of Makarios was thus initially concealed and onlybecame manifest in the summer of 1959, but again in a desultory fashion(with only a section of them withdrawing from the political party sup-porting Makarios). Finally, the dissenting Grivas supporters, the Kyreniaactivists, and other nationalists supporting enosis came to an arrange-ment with Ioannis Clerides, former mayor of Nicosia, who was supportedby AKEL, and a few weeks before the elections they formed a politicalmovement supporting enosis, the “Democratic Union of Cyprus.”

In December 1959 the first presidential elections were held, in whichthe party of Makarios secured 67.8 percent of the Greek-Cypriot vote.Immediately afterwards AKEL withdrew its support from the pro-enosis“Democratic Union” and began to collaborate with Makarios. In the sub-sequent parliamentary elections the party supported by Makarios secured30 of the 35 Greek-Cypriot seats and AKEL 5. The political isolationof the pro-enosis Cypriot right-wing was consummated. Pro-enosis poli-cies could henceforth be promoted in Cyprus only from within theMakarios party.


The essential differentiation between the strategy of Makarios andthe strategy of the Greek state emerges most clearly over the questionof interpreting the agreements and elaborating the new Cypriot con-stitution. Here, whereas the Greek side sought as much as possible toobliterate the separate institutional arrangements, Makarios preferred toinstitute separate arrangements with a view to then not implement thesearrangements. The bone of contention here was primarily organization oflocal government in the big towns. The Turkish-Cypriots favored sep-arate municipalities in each town, a position that was rejected by theGreek government. To the surprise of E. Averof, the then foreign ministerof Greece, Makarios succeeded in imposing the separate municipalities,overriding Greece’s vehement opposition (Averof, 1988, p. 40). Despitethe constitutional protection extended to the separate municipalities,Makarios refused to establish them, thus provoking intense reactions fromthe Turkish-Cypriots and heightening of tensions in Greek/Turkish rela-tions (Kranidiotis, 1981, pp. 408, 458–461, 435). The prerequisites werethus created as early as 1959–1960 for the intercommunal “war” thatseveral years later culminated in the Cypriot state ostracizing the Turkish-Cypriots and confinement of the overall Turkish-Cypriot population to“enclaves” whose total area was less than 5 percent of the territory ofCyprus.

“Partition” and Independence. An Interpretation

The preceding analysis makes it clear that the Greek-Cypriot strategyof independence for Cyprus but also the Greek strategy of “indepen-dence” (as intermediate stage prior to enosis) emerged as the outcome ofa political balance of forces in Cyprus as well as an international bal-ance of forces that made unconditional “enosis” between Cyprus andGreece impossible. On the other hand, the balance of forces internallyand internationally clearly rendered “dual self-determination” somethingentirely feasible. Indeed in a subsequent phase, a few years after the estab-lishment of the state, at the beginning of the 1960s, an evolution inthe balance of forces to the advantage of Greece made enosis conceiv-able, simply in exchange for concession to Turkey of a military base,yet these solutions were rejected because of the categorical refusal ofthe Greek-Cypriot political leadership to accept any territorial concessionto Turkey.

The strategy of “independence” eventually adopted by the Greek statewas indeed “maximalistic” in the sense that as a final solution it aimedat the most ambitious objective of enosis without offering anything ofany importance to Turkey in return. But the strategy also entailed the


risk of “total defeat,” with all of Cypriot territory remaining outside ofGreek jurisdiction, as indeed occurred, after the failed Greek militaryintervention and the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus in 1974.

It was awareness of this risk that led the Greek political leadership todiscuss the solution proposed by Turkey and the Turkish-Cypriot com-munity of dual enosis, under the precondition of minimization of Turkishdemands. In October 1956 and again in June–July 1957, Greece dis-cussed with Turkey the possibility of partition or of enosis with concessionto Turkey of a military base. These discussions were abandoned becauseof the Ethnarchy’s opposition to them.

It is easy to understand why the Greek political leadership, if it had notfaced categorical refusal from the Greek-Cypriots, would have been will-ing to negotiate a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of partition.Greece would be annexing at least 80 percent of the territory of Cyprusand Cyprus, now included in the territory of Greece and Turkey, wouldbe incorporated into NATO, thereby appeasing Western internationalpolitical interests in the area.

The question that arises thus is why the Greek-Cypriot political lead-ership rejected out of hand any idea of negotiation on the basis of “dualself-determination.” One answer to the question would perhaps be theassessment that the Ethnarchy was already oriented toward the strategy ofindependence, even if it projected the slogan of “enosis and only enosis.”It was not inclined to accept any solution other than independence.It therefore persisted in the essentially unachievable demand for enosiswithout concessions, pending emergence of the opportunity to projectthe independence solution. Averof seems to be hinting at something likethis when he says: “I don’t know when, at the leadership level, Cyprusabandoned the idea of enosis. There are many factors at work, and muchdeviousness also. But in any case they abandoned the idea, definitivelyand officially, when the MacMillan plan began to be adopted” (Averof,1988, p. 39).

Yet we do not find such an interpretation entirely convincing. Politicalstrategy is not the expression of the “self-consciousness” of some subjectsor other (political leaders, the bourgeois class) who are aware of their“objective and long-term interests” and promote them consistently underall conditions. Political strategy emerges out of class struggle and alwaysin accordance with the continually shifting political and class balance offorces.

The preceding analysis has shown us that the Greek-Cypriot politicalleadership was initially oriented toward enosis, for which it struggled, irre-spective of the fact that enosis would eliminate the capacity of this politicalleadership to constitute itself as an autonomous state power and would


lead to absorption of Cypriot capital by Greek capital. The subjugationand absorption of individual (political, economic, ideological) interests bythe overall national (bourgeois) interest is a process that can be arrestedonly exceptionally and under highly specific circumstances.

The Cypriot exception cannot be explained either by the existenceof a Greek-Cypriot bourgeoisie as such, much less to the will of theGreek-Cypriot political leadership. It emerged in our opinion out of(a) the historically inherited mode of political organization (the pre-existing Greek-Cypriot political “power structure”) and (b) the specificdrift of postwar political conflict in Cyprus (the prospect of partition).

The political system in Cyprus, as developed under the rule of theOttoman Empire and as continued in broad outline under the Britishcolonial administration, was based on the existence of a Greek-Cypriotpolitical “power,” subordinate to the foreign overlord but neverthelesswith considerable autonomy, the “Ethnarchy,” whose domain includedall of Cyprus. This Greek-Cypriot “power,” as a (potential) form of Greekrule, tended on the one hand objectively to seek to join forces, or unitein enosis with the Greek state, and on the other as an autonomouspower covering all of the territory of Cyprus, to oppose any secession(to Turkey and/or the Turkish-Cypriot community) of any part of itsdominion.

The entire Greek-Cypriot “power structure” was pervaded throughand through by this contradiction, as it was evident that liberation fromBritish domination would necessitate loss of part of the territory overwhich it had authority. This contradiction did not concern the Greekstate, whose strategy was to annex as large a part of Cypriot territory aspossible.

If the Greek state was able to bargain on the basis of the principle ofpartition, so as to achieve the annexation of as large a part of Cyprusas possible, for the Greek-Cypriot “power structure” it was impossible tocede a section of its already existing “territory.”

The contradiction under which the Greek-Cypriot political leadershiplabored was stretched to the limit when British plans for partition wereset in motion. The solution of “independence” resolved the contradictionin the sense that it averted any Greek-Cypriot territorial concessions. Yet,when immediately afterwards the Greek-Cypriot virtual power took shapeas real state-political power (with the Zurich and London agreements andthe declaration of independence), the ground was prepared for a definitiveseparation of Greek-Cypriots from Greek political power.

Thus, if the period between 1957 and 1959 represents a transitionalphase for the differentiation between the Greek strategy of “indepen-dence” and the Greek-Cypriot strategy of independence, the period from


1959 to 1960 marks the point of no return in the differentiation processbetween the two strategies.

The evolution of the two strategies was also to set its imprint on the fol-lowing period of 1960–1974. Both strategies would continue in parallelto be determined in accordance with the movement of the same internaland international contradictions.

C h a p t e r 6

Turkish-CypriotNationalistDrive towardState-Building:Politics, Violence,and PoliticalEconomyHakan Arslan

Introduction

Scholarly research in northern Cyprus and Turkey, which treats the ques-tion of Cyprus from the perspective of the domestic dynamics of theTurkish-Cypriot society, is rather sparse. For the most part, the focal pointof theoretical narratives regarding Cyprus is that the problem belongs tothe realm of international relations, where the Turkish-Cypriots featurejust as a unitary actor. There are a number of authors who high-light this literary deficiency. For instance, Hasgüler (2007, pp. 1–3)claims that Cyprus has from the outset been treated as a national ques-tion alone in both Turkey and Greece, with the Cypriots as the ineptauthors of their own history. Similarly, Egemen (2006, pp. 37–39) notesthat popular and scholarly literature on the Turkish-Cypriots mostlyconcentrates on the question of Cyprus, at the expense of domesticpolitics and economics, ideology, and, particularly, power struggles forleadership.

120 H A K A N A R S L A N

Hence it becomes an imperative to decompose or deconstruct uni-tary actors in order to fathom the domestic origins of the drastic policyshifts of the recent past in Cyprus. Although it is possible to observe arecent increase in the scholarly interest on the domestic dynamics of theTurkish-Cypriot society, much of this novel work has a cultural focus,treating the issue, in terms of politics of identity, and the question ofnationalisms. Thus, as far as the studies of Turkish-Cypriot society areconcerned, I believe that cultural focus needs to be complemented by twofurther elements: The first is a state theories approach which concentrateson the various aspects of state-building. After all, the politics of identity ispart of the basic process of state-building, which involves as sub-processes,the monopolization of the means of violence, concentration of politicalpower, centralization of administration, quest for territory, formulationof economic policies to ensure capital accumulation, construction of acaptive market, enforcement of taxation, and the institutionalization ofcentralized budgetary practice.

The second is, in connection with the first, of course, a political econ-omy approach to Turkish-Cypriot politics, concentrating on the strategicrole of the state, via parliamentary politics, in the distribution of economicresources transferred by Turkey, and of Greek-Cypriot property, towardthe reproduction of political ideology and the sustenance of politicalpower.

Accordingly, in what follows, I will focus on the first of the two com-plementary elements above, and try to construct a preliminary theoreticalnarrative of the domestic dynamics of the Turkish-Cypriot society, with afocus on the processes of state-building in its military, administrative, ter-ritorial, economic, and fiscal aspects, together with the political economyof representative politics. In so doing, I will focus on the Turkish-Cypriotelite struggles of the period from the municipal elections of 1943, up tothe foundation of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960.

Catching up with the Greek-Cypriots

A basic understanding of the social division of labor between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots in the British era is the key to compre-hending the dynamics of the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist drive towardstate-building. This is true, to the extent that the emergent nationalistdiscourse and strategy involved the problematization of the Turkish-Cypriots’ relative position within the given division of labor, its trans-formation, and the elimination of its various aspects. A review of theTurkish-Cypriot newspaper clips and articles of the late nineteenth andearly twentieth centuries as compiled by An (1996, pp. 1–40) reveals the

T H E T U R K I S H -C Y P R I O T N AT I O N A L I S T D R I V E 121

way in which the Turkish-Cypriot elite perceived the problems associatedwith the social division labor between Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots. Thus, as the Turkish-Cypriot elite saw it, commerce, industry,and high-level public office was under Greek-Cypriot monopoly. Greek-Cypriots had specialized in modern, urban professions and skilled arts,whereas Turkish-Cypriots were largely confined to traditional, unskilledoccupations. In terms of such vital needs as law and health, Turkish-Cypriots were fully dependent on Greek-Cypriots. Turkish-Cypriot towndwellers were dependent on Greek-Cypriot traders for the provision ofconsumption goods, while Turkish-Cypriot peasants were dependent onGreek-Cypriot merchant-usurer capital for both the realization of theirproduce and the provision of subsistence goods. Thus, one frequentsource of complaint was clearly the extraction of the surplus generatedby the Turkish-Cypriot peasants by the Greek-Cypriot town-based com-mercial capital. As such, the establishment of a circuit and circulationof capital and circuit of income between the Turkish-Cypriot rural andthe Turkish-Cypriot urban has become one of the basic objectives ofTurkish-Cypriot nationalists. Apparently, and ideally, this required captivebuyers’ and sellers’ markets, i.e. ideally, a unified, national market, as wellas secure and stable communication and transportation routes betweenTurkish-Cypriot locales, i.e. a unified, national territory. The causes ofTurkish-Cypriot backwardness were seen from a secularist, ethical pointof view, which put the blame on laziness, selfishness, indifference, igno-rance, weak feelings of communal and national bonds, and, last but notthe least, the influence of religious conservatives and reactionaries.

A further issue of critical import was the control of Evkaf 1 and itsvast property, namely, arable lands and shops, hans (inns), and houses.Egemen (2006, pp. 105–108) cites the various types of rents that Evkafextracted, and the various revenue sources that it allocated. Thus, peas-ants were largely dependent on Evkaf land, which were of two types:Big Evkaf farms with large expanses of land, located outside Nicosia andother towns, where peasants worked for Evkaf, and lease lands away fromthe towns, which peasants rented and tilled on their own account. Also,note that the majority of shops in çarsı (Turkish marketplace) belonged toEvkaf. Thus, the esnaf (tradesmen) were basically dependent on Evkaffor shops and on the Evkaf chest for circulating capital as they wereperiodically strapped for cash. Finally, elements of the esraf (local nota-bles) were also dependent for revenue on posts on the board of governorsof Evkaf. Note that Evkaf revenues were typically ground rents. It con-trolled the distribution of arable lands and shops, thus the allocation ofrevenues in the town and villages, and it controlled the redistribution ofrents amongst the elite. In 1925, the notable Sir Münir (Mehmet Münir),


a British-educated lawyer, was appointed as the Muslim director of theEvkaf, and in 1928, a royal decree turned the nominally autonomousEvkaf into a department of the British colonial administration, empower-ing the Governor with the appointment of its Turkish director (Egemen,2006, pp. 99–101; Fedai, 1997, pp. 90–91).

Under the circumstances, Evkaf ’s gaining autonomy and its transfer-ence to the Turkish-Cypriot community was one of the major demands ofthe Turkish-Cypriot nationalist elites. This basically rested on two argu-ments: Firstly, it was ancestral property, so it was to be autonomous, and;secondly, its administration, for example the administration of Sir Münir,represented, not the Turkish-Cypriots, but the British. This brings upthe issue of representation, which was critical to the relations betweenthe Turkish-Cypriot nationalists and the British, as it was the object ofintra-elite rivalry as part of the process of state-building amongst theTurkish-Cypriots. The Turkish-Cypriot elite had its early practice in elec-toral representative politics in central and local administrative institutionsof the British rule. For example, Necati Özkan, a major contestant inthe leadership struggle of the 1940s and early 1950s, won a seat on theMunicipal Council of Nicosia, in the municipal elections of 1926, thena seat on the Executive Council, in the general elections of 1930, whenhe led the Millî Cephe (National Front) group against Sir Münir and hisEvkaf group (Birinci, 2001a, pp. 116–120, 139). Sir Münir had a shakyrepresentation, for although he represented the British before the Turkish-Cypriots, he failed to represent the Turkish-Cypriots before the British.On the other hand, Necati Özkan’s meeting President Ismet Inönü in1949 raised the protest of his opponents. In a telegram to Inönü, FazılKüçük emphasized that Necati Özkan has no representative power what-soever and cannot speak on behalf of the Turkish-Cypriot community.In retrospect, one is able to see that the intra-elite struggles to appropriateand monopolize representation worked to centralize power, all of whichwas part of the larger drive toward state-building.

The three concomitant aspects of elite struggles toward state formationappear to be, from a retrospective point of view, centralization of politi-cal power, centralization of economic power, and monopolization of themeans of violence. Note that (the sources of ) political power, economicpower, and violence are not simply pre-given, but partly constructed bythose who strive to centralize and control them.

Elite Struggles for Political Power

Intra-elite struggles are critical to the centralization of political power asthe core process of the genesis of future proto-state and state structures.


Centralization of political power essentially consists of the eliminationby the winning fraction, of alternative contestants to political leadership,within and without, via a multifaceted struggle based on a discourse ofcommunal/national unity. As far as the older cohorts of community lead-ers are concerned, the major contestant to Fazıl Küçük (b. 1906) certainlywas Necati Özkan (b. 1899). Contest from without, by Ihsan Ali (b. 1904,president of KATAK’s Paphos district committee), and within, by FaizKaymak (b. 1904), were much less effective.

Turkish-Cypriot intra-elite struggle intensified after 1940 as part ofthe new phase of political mobilization of the WWII years, to partlycounter the resurgence of Enosis under the conditions of British leniencyon the Island after the proclamation of the Atlantic Charter (Örek, 2010,p. 4).2 Thus, in 1943, municipal elections were held for the first timesince the Greek-Cypriot riots of 1931 (Bozkurt, 2002, p. 388; Oberling,1982, p. 56). More specifically, elections for the Municipal Council ofNicosia of March 21, 1943, gave shape to the basic alignments, proto-party formations of the intra-elite struggle for representation of the next10 years or so. Shortly before the elections, Turkish-Cypriot elites, includ-ing, amongst others, Sir Münir, Necati Özkan, and Fazıl Küçük, joinedforces to found KATAK (acronym for Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlıgı Kurumu:Turkish Minority Institution of the Island of Cyprus), on April 18, 1943(Bozkurt, 2002, p. 388; Birinci, 2001a, pp. 250–251; Birinci, 2001b,p. 95). Two groups competed in the elections, Fazıl Küçük’s and NecatiÖzkan’s, with Küçük’s group winning three seats, the remaining seat goingto Özkan himself. Apparently, Küçük took note of the critical role ofpress support in his electoral victory, thus in politics, and founded hisown newspaper, Halkın Sesi (People’s Voice), shortly thereafter (Azgın,2009, p. 25). A year later, he split with KATAK and founded his ownparty, Kıbrıs Millî Türk Halk Partisi (Turkish People’s National Party ofCyprus), on April 23, 1944, with Faiz Kaymak as party treasurer.

One should note that KATAK was controlled by an elite composedof civil servants, professionals, and businessmen, who seem to belongto the birth cohort of the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-turies.3 The year 1949 seems to witness the next turning-point in thepolitical mobilization of Turkish-Cypriots. Thus, in the municipal elec-tions of May 1949, KATAK and Küçük’s party allied as Milliyetçi andHalkçı Birlik (Nationalist and Populist Unity) (Akkurt, 2000, pp. 78–79).On June 21, 1949, Necati Özkan founded his own party, Kıbrıs TürkBirligi (Istiklâl) Partisi [Turkish Cypriot Union (Independence) Party].On September 8, 1949, Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu, led by FaizKaymak, was founded, with KATAK and Kıbrıs Millî Türk Halk Partisiunited to form its political arm, on November 6, 1949, as Kıbrıs Millî


Türk Birligi Partisi (National Turkish Unity Party of Cyprus), led by FazılKüçük (Akkurt, 2000, p. 79). By early 1954, the Federation and FazılKüçük had come victorious over Necati Özkan in leadership contest forrepresentation. The two concomitant factors that carried Fazıl Küçük tovictory, besides his close connections with critical elements of the localelite, appear to be his influence over a younger birth cohort of mid-1920s, as well as the support he gets from the Turkish-Cypriot diasporaand Turkish nationalists in Turkey, in the late 1940s and early 1950s.This younger cohort seems to have been activated by the new politicaltide, and comes under the influence of Küçük who, as a journalist, has arather acerbic rhetoric of possibly great appeal for the youth. It includessuch key persons as Rauf R. Denktas (b. 1924), Osman Örek (b. 1925)(Küçük’s two closest associates in the years to come), Burhan Nalbantoglu(b. 1925), and Ahmet Mithat Berberoglu (b. 1925).4

Overall, these years witnessed the emergence for the first time ofthe dual organizational structure with the Federation as the culturallyand economically oriented front, umbrella organization, headed by FaizKaymak, then Küçük’s right-hand man, and Kıbrıs Millî Türk Partisi asthe more properly political vanguard, headed by Küçük himself (KKTCDısisleri ve Savunma Bakanlıgı, 2000, p. 81). This dual structure becamewell established as of the mid-1950s, and further concentrated politicalpower by being complemented, in the late 1950s, first by the assumptionof Turkish-Cypriot control on Evkaf, as the organization of economiccommand, and second, by the foundation of TMT (acronym for TürkMukavemet Teskilâtı, Turkish Resistance Organization) as the organi-zation of monopolized violence. This whole process corresponded tothe completion of a certain elite coalition between Küçük, universitystudents/graduates, the Turkish-Cypriot diaspora in Turkey, its collabo-ration by Turkish nationalists, and the recognition by the Turkish stateof its capacity to represent as well as its political leadership of theTurkish-Cypriots.

Monopolization of the Means of Violence

There was yet a long way to go, from the early, sporadic use of violenceagainst such political rivals as Özkan and Ihsan Ali as a means of thestruggle for political power,5 to its systematization and its monopolizationas an integral constituent of the emergent proto-state and state structures,and its further use to institute taxation and support capital accumulation.This took place in two steps, where the apex point of the first was, theterribly tragic events of September 6–7, 1955, in Istanbul and, that ofthe second, the provocations and terror campaigns of 1958, in Cyprus,


together with the foundation of TMT and its organization, by the Turkishchief of staff. Greek Prime Minister Papagos raised in the United Nations,on August 18, 1954, the question of Cypriot self-determination (Fırat,2006a, p. 598). This provided the necessary stimulus for the constructionof Cyprus as prime Turkish national cause (An, 2002, p. 36) as well asoccasion for the formalization of Küçük clique’s hold on power, on behalfof the Turkish state, and internationally. As a part of the radicalization ofpolitics and the internationalization of the Cyprus question, the weightshifted from the elderly notables of the Turkish-Cypriot diaspora, to a newcircle of militant elements, including, amongst others, journalists, youthleaders, trade union leaders, in Turkey and, from the elderly notables ofÇarsı, to a company of the educated professionals, primarily lawyers anddoctors, in Cyprus.

Thus, on August 24, 1954, a congress met upon the call of TürkiyeMillî Talebe Federasyonu (National Federation of Turkish Students) andelected a committee, which, as of October 2, 1954, turned itself intoKıbrıs Türktür Dernegi (Cyprus Is Turkish Association). This was basicallya joint enterprise of the Turkish-Cypriot diaspora, nationalist Turkishyouth, and press, where Nevzat Karagil and two Turkish journalists,namely Hikmet Bil, of Hürriyet newspaper and Kamil Önal, were com-mittee members, while Mehmet Ertugruloglu, of Kıbrıs Türk KültürDernegi became the president of the Ankara branch of the ensuing asso-ciation (An, 2002, pp. 37, 40, 43). On April 1, 1955, EOKA launchedits attacks and acts of sabotage, and on June 20, 1955, British gov-ernment called for a British, Greek, and Turkish conference to discussdefense issues in eastern Mediterranean, set to start on August 29, 1955,in London (An, 2002, pp. 43–44; Fırat, 2006a, p. 600). The leadingfigure, Hikmet Bil, pursued a double strategy of raising nationalistic fer-vor and building mass mobilization in Turkey, under the auspices ofthe Adnan Menderes government, and overhauling and activating theTurkish-Cypriot leadership in Cyprus. In early July, the Turkish press, led,particularly by the Hürriyet newspaper, intensified its concerted attacks onthe Patriarch of Greek orthodox church and Greek minority in Istanbul,asking for proof of their loyalty to the Turkish state (An, 2002, p. 51).

In late July 1955, Bil and Önal went to Cyprus where they discussedissues of reorganization with Küçük and others. Consequently, on July 24,Kıbrıs Millî Türk Birligi Partisi renamed itself as Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi(Cyprus Is Turkish Party) to unite, in a way, with Kıbrıs Türktür Dernegiin Turkey (An, 2002, p. 44). In late August 1953, baseless rumors ofGreek-Cypriot plans to slaughter Turkish-Cypriots on August 28, the dayof AKEL meeting in Nicosia to protest the triple London Conference,spread across Turkey amidst open threats of reprisal against the Greeks of


Istanbul. Apparently, Fazıl Küçük, Faiz Kaymak, Hikmet Bil, and KamilÖnal were the key figures who fabricated the false news of massacre plans,to which, the famous speech of August 24, by Menderes, prized by thenationalists as the official acknowledgement of Cyprus as national cause,lent credence, building further tension (An, 2002, pp. 52, 53, 55–6,58–62). Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that the rampages ofSeptember 6–7, staged, as they were, by Kıbrıs Türktür Dernegi, TürkiyeMillî Talebe Federasyonu and some trade unions, were conceived and abet-ted by Celal Bayar and Menderes, as Fatin Rüstü Zorlu, in a cryptogram,urged the two to be more active, so he could argue at the table thatthey could no longer tame the Turkish public, to strengthen his hand.Thus, on September 6, Menderes got the news that Atatürk’s birthplacehouse in Salonica is bombed, whose wide radio broadcast he ordered.It was all a plot, and the provocateur who planted the bomb turned outto be a Turk of Western Trakia, by the name Oktay Engin, who in the1970s served in Turkey as a top police chief and a governor (An, 2002,pp. 68–9, 72, 74–81). Following the protest meeting at Taksim square,the same day, groups led by Kıbrıs Türktür Dernegi leaders started whatdeveloped into a two days pogrom against the Greeks of Istanbul, withmobs of urban poor sacking businesses, churches and houses, murderingand wounding people, and raping women. The Menderes governmentresponded by calling the riots a great catastrophe, apologized, arrestedcommunists, and banned Kıbrıs Türktür Dernegi (Fırat, 2006b, p. 601;Zürcher, 2004, p. 231).6

The foregoing conjunction of foreign policy offensives abroad andnationalist campaigns at home, supported by mob movements orches-trated by state authorities, set a precedent for the terror campaigns of1958, in Cyprus. On December 19, 1956, Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd stated that the principle of self-determination should apply toboth communities with partition as one of the possible solutions. Con-sequently, on December 28, Menderes set forth Taksim (Partition) asTurkey’s new Cyprus policy. As, by the autumn of 1957, prospects forsettlement improved, the British started to pitch successive plans for apolitical solution. On December 3, Sir Hugh Foot, who had replaced SirJohn Harding as Governor, arrived in Cyprus, armed with a plan, whichinvolved representative government. He visited Ankara on January 28,1958, where Zorlu roughly rejected his plan. On June 19, British PrimeMinister Harold Macmillan proposed a new plan, which involved rep-resentative government and communal autonomy. All parties rejectedthe plan, Macmillan presented a revised version on August 15, whichTurkey and Turkish-Cypriots accepted a week later. Zurich Conferencetook place on February 6, 1959, and the London Agreements were


signed on February 19 (Fırat, 2006a, pp. 604, 606–610; Reddaway,1986, pp. 95–96, 105–106, 109–113, 120). Meanwhile, these criticalmonths of 1957 and 1958 witnessed a new phase of political mobiliza-tion amongst Turkish-Cypriots, further concentration and centralizationof political power, and most particularly, the monopolization of the meansof violence.

As the end of British rule loomed ahead, Denktas, as Küçük’s pro-tégé, resigned from office and replaced Faiz Kaymak, as president of theFederation, on October 27, 1957 (Akkurt, 2000, p. 33). Retrospectively,it appears that Denktas had in view to reorganize the entire movement,including the youth (An, 1996, p. 76).7 This, he envisioned, beyond thereorganization of the regular youth organization of the Federation, viathe foundation of a new paramilitary organization, namely, TMT. It isdifficult to track the precise genesis of TMT, but, apparently, it was orig-inally founded by Denktas, Burhan Nalbantoglu, and Kemal Tanrısevdi,officer at the Turkish Embassy, with its very first public notice put outsometime between the middle to end of November 1957, asking fromTurkish-Cypriots for total obedience to its orders. In early January 1958,Denktas paid his first visit to Ankara, with Küçük, and asked Fatin RüstüZorlu for arms to equip and officers to steer TMT (An, 2002, pp. 123,126–127, 153–154). Possibly, Denktas desired to entrust Turkey with theultimate control of TMT, not simply on considerations of professional-ism and efficiency, but also to free it from the clutches of ambitious localleaders (An, 2002, p. 164). The Turkish chief of staff was instructed ordecided to act in late May 1958 and, as of August 1, Lieutenant ColonelRıza Vuruskan started the organization of TMT in Cyprus, under thecover of a bank inspector. In the next two years, the Turkish military cre-ated a force of about 5,000 combatants and established secret cells in allthe six regions of Cyprus (An, 2002, p. 150).

Thus, the events that triggered the riots of January 27–28 and June 7,1958, and the series of assassinations of leftists and communists overthe months of late May through early July, were likely to be the doingsof, directly, the local leadership, serving multiple purposes. Firstly, theyhelped to construct the discourse of Greek-Cypriot threat as an ethnicallyand historically given condition of Turkish-Cypriot existence. TMT, par-ticularly, conceived of and actively sought to provoke, if necessary, cases ofintercommunal violence to be used to then selectively construct stories asfacts, and thereby prove the discourse of objectively given Greek-Cypriotanimosity. Secondly, they sought to shape foreign policy outcomes, par-ticularly Taksim, by putting pressure, not only upon the British, but theTurkish government as well, via provocations, mass mobilization, andmob riots.8 Thirdly, they served to further centralize and concentrate


power, toward Taksim, by the exclusion of any opposition whatsoever, viaterror. Thus, Cumalıoglu (2002, p. 48) cites amongst the basic goals ofTMT, the provision of communal unity and wholeness, and the preven-tion of attempts by pro-Enosis Greek-Cypriots to ideologically influenceand split the Turkish front. The victims of the series of TMT executionsand attempted assassinations followed the jointly celebrated May Day of1958, and targeted, particularly, journalists and union activists. Thus, thesole obstacle before separation, namely leftist, liberal etc., proponents of atrans- or post-communal Cypriot society, were effectively neutralized viaterror.

Policies of Total Communal Separation

Note that concomitantly with the pursuance of Taksim internationally, aswell as the monopolization of the means of violence and the accompany-ing wave of terror, the year 1958 witnessed the mise en scène, on a largescale, of the policies of total communal separation. To begin with, thereis, of course the obstruction of communicative encounters and exchanges,the loss of emotions of fraternity and solidarity, at the level of day-to-dayas well as political relations. Thus, for instance, the number of membersof the separate Turkish trade unions increased from 1,137 in 1958 to4,829 in 1959 (An, 1996, p. 79).

There are three further aspects of the separatist strategy that were keyto the genesis of prospective proto-state structures. The first aspect is spa-tial separation, for the principal condition of the success of Taksim was theconstitution of a separate, well-bounded territory. Although physical sepa-ration between the two communities was still local and discontinuous, sothat they still lived adjacent to one another, it is nonetheless of criticalimport that British soldiers, strengthened and extended the Mason–Dixon Line in Nicosia, where cross-communal connections in termsof economic and administrative life of the entire island concentrated(Reddaway, 1986, p. 95). The second aspect is administrative separa-tion, which meant separate municipalities. Thus, with a timing whichcuriously coincided with the wave of intracommunal assassinations andintercommunal clashes, Turkish members of municipal councils resignedtheir posts, on June 3, 1957. They elected a committee that proclaimed,on April 22, 1958, a tax boycott of Greek municipalities, as well as thestart of the process of elections to found separate Turkish municipalities.On May 4, the joint meeting of resigned municipal members, the Feder-ation and Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi authorities, resolved that preparations formunicipal elections be started. On June 16, 1958, the first Turkish munic-ipality was founded in Nicosia. Following a few fruitless attempts to get


the Turkish leadership to pull out, Governor Foot decided, on Septem-ber 20, to establish a commission, headed by B. T. Surridge, to enquireinto the issue of separate municipalities, who wrote a report, never to bepublished. Nonetheless, the outline constitution agreed between Greeceand Turkey at Zurich, stipulated separate Turkish municipalities (Akkurt,2000, pp. 82, 84–85, 87, 89–90; Reddaway, 1986, pp. 121–122). NiyaziManyera, first mayor of the Famagusta Turkish municipality, in the activ-ity report for the period of 1957–1958, notes that a quasi-tax was put,to be donated by all by the equivalent of a day’s wage (Akkurt, 2000,p. 91). The third aspect is economic separation: Thus, on September 7,1958, the meeting of the Federation and of Turkish-Cypriot merchants,where Denktas also spoke, resolved to establish a separate çarsı, imply-ing a separate circuit of commercial and productive capital, supported bya captive market for the means of consumption and production, basedupon a separate set of exchange relations between importer-wholesalers,retailers, producers, and consumers. A board of control was establishedto oversee the “Türk’ten Türk’e” (From the Turk, to the Turk) campaignwhile merchants, organized as an association, reorganized on October 18as a separate trade chamber, were officially recognized by the British afterthe Zurich and London agreements (An, 2006, pp. 231–233; Evre, 2004,pp. 139–140; Gazioglu, 2000, p. 179).9

Centralization of Economic Power and CapitalAccumulation

Institutionally, most critical to the centralization of economic power wasEvkaf. As mentioned before, in 1928 a royal decree had turned theEvkaf into a department of the British colonial administration. Thiswas only revoked after the report of the Turkish Affairs Committee tothe Governor, in 1949. Although revocation was largely seen as a signof the prospective restitution of Evkaf, this took a Federation campaignthat began in early 1954, and restitution came only before the tripar-tite London Conference (Akkurt, 2000, pp. 28–29; Gazioglu, 2000,pp. 145–146, 151–152). The law on the restitution of Evkaf to theTurkish community, which stipulated a two-stage electoral process offirstly, mosque commissions, then from amongst the commission mem-bers, the Supreme Council of Evkaf, as well as the executive committee,was published in the official gazette of July 22, 1955. The Federation andKüçük’s Kıbrıs Milli Türk Birligi Partisi drew up a joint list of candidatesfor the mosque commissions, which swept the elections of January 20and 22, 1956, against independent candidates. On April 14, Fazıl Küçükwas elected as president of the Supreme Council of Evkaf, Osman Örek


as vice president, Faiz Kaymak, as president of the executive committee,and the next day, Evkaf started to fly the Turkish flag, which com-pleted the process of restitution (Akkurt, 2000, p. 30, 31, 32; Gazioglu,2000, p. 153).

What characterized the period of transition, which formally spannedthe period between the signing of the London Agreements in February1959 and the establishment of the Republic in August 1960, under theconditions of a thaw in intercommunal relations, was, on the part of theTurkish-Cypriot leadership, the primacy of economics. The prevailingconcern was, obviously, the competitive threat that the single economyof the prospective common state was bound to pose, and thereby, thequestion and policies of catching up with the Greek-Cypriot capital,toward which Evkaf, with its considerable assets and revenues, became thebasic leverage (Gazioglu, 2000, pp. 163–164, 168). Priority in the allo-cation of projects appears to have been given to the urban developmentof Nicosia’s Turkish quarters, by means of a construction drive centeredaround the renovation and expansion by newly constructed shops of theTurkish çarsı, new public buildings, and private residences, supported bybank loans from Lefkosa Türk Bankası, Barclays Bank, and Turkey’s IsBankası (Gazioglu, 2000, pp. 164, 166–168). The underlying ideologywas obviously one of modernization and Westernization of urban life viathe construction of the physical substructure of the capitalist economy,of the capitalist state, and of the public and private spheres of modernurban life. This occasionally manifested itself, as a gigantomania, as inthe construction of Saray Hotel, modeled, reputedly, on Istanbul’s Hilton(Gazioglu, 2000, pp. 163–164). Such grandiose projects possibly reflectedthe aspirations for new lifestyles of the local notables expressed in pettyquarrels at traditional coffee houses (kahvehanes), shops, and clubs, who,within less than a decade, had become statesmen, diplomats, and dramatispersonea of a major global conflict, yet lived in pre-modern surround-ings. In the absence of a state, the Federation and Evkaf representingrespectively political and economic public powers, assumed the role ofactuating and guiding capital accumulation. The basic obstacle being theabsence of money capital, as the starting point of the circuit of capital, theprojected institutional setup involved banks, share companies, and coop-eratives, thought to be the best fit to transform local savings and Turkishloans into money capital.

The major investments of Evkaf as the leading public entrepreneurwere the grandiose projects of Saray Hotel and Evkaf Ishanı (traditionaloffice building for businesses), housing 53 shops. The two projectssyphoned off substantial resources, reportedly, 400,000 liras as of late1961, the equivalent of the cost of setting up three or four factories (An,


2006, pp. 234–235, 248). In 1959, a pasta factory, a family venture; ashoes factory, the joint venture of 18 shareholders; and a knitting andunderclothes factory, the joint venture of four shareholders were founded,under Federation leadership or auspices (Gazioglu, 2000, pp. 71–72).Also founded were a sales cooperative of potato producers from 20 vil-lages and a dairies cooperative of stock breeders from 24 villages, witha cheese works, both under the leadership of the Federation, whichalso contributed 1,000 liras to each (Gazioglu, 2000, pp. 170, 180).On September 9, 1959, a separate Turkish-Cypriot central bank of coop-eratives was founded. The year 1959 witnessed the establishment ofseparate Turkish-Cypriot cooperatives, in accordance with the Zurich andLondon Agreement, which considered cooperatives to be a part of thecommunal affairs (Hasgüler, 1996, pp. 20–21).10 Despite new invest-ments, a quick survey of ads in local newspapers listed by Gazioglu (2000,pp. 182–188) reveals that the majority of businesses were imports agents,small workshops, with only very few big manufacturers.

Turkish aid to Turkish-Cypriot leadership came in the form of cred-its and technical assistance. Turkey provided loans with low interests tosupport Turkish-Cypriot esnaf and vitalize commerce (Gazioglu, 2000,pp. 172–173). In May 1959, Fazıl Küçük paid a visit to Ankara, fromwhere he returned with the promise of a first-stage credit support of125,000 pounds sterling; he was accompanied by a team of select eco-nomic advisors, consisting of two officers of the Ministry of ForeignAffairs, vice president of the Treasury, undersecretary of the Ministryof Trade, and vice presidents of the tobacco monopoly, and two statebanks (Gazioglu, 2000, p. 177). This set a precedent for the future, andincreasingly became a regular pattern in Turkey’s relations with Turkish-Cypriots. Interestingly, consensus on the new common state hinderedTurkish assistance to Turkish-Cypriots, as Greek-Cypriots and the Greekgovernment, which saw in such unilateral aid the signs of economicTaksim, duly argued that it should be given to, not just one community,but the Republic itself. That it had now become necessary to get permitsfrom ministry offices controlled by Greek-Cypriot nationalists also putlimits on investments aiming at economic separation (Gazioglu, 2000,pp. 172–173, 175–176).

As it appears, “From the Turk, to the Turk” campaign, in full swingas of early 1959, lost its momentum by early 1960 as, with the polit-ical thaw, Turkish-Cypriots started to prefer Greek shops, upon whichthe youth organization and the federation of workers came out with ajoint declaration, warning against the economic consequences of suchbehavior on the community (Gazioglu, 2000, p. 190). This was possi-bly the belated effect of resentment common people felt at speculative


retailers who surcharged consumers by reselling goods actually providedfrom Greek-Cypriot suppliers, and the rough conduct of Federasyon youthagainst violators.11

Conclusion

Since the late 1990s, Turkish-Cypriot society has been undergoing ageneral, structural (as opposed to partial, and conjunctural) crisis in itseconomy and politics. In the economy, this manifests itself as an erraticgrowth, characterized by speculative bubbles and slumps, and massive fis-cal deficits, and in politics, as sharp ups and downs in the fortunes ofpolitical leaders and parties, and loss of legitimacy for the political regimeas a whole.

One is also able to discern that the structural crisis in question encom-passes all the basic institutional, legal qualities and functions of statehood,namely, monopoly on the means of violence, territory, property and citi-zenship regime, taxation and budgeting, control over the flows of capital,labor and commodities into the national economy, and so on. But thekey to understanding the dynamics of the current crisis is then the studyof the characteristics of the genesis of the existing state apparatuses andinstitutions. This, in turn, requires alternative ways of approaching theCyprus issue, by putting emphasis on domestic dynamics as well, fromthe perspective of state theories and political economy.

Historical inquiry indicates that the genesis of elementary state struc-tures actually dates back to the elite struggles for political representationand the constitution of Cyprus as Turkey’s prime national cause, betweenthe commencement of political thaw in 1943, and the foundation of theRepublic of Cyprus in 1960. The nationalist drive toward state-buildingencompassed, as subprocesses, the monopolization of the means of vio-lence, concentration of political power, centralization of administration,quest for territory, formulation of economic policies to ensure capitalaccumulation, construction of a captive market, enforcement of taxation,and the institutionalization of centralized budgetary practice. In prac-tice, this corresponds to the emergence of a new complex of institutions,involving, domestically, the Party, the Federation, Evkaf, the youth orga-nization, TMT, the separate municipalities, and externally, the Turkishgovernment, chief of staff, and foreign affairs, with the locus of powerspanning a Turkish-Cypriot–Turkish nexus. The same process also wit-nessed the emergence of the basic elements or tools of Turkish-Cyprioteconomic policies: (a) Turkey’s fiscal transfers; (b) the beginnings of, albeitat a rudimentary level, public budgets (particularly, embryonic forms oftaxation and public investments by Evkaf ); and (c) a capital strategy,


based on the actuation of a process of rapid capital accumulation, aroundÇarsı, via the institution of a closed, all-Turkish circuit of capital.

Notes

1. The central administration and umbrella organization of Ottoman piousfoundations.

2. What came to be known as the Atlantic Charter was a statement of pol-icy principles, issued jointly by Great Britain and the United States, onAugust 1, 1941, shortly after the German invasion of the Soviet Union.Roberts (1999, p. 466) notes that anticolonialism was implicit in the AtlanticCharter “ . . . about the rights of nations to choose their own governmentsand the ultimate goal of independence for colonial territories,” notably, asthe principle of peoples’ right to self-determination.

3. Amongst the 76 participants to the all-Nicosian foundational meeting ofKATAK, there were 2 members of Mesveret Meclisi (Consultative Council);4 members of the Municipal Council of Nicosia, including Necati Özkan(b. 1899) and Fazıl Küçük (b. 1904); and 1 member of the executionalcouncil, Sir Münir himself. Of the 76, 14 were professionals and civil ser-vants of which 1 was a judge, 1 lawyer, 3 doctors, 2 pharmacists, 3 bankofficials and clerks, and 4 civil servants; 18 were merchants and business-men and 37 were small shopkeepers and artisans. The 2 members of theConsultative Council and all the 4 members of the Municipal Council wereelected to the board of directors of 9 members (Birinci, 2001a, pp. 252–255).Arif Hasan Tahsin argues that leading the foundation of KATAK was çarsı(Tahsin, 1995, p. 113).

4. However, it is a less known figure, Hasan Nevzat Karagil (b. 1920), aTurkish-Cypriot student with Turkish citizenship, who actually played a keyrole in shaping up the new political alliances of Turkish-Cypriot politicsof the late 1940s and early to mid-1950s. Thus, he led the foundation ofTurkish-Cypriot diaspora associations in Turkey, as well as the foundationof the Federation as an umbrella organization and, directly or indirectly, theunification of KATAK and Kıbrıs Millî Türk Halk Partisi as its political arm.

5. On December 5, 1953, Necati Özkan’s house in Nicosia was burned down,apparently, by an arson attack, and on January 13, 1954, he terminated thepublication of the newspaper Istiklâl, and with it, his political career. On theother hand, following the approval by Paphos secondary school commissionof the new education law of British administration amidst bitter controversy,Ihsan Ali got harassed, on October 4, 1953, by members of the youth organi-zation of the Federation, namely, Kıbrıs Millî Türk Gençlik Teskilâtı (NationalTurkish Youth Organization of Cyprus) (Birinci, 2001b, pp. 316, 329–331).

6. Only 23 people were put on trial, including Hikmet Bil himself, andall quickly acquitted. Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs later appointedBil to the Turkish Embassy in Beirut as a press attaché (An, 2002,pp. 79–80).


7. Kızılyürek (2005, pp. 248–250) sees Denktas’s rise to prominence as a crit-ical juncture in the way toward Taksim. As the Federation president and aTMT officer, he sets about making military, political, ideological, and eco-nomic preparations for Taksim, parts of which were the politics of culturaland economic Turkification.

8. Thus, on January 27–28, seven Turks got killed in clashes with British sol-diers in pro-Taksim demonstrations. The events of June 7, in which 13Cypriots were killed, setting off horrific killings between the two commu-nities, including the Gönyeli massacre of nine Greek-Cypriots on June 12,closely followed the pattern set by September 6–7 pogrom against the Greeksof Istanbul, as they preceded the great pro-Taksim meeting of June 8, inIstanbul, as well as the release of the Macmillan Plan. As Denktas was later toreveal, it is actually some close friend of his who planted the bomb in Turkey’sinformation office in Nicosia, upon which, mobs of youngsters crossed theMason–Dixon line, set shops afire, and clashed with Greek-Cypriots (An,1996, pp. 83–86; Özgür, 1992, p. 149).

9. For similar analyses, see, particularly, Evre (2004, pp. 132–141) andHasgüler (2007, pp. 227–232).

10. Articles 87 and 89 of the Constitution trusted the communal chambers withthe control of the cooperatives.

11. See, for examples of rough treatment and price surcharges, Ali (2002,pp. 56–58), Egemen (2006, pp. 174–175), Mapolar (2002, pp. 141–144),and Özgür (2000, p. 31).

C h a p t e r 7

Making Sense ofTurkey’s ChangingCyprus Policy: TheEU Factor and theShifting Preferencesof the Power BlocEmine Tahsin

Introduction

This chapter examines the factors that shape and transform Turkey’sCyprus policy by utilizing the insights of an international political econ-omy perspective. The core of the determinants of changing Turkey’sCyprus policy is to be found in the Turkey–European Union (EU) rela-tions and the changing circumstances for the EU project of Turkey. It willbe argued that behind Turkey’s changing Cyprus policy lie the shiftingpreferences of the “power bloc”1 in which big bourgeoisie is hegemonicbut not without contradictions.

In contrast to the state-centered approaches that read policyshaped merely by diplomatic relations, international political economyapproaches2 concentrate primarily, though by no means exclusively, uponactivities taking place among international actors, states, global corpora-tions, international organizations as well as social forces within and acrossthe borders, such as trade unions, political and social movements, andother manifestations of popular mobilizations (Crane and Amawi, 1991;Bieler, and Morton, 2004). Within this framework, classes are consideredas the main actors in the global economy and how these interact with

136 E M I N E TA H S I N

social forces that shape particular historical formations has been analyzed(O’Brien and Marc, 2004, p. 22). In order to do so one has to examinethe connections and transformations in the production and power withinthe state and international relations.

At the center of this endeavor is the concept of hegemony. Accordingto Gramsci, a hegemonic project can be defined as a concrete programdeveloped in a particular historical moment through which a particularclass/group maintains its hegemony. It is the hegemonic project whichwould make the articulation of interests of subordinate classes/groups tothat of the hegemonic one, which would establish the famously unstableequilibrium (Gramsci, 2000, p. 206) between interests of the dominantgroup and those of subordinate groups—an equilibrium in which theinterests of the dominant group prevail—temporarily within specific his-torical conditions. In addition to these, there is also a need to assess therole of big capital in the determination of hegemonic fraction and polit-ical power and the contradictions among the other fractions of capital(Poulantzas, 1973, p. 44), which will be undertaken in this chapter.

This framework will be employed to analyze Turkey’s Cyprus policy.The Cyprus question has been defined as a national cause in the Turkishforeign policy since 1950s, and an understanding that highlights thegeopolitical importance of the island has prevailed. On the other hand,state-centered approaches often fail to recognize the meaning of Cyprusfor Turkish economy and fractions of Turkish capital and therefore itseffects on the formulation of foreign policy. This chapter goes beyond“Turkey’s interest in Cyprus” departing from the presumption that thestate in Turkey is a unitary actor, and aims to analyze the preferences ofthe power bloc—including the demands of the different factions withinit—in formulating this policy.

The decade starting with the year 2000 has brought about a remark-able rupture in the traditional policy of Turkey on Cyprus and the periodwas marked by the fractions of Turkish capital assuming an active rolein the formation of the Cyprus policy of Turkey. Such an active role wasimperative to effect the determination of Turkey’s foreign policy and inspecific Turkey’s relations with the EU. This chapter will trace the dynam-ics behind Turkey’s changing policy on Cyprus by focusing on Turkey–EUrelations, the place of Cyprus within this framework, and the role ofcapital fractions in shaping these relationships.

Early in the first decade of 2000: The Dynamics behind Turkey’sChanging Policy on Cyprus

The underlying reason of this change in Turkey’s Cyprus policy in the firstdecade of 2000 was the emergence of new dynamics, the most important

T U R K E Y ’ S C H A N G I N G C Y P R U S P O L I C Y 137

being the expansion process of the EU in the aftermath of the Cold War.Furthermore, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) showed its will to solve theCyprus question in cooperation with the EU by applying for EU mem-bership (Hasgüler, 2003, p. 225). The RoC’s application to join the EUeventually brought the recognition in northern Cyprus that a solution isonly possible via EU accession, and membership was considered as themeans for reunifying the country under the EU umbrella. In addition,EU accession became a hope after the financial crises of 1999–2001 innorthern Cyprus that revealed the flaws of a defunct politico-economicstructure3 (Sonan, 2007, p. 12).

The new dynamics of the Cyprus problem led to the rise of a publicdebate in Turkey where Turkey’s traditional position on Cyprus, includ-ing the presence of Turkish troops on the island as well as the costs ofCyprus on Turkey, started to be questioned (Yaka, 2006, pp. 31–32).By the first decade of 2000, EU institutions and authorities publiclyexpressed the view that Cyprus was an obstacle to Turkey’s EU accession.As the tendency of pushing for EU accession as a means of integrationwith global economy gained momentum on the part of Turkish capi-tal, it started explicitly pushing for a settlement of the Cyprus problem.In specific terms, Türk Sanayicileri ve Isadamları Dernegi (TÜSIAD, Asso-ciation of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen), which represents “bigbourgeoisie” in Turkey, has started a campaign to change Turkish publicopinion articulating the view that a solution in Cyprus was vital.

TÜSIAD has always acted with “class consciousness” (Bugra, 1994,p. 337) representing and articulating views in the interest of big capital.The industrial bourgeoisie in Turkey was the creation of Import Sub-stitution Industrialization (ISI) model that was implemented in Turkeybetween 1960 and 1980. The big bourgeoisie that flourished in thisera was either monopolist or oligopolistic because in the absence ofexternal competition, the big bourgeoisie enjoyed the benefits of pro-tection (Keyder, 2003, p. 236). TÜSIAD’s foundation in 1971 was theresult of growing conflicts between big and small industrialists (Bugra,2003, p. 192) as well as the bourgeoisie’s perception of threat from theincreasingly militant working class in this era (Yalman, 1997).

By the late 1970s, the big bourgeoisie had increasingly become strongerin the course of an inwardly oriented capital accumulation strategy andwas looking for a way out of the economic crisis that plagued the Turkisheconomy. The solution embraced by the big bourgeoisie, and shared bythe IMF and the World Bank, entailed a transition from ISI to exportorientation where industry would be the leading sector (Yalman, 1997,pp. 177–178). The Turkish bourgeoisie acted as a unified class in this pro-cess. In the summer of 1979, TÜSIAD started a press campaign targetingthe government’s economic policies, criticizing its inability to export and


explicitly expressed its demand for free enterprise and a liberal economy(Dodd, 1992, p. 27). Furthermore, in an era marked by intensifying classstruggle, economic crisis, and political deadlock, the representatives of thebig bourgeoisie explicitly supported the military regime (Savran, 2002,p. 16). The September 12 process was a simultaneous process of politi-cal authoritarianism and economic liberalism. While all associations werebanned and labor was directly excluded from the decision-making pro-cess, the military regime asked for the support of TÜSIAD to transmitthe message abroad that it would remain loyal to the structural adjust-ment program that started to be implemented in the beginning of 1980(Yalman, 1997, pp. 219–220). Hence it is not surprising that the bigbourgeoisie became an explicit supporter of Turkey’s EU membershipfrom late 1990s and later the resolution of the Cyprus problem, whichwas clearly put forward to Turkey as a condition for joining the EU.

Meanwhile, the slogans of “solution in Cyprus against status quo” wereraised in north Cyprus early in the first decade of 2000. Interestingly,Turkish-Cypriot opponents of Denktas’s regime converged with the cap-italist groups in Turkey on the issue of settlement in Cyprus followedby EU membership of a united island. In this framework, the processthrough which the EU project became the hegemonic project of the cap-ital in Turkey can be explained by focusing on its shifting position onCyprus. The following sections examine the approaches of TÜSIAD andother fractions of capital on Turkey–EU relations, the Cyprus question, aswell as their capitalist activity in the north Cyprus economy. The interestof TÜSIAD and other fractions of capital in Cyprus should be analyzedfrom 1974 onwards, while the dominant economic view in Turkey shapedthe economy of northern Cyprus.

Course of Turkey–EU Relations and TÜSIAD

To reiterate, EU’s openly linking Turkey’s EU membership to a settlementin Cyprus paved the way to a more active role assumed by the Turkishcapital to resolve the Cyprus problem. Yet in order to understand this,there is a need to elaborate how different fractions of capital and in specificTÜSIAD positioned themselves in the course of Turkey–EU relations.Turkey’s EU adventure started with the Ankara Agreement of 1963. Theagreement was a stage-by-stage integration process toward eventual fullmembership in the European Economic Community (EEC) (Esfahani,2003, p. 808). In 1973 Turkey signed an additional protocol accordingto which customs would be nullified between the EEC and Turkey in22 years and during this process Turkey would become a full member ofthe EEC (Esfahani, 2003, p. 814). The ANAP government applied for


membership of the EEC in 1987, which was rejected by the EEC on thegrounds that Turkey was not ready for full membership because of its lackof economic development and failure of democracy (Vardar, 2005, p. 92).

A turning point in relations between Turkey and the EU came in1995 when Turkey signed an agreement to create Customs Union withthe EU, which accelerated the momentum of the trade liberalization pro-cess and exposed domestic industry to greater external competition (Önis,2006, p. 6). The Luxembourg Summit of the European Council held in1997 explicitly excluded Turkey from the list of countries considered forpotential full membership. Yet in two years’ time, Turkey was formally rec-ognized as a candidate for membership in the Helsinki Summit of 1999and, having implemented the political and economic measures demandedby the EU, started accession negotiations in October 2005 (Önis, 2006,p. 21). In the process of accession, the EU and Turkey will be discussing35 policy areas or “chapters.” However, Turkey’s negotiation process isnot proceeding well. Fourteen out of 35 chapters of Turkey–EU nego-tiations were suspended due to the Cyprus question (BBC Turkishnews,June 30, 2010).

As the relationship between Turkey and EU gained a momentumearly in the first decade of 2000, the campaign of the capitalist frac-tions in Turkey to transform the accession process into a social projectand to conduct lobbying in the EU intensified, while a new allianceemerged between fractions of capital, certain intellectuals, the media,and some trade unions, focusing on the target of EU accession. Whatneeds to be underlined is that different fractions of capital organizedunder TÜSIAD, Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi (TOBB, The Union ofChambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey) and Müstakil Sanayicive Isadamları Dernegi (MÜSIAD, Independent Industrialists and Busi-nessmen’s Association) explicitly supported the EU project in this period.4

The enterprises gathered under TOBB, which included large-scale as wellas medium enterprises, supported the EU accession process regardlessof their competitive capacities (Uzgel, 2004, p. 215). The main asso-ciation of Islamic-oriented businessmen in Turkey, Müstakil Sanayici veIsadamları Dernegi (MÜSIAD, Independent Industrialists and Business-men’s Association), which predominantly represented small to mediumenterprises, also adopted a pro-European stance in the second half of the1990s (Önis, 2006, p. 8).

This convergence amongst the different fractions of capital was some-thing novel. For example, it was mainly TÜSIAD supporting acces-sion when the Additional Protocol was first executed in 1973 (Ugur,2000, p. 118). Similarly, TÜSIAD explicitly supported Customs Unionwhereas MÜSIAD vehemently opposed the process, arguing increasing


competition from Europe would adversely affect its members (Eder,1999, p. 91).

As the leading representative of the alliance between actors supportingthe EU, TÜSIAD defined the EU strategy as the fundamental strategyguiding the future of Turkey. According to Türkay (2004, p. 4), TÜSIAD(2002a) defines the EU membership as a national policy supported bythe majority of the Turkish society and regards the accession process asa modernization project, asserting that it will determine Turkey’s statusas a developed country and its stabilization (TÜSIAD, 2002b). Also,the necessity for EU membership has been defended on the groundsof attracting foreign capital and investment to Turkey (Önisb, 2003b,pp. 10–11). On the basis of examples of Spain and Portugal, it has beenargued that Turkey would grow better with foreign capital investment.

It may be argued that the big bourgeoisie in Turkey aims to achieveintegration with global capitalism through EU membership to improve itscompetitiveness and liberalization (Uzgel, 2004, p. 205). What is criticalis that as the hegemonic fraction5 it managed to bring together differ-ent fractions of capital in the name of this hegemonic project. Sincethe interests of the hegemonic fraction correspond to the state apparatus(Poulantzas, 1973, p. 44), it is not surprising to see that Turkey’s policyon Cyprus changed significantly after the first decade of 2000.

Turkish Capital’s Involvement in Cyprus

Since the 1950s, different fractions of Turkish capital have been involvedin the north Cyprus economy. In that sense, Turkish capital’s affiliationwith the island economy precedes 1974. In 1955, Türkiye Is Bankası(Isbank of Turkey) opened its first branch on the island. The foun-dations of the cooperation between Turkish-Cypriots and fractions ofTurkish capital and Turkish government were also laid in 1950s to ensurecapital accumulation among Turkish-Cypriots. Kıbrıs Türk Ticaret Odası(KTTO, Turkish-Cypriot Chamber of Commerce) was founded in 1958,and TOBB conducted activities on Cyprus before 1974. The first officialassistance of Turkey to Turkish Community in Cyprus also came duringthese years. Turkey made a decision of granting 125,000 GBP to CypriotTurks in 1959 (Gazioglu, 2000, p. 177).

The campaign titled “From Turkish people to Turkish people” aimedat economic growth of the Turkish community, and it was declaredthat the Turkish Bank granted a loan of 40,000, Barclay’s Bank 90,000,and Isbank 130,000 GBP for the projects in this framework (Gazioglu,2000, p. 167), in addition to 500,000 GBP loan to be issued by TürkiyeZiraat Bankası (Ziraat Bank) for long-term projects (Gazioglu, 2000,


p. 163). The process primarily aimed at the development of commer-cial bourgeoisie, and the executives and members of Türk MukavemetTeskilatı (TMT, Turkish Resistance Organization) assumed active rolesin economic domain, where the said steps were a natural extension of the“Either division or death policy.”

Acting in concert with the government on the Turkish interventionin Cyprus, TÜSIAD issued a report in August 1974 to gather data onCyprus economy. However, unlike TOBB, TÜSIAD did not have anactive role on the island before 1974. Nevertheless, the Cyprus reportof TÜSIAD is one of the first studies issued by a capital organization inthe immediate aftermath of the intervention of 1974, and it is importantin reflecting the view of the Turkish capital on the Cyprus question. Withthis report, TÜSIAD approved of the intervention, referring to the inter-vention as “a successful peace campaign by our Military Forces in Cyprus”(TÜSIAD, 1974, p. 1). Apart from this report, TÜSIAD supported theTurkish intervention on the island through its statements, and SabancıHolding, the leading member of the association, announced its 1.5 mil-lion TL grant to the army (Hürriyet, July 25, 1974) (Yaka, 2006, p. 62).TOBB’s unconditional support was also evident during this period. SadiPehlivanoglu, then the general secretary of TOBB, who had close relation-ships with the Turkish-Cypriot capital fractions before 1974, declared thatthe private sector was ready for service to the Turkish Military Forces withits financial and physical capabilities (Türkiye Iktisat Gazetesi, July 25,1974; Yaka, 2006, p. 72). Again, the executives of TOBB defined Cyprusas a national cause, stating that Turkey would never make concessionsin Cyprus, and the private sector was ready to make any sacrifice todefend the theses on Cyprus (Türkiye Iktisat Gazetesi, July 18, 1974;Yaka, 2006, p. 73).

In the aftermath of the Turkish intervention in 1974, the fractions ofTurkish capital also discussed the potential course of development of theeconomy of northern Cyprus. However, it may be suggested that thesediscussions did not go beyond determining the areas of investment inthe short run, and failed in establishing long-term strategies. The ambi-guities pertaining to the future of Cyprus, accompanied by the lack ofinformation of the Turkish capital on its material conditions as well as onthe Cyprus economy, and the political conjuncture in Turkey, were theprimary reasons that led to a failure in developing a long-term planningperspective among the fractions of Turkish capital.

During the first few years, the northern Cyprus economy set as itsprimary target improving the production capacity and recovering hotels,enterprises, and factories that lay idle after 1974, and the fundamentalinfrastructural investments were highlighted. In 1975, Ziya Müezzinoglu,


then the minister of finance who was also appointed to the Chair ofCyprus Coordination Board,6 prepared a growth plan for Cyprus thataimed, in accordance with the conditions of the time, at a growth strategyin northern Cyprus on the basis of nationalization policies. Müezzinoglu’splan ignited debates between the Turkish government and the repre-sentatives of different fractions of capital who accused Müezzinoglu forimporting Turkey’s flawed model to Cyprus and underlined that factorieson the island should be left to Sabancı or Koç, or opened to foreigners(Birand, 1986).

Given the effect of political ambiguities in Turkey, such plans couldnot be successfully put into practice, and by 1978, approximately 50 per-cent of existing enterprises in the industrial sector were not yet putinto service. According to the report of Sanayi Odaları Birligi (Unionof Chambers of Industrialists), the industrial sector made use of 50 per-cent, tourism 23 percent, and agriculture 60 percent of existing capacity(Sanayi Odaları Birligi, 1978, p. 18). The reasons for low capacityof the industrial sector in northern Cyprus include the small scale ofdomestic market, deteriorating worker–employer relations and increas-ing unrest, lack of qualified employees, and difficulty in importing inputs(Sanayi Odaları Birligi, 1978, p. 20). Despite various measures, such asconstruction of a free seaport zone in Famagusta, operation of certainenterprises by the state under the title of Industrial Holdings (similarto Public Economic Enterprises), subsidy for local production remainedlimited. During this process, increased imports from Turkey and lim-ited export conditions further increased the dependency on the Turkisheconomy.

Turkey underwent a major political and economic transformation afterthe military coup of September 12 1980, which had its repercussions innorthern Cyprus. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)7

declared independence (on November 15, 1983) during the governmentof Bülent Ulusu, before ANAP came to power. Özal did not approve ofthis development. The ANAP government, aiming at integration withcapitalism and a liberal policy in economy with an active role in foreignpolicy, brought on the agenda a project that suggested establishing a freezone8 in north Cyprus for the solution of the Cyprus question. Busi-nessmen accompanied Özal on his visit to the island, including leadingmembers from TÜSIAD such as Sakıp Sabancı and Sarık Tara (Uzgel,2004, p. 329). Then the chairman of TÜSIAD, Sabancı, defended thatthe island should completely become a free zone, while others complainedof the excessive role of etatism and bureaucracy in investing on the island.However, it needs to be underlined that the free zone project could notbe implemented due to political concerns.


A process in parallel with liberalization in Turkey started in the mid-1980s in the northern Cyprus. In 1986, an agreement executed betweenTurkey and TRNC marked a significant transformation. Bearing thesignature of Özal, the agreement legalized the rules on central bank,currency and foreign exchange, and banks and off-shore banking, andauthorized suitcase trade while highlighting foreign trade, education,banking, and tourism. It was also during Özal’s government that freemoney transfer was authorized, foreign exchange regime of TRNC wasrevised, and customs taxes were decreased by 30 percent, which may beregarded as crucial steps in liberalization (Uzgel, 2004, p. 352). Duringthis period, Turkey emphasized investments on highways, communica-tions, and water systems to pave the way for tourism investments (Uzgel,2004, p. 353).

In 1990, upon approval of the application of RoC for EU membershipdespite opposition of Turkey and TRNC, a discourse of integration withTRNC started to prevail in Turkey. The Luxembourg Summit of 1997,which excluded Turkey from EU expansion, led to a further emphasis onthe discourse of integration in the Cyprus policy of Turkey (Ugur, 2003,p. 168). In August 1997, a Council of Association was founded betweentwo countries to ensure complete integration in economic and financialdomains, and partial integration in the security, defense, and foreign pol-icy domains. These agreements consolidated the thesis that Turkey wouldresort to integration with northern Cyprus, while the government of thetime declared recognition of the confederation thesis on Cyprus (Dodd,2000, p. 168).

In this process, TÜSIAD, though faintly, stated that a solution inCyprus would allow Turkey a greater possibility of action particularly inforeign policy (TÜSIAD, 1998, p. 11). The report dated 1998, whereTÜSIAD investigated the northern Cyprus economy, suggested that apermanent solution on the island on the basis of equality would onlybe possible through the elimination of economic differences betweenTRNC and southern Cyprus (TÜSIAD, 1988, p. 11). According toTÜSIAD, political reasons were underlying the economic problems inTRNC. The fundamental views in the report can be summarized asfollows: A strong economy in TRNC and a solution on the basis ofequality would allow Turkey a greater possibility of action particularlyin foreign policy (TÜSIAD, 1988, p. 11). Investments by Turkish busi-nessmen in TRNC with a limited capital contribution, and particularlytheir assuming the function of marketing goods produced there in Turkeyor other third countries, will be a remarkable contribution. In addition toexisting potential, the importance of Cyprus in the Mediterranean as acenter of production and seaport will be increased with the completion


of the Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP) and the initiation of theManavgat water system. Furthermore, the execution of Baku–Ceyhanoil pipeline will further increase the strategic importance of Cyprus(TÜSIAD, 1988, p. 71).

In this study, TÜSIAD proposed a restructuring of the northernCyprus economy, and joint investments by Turkish and northern Cyprusbusinessmen. Hence this study revealed that TÜSIAD envisaged northernCyprus as a potential center of production in the Mediterranean regionwhile excluding possible effects of the EU accession process on the Cypruseconomy.

The Helsinki Summit and Its Aftermath

The Helsinki Summit was not only an important milestone in Turkey–EU relations, but it also led to a significant shift in Turkey’s policy onCyprus. In the final declaration of the summit it was underlined thata solution of the Cyprus problem would facilitate the EU accession ofTurkey. This became a turning point for the position of the hegemonicfraction of capital represented by TÜSIAD. After 1999 the associationcompletely changed its disposition on Cyprus since 1974 and did notabstain from conflicting with the fractions that regarded Cyprus as anational cause. Such a position seemed to TÜSIAD to be an obstacleto EU accession. Meanwhile, in comparison to TÜSIAD, TOBB tried toadopt a less confrontational position.

In November 1999, Rauf Denktas declared his withdrawal from theUN negotiations on the ground that the suggestion of the Turkish side fortwo-territorial states was not included, revealing the Turkish side upheldthe confederation thesis. The National Security Council on Novem-ber 24, 2000, supported Denktas’s decision, and Prime Minister BülentEcevit pleaded EU not to associate Turkey’s membership with the Cyprusquestion. After a statement by the EU on November 1, 2001, that Cyprusmay become a member before a solution of the Cyprus question, PrimeMinister Ecevit explicitly stated that Cyprus would be integrated withTurkey.

The harshest criticism of this statement came from TÜSIAD thatexpressed their disapproval of Turkey’s support to Denktas, which wouldcause irreparable damages to Turkey–EU relations as well as on the EUaccession process of RoC (Yaka, 2006, p. 38). Hence in the period untilthe elections of November 2002, TÜSIAD stood out as the key actorthat challenged Ecevit’s government’s traditional Cyprus policy. The vic-tory of Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP, The Justice and DevelopmentParty) in 2002 began a new era when the opinions of the government


and fractions of capital on Turkey–EU relations and Cyprus converged.The statements on Cyprus made by AKP immediately after its victory atthe elections emphasized the urgency of a solution and were perceivedas a resolution by AKP to solve the Cyprus question. In his speech ofJanuary 1, 2003, Erdogan reiterated his view that “Cyprus is not Denk-tas’s matter. We shall do what we are required to do on this issue. I donot support the continuation of the policy which has been sustained inCyprus for 30–40 years,” and increased the pressure on Denktas (Simsir,2004, p. 257).

The period between November and December 2002 was one of heatedpublic discussions between the defenders of the conventional policy andthe defenders of a change for the sake of the EU accession process.With the introduction of the Annan Plan, TÜSIAD clearly declaredits support for the plan, highlighting the position that the negotiationson Cyprus should continue in a constructive way with due consider-ation of the UN proposal, during a time when Turkey demonstratedpolitical determination to fulfill other liabilities in the political criteriaof Copenhagen. TOBB, Istanbul Sanayi Odası (ISO, Istanbul Cham-ber of Industry) and Istanbul Ticaret Odası (ITO, Istanbul Chamberof Commerce), and other capital organizations also leaned toward thenegotiation of the Annan Plan, while refraining from criticizing Denk-tas. Zafer Çaglayan, the Chairman of TOBB, referred to Denktas asa national hero in his statements, while suggesting that a solution onthe island in the framework of the Annan Plan would be an impor-tant opportunity for the recovery of Turkish–Greek relationship (Yaka,2006, p. 71).

On the other hand, as explained above, disappointment with the eco-nomic and political system in north Cyprus led to a mobilization of tradeunions and fractions of capital in favor of a solution on the island followedby EU membership. The fractions of capital that had been supportingDenktas for years changed their positions, and met with liberal circlesin Brussels and Turkey on a common ground (TÜSIAD, March 12,2009). TÜSIAD went into cooperation with anti-Denktas opposition,and supported Mehmet Ali Talat, the president of Cumhuriyetçi TürkPartisi (CTP, The Republican Turkish Party), for the oncoming elec-tions. The association also held common meetings with KTTO and KıbrısTürk Isadamları Dernegi (ISAD),(Cyprus Turkish Businessmen Associ-ation). In this process, pro-EU policies of KKTO, ISAD, Kıbrıs TürkSanayi Odası (KTSO, Cyprus Turkish Chamber of Industry), and KuzeyKıbrıs Genç Isadamları Dernegi (GIAD, North Cyprus Young Business-men’s Association) helped to undermine the Denktas front in northernCyprus.


Economic Concerns in the Annan Plan and the Present

With the introduction of the Annan Plan, the fractions of Turkish capitalmade use of economic concerns to back up their pro-settlement positionon Cyprus. TÜSIAD, accompanied by KTTO and ISAD, highlightedthe argument that EU membership is a precondition for the growth ofthe northern Cyprus economy, and referred to the Annan Plan as anopportunity for the future of the economy of northern Cyprus. In 2009,a joint declaration by TÜSIAD, K υπρoυ (OEB, Cyprus Employersand Industrialists Federation), ISAD, and SEV (Hellenic Federation ofEntreprises) stated that “As the leading business organizations of Cyprus,Greece and Turkey, we, the OEB, ISAD, SEV and TÜSIAD, call on bothsocieties in Cyprus to continue talks in good will to achieve a compre-hensive and permanent solution for the Cypriot question” (TÜSIAD,March 12, 2009).

Ümit Boyner, the chairwoman of TÜSIAD, visited northern Cyprus inMarch 2010 to attend a meeting held by ISAD, and stated that northernCyprus, together with southern Cyprus, may become a strong econ-omy offering high-quality services, during a time of changes in globalconjuncture (TÜSIAD, 2010). She also stated their support for thenegotiation process, reiterating that the problem on the island was noteconomic but political.

Declaring their views of the Annan Plan to the public through a report,TOBB attempted to analyze the pros and cons of the plan. The reportby TOBB (2003) criticized the plan for its lack of fastidiousness oneconomic issues and its failure to make suggestions on issues to meetthe economic requirements of the Turkish side, which has a relativelylower level of development, as well as for its failure to offer measuresto eliminate the past inequalities between the parties due to embargoes.In the period following the Annan Plan, Faik Yavuz, vice chairman ofTOBB, declared that the organization was always closely associated withCyprus, and stressed that the solution of the question was a politicalmatter. In addition to these, Chairman of TOBB, Rıfat Hisarcıklıoglu,declared:

Basically, TRNC should be immediately integrated with the world. Cyprus hasfulfilled its obligations in the framework of the Annan Plan. We have keptour promises we made on the international platforms. It has achieved globalintegration. Northern Cyprus should be freed from economic isolation.

(TOBB, 2006)

Clearly, these approaches on the part of TÜSIAD and TOBB on Cypruswere identical to the AKP’s line of thought.


Northern Cyprus after the Annan Plan

After the referendum for the Annan Plan, RoC officially became a mem-ber of the EU on May 1, 2004, while the Union had to take severaldecisions against northern Cyprus. On July 7, 2004, the EU Com-mission brought to the Council a package of two regulations, DirectTrade Regulation and Financial Assistance Regulation, to end restric-tions on Turkish-Cypriots and to improve economic growth. The DirectTrade Regulation (authorizing direct trade from airports and seaportsof northern Cyprus to EU countries) was suspended by the Coun-cil after the opposition of the RoC. In addition, EU drafted anotherregulation, referred to as the Green Line Regulation, regulating the cir-culation of goods, services, and people between territories of northernCyprus and the RoC, which was executed on April 29, 2004, to facili-tate trade between two communities (EU Coordination, Turkish-CypriotCommunity, 2011).

The RoC imposed conditions to approve the Direct Trade Regulation,such as transfer of Varosia (Maras) region to the South, and the Magusa(Famagusta) Seaport to EU government. The process once again contin-ued in connection with the negotiation chapters of Turkey. In Turkey, theAKP government continued with the win-win strategy, while also defend-ing that the seaports of northern Cyprus should be opened for trade forMaras. Today, the RoC still maintains its opposition against the DirectTrade Regulations. On the other hand, there is a policy change on thepart of the Turkish side regarding Maras, which could be seen in thedeclarations (Abhaber, July 16, 2011) by Prime Minister Erdogan stat-ing the possibility of opening Maras to Turkish settlement. This changeshould also be analyzed as a part of the win-win strategy and the bargain-ing process of Turkey in relation to Turkey–EU relations. Simply, AKPaims to protect and strengthen its bargaining power on the Cyprus ques-tion on the one hand, and consider the future of Turkey–EU relations onthe other.

The significant difference that the AKP period has made to northernCyprus should be evaluated not only in case of foreign relations but alsoon the dimensions of AKP’s intervention in north Cyprus concerningeconomic problems. There has not occurred a remarkable improvementin the economy of northern Cyprus during the AKP government, andmoreover, the global crisis adversely affected the real estate market in thenorthern Cyprus, which had been the best-growing sector in recent years.Besides, AKP clearly set up a strategy that defines northern Cyprus as aninvestment area and has been increasing the amount of credits (akpartiHaber, January 18, 2012,) especially coordinated by Turkey’s institutions.


In Turkey, a discourse stating that Turkey aims to make TRNC a“Riviera” of the Eastern Mediterranean region has been on the rise. Therecent investments of large capital groups of Turkish origin in the BafraTourism zone stand out, and new investment areas are established withsubsidy laws. On the one hand, based on the TRNC Future StrategiesReport (2010) drafted by Türk Ekonomi Bankası (TEB), TOBB, and DısEkonomik Iliskiler Konseyi (DEIK, Foreign Economic Relations Board),the Turkish-TRNC Business Council aimed at encouraging investments(TOBB 2010), and on the other the TRNC Investment ConsultancyCouncil was created. Thus, the investments in northern Cyprus wouldbe coordinated by a commission of government officials of Turkey andnorthern Cyprus and representatives of the private sector from both sides,which was recognized as the most concrete example indicating that frac-tions of Turkish capital would become more active in northern Cyprusduring the AKP government. The first meeting of the Council summa-rized the proposals for the economy of northern Cyprus in 38 articles.The proposal package, by taking into consideration the requirements forEU accession, included proposals such as putting in force regulationsrequired to encourage foreign investment, facilitating real estate purchasesby foreigners, and making interventions on wages, privatizations, and areduction of loan expenses of banks in northern Cyprus. The prioritizedinvestments include tourism, education, energy, and communication(Tahsin, 2010).

In recent times, AKP has been maintaining its pressure on northernCyprus governments, on the basis of the recognition that the most crucialproblem in the economy of northern Cyprus is the cumbersome state, andoffers economic measures aiming at privatization and the limitation ofpublic expenditure.9 The attempts to privatize key state organizations andthe transfer of the ownership rights of some privatized enterprises to AKP-oriented capital groups10 increased the tension among the social classes innorthern Cyprus, as well as between Turkey and a significant section ofthe Turkish-Cypriot community. In an interview with the Turkish For-tune magazine (February 2011), Halil Ibrahim Akça, the ambassador ofTurkey to the TRNC, described Turkey as the IMF of northern Cyprus.This statement has been heavily criticized in northern Cyprus (Milliyet,February 11, 2011). On the other hand, this declaration explicitly revealshow Turkey looks at the economy of northern Cyprus.

Today, the investments of Turkish capital on the island demonstratethat their expectations for the future of Cyprus remain vivid. The expec-tations of AKP from the northern Cyprus government focus primarilyon limitation of public expenditure and maintenance of privatizationpolicies and gaining new investment areas. A significant proportion of


Turkish-Cypriots remain critical of AKP’s preferences, which becamemanifest in the three rallies held in 2011 protesting AKP-imposedeconomic policies.

Conclusion

We have shown that external dynamics impacting on the Cyprus prob-lem were redefined with the changing conditions since 1990s, and wediscussed the ways in which the internal dynamics of Turkey restructureditself in this process. The big bourgeoisie rebuilt its hegemony within thepower bloc through the EU process, while redefining the national interestsof Turkey on Cyprus. A renouncement of the traditional foreign policywas brought to the agenda due to its unfavorable consequences for thecapital; however, the process was shaped by the conflicts and compromisesbetween different interest groups.

Nevertheless, Turkey’s policy on Cyprus brought about a process thathighlighted social classes in northern Cyprus, regardless of the dynam-ics in Turkey, and the social dynamics in northern Cyprus was involvedin the conflict/compromise processes between the state and fractions ofcapital in Turkey. The alliance existing historically between the capitalsof Turkey and of Turkish-Cypriot community was reorganized under theEU process, which required renouncing conventional policies.

It is a matter of discussion whether Cyprus still remains a nationalcause for Turkey. AKP, in line with the conditions of the new era, adopteda win-win formula on Cyprus, while leaving aside the approach thatCyprus is a national cause. The effects of Cyprus on Turkey–EU relation-ship cause a major interest in the island on the part of AKP and fractionsof capital. As a matter of fact, interventions on political and economic lifeon the island continue during the AKP era.

As compared to early in the first decade of 2000, it may seem thatdiscussions on the course of Turkey’s Cyprus policy have lost their heattoday. However, Cyprus is still a fundamental issue that has an effecton the Turkey–EU relationship and Turkey’s regional policies. Further-more, while this chapter was being written, the RoC has started oil andgas drilling in the Mediterranean that led to an escalation of tensionswith Turkey, which means Cyprus conflict will continue to engage publicopinion and the power bloc in Turkey for many years to come.

Notes

1. Power bloc is a concept used by Nicos Poulantzas to define the key featureof the capitalist states. As opposed to the pre-capitalist states that were based


on the exclusive domination of one class or fraction, a capitalist state is basedon a plurality of dominant class fractions (Poulantzas, 1968, p. 230). This isreflected in the structure of the capitalist state as a “power bloc” composed ofseveral dominant class fractions, one of which is hegemonic over the others(Poulantzas, 1968).

2. For a state-centered or realist approach and its critiques in international rela-tions, see Cohen (2007);.O’Brien and Williams (2004, p. 11–36); Craneand Amawi (1991, p. 3–33); Bieler and Morton (2004, p. 85–113). For acritique of said approaches in the Cypriot example, see Ulusoy (2009).

3. As a result of the banking crisis in the end of 1999, more than 30,000 peoplewere affected. It was reported that 18 percent of the deposits in bankruptbanks included in the banking system, equivalent to 163 million USD in58,000 accounts, was lost (Sonan, 2007).

4. The only exception that stood out as a critic of the EU process turned outto be USAID (Ulusal Sanayici ve Isadamları Dernegi, the Association ofNational Industrialists and Businessmen), which represented capital groupsthat are only large enough to use the resources of the domestic market(Türkay, 2004, p. 6).

5. Big bourgeoisie shall be defined as an amalgam of industrial, commercial,and financial bourgeoisie. Post-1980 Turkey is marked by the ascendance ofthe holding companies that harbor the different functions within the totalcircuit of capital. In this period, holdings started increasingly wielding banksin order to control the circuit of money—capital in the economy. Theseholding companies also wield productive and commercial capital (Ercan,2002, p. 29–30).

6. Starting in September 1974, Turkey established the Cyprus CoordinationBoard in Cyprus and laid the ground for current institutionalization. Fur-thermore, in 1995 resolution no. 381/95 by the prime minister stipulatedthat the relationship between Turkey and Cyprus would be coordinated bya unit, which was founded in 1981 with the title Organization for CypriotAffairs and renamed in 1984 Consultancy for Cypriot Affairs. The functionof this unit and its role in economy and political life in northern Cyprus leadto the questioning of the independence of northern Cyprus.

7. On formation of Cypriot state in the framework of the Cypriot question, seeTrimikliniotis and Bozkurt (2010).

8. In free trade zones, some normal trade barriers such as tariffs and quotas areeliminated for firms, and bureaucratic requirements such as tax breaks arelowered.

9. The protocol of 2011 entered between Turkey and TRNC may be an exam-ple of this. Furthermore, it may be regarded as a reflection of the view onCypriot economy during the AKP era.

10. In the case of privatization of Dogu Akdeniz ( East Mediterrenean) Collegeand Cyprus Turkish Airlines (KTHY), businessmen close to AKP becamethe new owners of the institutions.

C h a p t e r 8

AKEL:A SociopoliticalProfile ofGreek-CypriotCommunism1

Giorgos Charalambous

Introduction

This chapter examines the case of Aνoρθωτικó Kóμμα EργαζoμενoυΛαoυ (AKEL, Progressive Party of the Working People) focusing mostlybut not exclusively on the post-1974 period. Its main goal is to assess howthe party, both as a self-labeled representative of the interests of the lowerclasses and a competitive electoral actor with political and social capitalhas evolved, thus sketching a sociopolitical profile. Rather than providinga detailed account of AKEL’s long and turbulent history, the chapter willaim to support the argument that AKEL has been and still is a party ofits time and place, deeply rooted in its context. Its study is hence madepossible, only within the confines of actual Cypriot reality. The chapterproceeds with a historical review of AKEL’s emergence and consolidationand then examines briefly its ideological, electoral, and political evolutionin separate sections, before concluding.

AKEL’s Origins and the Roots of Cypriot Bipolarism

AKEL’s progenitor was the Koμμoυνιστ ικó Kóμμα Kυπρoυ (KKK,Communist Party of Cyprus)—officially founded in 1926. Its perception

152 G I O R G O S C H A R A L A M B O U S

of the Russian Revolution as a historical step forward and the view ofthe Soviet Union as a geopolitical ally or “older brother” of the Cypriotworking class in its struggles, consolidated a strong ideological umbrella,under which the first partisans would challenge not only all the aspectsand beneficiaries of the status quo but also all the other rudimentary,populist, and nationalist ideologies that existed at the time, within theruling classes of the Greek-Cypriot community. Rhetoric that addresseda fusion of internationalism, anticolonialism, and antinationalism, madethe KKK a “dialectical product of colonialist impact and local dynam-ics” (Panayiotou, 2006, p. 275). Initial communist support was derivedfrom artisan workers and the proletarianized peasants and the party’s firstmanifesto explicitly reflected the collective interests of these groups. Themanifesto included—inter alia—the party’s position on abolishing privateproperty; expropriation of Church land in favor of peasants; establish-ment of a socialist society; and in accordance with Comintern Policy atthe time, Cypriot membership in the envisaged Soviet Balkan Federation(Katsiaounis, 2008, p. 32).

The emergence of the communist movement in Cyprus fits perfectlya specific strand of sociological theory, which views the appearance ofclass-consciousness and the growing popularity of the communist alter-native within the context of developing capitalist relations of productionand backward socioeconomic dynamism (Bartolini, 2000, p. 514; seealso Panayiotou 1999, p.101). The social space for the appearance ofa working-class organization arose when Cyprus was in deep economiccrisis, with semifeudal conditions, sluggish industrialization, a continu-ous peasant small owner expropriation by moneylenders and subsequentrural—urban migration, whereby it lacked a crystallized political arenaand the provision of substantial political and civil rights (Katsiaounis,2008, pp. 38–51).

Five years after its appearance (in 1931) the KKK was outlawed follow-ing a spontaneous revolt against colonial rule (known as the Oκτωβριανα

[Oktovriana]), whose main instigators were the nationalists. This provedfruitful in a sense, since it led to more focus on trade union activity duringthe 1930s,2 which helped increase the KKK’s appeal and counterbalanceits political marginalization. Amidst new conditions accompanying theeruption of the Second World War, there emerged an opportunity forlegal action under the looser authoritarian measures and so AKEL wasestablished on April 14, 1941, by communists and other progressive,bourgeois, anti-Church figures. The two parties existed in tandem—theKKK as an outlaw and AKEL with an umbrella status—until 1944.

AKEL’s very establishment signaled the first turning point in the party’sideological evolution, since above all it aimed at legitimization. AKEL

G R E E K -C Y P R I O T C O M M U N I S M 153

was in a sense the legal and more wide-encompassing front of the KKK.It combined the protest sides of the three crucial and evolving cleavages onthe island—nationalist/anti-nationalist, colonial/anti-colonial, and class,between employers and workers—into an ideology that was highly sub-versive and revolutionary in its domestic context, and given its proclaimedteleological elements, but reformist and moderate compared to the KKK,in both rhetoric and programmatic positions. Although projecting aMarxist–Leninist ideology, AKEL’s first program (as well as the ones thatfollowed) averted any resurrectionist phraseology and content, droppedsome of the KKK’s salient positions, and focused instead on proposedremedies for the problems of peasants, workers and employees, women,and the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot community (Papadimitrisand Petridis, 1980, pp. 107–111). The beginning of the 1940s also wit-nessed the rallying cry of a Popular Front against the Nazi threat, and theobjective of the Cypriot communists at this point was adjusted in a simi-lar way to that of almost all other communists in Western Europe. Theyviewed fascism in internationalist terms, urging its members to enlist vol-untarily in the allies’ armies (although this was decided at the late stagesof the war, after an initially negative decision) and in this way making iteasier for the party to build up support.

Electoral success ensued in the municipal elections of 1943, 1946,1949, and 1953 that in the absence of an elected legislature3 were espe-cially significant in political terms, as well as in the 1947 archiepiscopalelections. By the 1940s and largely due to the appeal and accomplish-ments of trade union action, AKEL displayed all the main characteristicsof a mass party, most of which many other communist parties inEurope did not: extra—parliamentary mass mobilization of politicallyexcluded social groups; mass ancillary organizations, which functionedas subcultural, counterhegemonic agencies and which together formedwhat came to be known as the Popular Movement (Panayiotou, 1999,Chapters 5 and 6); enforced party cohesion and discipline;4 an exten-sive and articulate membership organization of branches and cells; a partypress and other controlled channels of communication, which propa-gated the party’s goals and contributed further to the identification ofthe party’s enemies, and the cultivation of a collective identity; and soonthereafter, also an internal process of socialization, ideological educa-tion, training, and recruiting that inhibits competitive intraparty elections(Krowel, 2006, p. 255). A very effective organizational body did notmean, however, that the party was untarnished by internal problems.Lines of division existed in its first years, both broadly speaking and morespecifically on particular topics, such as that of enosis.5 Compounded byinternal quarrels that had to do with the personalities of its first two main


leaders—Ploutis Servas6 from 1936 until 1945 and Fifis Ioannou until1949—this gave rise to ideological and strategic disagreement, which wasresolved after the expulsions of 1952, the consolidation of the leader-ship of Ezekias Papaioannou and the establishment of an overall morecentralist organizational culture.

By the 1950s, the bipolar party system of Cyprus was consolidated,largely as a result of the reaction of the conservative and nationalistright to AKEL’s growing appeal and their maturity into more ideologi-cally and organizationally cohesive structures (Protopapas, 2006).7 Yet,this bipolarity must not be interpreted as consequential of the momen-tum gained by a purely communist tradition in Cyprus. Despite theclear dominance of workers in the supporters and activists of AKEL,the role and significance given to influence over sections of the middleclass was central to the politics and strategy of the Left after the 1930s(Katsiaounis, 2008, pp. 68–77; Panayiotou, 1999, Chapter 5) in a simi-lar, quasi-Gramscian fashion as the equally successful Italian communists(see also White, 1972).

Ideological and Programmatic Evolution

AKEL has claimed a Marxist–Leninist analysis of the capitalist systemand a long-term vision of its substitution by a qualitatively higher stageof socialism. In its view, the basic antithesis of the capitalist system—that between the social character of production and private, capitalistexpropriation—is also the basic antithesis in Cyprus. But the resolutionof this antithesis, which characterizes the conflict between the workingclass and the bourgeoisie, is not brought to the fore according to the partydue to the various specificities of the Cypriot context; the most impor-tant being the Cyprus problem, itself evolving from ethnic division andconflict to the post-1974 division of the island. Imperialism—initiallymanifesting itself vis-à-vis Cyprus in the form of British colonialism, thenthrough a more clearly friendly attitude toward Turkish inflexibility onbehalf of the main Western powers—is identified by the party as a criti-cal obstacle that has to be overcome, before root and branch changes inthe socioeconomic structure can follow. The party holds that the nationalliberation, anti-imperialistic aspect (or stage) of struggle, which incorpo-rates the fight for reunification of the island in the post-1974 period,precedes that of socialist transformation (AKEL, 1978, p. 18). This isa Leninist concept based on the tactic of looking for alliance with theclosest national bourgeoisie in colonized countries and of supporting thenational liberation movement (Alavi, 1991, pp. 350–353).


Upon such an ideological rationale and based on a line existing since1926 in the KKK, AKEL formulated its policy of alliances in the early1940s, immediately after its establishment (thus, running in the munic-ipal elections of 1943 in alliance with other forces). In doing so it drewfrom the analyses of Bulgarian communist leader Georgi Dimitrov, thendominant inside the Third International. Its theorizations were rephrasedin 1962, under conditions of independence, but remained essentiallyunchanged in political terms. In 1991, its strategy was formalized intoan electoral coalition under the label AKEL–Left–New Forces, with theleadership reiterating that the priority of the party in this stage of strugglewas to solve the Cyprus problem and reunite the country (AKEL, 2001,pp. 27, 42; see Charalambous, 2009, p. 101).

AKEL’s analysis has led to various (sometimes cynical) interpretationsor vantage points of Cypriot communism’s radicalism. Among these, how-ever, a crucial point arises, implicitly or explicitly. It regards the distinctionbetween official teleology and conjunctural programmatic positions, andthe particularly “patient” differentiation between what can be achieved inthe present and what has to be left for the indefinite future (Panayiotou,2006, 1999; Peristianis 2006; Protopapas, 2006; March and Mudde,2005). While Marxist–Leninist ideology has remained pivotal for theleadership and the party’s core members, contributing to the cultivationof a collective partisan culture that considers “the system” as inherentlyflawed, the party’s public rhetoric includes many elements of liberalism.Such rhetoric is not antireligion but against the Church’s social insensi-tivity and its involvement in politics, not against the nation but againstnationalism’s inherent excesses; not against capitalist structures but againstsocial insensitivity and exploitation (see Peristianis, 2006, pp. 258–259).

The articulation of ideology around the existence of domestic speci-ficities meant that the party’s fierce anti-imperialism would inform itsCyprus problem policy as well. On the basis of studies exploring AKEL’ssocial culture and the profound contribution it has made to the peacefulcoexistence and, after 1974, rapprochement with the Turkish-Cypriots,it is clear that AKEL promoted a Cypriot patriotism, which was bothan alternative to and an enemy of Greek (and Turkish) nationalism(Panayiotou, 2006, p. 275; Papadakis, 1998). Yet, from late 1941 theparty adopted a pro-enosis position (that had been avoided by the KKK)through the intermediate stage of self-government, later modified by thenew leadership (in 1949) into a demand for direct enosis (without anintermediate stage). The change to direct enosis appears to have been aresponse to the collapse of the talks for self-government and cruciallyalso to the alignment of forces and ideologies in Greece, where theK oμμoυνιστ ικó K óμμα Eλλαδoς (KKK, Greek Communist Party)


exerted a determinant influence. At the same time, throughout the wholeperiod of projecting the enosis position, AKEL conceived it as repre-sentative of the Greek-Cypriots’ genuine desire and a means to build aunited front against imperialism (Katsiaounis, 2007, p. 458; Panayiotou,2006, p. 270). In subsequent decades, AKEL’s proclaimed position of abizonal, bicommunal federation as the only feasible way of reunifying theisland would also reflect a strong conviction that a solution agreementshould embody and satisfy to the greatest extent possible domestic andnot foreign interests.

An episode of serious internal disagreement that gave rise to aninternal crisis came in the 1980s. The crisis started after the parlia-mentary elections of 1985, where AKEL’s vote dropped by around5 percent, compared to the previous elections. The official analysis ofthe party attributed this to the tacit cooperation with the right wingΔημoκρατ ικóςΣυναγ ερμóς (DISY, Democratic Rally). This coop-eration arose in the form of a document that the two parties submittedin parliament. Essentially, they were responding to what they consid-ered as bad management of the Cyprus problem, by the then centristPresident Spyros Kyprianou, whom AKEL had supported in the pre-vious presidential elections. Initially, the crisis began in the form ofstrong internal disagreement with the position of primarily blamingcooperation with DISY. The “reformists” called for “de-stalinization,”the end of “monolithic” attitudes and leaderships, as well as a broaderreconceptualization of AKEL’s electoral tactics based on what they con-ceived as the appropriate Cypriot version of perestroika. Having lost theCentral Committee elections to Dimitris Christofias shortly after thedeath of historic leader Ezekias Papaioannou (in mid-1988) and follow-ing two crucial Central Committee meetings (in December 1989 andJanuary 1990), where “evidence” of factionist activity and “rebuttals”of the leadership’s arguments were presented, the “reformists” left theparty and formed AνανεωτικóΔημoκρατ ικóΣoσ ιαλιστ ικó K óμμαK υπρoυ (ADISOK, Democratic, Socialist Renewal Party of Cyprus).8

Soon after, AKEL underwent important ideological, organizational,and programmatic changes, whose first versions began before the crisiswas resolved. The 1990 Congress of the party would thus come to beknown as the renewal one, carving out many of AKEL’s current behavioralcharacteristics. The 1990 manifesto of “Our View of Socialism” repre-sented the party’s most explicit indication of ideological (re)definition(Charalambous, 2007, p. 436). It mainly included the condemnationof Stalinism as a falsification of the Leninist model; the reiteration ofbelief in multiparty politics; and, more broadly, the formulation of aprogram of “renewed socialism” where forms of ownership would vary,


the market and central planning would be combined, and “the compo-sition of the driving forces as well as the form of their political alliancewill be decided by the particular conditions, the character and the natureof the social and political procedure for the establishment of social-ism” (AKEL, 1990a). The product was an indistinct ideology, hoveringbetween Marxism–Leninism and social democracy with regard to its ulti-mate purpose but maintaining an electorally and cohesion-wise crucialcontinuity with its past (Charalambous, 2007, p. 436). A non-nostalgic,nonorthodox direction was given to the party with many elements of lib-eralism and many unanswered questions at the level of theory that wouldmost possibly feed AKELites with heterogeneity of radicalism.

The absence of a theoretician and the drafting of the 1990 manifestoby a few averted the possibility of igniting a damaging internal or exter-nal debate. Crucially, AKEL has never been a party of theory and thiswas reconfirmed during the 1989–1991 period and beyond, a time dur-ing which it has been systematically avoiding an academic clarification ofits exact ideological nature (Charalambous, 2007, pp. 433–437). At onelevel, it has been argued that this lack of theory has made it difficult forthe party to respond effectively and resonantly to dilemma-like situations(Peristianis, 2006, p. 260). At another level, it has also safeguarded itfrom any propaganda that could have easily flowed convincingly amongCypriots; especially in a country where the center and the right have con-trolled and guided much of the media as well as the state’s structures andmechanisms, and subsequently also in the face of external developments(dissolution of “actually existing socialism,” intensification of Europeanintegration etc.), that affected the Cypriot superstructure. Perhaps, thisalso explains why the party: (i) has not reexamined its ideological man-ifesto of 1990, although important developments led to changes in theparty line—for example, vis à vis European integration; (ii) has not madeany real effort to reestablish its theoretical journal—which ceased to bepublished in the mid-1990s—despite expressing the intent of doing soin its last two congresses. A third, parallel—and common outside AKELand many other communist parties more broadly—explanation would bethat the party’s mixture of radicalism and pragmatism is fragile enoughto collapse under the pressure of any kind of Marxist theoretical analysisof communism’s teleological dimension, that reaches deeper than the sur-face and shifts attention from Lenin’s pro-alliances writings. The simplefact remains, nevertheless, that the Cypriot communist party during itsmore than 80 years of history and in contrast to the great majority of itscounterparts, irrespective of their electoral strength and radicalism, hasnot had a theoretician who made a substantive contribution to local orinternational Marxist thought.


During the past two decades the party has been veering toward neo-Keynesian social democracy regarding electoral rhetoric, issue saliencepatterns as well as in terms of programmatic positions to a certain extent.Firstly, it has placed less emphasis on its Marxism and more on the reg-ulation of a social market. An increasingly less communist rhetoric andimage have been accompanied with an increasing tendency to tone issuesdown or up mostly in accordance with the electoral circumstances, thusalso shifting the broad electorate’s perception of its radicalism. In addi-tion, AKEL began to institutionalize itself and to project and publicizeits institutional action to a far greater level than it mobilizes in non-institutional protest. Of course, this is much more evident in the past8 years, during which the party has been in government, although it seemsto have begun in 1991 when indoor meetings and cultural events startedreplacing the big mass rallies of the past (Katsourides, 2010). While thissignifies a rupture in the party’s societal and organizational trajectory,one could additionally argue that it is also a symptom of the wider anddeeper transformations in the Greek-Cypriot society. However, electoral-ism has always been a trait of the AKEL modus operandi, as reflected inthe immense importance attributed to it in all Congresses and pre-electionperiods.

Secondly, regarding programmatic positions, certain changes havetaken place and most relate to the constraints imposed by the accep-tance of Cyprus’ EU membership. Some of the main ones include nopreoccupation with a radical redistribution of wealth, no demands fornationalizations, more emphasis on healthy competition and budgetdeficit reduction and some positive references to Cyprus’ accession tothe EU (Charalambous, 2012a). Essentially, the actual programmaticpositions of AKEL show a party that is concerned with maintaininga high standard of living for the middle and lower classes, defendingthe welfare state and preserving as much as possible the labor rightsof employees, without, however, initiating protest, strikes, class con-frontation, or anything of rebellious or aggressive towards the systemnature. In AKEL’s view, the global and regional context necessitates apragmatic “pro-people” program, with pragmatism meaning differentthings at different times. However, one can still speak of continuity,in the sense that AKEL did not change from being a revolution-ary party to being a reformist one. Today like always, it does notappear to be a party that aims to shape consciousness on the basisof articulate theory building and strictly ideological propaganda, butone that has internalized the contingencies of electoral competition (seeCharalambous, 2012a).


Electoral Evolution, Voters and Members

As evident from table 8.1, the electoral fortunes of AKEL have beennothing short of exceptional in comparative European terms, especiallyafter the dissolution of “actually existing socialism.” It reached an all-time high in 2001 with 34.71 percent, when after an 8-year period ofright-wing government and right–center cooperation in the presidentialelections of 1993 and 1998, it attracted many dissatisfied voters fromthe center parties. Surely, the party’s biggest electoral success has been itsgeneral secretary Dimitris Christofias’s win in the presidential elections of2008. The personality-based contest of presidential elections and the dif-ferentiation between Christofias and AKEL during the campaign periodwas crucial, and would lead us to assume that that the new president’svotes were derived from a much broader base than that of AKEL. Yet,Christofias secured 33.3 percent in the first round and it was essentiallythe two-round presidential system, and the official call from center party

Table 8.1 Electoral results of AKEL (1960–2008)

Dates(Leg./eur./pres.)(year[s] of election)

Legislative(percentage/seats)

European(percentage/seats)

Presidential (preferredcandidate)

1960 42.90/5b — Clerides (not elected)1970/68 34.86/9 — Makarios (elected)1976/73 64.90c/9 — Makarios (elected)ˆ1981/78 32.77/12 — Kyprianou (elected)ˆ1985/83a 27.43/15 — Kyprianou (elected)1991/88 30.63/18 — Vasiliou (elected)1996/93 33.00/19 — Vasiliou (not elected)2001/98 34.71/20 — Iakovou (not elected)2006/04/03 31.13/18 27.89/2 Papadopoulos(elected)2011/09/08 32.67/19 34.90/2 Christofias (elected)

Source: Ministry of Interior, Republic of Cyprus; Chadjikiriakos and Christophoros, (1996)aAccording to article 62(1) of the Constitution, the number of representatives is 50. Out of this number35 are elected by the Greek-Cypriot community and 15 by the Turkish-Cypriot community. However, since1964, Turkish-Cypriot members have not attended the House, and no elections have been held among theTurkish-Cypriot community in accordance with the Republic’s constitution. The House decided in July 1985to adopt Resolution 124, to increase the seats to 80. Of these 56 (70 percent) representatives are elected by theGreek-Cypriot Community and 24 (30 percent) by the Turkish-Cypriot Community. The Turkish-Cypriotseats remain vacant.bAn agreement was reached and the 35 seats of the Greek-Cypriot community were allocated beforehandbetween AKEL, which took five seats and the Patriotic Front, the electoral coalition of the mainly right-wingforces, which took 30 seats.cThis result is due to the block vote system and electoral cooperation between AKEL and the center parties.ˆIn these presidential elections, Makarios and Kyprianou were only candidates, respectively.


Table 8.2 Composition of AKEL’s affiliates: Social class

Category: Social classa AKEL (percentage) Total (all main parties)(percentage)

1 1.8(0. 8) 1.32 3.4(1. 0) 1.93 10.6(3. 3) 6.74 14.4(6) 9.55 22.3(17. 60) 19.66 22.7(23. 3) 25.57 13.7(20. 7) 17.28 5.1(14. 5) 9.29 2.2(7. 1) 4.6

10 1.1(3. 9) 2.0Do not know/refused to

answer2.7(1. 2) 2.5

Source: own elaboration of data (fixed categories) from issp.org. Figures are averages of theyears 2008, 2007, 2005, 2004, and 2002. Figures for each category may add up to more than100 percent, because they were rounded up to one decimal place.aThis is a self-placement category. Figures do not include data from 2008.() Bracketed figures are for the main right-wing party DISY.

Δημoκρατ ικó K óμμα (DIKO, Democratic Party) to support him, onceits own candidate was excluded after the first round, that got him to power(Charalambous, 2009).

However, this must not detract one from the fact that AKEL drawssupport from various sections of society. The self-placement of AKEL’saffiliates in all categories of the 1–10 social stratification range (table 8.2)confirms that its support spans the whole of the socioeconomic spec-trum. Surely, the party is supported by a significant percentage of thelower strata (classified as 4 or below). Compared to the right-wing partyand the average of the four main parties taken together, its support fromthese sections of society is higher, from point 5 on the scale and belowand lower, from point 6 and above. Yet its more substantial groups ofsupporters are placed either in the exact middle of the range or slightlyhigher. These figures raise two points worth highlighting. Firstly, a sub-stantial part of the lower strata has been absorbed by other political forces,something that in the absence of solid empirical work appears to have hap-pened with the beginning of the party system. Secondly, as in most casesof European communism, the internal divisions of the working class maybe considered to be a factor conditioning the presence and character ofAKEL’s reformism (Przeworski, 1980).

Overall, AKEL’s electoral appeal and the small amount of dataon its voters’ profiles (in concurrence with the practice-oriented and


theory-avoiding approach of the party) remind us that AKEL is a commu-nist party without a necessarily communist-thinking support base. Theargument that AKEL’s electorate has been making its choice not on thegrounds of theoretical and strictly ideological concerns, but on the basisof its Cypriot-specific political views and rational calculations, within agiven, deeply partisan and bipolar environment, unquestionably gainscredence.

Membership-wise, the party remains strong (table 8.3). In contrast tomost south European parties, AKEL’s membership levels have not suf-fered any decline since the 1960s, when its membership was already ataround 14,000 (Adams, 1971, p. 61). Its membership density (the ratioof the party’s membership to its own voters) has decreased because thenumber of registered voters has grown. On the other hand, the high andincreasing membership of AKEL’s mass ancillary organizations (columns5–8), counterbalances these trends, in terms of Left-wing ideology’s andAKELite culture’s social penetration and electoral effect. In the cases ofall four ancillary organizations, membership exceeds that of AKEL andhas either risen or remained stable indicating a high discrepancy betweenparty membership and participation in the Popular Movement; some-thing that has been evident since the nascent stages of these structures’development (Panayiotou, 1999, pp. 452–458). At least in part, thiscan be attributed to AKEL’s careful membership selection procedures(Christophorou, 2006, pp. 521–523), which make some kind of personalrecommendation the most usual way of recruitment. In accordance withthe Leninist conception of the party, prospective members must be activeenough, and "innocent" enough (in ideological terms), before they enterAKEL’s ranks. Yet, since members have to be approved by the party cell towhich they will prospectively belong, personal ties sometimes operate insuch a way that the lack of the first criterion is silently ignored.

Party System Position and Government–OppositionDynamics

AKEL’s trajectory is one of continuous cooperation with non-communistand indeed non-Left forces as well. In 1960, AKEL supported IoannisClerides, also backed by the nationalist right. Between 1960 and 1977it supported Archbishop Makarios on the basis of their political, butnot so much ideological, common denominators, of being antagonis-tic to the ultranationalist right, of aiming at cleansing Cypriot societyfrom extremist elements, of pursuing a non-aligned foreign policy and ofmaintaining a mixed economy, with extensive state regulations and socialprovisions. Especially after the 1974 events AKEL stood fully against


Table 8.3 AKEL’s and the popular movement’s membership

Year AKELmembership(×1000)

AKELmembershipdensity(percentage)

AveragesouthEuropeanmembershipdensitya

(percentage)

Membership in AKEL’s ancillaryorganizationsc (×1000)

PEO EDON EKAf POGOg

1981 13, 958 14.6 4.2b 60,556 — 15,0001986 15,000 17.1 7.5 66,246 — 15,000 —1991 (15,000) 14.3 7.2 67.342 — 15,000 16,0001996 (14,000) 11.5 7.2 64,856 — 15,000 —2001 (14,000) 9.8 — 68,123 14,500 15,000 —2005 13,941 — 8.7 81,473d 16,800 15,000 —173h

2009 — — — 19,400e —

Source: Own compilation of data from Bosco and Morlino (2006); Christophorou (2006); PEO (2006, 2001,1996, 1991, 1986, 1981); EDON (2010, 2007, 2001).aThe south European average has been calculated with reference to Spain, Italy, Portugal, Greece, and (for1991 and after) also the unrecognized “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” and Turkey. () Figures in brack-ets are estimates obtained by Christophorou (2006).bThis figure refers to 1976.c�αγκυπρια Eργατικη Oμoσπoνδια (PEO, Pancyprian Labor Organisation); Eνιαια �ημoκρατικη

OργανωσηNεoλαιας (EDON, United Democratic Union of Youth); Eνωση Kυπριων Aγρoτων (EKA,Union of Cypriot Farmers);�αγκυπρια Oργανωση�υναικων (Pancyprian Federation of Women’s Organ-isations).dThis figure refers to 2006.eThis figure refers to 2010.fFor EKA, figures are approximate (and slightly fluctuating) and have been provided by EKA Headquarters.gFor POGO, figures are also approximate and provided by POGO Headquarters.hThis figure refers to the number of local branches.

the right. Initially, it supported DIKO leader Spyros Kyprianou in 1978and 1983 with the Cyprus problem being the main reason for this sup-port. Failure to agree with the center on this issue led to a separation ofpaths and subsequently to the nomination in 1988 of a moderate, liberaleconomist, Giorgos Vasiliou, who was elected to office. In the 1993 elec-tions, AKEL again supported Vasiliou and in 1998 Giorgos Iakovou, anindependent center-Left candidate, on both occasions losing to the right.After 10 years in opposition between 1993 and 2003, AKEL supportedTassos Papadopoulos and entered a government coalition with DIKO andEνιαιαΔημoκρατ ικη Eνωση K εντρoυ (EDEK, United DemocraticUnion of Center), now occupying four ministries and the parliament’spresidency (for the first time). In 2008, as explained above, the partyfielded its own candidate and won a historic election. At the municipallevel, the pattern is more or less the same, with AKEL forming tripartitelocal partnerships with DIKO and EDEK, on various occasions.


Ever since the Annan Plan (devised by the UN and Western powers)was put forward as the most promising solution to date to the Cyprusproblem, there has been an ongoing contest between three tendencies—35 percent of the population and the (official line in the) right wingDISY who supported a “yes” in the Annan Plan referendum; Greek-Cypriot “maximalists” who do not accept the Annan Plan even as abasis for negotiations (referred to as a “hard no” and mainly housedin DIKO, EDEK, and the Eυρωπαικó Kóμμα (EVROKO, EuropeanParty, which was formed in 2004 and is the only party officially against thebizonal, bicommunal federation); and those who want to see minimumbut crucial modifications to the plan to make it acceptable to the Greek-Cypriots, referred to as the “soft no” and represented mainly by AKEL(Trimikliniotis, 2006). Surely between 2004 and 2012, the rhetoric,alliances, and context of these tendencies have evolved. AKEL initiallyfound itself in a state of having to manage a governmental cohabitationwith its more inflexible allies in the Papadopoulos government, whilesustaining the legacy of its pro-rapprochement and pro-reunificationstruggles. Yet, even after AKEL ceased to be in a coalition with theseforces, its rhetoric on the Cyprus Problem remained entrenched in a ver-sion of anti-imperialism that considers the concession of power to thirdparties in the negotiation process as wholly unwanted by and unjust tothe Cypriot people (AKEL, 2010, thesis 21).

Criticism to AKEL’s Cyprus Problem policy comes from two sides.EDEK, DIKO, the European Party (as well as the green party and someparts of DISY) argue that the Christofias government (with the support ofAKEL) is too soft and compromising at the negotiating table. The extra-parliamentary and liberal Left (as well as some other parts of DISY) positthat more flexibility is needed, given that the alternative would mean yetanother (possibly longer than before) stalemate, or even an eventual andabsolute partition. This latter point of view also centers on the “paradox”of AKEL misinterpreting the essence of Cyprus’ progressive forces andchoosing DIKO and EDEK over DISY’s pro-solution and officially moreflexible leadership. Indeed, at various point since 2004 DISY officialshinted at cooperation with AKEL, on the basis of their common posi-tions on the Cyprus problem. Neither such hints, nor any criticisms haveconvinced AKEL, however, that DISY would be consistent in a poten-tial cooperation with the Left and that subsequently such a cooperationwould truly lead to a solution of the Cyprus problem. What appears to becrucial for AKEL is its anti-imperialist identity, which although differentfrom the center’s nationalism, makes a pact of resistance to foreign inter-ests practically possible and differentiates the communists’ flexibility levelto foreign pressures, from that of the right.


The Cypriot party system’s specificities and its diversion from the westEuropean norm concern mostly the Left and center-Left and can be inpart attributed to the development and electoral status of AKEL itself.More specifically, that the socialist (and later social democratic) partyEDEK arrived late (in 1969) meant that AKEL’s appeal to voters, which inother countries would fit a socialist/social democratic profile, had alreadybeen consolidated. Further, this imbalance, one may argue, can also beconnected to EDEK’s unclear and confusing ideology—influenced by theneo-Marxians and third-world socialism and later by new/transformedsocial democracy—as well as its traditionally “inflexible” attitude on theCyprus problem (Charalambous, 2007, p. 449). This “mixed bag” madeEDEK a hybrid space that attracted both leftist and rightist voters butwas not distinctive enough to form a challenge to Cypriot bipolarism. In asimilar manner, when the Movement of Ecologists and Environmentalists(Green party) was established in 1996, it proved unable to garner sup-port among the youth, challenge AKEL among the middle classes, orpresent a multifaceted policy program that moved beyond the envi-ronment. Although research in this domain is less developed, one canpreliminarily attribute the Cypriot “green paradox” both to AKEL’s massand solid appeal and (once again) the greens’ inflexibility on the Cyprusproblem that does not fit well into the overall liberalism they seekto project.

The existence of the Cyprus problem essentially meant the presenceof a second axis of electoral competition, beyond the Left–right one(Christophorou, 2009; Giallourides, 1993) and it is only upon the basisof these two axes’ interaction that AKEL’s electoral fortune and tactics canbe fully understood. DIKO and EDEK have been identified as the “pro-gressive forces” that can be utilized in the struggle for reunification andthe defense against nationalist and neo-liberal attacks by the forces of theright. They are not seen as comrades to the party, but as political actorsthat are ideologically and politically the closest to AKEL, and as forceswith whom cooperation is necessary from a long-term, strategic point ofview. In the post-1974 period, AKEL’s relation with these two parties hasbeen following a distinct pattern—the formation of coalitions that endbadly, either by the next election or before the end of the electoral cycle,largely on the basis of disagreements on the Cyprus problem.

Paradoxically, AKEL has had a much more antagonistic relation withEDEK than with DIKO, although EDEK has been officially espousingan ideology closer to that of the communists. Indicatively, EDEK’s deci-sion in the presidential elections of 1993 and 1998 to vote “accordingto will” contributed significantly to keeping AKEL’s preferred presidential


candidate out of executive power. Since EDEK could not reasonably hopefor any substantial inroads into communist support,9 the populist andleadership-based style it has adopted, since its inception—foremost, asembodied in their former leader Vassos Lissarides, apparently still a dom-inant figure in the party—appears to be a driving force of its antagonismwith AKEL. With DIKO, AKEL’s cooperation followed the pattern ofthe communist–Makarios alliance; the two parties share certain commonprogrammatic visions but no ideological heritage and have a sharp differ-ence on the nationalism–patriotism axis. The center party was establishedin 1976 and by 1981 it had consolidated its appeal to the center andthe “progressive right,” as opposed to DISY, which it initially labeledas “extreme right” and “fascist” (Christophorou, 2009, p. 90). However,DIKO, just like EDEK, has not been a consistent ally of AKEL, decidingon whether to join forces with the communists or the right, in accor-dance with its perceived immediate benefit in terms of office holding andthe short-term context (Christophorou, 2009, p. 93).

DISY’s establishment in 1976 by Glafcos Clerides united diverse ten-dencies among the right, nationalists, and ultranationalists and reinforcedthe bipolar party system. AKEL identified DISY as its main ideologicalopponent, thus following a pattern of continuity that reflected AKEL’sattitude toward the disarrayed right-wing organizations and groups thatexisted before DISY (with the exception of the period when AKEL sup-ported Ioannis Clerides). Although, in everyday politics DISY promotedthe image of a moderate right-wing and center-right political force, itremained anticommunist and sharply different to AKEL on economicissues. A reciprocal relation can thus be hypothesized between the devel-opment of the party and political system in the post-1974 period—astrong bipolarity, low electoral volatility, deep penetration of parties insociety, consensus as a characteristic only of institutional politics—andAKEL’s, as well as DISY’s similar and diachronic attitudes to each other.As seen already, the only time that AKEL was not entirely hostile to theright in the post-1974 period, brought with it internal confusion, deepdivisions, and an electoral shock that gave a strong impulse to avoidingany kind of identification with the right.

AKEL’s eventual decision to join executive office (with four ministriesin the government of Tassos Papadopoulos) came in 2003, after 10 yearsof a DISY-led government and in the midst of important negotiations onthe Cyprus problem. After 5 years in a coalition where it kept many ofits disagreements behind closed doors and in view of the growing beliefamong leadership and supporters that Papadopoulos’s Cyprus Problempolicy was leading to a deadlock, AKEL fielded its own candidate in the


presidential elections of 2008 (Charalambous, 2009, p. 102). This deci-sion reflected neither a drive toward socialism, nor a reconceptualizationof the party’s closest potential allies but simply a position in favor of AKELplaying a much more decisive role within the coalition and thus alsohaving a greater say on Cyprus problem policy (Charalambous, 2009,p. 102). This was reconfirmed in the first days of the second round ofthe presidential elections, when EDEK and DIKO were welcomed intoan “informal” coalition and soon after the elections given three and two(out of 12) ministries, respectively. Both parties were reassured that afull-fledged dialogue would precede Christofias’s moves on the CyprusProblem.

The election of Christofias to presidential office makes AKEL notsimply the only occasion of a self-declared communist party leading agovernment in Europe, but also a critical case study of incumbent com-munism, since its comparatively exceptional electoral following and thestrengths and maneuverability of presidential office in the Republic ofCyprus, allow one to hypothesize a relatively comfortable policy leeway,when in office. In the first four years of this new reality, however, the partyhas been faced with constant attacks by all political forces, including itsallies, with both EDEK and DIKO leaving the coalition in early 2010 andmid-2011, respectively. AKEL, itself, has so far fully aligned itself with thepresident, never disagreeing with him publically and mobilizing to the fullthe mechanisms of the Popular Movement in support of his policies. Dur-ing the last legislative elections of 2011, the party, although polling lowerin total numbers, actually increased its percentages and won one moreparliamentary seat. Its ability to inculcate a strong identity in its voters wasonce again reconfirmed, as was the difference between voting behavior inlegislative elections and public opinion on the one hand, and sentimenton government performance, which hovered around merely acceptablelevels, on the other.

A combination of recent (post-election) events and developments, hasrendered AKEL’s governing experience a very tricky one. Notably, theonset of the economic crisis and its impact on Cyprus led to an envi-ronment that made it difficult for AKEL to defend pro-working peoplepositions on the economic front, at least given the EU’s restrictions andpressures, the party’s own diachronic calls for domestic consensus and thefact that on its own the government forms a minority in parliament. Fur-ther, an explosion in the village of Mari in the summer of 2011, whichcaused the death of 13 people and destroyed the island’s largest electricalpower station, allowed the opposition parties (all five of them) to demo-nize the Christofias government for its “ineptitude” and obtain a strongerbargaining position on economic matters.


Conclusions

The plexus of external–internal dialectics must not be overemphasized,in the sense of downplaying AKEL’s similarities with European commu-nist and radical Left party trends, especially in terms of its ideological,programmatic, and political evolution. While these dialectics differentiateAKEL and make it incomprehensible outside its context, it is the ideolog-ical traits of Marxism–Leninism that place the party in the anticapitalistparty family and shaped its Cyprus problem approach, its pro-Soviet pol-icy, and even its broader home strategy, in the same way as that these traits’domestic adaptation, although tailored to fit Cypriot reality, has resultedin the early drift to reformism, continuous pragmatism, and alliance-seeking, evident across most of the European communist and radical Leftparty movements.

Nevertheless, AKEL’s case does bring to the fore a central question inthe study of communist and anticapitalist politics: how does an inherentlyinternationalist ideology adapt to the domestic conditions of a party’shome country? Already, it can be seen that the case of AKEL bears impor-tance as an enigmatic case that has certain particularities in comparisonto its European counterparts. The Cyprus problem both as a cleavageand an electoral issue; AKEL’s exceptional electoral success that is notequivalent to any of its European counterparts; and the continuation andflourishing of the mass party model, which allows it to penetrate deepinto Cypriot society, are probably the most important. These three mainaspects of AKEL’s profile appear to be both results of the Cypriot con-text and conditioning factors of the party’s development and evolution.Methodologically, AKEL’s case reminds us that the comparative study ofcommunist and anticapitalist parties may become most fruitful only whencross-country and longitudinal generalizations are carefully distilled onthe basis of the nuances of single cases and their contexts.

Notes

1. This chapter is a shorter and updated version of Charalambous (2012)“AKEL: Un Profil Socio-Politque.” In Les Partis de la Gauche Anticapitalisteen Europe, edited by Jean-Michel De Waele and Daniel-Louis Seiler. Paris:Economica. Because of this shortening and updating process, this version nowincorporates minor changes in syntax and expression, compared to the chapterin French, either as suggested by the editors, or as incorporated by the authorhimself.

2. Trade unions were legalized in 1932 due to new British laws.3. An elected legislature was established in Cyprus in 1960, on the basis of the

Constitution that came into operation in the same year, following the island’s


independence. Until 1931 when it was abolished, there was a colonial parlia-ment (the Legislative Council). Municipal elections were held on the islandbut were also abolished by the British in 1931. They were reintroduced in the1940s.

4. Democratic centralism has applied since the first Congress.5. “Enosis” refers to the persuasion for unification with Greece.6. Servas was expelled from the party in 1952 and subsequently followed a very

critical approach toward AKEL’s leadership.7. The right’s main and initial moves included the formation of theΠαγκυπριoς Oργανισμóς Aγρoτων (Pancyprian Farmers’ Organisation)and Παναγρoτικη Eνωση Kυπρoυ (PEK, All Peasant Union) in 1942, theestablishment of Kυπριακó Eθνικó K óμμα (KEK, Cyprus National Party) in1943, and the setting up of Συνoσπoνδια EργατωνK υπρoυ (SEK, LabourConfederation of Cyprus) in 1944.

8. For a detailed, insider account—by a member of the “orthodox” leadership—see Poumbouris (2008). According to this account, the leading “reformists”were excluded from their leadership positions because of factionist activity,but not from the party.

9. Indeed, when AKEL lost votes to other parties, as in 1991, it was DIKO thatbenefited and not the socialists, while EDEK at times benefited mostly fromDIKO’s dissenting voters (Charalambous, 2007, p. 449).

C h a p t e r 9

Turkish-Cypriot Left:A HistoricalOverviewNiyazi Kızılyürek

Introduction

The Turkish-Cypriot society had entered the twentieth century infear. This fear was precipitated by a declining Ottoman Empire in tur-moil and the Republic of Turkey abdicating its rights on Cyprus afterthe Lausanne Treaty on the one hand, and rising Hellenic nationalismaiming to integrate Cyprus to Greece (Enosis) on the other. The militaryachievements of Mustafa Kemal and the foundation of the Republic ofTurkey became significant sources of inspiration for the Turkish-Cypriots.The rising struggle for Enosis by the Greek-Cypriot community furtheraccelerated the orientation toward Turkey.

Turkey became a party to the Cyprus question from the mid-1950s asa result of the “divide and rule” policy of Great Britain, which plannedto retain the island as its “last colony.” In 1957, Türk Mukavemet Teski-lati (TMT, Turkish Resistance Organization) was established in Cyprusby the Special War Department, which was founded by the TurkishChief of Staff to fight against communism.1 Defending the partitionof the island (Taksim) on the line of Enosis, the TMT acted uponorders from Ankara. During this period, the Turkish-Cypriot communitycame to be completely dominated by Turkey. The TMT commanders inpower were directly appointed by the Special War Department, and thelocal TMT staff was submitted to these military administrators. Leftist

170 N I YA Z I K I Z I LY Ü R E K

Turkish-Cypriot workers became the first victims of the violent policy ofTaksim.

First Generation: Leftist Workers

The 1920s witnessed the foundation of first workers’ unions as well as theK oμμoυνιστ ικó K óμμα K υπρoυ (KKP in Turkish; Communist Partyof Cyprus) that was established in 1926. Although the overwhelmingmajority of the KKP were Greek-Cypriots, the party addressed both com-munities, and opposed Greek nationalism and Enosis policy. Althoughthey did not become official members of the communist party, someTurkish-Cypriots took active roles in the workers’ struggle during the1920s and 1930s. In 1939, the process to establish the first federationof workers’ unions was launched, and in 1941, 194 workers, representing7500 workers, founded the “Committee of Cypriot Trade Unions” thatwas later renamed Πανγ κυπρια Eργατ ικη Oμoσπoνδια (Worker’sFederation of Cyprus, PEO) in 1946. Since there were no Turkish-Cypriot trade unions at the time, the working class of the two communi-ties pursued a collective struggle.

Meanwhile, in 1941, the leftist leaders, most of them who werethe members of the illegal Communist Party of Cyprus, foundedAνoρθωτικó K óμμα Eργαζ oμενoυ Λαoυ (AKEL, Progressive Partyof Working People). Yet, AKEL like the workers union supported Enosissince its establishment, a policy that undermined the common strug-gle of the working class. In an article dated August 15, 1944, AndreasZiartides, the Secretary General of Committee of Cypriot Trade Unions,defended the policy of Enosis, which was adopted after 1941, and said,“The majority of the Cypriot people are Greek and they form an inte-gral part of the Greek nation with all their characteristics.” According toZiartides, it was the task of the workers to struggle for Enosis, “the nationalemancipation of the Cypriot people” (Kakoullis, 1990, pp. 24–25).

The adoption of the Enosis policy by AKEL and the leftist workers’ fed-eration considerably alienated the Turkish-Cypriot workers, which pavedthe way to the foundation of the first separate Turkish-Cypriot tradeunion. They founded the “Nicosia Union of Turkish Workers” in 1944and the umbrella organization Kıbrıs Türk Isçi Birlikleri Kurumu (KTIBK,Organization of Turkish-Cypriot Workers’ Unions) in 1945 (Kızılyürek,2002, p. 260).

Although separate Turkish-Cypriot unions emerged, a significantnumber of the Turkish-Cypriot workers remained organized in PEO.PEO expanded on to Turkish-Cypriot community by opening a “TurkishOffice” and starting publications in Turkish language. In 1954, PEO

T U R K I S H C Y P R I O T L E F T : A H I S T O R I C A L O V E R V I E W 171

had a total of 18,085 members, including 1,700 Turkish-Cypriots, while740 members were registered to KTIBK. The figures were graduallychanging in favor of KTIBK. In 1955, PEO had 1,400 and KTIBKhad 2,214 Turkish-Cypriot members while in 1957, of the total 3,244organized and 5,256 non-organized Turkish-Cypriot workers, 1,800 wereregistered at PEO and 1,800 at KTiBK (Kakoullis, 1990, p. 59).

Gradually, Turkish-Cypriot workers were inclined to separate Turkish-Cypriot trade unions. The rising bipolar, nationalist tension had its reper-cussions among the working class. Nevertheless, in the late 1950s, therewere a significant number of Turkish-Cypriot workers who were active inPEO and who defended peaceful coexistence of the two communities.

After May 1, 1958, the leftist workers were subjected to politicalviolence. The Turkish-Cypriot members of PEO who held a May Daydemonstration with the Greek-Cypriots, were called to resign from theunion. This was followed by political murders. First, Ahmed Sadi Erkurt,the head of the PEO Turkish Office, was injured at an attempt of assas-sination on May 22, 1958, followed by murders of Fazıl Önder onMay 24, and Ahmet Yahya on May 29. As the killings continued, theTurkish-Cypriot workers published newspaper statements to declare theirresignations from Greek-Cypriot unions and that they would “walk inthe path” of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership. The murder in 1965 ofDervis Ali Kavazoglu, who was the only Turkish-Cypriot member of theAKEL Central Committee, further undermined the activities of the left-ists in the Turkish-Cypriot community. Nationalist antagonism on theone hand and political violence on the other remarkably suppressed thefirst generation of the Turkish-Cypriot Left.

Second Generation: Leftist Intellectuals

At the end of the ethnic clashes that started in December of 1963,the Turkish-Cypriot community “withdrew” (or were forced to do so)from the administration of the Republic of Cyprus. Since Turkey couldnot intervene, as expected by the nationalist leadership, neither “par-tition” was implemented, nor could a separate Turkish-Cypriot stateemerge. As the separatist, nationalist ideology failed to yield results inthe 1964–1974 period, the community drifted into chaos and misery.

In 1968, a sort of “normalization” could be observed in the entireCyprus. Freedom to travel across the island was secured and various tradeunions and associations were founded in the Turkish-Cypriot commu-nity. A “Transitional Turkish administration” was declared in this period.This new oppressive administration, referred to as the “BEY admin-istration” (Bayraktarlık [Military Chief in Command]—Türk Elçiligi


[Turkish Embassy]—Yerel Yönetim (Local Government]), was increasinglyprotested by the teachers’ union and the university students. The leftistmovement in the Turkish-Cypriot society would rise based on the strengthof these actors.

As a result of partial “normalization,” which started in 1967, a consid-erable number of Turkish-Cypriot students started to study in Turkishuniversities. Turkey entered a new, dynamic era in the aftermath ofthe military coup on May 27, 1960. While leftist intellectuals createdan atmosphere of heated debates, this period witnessed the creation ofthe Türkiye Isçi Partisi (TIP, Workers’ Party of Turkey) and DevrimciIsçi Sendikaları Konfederasyonu (DISK, Revolutionary Workers UnionConfederation). The discussions on the concepts such as “imperialism,”“socialism,” and “independence” availed Turkish-Cypriot students withnew concepts and ideas, which they tried to evaluate in the context ofCyprus. Istanbul Kıbrıs Türk Talebe Cemiyeti (IKTTC, the Istanbul Asso-ciation of Turkish-Cypriot Students), raised the thesis of a “federationin Cyprus” in 1968, while the Turkish-Cypriot students organized inAnkara defended “an independent Turkish-Cypriot state.” Some arguedthat other solutions such as “Partition” and “Enosis” served imperial-ism (Öncül and Düzgün, 1999, p. 17). Gradually, the youth adaptedleftist ideas, which were introduced from Turkey to Cyprus and starteddeveloping a new political discourse outside the paradigm of nationalism.

On the other hand, a local leftist movement opposing the “BEYadministration” in Turkish-Cypriot community was developed by theTurkish-Cypriot teachers. At the 5th Plenary General Assembly (1973) ofthe Teachers’ Union, which was founded in 1968, candidacy of 16 teach-ers was prohibited upon orders from Lefkosa Sancagı (Military DistrictOfficer of Nicosia) (Tahsin, 2000, p. 52). In 1974, the members of theexecutive board of the Union were put to jail after publishing a state-ment that protested the high living costs. At his office, the Bayraktar saidto the members of the executive board that he would “neither recognizethe law, nor the order and Constitution and will blow like a bomb ontheir heads” (Tahsin, 2000, p. 64). Arif Hasan Tahsin, the secretary of theexecutive board, was tried at the Military court, and was jailed since he“dared” to say “Turkey should supply more funds.” He was found “guilty”of “insulting Turkey.”

The oppressive regime gradually brought about the radicalization ofthe Turkish-Cypriot teachers. The primary school teachers, who studiedin Cyprus away from the leftist discussions in Turkey, underwent a processof “political socialization” in the face of the problems and oppression,and discovered the leftist ideas within the difficulties of the daily life.As a matter of fact, Arif Hasan Tahsin, who was imprisoned for “being


a communist” pointed out that he had never read anything about theconcept of “communism” and that he first learned about communismin jail.

Foundation of CTP

Meanwhile, under the oppressive atmosphere that was sustained through-out 1960s, Ahmet Mithat Berberoglu founded the Cumhuriyetçi TürkPartisi (CTP, Republican Turkish Party) on December 27, 1970. Main-taining that the solution to the Cypriot question should be “based onthe partnership of two national communities,” the party defined itself as“nationalist and Atatürkist” and believed in “a democratic system in theWestern sense.” Berberoglu intended to run for the elections for the vicepresidency in 1973 but the Chief in Command objected his candidacyand Berberoglu was forced to withdraw from the elections.

Meanwhile, CTP drew the attraction of leftist Cypriot students study-ing in Turkey and many students, led by Naci Talat, became members ofCTP and soon drew the party to a leftist position.

An Identity Movement Based on “Cypriotism”

The Turkish-Cypriot Left insisted on the peaceful coexistence of theCypriot communities and rejected nationalist projects such as “Enosis”and “Taksim.” Ideas expressed as “Cyprus belongs to the Cypriots” andthe “population of Cyprus above everything else was Cypriot” became theruling ideas among the left-wing Turkish-Cypriots.

Hence the second generation of the Turkish-Cypriot Left emerged asan “identity movement” and highlighted the cultural codes that were spe-cific to Cyprus, and mobilized cultural goods such as the folklore or folksongs of Cyprus, against the hegemony of Turkish nationalism. This folk-loric positioning, which emphasized “the local,” was actually an attemptto define Cyprus as the common homeland of the Turkish and Greek-Cypriots, against the discourse of “Motherland Turkey” of the Turkishnationalists. It was this perception of “homeland” that turned the Turkish-Cypriot Left into an identity movement. For the Turkish-Cypriot Left, tobe a “leftist revolutionary” meant almost to be devoted to “Cypriotism.”Particularly after 1974, this tendency was even more evident. All orga-nizations, including Kıbrıslılar Ögrenim ve Gençlik Federasyonu (KÖGEF,Cypriots Federation of Education and Youth), which was aligned withthe Moscow policy, and Halkla Dayanısma ve Kültür Dernegi (Halk Der,Association for Culture and Solidarity with the People), which was criticalof the Soviet Union, shared the same common denominator to adhere tothe “consciousness of Cypriotism” and “peace in Cyprus.”


The idea that “Leftism is Cypriotism” was in fact a criticism of theTurkish nationalism and its policy of partition of the island. Such criti-cism was expressed both in the cultural and political sphere of life. Indeed,the cultural domain is where KÖGEF influenced the society in the mostprofound way. A society with limited cultural activities, which is grad-ually forgetting “its own culture” under the hegemonic position of theTurkish nationalism, launched a process of cultural breakthrough with amovement led by KÖGEF. The breakthrough was focused on Cypriotism(highlighted in original, N. K.). “The society rediscovered the fact thatthey were Cypriots. With the folk dances by the folklore teams (highlightedin original, N. K.) of KÖGEF, the people saw the true essence of their ownfolk dances, which they were forced to forget, and they have shown greatinterest in these efforts” (Özejder in Öncül and Düzgün, 1999, p. 78).

The leftist youth was gradually inclined to support the idea of an“Independent Cyprus”. After the de facto division of the island by theTurkish military invasion in 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot Left emphasizedsystematically that “All People were Brothers” and developed a strongidentity movement based on “Cypriotism” and challenged the rulingTurkish nationalist ideology.

The most explicit target of this criticism was Rauf Denktas, who wasregarded as the “servant of imperialism” and the symbol of Turkish nation-alism in Cyprus. In return Rauf Denktas accused the Left of defend-ing “Cypriotism.” According to him, Turkish-Cypriot Left defended“Cypriotism with funds from AKEL and instructions from Moscow” and“Cypriotism” in fact meant falling into the trap of the Greek-Cypriots(Öncül and Düzgün, 1999, p. 283).

Turkish-Cypriots started more explicitly to highlight the “Cypriot”aspect of their identity after 1974, when Turkey settled on the islandand started transferring population from Turkey. Indeed, the popula-tion transfer from Turkey after 1974 played, and continues to play, animportant role in the lives of the Turkish-Cypriots. What was perceivedas “workforce assistance” at first, turned out to be a well-organized demo-graphic engineering. In an attempt to change the demographic structureof Cyprus, many Turkish citizens have been transferred to the island. Thiscaused a strong reaction among the Turkish-Cypriots who perceived thepopulation transfer as a threat to their own identity.

Based on the idea of an “organic community,” the difference-blindTurkish nationalism in Cyprus aimed at melting all the people in the samepot of “Turkishness.” Turkish-Cypriots were expected to perceive them-selves as the “organic part” of the Turkish nation. The education systemand the informal education were based on this understanding. Ankara andRauf Denktas were trying to impose the idea that “Turkish-Cypriots and


Turkey were one hand in glove” or “Cyprus was the same as any Turkishtown.” Besides this difference-blind attitude, Turkey was systematicallyintervening in the political life of the Turkish-Cypriots. This led to reac-tions in the Turkish-Cypriot community, which strengthened the identitymovement. The problems of the democratic life and the denial of theTurkish-Cypriots as a “distinct community” further politicized the differ-ence and helped to spread the idea that democracy cannot be consolidatedwithout the solution of the Cypriot conflict.

Political Life in the Aftermath of 1974

The year 1974 marks a milestone in the history of the Turkish-Cypriotcommunity. Turkish-Cypriots who settled at the northern part of theisland after the Turkish military intervention, which divided the islandinto two, established a multiparty system for the first time in their history.In this period Turkish-Cypriot left-wing intellectuals started joining theCTP, which was founded by Mithat Berberoglu and developed a dialoguewith the Greek-Cypriot communist party AKEL. On the other hand agroup of teachers who originally were members of the TMT but now hada conflict with the Turkish-Cypriot leader Denktas, united with anothergroup from the Teachers’ Union and established the Populist Party in1975, and later left the party and founded the Communal LiberationParty (1976). Thus, a second opposition party was established. Whilethose inclined toward Soviet-centric Marxist Left gathered under CTP,others who could be described as social democrats, as well as those “whowere offended by Denktas,” gathered under Toplumcu Kurtulus Partisi(TKP, (Communal Liberation Party). The leader of the party was AlpayDurduran. In the meantime nationalist groups came together under theleadership of Rauf Denktas and founded the Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP,National Unity Party). The first elections were held in 1976. Although allparties in the parliament unanimously decided to support the foundationof a “bi-zonal, bi-communal, federal state” Rauf Denktas and his partyUBP were firmly against the idea of a federal state in Cyprus. Hence, thefederal state was an idea only defended by leftist opposition parties suchas TKP and CTP.

Although Turkish-Cypriots after the division of the island made a freshand enthusiastic start, there were heated debates about the ownership ofthe property of the Greek-Cypriots who were forced to leave the north-ern part of the island. The “unjust” and “unequal” distribution of thisproperty in particular and the “distribution of pillages” in general cre-ated a wide mass of “displeased” people. Most of those who felt offendedwent to the opposition parties. As a matter of fact, the disappointment


was reflected in the elections in 1981. Whereas parties on the left, TKPand CTP, received 43.6 percent of the votes, the right-wing UBP received42.5 percent of the votes. Furthermore, during the presidential elections,Rauf Denktas was challenged by Ziya Rızkı, the candidate of the oppo-sition. Denktas’s support fell to 51.7 percent at these elections. Withoutthe backing of Turkey, Denktas could have lost his seat at the elections of1981. UBP failed to ensure majority at the parliament, and the oppositionhad the opportunity to create a government. TKP and CTP, as well as theDemokratik Halk Partisi (DHP, Democratic People’s Party), which dis-tanced itself from the right-wing camp and cooperated with the left-wingparties, sought to establish a coalition government. However, the opposi-tion would not have been able to form the government since Turkey wasagainst it. Ilter Türkmen, the Turkish Foreign Minister of that time, cameto Cyprus and announced to the opposition that the planned governmentwould not be established as Turkey particularly rejected the inclusion ofCTP in the government: “Given the fact that CTP is against NATO andTurkey is a member of NATO, Ankara cannot allow CTP to be includedin the coalition” (Özgür, 1992, p. 53). Eventually it was the UBP thatformed the new government.

This was the first explicit intervention of Turkey in the political life ofthe Turkish-Cypriot community in the aftermath of 1974. With the elec-tions in 1981, outstanding problems of democracy in northern Cypruswere revealed. It was now more evident that peace and democracy wouldnot be possible without a solution to the Cypriot conflict.

The Declaration of the “Turkish Republicof Northern Cyprus”

In 1983, Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti (Turkish Republic of NorthernCyprus, TRNC) declared its independence. All the parties and deputiesat the parliament, including the left-wing parties, voted “yes” to the foun-dation of “TRNC.” Or rather, they were forced to vote “yes” becauseDenktas invited all the deputies to the presidential palace and stressedthat the parties voting “no” for declaration of independence would notbe allowed to function in the new era. This was a clear threat for CTPand TKP (Kızılyürek, 2002, p. 285). Both parties were strong support-ers of a federal solution but now they had to act pragmatically. Theydid not oppose the foundation of TRNC but continued to support theestablishment of a federal state in Cyprus.

Meanwhile, the clientele-patronage system established in the northernpart of the island reached such a scale that even the Turkish settlers, whoin general were loyal to the existing system, began to complain. Indeed,


in the parliamentary elections of 1990, Yeni Dogus Partisi (YDP, NewBirth Party), which was predominantly supported by the population fromTurkey, went into an alliance with CTP and TKP to create the DemokratikMücadele Partisi (DMP, Party for Democratic Struggle) against the UBPgovernment. This was the largest alliance ever against the nationalist UBP.Nevertheless, UBP received 54.7 percent of the votes, corresponding to 34out of 50 seats. DMP got 16 seats with 44.5 percent. Immediately afterthe elections, 12 deputies from DMP, who were affiliated with CTP andTKP, protested the elections and withdrew from the parliamentary func-tions. Twelve opposition deputies accused Turkey of intervening in theelections. This was the first “civil disobedience” against Turkey. Followingthe elections in 1990, it became clear that it was almost impossible toforge a functioning democracy in northern Cyprus under existing condi-tions. The conclusion that problems of democracy in Cyprus would notbe resolved unless a settlement over the Cypriot problem was reached wasthereby further strengthened. It became self-evident that the struggle fordemocracy was inseparable from the struggle for peace.

The Repercussions of the Divisionof the Turkish-Cypriot Right on the Left

In the early 1990s two events came to affect the Turkish-Cypriot Leftprofoundly: the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the division of theTurkish-Cypriot right. The elections of 1990 revealed divisions in theright-wing front. After the parliamentary protests of CTP and TKP, totalseats of the UBP reached 46 out of 50 and thereby started a de facto “one-party” regime. During the same period, the increasing power of DervisEroglu, the prime minister and the chairman of UBP, was unsettling forRauf Denktas, who was the “natural” leader of the right wing. Erogluused the office of the prime ministry, which he had held since 1985 as aninstrument to consolidate his supporting cadres, and created loyal “parti-sans” that spread across the community through his clientele-patronagesystem. These included businessmen grasping various opportunities aswell as a wide mass of public officers. UBP was already powerful in therural areas as the party was controlling the lands left behind by the Greek-Cypriots. Briefly, the sectors that were strengthened by the 1974 regimewere the “clients” of Dervis Eroglu. This was very discomforting for RaufDenktas. Therefore, Denktas started looking for ways to divide the UBP.In response to the opposition referred to as “the nine” within the UBPencouraged by Denktas himself, Eroglu changed the council of minis-ters, and dismissed all ministers who were close to Rauf Denktas, excepthis son Serdar Denktas. The charismatic nationalist leader was now faced


with a serious challenge. Eroglu became even more hawkish than Denk-tas and vehemently opposed not only the federal solution but also theCypriot negotiations. According to Eroglu, the division of the island wasthe final solution; hence the Cyprus conflict was already “solved.” He alsohad fairly good relations with the Turkish governments. He received a cer-tain extent of support due to his “Yes man” attitude. This was worryingfor Denktas.

Finally, Denktas started his operation: On May 15, 1992, SerdarDenktas resigned from Eroglu’s council of ministers. “The nine” resignedfrom the UBP and established the Demokrat Parti (DP, Democrat Party)under the leadership of Hakkı Atun. Now the right wing consistedof two parties. At the parliamentary elections of 1995, UBP received29.9 percent of the votes, while DP hit 29.2 percent. The division ofthe right wing also caused an increase in the left-wing votes. CTP’s votesincreased to 24.2 percent, whereas the TKP received the 13.3 percent ofthe votes.

The division of the right wing and deepening of the conflict betweenDenktas and Eroglu led to unprecedented events. In 1994, Hakkı Atunwho was authorized to found the new government, decided on a coali-tion government with the leftist CTP. This led to intense debates in theCTP that was not prepared for partnership in the prospective governmentof TRNC, which it unwillingly supported in 1983. In conclusion, CTPdecided by a majority of votes to set up found a coalition government withDP. The CTP–DP coalition was reorganized three times in two years, andfinally in 1996 it was replaced by the coalition of the right-wing partiesUBP–DP. Turkey was uncomfortable with the former coalition, and wasunwilling to sustain it. As a matter of fact, the CTP–DP coalition wasdisrupted by an intervention from Turkey. To quote Özker Özgür, “theregime kicked CTP to the curb” (Baska, 1997). This development led tothe intensification of the debates within the CTP. Vice Prime MinisterÖzker Özgür, who was reluctant to continue with the coalition govern-ment, was replaced by Mehmet Ali Talat in 1995 and in 1996 was oustedas party leader.

The Downfall of the Soviet Union and Frictionsin CTP

After the dissolution of the world socialist system, CTP began to refor-mulate its policies as was the case everywhere else in the left-wing parties.What would be the new route for CTP? There were three main subjectsof discussion at this point: (1) What should be the policy to be adoptedin the system established in northern Cyprus? (2) What kind of relations


shall be sustained with AKEL? (3) What should be the position of theparty in regard to the solution of Cyprus conflict?

Particularly the second issue, that is the relations with AKEL, had longbeen discussed in the party; however, the disagreements had not beenrevealed until then. Özker Özgür, the chairman, was known for his align-ment with AKEL while Naci Talat, the Secretary General, tried to liberatethe party from the influence of AKEL. Although Naci Talat’s arms’ lengthposition vis-á-vis AKEL, articulating the motto that “CTP is not a tincan tied to a cat’s tail,” was sympathized by the party cadres to a certainextent, such sympathy could not be translated into a political will untilthe collapse of the Soviet Union. Loyalty to the Soviet Union necessarilymeant loyalty to AKEL.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the party cadres followingthe path of Naci Talat, who died young in 1991, started a discreet oppo-sition against Özker Özgür. At the CTP congress in 1995, Ferdi SabitSoyer, who ran for the position of chairman against Özgür, lost the elec-tions by three votes only. This was an explicit sign that Özgür’s seat washung by a thread. Indeed, Özgür lost to Mehmet Ali Talat at the congressthe following year.

The second issue was the fact that CTP had long been excluded,marginalized, and “otherized” by the Turkish governments and sepa-ratist Turkish leadership. On the other hand, the separatist structures andthe hegemonic discourse of the Turkish nationalism in northern Cyprushad an impact on the majority of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Thisreality forced CTP to “rethink” and review its policies after the fall ofthe Soviet Union. CTP was preparing to launch a new effort in orderto be recognized as a “national” party and to escape marginalization.Indeed, a coalition government with DP was considered as a welcomingopportunity in this regard.

The strong will of CTP for “recognition” was necessarily reflected inthe policies of the party. The policy in regard to the existing regime in thenorthern Cyprus, the policies on the Cyprus question and the relationswith the Greek-Cypriot community and AKEL as well as the relationswith Turkey, were now to be revised. In this transformation period seriousdisagreements emerged. Özker Özgür was accusing the new leadership ofthe party and arguing that CTP “was willing to remain in the governmentno matter what,” “was inclined to embrace the status quo,” “was divergingfrom a federal solution and did not exclude a confederal solution.”2

It was indeed obvious that Mehmet Ali Talat, the new chairman of theparty, and his colleagues were using a different political language. Theydid not explicitly say “no” to a federal solution but in a way approvedthe existence of TRNC, based on the idea that Turkish-Cypriots were


entitled to have their own separate state. For example, in an interviewMehmet Ali Talat was saying the following: “The weight of the status quowhich emerged after 1974 has increased as compared to the past. This isvery important.”3 As a matter of fact, Talat explicitly confessed that headvocated the model of a “federation based on two states,” and continuedas follows:

What I meant by calling on to make claims on TRNC can be put as follows:If we seize the power or set a political balance, then what is the harm in recog-nition of TRNC by the world? Are independent states not allowed to createfederations? 90 percent of the federations around the world have been createdby the coming together of the independent states. We can as well establish afederation as two independent states.

(Güven, 2009, p. 49)

The inner party crisis, which ended with the expelling of Özker Özgürfrom the party, led to a “new policy” which did not really yield any results.To the contrary, it caused CTP to significantly lose its power. In 1998,the left experienced one of its worse electoral outcomes, after receiving44.8 percent votes at the first elections in 1976, its votes had fallen aslow as 31.22 percent in 1998 (Bozkurt, 2001, p. 253). In the presidentialelections in 2000, Mehmet Ali Talat, the chairman of the CTP, receivedonly 10 percent of the votes.

However, this period, which was marked by significant social and eco-nomic developments and the decline of the Left and took a course thatfavored the left-wing parties. As the economic conditions were aggra-vated, overseas migration of Turkish-Cypriots accelerated. The publicdeficit exceeded 10 percent of the GNP and “The economy of TRNCcould only achieve a growth by 3 percent from 1990 to 2000 due tostructural problems, high inflation rate and external hindrances” (Güven,2003, p. 36).

The Spring of the Turkish-Cypriot Left

The year 1999 was a milestone for the Turkish-Cypriot community.In this year at the Helsinki Summit, the European Union officiallyaccepted Turkey as a candidate for membership and also decided thatthe Republic of Cyprus will join the EU by the next enlargement with-out prior solution of the conflict being a precondition. This sproutedthe hope for a solution among the Turkish-Cypriots. The EU member-ship was remarkably effective in mobilizing the Turkish-Cypriots. Theregime in northern Cyprus stood on shaky grounds during this period


which was marked by the EU perspective. While the political impositionsand defamation, which agitated Turkish-Cypriots, reached its climax, theeconomy was hitting rock bottom. Mustafa Akıncı, who was the viceprime minister during the UBP-TKP coalition, made some attempts fordemocratization and expressed the will to affiliate the police force to theMinistry of the Interior instead of Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlıgı (GKK,Command of Security Forces), which is in turn affiliated to Turkish Gen-eral Staff. The Chief of the Turkish army in Cyprus reacted very stronglyto Akıncı, subsequently propounding a “conspiracy theory”; he orderedthe arrests of the journalists of the Avrupa newspaper, who were knownfor their dissident positions, on the grounds of “espionage.” These devel-opments caused unrest among the Turkish-Cypriots who held a series ofdemonstrations directly targeting the GKK commander and Turkey, withan unmatched reaction and resistance.

Meanwhile, a platform comprising NGOs and opposition parties wasfounded: “This Country is Ours.” The message was clear: the Turkish-Cypriots wanted to be their own masters, for which they revolted againstTurkey and the Denktas regime. Indeed, a statement on the arrests ofjournalists was the most clear indicator of the revolt: “The Turkish-Cypriots are faced with the threat of extinction. Their self-governanceis hindered. GKK has long been threatening the Turkish-Cypriots andinsulting our people. With the arrests, which comprise a mini-coup d’état,GKK has inflicted a blow on the will of the Turkish-Cypriot community”(Kızılyürek, 2005, p. 267).

The platform, reacting upon the arrests of the journalists of theAvrupa, called upon the Turkish-Cypriots to gather at the Inönü Squarein Nicosia. The attendance was high and excitement of the crowds wasremarkable. The crowd yelled “Denktas, Take Your General and Leave!”It was also notable that the participants of the demonstration includedpeople from the right-wing sectors as well as leftist opposition.

Soon after the demonstration of July 18, 2000, Nicosia hosted a rebel-lion by the victims of the banking system. “In this country, above all, thebanks where the savings of one fourth of the population were depositedwere bankrupt” (Güven, 2003, p. 49). Thousands of victims of the fail-ure of banking system marched to the palace of Rauf Denktas, and thento the National Assembly. The demonstrators breached the security andraided the Assembly. The anger had reached its climax.

The Turkish-Cypriot community gradually started to pin its hopes on“peace” and “EU membership,” which had been defended by the leftiststhrough the years. For the very first time, the ideals of leftism largely coin-cided with the yearnings of the society. Ideas that were once only defended


by leftist groups and intellectuals were now becoming the common ideasof the entire society.

Under these circumstances, Kofi Annan, then the Secretary General ofthe United Nations (UN), called upon the parties to move ahead fromindirect talks to direct talks and reach a solution as soon as possible.However, on November 24, 2000, after a meeting in Ankara, Denktasdeclared that, “at the current point, these talks are nothing but a waste oftime,” and withdrew from the Cyprus negotiations. This in fact meantputting a brake on Turkey’s progress towards EU membership as wellas avoiding the solution of the Cyprus conflict, thereby depriving theTurkish-Cypriots of representation in the EU.

The concern for failing to grasp the EU perspective mobilized individ-uals and organizations from various social sectors. The impact of “ThisCountry is Ours” platform was growing day by day. In the meantime,the “Joint Vision” initiative was launched by gathering more than 90social organizations including representatives of businessmen, teachers,peasants, workers, and public officers. When the comprehensive solutionplan for Cyprus, prepared by Kofi Annan, was presented to the partiesshortly before the EU enlargement in 2002, the enthusiasm and angerhad reached a climax. As Denktas and Ankara said “no” to the AnnanPlan, the chance for peace in Cyprus and EU membership had slippedfrom the hands of the Turkish-Cypriots. Therefore, for Turkish-Cypriots,the year 2003 began with considerable disappointment. The “EU train”had passed by. The rejection of the Annan Plan by the Turkish side causedremarkable reactions among the Turkish-Cypriots. The struggle againstDenktas, UBP, and civil-military bureaucracy in Ankara intensified fur-ther. In this situation, the parliamentary elections in December of 2003were considered to be a “referendum” for the Annan Plan. The electionsof 2003 marked the victory of the forces that were defending peace inCyprus. For the first time in history, they secured the majority of votesand Mehmet Ali Talat of CTP became the prime minister of the newcoalition government. It was the first time that a left-wing leader from theTurkish-Cypriot community was elected PM.

Taking office after the elections, Mehmet Ali Talat primarily focusedon the solution of the Cyprus conflict. The adoption of the Annan Planat the beginning of 2004 by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep TayyipErdogan, who ignored the opponents of a solution to the Cyprus problemin Turkey, revived the hopes for a settlement in Cyprus. This was the firsttime that the Turkish government and the Turkish-Cypriot Left had cometo share a common meeting point, following a tumultuous period.

At the referendum in April of 2004, the vast majority of theTurkish-Cypriot community voted “yes” for the foundation of the


“United Republic of Cyprus.” However, this time, the Greek-Cypriot“no” blocked the way to accession to the EU for the Turkish-Cypriots as acommunity within a federal Cyprus; that would have ended their isolatedlife in northern Cyprus. Consequently, the Cyprus conflict could not besolved, and Turkish-Cypriots were excluded from the European Union.On May 1, 2004, the Republic of Cyprus was admitted to the EU, whiledisappointment prevailed on the Turkish-Cypriot side.

At the parliamentary elections in 2005, the Turkish-Cypriot societypunished the right-wing parties: CTP received record 44.45 percent votesto become the winner of the elections while the total right-wing votes fellbelow 50 percent. Conducting a persevering struggle for peace in Cyprus,Barıs ve Demokrasi Hareketi (BDH, the Movement for Peace and Democ-racy) did not perform well (5.81 percent) as it suffered from internaldivisions. TKP, the other leftist party, received 2.41 percent votes, andYKP boycotted the elections. The total left-wing votes reached a consid-erably high for the first time in the history of Cyprus and reached about53 percent.

At the presidential elections held the same year, Mehmet Ali Talat,chairman of CTP, became the president of the unrecognized TRNC whileFerdi Sabit Soyer, the new chairman of CTP, took the office of primeministry.

2004: A Milestone?

Those groups within the Turkish-Cypriot community, which supportedthe Annan plan including the left-wingers, experienced a deep disap-pointment upon the rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek-Cypriotcommunity. Particularly the “no” vote of the left-wing AKEL in the ref-erendum led to more strained relations with the CTP, which were alreadydeteriorating. Another development that brought disappointment wasthe fact that the negotiations that continued until 2010 between Talatand Dimitris Christofias, Secretary General of AKEL, who became thepresident of the Republic of Cyprus in 2008, failed to yield any con-crete result. This indicated for the first time a profound disagreementbetween the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot Left on the solution ofthe Cyprus conflict. Besides, the CTP government was considered tobe a failure by the Turkish-Cypriots, and the party lost the power afterits setback in the elections in 2009. At the presidential elections helda year later, Mehmet Ali Talat lost his office to the nationalist leaderDervis Eroglu. Thus, the “spring” of the Turkish-Cypriot Left, whichbegan in the early years of 2000s, turned into “fall” by the end of thedecade.


The Turkish-Cypriot community, which became more dependent thanever on Turkey, is gradually turning into a protectorate of Turkey. TheTurkish-Cypriot Left, still mainly an identity movement, is carryingout its struggle for the recognition of the Turkish-Cypriot commu-nity as a “distinct community,” challenging Turkish nationalism andits policy of homogenization. This is at the same time a struggle forpeace and federal state-building in Cyprus; a struggle that forces theTurkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot left-wing movements to join hands,go beyond nationalism and ultimately achieve postnational patriotism.

Notes

1. For a detailed account, see Parlar (1997).2. For details, see: Özker Özgür, Yanılmayı Çok Isterdim, Isık Kitapevi Yayınları,

Nicosia (1999).3. Özgür (1999).

C h a p t e r 10

Transformationsof the Greek-Cypriotand Turkish-CypriotRight: Right-wingPeace-makers?Neofytos Loizides

Introduction

This chapter examines the center-right and its political transfor-mation in the past decade by first focusing on the case of�ημoκρατικóς�υναγερμóς (Democratic Rally, DISY) and thenprobing the prospects for comparable political transformations in theTurkish Cypriot community.1 A paradox from its very inception in thepost-1974 era, DISY hosted the moderate center-right along with for-mer EOKA B sympathizers opposing Archbishop Makarios’ return topresidency. The party’s founder Glafkos Clerides was the first main-stream political figure to introduce the idea of federalism to the Greek-Cypriot public and since the 1970s suggested combining federal arrange-ments with the island’s pro-European orientation. DISY’s opposition toMakarios’s legacy kept the party away from power until the 1990s. Itsdecade in government between 1993 and 2003 marked a steady trans-formation of Greek-Cypriot politics and steered the vulnerable Republicof Cyprus towards accession to the European Union. Subsequently, asthe main opposition party, DISY supported the Annan Plan in the2004 referendum and since then has advocated a political settlement

186 N E O F Y T O S L O I Z I D E S

for the reunification of Cyprus. However, by doing so, the party riskedits unity and jeopardized its long-term electoral prospects by alienatingitself from a significant segment of its constituency traditionally associ-ated with Greek nationalism. It also became difficult to attract politicalallies including its less conciliatory center-right competitor and potentialally, �ημoκρατικó Kóμμα (Democratic Party, DIKO).

This chapter looks closely at DISY’s remarkable albeit often con-tested transformation. It explains the dilemmas historically facing thecenter-right liberals and conservatives in the Greek-Cypriot community.It identifies the conditions behind the shift in DISY’s policies and dis-cusses the implications for other political actors on the Greek-Cypriotand Turkish-Cypriot right, particularly in the post-Denktas era.

Brief History of DISY

The Democratic Rally was established in 1976 by Glafkos Clerides.Its predecessor was the national-minded United Party (Enieon), whichClerides dissolved due to the controversies of the pre-and post-1974periods (Ierodiakonou, 2003, pp. 145–146; Clerides, 1989–1992).DISY is a center-right party but has drawn support from all seg-ments of the society, including those with historical affection forEθνικη Oργ ανωση K υπριων Aγωνιστ ων (EOKA, the 1955–1959resistance movement against the British) and the post-1960 pro-enosisforces, which aimed at unification with Greece at all costs (Kızılyürek,2006, pp. 149–151). Thus, from its inception, the party maintaineda “broad Church” vision as it hosted center-right liberals supporting acompromise with the Turkish-Cypriot side, conservatives maintaining anattachment to the ideals of Greek nationalism as well as the overwhelmingmajority of Cypriot Maronites (Sandal and Loizides, 2009).

As DISY’s experience indicates, political movements might transformethnic nationalism (although often in limited ways) and even motivateand incorporate sympathizers of such extremist movements as formermembers of paramilitary groups into normal political life. Furthermore,moderates like Clerides could convince their arguably more intransigentconstituencies to adapt pragmatic policies often by securing in returnthe support of critical peace allies such as Greece and the EU (Sandaland Loizides, 2009). During the 1970s and 1980s, Clerides emphasizedstatesmanship and compromise with the Turkish-Cypriot community.When he was the acting president (but speaking in his personal capacity),he endorsed the federal idea for Cyprus in his historic November 1974speech in Gallery Argo (Kızılyürek, 2006, p. 142), becoming the firstGreek-Cypriot politician to do so. In this endeavor, he was supported byGreek PM Konstantinos Karamanlis and most European governments,

T H E G R E E K -C Y P R I O T A N D T U R K I S H -C Y P R I O T R I G H T 187

which considered Clerides as the only credible interlocutor among theGreek-Cypriot political figures. The federalist vision would safeguardthe vulnerable Republic of Cyprus in the turbulent post-1974 era. Theinternational community, including the United States, European govern-ments, and the then USSR, accepted it as a viable scenario (preferable tode jure partition) while Greek and Turkish-Cypriot moderates assumed forthe first time a shared vision of the future. Since the 1970s all membersof the UN with the exception of Turkey have preferred supporting thefederalization of Cyprus to recognizing “Turkish Republic of NorthernCyprus” (TRNC) as an independent state. Thus, through their espousalof a federal compromise, Clerides and other political forces in the islandparticularly the Aνoρθωτικó Kóμμα Eργαζoμενoυ�αoυ (AKEL, Pro-gressive Party of Working People) safeguarded the Republic of Cyprusfrom de jure partition or other undesirable alternatives.

DISY, under the leadership of Nicos Anastasiades, was expected bycritics to take a nationalist turn. Seen as a hardliner by his opponents,Anastasiades was often associated with tough positions in resolving prob-lems in the 1990s—an impression mostly reinforced by his forcefulpersonality. But Anastasiades demonstrated remarkable statesmanship andhas been fairly consistent in his pro-unification policies in the past decade,continuing to follow Clerides’s moderate path after the introduction ofthe Annan Plan. Equally interesting is the support for moderate policiesevidenced by other DISY senior leaders who set personal disagreementsaside and worked for the pro-unification campaign. The younger gener-ation of leaders included, apart from Anastasiades, the 2008 presidentialcandidate Ioannis Kasoulides (former minister of foreign affairs), and theparty’s Deputy President Averoff Neofytou. Despite the dynamics of intra-party competition and the visible personal political costs, post-CleridesDISY leaders led a joint campaign for unification in 2002–2004. Forexample, as one of the least popular leaders in public opinion polls duringthis period,2 Anastasiades was vulnerable to the political consequences ofthe “yes” campaign. Likewise, Kasoulides hurt his future campaign for thepresidency of Cyprus with his “yes” stance. Other pro-yes DISY politi-cians were publicly harassed; Anastasiades’s home was the target of anunresolved bomb attack after the referendum. Yet, up until today none ofthe political leaders of the Democratic Rally retracted his support for theAnnan Plan in 2004; in fact, despite the alleged demands by the DIKOleadership, Kasoulides refused to do so even during the critical secondround of presidential elections in 2008. On the one hand, these exampleshighlight DISY’s consistency at critical moments and its growing capac-ity to lead the political and social transformation of Cyprus at variouslevels. On the other, critics challenge the party’s record of consistencyparticularly in the post-2008 mediation process.


Moderates on the left often speak of “political mutation” in the posi-tions of DISY and present as evidence its leadership’s discourse, theparticipation of junior party leaders in events organized by the extremeright and the gradual “ascendancy” of hardliners in the party’s hierarchy.Critics also fear that the “gradual encroachment of nationalism” by thecenter-right might become irreversible thereby eliminating the chances ofa cross-party consensus in future settlement efforts. Such fears are notunfounded as the transformation of parties is a natural process in alldemocracies. Yet DISY leaders have argued that the party’s commitmentto the peace process should not be equated with their lack of trust inChristofias’s presidency; the latter has failed to include representatives ofother political parties into his negotiating team (not even constitutionalexperts) and more importantly has failed to consult the National Coun-cil on substantial matters. Furthermore, moderates criticize AKEL for itsown alliances; the latter has prioritized in the past decade its ties withDIKO and Eνιαια Δημoκρατ ικη Eνωση K εντρoυ (EDEK, UnitedDemocratic Union of the Centre), both of which support hardline posi-tions as a norm rather than an exception. In the future, if AKEL continuesto be concerned with the erosion of the moderate line within DISY, itmight consider embracing consensus politics with the centre-right beforeits much-feared “hardline takeover.”.

On this matter, it is important to recognize that DISY’s decisions in thepast decade indicate a political transformation that cannot be attributedto short-term political expediency. As noted, the party flouted the expec-tations of a significant segment of its constituency in 2002–2004 whileindividual leaders risked their political prospects. For the most part, themore pragmatic center-right liberals supporting a compromise with theTurkish-Cypriot side in order to prevent partition dominated the partyand gradually diluted the power of conservatives. Those opposing a com-promise ended up forming Europaiko Komma (EUROKO, EuropeanParty), which failed to attract voters due to the latter’s lack of pragmatism(Moore et. al, forthcoming). During this period, an aging Clerides had nofurther personal ambitions but throughout his political career and partic-ularly during his second term, Clerides proved to be a careful reader ofhistory, political strategy, and statesmanship. He passed this virtue to thenext generation of leaders turning statesmanship itself into the distinctivefeature of Democratic Rally politics. Statesmanship induced with a strongsense of pragmatism is a necessary condition for a successful mediation ina peace process. As Senator Mitchell said of Northern Ireland, Irish lead-ers recognized the risks of the peace process but understood that inactionwas much more risky (Mitchell, 1999, p. xiii). Equally for DISY, a “no”vote meant the irreversible partition of Cyprus, followed by a reversal


of population balances with a continuous flow of Turkish settlers to theNorth (Clerides, 2007).

Yet, as Table I demonstrates, maintaining DISY’s moderate path mightbe problematic in the future due to the nature of political cleavagesand alliances in the Greek-Cypriot community. Apart from the left/rightcleavage, Greek-Cypriot parties share at least four main cleavages carvedby the history of the island and attitudes towards reunification. Althoughdivided by class ideology, the two main parties, AKEL and DISY, share amoderate agenda on reunification (Trimikliniotis, 2006). AKEL, DIKO,and EDEK have a history of conducting politics and alliances together,going back to the first president of the Republic of Cyprus, ArchbishopMakarios who served as president of the Republic between 1960 and1977. AKEL has historically supported a compromise, but in 2004,together with its allies in the above tripartite alliance, it voted againstthe Annan Plan. As mentioned before, DISY was the only party to sup-port the Annan Plan, a decision that divided the party and alienatedpart of its nationalist constituency, causing it to form the EUROKO.DISY continues to emphasize the Greek cultural heritage of Cyprus, whileAKEL emphasizes the common Cypriot character of the two communi-ties. DIKO and EDEK tend to align with DISY on this aspect. All parties,with the exception of AKEL, look to closer political, economic, and cul-tural ties with the European Union. AKEL itself has been criticized forEurosceptisism but the party itself considers such accusations as unsub-stantiated; in fact it has recently initiated its own “socialization path” toEurope’s mainstream through increasing ties with the social democratsgradually distancing themselves from its traditional Eurocommunist allies(table 10.1).

Table 10.1 Electoral cleavages in Greek-Cypriot politics

Party/cleavage

Left/right Unificationattitudes

AnnanPlan

Education/heritage

Makarios’slegacy

2006elections(percentage)

AKEL Nominallycommunist

Moderate No Cypriotist Pro-Makarios

31.13

DISY Center-right Moderate Yes Greek Mainlycritical

30.34

DIKO Center-right Hawkish No(strong)

Greek-Cypriotism

Pro-Makarios

17.92

EDEK Socialist Hawkish No(strong)

GreekCypriotism

Pro-Makarios

8.91

EUROKO Right Hawkish No(strong)

Greek Critical 5.75


Yet AKEL and DISY, despite their moderate agenda on reunification,have consistently failed to join hands in pursuing a peace settlement. Thesplit between the two parties is most evident in their decisions on theAnnan Plan referendum.

Evidently, prior civil society transformation (Varshney, 2001) is insuf-ficient to explain a pro-peace behavior. More specifically, although AKELemphasizes the common Cypriot character of the two communities, ithas historically been closer to the Turkish-Cypriot community. A highlyorganized grassroots party embedded in a network of civil society orga-nizations, it has the tradition of working with the Turkish-Cypriot civilsociety (Anastasiou, 2008, p. 164; see also Charalambous’s chapter inthis volume). Paradoxically, it supported the “no” vote despite its exten-sive institutionalized civic linkages with the Turkish-Cypriot community.Meanwhile, as we argued elsewhere (Sandal and Loizides, 2012), DISYvoted “yes” despite its lack of ties to Turkish-Cypriots, primarily becauseof its own tradition of realist thinking and close connection and socializa-tion with “international peace allies.” Both AKEL and DISY recognizedinitially the merits of the Annan Plan but the latter maintained its sup-port until the end as it feared less Turkey’s “untrustworthiness” with regardto the (non)-implementation of the settlement itself. Heavily invested inthe enlarged European vision, DISY trusted the EU in facilitating thepeace process and obtaining Turkey’s compliance through the incentivesof the accession process. Meanwhile, moderates in the Greek-CypriotLeft, despite their historic ties with Turkish-Cypriots, were reluctant totrust Turkey or the international community and opted instead to rejectthe Annan Plan, maintaining the Cypriot stalemate for the foreseeablefuture (Sandal and Loizides, 2009). AKEL’s lack of trust in the inter-national community has been reflected in the post-2008 negotiations asChristofias insisted that any initiatives be exclusively guided by the twocommunities locally.

The Turkish-Cypriot Right

Meanwhile, in the Turkish-Cypriot community, the cleavage betweenpro-deal and anti-deal forces is less complicated. As in the pre-Kadimaelectoral map of Israel, the Left stands for moderation, and the right rep-resents the more hawkish constituencies. A promising moment for thereunification of Cyprus appeared between 2005 and 2010 when the mod-erates got the upper hand in the Turkish-Cypriot community (Sözen,2005; Carkoglu and Sözen, 2004). Despite AKEL’s presence in powersince February 2008 (or in coalition with Papadopoulos until July 2007),the opportunity for the reunification of the island has been partly missed,


mainly due to the indecisiveness of the two sides in the renewed UNmediation (an issue to be further documented in future UN SecretaryGeneral reports).

The Turkish-Cypriot Left has historically demonstrated high levels ofindependence from the nationalist camp, despite a history of threats, vio-lence, and outside interventions from Turkey. When it came to power,CTP and Mehmet Ali Talat were accused of giving in to Ankara; however,a more careful reflection on Talat’s policies suggests an adaptation aimed atintegrating pro-unification with what was acceptable to the Turkish polit-ical establishment (Loizides, 2007). Specifically, the rift between the armyand Erdogan’s AKP government offered Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP,Republican Turkish Party) an opportunity to build a short-lived alliancewith pro-reform and pro-EU forces in Turkey willing to disentangle thelatter’s foreign policy from the Cypriot stalemate. As Kızılyürek demon-strates in this volume, CTP had been internally divided in the past onwhether the party should retain its Marxist ideology and whether it shouldpreserve closer ties with AKEL. The party grew in the pre-Annan erapartly due to its increasingly popular vision for EU accession and partlydue to its new alliances with moderate settlers. The disappointment of theTurkish-Cypriots with the outcome of the 2004 referendum hurt CTPand made the party less enthusiastic about the post-Annan peace talks.

Turkish-Cypriot right-wing political parties have been slower in adapt-ing to the needs of a federal settlement than were the Left. Traditionally,right-wing politics in the North have been represented by the Ulusal BirlikPartisi (UBP, National Unity Party) of Dervis Eroglu and the smallerDemokrat Parti (DP, Democratic Party) of Serdar Denktas.3 These partieshave a few institutional or ideological links with Greek-Cypriot politi-cal parties. Taking a nationalist line, they have traditionally confrontedleftist opposition by emphasizing that “motherland Turkey gave martyrs,paid a high price and faced great sacrifices for the Turkish-Cypriots”(PIO, 1996). Not surprisingly, much of the Turkish-Cypriot ideologyon the right draws on its legacy of Rauf Denktas, the historic leader ofthe Turkish-Cypriot community since the 1950s and the father figureof Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. It will be interesting to see whether,after his death in the early 2012, Turkish-Cypriot politics on the rightwill become more local and pragmatic or alternatively whether the partywill become more “Turkish” not only in its policy but also in its ethniccharacter due to the increasing presence of conservative Turkish settlers.

On the one hand, upcoming leaders in the Turkish-Cypriot center-right seem to be more localized in the Cypriot pragmatic scene andeager to avoid Denktas’s contradictions of being too attached to themotherland or relying excessively on successive Turkish governments.


On the other, the Turkish-Cypriot community is only gradually catch-ing up in socioeconomic terms compared to the Greek-Cypriot side.The social transformation of the middle class constituencies has beenan important factor promoting the transformation of DISY as it grad-ually exposed the party’s electoral base to international norms and values.Turkish-Cypriot isolation in conjunction with the role of Turkish capi-tal in the north might obstruct a similar transformation either within theUBP or within its smaller right-wing rival, DP.

The latter also makes an interesting case study as it has frequentlybeen the kingmaker in the Turkish-Cypriot politics. DP has only fewestablished institutional links with the Greek-Cypriot community butit has been very effective in building links with the Maronite commu-nity. In 2003, Serdar Denktas hinted that displaced Maronites would beallowed to resettle in their largest village of Kormakitis, a decision rat-ified in 2006. His photo decorates the main coffee shop of Kormakitiswhile the returnees have developed informal networks through whichcenter-right politicians from both communities have met in their villageto discuss future steps for the reunification of Cyprus. There are around6,000 Cypriot Maronites in the island. All the four ancestral Maronitevillages, Agia Marina, Asomatos, Karpasia, and Kormakitis, are in thenorthern part of the island, with their native populations largely displacedsince 1974 (Stefanovic and Loizides, 2011). Displaced Maronites haveavoided assimilation within the Greek-Cypriot community although theyactively participate in politics, directing their influence towards the mod-erate wing of DISY. Pro-DISY Maronites played an important role inthe election of Antonis Hadjirussos, their formal constitutional minor-ity representative in parliament, and Socrates Hasikos, former DISY vicepresident and committed advocate of reunification. However, as DISY hasbeen in opposition since 2004, it could not fully utilize these connectionsin the peace process itself.

Meanwhile, in the Turkish-Cypriot community, CTP and other mod-erate forces began to lose strength since 2005 partly due to widespreaddisappointment among the Turkish-Cypriots over a lack of progress in thenegotiations and partly due to domestic governance issues. In response,nationalist parties increased their votes in municipal and parliamentaryelections. More importantly, the nationalist block united against CTPPresident Mehmet Ali Talat. But the most significant development wasan alliance between right-wing UBP and DP, which had traditionallycompeted in most hostile terms for the right-wing Turkish-Cypriot vote.

During his tenure, Talat also failed to reach out to other moderateTurkish-Cypriot parties (particularly Mustafa Akıncı and Ali Erel) to sus-tain alliances with moderates or transform hardliners across the political


spectrum. In Turkey, the AKP government did not intervene in favor ofTalat as the Cyprus problem decreased in importance for the Turkishpolitical elite. From Ankara’s point of view, such an intervention wasnot only difficult and risky but also unnecessary, given the perception of“Greek-Cypriot intransigence” in the negotiations. Closing a short cycleof moderation in the Turkish-Cypriot community, CTP and Talat weretoppled in the April 2010 elections by National Unity Party’s (UBP’s)Dervis Eroglu.

UBP has no clear policy on reaching a compromise with the Greek-Cypriots. It has continued the negotiations but has blocked progresson major issues, even challenging previous areas of consensus betweenChristofias and Talat. DISY and Anastasiades have made official partyvisits to UBP, but these remain limited in scope. Some politicians inUBP, such as Hasan Taçoy, have developed a greater international pres-ence and EMU academic Kudret Özersay (although an independent) hasassumed a prominent role as a chief negotiator under Eroglu. However,these developments are exceptions to Eroglu’s and UBP’s general orien-tation. Certainly, the party remains committed to the ethnic Turkish-Cypriot nationalism; but the question is whether UBP will exploit everyopportunity to derail the current peace talks or whether the party willconstructively adapt its needs to a settlement.

In sum, at the moment, DISY’s major weakness is the absence of amajor center-right movement in the north sharing its views and prag-matism. This could be a problem but it can be also a blessing as itopens the party to various alternatives. CTP might become DISY’s closestcross-community and cross-class ally in the future following the former’sexpressed disappointment with what CTP considers AKEL’s lukewarmengagement with reunification. The current cross-voting proposal in thenegotiations (a system that entails reciprocal influence across each com-munity of about 20 percent) does not exclude the possibility of a futureDISY–CTP alliance although such an alliance will require significantcompromises from both parties on issues of economic management. Moreimportantly, it will be extremely difficult for the two parties alone torun an effective government while facing overwhelming opposition fromall other Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot political parties. Alterna-tively, the d’Hondt executive formula currently employed in NorthernIreland offers each significant political party equitable representation ingovernment (McGarry and O’Leary, 2009); the latter is more broadlyinclusive and neutral to all political parties and could offer more flexibil-ity in negotiating arrangements across community issues. D’hondt willalso integrate in the peace process UBP’s concerns as well as DIKO andsocialist EDEK on the Greek-Cypriot side. Anti-deal political parties in


both communities have dominated politics for long periods in the recenthistory of the island and often participated in governments dispropor-tionately to their electoral strength. The d’Hondt executive arrangementwill offer these parties an equitable presence in government and encouragetheir moderation through participation in decision-making; more impor-tantly though, it will restrict their negative impact as radicalized spoilersin the peace process (Loizides, forthcoming). Furthermore, in alternativeelectoral arrangements, any future proposal should also take into con-sideration the electoral dynamics and history of recent elections in eachcommunity.

The Greek-Cypriot Center-Right in Elections

Following the Annan Plan referendum, DISY remained an active sup-porter of reunification and ran a campaign for renewed negotiationsin 2008 with Ioannis Kasoulides as its presidential candidate. MostEuropean nations have parliamentary systems in which election cam-paigning takes place over a few weeks. In contrast, Cyprus has a presiden-tial system like the United States and France (but with Cypriot presidentswielding more powers than their French or American counterparts). As inthe United States, deliberation over candidates takes place months, evenstarting a year before the end of a five-year tenure. As in France, Cypriotsvote in two rounds after choosing the top two candidates in the firstround. The two front runners vie for the majority of votes a week afterthe first round of elections. It is a system where strategy and last-minutecoalitions count more than policy. According to the 1960 Constitution,when the two communities lived side by side, only Greek-Cypriots couldvote for the president, while Turkish-Cypriots voted for the vice presi-dent. As noted earlier, Turkish-Cypriots vote for their own leaders in thenorth; however, the self-proclaimed “TRNC” is not recognized by anyother government except Turkey.

During the 2008 elections, at odds with opinion poll predictions andto his own apparent surprise, Tassos Papadopoulos was eliminated in thefirst round, receiving only 31.8 percent votes compared to 33.5 percentfor Kasoulides and 33.3 percent for Christofias. In fact, the UN referen-dum seems to have had little impact on the elections, with Papadopoulosfailing to capitalize on the resounding “no” vote of 2004 (Loizides, 2009).Exit polls showed that he had the support of only 40 percent of the“no” camp and 5 percent of the “yes” camp. The corresponding per-centages for Kasoulides were 24 and 62 percent. Christofias receivedsubstantial backing from both camps, winning the first round with thesupport of 35 percent of “no” voters and 32 percent of “yes” voters


(Konstantinides, 2008). The failure of the anti-Annan camp to outbidDemocratic Rally (DISY) in Cyprus is puzzling, given DISY’s unsuc-cessful “yes” campaign. Paradoxically, the parties that rejected the plan(DIKO, EDEK4 and EUROKO) have been unable to exploit the appre-hensions of the Greek-Cypriots about the Annan Plan, even though itwas rejected by an overwhelming 76 percent majority. As we argue withMoore et al. (2011), these parties have failed to identify appropriatestrategies for addressing the Cyprus problem, leading to deadlock, inter-national consternation, and what Greek-Cypriots fear the most, a furtherentrenchment of partition.

In the 2008 elections, AKEL and DISY demonstrated no major dis-agreements on the national issue. For both, it made sense to accept acompromise on the Cyprus issue rather than prolong the stalemate. Bothrepeated the prospect of the creation of “a state like Taiwan” in theNorth as well as the likelihood of future waves of colonization by Turkishsettlers—who since the 2004 referendum have outnumbered Turkish-Cypriots. Cyprus is one of the most militarized places on the planet,with 40,000 Turkish troops preventing approximately 200,000 Greek-Cypriot refugees (a number that includes descendants) from returning totheir homes in the North. A settlement will normally allow more thanhalf of those displaced to return, under a Greek-Cypriot administrationand a reconstituted federal border (Loizides, 2009). Not surprisingly, per-haps, many Greek-Cypriots sensed that another Papadopoulos presidencywould allow Turkish-Cypriots to reclaim their constitutional rights andformer properties in the South; the majority of Turkish-Cypriots havealready applied for and received identity cards or passports of the Republicof Cyprus.

In short, in 2008, constituents, particularly those on the right, showeda tendency to transcend traditional party lines in favor of electinga moderate candidate. Yet the success of AKEL–DISY in eliminatingPapadopoulos in 2008 had the unintended effect of causing moderates,who were still divided by their traditional Left–right rivalry, to confronteach other again on the second round and reverse their arguments injust a week. The second round was particularly intense, as both themoderate camps had to win the hearts and minds of defeated hardlin-ers. After days of deliberations with the three losing parties, Christofiasgained the support of EDEK and DIKO, while EUROKO remained neu-tral. Papadopoulos did not take an official position in the second round,but his close associates had aligned with Christofias during the crucialdeliberations with DIKO.

In the second round, the Kasoulides camp emphasized educational andheritage issues, openly accusing AKEL of undermining the Greek and


Greek Orthodox heritage of the island. Identity has been a feature of allCypriot elections, with DISY center-right supporters often asserting that“Cyprus is Greek” and AKEL supporters responding that “Cyprus belongsto its people.” DISY also accused AKEL of Euroscepticism, emphasizingits own connections with European center-right parties in power. How-ever, these arguments proved weaker than the alliance between AKEL andits former allies in the Papadopoulos camp that dated back to the 1960s.In the end, Dimitris Christofias benefited from the support of the los-ing parties; he overturned the narrow first-round deficit and won a clear(albeit still narrow) second-round victory, garnering 53.4 percent votescompared to 46.6 percent for Ioannis Kasoulides.

DISY and Christofias’s Presidency

The results of the 2008 elections clarified the preferences of the Greek-Cypriot community and indicated the likely direction of the 2008-13negotiations. Importantly, over 65 percent of the Greek-Cypriot elec-torate supported pro-solution candidates. Thus, the electoral perfor-mance of Christofias and Kasoulides boosted the confidence of thepro-unification camp in its ability to achieve a federal settlement withthe Turkish-Cypriots. Having adopted a moderate line itself in the previ-ous elections, DISY refrained from criticizing Christofias’s pro-settlementinitiatives.

In the first months of his presidency, Christofias appointed DIKO andEDEK party members to his cabinet and convinced DISY of re-enteringthe National Council, the main consultative body on the national issue.Marios Garoyian, president of DIKO, was elected to replace Christofiasas the president of the House of Representatives. Garoyian, an Armenian-Maronite Cypriot, was the first member of a religious minority to beelected to this post. A moderate among hardliners, Garoyian was expectedto play a balancing role against forces in DIKO who opposed Christofias’spolicies in the negotiations. He failed to do so, objecting to every stepin the negotiations with the Turkish-Cypriots, and appointing to thegovernment ministers who eventually undermined the government’s ownpopularity.

On March 21, Christofias met with Turkish-Cypriot leader MehmetAli Talat and agreed to resume preparations for negotiations by setting uptechnical committees and working groups. A couple of months later, onMay 23, in a joint declaration, the two leaders agreed on a “partnershipwith a federal government a single international personality, as well as aTurkish-Cypriot constituent state and a Greek-Cypriot constituent stateof equal status” (UNFICYP, 2008). While the opposition DISY supported


the joint declaration, DIKO and EDEK government coalition leadersexpressed strong opposition, as did former President Papadopoulos. Nev-ertheless, public opinion polls were strongly in favor of Christofias andreunification talks.

Initially, Christofias appeared determined to move the peace processforward, resuming direct substantive negotiations with Talat on Septem-ber 3, 2008, under UN auspices. At the time Ankara was committed to asettlement, and Talat actively engaged with novel ideas to reach a com-promise. Talat was anxious to avoid defeat in the 2010 elections andto demonstrate to his constituency that progress had been made in thenegotiations. Accordingly, the two sides agreed on multiple issues, mostnotably governance through an innovative system of cross-communityvoting. Specifically, cross-voting could allow all Cypriots a double vote,one in their ethnic community and another (with a standardized influ-ence weight of around 20 percent) in the other community (Loizidesand Keskiner, 2004). This system would have turned Turkish-Cypriotsinto an electoral minority in the Greek-Cypriot-dominated areas, whilethe Greek-Cypriots would represent an electoral minority in the Turkish-Cypriot-dominated areas, with respect to their representatives.

During this period, criticisms of DISY were milder than those ofEDEK, DIKO, or EUROKO. When DISY officials were asked aboutcross-voting and related provisions, for example, they carefully qualifiedtheir answers, allowing space for negotiations even though the cross-voting system put DISY at a disadvantage. Although they were notcolored by rejectionist rhetoric, serious objections raised by DISY relatedto the deadlocks and arbitration mechanisms, were attached to the rotat-ing presidencies. There was also the question of sharing power at thecenter, as DISY preferred a more decentralized federation and a limitedTurkish-Cypriot veto.

In other words, DISY opted for a formula that included more decen-tralization and fewer potential consociational deadlocks. This proposal(particularly the decentralization component) seems closer to the Turkish-Cypriot positions as it implies minimum changes in the everyday realitiesof each community following reunification as well as minimum risks indaily governance and social provisions.

Critics frequently confuse DISY’s proposal for a decentralized fed-eration with the option of confederation. A decentralized federationfollows the subsidiary principle whereby authority devolves to the mostappropriate level to facilitate improved financial and social services. It isa widely accepted governance approach, which has been advocated fordecades by the European community and international experts on localgovernance. It allows local communities an effective say in daily issues;


decentralization could take various forms and it increases in capacity ifthere is substantive evidence that local communities could offer betterservices to citizens. In a decentralized federation in Cyprus, each commu-nity would run its own domestic affairs, ranging from road infrastructureto health and social welfare. There would be less demand for commondecision-making in most areas of daily public life and hence, less chance ofacrimony. In fact, in federations, constituent states have multiple options;they can decide to share the costs and benefits of a new infrastructure(a specialized hospital unit or a sewage system in a major urban center) orthey can maintain their own programs. In contrast, a confederation hasno implications on sharing power but implies the rights of units to secede.Unlike confederal arrangements, a decentralized federation implies nosovereign rights. On this point, confederations could be highly central-ized, thereby lending themselves to mutual grievances and secession as inthe cases of the former Yugoslavia and USSR. As many other issues regard-ing federal options, these important distinctions have not been discussedextensively among the Greek-Cypriots before; however, they are likely tobe debated in the Greek-Cypriot community during and following thecritical 2013 election campaign.

The 2013 Presidential Elections

What makes any presidential elections in Cyprus a game for those withstrong nerves is the fact that each main camp in Greek-Cypriot poli-tics shares about a third of the electorate. Each must devise a strategyto make it to the second round without alienating the losing side’s can-didate and voters. The candidate eliminated in the first round becomesthe kingmaker in the second round, a prospect that adds an interestingdynamics to the campaign, as opponents compete simultaneously for thefirst-round votes and second-round pacts. If one cannot be king, it makessense to be the kingmaker. As demonstrated above, in the 2008 elec-tions, the first-round, losers could divert voters to one of the candidatesin exchange for a share in government and promises of support in futureelections.

As the next Cypriot president will be able to influence EU decisionson important issues, including Turkey’s EU accession, DISY is likely toemphasize its EU credentials. DISY played a key role in the island’s acces-sion process to the European Union and maintains close connections withthe United States and the United Kingdom. It is seen as the politicalforce best able to mobilize international support for a peace settlement,a process sidelined since 2004. AKEL broke ranks with DIKO in 2011but maintains a lukewarm relationship with its leadership, as each side


hopes for the other’s support in 2013. In the past, AKEL capitalized onthe party’s historical connections with the Turkish-Cypriot communityand emphasized reunification in its electoral programs; however, followingthe explosion in Mari, the party’s orientation remains unclear and AKELfaces an unprecedented crisis. Since a DISY–AKEL alliance is unimagin-able in Greek-Cypriot politics, both must constantly approach DIKO andEDEK in search of a coalition, a point underlined by the elected Memberof European Parliament Eleni Theocharous, who argued in an interviewwith the author that for DISY to regain power, it must make a pre-electionpact with DIKO or EDEK.5 Yet, in a bid to avoid undermining his cred-ibility and legacy, Anastasiades limits the extent to which his party adoptshard-line positions. In a statement that demonstrates the party’s tradi-tion of statesmanship, DISY MP Christos Stylianides told the authorthat Anastasiades “is not facing elections anymore but the judgment ofhistory.”6

Conclusion

In the end, despite all limitations, DISY’s own political transformationcould be the catalyst for the reunification of Cyprus. If DISY couldtransform its own nationalist dimension into a positive force under con-ditions that originally seemed prohibitive, there is no significant reasonwhy the same transformative process could not be replicated by otherpolitical actors in the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities.Despite the risks entailed in its transformation, the case of DemocraticRally also demonstrates that, in the long run, citizens in divided societiesmight come to recognize the importance of statesmanship and pragma-tism. And if past political behavior is the best predictor of a future one,one could predict that DISY will take significant political and electoralrisks to reach a viable settlement in Cyprus. Admittedly, peace processesdepend on multiple factors including the new geopolitics of the EasternMediterranean and Turkey’s EU accession process, both guiding a futurepeace momentum in the island as well. EU intentions in its southernperiphery might be beyond the influence of domestic political forces inCyprus. Yet, DISY carries the international credibility to influence, evenshape, EU decisions, and pose dilemmas on Turkey. More importantly,the party is in a unique position in which it can attach Greek-Cypriotinterests to the interests of critical peace allies, and rally European andinternational support for a future settlement. The center-right will havean increasingly important role to play in the future of the Cyprus peaceprocess; nonetheless, such a settlement should result from broader socialconsensus across ethnic and ideological divisions.


Notes

1. The author would like to thank Christoforos Fokaides, Alexandros Lordos,Gavin Moore, and Nukhet Sandal for their assistance in joint projects on thecenter-right partly summarized in this chapter. The author would also like tothank the editors of this volume, Umut Bozkurt and Nicos Trimikliniotis, fortheir insightful comments. The usual disclaimer applies.

2. See polls by TV Mega (RAI) May 04, 2001, and daily newspaper Politis,March 24, 2006.

3. Former minister of foreign affairs, son of veteran Turkish Cypriot leader RaufDenktas.

4. Eνιαια Δημoκρατ ικη Eνωση K εντρoυ (EDEK, (United DemocraticUnion of the Centre).

5. DISY Member of the European Parliament, Eleni Theocharous, interview,2009.

6. Christos Stylianides interview, 2008.

C h a p t e r 11

The Potentialfor Reconciliation,Forgiveness,and SocialTransformationDilek Latif and Ari Sitas

The Annan Plan for the reunification of Cyprus was rejectedby a great majority of the Greek-Cypriots (76 percent) in the April2004 referendum. On the other hand, an overwhelming majority of theTurkish-Cypriots (65 percent) supported it. A wide-ranging research onthe “Prospects of Reconciliation, Co-existence and Forgiveness in Cyprusin the Post-Referendum Period”1 was started after the failure of the AnnanPlan to comprehend this process and its repercussions. This chapterdraws on the key findings of this research in discussing reconciliationand social transformation in Cyprus. The research explored the dispo-sitions of Cypriots on the prospects of reconciliation, coexistence, andforgiveness. One hundred and seventy qualitative interviews were car-ried out, focusing on two generation of Cypriots: Those now in their50s that experienced the conflict, and the generation of their children,now in their mid-20s, born and raised on a divided island. The mainobjective of the study was to understand and interpret the dispositions ofCypriots concerning the terms of reconciliation, coexistence, and forgive-ness and to explore how Cypriots defined, related to, and differentiatedthese terms as they meant diverse things to individuals, groups and socialcollectives.

202 D I L E K L AT I F A N D A R I S I T A S

The first phase of the research started in September 2005 andwas finalized by July 2006. Throughout this period, the 170 individ-uals who were interviewed were as follows: (a) 100 people in their50s, (b) 50 people in their 20s–30s, and (c) 20 people that weremembers of non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations,and/or bicommunal groups. The methodological reason for formingthese groupings was not aiming at “representativity,” but on “propor-tional complementarity.” The numbers of interviewees were equal ingender and ethnicity, refugees and non-refugees, from five major citiesfrom the same high-school classes. The study covered people fromNicosia (men and women from both communities), Limassol (Greek-Cypriot men, Turkish-Cypriot women), Famagusta (Greek-Cypriot men,Turkish-Cypriot women), Larnaca (Turkish-Cypriot men, Greek-Cypriotwomen), and Kyrenia (Turkish-Cypriot men, Greek-Cypriot women).

Why these groups? The generation that was born in 1950s is the onethat was already in, or was coming into, power and influence. In theiryouth they directly experienced the events of the 1950s and 1960s.During the tragedies of the late 1960s and 1974, they had been activeparticipants in the processes of the tragedies. They are also the last gen-eration that experienced the island “whole.” The younger generation wasalso important for the consolidation of any prospects on the island. Theywere born with the reality of a divided island. They grew up with storiesabout the “other side” and the “other,” about momentous events, hard-ships, and traumas. Their notions of the past have been formed throughtheir parents, the media, books, school curricula, and public rituals of“remembrance.”2

The methodology covered the broader demography of the island andits stratification patterns. It examined the Cypriot society as a wholerather than identifying ethnic differentiation. Qualitative and quantifi-able themes were consolidated into an open-ended, exploratory researchschedule. The semi-structured interviews contained a structured and aqualitative part. The dispositions were divided into hard and soft vari-ables. Soft variables refer to the exposure in everyday life and the livedexperiences influencing people’s dispositions and behaviors. Hard vari-ables refer to people’s tendencies to act or to be disposed to certain choicesthat are constrained by prior forms of socialization embedded in socialstructures and institutions.3

It was assumed that the new interactions since the opening of the“check-points” could be (a) instrumental, involving synanostrofi, synal-lages, or synandisei (association, exchanges, and encounters); (b) unantici-pated; for example, a product of the sychrotismos (syncretism) that hasoccurred; and (c) more active and a product of synergasies (cooperation).

R E C O N C I L I AT I O N , F O R G I V E N E S S 203

To see how these processes or encounters were mediated by past expe-riences and traumas was a fascinating prospect. What we sought toestablish was whether (a) the possibility of failure to find a solution(closure), and therefore no prospect of reconciliation, was the definingreality; (b) an openness to a “formal reciprocity”; and (c) an opennessto a “substantive reciprocity.” The dominant modalities in the studythen were of (a) closure, (b) pragmatic coexistence, and (c) reconcilia-tion and syghoresis. Formal reciprocity is achieved (like in South Africa)when opposing sides agree that there is something that binds them intoa solution/constitution/settlement despite the fact that they are not con-tented with what the other believes, articulates, or practices. Substantivereciprocity is when there is mutual understanding and recognition of eachother’s cultural autonomy.

Findings

The study found that hard variables of class, ethnicity, gender, age, reli-gion, and refugee status very strongly influence the responses towardprospects of reconciliation, coexistence, and forgiveness: Regarding class,the results show that those most reluctant to reconciliation are primar-ily members of the working class; the second and third most reluctantare members of the upper class and people of old peasant descent. Yet,both the new and the traditional middle class believe that reconcilia-tion and coexistence are possible. When it comes to ethnicity, being aGreek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot is a significant variable, but there isalso a radical differentiation within each community. A similar propor-tion of people on both sides are unsure about prospects of reconciliation.While half of the Greek-Cypriots believe that reconciliation is possi-ble, only one-third of Turkish-Cypriots agree. The view that coexistenceis possible has higher acceptance in both communities. More Turkish-Cypriots than Greek-Cypriots believe that forgiveness is possible, whilemore Greek-Cypriots believe the current period is leading to a closure.

On the other hand, being a man or a woman is an important vari-able: women are more cautious and insecure about most of the elementsthat constitute an emotional overcoming of the past. Half of the men,as opposed to a third of women, see positive prospects of reconciliation.Similarly, almost two-thirds of men see coexistence as possible as opposedto just above half of the women, and more men than women see for-giveness as possible. Almost half of the women think that the currentperiod is moving toward a closure as opposed to a third of the men.Meanwhile, there is no major difference between the two generationsregarding positive dispositions toward reconciliation, while that is not the


case for negative dispositions: almost 40 percent of the younger genera-tion is against reconciliation in contrast to 29 percent among the oldergeneration. Slightly more youngsters than elders think that forgivenessis not possible. Almost half of the younger generation believes that thecurrent period is leading to a closure.

Contrary to general perception, the results show that the majority inboth communities is only casually religious. Most resistance to reconcil-iation is found in the active religious category, where half of these seeno such prospects. On the prospects of coexistence and forgiveness, allcategories think that these are possible. On the other hand, refugee sta-tus and displacement are also taken as important variables. Almost allrefugees believe that the consequences of 1974 have been negative. Theprimary trauma identified by a third of the refugees was the experienceof displacement.4 Nevertheless, more refugees than non-refugees believethat reconciliation and forgiveness are possible. However, they are morecircumspect and below the general positive picture regarding coexistence.

The soft variables explored are education, civic involvement, exposureto the “others,” and traumatic experiences. These are vital in determin-ing the dispositions of the Cypriots as they involve a larger degree ofchoice than the hard variables. The level of education makes a signifi-cant impact on dispositions. The greatest difference is between those whohave postgraduate education and those who only completed high school.High school graduates do not see much hope for reconciliation and are themost negative toward coexistence and forgiveness; the opposite is the casefor those with postgraduate education. Moreover, the place of educationmatters, as we see that those who studied in Cyprus are below the averagein support of reconciliation, coexistence, and forgiveness. On the otherhand, civic involvement in voluntary, social and political associationsand organizations is a significant variable. The small minority who areactive in pro-peace, rapprochement, and bicommunal nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs) exhibit the strongest dispositions toward recon-ciliation, coexistence, and forgiveness. But the trend is the same amongthose actively involved in civic associations.5 In contrast, those who arenot involved in such activities tend to have greater reservations towardreconciliation, coexistence, and forgiveness.

The strongest dispositions toward reconciliation and coexistence cor-relate with people that claim to have had not only exposure to the “otherside” but have also had strong, intense encounters with people from“there.”6 Of those who claim strong exposure only, 84 percent are still dis-posed toward coexistence, and 68 percent are in favor of forgiveness. Thefollowing quote from the feedback session with the bicommunal focusgroup speaks about this reality: “Old people feel the way they felt before,


but the younger generation does not identify with them, they are proudbut they don’t know the ‘other people’ they have not seen the beauty ofthe past.”7

For the research team the analysis of experienced trauma/war/violencewas the most overwhelming. Almost two-thirds of those who experiencedviolence and forced displacement during the hard years are open to bothreconciliation and coexistence, and over half of them are open to forgive-ness. Three-fourths of those who suffered and were victims of interethnicviolence are open to reconciliation. The figure rises to two-thirds in termsof coexistence and diminishes to just above half in terms of forgiveness.However, there is an exception: If you have lost a loved one.

The numerical findings: Are there prospects of reconciliation on theisland? The results show 42.4 percent yes, 31.1 percent no, and 26.5 per-cent maybe. What are the prospects for coexistence? The results show63.1 percent positive, 30.6 percent negative, and 6.3 percent unsure.What are the prospects of forgiveness? The results show 54.1 percent posi-tive, 27.7 percent negative, and 18.2 percent unsure. Where is the currentperiod on the island heading toward? The results show 38.7 percent clo-sure, 33.8 percent openness, and 27.5 percent unsure. Was the partialopening of the borders appreciated? The results show 64 percent positive,24.2 percent suspicious, and 11.8 percent negative.

Reconciliation(s), Values, and Perceptions

Reconciliation, coexistence, and forgiveness mean diverse things to indi-viduals, groups, and social collectives.8 They have a different career asconcepts in moral philosophy, in political science, theology, and interna-tional relations. What we sought was their idiomatic use and meaningsin the everyday language of Cypriots. Both languages have a rich troveof words that denote senses of commonality and distance. For exam-ple, the Greek language polarizes such senses around words constructedwith “syn” and “anti” prefixes: symphilosis, syniparxis, synghoresis, synandi-sis, synchrotismos, symponia; and antagonismos, antiphases, antiphonia, andso on. Similarly, in Turkish, with uzlasmak, beraber varolmak, bagıslamak,kasılasmak, kaynasmak, bulusmak, anlasmak. The first three in each seriesapproximates best the formal literature on reconciliation, coexistence, andforgiveness.

There are many possibilities of constructing the qualitative responses-to get to or behind the meaning of the “yes,” the “nos,” and the “maybes”outlined above. Nonetheless, the study contrasted the extremes: thosewho reject its prospects and those who are positive about it. Before pro-ceeding with that, it is crucial to introduce two issues, alluded to in


Introduction, that arose from the qualitative side of the research. Firstly,in most of the narratives collected, there is a thick description of veryviolent and traumatic experiences. Yet in approximately a third of thenarratives there appear to be remarkable acts of kindness and humanismeven in extreme situations of combat and flight. It is also evident thatthe Türk Mukavemet Teskilatı (TMT, Turkish Resistance Movement) hada more commanding situation in all the urban settlements and villages,especially after 1963. In contrast, the paramilitaries, which evolved intoEOKA B’s (Greek-Cypriot paramilitary organization) control, were tenu-ous in the years that followed (Droussiotis, 1996; see Kızılyürek’s chapterin this volume). The villages though presented a more complex story:there were villages where the two communities continued to have good orcordial relationships, which continued into the 1970s. Such villages wereattacked on some occasions by ethno-nationalists from elsewhere.

The majority of the narratives speak of transcommunal forms ofkindness—co-workers shielding each other; factory owners transportingpeople to safety; co-villagers helping others to flee; clients and suppliershelping their counterparts and once in flight, helping each other’s flightand even supplying food and water. Even this must be contextualized:it was a significant exception. The majority of our respondents mighthave been bystanders through the 1950s and 1960s but by the 1970s,they were in the thick of the conflagration. It is a significant exceptionthough because it illustrates the underbelly of humanism, common toboth “sides” that engendered restraint and dignity. This has to be bal-anced with an understanding of the external ever-present terrorizing fearof retribution and an adequate understanding of what saved the islandfrom a murderous ethnic cleansing. The reason why a murderous ethniccleansing did not happen is that ordinary people were not as much takenin by the respective leaderships’ zero sum games; even when they showedsupport in practice, they did not go out to kill each other, and in somecases rather helped each other find refuge.

Secondly, the responses below have to be read against a backdropof powerful public constructions of ethnic traumas to appreciate howthe two generations make sense of their current realities and prospects.A number of pro- and anti-reconcilers were included in both the agecohorts to get down to the meanings people attach to their dispositions.

Pro-reconciliation Responses

To say that the prospects of reconciliation are fading away despiteone’s commitment to it does not mean that reconciliation is not desir-able. Phrased in another way, it is hardly surprising that this openness


constitutes no ground for “euphoria” despite the fact that the numericalmajority is more open toward its realization. There are doubts, shared bymany; there is its implausibility, also shared by many; the shadow over itsprospects lengthens as a slight majority of our respondents thinks that thispost-Referendum period is leading to “closure.” A straw poll amongst ourrespondents would highlight that an absolute majority thinks that “co-existence” is possible and forgiveness achievable. The issue is not “that”they say so but what our respondents mean when they do.

“There are people” noted Andri9 that “proved through their initia-tive that cooperation can exist.” But she believes that they are a kindof an avant-garde and it will take time and education. She sees thoughseparation rather than reunification as the immediate prospect. Unlessthere is a political solution, coexistence will be trumped. “Forgiveness isnot an issue but mutual understanding of what had been experienced bythe other, is a pre-requisite.” The word to describe the current momentis antifatiki—“although people want a solution they inadvertently choseseparation.”

Words like reconciliation are dangerous according to Ada, because cat-egorizations and simplifications are not sensible. By framing the problemthrough a few words, you reduce people’s horizons. “In theory it is pos-sible but can it be easily realized in practice? Can you find 10-20 peopleand tell them if you do this and that you might reconcile? Is it that easy todefine? These reconciliation techniques, gatherings and dialogues of dif-ferent groups are beneficial and should be used but we should be aware oftheir limits.” For Turkish-Cypriots, Ada continues,

the ones, who assigned a magical power to politics, were deeply disappointedand lost their faith in politics . . .. So we should not expect much from imposedsolutions but create grounds where people can come together, understand, andfeel each other. Coexistence is possible, but it will take a serious transformationin the mentality of people. You cannot tell people to give up their identity,beliefs, and deep-rooted views. This needs time and empathy. Forgiveness ispossible, we need to say yesterday was yesterday, it is the time to embrace eachother. Yet, this society is full of contradictions.

Christos wants a solution urgently and believes that reconciliation is pos-sible. He makes a distinction between ruling elites and ordinary people.The former are intransigent, “the people that became rich as an out-come of the war obviously they do not want to lose that advantageand they do not want to solve the problem as the problem keeps themrich and the politicians do not want to lose their positions.” Forgive-ness is a pre-requisite and it should be reached—“we did bad things


to each other . . .we killed each other. There will always be somethingleft out . . . families who lost loved ones might not be able to forgivecompletely but it will have to be reached.”

Çicek does not disagree with Christos but she is more pessimistic:

It is very, very difficult to forgive. People, who survived very difficult days inthe past cannot forgive those they think are responsible for it, but if you appealto them to forget with the passage of time, they may try to push it behindtheir subconscious and try to forget. Instead of transmitting poison to the newgeneration, we should remove ugliness from the history books, terminate badfeelings rather than brainwash, and try to render them forgotten. If we can dothat, we can reconcile.

Andonis agrees that reconciliation and coexistence are possible and thatthe present is not about closure. He shares with Christos the belief thatthere are good prospects between ordinary Cypriots and shares too someof the cynicism about vested interests. He believes that once relationsbetween people move from the current superficial and NGO-linked inter-actions to a more substantive level of relationships, the climate will bebetter. “I am sure I can forgive and be forgiven by Turkish-Cypriots andsit around and talk about the old Lemesos . . .what is more difficult is toforgive our own ethno-nationalists and broader Turkish nationalists.”

Though less in number than the older generation, there are youthamong our respondents who are strongly disposed toward reconciliation.Tzina, a young woman from Larnaca asserts with conviction that “thereis no need for solution for prospects to exist . . .There is a need to have agreen light on both sides politically. What we have now is a way of interac-tion but this is not coexistence. Coexistence means the same objectives beclaimed by both, which is not happening now. I believe that we can coex-ist but we need gradual integration. There must be forgiveness in orderto be able to cultivate a relationship that will have a solid foundation tobuild on.”

Mpagasas, son of a Famagustan refugee, strongly believes that there areprospects for reconciliation because the human factor is more powerfulthan the political factor under the current circumstances. He asserts:

We have many Turkish-Cypriot workers coming in the south and they haveintegrated within the system. I believe that there is a positive basis for thefuture, reconciliation can happen in the middle term not necessarily in thelong term . . . Co-existence is possible and it is for the interest of the Cypruspeople to live together, the people will sooner or later understand this. I wantco-existence to be unification, to be one people, not side to side. By accepting


the differences of each community we can live together. I would not say thatwe need forgiveness, but we need to see things from the beginning, to see whatreally happened, to rewrite common history. These would help in reconciling.

Fox, a young woman from a Kyrenian refugee family personally feels thatshe has already reconciled with Turkish-Cypriots:

I do not think of them as enemies, contrary I see them as friends. In additionthey want reunification more than we do. Of course we can coexist. In theold days they used to live together and they had no problem, they were com-promising. Then we sent them away and they divided us. They also lost theirhouse from this side, it is not only us. It is not the Turkish-Cypriot’s fault forwhat happened; it is their government’s fault for what happened. So there is nopoint to forgive; they did not do anything.

Med-Cezir from Nicosia does not share the skepticism of his youth peersand counterparts either. He sees prospects for reconciliation but for himthe dispute is about when it would happen—if it is soon or much later.

There are people in both communities who want a solution but there is noagreement on the type of a solution. Yet, everybody wants to reconcile . . . Ibelieve we should not forget what happened in the past but this should neverremain as a barrier in front of us to reconcile. Of course we will remember ourvictims and they will remember their victims. And forgiveness is . . .maybe weshould not use this word but for me it is possible. Forgiveness depends on theindividual. One forgives, the other does not. Does the state forgive? I thinkthere cannot be such a concept that a whole society forgives the other society.

Against Reconciliation?

There are respondents who are quite negative about the prospects of rec-onciliation, coexistence, and forgiveness on the island. Gümüs does notsee any prospects and definitely does not believe that Greek-Cypriots willreconcile with Turkish-Cypriots. Her answer to the question regardingthe openness toward a solution is that the only solution for her is therecognition of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Forher the two people cannot coexist as fire and ice cannot. “Race, religionand language of the two communities are different. Coincidentally, twocommunities found themselves living on the same island.” She claimsTurkish-Cypriot reception of the Greeks to cross to the north withoutcausing any trouble shows that we forgave them; “You forgive but youcan not forget. And forgiveness does not mean that immediately we


can live together. It is only possible in two zones.” Haralambos is infull agreement: “there is no prospect for reconciliation . . . It is a culturalthing, whatever they do; they are not European. . . . There might be somekind of existence but not together-we want a solution, if the Turks leaveus alone there can be co-existence. But there won’t be much sharing.”But cannot we forgive and get on with it? The answer will be sarcasticand ethnocentric: “Synghoresis? No. No such graciousness and megaleia!10

We have it in our religion but they don’t have it in theirs.”Yumos also does not believe that the two communities can reconcile.

Concerning a solution like Gümüs, her heart is for the recognition of theTRNC. The two communities can coexist side by side, she claims, butthey cannot live together. She carries on: “it is not possible to forget whathappened but it is possible not to repeat them.” Olta is as suspicious asYumos about the intensions of the Greeks and says “Greeks saved theirmoney, buy weapons and suddenly attacked us. I lived this two times;I am always suspicious and fearful.” For her, there is no openness towarda solution: “best is to live separately; everyone on their own sides, even theborders should be closed. Forgiveness is not possible either. If you bury asmall child in the mass graves, if you kill a pregnant woman . . . these arenot the things which could be forgiven.”

On the prospects of reconciliation and coexistence, Pitsa amplifies discord andexclaims,

however powerful it might be for many people I am against it. I have grownup as a Grivas-supporter. I do believe the island is Greek. I cannot sacrifice myethnic pride and dignity or even my land for anybody . . .We are at a point ofclosure. It is impossible to move forward—it will always remain us and them.Nor are there many real prospects for co-existence. Yes there are encounters butalso, antidraseis (resistances) and antiphases (contradictions).

Dal, thinks that openness depends on the help of the motherlands sincepeace cannot be attained by Turkish-Cypriots or Greek-Cypriots them-selves. For him coexistence can be possible when Greek-Cypriots leavetheir chauvinistic feelings and Turkish-Cypriots lose their TMT spirits.On forgiveness and reconciliation, he says there should be a new start,but this is not so easy.

Mehmet Arif ’s views are similar to Dal’s, and states that “if there is nooutside pressure I do not think that Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriotscan reconcile themselves.” He is also negative about the possibility ofcoexistence and argues that “we can not go back to the previous mixedconstruction. As I visit the south Nicosia, Greeks look at me differentlybecause I am a Turk. How can you feel comfortable among the Greeks?


Maybe in the future we can live together but for me mixing up now is dan-gerous. We failed to do that.” On reconciliation and forgiveness, he states:“if the other side has a good will why not. Both communities have sufferedand have losses. Our past is a wound in our hearts! Slowly we can get usedto the idea to forgive.” Contrarily to his previous statement, he carrieson . . . “in future to come to terms with the Greeks we can try to forgive.Now how can I forget my martyrs, how can I forget my friends and howcan I forget what they did to me?” Sima does not want reconciliation aslong as there is no solution to the property issue. She insists that first weneed to solve the Cyprus problem and then move on to forgiveness.

The young generation has strong views against reconciliation, too. Veli,son of a Turkish-Cypriot refugee from Larnaca, is negative: “As long asthe chaos on the property issue is not solved it will not be easy. Every-body established new lives for themselves. It will not be easy to dissolveand re-establish.” He sees a closure toward a solution because Greeks arereluctant but they pretended to be moderate. Yet, for him referendumresults showed that it is the Greek side who does not want a solution.“As long as both people have the pain of the past they can not cometogether.” Giorkalla from Larnaca is as negative as him. She thinks thereare prospects just among the older generation to reconcile but not amongthe young. She asserts “the most negative factor to co-exist is religion. Ourreligions counter each other, there is hatred between us.” She claims thatcoexistence will be very hard to be achieved, considers forgiveness impor-tant but she asks “how will anyone (Greek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot)who lost relatives in the war forgive the crimes done?”

Kara from Kyrenia does not think that there are prospects for recon-ciliation. “If there are any, they will be only for a temporary period, untilthe honeymoon is over. The people who often had troubles in the pastcan not be in peace in the future.” For him the Cyprus conflict will neverbe solved:

No matter how much Turkish-Cypriots try to reach a solution Greek-Cypriotswill never take any steps further. The two people can not co-exist as they couldnot co-exist in the past. What does not work in past will not work in the futurehe says. Forgiveness and reconciliation can only be possible when both sideshave an interest in forgiveness. But as long as there is a clash of interest thehostility will arise again. Only an artificial peace and artificial forgiveness ispossible. It will not come from heart and it will not be genuine. The reason ofthis is our past.

Correspondingly, Üçgen from Famagusta does not think that peace willcome from the heart. She says:


peace will not happen as a result of the desire of the people. It will happenbecause of the political and economic reasons or because outsiders want it thatway. This is because there is no trust between the two people. We can notlive together but we can live side by side. If we could have a new generationwithout hatred and enmity, we would be able to co-exist together. But now itis not possible . . . If we have peace one day it will not be because we forgave.We will never be the same again. I think people who experience such a paincan not forgive the other; can not take this feeling out of their heart . . .Everysmall incident will be dealt with suspicion.

For Günes from Lefkosa/Lefkosia, there are not any prospects for recon-ciliation and it will not happen. She says:

the goodwill of the Turkish-Cypriots is obvious. We showed it in the refer-endum too but Greek-Cypriots are not responding the same way. Bi-zonalityis a must. A solution on the property issue would comfort people but this isnot near now. We cannot co-exist because Greek-Cypriots perceive themselvessuperior. After all martyrs and missing persons it is not possible to forgive.

Onyx, who is from a Famagustan refugee family, is as suspicious as Günesconcerning reconciliation and thinks that people will never be able toleave behind their fears and believe in each other.

Even if the people reconcile there is always going to be a fear inside people’smind. For me symfiliosis means that as I face you I also face the other, but weare not the same . . . there is always going to be something that will tell you thathe did something to you and you will never be able to forget it.

Lolly, whose mother was a Kyrenian refugee, similarly does not think thatthere are prospects for reconciliation. She expresses that her mother hatesTurks and managed to transmit this and adds: “I hate Turks not onlybecause my mother transmitted it to me: I believe that even if my motherdid not say anything I would hate them. No we can not coexist. Thereis no such possibility because there are people that cannot forget whatthey did to them so they can neither coexist nor forgive.” Elena sees noprospects of reconciliation either: “Turkish-Cypriots are totally differentand have no common point of contact with Greek-Cypriots. They havedifferent religion, language, and ethnicity. The only thing that ties us isthe same island. Prospects exist only for politicians but not for the people.People will never leave fear behind. Only Turkish-Cypriots want and needa solution, we do not.” There is no possibility of conversation or dialoguebetween the respondents in this section and no immediate prospects ofagreement between them and the “Reconcilers” above.


Conclusion

There are three profound points that speak to the broader self-reflexiveacademic literature on reconciliation processes. The Cyprus “case” did notend up in murderous ethnic cleansing because of self-restraint and speaksto a humanism that precedes the conflict. It did end up in territorial eth-nic cleansing after the coup and the invasion, but, despite the existenceof core constituencies and militants, who were ready to push the soci-ety beyond the brink, commit atrocities, and inaugurate a zero-sum gameof eliminations, “something” prevailed. Michael Mann’s harrowing book“The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing” focuseson the most shattering cases of “classicide” (his own term), Yugoslavia,Rwanda, and many more. Murderous cleansing is modern, he argues, itis, in his chilling conclusion “the dark side of democracy.”

In his words,

the danger zone of murderous ethnic cleansing is reached when (firstly) move-ments claiming to represent two fairly old ethnic groups both lay claim to theirown state over all or part of the same territory and (secondly) this claim seemsto them to have substantial legitimacy and some plausible chance of beingimplemented.11

Such a “danger zone” was present in Cyprus. He continues to say thatthe brink of murderous cleansing is reached when one of two scenariosplays out:

The less powerful side is bolstered to fight rather than to submit by believingthat aid will be forthcoming from the outside-usually from a neighboring state,perhaps its ethnic homeland state . . .The stronger side believes that it has suchan overwhelming military power and ideological legitimacy that it can forcethrough its solution.

With a few variations in detail, what Cyprus experienced is precisely this“brink.” The question though is this—why did it not move to murderousethnic cleansing when all the conditions were there, including a range ofatrocities.

A discerning reader will be struck by the usage of “Intensity” as anadequate measure of the experiences of violence and war. There is noprecise measurement—it depends so much on character, personality, psy-chology, and support networks. No matter what preparation individualsmight have had, no one is adequately prepared for the experience ofactual warfare and its implications. There were atrocities on the waybut most were not pre-planned. The invasion was—the troops “cleared


up” what had to be “cleared up” on the way, stopping exactly at apre-planned line. Greek-Cypriots were gathered, exchanged, or killed.Turkish—Cypriots in turn, were gathered, exchanged, or killed. It wasruthless and ugly. What stopped it from being a case of murderous ethniccleansing?

The answer is usually “external” to the dispositions of Cypriots them-selves. It was the Invasion and Occupation or the Peace Operation (forGreek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, respectively) that halted the pro-cess. And the consequent balance of Terror—if we kill theirs, they willkill ours. The first glimpse that this broader study gives is that therecould have been “internal” restraints as well. That firstly, militant ethno-nationalists were not as hegemonic as their public self-confidence betrayedand secondly, that there were internal ethical constraints in both commu-nities that disallowed murderous excess. It allowed, at least for a third ofour respondents, evasions of ethno-nationalist duty (killing the other) andacts of kindness to others in mortal danger or flight.

Secondly, the study confirms that there is a need to distinguish betweenpowerful social constructions of collective traumata and actual grief-work—the emotional work that allowed people to get on with their livesafter they experienced intense moments of violence as victims or per-petrators and sometimes as both.12 It has been an unexpected findingthat those who experienced the violence personally, intensely, and dev-astatingly are more open toward reconciliation than those who were ata distance from it. This comes with a proviso: unless you had lost animmediate loved one. Here, the story becomes more complex. This expe-rience proscribes the prospects of reconciliation but does not cancel theprospects of coexistence or forgiveness.

Thirdly, there is a need to balance hard and soft variables: one’s expo-sure in everyday life and one’s lived experience does influence one’sdispositions and behavior. Otherwise social change would be unthink-able. Yet people’s propensities to act or to be disposed toward certainchoices are not free-floating. They are constrained by prior forms ofsocialization embedded in social structures and institutions.13 The studyfound that there are a range of social variables that correlate well withswings in dispositions toward or against reconciliation. Following fromthe above, these are: the hard variables of class, age, gender, religion,and refugeedom/non-refugeedom, and the soft variables of exposure andexperience: involvement in bicommunal NGOs and activities, involve-ment in civic and associational life, strong or weak exposure to the“other side,” forms of consumption of cultural goods and ideas, and mostimportantly—traumatic experiences. Put differently-the more intense the


experience of traumas through the violence was, the more open peo-ple are toward reconciliation. The more distant in experience and age,the more closed to reconciliation. Hence, there is much more space forsocial initiative and “rapprochement” than what the skeptics seem toindicate.

Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that as women in general feel moreinsecure than men, and the youth are less committed to change, a recon-ciliation process will require time. Nevertheless, the study establishes thatthe more exposure across the dividing line, the more open the climatebecomes toward reconciliation. The findings of the study show that thereare areas in both communities that require more attention in order todevelop a positive stance toward reconciliation. Platforms for sustainabledialogue among the groups most reluctant to reconciling: the women, theyouth, and the people who lost loved ones, need to be created.

Notes

1. See for details of the study, Sitas, Latif, Loizou (2008).2. The collective construction of traumas has been covered by Papadakis

(1993).3. Sztompka (1999).4. Research on refugeedom done by Loizos (1981); Agathangelou and Killian

(2002).5. On civil society, the Civicus Report deals with the weaknesses of civil society

on both sides of the divide. CIVICUS (2005).6. The UN in Cyprus: An Inter-communal Survey of Public Opinion by

UNFICYP in February 2007 reveals that only a small percentage of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots have actually come in contact with membersof the other community. In those cases where there has been contact, theresult on the whole has been an increase in the level of trust toward mem-bers of the other community. The survey is available at http://www.unficyp.org/ UNFICYP percent20Survey.htm. Similarly, UNDP-ACT survey on“Level of Trust Between the Two Communities in Cyprus” shows that avast majority of members of both communities do not come into con-tact with the “others.” Among Greek-Cypriots, those who socialize withTurkish-Cypriots belonged to the older age groups, while the younger of theTurkish-Cypriots socialized with the others. Any contact they had with the“other” had a positive impact on their level of trust toward “them” comparedto the majority who did not have any contact. For more information, see“Report on A Quantitative Household Survey on the Level of Trust Betweenthe Two Communities in Cyprus,” prepared for UNDP Action for Cooper-ation and Trust and carried out by RAI Consultants Public Limited, Nicosia(December, 2006), available at http://www.rai.com.


7. Latif and Loizou (2008).8. Meierhenrich (2008).9. All names have been changed to protect the privacy of respondents.

10. Greek for superior virtues.11. Mann (2005), p. 6.12. The victims of violence had been extensively studied by local scholars such

as Volkan (1979); Papadakis (2003); Kaymak (2007).13. Sitas (2008).

C h a p t e r 12

A Political Economyof Division,Development, andCrisis: EnvisioningReunification Beyondthe Cyprus EconomicMiracleNicos Trimikliniotis, EliasIoakimoglou, and PanayiotisPantelides

All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned.Marx and Engels, Communist Manifesto (1848)

Introduction: A Political Economy Perspectivefrom the Current Crisis

This chapter examines three interrelated aspects: First, it offers an eco-nomic overview of the two parts of the country, which are de factostructurally divided, but also connected via some elements of interde-pendence. Secondly, it examines from the point of view of the currenteconomic crisis in the Eurozone the basic features of the post-1974economic development in Cyprus, focusing mostly on the last decade,which illustrates the end of an accumulation regime in what was seen

218 N. T R I M I K L I N I O T I S , E . I O A K I M O G L O U , A N D P. PA N T E L I D E S

as the “Cyprus economic miracle.” The economically stronger Republicof Cyprus (RoC) in the south went from slowdown to crisis, while thesmaller economy of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC),heavily dependent on and recognized only by Turkey in the north, is ina deeper economic and social crisis. Reunification requires that the twoparts of the country, economy, and society be reunited; critical researchagendas ought to reflect the need to reorient economics toward an inte-grated economics of reunification. Finally, this chapter envisions a pathtoward sustainable reunification, realizable in the days of economic cri-sis on new forms of “development.” The current economic crisis makesmainstream approaches to private-led financing and neoliberal-inspireddevelopment increasingly untenable. Learning from the past and enrich-ing knowledge from global experience, we propose innovative formscombining sustainable, democratic, and popularly controlled state-ledand cooperative development.1

Economic Overview: A Divided Economyand Interdependence

Examining the economy and society of the small island of Cyprus, oneis struck by three crucial features: first, the RoC as a “border society”(Panayiotou, 1999) is well integrated in the regional economic system; inthis sense it is also a border economy, operating as a bridge and a hub inthe eastern Mediterranean. It is an open southern European economy tothe West as a European Union (EU) member since 2004, which is con-nected to northeast Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, drawing on thelabor reserves, tourism, and financial services exporting from its neigh-bors. It is listed as one of the high-income island economies, which areoff-shore financial centers with associated tourism (Bertram and Poirine,2007, pp. 358–359).

The second feature is the paradox of the de facto divide, whichgenerates multiple “states of exception” and contradictions in what isdescribed as a “non-border” of the EU2 tearing the country apart. Theso-called “Green Line” as the buffer zone is but a cease-fire line since1974, patrolled by one of the longest UN-stationed peace-keeping forces,United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFCYP), which is in the countrysince 1964. This situation is even today, after the end of the Cold War,considered by all interested actors to be unsustainable and unacceptableand may threaten the stability of the southern flank of North AtlanticTreaty Organization (NATO) and the wider region. The situation issimultaneously perceived as a “deluxe partition,” a typical example of alack of “hearting stalemate,” a comfortable situation in the absence of a

E N V I S I O N I N G R E U N I F I C AT I O N 219

settlement.3 Yet there is a “mini Cold War” in what the UN describedas one of the world’s most militarized zones. In this multiplicity of para-doxes, the study of the growing economic interdependence4 as well as thevarious initiatives from trade unions, teachers, and activists in the BufferZone groups (Trimikliniotis et al, 2012) are worthwhile projects, whichcounter the overall disappointing picture in the cause for reunification.

The third important feature is the centrality of migrant labor,which makes the country comparable to the southern European andMediterranean island economies (see Trimikliniotis, 2001; Thompson,2006 and Mainwaring, 2008). On both sides of the barbed wire, pre-carious migrant labor is a crucial feature in the accumulation regimes andthe developmental models, which is radically affecting economic develop-ment and society at large (Trimikliniotis, 2010c, 2010d; 2011a; Kurtulusand Purkis, 2012). There are similarities in terms of the exploitation pat-terns for instance; however, there are crucial differences in the regulationand market operation of the migratory system, but this is beyond thescope of this chapter.

Asymmetrical and de facto Divided Economies Compared:Measuring the Elements of Interdependence

The two sides are asymmetrical in different ways; also, they do notrecognize each other as legitimate states, even though the RoC is the inter-nationally recognized state and an EU member. The prosperous south hasa population of just over 800,000, whilst the population issue in the notso prosperous north is a hot political issue: estimates vary from 220,000to 230,000 (Faiz, 2008, p. 134); some even put the figures as high as500,0005 depending on their perspective and method of estimation.

The RoC has a gross domestic product (GDP) of US$25 billion andan estimated GDP per capita of US$30.003. The principal export desti-nations are Greece, Germany, and the United Kingdom, while the mainimport sources are Greece, Italy, and Germany. In the immediate after-math of the 1974 disastrous war, there was massive economic growthup to 1990s. Since EU accession in 2004 right up to the beginningof the crisis in 2008, the average growth rate was 3.7 percent per year.Following a period of rapid economic growth from 2002 to 2007, theeconomy has been in recession from 2009 onward. The RoC joined theEurozone on January 01, 2008. After the 2009 recession there was a slowturnaround in 2010, but in 2011 there was negative economic growth asthe RoC is sinking deeper into the crisis of the Eurozone via its connec-tion to Greece. The situation deteriorated with the loss of the country’smain power station after a major explosion of confiscated munitions at


the Florakis naval base on July 11 (see the introductory chapter in thisvolume). Since then, rating agencies have been downgrading the RoCeconomy credit capacity to Baa1 and a reduced growth forecast from1.5 to 0.5 percent in 2011. Matters took a further downturn with theGreek “haircut” which affected the two largest banks, which announcedmajor losses of about 4 billion Euros, a huge amount as it amounts to23 percent of the country’s GDP. Under EU and opposition pressure, theGovernment introduced economic austerity measures and public deficitcuts to avoid an EU bailout; however, as the revenues from tourism andproperty sales are dropping and unemployment is rising, these measuresare further deflating the economy. Unemployment rose to 9.6 percent inJanuary 2012, the highest ever recorded.

The economy in the northern part of the country is much smallerand more narrowly based than the south. Economic growth tends tobe erratic given the relative isolation, a large public sector subsidized byAnkara, reliance on the Turkish Lira, and a small market size. Agricul-ture and services together employ more than half of the workforce. Percapita incomes in the north are, on average, about half of those in thesouth. GDP is estimated to be around US$1.5 billion. The unrecognizedregime in the north is heavily dependent on Turkey (credits, grants, subsi-dies, and trade), Turkish cheap labor and settlers and 35,000 army troops.It has no effective control over monetary policy as the currency is theTurkish Lira, leaving the economy vulnerable to currency shocks fromTurkey and imports Turkish inflation. Very few revenues are gained byexports, mostly with Turkey, and limited trade with the EU6 and othermarkets. During the period of 1977–2008, the average rate of growthwas 4.7 percent and per capita income has reached US$16,158 in 2008against US$1,444 in 1977 (Güryay, 2011). The public sector relies on fis-cal transfers from Turkey, and the rapid growth between 2003 and 2006was sustained by real estate and construction, which subsided since 2007,pushing the economy into recession since then (Oguz, 2008; Güryay,2011). Apart from real estate and construction, the other major sectorsare tertiary education services, tourism, and gambling and related ser-vices. The decline in real estate, which is manifested in a virtual stand-stillof small-scale construction, is thought to be due to legal developmentsregarding Greek-Cypriot properties. In 2008, the economy in the northentered a recession. In 2010, Ankara decided to drastically reduce grantfunding and the authorities imposed stringent austerity measures. Thisplunged the economy into further recession; together with the failureto find a solution to the Cyprus problem and the inflow of popula-tion from Turkey, the economic crisis precipitated social and political


Table 12.1 Basic features of Cyprus economy for 2008

Population 1,071,300 GCCa 74.4 percent TCCb 25.6 percent

Employment 70,300 GCC 80.6 percent TCC 19.4 percent

Activity rate 43.9 percent GCC 47.5 percent TCC 33.2 percent

Unemployment rate 5.2 percent GCC 3.8 percent TCC 10.8 percent

GDP ¤19,913 million GCC 87 percent TCC 13 percent

GDP per capita ¤18,588 GCC 116 percent TCC 52 percent

Productivity ¤42,341 GCC ¤45,341 TCC ¤29,215

Exports ¤1,247 million GCC ¤1,190 million TCC ¤57 million

Current AccountDeficit

−16.6 percent GCC −18 percent TCC –10 percent

Inflation GCC 4.7 percent TCC 14.5 percent

Exchange reserves ¤1,931 million GCC ¤717 million TCC ¤1214

Source: Economic Interdependence in Cyprus, Main findings and recommendations,http://www.undp-act.org/data/articles/interdependence_report_2011.pdf (accessed February 28, 2012).aGCC, Greek-Cypriot community; bTCC, Turkish-Cypriot community.

discontent amongst trade unions and community groups leading to massmobilizations.

A recently published study on interdependence provides the basic fea-tures of the economy in the north (Turkish-Cypriot community, TCC,)and the south (Greek-Cypriot community, GCC) (table 12.1). Thefollowing excerpt from the report is a good summary of the currentsituation:

The population of the TCC forms 26 percent of that of Cyprus, but GDPis only 13 percent. There is a clear disparity between the GCC and TCCeconomies with TCC unemployment accounting for 41 percent of the total,inflation being three times higher, exports less than 5 percent, and the TCCactivity rate only 33 percent. But the TCC exchange reserves are higher thanGCC, because the Eurozone has the effect of the whole currency being anexchange reserve. TCC per capita income was 52 percent of that of the island,but productivity was relatively higher at 69 percent.

Another aspect of the divide is that since 2003, there has been popu-lar interaction between the two communities; this was not possible foralmost 30 years since the war of 1974. The opening of the checkpoints onApril 23, 2003, with the sudden decision of the authorities in the north,


abandoning the long-term opposition to Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot contacts, took everyone by surprise. This move was connectedto the massive and unprecedented Turkish-Cypriot demonstrations thatstarted in 20027 and opened up a radical potential as a result of thecrossings and mobilizations for further crossing of people from the twocommunities (Trimikliniotis, 2003; Demetriou, 2007, 2006). It alsoopened up a trade potential, which was immediately taken up by business.With the accession of a divided RoC in the EU, the Green Line Regula-tion8 came into force to regulate problems deriving from the de factopartition of Cyprus.9 The EU also introduced the Financial Aid Regula-tion (Hatay et al., 2008, pp. 9–14; Güryay, 2011, p. 97; Trimikliniotis,2009). However, together with the positive and radical potential, there arebarriers, obstacles, and backlashes reported, which derive from the fears,reactions, and prejudices reproduced by the fact that the Cyprus problemis still unresolved (Trimikliniotis, 2003; Hatay et al., 2008; Trimikliniotis,2009). This peculiar non-border or soft border of Cyprus/EU has inher-ent complications resulting from the operation of policies, which aim tocombat illegal immigration of third country nationals from the north, todetect and prevent any threat to public security and public policy, andsimultaneously encourage intercommunal trade.10 Nevertheless, tradebetween the two sides continues to grow over time. The table below showsdevelopment between two communities from 2003 to 2009 (table 12.2).

Since the opening of crossing points and the implementation of theGreen Line Regulation in 2004, the crossing of foreign tourists, Greek-Cypriots to north, and Turkish-Cypriot to the south, the few hundredsof Turkish-Cypriot working in the RoC-controlled area have gener-ated trade (see Güryay, 2011, pp. 98–99; Economic InterdependenceReport, 2011):

• The economy in the north had gained ¤20.6 millionin 2003 butthis amount reached ¤118 million in 2009.

• There is an increase in Turkish-Cypriots working in the south; theaverage number registered in the RoC social insurance scheme was2500 workers in 2009 and their estimated income was¤41.3 millionin 2009 compared to ¤13.2 million in 2003.

• There are 4,175 Turkish-Cypriots who maintain their social securityrights in the RoC and receive pensions of about ¤19.6 million.

• Green Line trade from north to south Cyprus began in August 2004,and grew every year, reaching¤7.1 million in 2008 but has decreasedto¤6.0 million in 2009 because of recession in both sides. However,in 2009, trade of Turkish-Cypriots fell sharply by almost 12 percent.


Table 12.2 Economic interdependence between Greek-Cypriots (GC) and Turkish-Cypriots (TC) after 2003 and according to the Green Line regulation (million ¤)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Benefit toTurkishCypriots

MovementGreek Cypriots 18.9 31.2 47.9 36.3 28.5 37.1 39.4Tourists na 36.4 44.8 36.0 32.5 43.1 45.6Others 0.7 1.9 na na 19.0 27.6 31.6Car Insurance 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.1 1.5 1.2 1.4Sub-Total 20.6 70.9 94.1 73.4 81.5 109.0 118.0Labor Income 13.2 31.1 39.7 39.7 42.9 45.4 41.3Green Line Trade na 0.5 1.3 3.2 4.2 7.2 6.0TC Pensions 16.1 16.5 17.2 17.6 18.1 18.8 19.6Public Health 2.5 5.1 4.3 4.0 4.8 4.4 7.0Sub-Total 31.8 53.2 62.5 64.5 70.0 75.8 73.9

TOTAL 52.4 124.1 156.6 137.9 151.5 184.8 191.9

Benefit to GreekCypriots

MovementTurkish Cypriots 17.3 36.5 47.1 56.5 97.7 120.6 102.4Car Insurance 0.5 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.8 2.1Sub Total 17.9 37.8 48.5 58.0 99.3 122.4 104.5Green Line Trade 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 0.7 2.4 3.7Private

Educationna 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.3 2.4 3.7

Sub Total 0.0 0.8 1.1 2.1 2.0 4.8 7.4

TOTAL 17.9 38.6 49.6 60.1 101.3 126.2 109.0TC + GC 70.3 162.7 206.2 198.0 252.8 311.0 300.9

Source: Economic Interdependence in Cyprus project supported by UNDP-ACT and USAID.http://www.undp-act.org/data/articles/interdependence report 2011.pdf (accessed May 28, 2012).

• The total financial flows from south to north has increased from¤52.4 million in 2003 to ¤191.9 million in 2009, and growth rateof financial flows during that period was 266.2 percent.

• A financial flow from north to south Cyprus consisted of mainlyTurkish-Cypriot customers spending, who spent ¤17.3 million in2003 and reached ¤102.4 million in 2009.The rate of increase inspending during the period of 2003–2008 was 492 percent.

• Total volume of flows between the two sectors increased from¤70.3 million in 2003 to ¤300.9 million in 2009. The rate ofincrease in total flows during that period was 328 percent.


On first impression the overall volume of trade appears rather small: forthe RoC economy the above figures represent less that 1 percent, andless than 5 percent of the Turkish-Cypriot economy. However, the overallexpenditure effect is far greater. If we add the health provisions offeredand the social aspects of interdependence, the effect is even larger: forthe Turkish-Cypriots dependence is much greater making the economyof RoC second only to Turkey and the United Kingdom; for the RoCwe are referring to services to Cypriot citizens residing in the northernpart of the country, what the RoC considers to be occupied territo-ries under the control of the TRNC.11 To understand this process onemust go beyond strict economic or economistic approaches: the inter-action between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriot across the barbedwire is best perceived in terms of a socioeconomic and ultimately polit-ical multiplier, which has the potential to enhance the economics ofinterdependence, peace, and reconciliation and can be a drive towardssettlement.

In 2003 it was thought that there was no tendency for the two Cyprioteconomies to converge on a common steady-state growth; it was estimatedthat it would take 30 years for the north to cover half of the economic gapwith the southern economy (Demetriades, et al., 2003). However, Ayres(2003) found that the macroeconomic impact on growth and employ-ment is potentially positive and particularly for the economy of the north.Also, between 2003 and 2006 the economy in the north converged from30 to 52 percent with that of the south (Oguz, 2008). This gap has beenstagnant ever since.

Life after the “Economic Miracle”

The post-1974 development in areas under control of the RoC has beendepicted as an “economic miracle” (Christodoulou, 1992); and indeedthe growth rate in the post-1974 years, particularly in the early yearsafter the war up to the late 1980s, were remarkable. The exhaustionof the model marks the end of a strategy of accumulation as the RoCis nearing the limits of “development” and convergence with the coun-tries in the Eurozone. To grasp the situation, one needs to historicizethe Cypriot economic development so as to draw out the key issuesthat we consider as crucial as pointers for future economic developmentin the light of a solution. The development of Cyprus can be peri-odized according to the qualitative and quantitative characteristics, butthat is beyond the scope of this chapter (Trimikliniotis, 2001; Kattos,1999).12


The 1974 war left the society and economy divided and devastated.It was “a planners nightmare” (Matsis, 2011) as economic activity col-lapsed by one-third, partly because of the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriotsand 47 percent reduction in gainful employment—from 253,000 in 1973to 135,000 in 1975. Massive unemployment in 1974 was measured at29.6 percent of the economically active population, as well as loss of pro-ductive resources in all sectors, particularly heavy in tourism, agriculture,mining, and transport in what was then a closely integrated economy.The displacement of 160,000 Greek-Cypriots meant heavy dependenceof people on the state to provide means of subsistence. In contrast withthe conservative fiscal policies pursued from 1960 to 1973 characterizedby fiscal surpluses and very low government debt, the post-1974 policiesemphasized a radical change in fiscal policy, which became Keynesian,expansionary with very high deficits financed from foreign borrowing.The government pursued expansionary economic policies, implementedlarge housing programs, provided incentives to the unemployed, andexpanded educational and health policies.

The dramatic economic growth in the 1980s and 1990s, referred to as“the economic miracle,” was structured by a number of “external” factorssuch as the Turkish occupation of the north since 1974 (Christodoulou,1992). This fact, together with a concerted effort by the Government,political parties, and trade unions, created the conditions for the eco-nomic growth that was subsequently experienced in Cyprus, based on themassive expansion of the model known as “mass tourism” (Anthias andAyres, 1983; Christodoulou, 1992; Panayiotopoulos, 1995, 1996). TheGreek-Cypriot “economic ethos” (Mavratsas, 1992), in Weberian termspropelled accumulation, growth, and commerce, but was much premisedon the fact that land-ownership, commerce, and trade were dominated byGreek-Cypriots.

Despite the socioeconomic transformations, up to 1974 thepostcolonial social class structure retained essentially the same pyramid ofwealth and income: the Church continued to be the largest land-ownerand expanded its commercial activities, whilst at the same time there wasa growth in the Greek-Cypriot commercial classes. An abrupt changeoccurred in 1974: the Turkish military invasion and occupation of thenorth and the mass expulsion of Greek-Cypriots in 1974, by default cre-ated the preconditions for rapid (capitalistic) “modernization,” in whatHarvey (2003) refers to as conditions for “accumulation by disposses-sion.” In spite of the severe drop in the GDP during 1973–1975 andthe sharp rise in unemployment and mass poverty, cheap labor was pro-vided by the Greek-Cypriot displaced persons, forcibly expelled and livingin government refugee camps. The conditions of the rapid development


were reminiscent of the early industrialization of western Europe. Thisfact together with a concerted effort by the government, political parties,and trade unions created the conditions for the development that wassubsequently experienced in Cyprus.

The process of “tertiarization” continued undeterred during the 1980’sand 1990’s, shaping a Cyprus as a “paradise-like destination”. De-industrialization is setting in as the industrial output to GDP has droppedfrom 18 percent in the early 1980s to less than 11 percent in the late1990s. The signs of a slowdown began to show as the overdependence onfinancial and service sectors made them more susceptible to fluctuations.Panayiotopoulos (1995, 1996) refers to a postcolonial “developmen-tal state,” which took the lead in development and encouraged privateinvestment. It is questionable whether there was ever a rational devel-opmental state in Cyprus as such (see Trimikliniotis, 2001). Economicgrowth continues after 2000 but certainly not at the same level—infact we have argued elsewhere that perhaps we are approaching the lim-its of growth hitting on a technological frontier as the limitations ofthe “mass tourism model” are becoming more apparent (Ioakimoglou,et al., 2011). The dependence on tourism has receded from 22 percentin 1990 to less than 10 percent in 2012. Nevertheless, the process of ter-tiarization continues unabated as the service industry is dominating theeconomy.

Crucial social transformations in a country are recorded in the formof “urban adaptation” and urbanization, as analyzed by Attalides (1981).We have a more complex situation, where there are two crucial elements,dialectically united: (a) we have a new social spatiality, where the presenceof migrants has created a more international and multicultural Cypriotpublic sphere and (b) an impoverished ghetto-like area, which is nota ghetto as such. It is just poorer: we can say without hesitation thatin the millennium “urbanization is creating a ‘marginal class’ of recentmigrants”. Moreover, trends recorded as crucial transformations in thestratification in early 1980s are vastly accelerated and new phenomena aregenerated in the post-millennium Cypriot society toward the 2020s andbeyond. This new “urbanization” and the model of development are cer-tainly shaping a new system of stratification in Cyprus, with a new lowerurban class, as well as a ruralization of the poors, i.e. a sustaining of ruralindustries/agricultural unites and areas precisely due to the poor livingconditions of migrant workers in the areas abandoned by Cypriots, whohave migrated to the cities. We have the new urban poor as we have therural poor. Secondly, we have a long-term racialization process, as migrantsincreasingly form the urban and rural poor. The majority of the workingclass of manual labor is made up primarily of foreign migrant labor.


Moreover, the processes of tertiarization, the transformation of familyand employment together with globalization, have transformed the innerpart of the Cypriot home and the elements of what statistics refers to asthe “basic economic unit”, i.e. the “household.” This type of economicactivity is characterized by feminization and gender division of labor: infact in Cyprus there are more women migrants than men. We have pro-cesses that have created the conditions for the “globalization of care” asPanayiotopoulos (2005) notes:

“a significant number of households responded to the growing demand forcare for the elderly by becoming petty employers of immigrant women. Thematerial above provides some illustration of how the labour regime and the day-today lives of immigrant women are shaped by the nature of the care regime.”

The Cyprus case is a prime example of the commoditization of domes-tic labor via the use and abuse of female migrant labor. Panayiotopoulos(2005) puts it in this way:

Female migration from the Philippines to Cyprus and worldwide can be seenas a practical illustration of globalisation in the personal-service sector. In the-oretical terms, the transfer of reproductive labour can be understood as a formof servitude. It is, however, very different to the servitude associated with theemployment of young girls from the countryside by wealthy urban households:the labour regime in modern servitude is characterized by the commoditisa-tion of reproductive labour itself, and the existence, in most cases, of writtencontracts involving the payment of pre-agreed wages.

We can therefore speak of a demographically different working classthan in the 1980s, which is segmented and differentiated according tosector, industry, position in the labor process, unionization, workingconditions/pay, and is socially located according to nationality, ethnicbackground, migration status, sex/gender, disability, and age, which hascreated a major challenge for the social agents of change. There is a genericworking class as a structurally positioned wage labor in a Marxian sense,but we cannot speak of a unitary working class (Wastergaard and Restler,1976). We can speak of a segmented labor class (Castles and Kossack,1973) or a racialized class fraction (Miles, 1982). It is, however, highlyquestionable whether we describe the situation in Cyprus in terms of the“underclass thesis” (see Rex and Tomlinson, 1979). Race, racism, and eth-nicity in the “the age of migration” (Castles and Miller, 2003) forces us tothink of the Cypriot context in terms of the “racialized boundaries” gen-erated (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992): the ambiguous identities in thecontradictory relations between “race”, “ethnicity,” and “class” and gender(Balibar, Wallerstein, 1992; Miles, 1989).


In any case, a serious rethinking is required to appreciate the economicand social context of migrant workers in Cyprus. Migrant workers areperceived to be so apart from social integration, they are seen as tem-porary and “transient” and are “otherized” as being “so different fromus”. However, today’s insecure world characterized by flexibilization andderegulation is transforming employment and is increasingly affectingthe Cypriot labor market. Homeworking results in spatial destandard-ization of work; increasing numbers of temporal work creates temporaldestandardization and informalization of employment in the directionof “total destandardization” (Edgell, 2006). The rising unemployment isforcing Cypriots to confront the “brave new world after all” as increasingnumbers of younger Cypriots are facing dilemmas of lack of job securityand “flexiwork” (Ioannou, 2012).

Migration and the Cheap Labor Model: Growthand Accumulation in Cyprus

Migrant Labor in the RoC: Extending the Economic Miracleby Super-exploitation?

A crucial factor that extended the life-line of the accumulation regimewas the change of immigration policy in 1990, which opened up theisland’s doors to migrants, which was mainly the result of this rapideconomic development emanating largely as a result of the world-widegrowth in tourism that increased the demand for labor in Cyprus. Theimmigrant population has become an important component of the laborforce. In October 2010, out of 376,300 employed persons, 114,425 wereEU or third-country nationals, comprising 30.4 percent of those gain-fully employed. The sending countries are non-EU countries (Sri Lanka,Russia, Philippines etc.) and some of the EU countries (Greece, theUnited Kingdom, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania etc.). As of October 2010third-country nationals (TCNs) largely work in private household ser-vice (domestic workers, carers etc.) and other services. This has remainedunchanged when compared to previous years, with the exception of thedecline in TCN employed in construction, restaurants, and the hotel sec-tor. These sectors were among the hardest hit during the economic crisisof 2009, and although further research is needed, the decline of TCNs inconstruction is comparable to the decline of employment in that sector ofCypriots (Greek and Turkish) and of Europeans.13 The tables below showthe migration movement of the last decade as well as the actual num-bers of non-Cypriots working in Cyprus from 2005 to 2010 (table 12.3and 12.4).


Table 12.3 Migration movements, 2000–2010, in the RoC

Year Total immigrants Total emigrants Net migration Net migrationrate (percent)

2000 12, 764 8, 804 +3960 +5, 72001 17, 485 12, 835 +4650 +6, 62002 14, 370 7, 485 +6885 +9, 72003 16, 779 4, 437 +12342 +17, 12004 22, 003 6, 279 +15724 +21, 32005 24, 419 10, 003 +14416 +19, 02006 15, 545 6, 874 +8671 +11, 22007 19, 142 11, 752 +7390 +9, 42008 14, 095 10, 500 +3595 +4, 52009 11, 675 9, 829 +1, 846 +2.3

Table 12.4 Employed non-Cypriots in the RoC

Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

EU citizens 23,558 16,838 30,482 42,630 48, 793 53, 875Third country 46,225 45,868 49,560 53,693 58, 243 60, 550

Total 58,784 60,917 81,042 96,436 107,036 114,425

Numerous studies illustrate the contribution of migrant workers to theeconomy. It must be pointed out, however, that these studies took placein the background of strong economic growth, where the labor demandwas reaching the limits imposed by the domestic population. The studiesshow the following.

First, it is estimated that the contribution of migrant workers tothe growth rate of total gross value added in 2004 compared to 1995was 54.2 percent, which is the highest contribution among all factorsof production. Second, a number of studies (Pashardes, et. al., 2001;Michael, et. al., 2005; Michael, et. al., 2006) suggest that there is norelation between the presence of third-country migrant workers andunemployment, but that there is some substitution (that is, displacementof Cypriots by migrant workers) in the primary sector, not toward unem-ployment but toward the secondary and tertiary sector and a much greaterjob creation process in the tertiary sector. Third, migrant workers havebeen beneficial in increasing the number of Cypriot women in the labormarket (Michael et. al., 2008). In particular, the domestic workers havefacilitated the increase in women’s participation in the workforce, par-ticularly educated women.14 Women who have domestic assistance are20,5 percent more likely to participate in the labor market than those


who do not. Studies and reports on migrant workers point to structuralissues generating ethnic and racial discrimination in the employment ofmigrant workers.15

Overall, the working conditions in farming and agriculture, wherethe workforce is almost entirely made up of migrant workers and asy-lum seekers, are extremely poor: wages are well below the minimumfixed by collective sectors of the economy. Matters are changing as EUcitizens form a vast majority of migrant workers today: they are notunionized and employers do not require to obtain permits. In March 2012there were 110,375 EU citizens registered with the RoC, out of whom33,949 are from Greece, 23,803 from Romania, 21,872 from Bulgaria,and 16,950 from the United Kingdom.16 A smaller number are payingsocial insurance.

Migrant workers in the hotelier industry and construction are used ascheap labor to undermine unions and the regime of a collective agree-ment, in order to replace domestic workers by nonunionized EU citizens,who instead had personal contracts under inferior working conditions andpay.17 The practice of signing personal contracts with unfavorable termsfrom those contained in collective agreements leads the deregulation oflabor relations and the gradual abolition of collective agreements, the fail-ure to implement the laws and regulations and the creation of workers oftwo or three speeds in the hotel industry (Ioannou, 2012).

Demographic Engineering and Super-exploitationin northern Cyprus

The migration issue in the northern part of the country is closelyconnected to the discourses on the contentious population issue inTurkish-Cypriot politics18 and the relations between Greek-Cypriots andTurkish-Cypriots. It has to be located within the context of the struc-tural factors overdetermined by Turkey’s demographic engineering policyas well as super-exploitation of irregular and precarious workers in a veryloosely regulated capitalistic system of unrecognized TRNC. There werethree waves of post-1974 migration to the north, which reflected thepolitical and socioeconomic reality in the northern part of Cyprus andTurkey (see Hatay, 2008; 2007; Kurtulus and Purkis, 2012). This is oftendescribed as a colonial population policy on the part of Turkey. The firstone was in the immediate post-invasion period of 1974–1979, approach-ing 15,000 persons per year moving from Turkey to the area north of thebarbed wire; this sharply receded to about 1000 per year in 1980–1984.The second wave started in the mid-1980s to late 1980s and peaked in1995–1999 with 10,000 persons per year. There was a sharp fall during


2000–2002 to about 3,000 persons per year, reflecting the state of theeconomic situation. It then began to rise again, in that is described as thethird wave, reaching a peak of 20,000 per year in 2006.

The third migration wave from Turkey to northern Cyprus startedin the 1990s and 2000s and is connected to the neo-liberal policies inmainland Turkey and in the TRNC. The rise in unemployment made upof property-less ex-small farmer communities, together with the ongo-ing conflict in Turkey’s southeastern and eastern regions led to forcedmigration from the eastern and the southeastern regions of Anatolia tonearby cities such as Adana, Antalya, and Mersin. Meanwhile the regimein northern Cyprus as a peculiar extension of Turkish territory providedopportunities to work in the growing construction sector, which was themost important leading sector for capital accumulation. Research froma field-survey project in the walled city of Nicosia19 illustrates that theprocesses of informalization and precariatization of labor was the basis forintense capital accumulation in the third wave of migrants from Turkeysince 2000.

From Slowdown to Crisis: The RoC GDPand the Current Account Deficit20

For 20 years, from 1990 to 2009, the rate of GDP growth in the RoC wasexceeding the corresponding growth in the 15 most advanced economiesof the European Union. When Cyprus began to suffer the consequencesof the economic crisis, the economy slowed down and GDP growth(Figure 12.1) during 2010–2011 was lower than the EU-15 average. As aresult, unemployment reached historical highs (9.6 percent in January2012, 7.2 percent in 2011 compared to 3.7 percent in 2008; Figure 12.2).

The current crisis revealed in a dramatic way that the economy in theRoC was already running out of steam in 2008. What was evident beforethe crisis as a source of economic slowdown turns out to be now a severecause of threatening imbalances.

The deficit in the current account (Figure 12.3) rose in 2008 to ahistorical high of approximately 12 percent of GDP, it remained above9 percent until 2010, and decreased during 2011–2012 as domesticdemand is falling and imports decreasing. Weaknesses are also reflectedin export performance, the trade balance of goods and services, in theeconomy’s dependence on tourism, in the existence of a productivity gapagainst competing countries, as well as in other indicators of competitive-ness. Furthermore, during the crisis years of 2009 to 2011, export marketsdid not expand at all.

232

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% A

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Figure 12.1 GDP growth, 1996–2012

Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission

Year

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)

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Figure 12.2 Unemployment rate (percentage), 1995–2011

Source: Annual Macroeconomic Database, European Commission.


Year

% o

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–0.14

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Figure 12.3 Current account deficit as percentage of GDP


Tourism and Competitiveness

Tourism is the main source of foreign exchange, thereby directly or indi-rectly affecting the economy as a whole. Nevertheless, this sector is atthe same time extremely sensitive and easily influenced by external fac-tors, among which the most permanent is the rate of economic growthin the EU-15 area. The heavy reliance on tourism industry renders theRoC economy vulnerable to international fluctuations; GDP changesin the EU-15 affect strongly the rate of change in the number of vis-itors. A decline in the economic growth rate of the EU-15 below thecritical threshold of 2 percent was expected, before the crisis, to lead to areduction in the number of visitors to Cyprus. During the crisis, a risein visitors from Russia and other non-EU countries tends to mitigatethe negative effects of the decline in the west European demand. Dur-ing the first decade of 2000, the Cypriot tourism industry respondedto international competitive pressure, lowering labor costs and intensi-fying its efforts to offer mass tourism services. This reaction proved tobe wrong since international demand was shifting toward higher qualityand differentiated products. Structural changes were necessary to improvethe non-price competitiveness of the Cypriot tourism industry in orderto restore the balance in the current account. Non-price competitive-ness is based on quality, innovation, product diversification, favorable


geographical orientation of sales etc. As a result of the wrong strategyaiming at lower unit labor costs, the number of visitors did not increaseduring 2000–2009 and declined in 2010–2011.

Financialization: From an Export-Drivento a Consumption-Driven Economy

Until 2001, the tourism industry was the engine of growth of theRoC economy. The number of visitors did not increase remainingapproximately stable during the decade of 2000. After a recession during2002–2003, a shift from export-led growth to consumption-led growthtook place. During the five years of 2004–2008, the economy was boostedby the rise in private consumption and fixed capital investment, mostly inconstruction (housing and public works). Both consumption and residen-tial construction were fuelled by easy and low-cost borrowing followingbanking liberalization and preparations for the adoption of the Euro(January 01, 2008). The change of paradigm from an export-driven toa consumption-driven economy was the result of financialization andlow-interest borrowing from the international markets as Cyprus gainedconfidence in view of its participation in the Eurozone.

Domestic demand–led growth resulted in large increases in imports,while tourism receipts were lagging behind. Since 2004 the currentaccount deficit grows dramatically and ends up at the high level of approx-imately 12 percent in 2008. These developments are strong signs of thereduction in competitiveness that require restoration to maintain the levelof income at its actual level. The RoC economy has to move to a positionnot only where inflation will be stable: serious action is required to reducethe creeping unemployment while at the same time ensure a balanced (orsustainable) external trade of goods and services.

The present circumstances make it an urgent task for the RoC topromptly and effectively deal with the adverse effects of the economiccrisis on tourism, which are being diffused throughout the economy.In the forthcoming years, the number of visitors will probably continue todecrease, since in the following years the Cypriot tourism industry is goingto find itself faced with the cumulative negative effects, on the one hand,of a decline in international demand for tourism services as a result of thecrisis, and on the other, of the structural defficiencies of the industry. Forthis reason, a priority must be put on significantly improving competitive-ness in the tourism industry. In this frame, the economy must move awayfrom the mass tourism model based on low quality, precarious labor, andenvironmental damage, toward a higher-quality and ecofriendly tourism


in what we refer to as the high road to competitiveness (see Ioakimoglou,et al., 2011).

Debt and Exposure to Risks of the Banking System

Private consumption was the growth engine of the Cypriot economy dur-ing the recovery in 2004–2008, although the average real wage did notincrease (Figure 12.4). The apparent contradiction was resolved throughan increase of lending to workers’ households. Consumer spending andresidential investment were fuelled by loans given to workers althoughtheir purchasing power for their wages remained constant. Therefore, atthe end of this period (2008), profitability was high after five years of con-stant wages and income redistribution, workers’ households were highlyindebted, private consumption was approximately 20 percent higher thanin 2004, residential investment and banking profitability were at histor-ical highs, and the current account deficit was unsustainable. Recoveryand boom of 2004–2008, exploding profits and financial euphoria, wereachieved at the cost of a historically high current account deficit and ahigh debt burden of households. These are the reasons that the RoC

% o

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Private consumption Annual real wage

Figure 12.4 Real wage and private consumption



economy is now in a process of adjustment with falling real wages anddomestic demand, slow growth and exploding unemployment, decreas-ing imports and a large current account deficit. A large part of profitsof 2004–2008 were invested in the financial sector where rates of returnon capital were increased. During the following years, that is, the cri-sis years, private banks invested heavily in Greek bonds due to wrongexpectations and following bad advice from the Cypriot Central Bank.21

As a result, the RoC banks are now exposed to high risks and havebeen downgraded by international markets. Currently, the most seriousthreat to economic growth derives from the two large bank’s exposureto the Greek crisis: the only way out is public ownership and control ofthese banks.

The public debt of the RoC was relatively low (65 percent) com-pared to the Euro area average (88 percent) or the corresponding debt ofGermany (82 percent), France (85 percent), or Italy (120 percent) at thebeginning of the crisis. However, the public debt ratio in Cyprus is set torise as the government seeks international lending either from third coun-tries or from the EU financial stabilization mechanism in order to financethe banking system’s recapitalization requirements and the budget deficitand debt refinancing needs. The banking crisis in Cyprus mostly relatedto the Cyprus banks’ exposure to Greek public bonds and to expectedbad debts of the subsidiaries of Cyprus banks operating in Greece is setto modify dramatically both the public debt level of the Cyprus economyand the future prospects for economic development.

The High Road to Competitiveness

The RoC economy is characterized by reduced non-price competitive-ness. In other words, the unemployment rate at which constant inflationand balanced external trade of goods and services can be achieved is rel-atively high. Given low non-price competitiveness, an improvement inthe external balance of goods and services through internal devaluationwould lead to a painful and long recession. Econometric estimates showthat to achieve an improvement in price competitiveness of 15 percent, afall by approximately 25 percent in GDP would be needed. The internaldevaluation process has begun with the various deregulation policies aswell as the public expenditure cuts imposed. Deflationary public expen-diture measures threaten to spiral the economy into further recession andeconomic disaster, following the same path with Greece.

A policy toward the improvement of structural competitiveness (non-price competitiveness) in the RoC and the development of new export


Table 12.5 Determinants of structural competitiveness

International trade Export industrial specialization, geographic orientation ofexports and imports, product quality, adjustment to globaldemand, product differentiation.

Product markets and labormarkets

Enterprises’ power in product markets, price elasticity ofdemand, oligopolies, autonomous claims of enterprises andemployees on net product, labor market institutions.

Productive capacity Restructuring of production, new forms of workorganization, industrial specialization.

[Source: Cyprus Labour Institute, INEK-PEO (2011), Cyprus Competitiveness under EMU, Nicosia(authored by Elias Ioakimoglou)].

oriented economic sectors is urgently needed in order to shield the econ-omy from the painful consequences of a possible internal devaluation.The question is how the economy can improve its structural competi-tiveness. From a macroeconomic approach of competitiveness, structuralcompetitiveness can be defined in terms of the unemployment rate thatcan be achieved under conditions of stable inflation and balanced orsustainable external balance of goods and services. In this context, pleasesee Table 12.5 shows the determinants of structural competitiveness.

A number of historical, social, technological, and political factors con-tribute to the structural competitiveness of a country (or a region), suchas the level of technology used, the size of production units, the currentlevel of labor force, the rate of replacing and upgrading the mechanicalequipment, the replacement rate of work operations by mechanical sys-tems, the type of products in which there is a competitive advantage,the country’s historical relations with the international and domesticeconomy, which explain the existence or absence of important commer-cial transactions with specific markets, geographic regions with whichexchanges of goods take place, traditional social relations within the work-place and their impact on the formation of effective collective forms oflabor organization, the framework within which employment relationsare configured, as well as product quality and reputation. The increasinginternationalization of production and the globalization of financial andcapital markets create new competition terms and conditions, and giveprominence to new sources of structural competitiveness. New circum-stances emerge regarding the mobility of the production factors: some ofthem gain maximum mobility, while certain others remain rigid, eitherwithin national borders or within regions. Telecommunication networksmake it easy to access information from any place of the developed world,


and to use services related to product marketing and trading, accounting,as well as a number of other business services.

There is a low road to competitiveness that is internal devaluation, awell-known economic policy aimed at reducing prices through painfulrecession, high unemployment, increasing inequalities and social despair,reduction of wages, pensions and unit labor costs, and there is a high roadto competitiveness, which is the restructuring of the productive system inorder to produce new and higher-quality products, to adapt domestic sup-ply to changing international demand, to meet new tastes of consumersin export markets etc.

Whether Cyprus will take the high or the low road to competitivenessdepends on the balance of power between social and political forces.

Sketching Out a Different Path of Development

The impact of the global economic crisis, particularly the large bankexposure to Greece, is the primary cause of the serious economic dif-ficulties that Cyprus has to face. However, there are also underlying,structural long-term factors that have given rise to an unsustainable modelof economic development. The unsustainability of the model of economicdevelopment applies to the economies on both sides of the dividing line,although each side has its own peculiarities. The structural limitationsof the model of economic development, which has been followed up tothe present, have been noted repeatedly by various studies, although theseissues have not been discussed adequately, if at all, at an internal politicallevel. Briefly, we note some of the structural deficiencies of the model ofeconomic development below.

• Excessive dependence on tourist development.• Adverse environmental consequences of mass tourist development.• A gradual process of de-industrialization (low contribution of the

manufacturing sector to GDP).• Deficiencies regarding expenditure on research, productivity growth,

and the ability to adopt and develop new technologies.• High balance of trade and current account deficits.• Undemocratic, socially and environmentally unsustainable develop-

mentalism.• A large informal economy sector.• Uncollected taxes and tax evasions.

We propose that we shift the debate forward in what we consider to be thedirection for a sustainable economic model, that is, a model that properlyincorporates the social and environmental/ecological issues as the central


aspects of the economy. However, it is essential to consider the parame-ters of a sustainable model of economic development in Cyprus in thecontext of a potential settlement of the Cyprus problem and the re-unification of the island. Any settlement to the Cyprus problem needs toaddress the broader issues of reconstruction and development, includingproperty-related aspects, which include the real estate market and financ-ing, and the compensation and resettlement costs for displaced persons.The estimate ranges of the cost of re-unification vary: for instance, com-pensation costs range from ¤8 billion to ¤19 billion, rehousing costscould range from ¤1 billion to ¤2.5 billion; even the minimum esti-mates of ¤9 billion amounts to 45 percent of Cypriot GDP.22 There is abig gap between expectations and payouts. However, the issue of the “costof solution” must be approached differently—totally differently—and hasto be considered as investment for reconstruction and development. TheMarshall aid program was a massive injection in investment; the so-called cost of solution is in reality investment for a new re-united Cyprus.In fact, in the context of an agreed settlement, particularly in the currenteconomic slowdown, which is deep, structural and massive investmentin the northern part of Cyprus in sustainable and properly managedprojects offers a huge potential for economic development and a distinctpossibility for a way out of the crisis.

There is an additional issue relating to the so-called cost of solutionwhich has to be considered: what is the cost of separation/partition—anissue addressed by Ayres (2003). We ought to widen the scope of thisissue to consider the psychosocial and political as well as economic cost ofthe insecurity and the uncertainty of status quo. Estimating the socioeco-nomic value of peace, stability, and security is something to be developedin the research agenda of a critical political economy. The research agendamust attempt to address a number of key questions: What public andsocial space is unleashed with a solution? How do we shift resources fromnegative features relating to managing the conflict and de facto partition(army, diplomacy, empty space, land mines, check points etc.) towardconstructive forces (health, education, unsustainable development fundetc.). What social, political, symbolic, and other material interests willbe affected by a possible settlement? What synergies can be created by asolution? What is the strategy for sustainability in the Cyprus context?

Alternatives: Sketching Out a Different Path of Development

We now raise certain questions that may allow us to shift the debate for-ward in what we consider to be the basis of a sustainable economic model.The question of development and sustainability from a comparative


political economy perspective, although it ought to draw on ideas andexperiences from different countries and social, economic and politicalcontexts, nevertheless it must be properly grounded in the specificities ofthe socioeconomic and historical context of Cyprus. Unless such a sociallyand historically contextualized approach is taken, one runs the risk ofintroducing ideas, innovative and inspiring as they have developed andsuccessfully applied in other contexts, but may result in complete failurewhen “planted” in Cyprus. The vision must be based on the current andhistorical realities and socioeconomic trends by trying to critically engagewith the successes and failures of different fields, sectors, and the whole ofthe economy. A close look at the post-1974 development in the economyunder the control of the RoC, after the end of the immediate crisis man-agement, provides us with some clues. The global economic crisis has putan abrupt end to almost uninterrupted economic growth in Cyprus andthis is primarily an exogenous factor, rather than something internal tothe Cypriot economy. However, we have located a longer-term structuralprocess, which is associated with the long-term slowdown of economicgrowth, and which we can describe as the exhaustion of the current modelof economic growth or an end to an accumulation regime.

We outline below some pointers regarding the sustainability of aprospective model of economic development in Cyprus in terms of:(a) the concept of “real convergence”; (b) factors leading to increasingtrade, cooperation, and exchange between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots; and (c) introducing critical sustainability as a dual conceptthat encompasses the environmental as well as the social aspects ofdevelopment.

Development and Sustainabilityin the Light of a Possible Solution

Thinking about the model of development of a reunited federal republicin concrete terms is a difficult task given that we do not have the preciseparameters regarding the political, institutional and economic,23 provi-sions of the framework agreement of a re-united Cyprus. The currentsituation, the de facto partition with limited exchange, is obviously notthe desired way to move into the future. The north appears to be moreor less following the same path of environmentally destructive and badlyplanned development at all costs and in a similar fashion to what RoCdid for a long duration after 1974. In fact what can be said about thesouth is that there have always been certain sectors of economy whosemotto was not technical or technological innovation or product inno-vation but use of cheap, unskilled labor. These economic sectors have


flourished since the change of policy in 1990 allowing temporary migrantworkers to enter the country. Today they are over 20 percent of the totalworking population.24

The observation about this kind of “development” must begin by chal-lenging the corporate interests and engaging is a serious rethinking of themeanings of “sustainability” and “corporate social responsibility,” draw-ing on the heterodox and radical traditions of economics,. Also we haveto consider in a critical perspective and professional interests and activ-ities associated with civil engineering, architecture, and planning, whichhad a very significant influence on the nature of social and environmentaldevelopment in Cyprus. There is immense scope of collaborative alterna-tive projects by environmentalists, activists, local resident action groups,and trade unionists in the context of an alternative model of sustainabledevelopment in Cyprus. Moreover, If we take seriously the contentionthat the key driver of the “Cyprus economic miracle” has been the laborforce (Christodoulou, 1992), then we must address this in our visionfor an alternative development. This is not confined to the “Cypriot”labor force, but it certainly includes migrant workers. In the days of eco-nomic crisis, this requires moving in the opposite direction of the waythe neoliberal austerity measures are driving: we need new employmentstrategies as well as democratizing work and enhancing cooperatives andco-ownership.

Parameters for a Sustainable Model of EconomicDevelopment

We need a research agenda that adopts a critical approach to sustainabledevelopment as we must take seriously the ecological crisis at a global level(Strange, 2000; Spence, 2000). At the same time we critique concepts cur-rently in vogue, which have been essentially appropriated by mainstreamor hegemonic discourses, which gloss over or obscure the “social ques-tion,” underlying the notion of sustainability that is determined by class,gender, migrant related, and antiracism struggles and contestations.25

In our perspective, the question of development and sustainability is inte-grally connected to the perspective of envisioning a reunited Cyprus,based on full equality of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots in abizonal, bicommunal federation, whilst it is simultaneously integratedin a politics of class struggles toward socialism. A serious rethinkingof the model of economic development on both sides of the dividingline is urgently required. In the context of negotiations for a politi-cal settlement, the debate on any institutional framework of sustainable


development within the parameters of a solution is totally marginalized;even mainstream approaches to sustainable development are subordinatedto the neoliberal logic of private-led economic governance or propertydevelopment. It is high time that the settlement in Cyprus should notbe seen as a purely political and legal arrangement but also socioeco-nomic and ideological aspects have to be integrated in the search for asolution.

A post-settlement reunited Cyprus needs a broader vision based onnew principles, to break down the ethnopolitical barriers and economicinterests generated and perpetuated by the de facto partition and openup spaces for new kinds of cooperation among the two communities.Huge social as well as economic investment possibilities in a reunitedCyprus will ensue. Planning for an alternative model of economic andsocial development with due consideration to environmental protectionmeans learning from the past, knowing that a continuation of the existingmode of economic and social organization will inevitably lead to renewedlimitations and constraints in the not too distant future.

The institutional framework for the achievement of such objectives,which is made more complicated in a federal state context, must berobust. Embarking on an alternative path of sustainable development isa complex and ambitious objective that requires not only an appropri-ate institutional framework but also the political and social struggles tosupport it and and challenge the resistance of vested interests. Essentialsteps in the direction of an alternative sustainable model of economicdevelopment include moving away from the speculative, profit seekingprivate banking system to social development banking which includesthe cooperative banking sector, moving beyond the mass tourism model,and giving priority to knowledge-intensive industries, extending socialprovision, and protecting the environment.

The main parameters of a sustainable model of economic and socialdevelopment could be summarized as a model of economic develop-ment that is more autonomous, diversified, and to the extent possiblein a small economy, endogenously driven with emphasis on sustainablere-industrialization on a knowledge-intensive basis. The development ofsustainable forms of tourism such as agro-tourism, cultural and healthforms of tourism accompanied by strict planning criteria that abide byenvironmental standards and regulations are essential planning tools forthe future. Sustainable economic development also entails the rebuildingof the manufacturing sector in new directions that embody new tech-nologies, skilled labor, and high productivity. One example of a sectorthat is often referred to is the renewable energy sector. In this context,the development and modernization of knowledge-intensive services as


well as the development of organic forms of agriculture could form partof a sustainable development strategy. Below we list the parameters ofsustainable economic development.

• Economic restructuring to upgrade the productive sectors of theeconomy regarding agriculture and manufacturing industry by uti-lizing research, knowledge intensive activities and new technologies.

• Extension and qualitative upgrading of social welfare provision inCyprus.

• Sustainable urban and rural development.• Developing an integrated class, gender, and antiracism strategy.• Enhancement and extension of the cooperative movement in differ-

ent fields.• Environmental protection.

Thinking critically about the political and institutional context leading tothe formation of developmental state in Cyprus is essential if we are tosupersede the minimal, neoliberal state that we had up to now. A criticalmodel of a developmental state operates in the framework of target-setting, planning institutions that function in strategic, interventionistdirection, by taking into consideration the political and social supportnecessary as well as the constraints, resistance, and conflicts it would haveto face. In this context, as has become obvious from the recent phe-nomena associated with the economic crisis, the role of developmentalbanking under the strategic control and direction of the state has becomeabsolutely crucial.

We propose innovative forms combining sustainable, democratic, andsocial-centered and state-led and cooperative development. Such a per-spective must be informed by four principles that can be placed under thefollowing headings:

1. A critique of the developmental state in the Third World, includingthe post-independence and post-1974 Cypriot version, which insti-tutionalized the relationship between state and economic develop-ment on the premise of “subordination of working class interest tothat of the ‘national’ interest” (see Panayiotopoulos, 1995, p. 47).

2. Socially owned, democratically controlled and directed economicprojects, which take seriously and goes beyond “envisioning realutopias” (Wright, 2008) and the experience drawn from what is asocially embedded Cypriot cooperative movement. This is sharedby both communities, Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, inCyprus.


3. New and more radical versions of environmental and socialsustainability considerations for the more equitable sharing ofwealth and the interests of future generations in harmonizingthe relation with the ecosystem of the eastern Mediterranean.Future economic development is best understood in a frameworkfor regional cooperation in the eastern Mediterranean, particu-larly after the discovery of hydrocarbons off the shores of Cyprus.Equitable sharing of the benefits of the hydrocarbons is anotherchallenge for a critique of political economy.

4. It is high time research began to properly engage the issue of howmigrant workers are affecting the dialectic of transformation that istaking place. We are required to go beyond the so-called uniquenessso that we can locate what is particular, comparable, and uni-versal as a southern European state in the eastern Mediterraneanregion.26 The migration question in Cyprus must be seen over amuch larger time span as Cyprus is, by geopolitical location andhistoric conjuncture, a border society, and historically a frontiersociety de facto divided by a default line, a buffer zone that isalmost impossible to police. Moreover, we need to rethink the pro-cesses of Europeanization of migration, integration, settlement, andexploitation of precarious migrants and relate them to class andsocial struggles in the country. The narratives of the migrant work-ers point to the need to rethink the nature of “borders” and toreconceptualize the policies regarding migration control via an out-moded and ineffective “border policing.” Migration is not a passiveproduct of change, migration is a motto of change and migrants areagents of change.

Conclusions

The model of economic development in Cyprus, particularly in thecontext of a settlement, needs to be radically reconsidered. The mostimportant aspect of this challenge is to develop strategies for the socialand political forces of labor that illustrate the necessity of such an orienta-tion. Drawing on research, social and political dialogue, and internationalexperiences of successful case studies is crucial; however, we must remaincritical and avoid replanting and copying. Free market principles do notlead to a sustainable economic development; on the contrary, they arethe primary cause of the current situation and threaten to drag Cyprus todepression. A political settlement in Cyprus should be considered to bethe beginning for rebuilding the society as a social entity for all, surpassingthe ethnic and racial divide. The socio-economic aspects of a settlement


are too important to be left to mainstream economic and legal experts andto entrenched economic and social interests. We need critical perspectives.

In the absence of a settlement, it is essential that future research mustexamine further different aspects of social and economic interdependencebetween Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots as well as all other commu-nities that are present in an increasingly multicultural setting: education,health, and social divisions and struggles taking place on both sides ofthe country must be studied more closely. The transformations takingplace in the country and the region are radically reshaping the socioeco-nomic, political, ideological, and cultural landscape. Also, it is crucial thata critical political economy perspective integrates the Cypriot economicprocesses within the wider socioeconomic and political transformationsin the context of the region and the globe. Further study is requiredof the crisis in the euro zone and the imposition of austerity measures,which is radically deepening the crisis, increasing migration from EUcountries causing an even more serious problem, such as from Greece.Also, the situation in the northern part of the country needs to be closelymonitored; struggles are increasingly interconnected as ideas and move-ments spread across the barbed wire. Moreover, critical political economyperspectives of the new geopolitics hydrocarbon exploitation in the Mid-dle East and Cyprus are urgently required; developing research agendason social and environmental repercussions and alternatives in sharing thebenefits and costs of the extraction of natural gas has yet to feature inresearch or public debates. In the light of the current economic crisis,which may last for some more time, these are prerequisites for envisioninga country beyond the divide in a region of cooperation rather than impe-rial contestations. As the holy scripts of economic orthodoxy collapse, wemust at least imagine alternatives.

The challenge of economic restructuring and sustainable developmentin Cyprus has become immensely more difficult as the global economiccrisis had a very significant impact on the economy mainly through thecrisis of the banking sector. The exposure of the two large banks in Cyprusto Greek public bonds and the bad debts expected through the operationof their subsidiaries in Greece have given rise to unsustainable losses in thebanking sector and the need for their recapitalization through state sup-port. However, international finance to the Cyprus state has been blockedas a result of repeated adverse ratings by the international rating agencies,citing as the main reason the state of the banking sector in Cyprus. TheGovernment of Cyprus has desperately tried to secure the required financethrough inter-state loans, an effort mainly directed to Russia, which didnot produce the required results. The unavoidable alternative has been anofficial request by the government of Cyprus for financial support to the


EU financial stabilization mechanism. The EU finance facility, however,as seen in the case of Greece and the other EU periphery countries, isaccompanied by strict economic conditions consisting of austerity mea-sures and market enhancing economic reforms which lead to what hasbeen referred above as internal devaluation. Such measures have to beresisted since they will lead the economy of Cyprus into deeper reces-sion and higher unemployment. A comprehensive alternative model ofeconomic restructuring has to be proposed by the government of Cyprusand supported by social and political forces based on nationalized bankingsystem and sustainable economic development.

Notes

1. We would like to thank Umut Bozkurt, Gregoris Ioannou, Ron Ayres, andSotiris Kattos for their comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

2. See Constantinou (2008) and Trimikliniotis (2009, 2010).3. See, for instance, Bryant (2010).4. See “Economic Interdependence in Cyprus,” main findings and recommen-

dations, http://www.undp-act.org/data/articles/interdependence_report_2011.pdf (accessed February 26, 2012).

5. This figure is attributed to the former leader of the Turkish-Cypriotcommunity Mehmet Ali Talat and is related to the mobile telephone sub-scriptions and the numbers of motorized vehicles registered; see Halil Pasa’sintervention in the debate, BILBAN-IKME (2008, p. 125).

6. In a landmark case, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled on July 05,1994, against the British practice of importing produce from northernCyprus. The ECJ decided that only goods bearing certificates of origin fromthe Republic of Cyprus could be imported by EU member states. The deci-sion resulted in a considerable decrease of Turkish-Cypriot exports to theEU

7. See Demetriou and Vlachos (2007).8. Corrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of April 29, 2004

on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession (OJL 161, 30.4.2004), http://eur-lex.Europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=304R0866R(01.

9. See ECRI (2005) Third Report on Cyprus, European Commission againstRacism and Intolerance, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, May 16, 2006 andCorrigendum to Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 of April 29, 2004on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol 10 to the Act of Accession (OJ L161, 30.4.2004).

10. See Communication from the Commission COM (2006) 551 final, Brussels,September 25, 2006, at http://eur-lex.Europa.eu/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexplus!prod!CELEXnumdoc&numdoc=506DC0551&lg=en.

11. We would like to thank Dr. Alex Apostolides for pointing out how importantinterdependence is for the economy and society.


12. That paper periodized development in Cyprus in the following peri-ods: Colonial Modernization from above and from outside 1878–1960;postcolonial “developmentalism”; 1974–1990 Modernization by defaultand the introduction of cheap migrant labor; Europeanization andModernization.

13. For further analysis, see Trimikliniotis (1999, 2010c, 2011); Trimikliniotisand Pantelides (2003); Ioannou (2012b).

14. The rate of participation of women in the labor force increased from50.5 percent in 1985 to 53.3 percent in 2004; in contrast, the correspondingrate among men dropped from 94 percent in 1985 to 73.5 percent in 2004.

15. See Intercollege Report (2002); Trimikliniotis (2012, 2010c).16. Figures from Ministry of Interior up to 13 March 2012.17. The Equality Authority investigated the practice of hoteliers to dismiss

Cypriot workers, A.I.T. 1/2011, June 22, 2011. See also Trimikliniotis(2011b).

18. See Hatay (2005, 2007, 2008); Faiz (2008); Bilban-IKME (2008).19. Research project (no. 106K330) by Kurtulus and Purkis, supported by

the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK).Kurtulus and Purkis (2012) draw on this research.

20. All data and analyses in this section are from the annual edition ofThe Economic and Employment Outlook and the recent study CyprusCompetitiveness under EMU of the Cyprus Labor Institute (PEO).

21. Former Finance Minister Stavrakis (2012) went further claiming that theGovernor of the Bank had advised bankers not to buy RoC bonds and buyGreek bonds.

22. Estimates by Fiona Mullen at the conference September 30, 2011, on prop-erty issues within the context of displacement in Cyprus; see Trimikliniotisand Sojka-Koirala (2011).

23. See the outlook on a PowerPoint presentation at: http://www.inek.org.cy/english/. For an interesting debate on the subject of “convergence” of the twoparts of Cyprus, see the website of the Management Centre, which hosts thepapers of the Wolfson group at http://www.mancentre.org/OtherActivities/Wolfson/Wolsonindex.htm

24. See recent statement by Ministry of Labor: cheap labor is provided in thenorth from Turkey.

25. For a critical analysis, see Corbridge (1988); Paris (1993), pp. 233–238;Forster (2000).

26. For a critical analysis, see Corbridge (1988); Paris (1993), pp. 233–238;Forster (2000).

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Contributors

Editors

Nicos Trimikliniotis is an interdisciplinary scholar working in the fieldsof sociology and law. He is an associate professor of law and sociol-ogy at University of Nicosia; Senior Research Consultant, PRIO CyprusCentre; and honorary research professor of University of Cape Town.He has researched on ethnic conflict and reconciliation, constitutionaland state theory, integration, citizenship, education, migration, racism,gender, human rights, free movement, discrimination, and labor issues.His works include Gauging the Global Cycles of Deviance (with Ari Sitas,Sumangala Damodaran, and Wiebke Keim, forthcoming); Contested Inte-gration, Migration and Societal Transformation (University of NicosiaPress, 2013); The Nation-State Dialectic and the State of Exception (Greek)(Savalas, Athens, 2010); Rethinking the Free Movement of Workers: TheEuropean Challenges Ahead, Wolf, Nijmegen, 2009 (co-edited with PaulMinderhoud).

Umut Bozkurt is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations,Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus. She completed her PhD inpolitics in the University of York, United Kingdom. Her research interestsare state theory, critical political economy, and modern politics of Turkeyand Cyprus. She worked as the co-country manager of the InternationalCenter for Transitional Justice’s Cyprus program, which was aimed to helppave the way for a revision of the divisive historical narratives held by eachside in Cyprus. Her latest works include “Neoliberalism with a HumanFace: Making Sense of Justice and Development Party’s Neoliberal Pop-ulism in Turkey”, Science and Society [forthcoming, Volume 77 (2013)]and a working paper titled “Legacies of Violence and Overcoming Con-flict in Cyprus: The Transitional Justice Landscape” (co-authored withChristalla Yakinthou) (Peace Research Institute of Oslo [PRIO], Cyprus,2012).

278 N O T E S O N C O N T R I B U T O R S

Authors

Hakan Aslan is currently a part-time instructor at Istanbul Bilgi Univer-sity. His research interests include Marx and Marxism, socialist planning,labor movement in Turkey, Turkish Cypriot politics and economy, andrecently, for-profit universities and more broadly academic capitalism andunionism.

Giorgos Charalambous is an associate teaching staff at the University ofCyprus and visiting lecturer at Frederick University, Cyprus. His researchis focused on political parties, the European radical left, the domesticpolitics of European integration, and Cypriot politics.

Elias Ioakimoglou is a senior research associate for the Cyprus LaborInstitute (INEK-PEO) and the Greek Labor Institute (INE/GSEE). Hehas researched and published widely on economy, labor and workers’movement in Greece and Cyprus.

Niyazi Kizilyurek is a professor at the Turkish and Middle EasternStudies Department at the University of Cyprus. He published on mod-ern history and politics of Cyprus and Turkey, in Greek and Turkishlanguages.

Tassos Kyprianidis is a consulting professional in Athens, Greece, and amember of the Editorial Secretariat of the journal Θεσεις (Theseis). Hehas published widely on the Left, Marxism, and politics.

Dilek Latif is a lecturer in the International Relations Department ofNear East University. Her research focuses on history and education,conflict and societal peace.

Neofytos Loizides is a senior lecturer in international conflict analysis atthe University of Kent and the associate editor of Nationalism and EthnicPolitics. His research focuses on nationalism, federal arrangements, andconflict regulation in deeply divided societies.

John Milios is a professor of political economy and the history of eco-nomic thought at the National Technical University of Athens, Greece,and the editor of the journal Θεσεις (Theseis). He has authored manyarticles and books on various aspects of political, ideological, social, andeconomic issues.

N O T E S O N C O N T R I B U T O R S 279

Andreas Panayiotou is an assistant professor at the Frederick University,Cyprus. He has carried out research in the areas of social movements andthe world system, mass communication, and cultural studies.

Panayiotis Pantelides is on the academic board of the Cyprus LaborInstitute and a founding member of the Cyprus Institute of Critical SocialResearch and Dialogue. He has taught and researched political economy,European integration, and industrial policy and development.

Edward Rooksby teaches politics at Ruskin College, Oxford. He haspublished several papers in political theory and is currently writing a bookabout the British philosopher John Gray.

Ari Sitas is a sociologist, poet, and writer. He is a senior professor ofsociology at the University of Cape Town. He has published widely onlabor sociology, trade unions, globalization, reconciliation, culture andsociety, and post-apartheid South Africa.

Emine Tahsin teaches development economics courses at the IstanbulUniversity and is currently coordinating a project on migration andwomen in northern Cyprus.

Index

Note: The letter ‘n’ followed by the locators represents notes in the text.

accession of Cyprus to the EU, 11, 13,39, 79, 92–4, 137, 139–40,144–5, 148, 158, 185, 190–1,198–9, 218, 222

Acheson Plan, 22, 89Acquis, 9, 61Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi [AKP]

(Justice and Development Party),12, 39, 93, 144–9, 150n9,150n10, 191, 193

Agamben, Giorgio, 61, 66n21Agia Marina, 192Akıncı, Mustafa, 181, 192Ali, Ihsan, 123–4, 133n5Althusser, Louis, 41n5, 53, 57, 65n14,

65n19ANAP Anavatan Partisi (Motherland

Party), 138, 142Anastasiades, Nicos, 12, 187, 193,

199Anderson, Perry, 5, 19, 32, 43, 94, 98Ankara, 6–7, 10–13, 16, 18, 19n20,

21n45, 27–9, 33, 36–9, 57,58n14, 90, 125–7, 131, 138,169, 172, 174, 176, 182, 191,193, 197, 220

Annan Plan, 6, 9–10, 12, 16–17, 39,91–7, 145–7, 163, 182–5, 187,189–90, 194–5, 201

and British bases, 28, 32, 34EU accession, 91–2imperialist critics of, 93–4and NATO, 6, 39

necessary for imperialist interests,94, 97

and partition, 9, 16, 91, 96–7, 163,187, 195

reducible to imperialist interests,94, 97

and reunification, 16, 163, 185,189–90, 194, 201

and Russia, 91and United States, 32, 34, 93–5

annexation of Cyprus by Turkey, 6,19n20, 75, 100, 105, 107, 116

Anthias, Floya, 34–5, 51–4, 225, 227anticolonial struggle, 8, 53anti-communism, 106–65anti-imperialism, 25, 36, 74–8, 81,

94, 96, 154–5, 163See also Imperialism

Arabs, 12, 17, 27–8, 77, 87Archbishop of Cyprus, 49, 52–3, 70,

76, 88, 100–1, 103–4, 106, 161,185, 189

Archiepiscopate, 101Armenians, 196Asomatos, 192Association of Turkish-Cypriot

Students, 172Athens, 37, 43n19, 50, 53, 76, 105–6,

109–11Atun, Hakkı, 178austerity measures/package, 7, 15–18,

21n43, 36, 45, 220, 241, 245–6

282 I N D E X

Aνανεωτικó Δημoκρατ ικóΣoσ ιαλιστ ικó K ινημα[ADESOK] (ReformistDemocratic Socialist Movement),156

Averof, Evangelos, 110, 112, 114–15Aνoρθωτικó K óμμα

Eργαζoμενoυ Λαoυ [AKEL](Progressive Party of WorkingPeople), 12, 15, 20n31, 29,43n18, 45n41, 54–5, 64n7,64n8, 71, 73–5, 78, 82n5, 87,93, 101–5, 108, 110, 113, 125,151–68, 170–1, 174–5, 179,183, 187–91, 193, 195–6, 198–9

Avrupa Newspaper, 181Ayres, Ron, 51–4, 224–5, 239

bailout, 15, 220banking crisis, 16–17, 150n3, 236Bayar, Celal, 126Bayraktar, 171–2BDH Barıs ve Demokrasi Hareketi

(The Movement for Peace andDemocracy), 183

Berberoglu, Ahmet Mithat, 124, 173,175

BEY administration (Bayraktarlık[Military Chief inCommand]—Türk ElçililigiTurkish Embassy—Yerel Yönetim(Local Government]), 171–2

bicommunality, 9, 11–12, 18, 33, 35,37, 55, 61, 69, 78, 81n1, 89, 94,96, 156, 163, 202, 204, 214, 241

See also Constitution of 1960big bourgeoisie, 135, 137–8, 140,

149–50Bil, Hikmet, 125–6, 133n6bizonal bicommunal federation, 9, 12,

94, 96, 156, 163, 241border, 28, 67, 195, 218, 222, 244

dialect, 67–82borderline, 61, 80–1Boyner, Ümit, 146

Britain/British, 1, 3, 6–8, 11, 20n24,23–4, 31–5, 43n29, 44n31, 54,64n9, 65n11, 68–70, 72–4,83–98, 99–100, 103–5, 109–10,111–12, 116, 122–3, 127–9,133, 134n8, 154, 167–8n3, 169,186, 246n6

bombing of Lebanon and Iraq, 28,91

colonialism/rule of, 1, 7–8, 20n24,23, 31–3, 43n29, 49–51, 54,59, 68–70, 72–4, 82n4, 82n6,85–6, 100–1, 109, 116,122–3, 127–9, 154, 167–8n3

decline of, 24and establishment of the state of

Cyprus, 88, 99, 109, 114,130–1, 176

global system of bases, 8, 24intelligence and surveillance, 1–2,

33, 44n32, 83, 87, 89, 92,96–7; See also Britain/British,and role of military bases inCyprus

and NATO, 6, 32, 34, 54, 59, 76,109

and role of military bases inCyprus, 8, 24, 28, 32–4, 38,62, 102; See alsoBritain/British, intelligenceand surveillance

and rule of Cyprus. SeeBritain/British,colonialism/rule of

and Russia, 68, 91and the United States, 24, 32, 38,

83–98, 133n2British imperialism, 1, 3, 23–4, 33,

83, 85–6, 94–7changing priorities and interests, 33and Cyprus, 1, 3, 23–4, 33, 83,

85–6, 94–7Double union (Διπλη ενωσ ις ),

33Enosis, 86

I N D E X 283

in Greece, 3, 23, 33, 85–6in Middle East, 24, 33, 85, 96narrow and broader views of,

33and Partition, 33, 86, 96–7and Soviet Union, 86, 96and Turkey, 3, 23, 33, 97underwritten by the United States,

32and the United States, 83–97

Campaign, ‘From the Turk to theTurk,’ 129, 131

Castro in a cassock, 33See also Cuba of the Mediterranean

center-right. See Left, Greek-CypriotCentral Intelligence Agency (CIA),

45n44central powers, 100China, Peoples Republic of, 26, 91Christofias, Dimitris, 12–15, 20n28,

35, 43n18, 156, 159, 163, 166,183, 188, 190, 193–7

Church, 8, 20n24, 37, 49–50, 52–3,64n5, 69–70, 72, 82n6, 102–3,125–6, 152, 155, 186, 205

and class revolts, 70, 72, 82n6,126, 152, 155

elections, 70civil society, 59–60, 190, 202, 215n5

atrophy of, 59clientelist neocorporatism, 59critique, 59

class:analysis, 51–4contradictory to nationalism, 53,

76, 227ideological state apparatus, 53, 132,

140intercrossing with ethnicity/

nationalism, 53–60interests, 5, 8, 48, 52–3, 96, 243;

See also Althusser, Louismechanical and reductionist, 30–1,

52, 60

politics, 52, 69revolts, 68, 71, 152

Clerides, Glafkos, 113, 159, 161, 165,185–9

Coexistence, 8, 49, 54, 79, 102, 155,171, 173, 201, 203–5, 207–10,214

Cold War, 24, 32–3, 35, 38–9, 54–5,75, 87, 91, 95–6, 137, 219

colonialism, 32–3, 54decolonization, 75post–, 24, 33, 35, 38–9, 95–6

Committee of Cypriot Trade Unions,170

Communism, 1–2, 8, 34, 37, 45n44,64n7, 70–6, 78, 81, 87, 89, 96,101, 110, 126–7, 151–68,169–70, 173, 175, 189

Communist Party of Cyprus(KKK Koμμoυνιστ ικ o K oμμαK υπρoυ), 53, 101, 151–3, 155,170

conflict resolution, 4–5, 48critiques of, 5liberal approaches, 5, 48

consociationalism, 8–9, 34, 197Constitution of 1960, 8, 10, 34–5,

45n39, 112, 134n10, 159,167n3, 172, 194

and accession of Cyprus to the EU,11, 13, 39, 79, 92–4, 137,139–40, 144–5, 148, 158,185, 190–1, 198–9, 218,222

amendment of thirteen articlesproposed in 1963, 35, 89

and the Cold War, 35consociation, 8–9, 34, 197Federal, 35formal state power, 34See also bicommunality

Coup of 1974, 7, 9–10, 16, 29, 33,35–6, 55, 64n7, 76, 80, 115,172, 174–7, 180, 202, 219, 221,224–5

284 I N D E X

Cuba of the Mediterranean, 2,33

See also Castro in a cassock;Makarios III, Archbishop andPresident of the Republic ofCyprus

Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi [CTP](Republican Turkish Party),31n20, 78, 93, 145, 173–80,182–3, 191–3

Customs Union, 139Cypriot consciousness, 55, 75Cypriot society, 49, 57, 59, 81–2n3,

119–20, 128, 132, 158, 161,167, 169, 172, 183, 202,226

border society, 218, 244class analysis, 51–4class conflict, 47, 51, 59, 81Federal solution, 93, 176, 178–9migrant labor, 3, 18, 19n10,

19n11, 219, 226–31, 241,244, 247n12

racialized boundaries, 227racism, 13, 227, 241Turkish settlers, 38, 176, 189, 191,

195, 220Urbanization, 226Xenophobia, 18

Cypriot sociological thought,60

Cyprocentrism, 72, 75, 78, 80,81–2n3

Cyprus conflict. See Cyprus problemCyprus conspiracy theory, 5, 31–2,

90, 97, 181critiques of, 5, 90discovery of hydrocarbons, 2, 13,

23–40, 244, 245Enosis, 8, 20n24, 20n27, 36, 72,

82n4, 82n6, 86–8, 100–9,111, 113–16, 153, 155–6,186

ethnic conflict, 3–4, 40, 47–63,75

global geopolitical/regional model,48

globalization, 41, 227, 237Imperialism, 1, 3, 23–5, 33, 40, 48,

63, 83, 85–6, 94–7, 155–6,172, 174

Left-wing nationalism, 10, 34n46Left-wing and right-wing

proponents, 5, 7, 10, 12–13,17, 76–7, 113, 159–61, 165,173, 175–8, 180–4,185–99

legalistic reading, 57, 65n16Liberalism, 155, 157, 164Marxist approaches, 57, 65n16Middle East, 33, 96Nationalism, 12–13, 36, 50–1,

53–4, 59, 63, 65n10, 69–72,75, 79, 86–7, 113, 120, 155,163, 165, 169–70, 171–4,179, 184, 186, 188, 191, 193

NATO, 2, 6, 23, 28–9, 32–4,36–7, 39, 54–5, 59, 64n9, 76,87–91, 105, 107–11, 115,176, 218

nature of, 31–2, 90, 97, 181Partition, 9, 16, 91, 96–7, 163,

187, 195political economy, 119–34, 135,

217–46Proponents, 5, 7, 10, 12–13, 17,

76–7, 113, 159–61, 165,173, 175–8, 180–4,185–99

Right-wing nationalism, 5, 45n46,76–7, 113, 159, 165, 177,183, 191–2

Russia, 21n40, 26, 28, 35, 68, 81,91, 228, 233, 245

Taiwanization, 195Turkey’s plan B, 6United Nations (UN), 6, 74, 95,

105, 125, 182, 218United States, 31–2, 90, 97Western interest, 34, 87, 163

I N D E X 285

Cyprus problem, 2, 4, 9, 12, 14,17–18, 23–46, 47–66, 79–80,93, 95, 97, 104–5, 107, 109–11,115, 137–8, 144, 149, 154–6,162–4, 166–7, 193, 195, 211,220, 222, 239

accession to EU, 11, 13, 39, 79,92–4, 137, 139–40, 144–5,148, 158, 185, 190–1, 198–9,218, 222

Annan plan, 6, 9–10, 12, 16–17,39, 91–7, 145–7, 163, 182–5,187, 189–90, 194–5, 201

bizonal bicommunal federation,9, 12, 94, 96, 156, 163,241

and Britain, 1, 7–8, 20n24, 23,31–3, 43n29, 49–51, 54, 59,68–70, 72–4, 82n4, 82n6,85–6, 88, 99–101, 109, 114,116, 122–3, 127–31, 154,167–8n3, 176

and China, 26, 91class factors, 52common sense approaches, 4and conspiracy theory, 5, 31–2, 90,

97, 181constitutional conflict, 11, 15, 35,

45n39, 54, 89, 114, 188, 192,195

geopolitics versus ethnic conflict, 3,40, 48, 74, 199

holistic reading, 4, 63national question, 32–6, 48–56,

81, 119postcolonial quasi-stateness, 47,

66n21solution/resolution to, 2, 5, 9–10,

12–14, 18, 23, 27, 31, 33,38–49, 55, 62, 76, 79, 88, 90,92–3, 95, 97, 104, 106–22,113–16, 126, 137–8, 142–6,154, 163, 172–3, 175–80,182–3, 196, 203, 207–13,220, 224, 239–41

Democratic Union of Cyprus,113

Demographic engineering of Cyprus,174, 230–1

Demokratik Halk Partisi [DHP](Democratic People’s Party),176

Demokratik Mücadele Partisi[DMP](Party for DemocraticStruggle), 177

Denktas, Rauf, 11, 13, 16, 20n23, 93,124, 127, 129, 134n7, 134n8,138, 144–5, 174, 178, 181–2,186, 191, 200n3

Denktas, Serdar, 20n23, 177,191–2

dialectic of intolerance, 55, 59Dıs Ekonomik Iliskiler Konseyi [DEIK]

(Foreign Economic RelationsBoard), 148

displacement of Cypriots, 107, 204–5,225, 229

Δημoκρατ ικ oς Συναγ ερμoς[DISY] (Democratic Rally), 156,160, 163, 165, 185–90, 192–9

Δημoκρατ ικ o K oμμα [DIKO](Democratic Party)Confederation, 176

division in Cyprus:by ethnicity, 48, 54–5, 78, 154,

199of the island, 2–3, 9, 63, 86,

89–90, 95, 97, 174–5, 178doctrine of necessity, 9–10, 61–2,

66n26apologist-types of studies, 61–2,

66n26critiques, 61–2Supreme Court, 9, 61–2

DP Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party),178–9, 191–2

dual or double enosis or union(Διπλη ενωσ ις ), 107, 109,111, 115

Durduran, Alpay, 175

286 I N D E X

Ecevit, Bülent, 45n46, 144Economic crisis, 3–4, 12, 15, 17–18,

23–4, 29, 37, 71, 137–8, 152,166, 217–21, 228, 231, 234,238, 240, 241, 243, 245

Economy, 3, 16–18, 19n10, 19n11,19n13, 21, 34, 40, 49, 69, 72,79, 119–34, 140, 142–3, 150n3,217–47

accumulation by dispossession, 225banking crisis, 16–17, 150n3, 236;

See also Economy, risks of thebanking system

border economy, 218cheap labor model, 228–31competiveness, 140, 233–45, 237consumption driven, 234–9debt crisis, 16demographic engineering in

northern Cyprus, 174, 230–1development, 34, 40, 69, 72, 79,

217–47economic miracle, 217–47Euro-crisis and Cyprus, 18export driven economy, 234–9financialization, 234–9of Greece, 3, 16–18, 69, 72, 119,

129, 219, 228, 230, 236, 238,245

internal devaluation, 236–7, 246mass tourism model, 226, 234, 242migrant labor, 3, 18, 19n10,

19n11, 219, 226–31, 241,244, 246n12

political division, 119–34precarious labor, 3, 19n21, 219,

230, 234, 244risks of the banking system,

234–47; See also Economy,banking crisis

sustainable model of economicdevelopment, 239, 241–4

tourism, 19n13, 49, 79, 142–3,218, 220, 225–6, 228, 233–4,242

Elections, 13–14, 17, 20n34, 103–5,159, 162, 164, 166, 192, 194,198–9

for Archbishop, 103–5Engin, Oktay, 126Enosis, 8, 20n24, 20n27, 36, 72,

82n4, 82n6, 86–8, 100–9, 111,113–16, 153, 155–6, 186

EOKA B, 35, 38, 64n7, 185,206

Eθνικη Oργ ανωση K υπριωνAγωνιστ ων [EOKA] (NationalOrganization of CypriotFighters), 8, 20n24, 27, 35, 55,88, 105–9, 111, 113, 125

Erdogan, Recep Tayyip, 182Erel, Ali, 192Erkurt, Ahmed Sadi, 171Eroglu, Dervis, 13, 171, 177, 183,

191, 193Ertugruloglu, Mehmet, 125Ethnarchy, 52, 100–16

Council, 102ethnicity, 48, 53–60, 78, 154, 199ethnic/national conflict/struggles,

3–4, 40, 47–63, 74–5, 199Europaiko Komma [EUROKO]

(European Party), 188–9, 195,197

European Court of Human Rights(ECtHR), 20n30

European Economic Community(EEC), 138–9

European Union (EU), 4, 6, 9–18,26–9, 36–9, 60, 80, 91–5,135–49, 150n4, 158, 180–3,218–20, 222, 228–33, 236,245–6, 246n6

Presidency, 13–14, 27Eνιαια Δημoκρατ ικη Eνωση

K εντρoυ [EDEK] (UnitedDemocratic Union of theCentre), 15, 20n35, 43n18,62–3, 64n7, 193, 195–7,199

I N D E X 287

Eνιαιo �ημoκρατ ικóó M ετωπoAναδημιoυργ ιας [EDMA](The United Democratic Frontfor Re-creation), 113

Evkaf, 121–2, 124, 129–30, 132Eνιαια Δημoκρατ ικη Oργ ανωση

Nεoλαιας [EDON] (UnitedDemocratic Youth Organization),162

Eνωμενoι Δημoκρατες [EDY](United Democrats), 15

Famagusta, 85, 129, 142, 147, 202,211

Foot, Hugh, 110Foot Plan, 111

Geopolitical, 1–2, 4–6, 12, 18,23–40, 48, 56, 67–9, 73, 75–6,80–1, 86–7, 91, 136, 152, 244

conflict, 4–6, 48, 73, 76Imperialism, 23–40, 86–7

global factors, 40globalization, 41n3, 226, 237Governor of Cyprus. See Harding, Sir

JohnGramscian approaches, 41n2, 41n3,

60, 136, 154Gramsci, Antonio, 49, 60, 62, 65n19,

65n20, 136, 154Greece, 3, 6, 8, 10, 15–18, 20n24,

20n25, 23, 27, 30, 33, 36–8,43n20, 45n43, 45n44, 53–6,64n7, 64n9, 69, 72, 76–7, 80,85–90, 92, 99, 101–5, 107–8,110–15, 119, 129, 146, 155,162, 169, 186, 219, 228, 230,236, 238, 245

Greek- Cypriot, 6, 7–15, 17, 19n20,20n24, 26–7, 29–30, 32–8,45n40, 45n41, 46n49, 52–5, 57,59–60, 62, 65, 69–81, 86–9,93–7, 99–106, 108–9, 120–1,126–8, 131–2, 134n8, 149–67,169–84, 189–90

bourgeoisie, 9, 50, 52, 64n7

control by, 6, 8–11, 15, 19n20,20n24, 26–7, 29–30, 33–8,45n40, 45n41, 46n49, 52, 55,59, 88–9, 94–7, 100, 106,108–15, 131–2, 134n8,169–84

intelligentsia, 53, 59Left, 7–8, 10–13, 15, 17, 29–30,

32, 52–3, 55, 60, 70–5,77–81, 93–4, 102–4, 108–9,154–5, 161–4, 167, 183,189–90

working class, 69–70, 101–2,120–1, 149–67, 169–84

Grivas, Georgios, 64n7, 105–6,109–13, 210

guarantor nations, 8, 55, 76, 80,112

Halil, Ibrahim Akça, 148Halk Der Halkla Dayanısma ve Kültür

Dernegi (Association for Cultureand Solidarity with the People),173

Halkın Sesi Newspaper, 123Hannay, Sir David, 11Harding Plan, 106–9Harding, Sir John, 106–9, 126Hegemonic, 6, 12, 28, 31, 37, 41,

53, 70, 72, 77–9, 85, 91,135–6, 138, 140, 144, 150,174, 179, 214, 241

fraction, 37, 41, 53, 136, 140,144

Project, 6, 78–9, 136, 138,140

Hellenic nationalism, 50, 169Helsinki Summit of 1999, 139,

144–9, 180High Level agreements of 1977 and

1979, 9Hisarcıklıoglu, Rifat, 146Holbrooke, Richard, 91–3, 95–6hydrocarbons, 2, 13, 23–40, 244,

245

288 I N D E X

immigration issue, 39, 222, 228Imperialism, 1, 3, 23–5, 33, 40, 48,

63, 83, 85–6, 94–7, 155–6, 172,174

articulation of interests, 18, 32n8,48–9, 52–3, 136, 155

China, 26, 91of Cyprus, 1, 3, 23–4, 33, 83,

85–6, 94–7de facto partition, 9, 16, 31, 34, 55,

89, 90–1, 222, 239–40, 242dependency theory, 41n3discovery of hydrocarbons, 2, 13,

25, 27, 29–30, 40, 244Disraeli, Benjamin, 85, 96global capitalism, 41, 140Western political system, 70,

92–3See also British imperialism

Import Substitution Industrialization(ISI) Model, 137

Independence, 5–9, 18, 23, 32–4,36–7, 45n41, 52–6, 59, 64–5n9,72, 75–8, 80, 88, 91, 99–117,133n2, 142, 150n6, 155,167–8n3, 172, 243

guaranteed, 23, 36, 55limited, 34post-colonial, 23, 133n2

Inönü, Ismet, 122International Monetary Fund (IMF),

15, 21n42, 137, 148Ioannides, Polykarpos, 108Iran, 14, 17, 28–9, 32Iraq, 29, 44, 91Israel, 6, 17, 25, 28–31, 40, 42n9,

42n16, 43n18, 43n19, 46n49,190

Istanbul Kıbrıs Türk Talebe Cemiyeti[IKTTC] (The IstanbulAssociation of Turkish-CypriotStudents), 172

Istanbul Ticaret Odası [ITO] (IstanbulChamber of Commerce),145

Karamanlis, Konstantinos, 186Karpasia, 192Kasoulides, Ioannis, 187, 194–6Kavazoglu, Dervis Ali, 171Kaymak, Faiz, 123–4, 126–7, 130Kemal, Mustafa Atatürk (Kemalist),

39, 50, 65, 78, 169Kıbrıs Adası Türk Azınlıgı Kurumu

[KATAK] (Turkish MinorityInstitution of the Island ofCyprus), 123, 133n3, 133n4

Kıbrıslılar Ögrenim ve GençlikFederasyonu [KÖGEF] (CypriotsFederation of Education andYouth), 173

Kıbrıs Türk Birligi (Istiklâl) Partisi(Turkish Cypriot Union[Independence] Party), 123, 129

Kıbrıs Türk Isadamları Dernegi [ISAD](Cyprus Turkish BusinessmenAssociation), 145

Kıbrıs Türk Isçi Birlikleri Kurumu[KTIBK] (Organization ofTurkish Cypriot Workers’Unions), 171

Kıbrıs Türk Kurumları Federasyonu(Turkish Cypriot InstitutionsFederation), 123

Kıbrıs Türk Ticaret Odası [KTTO](Turkish-Cypriot Chamber ofCommerce), 140, 145–6

Kıbrıs Türktür Dernegi (Cyprus IsTurkish Association), 125–6

Kıbrıs Türktür Partisi (Cyprus IsTurkish Party), 125, 128

Kissinger, Henry, 34, 44n36Kormakitis, 192Kosmas, General Georgios, 105K oμμoυνιστ ικ o K oμμα K υπρoυ

[KKK]. See Communist Party ofCyprus

Küçük, Fazıl, 122–4, 126, 129, 131,133n3

Kurdish question, 39

I N D E X 289

Kuzey Kıbrıs Genç Isadamları Dernegi[GIAD] (North Cyprus YoungBusinessmen’s Association), 145,176

Kyrenia, 103–4, 108, 110, 113, 202,209, 211–12

Labor, 7, 43–4n29, 51, 65n20, 73,94, 120–1, 132, 138, 158, 218,220, 225–7, 237–8, 240–2, 244

aristocracy, 7cheap labor model, 228–31migrant, 3, 18, 19n10, 19n11, 219,

226–31, 241, 244, 246n12precarious, 3, 19n21, 219, 230,

234, 244Larnaca, 21n46, 202, 208, 211Latins, 8Lausanne Treaty, 36, 169Left, Greek-Cypriot, 7–8, 10–13, 15,

17, 29–30, 32, 52–3, 55, 60,70–5, 77–81, 93–4, 102–4,108–9, 154–5, 161–4, 167, 183,189–90

Lilliputian states, 2–3, 47Limassol, 79, 101, 202Luxembourg Summit, 139, 143

Macmillan, Harold, 126Macmillan Plan, 111, 115, 126

Makarios II, Archbishop, 104Makarios III, Archbishop and

President of the Republic ofCyprus, 19n7, 20n27, 33, 37, 53,64n7, 76–77, 88, 90, 104–11,113–14, 159, 161, 165, 189

Manyera, Niyazi, 129Mari explosion, 14, 166, 199Maronites, 8, 186, 192, 196Mason–Dixon Line in Nicosia, 128,

134n8mass movement/mass mobilization,

7–8, 13, 74, 76, 78–80, 105,125, 127, 153, 221, 225

Menderes, Adnan, 125–6

middle class, 7, 19n22, 50, 71, 154,192, 203

Middle East, 6, 17, 24–49, 33, 40,44n32, 69, 76, 85, 87–9, 91–2,96, 218, 245

migrants/migration, 3, 18, 19n10,19n11, 219, 226–31, 241, 244,246n12

Milliyetçi and Halkçı Birlik(Nationalist and Populist Unity),123

Müezzinoglu, Ziya, 141–2Münir, Sir Mehmet, 121Mustafa Ibrahim Case, 20n26, 64,

66n23Müstakil Sanayici ve Isadamları

Dernegi [MÜSIAD](Independent Industrialists andBusinessmen’s Association), 139

Nalbantoglu, Burhan, 124, 127Nationalism, 12–13, 36, 50–1, 53–4,

59, 63, 65n10, 69–72, 75, 79,86–7, 113, 120, 155, 163, 165,169–70, 171–4, 179, 184, 186,188, 191, 193

NATO, 2, 6, 23, 28–9, 32–4, 36–7,39, 54–5, 59, 64n9, 76, 87–91,105, 107–11, 115, 176, 218

See also Imperialism, Britishimperialism

natural gas, 23, 25–6, 41n6, 43n19,245

Necati, Özkan, 122–4, 133n3, 133n5Neofytou, Averoff, 187Neoliberal, 7, 17, 36, 218, 241–2, 243Nicosia, 37, 42n9, 76, 79, 89, 102,

106, 109–10, 113, 121–3, 128,133n3, 133n4, 134n8, 170, 172,181, 202, 209–10

Non-governmental Organization(NGO), 208

occupation of Cyprus, 10, 29, 37, 50,86, 88, 91, 95, 121, 158, 214, 225

October Revolution, 101

290 I N D E X

Octovriana, 8Önal, Kamil, 125–6Oργ ανωση Eργ oδoτ ων και

Bιoμηχανων [OEB] (CyprusEmployers and IndustrialistsFederation), 146

Örek, Osman, 124, 129Orthodox Church/Christians, 49, 69,

72, 86, 125, 196, 245Orthodox Synod, 101Ottoman Empire, 31, 36, 49, 54,

64n4, 67–9, 85, 99–100, 116,169

Özal, Turgut, 38Özersay, Kudret, 193Özgür, Özker, 178–80

Palestine, 87Papadopoulos, Tassos, 11–12, 20n28,

45n44, 159, 162–3, 165, 190,194–9

Papagos, Alexandros, 104, 125Papandreou, Georgios, 37parliamentary elections, 18, 113, 156,

177–8, 182–3, 192partial approach, 172Partition, 5, 8–9, 16, 31, 33–4, 38,

45n41, 55, 59, 82n6, 84, 86,89–91, 96–7, 98n5, 107, 109,111, 114–16, 126, 163, 169,171–2, 174, 187–8, 195, 218,222, 239–40, 242

See also Taksimpassive resistance, 110passive revolution, 6, 39Πανγ κυπρια Eργατ ικη

Oμoσπoνδια [PEO] (Worker’sFederation of Cyprus), 51, 64n6,162, 170–1, 237

peasant(s), 49–50, 67–8, 71, 121,152–3, 182, 203

revolts, 67–8, 71pipeline geopolitics, 26population, 3–4, 8, 37, 39, 45n40,

49–50, 53, 68, 75–7, 86, 89,

100–1, 103–4, 107, 109, 112,114, 163, 173–4, 177, 181, 189,219–21

post-Cold War, 24, 33, 35, 38–9,95–6

See also Cold Warpost-colonialism, 1, 33, 35, 38–9,

82n6, 95–6Poulantzas, Nicos, 61, 65n17, 65n19,

136, 140, 149n1power bloc, 31, 135–49, 149–50n1

race/racism, 86, 209, 227Radcliffe Plan, 108reconciliation, 2–3, 11, 18, 59, 201,

224regional factors, 2, 18reunification of Cyprus, 2, 11, 13, 16,

18, 19n20, 20n35, 80, 93–5,154, 163–4, 185, 189–90,192–4, 197, 199, 201, 207, 209,217–47

Right, 7, 12–13, 20n23, 20n24, 32,45n46, 52, 64n6, 74–7, 79,82n6, 102–4, 108, 113, 156,159–65, 168n7, 176–8, 181,183, 185–6, 188–96, 198–9,200n1

Rızkı, Ziya, 176Roma, 8, 20n25Russia, 21n40, 26, 28, 35, 68, 81, 91,

228, 233, 245

Sabancı, Sakıp, 142Sanayi Odaları Birligi (Union of

Chambers of Industrialists),142

Security, 11, 14, 24–6, 31, 35, 38, 40,42n8, 88, 91–2, 94, 97, 107,110, 112, 143, 181, 222, 239

self-determination, 10, 20n24, 55,88–9, 103–11, 114–15, 125–6,133n2

settlers, 3, 38, 176, 189, 191, 195,220

I N D E X 291

Συνoμoσπoνδια EλληνωνBιoμηχανων [SEV] (HellenicFederation of Entreprises), 146

Social:Banditry, 69Formation, 1, 6, 25, 35–6, 40,

41n3, 48Movement(s), 68, 79, 101, 135Transformation, 58, 60, 187, 192,

201, 226Soviet Union [USSR], 38, 73, 86–7,

90, 92, 96, 133n12, 152, 167,173, 175, 177–9

See also RussiaSpaak, Paul-Henri, 111Special War Department (Özel Harp

Dairesi)169State:

authoritarian statism, 61Gramscian approaches, 41n2,

41n3, 60, 136, 154Gramsci, Antonio, 49, 60, 62,

65n19, 65n20, 136, 154Marxist or class-analytic

approaches, 41n3, 59, 98n1organization-analytic approaches,

57postcoloniality, 59rational-legal paradigm, 60

state-centered approach, 135–6,150n2

state of exception, 10, 37, 61–2,66n26

See also doctrine of necessityStylianides, Christos, 199subaltern classes, 6, 60, 97Suez Canal, 69, 81

Tahsin, Arif Hasan, 133n3, 172Taksim, 8, 126, 128, 131, 134n7,

134n8, 169–70, 173See also Partition

Talat, Mehmet Ali, 12, 20n35, 145,178–80, 182–3, 191–2, 196,246n5

Talat, Naci, 173, 179Tanrısevdi, Kemal, 127Tanzimat reforms, 68Tara, Sarık, 142Toplumcu Kurtulus Partisi [TKP]

(Communal Liberation Party),175–8, 181, 183

trade unions, 7, 17, 20n24, 54, 64n6,71, 73–4, 78, 80, 101–2, 108,125–6, 128, 135, 139, 145,152–3, 167n2, 170–1, 219, 225,241

traditional coexistence, 54Treaty of Alliance, 8Treaty of Establishment, 8, 32, 89Treaty of Guarantee, 8TRNC (Turkish Republic of

Northern Cyprus), 3, 6–7, 9–10,12, 16, 20n23, 27–8, 35, 57–8,62, 91, 93, 95, 142–3, 146, 148,150n9, 176, 178–80, 183, 187,194, 209–10, 218, 224, 230–1

troika, 15Turkey, 3–12, 16–18, 19n20, 23,

26–31, 33, 36, 40, 43n19,43n23, 50, 53–5, 57–8, 62, 63,65n20, 69, 76–80, 87–93, 97,98n5, 100, 103–4, 107–9,111–12, 114–16, 119–20,124–7, 129–32, 134n8, 135–50,169–84, 185–99, 218, 220,230–1

Cyprus policy, 135–50independence, 6–9, 18, 36–7, 55,

59, 75, 88, 110–11, 150n6,172, 176, 191

intervention/invasion in Cyprus, 7,16, 76–7, 80, 105, 141,175–6, 178, 191, 193

partition, 5, 8–9, 16, 31, 33–4, 38,45n41, 55, 59, 82n6, 84, 86,89–91, 96–7, 98n5, 107, 109,111, 114–16, 126, 163, 169,171–2, 174, 187–8, 195, 218,222, 239–40, 242

292 I N D E X

Turkish-Cypriot, 6, 13–18, 19n20,20n30, 20n31, 20n35, 21n45,21n46, 27, 29, 35, 37–8, 42n14,45n40, 45–6, 46n49, 50, 52–5,57, 59–60, 62, 65n11, 65n20,70, 75, 77–80, 87–90, 94–7,100–1, 105–6, 109, 111–12,114–16, 119–34, 138, 140–1,147–9, 153, 155, 159, 169–84,185–200, 201–3, 207–12, 214,215n6, 221–4, 230,240–1, 243–4, 245, 246n5,246n6

Left, 7, 12–13, 17, 30, 32, 52,77–80, 82n6, 169–84,191

Türkiye Isçi Partisi [TIP](Workers’ Party of Turkey),172

Türkiye Odalar ve Borsalar Birligi[TOBB] (The Union ofChambers and CommodityExchanges of Turkey),139–41, 144–6,148

Türkmen, Ilter, 176Türk Mukavemet Teskilati [TMT]

(Turkish ResistanceOrganization), 88, 106, 124–5,127–8, 132, 134n7, 141, 169,175, 206, 210

Türk Sanayicileri ve Isadamları Dernegi[TÜSIAD] (TurkishIndustrialists’ and BusinessmenAssociation), 140

Ulusu, Bülent, 142United Nations (UN), 6, 9, 11–14,

33–4, 39, 42n16, 74, 93, 99,104–5, 108–10, 125, 144–5,163, 182, 187, 190–1, 194, 197,215n6, 218–19

United States (USA), 3, 24, 26, 28,30–6, 38–9, 64n9, 83–97, 133n2

conflicting foreign policy goals onCyprus, 34, 83–97

Cyprus problem, 24, 26hydrocarbons, 24, 26, 28, 30, 36,

38–9Imperialism), 3, 24, 33, 86, 94–7

USSR. See Soviet Union [USSR];Russia

Varosia (Maras), 147Vasiliou, George, 159, 162Volkan, 106Vuruskan, Rıza, 127

working class, 50, 54, 70–1, 74, 78,137, 152, 154, 160, 170–1, 203,226–7, 243

World Bank, 137

Yahya, Ahmet, 171Yavuz, Faik, 146Yugoslavia, 198, 213

Ziartides, Andreas, 170Zorlu, Fatin Rüstü, 126–7Zurich–London Agreements, 8, 34–5,

45n41, 64–5n9, 99, 109, 112,116, 126–7, 129, 131