beyond brexit - european centre for development policy ... · policy officer, trade and...

VOLUME 7 - ISSUE 3 SUMMER 2018

Highlighting Brexit’s implications beyond Europe on: Africa, the Caribbean, trade, migration, development, aid, security and gender

Africa’s relations with the UK: Negotiating a post-Brexit landscapePhilani Mthembu, executive director, Institute for Global Dialogue

Time to close a deal is running outLinda McAvan, member of the European Parliament

Will UK leaders engage more with Africa?Tom Cargill, executive director, British Foreign Policy group

BEYOND Brexit

EditorialBrexit leaves no field untouched. Often presented as a EU-UK story, Brexit is much more than that. Elements of its breeding ground are observed throughout the world, and its impact will be felt far beyond Europe.

What characterises this breeding ground? First is a rising scepticism towards multilateralism, as Tom Cargill and Nick Westcott emphasise. Second, is a burgeoning populism (and recourse to referenda to revisit policies). How nationalist approaches and challenges to multilateralism play out can be difficult to predict. Nonetheless, the resilience of multilateralism should not be underestimated, particularly regionally, including in Europe. On three recent dossiers – safeguarding the Iran nuclear deal, countering US posturing around trade wars, and negotiating Brexit – the EU seems relatively united. In relation to Brexit, the systematic way in which the Commission’s Brexit Task Force is preparing for an ‘orderly withdrawal’, and in which the European Council stands behind Ireland, commands respect even from fervent Brexiteers. Negotiating Brexit is a difficult task for both sides, and a general fatigue risks slipping in. Yet, the stakes remain high, so a collective alertness remains de mise throughout the summer months.

Brexit will have consequences – both positive and negative – for many actors, in Europe and beyond. Particularly concerned are developing countries and non-state actors, such as international NGOs, traders from the Global South, refugees seeking a safe haven in a smaller EU or ambitious ‘Global Britain’, and policymakers and civil servants worldwide. Brexit means the departure from the EU of an influential security, aid, trade, and development player, and a range of actors will have to take steps to adapt to the emerging reality. Of course, the EU and UK have no monopoly on global events. Many more partners and actors will affect the destiny of Africa and the Caribbean, as Philani Mthembu, Philippe Darmuzey, and David Jessop write.

Also, it is not impossible that the actual withdrawal of the UK, foreseen for 29 March 2019, may be significantly delayed or not occur at all. This remark may surprise you. But the political environment, including in the UK, where a small majority government is working hard to reconcile diverging views and win a parliamentary vote in autumn, is so fragile that we cannot exclude Brexit becoming disorderly (rather than agreed), delayed, or even being dropped altogether. A request for extra time and even a ‘Breconsider’ are thus real possibilities. Despite the two years that have elapsed since the vote to leave, the variables around departure are still so undefined that all authors here have been forced into a degree of speculation. Anything else would be disingenuous or quickly overtaken by events.

Europe’s position in the world, and global relations with Europe, will depend on how judiciously four questions are confronted: Can opportunities be capitalised upon? Can continuity be maintained in key areas? Can threats be mitigated? What are the negotiators’ priorities? Timing will be essential, too, particularly on under-emphasised issues such as Africa, development, and international cooperation. A sense of urgency is what led us, in spite of all the speculation, to facilitate a collective reflection resulting in this special issue. With Simon Duke, we conclude that the stakes are high, and with Linda McAvan, that time is running out.

Don’t let the tight agenda be an incentive to read in a rush. Because when time is pressing, long-term thinking is compromised, and the impact on affected actors worldwide neglected. This is precisely what we tried to avoid in going ‘Beyond Brexit’. ECDPM will continue to follow this tentacular dossier from different perspectives, and we welcome feedback and engagement in further debate. Indeed this may not be the last Great Insights issue to feature this moving target.

Guest editorsEmmanuel De Groof, policy officer and Andrew Sherriff, head of programme European External Affairs, ECDPM

ECDPM’s Great Insights magazine offers a quick and accessible summary of cutting-edge analysis on international cooperation and Europe-Africa relations. It includes an independent overview of analysis and commentary from a wide variety of experts and high-level officials and provides updates on policy debates in Africa and Europe.

Disclaimer: The views expressed are those of individual authors. Articles reflect analysis as of May 2018.

Publisher European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)Executive editor Virginia MucchiGuest editors Emmanuel De Groof andAndrew Sherriff Editorial and production assistance Jacquie Dias and Annette Powell Web editor Jacquie Dias Language editor Michelle Luijben Cover illustration Roel Craen Concept Emmanuel De Groof Art direction and design ofmagazine template Yaseena Chiu-van ‘t HoffMagazine concept San Bilal and Claudia BackesLayout and production Claudia Backes

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Great Insights |Summer 2018 3

2 Editorial

4TheBrexitBox

Perspectives

5 Africa,EuropeandBritainafterBrexit PhilippeDarmuzey,honorarydirectorofthe EuropeanCommission

8 WillUKleadersengagemorewithAfrica? TomCargill,executivedirector,BritishForeign Policygroup

11 Breakingaway?Thedevelopingworldandthe futureofmultilateralism NicholasWestcott,directoroftheRoyalAfrican Society14 Africa’srelationswiththeUK:Negotiatinga post-Brexitlandscape PhilaniMthembu,executivedirectoratthe InstituteforGlobalDialogue

16 Choicematrix:FutureEU-UKcollaborationon internationalcooperation AndrewSherriff,headofprogramme,and EmmanuelDeGroof,policyofficer,European ExternalAffairsprogramme,ECDPM

Development

18 Timetocloseadealisrunningout LindaMcAvan,memberoftheEuropean Parliament

21 Tothepoint:UK-EUcoordinationforthepoor TamsynBarton,formerchiefexecutiveof Bond,theUKnetworkfororganisationsworking oninternationaldevelopment

24 TheimpactofBrexitonaid:Divorceor marriageofconvenience? IlianaOlivié,senioranalystandAitorPérez, seniorresearchfellowattheElcanoRoyal Institute

EU and UK Positions

27 EuropeanCommissionslidesrelatedto Brexitchoices PresentedbyChiefNegotiatorEuropeanCommission MichelBarnier

28 TheBrexitnegotiations:Whothinkswhat? AselectiveanalysisofUKandEUpositions EmmanuelDeGroof,policyofficer,European ExternalAffairsprogramme,ECDPM

Trade

30 IncreaseduncertaintyforachangingCaribbean DavidJessop,consultantfortheCaribbeanCouncil

33 How‘totradeornottotrade’isthequestionfor thirdcountriesafterBrexit SanBilal,headofprogramme,andSeanWoolfrey, policyofficer,TradeandAgriculturaltransformation programme,ECDPM

36 Developingcountriesagri-foodtradeafterBrexit AlanMatthews,professoremeritus,TrinityCollege Dublin

Migration, gender and security

38 BrexitcouldmakeUKmigrationcontrolinthe Mediterraneanevenharder GiacomoOrsini,post-doctoralresearcher, UniversitécatholiquedeLouvain

41 Europe’sgenderactionbeyondBrexit GillAllwood,professoratNottinghamTrentUniversity

44 Highstakes,Brexit,securityanddefenceSimonDuke,professorattheEuropeanInstituteof PublicAdministration

Contents

4 | Great Insights | Summer 2018

The Brexit BoxbyAndrewSherriffandEmmanuelDeGroof

The‘Brexitbox’,onthecoverofthisspecialissuelikenedtoPandora’sboxofGreekmythology,representsalessfatalisticandhopefullymoreconstructiveoutlookonthefuture.Asyet,thatfutureismaskedbyasmokescreenintheformofaquestionmark.Inspiteoftheuncertainty,wecananticipatethatBrexitmayhavepositive,neutralandnegativeeffects.

Somesmokeelementsrepresentpotentialbeneficialeffects.Inthefieldoftrade,AlanMatthewswritesthatBrexitmayindirectly‘improvethepositionofdevelopingcountriescompetingwithEUexportersontheUKmarket’.NicholasWestcottobservesthat‘forAfricaandotherdevelopingcountries,Brexitisagoldenopportunitytosecurebetteraccess,greaterprotection,andmoreaidfromBritain’.Inadifferentfield,gender,GillAllwoodseemstosuggestthatthedepartureoftheUK(seenasachampionofgendermainstreamingindevelopmentcooperation)mightparadoxicallystrengthentheEU’sgenderawareness.Indiplomacy,TomCargillseesopportunitiesforUKengagementinAfrica,butonlyiftheUKinvestsinitsowncapacity.

‘Businessasusual’oramixedoutcomeisrepresentedbyothersmokeplumes.Inthefieldofsecurity,SimonDukeexplainsthatbecausetheUKhas‘exaggerateditscontributiontoCSDPoperations’,thelossfortheEUcausedbyBrexitmaybelessthansomeassume,particularlyinoperationsontheAfricancontinent.Inthenon-competitivefieldofaid–apartfromthedevaluationofthesterling–Britishcontributionsarelikelytoremainstableafterthetransition,lianaOliviéandAitorPérezpredict.Thequestionisonlyhowandviawhatchannelsmoneywillbedisbursed.TherearemanifoldwaysfortheEUandtheUKtocontinuetheircollaboration,asourchoicematrixindicates(cf.page16).Herethefuturewillinpartbeamatterofpolicypreference.

TheshadowofthequestionmarkrepresentspotentialrisksfortheUKandtheEU,andbeyond.Threatsloomall-round.TheEUwillfeelnotonlya‘gapinthebudget’,butalsothelossoftheUKasarecogniseddiplomaticactoranddevelopmentplayer,LindaMcAvanwrites.TheUKwillfacelogisticalchallengesinmanagingmigrationwithouttheEU,asGiacomoOrsinidetails.Lookingbeyondareductiveshort-termfocusontheEUandtheUK,TamsynBartonpointsouttheneedfor‘parallelandcomplementaryUKandEUprogrammes[to]reducepoverty’,andbothNicholasWestcottandPhilippeDarmuzeycallforalong-

termperspectivetomitigaterisksandsuccessfullyenvisagehowthingscouldbeafter‘thedustsettles’.

Thesmoke-ejectingBrexitboxwasopenedbythereferendumof23June2016.Itwillcloseon29March2019,bywhichtimeawithdrawalagreementmustbereachedtoavoida‘cliff-edge’Brexit.Thefollowingday,theboxwillforcefully,perhapsindefinitely,beopenedagain.ThetimeuntilMarch2019representsthecurrentwindowofbothopportunityandthreat.Untilthen,thinkersandpractitionersalike,fromEuropeandbeyond,candiscernandmakeuseofconstructivebuildingblockswhiletheyarestillwithingrasp.

Atthetimeofwriting,thesecondphaseofthenegotiations,focusedonfutureEU-UKrelations,hadstartedbutrathertimidly.Basicchoicesregardingthenatureofthefundamentalframeworkhadyettobeagreed.Thisuncertaintyaffectsmany,as‘embassiesofdevelopingcountries[are]keentoknowwhethertheywillbeabletotradewiththeUKonthesameterms’,LindaMcAvanwrites.DavidJessoplooksathowCaribbeanexportersofgoodsandservicesmightdealwithuncertainty.Bytakingawait-and-seeapproach,AlanMatthewswrites.EveniftheUKacquirestherighttorenegotiatetradeandotheragreementsuntiltheendofthetransitionin2020(asthecurrentdraftwithdrawalagreementforesees),thirdcountrieswillexpectclarityontheEU-UKrelationbeforeventuringintosuchnegotiations,asSanBilalandSeanWoolfreyobserve.

Europe’sandtheUK’spositionintheworld,andglobalrelationswithEurope,willbeinfluencedbywhether,andhowjudiciously,theBrexitboxisusedtoconfrontpendingquestionsinthelittletimethatremains.Tothispoint,topicsbeyondtheEU-UKstoryhavebeensadlyabsentfromthetoptableofBrexitdiscussions.

ThepositionsrelatedtoAfrica,development,andinternationalcooperationmorewidelyhavebeenheldhostagetothedynamicsofthewidernegotiations.Yet,theUK(traditionallyastrongglobalactorinthesefields)hasprofileditselfontheseissuesearlyinthenegotiations.Recentlyitputforwardpeaceandsecurity,humanitarianassistance,andmigrationaspriorityareasoffuturecollaboration.Someofourauthorspointtothepossibilityofmissedopportunitiesduetothelackofmutualprioritisationontheseissues.Tohelpframethedebatewebrieflyreferencesomeoftheofficialpositions(cf.p.28),alsotocompensatefortheabsenceofhigh-levelpoliticalcontributions,whichisunusualforGreatInsightsbutmightbeexplainedbytheuncertaintyandunder-prioritisationmentioned.

Great Insights | Summer 2018 | 5

Africa, Europe and Britainafter Brexit The UK’s withdrawal from the EU, set for 29 March 2019, confronts the EU with its first separation since the launch of the European project in the 1950s. In today’s global world, Brexit is certain to bring adjustment costs: for Britain, for the EU, and for the world economy. EU external relations will be particularly affected. Interaction between Europe and Africa will gradually have to be thought up anew.

ByPhilippeDarmuzey

AnewglobalandEuropeanset-upInthedecadeahead,EuropeandAfricawillneedtocomeupwithnewpartnershipstrategiesthataremanageableforasmallerEUandseizetheopportunitiesarisingfromtheBrexitvacuum.AddressingthehugechallengeposedbydemographicandmigrationtrendswillbeamajortaskfortheEUintheaftermathofBrexit.Demography,development,climatechange,security,andgeopoliticswillcontinuetoshapemigrationwithinandfromAfrica.ThenewworldorderandAfricandemographicsbeyond2025compeltheEUtoreconsidertherelevanceofitspartnershiparrangementswithAfrica.CurrentlytheseareformalisedmainlyintheACP-EUCotonouPartnershipAgreement,theJointAfrica-EUStrategy(JAES),andtheEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicypartnershipwithNorthernAfrica.TherisksandopportunitiesbroughtbyBrexitwilldependontheconditionsoftheUK’swithdrawalanditsfuturerelationshipwiththeEU.Thecurrent

ambiguityofLondon’spoliticalstrategyandtheveryrealpossibilityofdelaysorcrisesaffectingthenegotiationssuggestthatbothsideswillneedalongperiodofadjustment.Businessesandinternationalpartnersareunlikelytoknowthenewpost-BrexitpatternofUKeconomicrelationsbefore2025.ThisbodespoorlyforBritain,Europe,EU-Africarelations,andworldprospects.

Britain:Aninward-lookingcountryoranewglobalactor?ThecampaignleadinguptothereferendumofJune2016revealedthatpartsofBritishsocietyhavebecomemoreinwardlookingandhostiletowardsimmigrantsandtheEU.Ontheexternalscene,thisyear’sCommonwealthSummit,heldinLondoninApril,tookplaceagainstabackdropofscepticism.FewfounditcrediblethattheCommonwealthforumcouldofferanadequateframeworkfortheUK’sproposednewroleasaglobalhuboutsidetheEU,withLondonasthe‘SingaporeontheThames’.TheBritishambitionto

Illustration: ©Sébastien Thibault


becomeanewglobaleconomicactor,moreover,ishardtoreconcilewiththecallsof‘Brexiteers’todisconnecttheUKfromitslinkstotheworld’slargesttradebloc.Understandably,manyworldactorshavehaddifficultyperceivingthesubtletiesdifferentiatingastatusas‘àlacarteEUmember’and,asMayhasvariouslydescribedit,“adeepandspecial”or“ambitious”partnership.Economicindicators,meanwhile,signaltheuntenabilityoftheBritishgovernment’sposition.Thelatesteconomicforecast,March2018,estimatedUKeconomicgrowthatjust1.5%,thelowestlevelamongallEUmemberstates.

TheEuropeanchallenge:Disintegrationversusreconstruction,fragilityversusresilienceFutureEUexternalactiontowardsAfricawilldependonEurope’scapacitytoovercomeitsownpoliticalfragilityandthecentrifugalforcesaffectingitsNorth-SouthandEast-Westaxesofmembers.Inabrilliantconclusiontohisbook,AfterEurope,IvanKrastevdescribesthereversaloffortunesthatoccurredin2016-2017,whenmostobserverswerepredictingtheendoftheEuropeanproject:“[T]hevariouscrisestheEUisgoingthroughhavecontributed,muchmorethananyofthe(so-called)cohesionpoliciesimplementedbyBrussels,tostrengtheningthefeelingthatEuropeansareallstakeholdersinthesamepoliticalcommunity.”Byoptimisingcross-fertilisationinregionalintegrationprocesses,EuropeandAfricacantogetherbenefitfromthelessonsBrexitteachesaboutresilience.

TheagendaforchangeinEU-AfricarelationsBrexitwillunleashnewchallengesandbringopportunitiesforchangeinseveralkeyareasofEurope-Africarelations,inparticular:• TheshapingandreshapingofEUpoliciesindomainswhere

Britainusedtoplayaleadingrole,constructiveorobstructive;suchasdevelopment,trade,migration,defence,security,andglobalissues.

• TheEU’s2021-2027budget,forwhichmodernisationandreformsmightbemoresmoothlypursuedafterBrexit.Theaimisto“make[thebudget]fitforthechallengesofthe21stcentury”.ThiscouldmeanashiftfromagricultureandregionaldevelopmenttoEurope’snewchallenges,suchasmigration,defence,security,andclimatechange.ThecurrentEuropeanconsensusontheneedtosupportyouthmobilityisaprioritythatcouldbetransposabletofutureEurope-Africacooperationstrategies.

• There-negotiationoftheEU-ACPpartnershipframework.August2018willsignalthestartofnegotiationstowardsapost-CotonouACP-EUpartnershipbeyond2020.EuropeneedstorecogniseAfricaastheoverarchingpoliticalprioritywithintheACPgroup.Yet,noreallinkhasyetbeenmadebetweentherenewaloftheCotonouAgreementandtheAfrica-EUpartnershipformalisedintheJAES.Signedin2007,theJAESwastosetthestageforanewpoliticalrelationshipbetweenthetwocontinents.However,itsresultshavebeenmixed.

FortheEU,BrexitoffersanopportunitytoputanendtotwomajorshortcomingsinAfrica-EUrelations.Thefirstisthefragmentation

ofAfricanparticipation,asCotonouislimitedtosub-SaharanAfrica(only48ofthe54AUmemberstates).ThesecondistheoveralllackofambitionintheJAES,despiteitsinnovativeprincipletoconnectEuropetothewholeofAfrica.Withscatteredresourcesandnolegallybindingprovisionstoaccompanypoliticaldeclarations,theJAEShasfailedtoevolvefurtherthanacomplexmulti-institutionalframeworkbetweentheEU,theAfricanUnion,anditsregionaleconomiccommunities.

Thepost-BrexitEU-AfricapartnershipshouldencompasstheAfricancontinentasawhole,ratherthanjustthesub-SaharansegmentoftheACPpuzzle.Migration,arootcauseofBrexit,isbothachallengeandapriorityandwillconnectEuropeandAfricafortheforeseeablefuture.ThetimeisripetoliftthepoliticalambitionofEurope-Africarelationsuptothelevelofaneffectivestrategicalliance,builtonthispriorityaswellasotherareasofconcern.

KeyareasoffutureAfrica-Europe-UKinteractionInthecurrentstateofplayofthenegotiations,itishardtopredictwhatthefuturewillbringforEUexternalactioninAfrica.Themainareasofinterestare,however,clear.Development:TheUKistheworld’ssecond-largestbilateralforeignaiddonor,aftertheUnitedStates.ItprovidedODAtomorethanahundreddevelopingcountriesin2017.ArecessionintheUKwouldweakenitsabilitytofulfilitsaidanddevelopmentcommitments.TherearesomepresumptionsthattheUK’sdevelopmentpolicywillremainalignedwithEUinterestsandpoliciesafterBrexit,asthegoalsofEUaidreflectBritishinterests:prioritisingglobalpovertyreduction,combatingclimatechange,andaddressingstatefragility(seealsothearticlesbyTamsynBartonandLindaMcAvaninthisissue).Trade:TheUK’sprimarypost-Brexitfocuswillbeonstrengtheningandexpandingtraderelations.Theprospectofano-dealcrisisinautumn2018issobering.Ineconomicterms,theAfricancountriesmostreliantontradewiththeUK–Nigeria,SouthAfrica,Egypt,andKenya–wouldsuffermostiftheUKfallsintoarecession.BrexitdoesnotdiminishthecaseforacontinuedcloseassociationwithAfrica,asestablishedbytheCotonouAgreementandregionaleconomicpartnershipagreements(EPAs)(seeKennes,2018).Intheshortterm,AfricaanditsregionaleconomiccommunitiesmaybeunabletorenegotiatetheireconomicandtradearrangementswithBritainortoreviewtheirpositionsintheEPAswiththeEU.ButBrexitcouldopensomepolicyspaceforamoreambitiousframeworkthatwouldgraduallycoverallAfrica-EUrelations,allowingincreasedtradeanddevelopmentcoherencebetweensub-SaharanAfricaandNorthernAfrica(ontradegenerally,seethearticlesbyAlanMatthewsandSanBilal&SeanWoolfreyinthisissue).Securityanddefence:WithdrawaloftheUKfromtheEUCommonSecurityandDefencePolicyhasimplicationsfortheEU’ssecurityactivitiesinAfrica.ItwillaffectEUfinancialcontributionstotheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture,andthusdonors’abilitytomaintainsupportlevels.Ontheotherhand,theEUseemslikelytospeedupitsintegrationprocessondefenceandsecurity,


basedonthePermanentStructuredCooperation(PESCO)initiativewhich,onlyafewmonthsago,wasnotconsideredcredible.Britainimpededever-closerunioninthisarea.Post-Brexitunexpectedopportunitiesmaythusarise.InJune2018,theEuropeandefenceministersdiscussedaproposaltoopenPESCOtocountriesoutsidetheEU,suchastheUnitedStates,Norway,andtheUK.ThisoffersnewprospectsforEUexternalaction,especiallyintheframeworkofEurope-Africapeaceandsecurityrelations(onsecuritycooperationafterBrexit,seethearticlebySimonDukeinthisissue).Migration:AnumberofpoliticalandtechnicalobstaclestoimmigrationfromAfricacouldarisefollowingtheUK’swithdrawalfrom,potentially,allfourcirculationfreedomsprovidedbythesingleEuropeanmarket.Therecent‘Windrushgeneration’scandaldrewattentiontothefragilityofBritishimmigrationpolicyandpublicservicemanagementdatingbacktoTheresaMay’sdaysashomesecretary.LackofclarityonthepresentorfutureresidencestatusofimmigrantsoriginatinginAfricanCommonwealthstatesentailsseriousrisks(onmigrationafterBrexit,seethearticlebyGiacomoOrsiniinthisissue).Regionalintegration:BrexitchallengestheEuropeanintegrationprojectandeventheEU’scredibilityinpromotingregionalintegration.However,italsopresentslearningopportunitiesforregionalintegrationinAfrica.TheUK,too,isunlikelytoabandonregionalintegrationasapriorityinAfrica.Furthermore,itseemslikelytocontinuesupportingthelinkbetweentradeanddevelopmentpursuedintheEPAs.Globalissues:TheUKhasbeenproactiveonglobalissues,likeclimatechangeandtheSustainableDevelopmentGoals(SDGs).ItwillcertainlywanttoretainthisinfluencethroughcloselinkswiththeEU.Indeed,BrexitthreatenstheUK’sreputationasaglobalagendasetter.WithouttheabilitytoprojectpowerthroughtheEU,Britain’sinfluenceinotherinternationalforumswilldiminish.

Overall,whilethenewBritishgovernmentwillfocusonsecuringshort-termeconomicbenefits,Africancountrieswillincreasinglyturntowardsotherfundingandtradingpartners,suchasChina,Brazil,andIndia.TheremainingEUcountrieswillneedtocounterBritain’sexitbyincreasedengagementintrade,development,andsecuritypoliciesinAfrica.ThedraftMFFconfirmsanEUambitiontostaythecourseofstrengtheningitsrelationswithAfrica.

RevampingEurope-AfricarelationsA2018reportbytheAddisAbabaInstituteforPeaceandSecurityStudiesaptlystates,“TheEUmotto,‘UnitedinDiversity’,appliestodaymoresothanever…InthemidstofuncertaintyinEurope,Africashould,morethanever,viewitsdiversityasanopportunityforgreaterregionalintegration.”

Fourdirectionsofactionandresearchcouldrenderpost-BrexitEUexternalactionmorefocusedonthenewchallengesfacingAfricaandEurope.First,EuropeanandAfricanintegrationprocessesneedtobereactivatedthroughincreasinglyeffectivecommunication

andparticipationofcitizensonbothsidesoftheMediterranean.Greateryouthmobilitycouldcontributetothisgoal.

Second,drasticreconsiderationneedstobegiventothenegotiationsonthefollow-uparrangementsfortheACP-EUpartnership.Thepartnershipneedstobeadaptedtonewrealitiesintermsofcostsandefficiency;institutionalcomplexityshouldbereduced;andamajorsimplificationandunificationlaunchedoffinancialinstrumentsincludingtheEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF).Furthermore,post-2020ACP-EUpoliticaldialogueanddevelopmentcooperationinstrumentsneedtobeeffectivelyregionalised,withtheadditionofNorthernAfricatomakethenewpartnershipgeostrategicallyinclusive.

Third,inaworldofmultiplealliances,theglobalchallengesfacedbyEuropeandAfricaprovidenewimpetusfortheircontinent-to-continentrelations.TheJAESshouldbeupgradedtoalegally-bindingallianceformutualassistanceonpeace,defence,andsecurity;onmigrationandmobility;andonsustainabledevelopment.TheEUandAU,andtheirstrategicallies,includingBritain,shouldengagecollectivelyonthekeychallengesofthe21stcentury.Last,butnotleast,strategicthinkingisneededonUK-EUrelationsbeyond2030.OncethedustofBrexitsettles,andBritainandEuropehavecompletedtheircouplestherapy,anewEU-UKrelationshipintheformofanassociationagreementcanbeconsidered(assuggestedbyEuropeanparliamentarianGuyVerhofstadt).Hence,withoutprejudicetotheUK’ssovereignty,theacquisofEuropeanintegrationandexternalaction,includingBritain’scontributions,wouldnotbelost.

ReferencesKennes,Walter(2018),HowBrexitmayaffectACP-EUrelations:Anhistoricalperspective.DiscussionPaper220.Maastricht:ECDPM.http://ecdpm.org/DP220

AbouttheauthorPhilippeDarmuzeyishonorarydirectoroftheEuropeanCommission.Heresearches,teaches,andwritesonEurope-Africarelations,thesecurity-developmentnexus,anddevelopmentcooperation,partneringwithinstitutionssuchastheUniversityofBordeauxIV-Montesquieu,variousEuropeanandAmericananalyticalandresearchinstitutesandnetworks(ECDPM,EARN,CERIS,CERDRADI,DENVERU/AfricaToday),andmedianetworks(VOXAfrica).Twitter:@PhDarmuzey


UK foreign and defence interest in Africa has grown, but is challenged by capacity constraints and political inertia heightened by Brexit. Yet, there is a UK generational and strategic renewal under way in relation to foreign policy issues including Africa, especially around soft power. But it is far from clear if this will emerge post-Brexit and lead to a resurgence of influence for the UK in Africa.

Will UK leaders engage more with Africa?

ByTomCargill

FromaUKdiplomaticanddefenceperspective,AfricahasrisenontheUKagendainrecentyears,albeitfromaverylowbase.FordecadesAfricawasgenerallyseenaseitheranirrelevantbasketcaseordevelopmentproject.Thereisnowgrowingrecognitionthatinaworldofrenewedmultipolarcompetition,thesupportofAfrican

statesisvaluabletotheUK.Moreover,thereisanemerginggenerationofleadershipinsidetheUK’sForeignandCommonwealthOffice(FCO)thathassignificantAfricaexperience.Justastherewasonceaprobablyoverblownperceptionthat‘Arabists’dominateddecision-makingandthoughtintheFCO,thereisnowan‘Africanist’contingent.Thisby

definitionbringsagreaterawarenessoftheopportunitiesandthreatsthatthiscomplexanddivergingcontinentrepresentsfortheUK.AfricacontrolsalmostathirdofUNGeneralAssemblyvotes,andsoonitwillprovide40%oftheworld’spopulation.

UKsecurityanddefencepolicysimilarlyreflectsagrowingappreciationof


In the UK, a fundamental shift is under way in wider government, both generationally and in worldview, that may tend towards a deeper engagement with African

issues.

theexpandingtraditionalandnon-traditionalthreatstotheUKrootedinonepartofAfricaoranother,whetherinrelationtomigration,climatechange,publichealth,terrorism,ortransnationalcrime.ThisisdemonstratedinUKgovernmentpolicy.The2015StrategicDefenceandSecurityReviewandthe2018NationalSecurityCapabilityReviewbothhighlightedthosethreats,alongwithsomeopportunitiesofferedbyAfricanstates.

Post-Brexit,barringawidespreadeconomicorpoliticalcrisisintheUKorlargepartsofAfrica,thistrendofasteadymoderationinUKforeignanddefenceperspectivesislikelytocontinue.Therewillbeanongoingdifferentiationofpolicytowardsthosecountriesandregionsmovingtowardsorthroughmiddleincomestatus,incontrasttoregionsorcountriesdeemedas‘failing’,orsimplypoor.

Withinthis,threelinkedfactorsarelikelytodrivethenatureofUKdiplomacyinAfrica:theUK’swiderinternationalpositionanddirection,itscapacityandappetiteinAfrica,andthealternativesoftpowerrelationshipsemergingforAfricanstates.

TheUK’swiderinternationalpositionTheUK’swiderinternationalpositionsitsattheveryheartofthechallengescurrentlyfacingthecountry.Whilemuchisbeyondthescopeofthisarticle,underneaththerathersclerotictoplevelpoliticsintheUK,afundamentalshiftisunderwayinwidergovernment,bothgenerationallyandinworldview,thatmaytendtowardsadeeperengagementwithAfricanissues.Thisisdueinparttoaperiodof20yearsorsowhennewandlessreductiveperspectivesonAfricaissuesweremakingtheirwayinto

mainstreampolicydebateintheUK.Butitisalsoafunctionofagrowingawarenessofthefundamentalcultural,demographic,technological,andothershiftsunderwayglobally,andanappetitefortheUKpost-BrexittobemoreproactiveinoptimisingtheseshiftsforthebenefitoftheUK.Insomerespects,foreignanddefencebureaucratsandyoungerpoliticiansseemmoreawareoftheseshiftsthanthemainstreammediaorthoughtleaders.

Yetitisthecurrentpoliticalimpassewhichisironicallycreatingspaceformoreimaginativeandfocusedlongertermthinking.Whetheritwillemergeinpolicypost-Brexitisunclearanddependentonmanyfactors,butifthereissignificantgenerationalleadershipchangeitwilllikelyfavourastrongforeignanddefencefocusonthosepartsofAfrica,suchastheSahel,whichposethegreatestchallenges,aswellasonregions,suchasEastAfrica,thatareattheheartofrenewedmultilateralcompetition.

CapacityandappetiteinAfricaDespiterecentBrexit-relatedincreasesinfunding,includingthereopeningofsmallUKdiplomaticpostsinLesothoandSwaziland,theUKForeignOfficehassufferedlong-termdecline,notjustinnetworksize,butalsoinlanguage

skillsanditsLondon-basedanalytical,administrative,andpolicyfunctions.Inrecentyears,itsAfricafootprintandstaffinghasmoderatelyimprovedinrelationtootherregionalnetworks,butitremainsstretchedtocoveritslargestgeographicregioninasubstantiveway.

Smallerposts,inparticular,arehighlydependentonthequalityofthediplomatsrunningthem,whichbringsinevitablevariabilityinperformance.ThetrendtowardsappointingyoungerdiplomatstoambassadorialpositionshasparticularchallengesinAfricanstateswhereageandauthorityarecloselyintertwined.

Defenceissimilarlyresource-challengedintheUK,withtheexperienceofIraqandAfghanistanstillhangingheavilyoverconsiderationsofpotentialexpeditionarydeploymentsofthetypeprobablyrequiredweretheUKtowishtoprojectpowerunilaterallyinmostofAfrica.Ontheflipside,thereisgrowingawarenessofthevalueofdefenceengagement,assetoutintheUK’s2017DefenceEngagementStrategy.Thishasledtotheincreaseddeploymentofsmallnumbersofmilitarypersonneltosupportregionalandlocalpeace,security,andstabilisationefforts.

ThisculminatedintheUK’scontributionofsignificantnumbersofmilitarypersonnelinsupportofUNpeacekeepinginSomaliaandSudan,adecisionthatreverseddecadesofUKavoidanceofdirectcontributionsofforcestoUNmissions.Again,resourcesallowingsuchactionswilllikelybeexpandedpost-Brexit.Howeverinrelationtobothdiplomacyanddefence,thelossofthemultilateralburden-sharingopportunitiesofferedbyEUmembershipwillplacefargreateronusontheUKtocommit


itsownresourcestocompensate.Atpresentitisfarfromclearwhetherthereistheappetitetodoso.ThealternativeisacceleratingdiminutionofUKinfluencepost-Brexit,wheninfluencewillbegreatlyrequired.

SoftpowerrelationshipswithAfricanstatesThethirddriveristhelikelyalternativesforAfricaandthesoftpowerthatoftenmediatesthese.AlternativesareexpandingasrivalandemergingpowerscourtAfricanstates,whichthemselveshaveeverfeweremotionalreasonsforaligningwiththeUKonanyparticularissue.TheUK’srecentlossofkeyvotesattheUN,amongothers,onthecontestedChagosIslands,andthelossofitsseatontheUNInternationalCourtofJustice–forthefirsttimeinover70years–wererealwake-upcallsforacountrythathadassumeditcommandedmoresupportinternationally.Africanstatesplayedkeyrolesindecidingboththesematters.

Post-Brexitthechallengewillgrow,asEUmemberstatesdeepenandadvancetheirowncollectiveinterests,sometimesatoddswiththeUKposition.MuchofthegroundworkfordiplomaticengagementinAfrica,aselsewhere,isprovidedbythatsteadydrumbeatofsocial,cultural,andsportinginteractionsemanatingfromarangeofformalandinformalnetworks.

Perhapsmostimportantofthesearelinksoffamilyandpersonalfamiliarity.HistoricallytheUKhasbenefittedsignificantlyinlargepartsofAfrica,particularlyCommonwealthcountries,fromprovidingeducational,business,andleisureopportunitiesforfuturedecision-makerstospendtimeintheUK.At58,moreworldleadershavestudiedintheUKthaninany

othercountry,asignificantnumberofthemfromAfrica.

TheopportunityandencouragementtovisittheUKforbusinesshasbuiltdeeprelationshipsandfamiliaritythatarethebasisforcommonperspectivesonglobalissues.UKinstitutions–fromtheBBCWorldServicetotheBritishCouncil,PremierLeague,FormulaOne,andBritishfashionandmusic–haveplayedanoutsizedroleinsecuringasympathetichearingforUKdiplomatsandpositions.

Yetthecontinuingpowerofallthesesourcesofinfluenceisnowsomewhatinthebalanceforanumberofreasons.ThesignalsbeingsentinternationallyonwhethertheUKisstillawelcomingdestinationforstudy,business,orleisurearemixedatbest.Thelong-termimpactofthisisunclear.Thenatureandqualityofsupportforbusinessandculturalinstitutionstocontinue,letaloneexpandtheirinternationalambitionsdependsuponadelicatebalanceofleadership,support,andencouragement,whichappearsatpresentinsufficientorabsentastheUKgovernmentgrappleswithBrexit.

ChallengeofleadershipThisleadershipchallengesitsattheheartofallthreeofthefactors

outlinedaboveandappliestoissuesofforeignanddomesticpolicyfarwiderthanAfrica.ButithasaspecialresonanceinrelationtoUKpolicytowardssuchacomplexandfastchangingcontinentwhichislikelytoposesomanychallengesaswellasbringopportunitiesfortheUKandthewiderinternationalsysteminthecomingdecades.Asnotedabove,therearespecificreasonsforbelievingthatarenewalinUKstrategicthinkingisunderway,iflargelyhiddenfromview,andthatindividualswithanunderstandingofAfricaareactiveinsuchdiscussions.

Africanissuescertainlywon’tdropofftheagenda,whateverchangesareunderwayintheUK.ButwhetherarealrevitalisationofUKengagementwithAfricanstatesispossibleorevenlikelyisunclearatpresent.MuchdependsonhoweconomicanddemocraticissuesintheUKplayoutafter2020.Inaneraofunprecedentedandgrowingvolatility,intheUKandtheworld,somedeepandprofounduncertaintiesremainthatwillbevitalindeterminingtheimpactofUKpoliciestowardsAfrica.

AbouttheauthorTomCargillisexecutivedirectoroftheBritishForeignPolicyGroup,anewnot-for-profitorganisationcommittedtoimprovingthequalityofnationaldebateontheUK'sinternationalpositionandchoices.Twitter:@tom1cargill

Alternatives are

expanding as rival and

emerging powers court

African states, which

themselves have ever

fewer emotional reasons

for aligning with the UK

on any particular issue.


Breaking away? The developing world and the future of multilateralism Brexit will have unpredictable consequences. The short term may bring little change for developing countries in general and Africa in particular. But in the long term, serious economic and relational changes could weaken them, the UK, and the EU.

ByNicholasWestcott

Illustration: ©Banksy

ConsequencesofBrexitBrexit,initselfanunpredictedevent,willhavemanyunpredictableconsequences,fortheUK,fortheEU,andfortherestoftheworld.Whileallcountrieswillbeimpactedinsomeway,forthosecloselylinkedtotheUKandEUthroughtradeordependentonthemfordevelopmentsupport,theimpactcouldbegreaterthananticipated.

Intheimmediateterm,therewillinprinciplebenomajorfinancialchanges.BoththeUKandtheEUwillcontinuetodevoteasmuchthroughtheirdevelopmentbudgetsasbefore.Theywilljustdoitseparately,thoughthatdisengagementwilltaketime.TheUKhasalreadyhintedatawillingnesstocontinueworkingthroughEUinstitutions,atleastonaselectivebasis(cf.thearticlebyIlianaOliviéandAitorPérezinthisvolume).Thiswouldmakesense.TheUK’sown

DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)ratesEUprogrammesasprettygoodvalueformoney.TheUKalreadyspendslargeamountsthroughothermultilateralorganisations,suchastheWorldBankandUN,andmanagingthe£1billionayear(oftheUK’s£13.4billionaidbudget)currentlyspentthroughtheEUwouldrequiresignificantextrastaffinDFID.Moreover,thefiveprinciplesofUKdevelopmentpolicyoutlinedbyUKpoliticianPennyMordauntina12AprilspeechaligncloselywiththeEU’soverallaidstrategy,whichtheUKplayedanimportantpartinshaping.Whateverthetermsofseparation,thisalignmentislikelytocontinue.Seealsothechoicematrixinthisissueonpage16.

Thetransitionperioduntil2020willallowalittlemoretimetoadjust,duringwhichtradeflowsshouldcontinueunimpeded.Britainwillsticktoits0.7%pledge,thoughtheslower


For Africa and other developing

countries, Brexit is a golden

opportunity to secure better access,

greater protection, and more aid

from Britain.

economicgrowthresultingfromBrexitwillmakeitworthless.TheOverseasDevelopmentInstitute(ODI)estimatedthatthe10%fallinthevalueofsterlingimmediatelyaftertheBrexitvotewiped$1.9billionoffthedollarvalueoftheUK’sannualoverseasaid(ODI,2017).

Overthenext2-3yearstherewill,nevertheless,beasignificantchangeinrelationsbetweentheUKandthedevelopingworld.Thisrelationshiphasalreadybeenthroughbigchangesinthelast70years,fromEmpiretoCommonwealthandACP.SomeBrexiteersbelievetheUKwill“rediscover”theCommonwealthandbuildanewdeeperrelationshipwiththosecountries.TheCommonwealthSummitmeetingthisAprilagreedonanumberofspecificinitiativesonplastic,girls’education,andmalaria.Butthecommuniquédidnotsuggestatransformativechangeintherelationship.TherewillneverthelessbeaclearshiftinthepowerbalancebetweentheUKandtheemergingeconomiesofAfrica,Asia,theCaribbean,andthePacific.

Inthelongerterm,theglobalrepercussionsofBrexitwilllikelyhavesignificantimpactonpoorercountries’positionintheworld,asthepost-warstructureofmultilateralinstitutionsitselfcomesunderstrainandbeginstofray.

Cuttingaquickdeal?TheUKhaspledgedthatitwillmaintainquota-free,duty-freeaccessforallleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs)totheUKmarketundertheWorldTradeOrganizationEverythingbutArms(EBA)agreement.Moreover,theUKInternationalTradeSecretaryispressingforfreetradedealswithemergingeconomiesthatarebetterthanexistingEUones.ButwithcurrenttraderelationsgovernedlargelybyEUagreements,whichwillcontinuetoapplyduringthetransition(theeconomicpartnershipagreements,EPAs),thenatureofsuchpost-BrexitdealswilldependheavilyonthetradedealeventuallycutwiththeEUitself.ItseemsunlikelythatdevelopingcountrieswilloffertheUKgreateraccesstotheirmarketsthantheEU,exceptinareaswheretheyfearnocompetitionfromBritain.Onthecontrary,manywillbe

lookingforgreaterprotectionfortheirdomesticmarketsthantheyhaveundertheEUEconomicPartnershipAgreements(EPAs).

ManyfeelthatintheBrexitcontexttheUKisthedemandeur,andtheyhavethenegotiatingadvantage.ForAfricaandotherdevelopingcountries,Brexitisagoldenopportunitytosecurebetteraccess,greaterprotection,andmoreaidfromBritainthantheyhadwhileitwasintheEU.FortheUK,itisachancetopartnerwiththepotentialAfricanContinentalFreeTradeArea(CFTA),approvedby44AfricangovernmentsatthespecialAfricanUnionmeetinginKigaliinMarch2018,therebyopeningawidermarkettoitsexporters.

Buttherearechallenges.WilltheUKbewillingtoofferlooserrulesoforigin,forexample,ontextiles,fordevelopingcountryimports,andgreaterprotectionagainstUKexports,suchasservices,thantheEUcurrentlydoes,evenifitputsBritish

businessatadisadvantage?Itwillbeatoughsell.Andeasierimports,whichwouldbealowcostwayfortheUKtofavouritstradewithdevelopingcountries,couldcomeatahighcostinUKtraderelationswiththeEU.Also,howfastwillAfricabeabletodeliveronitsCFTAvision,especiallywithNigeria,SouthAfrica,andTanzaniahesitatingtojoin?Sotradedealsmaytaketimetoworkthrough,unlesstheUKsimplyreplicatesEUtermsbyrollingovertheEPAs.Inthatcase,expectfewquickwinsforeitherside.

WorkingtogetherTheUKalreadyhasstrongbilateralrelationswithmanydevelopingcountries,aboveall,thoseintheCommonwealth.Itwillundoubtedlyseektostrengthenthese,asfarasitsresourcesallow.Butmanyofthesetiesarenotwithouthistoricalcomplexityandoccasionaltension,somethingfromwhichtheEUismercifullyfree.UKrelationswithIndia,Kenya,Nigeria,andSouthAfricahaveallhadtheirupsanddowns.

OneoftheparadoxesfordevelopingcountriesisthatBrexitmakesrelationswiththeUKbothmoreandlessimportant.MoreimportantbecauseasaseparateentitytheycannolongertreatitcollectivelywithEUpartners,leaning

One of the paradoxes for

developing countries is that Brexit

makes relations with the UK both

more and less important.


‘Global Britain’ is a great slogan,

but meaningless if it implies

opposition to people coming to live

and work in the UK.

onitseparatelywhentheywish.LessimportantbecauseinfluencingtheUKwillnolongerdirectlyimpacttheEU’sposition,andtheUKwillfindithardertodefenditspartnersintheirnegotiationswiththeEU–forexample,innegotiatingthepost-Cotonouarrangements,whichwillstillmattermoretomostdevelopingcountriesthantheirbilateraleconomicrelationswiththeUK.

Itisimportanttorecognisethatmoneyalonedoesnotbuyinfluence.FortheUK,beingadevelopmentsuperpowerdoesnotautomaticallybringpoliticalinfluence.Thatrequiresengagement.AcrossAfrica,inCommonwealthandnon-Commonwealthcountriesalike,Britainwillhavetostepupitsdiplomaticeffortsandministerialengagementifitistomaintainitsinfluence,asrecentvotesintheUNonDiegoGarcia,theWorldHealthOrganization,andInternationalCourtofJusticehaveshown.

Therecentscandalabouttheimmigrationtreatmentofthe‘Windrushgeneration’illustrateshoweasilyBritishinfluencecanbelostthroughimplementationoftheverypoliciesthatpoweredtheBrexitvote.‘GlobalBritain’isagreatslogan,butmeaninglessifitisaccompaniedbypoliciesthatdiscouragepeoplefromcomingtoliveandworkintheUK.

Theworlddoesn’tstandstillInthelongterm,10-20yearshence,historiansmayseethegreatestimpactofBrexitasitsunintendedconsequences.ForemostoftheseistheweakeningofthemultilateralsystemofwhichtheEUisanintegralandleadingpart.

Themultilateralsystemhingesoncountries’willingnesstocollaborateandcompromiseratherthanconfrontandriskconflict.TheEUdemonstratesthatthishasbenefitsintermsofeconomicsandsecurity.Itisthereforeanexamplethatmany,fromtheAfricanUniontotheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations(ASEAN)havesoughttoemulate.ThefactthatsomanyUKcitizenswerenolongerwillingtomakethepoliticalcompromisesnecessarytostaywithintheEUbutpreferredtoconfrontit–onimmigrationandtheruleoflawinparticular–sendsaworryingsignalatatimewhenthe

multilateralsystemitselfisunderthreatfromthosewhobelievetheyarebigenoughtogetwhattheywantbilaterally.ThelessonofthecrisesinUkraine,Syria,andtheSouthChinaSeaisthat,forthosepowers,ifyouareaclientstateyouwillgetfullsupportwhateveryoudo;ifyouarenot,youriskconflict.

Smallanddevelopingcountrieshavebeentheprimebeneficiariesofthemultilateralsystem.Theygrumble,withsomejustice,thatitisskewedintheinterestsofthegreatpowersandtheWest,whichcreatedit.Africa,inparticularhasstruggledtosecureadequaterepresentationinglobalfora.

Butthesystemhasprovidedthemguaranteesandprotectionsagainstthekindofclientelistglobalpoliticsandprotectionist/mercantilisteconomicpoliciesthatcharacterisedtheinter-warperiodandtheColdWarandthatsomepowersnowwanttoreimpose.Thelast30yearshaveseengreatstridesinensuringdevelopmentaidisnottiedtopoliticalcomplianceordiplomaticsupportforanothercountry.Themultilateralagenciesguaranteeaccesstomarketsandfinanceonanon-discriminatorybasis,whichisessentialifAfricaandothersaretoacceleratedevelopment.Itisthereforecriticalformostdevelopingcountriestopreserveandstrengthenthissystem,notletitdecay.

InsofarasBrexitweakenstheEUandweakensthemultilateralsystem,Britainanddevelopingcountrieswillneedtoworktogetherandharder,withtheEU,tosustaintheintegrityandincreasetheeffectivenessofthesystemforthebenefitofall.

AbouttheauthorNicholasWestcottisdirectoroftheRoyalAfricanSocietyandformerlymanagingdirectorattheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS).Twitter:@NickWestcottRAS


While it is important to understand how the EU and the UK move forward in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, it is equally important for African stakeholders to understand whether the uncertainty created poses an opportunity or a threat to their interests.

Beach in South-Africa. Photo: Pixabay

Africa’s relations with the UK: Negotiating a post-Brexit landscape

ByPhilaniMthembu

FromeuphoriatouncertaintyIftherewasalevelofeuphoriafortheBrexitcampaignersfollowingthereferendumtoexittheEU,itdidnottakelongfortherealityoftheBritishpeople’sdecisionanditsconsequencestosinkin.Thereferendum’soutcomeusheredinanuncertainperiodfortheUKanditspartners.WiththeEUpushingahardbargain,andtheBritishbureaucracyseeminglystretchedtonegotiatewiththeEUandkeypartners,itbecameclearthattheroadaheadwouldnotbeaneasyone.InasmuchasUKpoliticianshavetalkedupBritishprospectsaftertheexitfromtheEU,therealityisthattheUKisnotnegotiatingfromapositionofstrengthathomeandabroad,butfromapositionofweakness,asthegeopoliticallandscapecontinuestochange.

InternalconflictswithintheUKremainanobstacleforthekeyplayersinBritishpolitics.MembersofTheresaMay’sConservativePartyandJeremyCorbyn’sLabourPartycontinuetodisagreeontheverycontoursoftheBrexitnegotiationsandpost-Brexitorder(see,e.g.,Bienkov,2018).AsillustratedintheslidebyMichelBarnier

(reproducedinthisvolume),thedisagreementshaverevolvedaroundwhethertheUKshouldadoptthe‘Norwaymodel’andbepartoftheEuropeanEconomicArea(EEA),whetheritshouldseektobecomepartofacustomspartnership,thedateforfinalisingnegotiations,andwhethertheyshouldevenleavetheEUinthefirstplace,amongotherthings(ontheEEA,seeBBC,2018).

Lookingfromtheoutside:AviewfromAfricaFromtheAfricanstandpoint,thiscreatesperceptionsofacountryunsureofitselfanditsfuturedirection.Indeed,thepicturefromAfricaisofacountrystrugglingtofaceuptotheconsequencesoftheBrexitreferendum.CountlessparliamentarysessionsandanalysesfromthebusinesscommunityandthinktankshaveasyetbeenunabletocapturetheramificationsofBrexitforAfrica’songoingrelationswiththeUKandtheEU.SouthAfricaisoneoftheUK’slargesttradingpartnersinAfrica,withbilateraltradereachingalmost£10billion(R173billion)in2017.TherehasthereforebeenmuchinterestwithinSouthAfricaintheunfoldingdevelopments.Atthetimeofwriting,thesecondphaseoftheBrexitnegotiations

https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-44038476


Africa’s relations with the UK: Negotiating a post-Brexit landscape

isongoing.ThissecondphaseofthenegotiationsdealswiththefutureofEU-UKrelations,whichinevitablywillimpactthepositionofboththeEUandtheUKintheworld.WhileitisimportanttounderstandhowtheEUandtheUKmoveforward,itisequallyimportantforAfricanstakeholderstodiscernwhethertheuncertaintycreatedposesanopportunityorathreat.

CantheUKdeliveronitsassurances?TheUKhassoughttoassureAfricanpartnersthatBrexitoffersmoreopportunities,particularlyforexpandingexistingtradeanddevelopmentpartnerships.However,whetherthispromisematerialisesremainstobeseen,astheUKcontinuestobepreoccupiedwithitsmostimportanttask:accomplishingitsexitfromtheEU.Thiswillcontinuetoconsumemuchofitsenergy,forcingtheBritishbureaucracytoprioritiseitstradeanddevelopmentpartners.Theleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs)havereceivedassurancesofcontinueddutyfreeaccesstotheBritishmarket,andthereishopethattheUKwilladoptlooserrulesoforiginthanthoseoftheEU.

MarkPrice,UKMinisterofStateforTrade,statedduringa2017visitinsouthernAfricathattheUK’swithdrawalfromtheEUwouldnotmeanawithdrawalfromtheworld,butanincreasedopennessandopportunitiesforpartnercountries(seePrice,2017).HealsoreiteratedtheUK’scommitmentnottodisruptthetraderelationshipundertheEU-SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC)EconomicPartnershipAgreement(EPA)astheUKleavestheEU.HemetwithtradeministersandrepresentativesfromBotswana,Lesotho,Mozambique,Namibia,SouthAfrica,andSwaziland.Othermeetingshavealsobeentakingplacewithkeytradeanddevelopmentpartnersacrossthecontinent.

Followingthereferendum,TanzaniachosetonotratifytheregionalEPA,seekinginsteadtowaitthingsoutandpossiblygetabetterdealwiththeUK(Gopaldas,2018a).However,thepriorityoftheUKwillcontinuetobetheEU,wherethereareatleast759treatiestoberenegotiated,aneffortthatwillconsumemuchoftheeffortsoftheUKbureaucracy(Gopaldas,2018b).ThiswillchallengetheBritishbureaucracy’scapabilitytodeliveronitsmultipleassurancestotradepartners.

AnopportunityforAfrica’sleadingeconomies?WritingintheleaduptotheCommonwealthSummitofHeadsofState,MabuthoShangase(April2018)arguesthatAfricaiscurrentlybetterpoisedthaneverbeforetostrikefavourabledealswiththeUK.HealsoarguesthatBritainneedsAfricaandtheCommonwealthnations,astheyareasignificantmarketwithanestimatedpopulationof2.4billionpeople.HepositsthattheCommonwealthnationsstandtobenefitmorefromtheirtraderelationswiththesuperiorEUmarketthanwiththestand-aloneBritishmarket.Indeedin2016,theEUprovidedAfricawith€21billionindevelopmentcooperationand €32billioninprivateinvestment,andmuchofAfrica’span-AfricaninstitutionscontinuetobefundedbytheEU(Maré,2018).Giventhisreality,Africa’s

leadingeconomieswillseektoextractgreaterbenefitsfromaweakerUKeagertoshowitspartnersthatitisopenforbusiness.

WhenonecouplesthiswiththemanyAfricansuitorsthatalreadyexist,itbecomesclearthattheUKwillbeplayingcatch-up.WhilerelationsremainstrongwithAfricancountries,manyofwhichwereoncecolonies,itremainstobeseenhowtheUKonitsowncancompetewithdiverseactorssuchasChina,India,theEU,Turkey,theUnitedStates,SouthKorea,andJapan.AlloftheseactorshavetheirownregularsummitswiththeirAfricancounterpartstodiscusstrade,development,andsecuritymattersaffectingthecontinentanditspartnersandhavegrowntheirfootprintonthecontinentinrecentyears.TheUKisthusengagingwithAfricaatatimewhenmanymoreoptionsareavailabletothecontinent.ThisshouldbodewellforsomeofAfrica’sleadingeconomies,whichoftenhaveagreaterabilitytonegotiatetradedealsintheirfavour.Indeed,theEUwillbeouttoprovethatitisstillthemostlucrativemarket,whiletheUKwillbeouttomakeacaseforitselfinthepost-Brexitorder.

References• BBCNews(2018,9May),‘Brexit:PeerscallforUKto

remaininEuropeanEconomicArea’.www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-44038476

• Bienkov,Adam(n.d.),‘TheresaMay'scabinetinchaosasBorisJohnsoncallsherBrexitplans“crazy”’.BusinessInsiderSouthAfrica.www.businessinsider.co.za/theresa-may-cabinet-in-chaos-as-boris-johnson-calls-her-brexit-customs-union-plans-crazy-2018-5

• Gopaldas,Ronak(13April,2018a),‘CanAfricabethebigBrexitwinner?’ISSToday.www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-04-13-iss-today-can-africa-be-the-big-brexit-winner/#.Wv57kYjRAdV

• Gopaldas,Ronak(2018b,13April),‘Startingatnextweek’sCommonwealthsummit,smartmovesfrombothsidescouldbenefittheUKandAfrica’.ISSToday.www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-04-13-iss-today-can-africa-be-the-big-brexit-winner/#.Wv58ukjRAdW

• Maré,John(2018,5March),‘Uncertaintiesofapost-BrexitworldbringopportunitiesforSAandAfrica’.BusinessDay.www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-03-05-uncertainties-of-a-post-brexit-world-bring-opportunities-for-sa-and-africa/

AbouttheauthorPhilaniMthembuisexecutivedirectorattheInstituteforGlobalDialogue(IGD),anindependentSouthAfrica-basedforeignpolicythinktankdedicatedtotheanalysisof,anddialogueon,theevolvinginternationalpoliticalandeconomicenvironmentandtheroleofAfricaandSouthAfrica.IGDisassociatedwiththeUniversityofSouthAfrica.Twitter:@M_Philani

https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Africa/uk-africa-trade-will-be-even-better-after-brexit-20170811

https://www.fin24.com/Economy/Africa/uk-africa-trade-will-be-even-better-after-brexit-20170811

https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-04-13-iss-today-can-africa-be-the-big-brexit-winner/#.WvG063--mpo

https://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2018-04-13-iss-today-can-africa-be-the-big-brexit-winner/#.Wx2TfC-PCup

http://igd.org.za/research/infocus/11845-the-commonwealth-heads-of-government-meeting-chogm-2018-brexit-and-the-imperial-re-turn

https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/opinion/2018-03-05-uncertainties-of-a-post-brexit-world-bring-opportunities-for-sa-and-africa/


CHOICE MATRIX: FUTURE EU-UK COLLABORATION ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

POLICY ALIGNMENT METHOD

Lowalignment

EU/UK policies can be more or less aligned at any given geographic level/in any given area

Methods of collaboration can be more or less structured at any given geographic level/in any given area

Ad hocHighalignment

Structured

A.GLOBAL

E.g. UN/OECD

1.Forms of decision-making/Fora

2.Programmes and policy initiatives

TheUKwillshiftitsattentiontobolsteritsengagementinglobaldecision-makingfora.

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

UK&EUcontinuetosharepolicies:SDGs,ParisClimateChangeAgenda,ConsensusforDevelopment.

B.CAPITAL TO CAPITAL

E.g. Londonto Paris/London to Brussels

TheUKwillpartiallyshiftitsattentiontobilateralcooperationschemesincludingwithEUcountries.Proliferationofbilateralsummits,e.g.theFR-UKsummitinJanuary2018.

EU-UKSpecialFrameworkforcollaboration.

TheUKwillshiftitsattentiontobilateralpolicyinitiatives,alsoattheoperationallevel.

C.REGIONS

E.g. Africa/Horn of Africa

UKparticipationinsigningontopolicyframeworksasanassociatemember(e.g.EU-Africaorpost-Cotonou?).

TheUKasanobservertoEUcoordinationmeetings;e.g.EUcoordinationbeforetheAfricanUnionPartners’Group(AUPG).

Jointprogrammes&policyinitiativesinrelationto(other)regions.

D.IN-COUNTRY LEVEL

E.g. Tanzania/ Cambodia

CollaborationbetweenUKandEUHeadsofMission(HoM)/HeadsofCooperation(HoC).

Jointprogrammes&policyinitiativesinspecificcountries,e.g.collaborationbetweenHoM/HoC.


A.GLOBAL

Choice matrix continues...

3. Personnel and skills

4.Money flows

Thematic collaborationThematic issues e.g. migration, humanitarian aid, defence, peace and stability could appear at every level within the matrix.

Thematic collaboration can occur at any given geographic level/in any given area.

June 2018

TIMELINE

UK a member state

UK third state/transition period (principle of sincere cooperation applies) New partnership unless cliff-edge Brexit

Policy alignment, method or thematic collaboration can differ according to timing.

29 March 2019 31 Dec 2020

Consultationorexchangebetweendevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicyexperts.

JointsupportforUN/WorldBank/Globalinitiatives/programmes.

B.CAPITAL TO CAPITAL

ConsultationorexchangebetweenHQdevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicyexperts.

JointfinancingthroughoffEUbudgetfunds,oronbudgetop-inmechanism.

C.REGIONS

Consultationorexchangedevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicyexperts.

Jointfinancingforspecificregionalintiatives(includingEUtrustfunds).

D.IN-COUNTRY LEVEL

Consultationorexchangebetweenin-countrydevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicyexperts.

GraphicD

esign:YaseenaChiu-van’tHoff

Concept:AndrewSherriffandEm

manuelD

eGroof

Incountryjointflagshipprogrammes.

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely

Very unlikely

Unlikely

Likely

Very likely


IronoreloadedtrainsattheSaldanhaterminal,SouthAfrica.Photo:Jbdodane/Flickr

FROM AFRICA TO COUNTRY MINING VISIONS

There are real benefits to continued EU-UK cooperation on development policy after Brexit, but the window of opportunity to close a deal is tight and closing fast. With the clock ticking towards the Brexit date of 29 March 2019, many questions remain about how Brexit may affect EU development policy.

ByLindaMcAvan

Time to close a deal is running out

Brexitposesrisksforbothsides.TheUKrisksalossofinfluenceandreducedreachofitssoftpower,whiletheEUstandstolosenotonlyoneofitslargestdonors,butalsoastrongvoiceintheCouncilofMinistersandgloballyfordevelopmentpolicy.Thisishappeningagainstashiftingpolicybackground,astheEUinstitutionsbeginnegotiationsonthenextEUbudget–themultiannualfinancialframework(MFF)for2021onwards.Alotisthereforeatstakeinthenext12months.

UKwillmeetspendingcommitments,butdetailsareshortonnewrelationshipTheBrexitnegotiationsarebeingconductedintwophases:thedivorcesettlement(budget,citizens’rights,NorthernIreland),ontheonehand,andthetransitionalarrangementsaswellasthefuturerelationship,ontheother.Intermsofphase1,sufficientprogresswasmade.ForthecurrentMFF,theUKiscontributingaround€7.1billiontotheEU’sdevelopmentbudget,coveringthe

DevelopmentCooperationInstrument(DCI),theEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF),andtheHumanitarianAidInstrument(HAI).Underthetermsofthetransitiondealannouncedon19March,theUKagreedtohonouritscommitmentstotheEUbudgetandtheEDF.Thisisimportant,becauseitmeansnobudgetholeandnodifficultdiscussionstoplugthegap.Intermsofphase2,thefuturerelationship,wehavefewdetails:atthetimeofwriting,theremainingissuesunderthedraft

Big Ben clock, London. Photo: Pixabay


withdrawalagreementandthefuturerelationarebeingdiscussed.SpeakinginFebruaryinMunich,UKPrimeMinisterTheresaMaysaid,‘ifaUKcontributiontoEUdevelopmentprogrammesandinstrumentscanbestdeliverourmutualinterests,weshouldbeopentothat’.

Inmanyways,2018isaperfectwindowtodefineanewEU-UKrelationshipondevelopmentpolicybecausetheEUitselfistakingafreshlookatitswholefundingframeworkandprogrammes.Indeed,thecurrentMFFexpireson31December2020–thesamedayastheUKtransitionaldealends.TheEuropeanCommission’sproposalsforthenextMFFfundinground(2021-2027),andthenewspendingprogrammestoreplacetheDCIandtheEDFfrom2021onwards,willdominatetheEUinstitutionalagendainthislastyearofthecurrentEuropeanParliamentandCommission.Atthesametime,negotiationsareunderwayonareplacementfortheCotonouAgreementwiththeAfrica,CaribbeanandPacific(ACP)countries,whichexpiresin2020.

ClarityneededontheUK’spositionTheUKgovernmentcouldusethetimeithasleftasafullplayerattheEUnegotiatingtabletoinfluencethesediscussions.TherehavebeennoformalproposalsfromtheUKsofar,onlytwonon-paperssharedwiththeEU27andsuggestionsthattheUKcouldcontributetospecificEUdevelopmentinstrumentspost-Brexit.Thesecouldbeadhoctrustfunds,theAfricaPeaceFacility(oritsreplacement),anewEDFseparatefromtheEUbudget,orinvestmentfundslikethenewEuropeanFundforSustainableDevelopment(EFSD).However,thereareobstaclestorealisingthismodel.Inexchangeforfinancialsupport,theUKwilldoubtlesswantsomesayinhowfundsarespent.TheEU27arecautiousaboutanythingthatsmacksofcherrypicking,sotheymaybereticentaboutanyspecialrolefortheUK,whichbythenwillbeathird

country.Instrumentsthatareopentothird-countrycontributions,likethetrustfunds,arestronglycontestedbytheEuropeanParliament,whichmaywantthemscrappedunderthenextMFF,overwhichithasvetopower.OntheEDF,theCommission’spreferredoptionis‘budgetisation’,alongstandingdemandoftheEuropeanParliament,thoughcontestedbysomegovernments.EveniftheEDFremainsaseparatepotofbilateralmoneyoutsidethebudget,itsruleswouldhavetochangetoallowthirdcountriestocontribute.AparallelarrangementwouldalsoneedtobefoundtoallowtheUKtoremainpartytotheCotonouagreementsuccessor–morespecialrulesthatsomemaybaulkat.

TheotherproblemistheUK’slackofclarityaboutwhatitispreparedtoputonthetable.Itsapproachseemstobetowaitandseethenewpost-2020EUdevelopmentarchitectureandpotentiallyoptinatalaterstage.TheEU27areunlikelytoshapetheirnewinstrumentstoaccommodatetheUKbykeepingtheEDFoff-budget,allowingthird-countrycontributionsandvotingrights,orcreatingnewoff-budgetinstruments,unlesstheyhavemorethanwarmwordsthattheUKmightparticipate.

TheEUwouldbenefitfromcontinuedcooperationTheEU27doeshaveaninterestinkeepingtheUKonboardpost-2020.TheUKiswellrespectedininternationaldevelopment,andthereisalotofgoodwillamongparliamentarians,ministers,andambassadorsfromtheEU27tostaycloseafterBrexit.TheUKwasamajordriveroftheEUpledgetoachievetheUN0.7%aidtargetby2015,andwhiletheEUcollectivelyhasfailedtomeetit,theUKisoneofonlyfiveEUcountriestodeliver–andtheonlyonetohaveenshrineditinlaw.TheEUiscurrentlytheworld’slargestdonorofbilateralaid,butitsnumbersincludebilateralaidfromitsmemberstatesalongsidetheEU’sowncontributions.LosingtheUKwillputaholeinthesestatisticsunlessothermemberstatesstepup.

TheUK’sDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID)hasbeenoneofthestrongestsupportersoftheCommissionDevelopment(DEVCO)andHumanitarianAid(ECHO)directorates’policyagendas.Ithaspushedthegenderdimensionofdevelopment(seeGillAllwood’scontributioninthisissue),untyingaid(thoughrecentUKpolicyisreversingthis),improvingaideffectiveness,andmaintainingastrongfocusonpovertyreductionandfragilestates.Thatsupportbecamemoreimportantinthe“leanyears”afterthe2008crash.

UKinfluencegoesbeyondgovernment.TheCommissionhasdrawnheavilyontheexpertiseofUKthinktanksandNGOsonpolicydevelopmentandaiddelivery.Post-Brexit,UK-baseddevelopmentorganisationswillnolongerbeeligibleforEUfundsorformallyconsultedonEUpolicy.Theremaybewaysaroundthis.SomemayestablishabaseinBrusselsorinanothermemberstate,whileothersmaystruggletopersuadetheirUKconstituencyoftheneedtolobbyBrusselsandnetworkwithpartners.

In many ways, 2018 is a perfect window to define a new EU-UK relationship on development policy because the EU itself is taking a fresh look at its whole funding framework and programmes.

Time to close a deal is running out


TheUKhasmosttoloseButtheUKarguablyhasmosttolosefromfailuretodeliveronthedeepandspecialpartnershipTheresaMayoftentalksabout.Intherunuptothereferendum,aUKgovernmentstudystated,‘[T]heEU’sgeographicalfocusforitsaidisbroadlyalignedwiththatoftheUK...andtheEU’swidergeographicalcoveragemeansthattheUKcanchannelaidthroughittoreachcountriestheUKcouldnotreachalone.’Thatreachiskeyinfragilestates,wheretheUKiscommittedtospendinghalfofitsaidandwheretheEUhasabroaderrangeofinstrumentsandoffersamoreintegratedapproachtotacklingproblems.JointprogrammingandpracticalcooperationonthegroundthroughEUdelegationsandenhanceUKsoftpowercouldbelost.ItisworthrememberingthatgiventhelawrequiringtheUKtospend0.7%ofitsgrossnationalincomeonaid,thereisno“savings”totheUKtreasuryfromnotworkingthroughtheEU.DFIDhasratedtheEUmoreefficientthanmanyothermultilaterals,includingUNagencies.Ifaidmustbespentsomewhere,whynotthroughatriedandtrustedpartner?

Trade:ExistingagreementsmaynotsimplyberolledoverTherehasbeenalackofdebateabouttheeffectofBrexitonourdevelopmentpartners.Oneemergingissueistrade.DevelopingcountriesarekeentoknowwhethertheywillbeabletotradewiththeUKonthesametermsafterBrexit.Currentlyleastdevelopedcountriesenjoytariff-freeaccesstotheUKmarketthroughtheEverythingButArms(EBA)agreement.OtherdevelopingcountriesenjoyahighlevelofaccesstotheEUandUKmarketsfromvarioustradeagreementsandsupportmechanismslikeAidforTrade.

TheUKgovernmentsaysitwantstocontinuetariff-freeaccessandwilltrytorollovertradeagreements,butthisisnomeanfeat.AUKtradebilliscurrentlystrandedinWestminsterbecauseofdomesticproblems,anditisuncertainifallcountrieswillbewillingtorolloverthetradetermstheyenjoywiththeEUtotheUKalone.

WindowofopportunityclosingfastInlessthanayear,UKministerswillnolongerbeattheCounciltable.DFIDofficialswillnolongerbemembersofEUworkinggroups,andBritishEuropeanParliamentarianswillbegone.Influencewillinevitablydiminish.Atthesametime,thereisariskthatthedifficultMFFandBrexitnegotiationswilleclipsethepositiveroletheUKcouldplayasapartnerinEUdevelopmentpolicy.Thewindowofopportunitytoresolvetheseissuesistightandclosingfast.Weneedprogress.

AbouttheauthorLindaMcAvanisamemberoftheEuropeanParliamentandchairoftheEuropeanParliamentCommitteeonDevelopment.Shewritesinapersonalcapacity.Twitter:@LindaMcAvanMEP

... the UK arguably

has most to lose from

failure to deliver on

the 'deep and special

partnership'.

DFID has rated the EU

more efficient than

many other multilaterals,

including UN agencies.

If aid must be spent

somewhere, why not

through a tried and

trusted partner?


Photo:ChristianWeidinger/Flickr

To the point: UK-EU coordination for the poor If they coordinate, the EU and UK could do more to benefit poor people in developing countries after the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, even if they opt to operate their development programmes and policies separately. However, given path-dependencies and current pressures, the best post-Brexit outcome would arise from a form of collaboration where domestic objectives are moderated by acting multilaterally.

ByTamsynBarton

TheEuropeanUnionisunique.Ithasgonefartherthananyotherinternationalinstitutioninpoolingdecision-makingpolicyandresources.Itrepresentstheaspirationtomatchstructuretotheincreasinglyglobalnatureofthechallengesfacingitsmembersandthewiderworld.ThepreamblestoitsTreatiessetouttheambitiousaimtobeaglobalforceforgood,inrecentyearswithafocusonpovertyreductionandsustainabledevelopment.EUinfluencewillbemultipliedwiththeUKaligned–whetherinside

oroutsidethetent–oncommondevelopmentcooperationobjectives.TheEUhasyet,however,torealiseitsfullpotentialineffectingpositivechangeindevelopingcountries,arguablybecausememberstatedomesticobjectivestendtocompromisetheseaims.ThishasmeantthatwhileEUexternalpolicieshaveledtosomepositivehumanitariananddevelopmentoutcomes,theyhavealsooftenbeenpursuedinthecontextofunfairtermsofengagementthathavedisadvantageddevelopingcountries.

Malnutrition reduction project with UK Aid and other partners. Photo:DFID/Sylvain Cherkaoui


Trade arguably offers the biggest

potential for reducing poverty, and

it is hard to see how there can be

meaningful cooperation in trade

policy post Brexit.

AfterBrexit,theUKisexpectedtobefreetodevelopitsowntradepolicy,andtohavelessincentivetocooperatewiththeEUinexternalaffairs.Yet,theUKhasdeclaredthewishtohaveadeepandspecialrelationshipwiththeEU.On24May,theUKissuedanon-paperreiteratingitsdesirefor‘strategicco-operation’basedonthebeliefthat‘ourcollectiveimpactinaddressingspecificdevelopmentchallengesisgreatestwhenweworktogether’.Ifclosecollaborationdoesn’thappen,Iargue,itwillcreateanegativeimpactonpoorpeopleindevelopingcountries,inparticularthepoorercountries,andthoseaffectedbyconflictsandnaturaldisasters.

Let’slookatthisatthemultilaterallevelFirst,let’sconsidertheUK’scontributiontoEUprioritiesinexternalactionatthemultilaterallevel,wheretheEUincludingtheUKhasbeenoneofthekeyinternationalactors,whetherinthecontextoftheWorldTradeOrganization,climatechangenegotiations,theUN,orothergroupings.

Tradearguablyoffersthebiggestpotentialforreducingpoverty,anditishardtoseehowtherecanbemeaningfulcooperationintradepolicypostBrexit.Therefore,theUK’sliberalstance,whichhaslimitedagriculturalprotectionismharmfultodevelopingcountries,willnolongerimpactEUtradepolicy.Theimmediateriskhereisdisruptionofestablishedtradepatterns,inparticular,forpoorercountrieswithfeweroptions.UKcivilsocietyorganisations(CSOs),whichwerethefirstCSOstofocusontrade’spotentialforpovertyreduction,willalsofindithardertogaintractiononEUtradepolicy.

Indeeditispossible,thoughtherearefewsignsofitsofar,thatUKtradepolicycouldfavourdevelopingcountriesmorethantheEUdoes,forinstance,copyingtheAfricanGrowthandOpportunityAct.ButUKtradepolicyisboundtobelessimportantthanEUtradepolicy.Inanycase,iftradeistoreducepovertyitwillmatterwhetherthelinkagesbetweenaidfortrade

andadjustmenttoliberalisationcontinue;andtheUKhasbeenakeyplayerinattemptingtoeaseadjustmentwithaidfortrade(seeKennes,2018).TheimpactsoftheUKwithdrawalonEUmigrationpolicyarelessclear.Brexitmayjustaccelerateexistingtrendsonthis,asinotherareas(Bond,2017).Lesscoordinationontaxationislikelytoreduceopportunitiesforincreasingrevenuesfromforeigninvestmentindevelopingcountries.

Therewouldbedefinitedownsidestoreducedcooperationonenvironmentandclimatechange–eveniffearsofdiminishingUKenvironmentalstandardsproveunfounded.Ill-coordinatedinitiativeswouldbelesslikelytoachievethesamesystemicimpact,anddevelopingcountriesstillfacedisproportionateimpactsofclimatechangeandwastemismanagement,forexample.IfaUKgovernmentcameinthatwasinclinedtoendco-operationunderinternationalagreements,suchasonemissionsreductionsorfoodaid,itwouldcertainlyhitpoorpeopleindevelopingcountries.

Whataboutaid?Inrelationtooverallamountsofaid,theEUisthelargestdonor,includingallmemberstatecontributionsandtheEuropeanCommission.TheUKisoneofonlyfivememberstatestohavemettheUNaidspendingtargetof0.7%ofgrossnationalincome.BrexitisboundtoreducetheEuropeanCommission’scredibilityinpressingitsmemberstatestoraisetheirODAcommitmentstothe0.7%notch,whichitselfwillhaveglobalimpactsgivenEuropeanleadershiponthis.

AsforthequantityofEuropeanCommissionaidspecifically,despitetheambitiousproposalsonthetableforthenextEUbudget,Brexitseemslikelytoreducetheamountfor‘externalaction’oftheEUbudget(theEDFsuccessormaybeaseparaterisk).Howmuchitwilldropdependsontheinterestincontinuingcollaborationandhowtheportionofthe‘Brexitbill’classifiedasofficialdevelopmentassistanceisusedinthenegotiations.

Thelikelihoodisthatany‘repatriated’fundswouldnotbespentaseffectivelybytheUK.Theywouldbelesslikelytobespentinjointprogrammingandincomplementaritywithothers,andmightbespentbydepartmentsotherthantheDepartmentforInternationalDevelopment(DFID).Theseotherministrieshavealessgoodrecordincontributionstopovertyreductiononaverage,accordingtoreviewsdonesofarbytheUK’sownIndependentCommissiononAidImpact(icai.independent.gov.uk).

ThequalityofEUaid,asjudgedbyaideffectivenessprinciples,mightalsochange.WiththeUKoutoftheEUthefocusonthepoorestcountriesratherthanricherneighboursmightbereduced.TheUKwasalsooneofthefewmemberstatesfocusedonusing


EuropeanInvestmentBank(EIB)resourcesforpovertyreductionanddevelopmentoutsidetheEU,asopposedtofordomesticpriorities.ItwouldbeashametoseeCSOvoicesreducedastheEIBscalesupitsinvestmentindevelopingandemergingeconomies.Moreover,theUKanditsexpertssecondedtotheCommissionhavemadeimportantcontributionsinvariousareasofpolicy,suchasaideffectiveness,gender,andspecificissueslikecashtransfersinemergencies.

TheUKalsolosesimpactinreducingpovertyandvulnerabilityifitnolongercoordinateswiththeEU,whichoperatesin120countries,farmorethantheUKcanreachbilaterally.TheEUhasabroaderrangeofleverstocoordinatewithUKinputinregionswherethereisfragilitylikeWestAfricaandtheSahel.TheEUcanalsododifferentthingsinareaswhereEuropeisperceivedasmoreneutralthantheUK(Castillejoetal.,2018).

Thenegativeimpactsoffailuretocoordinateareprobablymostevidentinhumanitarianemergencies.TheEbolacrisisillustratedthepowerofcoordinationbetweentheEUandUK,aswellaswithotheractorsliketheUnitedStatesandwiththeUN,wheretheUKismoreengagedthanotherEUmemberstates.Theescalationindisplacementofpeopleinthedecadessince1970requiresajoined-upresponsetoensureprotectionofvulnerablepeople.TheUKhasencouragedreluctantmemberstatestoupholdhumanitarianprinciples,aswellasbeingamajorfunder.TheUKandEUneedtocontinuetocooperateinupholdingtheGrandBargain,whichaimstoincreaseefficiencytogetmorehelptomorepeoplemorequickly.

HowabouttheroleoftheUK-basedinternationalNGOs?InternationalNGOsarekeytodeliveryofEUaidtothepoorest,topeace-building,aswellastoadvocacyinfavourofthepoorest.UK-basedinternationalNGOsrepresentalonghistoryofknowledgeandexpertise,whilehavingstronggrassrootssupportintheUK(anestimated5millionpeopleare‘engagedsupporters’).Yet,UK-basedNGOsarealreadynolongereligible,accordingtoECHO,toapplytoimplementhumanitarianprogrammes,wheretheytraditionallyplayedaleadingrole(delivering25%oftheprogrammein2016,HaynesandDeToma,2017).Evenwheretheyareeligibleindevelopmentprogrammes,financialliabilitiesarecreatedbythe‘Brexitclauses’incontracts.Thisrepresents,firstly,adisruptionofservicetopoorpeopleindevelopingcountries,inparticularinemergencies.Inthemediumterm,itwillatleastproducealossofexpertiseandforfeitureofastrongsectorvoice.

WhileBondanditssisternetworkslikeConcordandVOICEarealreadytakingstepstomaintainlinksandworktogether,ratherthanabandoningeffortstoinfluencethelargestdonor,there

isnodoubtthatitwillbehardertomaintaintheengagementunlessthereisaclearUKinvolvementthatlegitimatestheCSOvoice(Godfrey,2018).

ConcludingremarksParallelandcomplementaryUKandEUprogrammesmighthelpreducepovertyandachievetheSDGs.However,giventhehistoryandcurrentpoliticalandeconomicpressures,thebestresultsarelikelytobeachievedbycollaboration,wheredomesticobjectivesaremoderatedbyactingmultilaterally.CivilsocietynetworkslikeBond,Concord,andVOICEwillkeepuptheirownjointworktopressforcoordination,whichhelpsthepoorestthemost.

References• Bond(2017),TheimpactofBrexitonUKandEUdevelopment

policy.London:Bond.www.bond.org.uk/sites/default/files/resource-documents/the_impact_of_brexit_on_uk_and_eu_international_development_policy_0.pdf

• Castillejo,Clare,MikaelaGavas,MariellaDiCiommo,MeritxellSayósMonràs,andNielsKeijzer(2018),TheEuropeanUnion’snextfinancialframework:ProspectsandchallengesforEUdevelopmentco-operation,EuropeanThinktanksGroup.https://ettg.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/ETTG-policy-brief-the-EUs-MFF_prospects_and_challenges_for_Development_cooperation.pdf

• Godfrey,Claire(2018,9January),‘Brexitisn’tanendtoUK-Europeancivilsocietycollaboration’.London:Bond.www.bond.org.uk/news/2018/01/brexit-isnt-an-end-to-uk-european-civil-society-collaboration

• Haynes,RachelandCostanzadeToma(2017),TheimpactofBrexitonEUfundingforCSOs.London:Bond.www.bond.org.uk/resources/the-impact-of-brexit-on-eu-funding-for-csos

• Kennes,Walter(2018),HowBrexitmayaffectACP-EUrelations:Anhistoricalperspective.DiscussionPaper220.Maastricht:ECDPM.http://ecdpm.org/dp220

AbouttheauthorTamsynBartonwrotethiscontributioninherformercapacityaschiefexecutiveatBond,theUKnetworkfororganisationsworkingininternationaldevelopment.Twitter:@TBartonUK


Brexit will certainly impact EU development cooperation and humanitarian assistance policies. A main question is whether these two parties will continue to collaborate in development cooperation post-Brexit. The UK is a ‘development superpower’ in its own right, as well as the third contributor (after Germany and France) to the EU’s aid budget. As for the EU, it channels more than half of the world’s ODA annually, something that constitutes a key political asset of the Union in its external relations.

ByIlianaOliviéandAitorPérez

WhatdoesBrexitmeanintermsofaid?TworelatedbutdistinctpoliticaleventsmakeitdifficulttoforeseetheeffectsofBrexitonaid.OneistheconservativeslantevidentinBritishdomesticpolitics.TheotherisBrexititself.InOliviéandPérez(2017)weproposedthreepotentialpost-2020scenarios,dependingonhowtheUK’saidbudgetanditsgeographicalallocationsevolve(Table1).

FollowingTheresaMay’snarrativeon‘atrulyGlobalBritain’,theUKseemsunlikelytocutaidspending.Moreover,giventheneedtostrengthenextra-Europeanlinks,theBritishmayopttoincreaseinternationalassistance,tonurturepoliticallinkswiththeCommonwealthandtheinternationalcommunity.AidcutswouldtakeplaceonlyifBrexitplungestheislandintoanationalistretrenchment.

Eitherintheframeworkofanationalistretrenchment,orinascenariowherethecountryseeksnewlinkages,aidpreviouslychannelledviaEUinstitutionswillbemouldedaccordingtocurrentBritishbilateralaidpatterns.Economicinfrastructurewillprobablybemoretargetedthan,forinstance,socialsectorslikehealthandeducation.However,itcouldbeinBritain’sbestinteresttomaintainabridgewiththeEUindevelopmentcooperationaffairs.Inthatcase,partofUKaidcouldbechannelledasintheothertwodepictedscenarios,whiletherestwouldretaintheEUaidpattern.

Worldaidwouldonlydecrease,afterBrexit,intheeventofanationalistretrenchmentintheUK.Andsuchdecreasewouldbelimitedto3%oftotalaidonaverage,thoughimpactswouldobviouslynotbeevenlydistributedamongaidrecipients(see

The impact of Brexit on aid: Divorce or marriage of convenience?


Demonstration:StillstrugglingforalegalrighttostayfortheLampedusaRefugeesPhoto:RasandeTyskar/Flickr

OliviéandPérez,2017).BrexitwillhaveamajorimpactontheEUasaglobaldonor.TheUnionwouldlose21-22%ofcurrentaiddisbursements,meaningthatitsshareofworldaidcouldfallfrom58%(accordingto2015figures)to48%or47%.TheEUwouldmaintainitstoppositionandtheEUinstitutionswouldstillberankedfourthinaidvolume(Table2).

AlthoughBrexitnegotiationsstillhavealongwaytogoandpoliticaleventscouldunfoldinunexpectedways,almosttwoyearshavepassedsinceMayandherBrexiteeradministrationtookpower.Despiteastrongcampaignagainstaid,whichappearstobeacontinuationoftheBrexitcampaignpriortothereferendum,UKpoliticianshavegivennosignofabolishingthering-fenced0.7%commitment.PreliminarydatarecentlyreleasedbytheOECDshowthattheUKhasevenincreaseditsaidby2.1%.Thenationalistretrenchmentscenarioisthusprovinglesslikely(OECD,2018).

DoestheUKwanttocollaboratewiththeEUafterBrexit?ContinuedcollaborationwiththeEUondevelopmentassistancecouldbeintheUK’sbestinterest(seealsotheeditors’choicematrixinthisvolume).First,theUKisboundbylawtospend0.7%ofitsnationalincomeonODA.Thatcommitmentrequiresadevelopedadministrativeandpoliticalinfrastructure.Reallocationofaidfundstootherpre-existingmechanismsorbuildingnewonesmightproveeasiersaidthandone.Secondly,theUKhasmaintainedamoralandpoliticalleadershippositioninthebuildingofEuropeandevelopmentpolicy.Ithasstronglyinfluencedthepolitical,geographical,andsectoralcomponentsofEUaid.Asaresult,EUinstitutions(whichalsocannotbereshapedovernight)areanidealchannelforpursuingBritishaidobjectives.Thirdly,keepingconnectedwiththeEUisawaytomaintainalinkwithareasandcountrieswheretheUKmightnothavethepossibilityorinterestinapresenceofitsown.AfourthreasonisapotentialfearthatBritishcharitiesmayloseaccesstoEUfundingafterBrexit.

Ontheothersideoftheargument,somemaysaythatBrexitmeansBrexit,andtheUKinterestistodevotetheresourcescurrentlychannelledviatheEUtostrengtheningitslinkswithpartnercountriesandmultilateralorganisations.Moreover,duetothelossofvalueoftheBritishpoundadditionalresourcesmayberequiredtomaintaincurrentaidprojects.

FromtheperspectiveoftheUKgovernment,theprosprobablyoutweighthecons.Itrecentlystated,‘TheEUwillremainoneofthelargestdevelopmentactorsintheworld,andtheUKwantstoretainaclosepartnershipwiththeEUinthefuture.’Thisviewwasexpressedinanon-papersharedwithmemberstatesatanEUForeignAffairsCouncilonDevelopmentearlierthisyear.In‘TheEUBeyond2020,FutureDevelopmentInstruments:AUKPerspective’,theUKcallsforflexibilityonthepartoftheEUwhendesigningthepost-2020developmentcooperationfinancialtoolssothatnon-memberstatescanjoinandplayaproactiverole(DeGroof,2018).

Doesthe(restofthe)EUwanttocollaboratewiththeUKafterBrexit?Ayearago,mostoftherelevantactorsinEUdevelopmentpolicywereintheprocessofabsorbingthelossoftheUnion’smostinfluentialandpowerfuldonor.Bynow,stakeholderswithintheEUhavedevelopeddifferentpositionswhenitcomestothebenefitsofcooperatingwiththeUKpost-Brexit,post-Cotonou,andpost-multiannualfinancialframework(MFF).

RegardingtheincentivesforkeepingtheUKonboard,firstly,thereistheobviousfinancialmotive.TheEUwilllosea10-11%ofshareofworldaidiftheUKleavestheUnion.RecoveringpartofthatshareisanaturalobjectivefortheEuropeanCommission,whichwillprobablypressurememberstatestorenewandstrengthentheircommitmenttodevelopment(andtoEUexternalrelationsgenerally,astherecentproposalforthenextMFFsuggests).Underthesecircumstances,smallorreluctant

Nationalistretrenchment Continuityandcommitment Settingupnewlinkages30%reductioninaidvolume Sameaidvolume SameaidvolumeRealistpattern

• DistributionchannelsfollowingBritishbilateralaid

• Geographicaldistribution

• Sectoraldistributionfocusedoneconomicinfrastructure

European-likepattern(50%ofaid)• Distributionchannelsremainthesame• Geographicaldistributionsame• Sectoraldistributionsame

Globalistpattern(50%ofaid)• DistributionchannelsfollowingBritish

multilateralaid(exceptEUinstitutions)• Geographicaldistribution• Sectoraldistribution

Realistpattern

• DistributionchannelsfollowingBritishbilateralaid

• Geographicaldistribution

• Sectoraldistributionfocusedoneconomicinfrastructure

Table1.Threescenariosforpost-BrexitBritishaid


EUdonorsmightprefertoleavethedooropentoamajordonorexternaltotheEU.Secondly,andreiteratinganargumentofECDPM’sAndrewSherriff,unlikesomeotherpolicies,developmentisnotacompetitiveaffairinthetraditionalsense;itispreferabletohavemorecountriesandstakeholdersonboard(andnotthecontrary).Itwillbeeasiertoworktowardsthedevelopmenttargetsofthe2030Agendawithbigdonorsonthesameteam.

Yet,keepingtheUKawayfromthetablemightbeawaytoachieve‘moreEurope’inthedevelopmentarena.TheUKhasexertedastronginfluenceinthedesignofEuropeandevelopmentpolicy,butithasnotalwaysbeenopentoinfluenceitself.Forinstance,theUKisknownforitsreluctancetodeepenintegratedactivities,suchasjointprogramming.Secondly,flexiblefinancinginstruments(whichwouldbethewayinfortheUKafterBrexit)meanmoreextra-budgetaryaid,whichismorecloselymonitoredbymemberstates.Budgetarytools(whichinprincipleleavetheUKoutsidethegame)wouldleavemoremarginofmanoeuvrefortheEuropeanCommission.TheCommissionmightthereforepreferbudgetaryaidtools.Thirdly,iftheredoesturnouttobesomecompetitionintheaidarenaafterall,theUKleavingtheEU(andburningitsbridges)wouldbeanopportunityforbigmemberstateswithincreasingODAbudgets,astrengthenedaidnarrative,andaparticularinterestinsub-SaharanAfrica(notablyGermanyandFrance)topositionthemselvesindifferentregionsofAfrica.

ConclusionAyearago,EUpolicymakersseemedtoleavethedooropenforUKparticipationinEUaidafterBrexit.However,theUK’sinterestinsuchparticipationremainsunclearandtiedtotheuncertainevolutionofUKdevelopmentpolicyandoverallforeignpolicy.Today,itseemslikelythattheUK’saidvolumewill

remainstable,andthegovernmentappearstowanttoretainaclosepartnershipwiththeEUinaidimplementation.SeveralEUactors,however,nowseemreluctanttocollaborateorhavemaintainedradiosilence.Theseincludebigmemberstateswithincreasingaidbudgets,theCommission,andsupportersofadeeperEUintegration.

References• DeGroof,Emmanuel(2018),‘TheUKproposesa‘win-win

opt-in’oninternationalcooperation’,ECDPMblog,5March.http://ecdpm.org/talking-points/uk-proposes-win-win-opt-in-international-cooperation/

• OECD(2018,9April),‘Developmentaidstablein2017withmoresenttopoorestcountries’.Mediacommuniqué.Paris:OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment.

• Olivié,IlianaandAitorPérez(2017),“PossibleimpactsofBrexitonEUdevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicies”,PE578042,EuropeanParliament.www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2017/578042/EXPO_STU(2017)578042_EN.pdf

AbouttheauthorsIlianaOlivié(left)isasenioranalystattheElcanoRoyalInstituteandlecturerattheDepartmentofInternationalEconomicsandDevelopmentfromMadrid’sUniversidadComplutense.Twitter:@iolivie

AitorPérezisaseniorresearchfellowattheElcanoRoyalInstituteandconsultantindevelopmentcooperation.Twitter:@aitor_ecoper

Donor Pre-Brexit Post-Brexit*Nationalistretrenchment

Continuityandcommitment

Settingupnewlinkages

UK** 16.385 30%reductioninaidvolume

Sameaidvolume Sameaidvolume

EUinstitutions 13.670

Globalaid 160.600 155.058 160.600 160.600

variation -3% 0% 0%

EUframedODA 94.787 74.153 75.197 74.153

variation -22% -21% -22%

*Ourestimatesforeachscenariobasedon2015dataandassumptions**ExcludingUKaidchannelledthroughtheEUinstitutionsSource:https://stats.oecd.org(DAC1).

Table2.TheimpactofBrexitonaid,netdisbursementsof2015ODAflowsinbillionsofcurrentUSdollarsunlessstatedotherwise

Slide presented by Michel Barnier, Chief Negotiator, to the General Affairs Council (Article 50) on 14 May and to the European Parliament Brexit Steering Group on 15 May 2018. Source: European Commission

Slide presented by Michel Barnier, European Commission Chief Negotiator, to the Heads of State and Government at the European Council (Article 50) on 15 December 2017. Source: European Commission


EUROPEAN COMMISSION SLIDES RELATED TO BREXIT CHOICES


The UK position

1. On trade, the UK has presented no clear end-goal, thoughithasindicateditwillnotremainpartofthesinglemarket(seePrimeMinister’sOffice,2017).

2. Onforeign,security,anddefencepolicy, theUKsays itwillfavour a partnership with theEUon internal and externalsecurity (Prime Minister’s Office, 2018). In a May 2018technical note dealing mainly with external security, theUKproposesdevelopmentofa‘futureframeworkofUK-EUconsultationandcooperationonexternalsecurity’.Anysuchframework,itsays,‘wouldbeflexibleandscalabletoenabletheUKandEUtocooperatemorecloselywhenitisintheirmutualinterests’(HMGovernment,2018).

A policy paper of 12 September 2017 emphasises that theUKis‘unconditionallycommittedtomaintainingEuropeansecurity’andthat‘theUKwants todevelopanewsecuritypartnership with the EU that builds on the breadth anddepthofoursharedinterestsandvalues,andonethatgoesbeyond any existing third country arrangements’. Such apartnership–includingonexternalmigration,cybersecurity,defence, and security – could be realised, for example,through mutual consultations and information exchange(DepartmentforExitingtheEU,2017).

3. Regarding development, the UK has conveyed its positioninseveralpapersapresentedhereinreversechronologicalorder:

• The ‘UK Non-Paper on Development’ of 24 May2018 makes clear that the UK wishes to cooperatestrategicallywiththeEU,butwill‘criticallyassesstherationale...dependingonthesituation,andwhether...the EU offers the best value for money’. It proposescollaborationparticularlyon(i)peaceandsecurity,(ii)humanitarian aid, and (iii) migration. This, it states,‘could form the basis of a strategic partnership ofdevelopment cooperation between the UK and theEU’.

• In a May 2018 technical note, the UK proposesconcrete forms of collaboration or consultation,especially regarding the areas mentioned in the 24Maynon-paper.Inparticular,itsuggests:

• (i)adhocmeetingswiththeEUForeignAffairs Council;

(ii)strategicdialogues;(iii)UKattendanceatinformalmeetings;(iv)coordinationincasesofcrisisoverseas;(v)UKparticipationinexternalprogrammes;(vi)contributionstoexternalprogrammes,ifitgetsaseatatthetable(HMGovernment,2018).

• A UK non-paper entitled ‘Future DevelopmentInstruments: A UK Perspective’, released 20February2018,outlinesthreeproposalsinvaryinglevels of detail: (i) The UK suggests that theEU retain options for collaboration with thirdcountries,particularlytheUK,inlightofthelatter’sexpertise and established role and reputation asaglobaldevelopmentplayer. (ii)TheUKsuggeststhat it could contribute financially to specificprogrammes or projects, through ‘externallyassigned revenues’. (iii) The UK insists on havinga seat at the table, or a say in the matter, whenit makes monetary contributions to specificprogrammesorprojects.

4. General positions, including the profiling of the UK as‘Global Britain’ that can engage with a strong EU withwhich it continues to share values, were expressed inthe Lancaster House Speech of 17 January 2017 (PrimeMinister’sOffice,2017).

The Brexit negotiations: Who thinks what Brexitisofcourseanegotiation,andwhiletherearemanystakeholdersthereareonlytwonegotiatingparties,theUKandtheEU.Tounderstandthepoliticalprocessinplay,itisusefultoseetheofficialstatementsmadebythepartiesontheirnegotiatingpositionsand interests. Here we briefly summarise these, using phrasing taken directly from official documents related to international anddevelopmentcooperation,trade,andexternalaffairs.WhiletheUKhasbroadlyassertedtheideaofanenhancedbespokepartnershipwiththeEUoncertainissues,theEU’spositionhascentredontreatingtheUKasa‘thirdcountry’.Waystobridgethisgapwillneedtofound,bothoverallandinspecificpolicydomains.Concludinganeffective,win-windealintheBrexitnegotiationsisarguablythemostsignificanttaskahead.Ofcoursethissummaryofofficialpositionsisnotdefinitive,norcoulditbeentirelyfreefromimplicitbiases.Butitwillgivereadersfurthercontextinwhichtoconsiderthearticlesandanalysescontainedinthisissue,withtheprovisothatnewpositions,policies,andpaperswillemergeduringtheprocess.


The EU position

1. On trade, theEUhasconsistentlystated itwouldadaptitspositiontothe‘redlines’setoutbytheUK.Thesewereaptly depicted in a figure presented by the European

Commission’s Chief NegotiatorMichelBarnierinDecember2017

(seepage27inthisissue).On the various options -

regarding the commonmarket, customs

union, free tradeagreements and

WTOrules-seeBilaland Woolfrey in this

issue.

2. Onforeign,security,and defence policy, as the UK

will become a third state, the EUhas suggested establishing a security of informationagreement(seeillustrationonp.27ofthisissue-TheEUhas referenced the EU-NATO partnership and explicitlya ‘specific dialogue and consultation mechanism’reflecting its interest in cooperating with the UK as a‘significant foreign, security and defence player’ (seeTF50b,2018).

• In a speech on 14 May 2018, High RepresentativeFederica Mogherini said that despite Brexit, shesaw‘aEuropeanUnionthatismovingforwardandgettingstronger.AftertheUKreferendum,many...werepredictingtheendofourUnion.Well,wehaveseen, on the contrary, a relaunch of our commonprojects, a recommitment to our unity’. Mogherinialso noted her preference for ‘a consultationmechanismwiththeUnitedKingdomtocoordinateourresponsestointernationalevents,ourpositionsinsideinternationalorganisations,andouractions,whenourobjectivesalign’(EEAS,2018).

• Ina14May2018speech,ChiefNegotiatorBarnierwelcomed the UK's commitment to Europe'ssecurity and encouraged a mutual partnership,notablyby;(i)closeandregularconsultationswiththeUKonforeignpolicy,(ii)acceptingUKcontributionswherefitforpurpose,(iii)acceptingtheUK’scontributiontotheresearch

and technology projects of the EuropeanDefenceAgency,

(iv)exchanginginformationoncyberattacks,(v)establishingasecurityofinformationagreement.

3. Regarding development, the EU has not respondedextensively to the UK’s proposals favouring flexiblecooperation mechanisms, for example, through trustfunds or other mechanisms. But in his 14 May speech,Chief Negotiator Barnier mentioned specifically thatin the area of development, the EU would be‘open tocontributions from third countries and to local jointprogramming’.

TherecentfutureEUbudgetproposalrelatedtoEUexternalaction mentions no specific collaboration mechanismswith the UK, while not excluding them either (EuropeanCommission,2018).

Forlinksoftheabovementionedarticlesandotherresourcessee:http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/beyond_brexit/brexit_negotiations_who_thinks_what

What has been agreed Commonpositionshavebeenreachedonanumberoftopics,withthecaveatthatnoagreementonanythingcanbecon-sideredfinaluntilthereisagreementoneverything.Inthedraftwithdrawalagreement(TF50,2018a),particularlythepartsingreenindicatewhereagreementhasbeenreachedinprinciple.Pointsofagreementincludethefollowing:

• Thetransitionperiodendswhenthecurrentmultiannualfinancialframework(MFF)ends,on31Dec.2020(art.121).• TheUKwillremainpartytotheEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF)untilclosureofthe11thEDF.Inthemeantime,it

mayparticipateasobserver,withoutvotingrights,intheEDFCommittee(art.145andfurther).• TheUKwillhonouritscommitmentsinrelationtotheEUEmergencyTrustFundforStability,theFacilityforRefugees

inTurkey,and‘anyfutureEuropeanUnionTrustFund’createdbeforethewithdrawalagreemententersintoforce(art.145andfurther).

• TheUKcannegotiate,sign,andratifynewtradeagreementsduringthetransitionperiodbutmayimplementthemonlyafter2020(art.124.4).

• ‘[I]n accordance with the principle of sincere cooperation, the United Kingdom shall refrain, during the transitionperiod, from any action or initiative which is likely to be prejudicial to the Union's interests, in particular in theframeworkofanyinternationalorganisation,agency,conferenceorforumofwhichtheUnitedKingdomisapartyinitsownright’(art.124.3).


ByDavidJessop

Brexit comes at a time when the Caribbean is facing many economic and political challenges. This makes it essential to achieve a rapid rollover of economic partnership agreement (EPA) equivalence in trade and to reach new understandings on UK development assistance.

Increased uncertainty for achanging Caribbean

FormostmembersofCARIFORUM(CaribbeanCommunity-CARICOM-plustheDominicanRepublic),Britain’sdecisiontoleavetheEUhasaddedtoagrowinglistofuncertainties.Itisoccurringatatimewheninternationaleconomicandpoliticalrelationshipsareinflux,tradewarsthatindirectlytouchtheregionareemerging,rules-based

systemsarebreakingdown,andtherearesignificantdivisionswithintheCaribbeanoverthefailuresandfutureoftheCaribbeanSingleMarketandEconomy(CSME).

Itisalsohappeningasnewandimportanttradeandinvestmentpartners,mostnotablyChina,are

emergingintheregion;atatimewhentheUSadministrationisseekingtoassertmuchgreaterhemisphericinfluenceregionally,particularlyinrespecttotheregion’stiestoVenezuela;andjustastheCaribbeanneedstoachieveinternationalagreementonpracticalsupportforlow-lyingstatesfacingtheexistentialthreatposed


Counting revenue from the market Photo: © AfDB Projects, Flickr.

byclimatechange.SuchconcernscoincidewitharecognitionthatthesupportivevoiceBritainofferedwithintheEUinrelationtotheregion’stradeanddevelopmentchallengeswillsoondisappear.BrexituncertaintyincreaseslikelihoodofanEPAtraderollover,post-2020Untiltheendof2020theCaribbean’stradeanddevelopmentrelationshipwiththeUKwillcontinuetobegovernedbytheEU-CARIFORUMEconomicPartnershipAgreement(EPA).However,BritainandCARIFORUMcannotmeaningfullydiscusstheirpost-2020traderelationshipuntiltheUKandEU27agreeonwhetherBritainwillremaininthecustomsunionorestablishsomesortofpolitically-ledbespoketraderelationship,oralternatively,gothehardBrexitroute.

Severalhigh-levelexchangeshavealreadytakenplacebetweenCaribbeanandBritishministersandofficials.ThesepointtoageneralcommitmentbyLondonthatthatthenationsofCARIFORUMwillbenoworseoffinanewtradeanddevelopmentrelationshipwithBritain.

MorespecificallyLondonhassaiditwill‘seektomaintaincurrentmarketaccess…toensurecontinuityoftheeffectsoftheEPA’,andbothsideshaveagreed

thattechnicaldiscussionswillfocusonavoidingdisruption,ratherthanprovidinganopportunitytorenegotiatetradeterms.

InthefaceofthecomplexityofwhatBritainistryingtoachievewiththeEU27andglobally,thiswouldseemtomeanthatthemostlikelyshort-termoutcomefortheCaribbean,givenitsrelativeeconomicinsignificancetotheUK,willbetoreachanagreementinearly2019onsomethingclosetoEPAtradeequivalence.

AlthoughtheregionandtheUKarethinkingintermsofarolloverofexistingarrangements,andatalaterdateenhancementparticularlyinrelationtoservicesaccess,muchlessisclearonhowthenon-tradepartsoftheexistinghybridEPAtext,whichincludeslanguageondevelopmentandpoliticalobjectives,willbesetaside.

GiventhattheUK’sdevelopmentpolicyisalsoinflux,onesuggestionisthatitmaybepossibletoagreeonsometypeofgrandfatherclauseensuringthatpreviouslyEU-negotiatedtradecommitmentssuchasthosecontainedintheEPA,becomepartofUKlegislationintheshorttomediumterm.Assuming,however,thatEPAtradeequivalencecanbedelivered,othermorepracticalissueswillthenarise.

InitsfinitetransitionperiodoutoftheEU,theUKhastoaccepttheadministrativeburdensofbecomingastand-alonestateanddeterminehowitspareddownbureaucracywillcopewithnewadministrativedecisionsinrealtime.

ThismeansinpracticaltermsthatCaribbeanexportersofgoodsandservicesareunlikelytoknowforsometimeyetaboutmattersasbasicasdocumentationrequirements,howgoodscurrentlyshippedonwardsfromtheUK

tocontinentalEuropewillbetreated,andifandatwhatpointadditionaltariffsorfeesmayhavetobepaid.

Itisalsofarfromclearwhatmoregeneralchangesmightoccurinrelationtolabelling,commercialshippingroutes,airservicesagreements,standards,administrativelaw,thefreemovementofgoodsintotheEU27,andthemovementofcapital,letalonethefuturecostofdoingbusinesswithorthroughtheUK.

TradeopportunitiesandchallengesTosomeextent,whateverisfinallyagreedmaybeacademic,astheexportofCaribbeangoodstotheUKandtotheEU27continuestodecline,despitetheEPA.

RecentEUstatisticsconfirmthatofthegoodsexportsfromCARIFORUMtotheEU,theUKcontinuestoaccountfor21-23%.In2015,CARIFORUMnationsexportedgoodsworthsomeUS$3.1billiontotheEU,ofwhichUS$718millionwenttotheUK.However,ifshipmentsofoil,refinedproducts,andchemicalsaresetasideitbecomesclearthattheUKremainsprincipallyamarketforCaribbeanprimaryagriculturalproduce,someprocessedfoods,andhighervalueproductssuchasrum.Furthermore,CaribbeanexportsareheavilyweightedtowardstheDominicanRepublic.

ThisimpliesthatintheabsenceofsomeformofEPAtradeequivalencewiththeUK,theCaribbeanexportsthatcouldbehardesthitintheeventoftheUKhavingtoadoptMostFavouredNation(MFN)tariffswouldbebananasandotherfruits,fishproducts,preparedfoodstuffs,clothing,andfootwear.

WhileCaribbeanExportandotherbetter-resourcednationaltradebodiesinJamaicaandtheDominicanRepubliccontinuetofocusondiversifyingandencouraginghighervalue-addedexports,

Increased uncertainty for achanging Caribbean

In its finite transition

period out of the EU,

the UK has to accept the

administrative burdens

of becoming a stand-

alone state...


thegeneralviewisthatthereislittleinBrexitthatwillalterthepresentnatureoftradeflowsifEPAtradeequivalenceisachieved.

Inthelongerterm,andmoresignificantlyperhaps,thereisasensethatifeventuallytheUK’sEPAservicesofferingcouldbeenhancedthiscouldhaveapositiveeffectontrade,althoughtodatethesparseinformationavailablesuggeststhattheCaribbeanhastakenlittleadvantageoftheUK’sorthelesssignificantEU27EPAoffersofservicesmarketaccess,otherthaninrespecttotourismfromEurope.

FutureofCaribbean-EUrelationsatajunctureBrexitwillbetakingplaceastheCaribbeananditspartnersinAfricaandthePacific(theACP)willbenegotiatingwiththeEU27towardsaverydifferentformofpost-Cotonou,post-2020,politicalanddevelopmentagreement.ThesenegotiationsareboundtostartaftertheSummerof2018.GiventheCaribbean’slimitednegotiatingcapacityandtheUK’sapparentofferofEPAtradeequivalence,itislikelythattheregionwillplace

muchmoreweightondiscussingdevelopmentissueswithboththeUKandtheEU27.InaBrexitcontexttheregionwillcertainlywishtosecureanappropriateproportionofBritain’spresent€4.5billioncontributiontotheEuropeanDevelopmentFund(EDF)post-Brexit,whileensuringthatitisnoworseoffinrelationtothenextEU27fundinground.Itwillalsowanttoknowspecificallyhowsuchsupportmightrelatetowhatitseesastheregion’s‘inherentandexogenousvulnerabilities’.

Anewformof‘specialrelationship’Fordecadesnow,Britainhasbeenengagedinaformofpost-colonialwithdrawalfromtheregionandareformulationofitsengagement.Today,itsmainpoliciesseekenhancedeconomicdevelopmentthroughtheprivatesectortosupportregionalstability;securitycooperation;supportforthemaintenanceofcommonvaluessuchasparliamentarydemocracyandhumanrights;workoncommonconcernsincludingclimatechange;lowlevelsofdevelopmentsupport;hurricanerelief;andwherepossible,mutualsupportinmultilateralinstitutionsincludingtheUN.SeenfromaCaribbeanperspective,relationsremainpositive,but

generationalchange,shiftingtradeandinvestmentflows,andthearrivalofnewerexternaltradeanddevelopmentpartnersarecausingBritaintobecomejustoneofmanyactorsintheregion.Itssignificancehasthereforediminished.

Thissuggeststhatinthemediumterm,somenewbutreducedformofspecialrelationshipwiththeUKwillevolvepost-Brexit.Stillmissing,however,isanycertaintyaboutpreciselywhatBrexitwillmean,andhowtheregionintendstogoaboutimprovingitsrelationswithotherEuropeannationsthatmightinthefutureplayaroleonitsbehalfwithintheEU27.

AbouttheauthorDavidJessopconsultsfortheCaribbeanCouncilandwritesonregionalissues.

In the longer term,

and more significantly

perhaps, there

is a sense that if

eventually the UK’s

EPA services offering

could be enhanced this

could have a positive

effect on trade.

Castriesmarket,St.Lucia.Photo:HeatherCowper,Flickr.


How ‘to trade or not to trade’ is the question for third countries after Brexit What does Brexit mean for trade relations between third countries and the current 28 member states of EU? And how will Brexit affect future trade with the UK and EU 27?

BySanBilalandSeanWoolfrey

Thesimpleanswerisincreasinguncertainty.And,asweknow,marketsdonotlikeuncertainty,nordopolicymakers,exceptperhapssomeBritishones.AllEUtradepartnersareonthealert.However,specificconsiderationisneededfordevelopingcountries.Brexitcouldsignificantlyimpacttheireconomicdevelopmentthroughitsimpactontheirtraderelations.UncertaintyUntil29March2019,theUKcontinuestobeanEUmember,andthuscurrentEUtradeandregulatoryregimesapply.

However,economicoperatorsandtradersmayadjusttheiractivitiesinanticipationofBrexit,sotradeandinvestmentflowsmaybeaffectedearlier.TransitionperiodTheUKandEU27areworkingtowardsatransitionagreementcoveringtheperiodfrom30March2019untilend2020.Shouldtheyfailtoconcludeorratifysuchanagreement,therewillprobablybea“hardBrexit”(a“nodeal”Brexit).Intermsoftrade,thismeansthattheUKwillbeoutoftheEU


customsunionandoutofthesinglemarket,willhavenotradeagreementinplacewiththeEU27,andwillhavetoestablishitsowntraderegimetowardsthirdcountries.ToavoidashockandallowtimefortheUKandEU27todefinetheirnewtraderegimes,theUKcouldremainintheEUcustomsunionandEUsinglemarketduringthetransition.ThiswouldmeanthattraderelationsbetweenthirdpartiesandtheUKwouldcontinuetobedeterminedbytheEU27’svarioustraderegimes:itsbilateralfreetradeagreements(FTAs),unilateraltradepreferences(GSP,GSP+,andEBA),andmostfavourednation(MFN)tariffsattheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).However,someUKorEU27tradepartnersmightobjecttothisarrangement,arguingthatEUFTAsandWTOobligationsapplyonlytotheterritoriesofEUmemberstates,whichtheUKwouldnolongerbeasof30March2019.TheUKwouldnotbeabletoadoptalternativetraderegimeswiththesethirdcountriesunlessitlefttheEUcustomsunionduringthetransitionperiod.Whilesuchascenarioseemsunlikely,thepointhereisthatthirdcountriesdonothavetoacceptthetransitionagreementbetweentheUKandEU27asafaitaccompli,atleastwithrespecttotrade.Tradepost-Brexit,beyond2020Beyondthetransitionperiod,thirdcountries’traderelationswiththeUKwilldependonthetraderegimetheUKadopts.That,inturn,dependsontheUK’stradeandregulatoryrelationswiththeEU27.IftheUKstaysinacustomsunionwiththeEU27,itmustcontinueapplyingtheEU27commontradepolicyandtraderegime,onwhichitwillhavenosay.OthercountrieswillnothavethepossibilitytonegotiatespecialtradedealswiththeUK,andwillhavetoconsidertheimplicationsofanynewEU27tradenegotiationsorarrangementsontheirtradewiththeUK.IftheUKremainsinacustomsunionwiththeEU27butleavestheEUsinglemarket(the‘Turkeymodel’),thiswouldimpactthirdcountries’traderelationswithboththeUKandtheEU27.Thisisbecausetradeflowsarenotonlyaffectedbytradebarriers(suchastariffsandquotas),butalsobyawholesetofregulatoryissuesandstandardsembodiedintheEUsinglemarket.Newcompliancerequirementsmayseriouslydisrupttrade,increasingtimeandcostsintermsofadministrativeburdenandlogistics.IntegratedsupplychainswithintheEU28maybebrokenupiftradeviatheUKbecomesmorecomplicated.ThismayleadsuppliersandtraderstousedifferentchannelstoreachtheUKorEU27markets.Toavoidregulatorybarriers,theUKmaythusopttostayintheEUsinglemarket.

TheUKcouldremainintheEUsinglemarket,butkeepitstradepolicyautonomybyleavingtheEUcustomsunion.Thiswouldbealongthelinesofthe‘Norwaymodel’withtheEuropeanEconomicArea.Alternatively,theUKcouldopttostayinbothacustomsunionwiththeEU27andtheEUsinglemarket,inwhichcasetheUKmustcontinuetoapplyboththeEUtradeandregulatoryregimes(tothedismayofBrexiteers).

TheUKcouldremainoutsideboththecustomsunionandthesinglemarket,optinginsteadtonegotiateanFTAwiththeEU.Thishasbeenreferredtoasthe‘Canadamodel’,asCanada’sisarguablythemostadvancedEUFTAtodate.

Finally,ifnotradedealisstruck,theUKwillhavenospecialtraderelationshipwiththeEU.TheUK,tryingtohavethebestofbothworlds,hastabledproposalsforatailor-made,àlacarteUKtradeandregulatoryconvergencewiththeEU27.Oneideaisacustomspartnership,wherebytheUKwouldformallystayoutsidetheEUcustomsunionbutwouldmirrorEUtradepoliciesandcollecttariffsonbehalfoftheEU27.Anotheristhemaximumfacilitation(‘maxfac’)plantofacilitate,throughtechnologiesstilltobedeveloped,bordercooperationandregulatoryalignmentwiththeEU27.Thesewouldnotcoverservices,however.AsfortheEU27,themainconcernremainstopreservetheintegrityoftheEUcustomsunionandsinglemarket.WhilemainlytriggeredbyconcernwithintheUKandIrelandtoavoidahardborderbetweenIreland(amemberstateoftheEU27)andNorthernIreland(partoftheUK),thechoiceofarrangementbetweentheUKandEUwilldirectlyaffectthirdcountrytraderelationswithboththeUKandtheEU.ThirdcountryconsiderationsEUtraderegimeswilloverallnotbeaffectedbyBrexit,asEUtradeobligationsandarrangementswillremaininplace,includingEUFTAs.However,tradingwiththeEU27,withouttheUK,willmeantradingwithasmallermarketthanpreviously.ThismightrendertheEU27marketlessattractive,affectingthebalanceofpowerandweightoftariffconcessionsandliberalisationcommitmentsmadeinthecontextofanFTAwiththeEU.ThisisunlikelytobeverysignificantformostEU27partners.Itmay,however,openthedoortoreviewandrenegotiationoftradearrangementswiththeEU.

Inthiscontext,itisworthmentioningtariff-ratequotas(TRQs),averytechnicalbutimportantissue,bothinthecontextoftheWTOandsomeEUFTAs,wheretheEU-28has


committedtoreducetariffsonspecificvolumesofimportsofparticular,usuallyagricultural,products;theUKandtheEU-27haveproposedwaystodividethesequotaspost-Brexit,mainlybasedonhistoricaltradeflows,anapproachthatsomeWTOmembershavealreadycontested,suggestingthatnegotiationsonthisissuemaybeneeded.

MoresignificantwillbetheneedoropportunityforthirdcountriestonegotiatenewtradearrangementswiththeUKshoulditleavetheEUcustomsunion.First,theUKwillhavetosetnewunilateraltradepolicies,includingcommitmentsattheWTO,whichrequireapprovalofallWTOmembers.ThirdcountriesmayusethisopportunitytoencouragetheUKtohaveamoreopentradepolicythantheEU28.TheseunilateralpolicieswillalsoincludeUKpreferentialtraderegimes.TheUKwillformulateanewgeneralisedsystemofpreferences(GSP),inwhichdevelopingcountriesmaywishtobedefinedmorefavourablythaninthecurrentEU28GSP.NewFTAswillhavetobenegotiated,basedontheEUmodelornot.Tospeedupthetransition,theUKisproposing‘grandfathering’(i.e.,copyingprovisionsof)currentEU28FTAsintonewUKFTAs,withonlyminortechnicaladjustments.Thesecouldthenbeopeneduplaterforre-negotiation.ThisisbecausetheUKdoesnothavethecapacitytonegotiatemultipleFTAsatonce.ConsiderationsforACPcountriesSeveralAfrican,Caribbean,andPacific(ACP)countriestradewiththeEUundereconomicpartnershipagreements(EPAs).ShouldtheUKnotremainintheEUcustomsunion,thesewillnolongerapplytotheUK,norwillanyotherEUFTA.ForcountriesunhappywiththeirEPA,exclusionoftheUKmaybeapositive,lesseningtheimpactoftheagreement.Itmayalsoprovideajustificationforrenegotiatingtheseagreements(theEPAsincludeanMFNprovision,suggestingthatanypreferentialtreatmentthattheEU27wouldgranttotheUKpost-BrexitandwhichwouldbemorefavourablethanthoseundertheEPAshouldbeextendedtotheEPAcountries).For

ACPcountriesthatareparticularlyreliantontradewiththeUK,suchasSouthAfricaandKenya,concludinganadditionalFTAwiththeUKmaybecomeanimperative.TradenegotiationsbetweentheUKandACPcountries,especiallyAfricancountries,willfacenumerouschallengesthough.First,theUKisunlikelytoprioritisenegotiationswithAfricancountrieswhileitseekstoestablishtradearrangementswithmorecommerciallyimportanttradingpartners.Second,negotiationswithindividualcountries,suchasKenya,maybeseenasweakeningregionalintegrationprocessesinAfrica;butnegotiatingwithblocsofAfricancountrieswilllikelyrunintothesamedifficultiesastheEPAnegotiations,asmanyofthoseagreementsareappliedbyonlyasubsetofthemembersoftherespectiveAfricanregionalblocs.

SomearguethattheAfricanContinentalFTAmayprovideimpetusforAfricanUnionFTAswiththirdcountries.However,itisdifficulttoseehowthiswouldworkinthecontextofanagreementwiththeUK.Nevertheless,giventhatBrexitwillaffectalargenumberofACPcountries,andtheywillthereforehaveaninterestineitherdevelopmentofafutureUKunilateralpreferentialtraderegimeorfuturebilateralagreementswiththeUK,someformofinternationalcooperationmaybehelpful,includingthroughtheACPGrouportheAfricanUnionconfiguration(andinthecontextofpost-Cotonounegotiations).SomedegreeofconvergencebetweentraderegimeswiththeUKandtheEU27mightalsobebeneficial,toreducetransactioncostsandfosterintegratedvaluechains.

AbouttheauthorsSanBilalisheadofprogrammeTrade,InvestmentandFinanceEconomicandAgriculturalTransformationprogrammeatECDPM.Twitter:@SanBilal1

SeanWoolfreyispolicyofficerwiththeEconomicandAgriculturalTransformationProgrammeatECDPM.Twitter:@SeanWoolfrey

More significant will be the need or

opportunity for third countries to

negotiate new trade arrangements

with the UK should it leave the EU

customs union.


The UK’s withdrawal from the EU will impact the food and agriculture sector of developing countries in various ways. The impact on agri-food trade flows could be significant. Brexit could also affect overall development assistance flows and foreign direct investment possibilities.

ByAlanMatthews

ThelargestimpactsofBrexitondevelopingcountryagri-foodtradeflowswillbeonexportstotheUKitself.TheUKcurrentlyaccountsforaround12%ofalldevelopingcountryagri-foodexportstotheEU.Ofthese,morethanhalfentertheUKunder‘mostfavourednation’(MFN)terms(includingMFNzerotariffs);onethirdunderpreferentialtradeagreements(freetradeagreements,FTAs)andtariffratequotas(TRQs);andasmallshare(around7%)undertheEU’sGeneralisedSystemofPreferences(GSP),whichincludestheduty-freequota-freeEverythingbutArmsschemefortheleastdevelopedcountries(LDCs).

Althoughpositionsmaychange,theUKhasindicatedthatitdoesnotwishtobeinacustomsunionnorbeamemberoftheEUsinglemarketinthelongerterm.Thiswillnecessarilyleadtoincreasedtradecostsforagri-foodtradebetweentheUKandtheEU27,evenifthetwopartiesremaininanFTAwithpreferentialzerotariffs.Dependingonthenatureofthefuturetraderelationship,costswillrisefromrulesoforiginchecks,physicalchecksforregulatorycompliance,customsclearanceformalities,andthepossibilityofdelaysatbordercrossings.

Theseadditionaltradecostswillleadtoaprocessoftradedestructionandtradediversion.TradedestructionmeansthatthevolumeoftradebetweentheUKandtheEU27willbelowerthanitwouldhavebeeniftheUKremainedanEUmemberstate.Tradediversionwillarisebecausethirdcountries,includingdevelopingcountries,willbecomemorecompetitiveinbothmarketsrelativetoUKandEU27exporters.ThiseffectwillbemainlyrelevantontheUKmarket,becauseUKexportsofagri-foodproductstotheEU27aremuchlesssignificant.BothtradedestructionandtradediversioneffectswillimprovethepositionofdevelopingcountriescompetingwithEUexportersontheUKmarket.

FurthereffectscouldarisedependingontheUK’sagriculturaltradepolicyafterBrexit.Acountry’stariffscheduleliststhemaximumtariffsandothercommitmentsthatacountryhasagreedinnegotiationsnottoexceed.TheUKhassaidthatitwilladopttheEU’stariffscheduleasitsboundtariffscheduleattheWorldTradeOrganization(WTO).

Developing countries’ agri-foodtrade after Brexit

Agri-food project Mozambique. Photo: CIF Action/Flickr


Coffee cherry picking in Bugesera district, RwandaPhoto: Graham Holliday/Flickr.

Butifitwishes,theUKcandecideafterBrexittoreduceitsappliedtariffsbelowtheseboundtariffsonanMFNbasis.Todate,theUKhasgivennoindicationofitspreferredfuturetraderegimeforagri-foodproducts.IftheUKweretoloweritsappliedtariffs,thiscouldopenfurtheropportunitiesfordevelopingcountriesexportingtotheUKonMFNterms.However,itwoulderodethevalueofpreferencesforthosedevelopingcountryexporterscurrentlyexportingtotheUKunderFTAorGSPtariffregimes.

TheUKandtheEU27mustalsodecidehowtoadministerthescheduledWTOEUtariffratequotas(TRQs).TheirinitialproposaltosplitthesescheduledTRQsonthebasisofhistoricimportquantitieshasbeenrejectedbyexportersasrepresentingareductionintheirmarketaccessrights.NegotiationsmayhavetotakeplacebetweentheEU,theUK,andprincipalsuppliersonmodificationofthisscheduleunderArticle28oftheGeneralAgreementonTariffsandTrade(GATT),whichmayrequirecompensationtothesesuppliersiftheEUTRQsarereduced.

EveniftheUKmaintainsitsexistingappliedtariffschedule,itintendstopursueanambitiousagendaoffreetradedealswhichcouldprovideadditionalmarketopeningopportunitiesfordevelopingcountries.IthascommittedtoreplicatingtheEverythingbutArmsschemeforLDCs,butitsintentionsregardingtheGSParenotyetclear.

AlthoughtheUKwouldbeallowedtonegotiateandsignFTAsduringthetransitionperiodunderthetermsofthedraftwithdrawalagreementwiththeEU27,itwouldnotbeabletoimplementthemuntilafterthecloseofthetransitionphasewhichissettoendon31December2020.MostcountrieswillwanttowaittoseewhatthetermsofafutureUK-EUtradedealwillbebeforefinalisingnegotiationsonabilateraldealwiththeUK(seealsothearticlebyDavidJessopinthisvolume).

Amoreimmediateissueconcernsthosedevelopingcountryexports(aroundonethirdofthetotal)whichcurrentlyentertheUKmarketunderexistingTRQsorFTAssignedwiththeEU.Underthedraftwithdrawalagreement,theseexportswouldcontinuetoentertheUKonthecurrenttermsuntiltheendofthetransitionperiodon31December2020,giventhattheUKwouldremainpartoftheEUCustomsUnionuntilthen.

Afterthatdate,theUKwouldnolongerbeapartytothoseagreements.ThismeansthereisapossibilitythatUKappliedtariffs(whichhaveyettobedetermined)wouldbeleviedondevelopingcountryexportsthatcurrentlyentertheUKmarketunderthetermsofanFTA.Thiswouldhaveahugelychillingeffectontheexportsoftheaffectedcountries.

TheUKisawarethatallowingtheseagreementstolapsewouldhaveaverydetrimentaleffectontradeflows.IthasproposedthatthecurrentagreementswiththeEU’sFTApartnercountriesshouldbe‘rolledover’sothattheywouldcontinuetoapplytotradewiththeUK,pendingtheopeningoffurthernegotiationsatsomefuturedate.

Givenitslimitedtradenegotiatingcapacity,itcouldbesometimebeforetheUKisinapositiontore-opennegotiationsontheseagreements.Somedevelopingcountryregionswillfearthattheiragreementswillnotbegivenpriorityinthissituation.

DevelopingcountrieswithFTAswiththeEUwillneedtodecidewhethertheyarewillingtorollovertheseagreementswiththeUK.SomedevelopingcountriesmayhopetoimproveontheircurrenttermsofaccessundertheEUagreements,butthiswouldimplyre-negotiatingtheseagreements,whichisnotlikelytohappenimmediately.ItwillbeimportantfordevelopingcountrieswithFTAaccesstoensurethatpreferentialaccesstotheUKmarketcancontinueafter31December2020.

EUFTAsoftenincludespecificTRQquantitieseligibleforreducedratesofdutywhichcurrentlycanbeusedeitherontheUKoronEU27markets.DevelopingcountriesthatuseTRQsaspartoftheirFTAwillneedtonegotiatetoensurethattheyarenotinalessfavourablepositionregardingmarketaccessafterBrexit.

DevelopingcountryexportswillalsobeaffectedbythefutureevolutionofmacroeconomicconditionsintheUK.IfBrexitresultsinafurtherdeteriorationinthevalueofthepoundsterling,andifitreducestheUK’slong-termgrowthrate,asmanyeconomicmodelspredict,householdpurchasingpowerintheUKwillbeadverselyaffected.ThiswilllikelybetheprimaryBrexitimpactondevelopingcountryexportersoftropicalproductswherecurrentEUappliedtariffsareloworzero.

AbouttheauthorAlanMatthewsisProfessoremeritusofEuropeanagriculturalpolicyintheDepartmentofEconomics,SchoolofSocialSciencesandPhilosophyatTrinityCollegeDublin,Ireland.Twitter:@xAlan_Matthews


AsBrexitapproaches,BritonswerefrequentlyremindedthatanexitfromtheEUwas,forBritishauthorities,theonlywayto‘takebackcontrolof[national]borders’(Reuters,2017).WhilecampaignersconcentratedonEUcitizens’mobilitytotheUK,thedebatewasinflamedbyaseeminglypermanentemergencyalongtheouterbordersoftheEU,culminatinginthe2015refugeecrisisintheBalkans.CriticsemphasisedtheEU’sincapacitytosecureitsexternalbordersandpreventunauthorisedthirdcountrynationals

(TCNs)fromapproaching,thenenteringBritishterritories(seeGrice,2017).Thecommonunderstandingwasthat,onceindependentfromBrussels,UKauthoritieswouldbecomeabletoselectthoseitallowedontoitssoil,thusbarringthemanyasylumseekerswaitingtoenterBritainfromcontinentalEurope(Watt,2016).

Nevertheless,acloserlookatthemechanicsofborderandmigrationcontrolintheUKraisesquestionsabouthowleavingtheEUcouldpossibly

improveUKauthorities’abilitytopreventunwantedTCNsfromenteringBritain.HereIcriticallyassesspost-Brexitscenarios,concentratingonadistantmaritimeborderspace;thatis,thestretchofMediterraneanthatextendsfromtheStraitofGibraltartotheSicilianChannel.ThecentralandwesternMediterraneanroutesofunauthorisedmigrationbetweenAfricaandEuropetraversethesewaters.ThousandsofundocumentedpeoplecrossthismaritimeareaannuallytoreachEurope.Itisthedeadliestbordercrossingtoday.TheEUhasinvested

Rock of Gibraltar. Photo: Pixabay

Brexit could make UK migration control in the Mediterranean even harderBrexit was presented as the solution for Britain to take back control of its national borders. However, a closer look at a Mediterranean British border shows that Brexit could weaken the ability of UK authorities to manage and reduce unauthorised migration to the country.

ByGiacomoOrsini


substantiallytoimprovecontrolandsurveillance.TherecentproposalbytheCommissiononthemultiannualfinancialframeworksuggestsincreasingthisspending.

Deskresearchanddatacollectedinaseriesoffieldworkstudiesconductedsince2008alongtheEU’sexternalbordersinMalta,Lampedusa,Melilla,andGibraltarindicatefewopportunitiesforBritaintoenhancecontrolofthoseenteringitsterritoriesafterBrexit.Rather,allindicationssuggestthatleavingtheEUwillreduceUKauthorities’capacitytoeffectivelycontrolunauthorisedmigration.UnexpectedandchallengingscenariosareparticularlylikelytoarisealonganalmostinvisibleBritishborderintheMediterranean:theseawatersthatseparateGibraltarfromMoroccoandtherestofAfrica.BeforediscussingtheissuessurroundingthetinyBritishoverseasterritoryofGibraltar,itisusefultoreviewBritishinvolvementintheEuropeanmanagementoftheEU’slargerMediterraneanborder.

TheUKandSchengen:PushingtheBritishbordersouthAstheSchengenzoneoffreemovementofpeopleexpanded,unauthorisedmigrationandasylumintoBritainbecameincreasinglyassociatedwithimagesofundocumentedTCNscrowdingtheimprovisedcampsofCalaisinNorthernFrance(see,e.g.,Duffin,2014).Thousandsofmigrants,mostfromAfricaandAsia,waitedthereforachancetoenterBritainunauthorised,inmanycasesaftertheyhadalreadyenteredandcrossedEuropeunauthorised.Todeterpeoplefromcrossingandkeeptheseunwantedtravellersout,BritishauthoritiesreachedagreementsonjuxtaposedbordercontrolswithFranceandBelgium.Suchcross-bordercooperationincreasedinthemonthsleadinguptothemigration

andasylumcrisisof2015(FranceintheUK,2014).ThatcrisiswasparticularlyfeltalongtheEU’smostexternalborders;thatis,inplacessuchastheItalianislandofLampedusaandtheSpanishenclavesofCeutaandMelilla.Thisiswhy,whilecooperationaroundtheBritishChannelgrew,BritishauthoritiesalsostartedcontributingtothecomplexgovernanceoftheSchengenareaoffreemovement(HouseofLords,2017).

AstheUKisnotpartofSchengen,itsgoalinincreasingcooperation,forinstance,withtheEuropeanBorderandCoastGuardAgency(FRONTEX)wastotransferatleastpartofborderandmigrationcontrolsouthwards,andthusawayfromtheEnglishChannel.Inthisrespect,overtheyearssuccessiveBritishgovernmentsmadesubstantialcontributionstopatrollingtheexternalbordersoftheEU.TheUKprovidedbothnavysupporttopatroltheMediterraneanandfinancialcontributionstoFRONTEXoperations.

Alongthesamelines,theUKreceivedspecialtreatmentfromitsEuropeanpartners.ThoughBritaindidnotjointheareaoffreemovementofpeople,theUKwasallowedtobecomepartoftheDublinRegulation.ThismeantitcouldreturnrefugeestoothersafeEuropeancountriestheyhadtransited.Withinthisframework,BritishauthoritieswerealsogivenaccesstotheEURODACarchive,inwhichdataarestored,suchasfingerprints,onTCNswhohadappliedforinternationalprotectionwithintheEU.IftheUKwouldliketoretainaccesstotheseinformationandpolicyinstrumentsafteritleavestheEU,itwillprobablyhavetoberenegotiated.Here,thus,BrexitbringsariskthatBritainmightlosecapacitytomonitorunauthorisedTCNs’mobilityinEurope(Hulme,2017).Inaddition,otherandnewchallenges

couldariseinadistantBritishborderlandlocatedatthegateoftheMediterranean.

AninvisibleBritish-Africanborder:TheStraitofGibraltarThoughenhancedbordercontrolisoftenpresentedasthecorestrategyfortacklingunauthorisedresidenceinBritain,thegreatestmajorityofunauthorisedpeoplelivingintheUKinfactenteredwitharegularpermitandthenoverstayed(Vollmer,2011).ThethousandswhohavecrossedtheMediterraneanundocumentedtoreachEuropeconstituteonlyatinyminorityofirregularTCNsresidingintheEU.Furthermore,evidencesuggeststhatnobordercanbeentirelysecured(KIB,2016).Itissimplyunfeasibletoeffectivelypatrolborders,especiallymaritimeones,astherearecountlesswaystocrossundetected,andnotechnologiesavailabletopreventit(Orsini,2015).Fromthisperspective,then,lossofaccesstoCommunitarianpolicyinstrumentstomanageandcontrolmigrationandasylumwillnotsignificantlyimpactBritishauthorities’abilitytolimitthenumberofunauthorisedTCNslivinginthecountry.

Yet,leavingtheEUcouldposedramaticchallengesforBritishmigrationandbordermanagementintheStraitofGibraltar.GibraltarneverjoinedtheEUandsharesalandandamaritimeborderwithSpainandMorocco.WithintheframeworkofaninternationaldisputebetweentheBritishandSpanishgovernments–and,partly,theMoroccanone–whichhasnowlastedfortwothirdsofacentury,thethreecountriesrecognisedifferentjurisdictionsoverthewatersoftheStrait(DeVivero,2009).Officially,SpanishandGibraltarianlawenforcementagenciesdonotcooperateatallincontrollingthesharedmaritimeandlandborder.However,datacollectedintheenclaveandobservationsthereindicatequiteadifferentstory.


Duetothemechanicsofeverydayinternationalbordermanagement,GibraltarianandSpanishforcesdefactocollaborateratherclosely.Thisisrecognised,thoughonlyobliquely,inofficialdocumentsissuedbyGibraltarianauthorities(GPR,n.d.).Offtherecord,GibraltarianlawenforcementofficialsexplainedtomehowmigrationandbordermanagementworksinthewaterssurroundingtheBritishenclave.IfamigrantboatentersGibraltar’snationalwatersandisquicklydetectedbyGibraltarianforces,itisusuallypushedbackintoSpanishwaters.TheboatsoftheGuardiaCivilthentakethemigrantsonboardandlandthemonSpanishsoil.If,instead,boatmigrantsaredetectedtooclosetoGibraltarianshores,TCNsarelandedinGibraltarandimmediatelytransferredtoSpainacrossthelandborder.Supportingsuchinformalaccountsisonehardfact:despitetherealitythattheStraitofGibraltarisoneofthemainentrancesforundocumentedbordercrossingsintotheEU,veryfewarrivalsarerecordedinGibraltar.

If,followingBrexit,Spainstopscollaborating,undocumentedmigrantscouldreachtheRockandapplyforasylumthere.ThiscouldcreatetheconditionsforahumanitariancrisistounfoldinthisdetachedBritishterritory.Furthermore,SpainoperatesasophisticatedmaritimebordercontrolapparatusontheStrait,calledtheIntegratedExteriorSurveillanceSystem(Carling,2007).TheUK’scontinuedrelianceonthissystemwouldbecomeimpossiblewithoutcooperationwithSpainandtheEUinplace.Asseenhere,therearenogroundstothinkthatBrexitwillenhanceBritishcontrolofitsborders.Rather,theUK’sdevolutionfromtheEUwillpotentiallyturnGibraltarintoagateforTCNstoenterBritaindirectlyfromthecoastsofNorthAfrica.

References• Carling,Jørgen(2007,7June),‘The

meritsandlimitationsofSpain'shigh-techbordercontrol’.MigrationPolicyInstitute.www.migrationpolicy.org/article/merits-and-limitations-spains-high-tech-border-control

• DeVivero,JuanLuisSuárez(2009),JurisdictionalwatersintheMediterraneanandBlackSeas.Brussels:PolicyDepartmentforStructuralandCohesionPolicies,EuropeanParliament.

• Duffin,Claire(2014,21October),‘MigrantsfightinCalaisforcontrolofroutestoBritain,saypolice’,TheTelegraph.www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/france/11178783/Migrants-fight-in-Calais-for-control-of-routes-to-Britain-say-police.html

• FranceintheUK(2014),‘FranceandUKagreestepstocombatillegalmigration’,London:EmbassyofFranceinLondon.https://uk.ambafrance.org/France-and-UK-agree-steps-to

• GPR(n.d.),AnnualreportoftheGibraltarPoliceAuthority,2013-2014.Gibraltar:GibraltarPoliceAuthority.http://gpasurvey.com/images/publications/Annual_Reports/GPA_Annual_Report_2013-2014.pdf

• Grice,Andrew(2017,18January),‘FakenewshandedBrexiteersthereferendum–andnowtheyhavenoideawhatthey'redoing’.Independent.www.independent.co.uk/voices/michael-gove-boris-johnson-brexit-eurosceptic-press-theresa-may-a7533806.html

• HouseofLords(2017),‘LeavingtheEuropeanUnion:FrontexandUKBorderSecurityCooperationWithinEurope’.London:HouseofLordsLibrary.http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/LIF-2017-0039

• Hulme,Benjamin(2017,2March),‘CouldBrexitbeaboontohumansmuggling?’OpenDemocracy.www.

opendemocracy.net/benjamin-hulme/could-brexit-be-boon-to-human-smuggling

• KIB(2016),Migration.Leuven:KringvoorInternationaleBetrekkingen.

• Orsini,Giacomo(2015),‘Goodpoliciesneedtobegroundedinreality’.ZOCALOPublicSquare.www.zocalopublicsquare.org/2015/10/21/the-refugee-crisis-is-not-temporary/ideas/up-for-discussion/#Giacomo+Orsini

• Reuters(2017,7December),‘WholeoftheUKneedstotakebackcontrolofbordersandcashfromEU,Johnsonsays’.Reuters.www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-eu-johnson/whole-of-the-uk-needs-to-take-back-control-of-borders-and-cash-from-eu-johnson-says-idUSKBN1E11M8

• Vollmer,Bastian(2011),IrregularmigrationintheUK:Definitions,pathwaysandscale.MigrationObservatoryBriefing.Oxford,UK:COMPAS,UniversityofOxford.

• Watt,Nicholas(2016,25May),‘EUreferendum:Voteleavefocusesonimmigration’.BBC.www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-eu-referendum-36375492

AbouttheauthorGiacomoOrsiniisapostdoctoralresearcherattheUniversitéCatholiquedeLouvain.HeteachesinternationalmigrationattheUniversitéLibredeBruxellesandisanassociatememberoftheVrijeUniversiteitBrusselandtheUniversityofEssex.


Europe’s gender action beyond BrexitThe UK has played an influential role in EU gender and development policy, including the second Gender Action Plan on Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment (GAP II). Is the institutional cultural shift promised by GAP II strong enough to keep gender high on the EU development agenda post-Brexit? There is a growing sense that GAP II has gained enough institutional momentum to continue regardless.

ByGillAllwood

TheEUhaslongbeencommittedtogenderequalityasafundamentalvalueandtogendermainstreaming.TheCotonouAgreement(2000/483/EC),whichhasgovernedrelationsbetweentheEUandthe79African,Caribbean,andPacific(ACP)countries,states,‘Systematicaccountshallbetakenofthesituationofwomenandgenderissuesinallareas–political,economicand

social’(Article1).The2005ConsensusonDevelopmentreiterates,‘TheEUwillincludeastronggendercomponentinallitspoliciesandpracticesinitsrelationswithdevelopingcountries’(EuropeanCommission,2006).ThisbroadobjectivewasfleshedoutintheEuropeanCommission’s(2007)communication‘GenderEqualityandWomen’sEmpowermentinDevelopmentCooperation’.

Mural of Simone Veil, (Honorary Dame of the Order of the British Empire). Photo: Thierry Ehrmann/Flickr


Whileimportant,theserhetoricalcommitmentslackedaplanofactiontotranslatethemintopractice.The2010‘ActionPlanonGenderEqualityandWomen’sEmpowerment’(theGenderActionPlan,orGAP)aimedtodopreciselythis(EuropeanCommission,2010).Itemphasisedathree-prongedapproach:mainstreaminggenderinalldevelopmentactivities,continuingtosupportinterventionstargetedspecificallyatwomenandgirls,andintroducinggenderequalityandwomen’sempowermentintopoliticaldialogue.However,theGAPhadlimitedsuccess.EvaluationscriticisedthegulfbetweentheEU’scommitmenttogenderequalityanditsinternalcapacitytoimplementit(Watkinsetal.,2015;O’Connell,2013).ThesecondGAP,adoptedbytheCouncilinOctober2015,aimstoaddressthisandotherfailings(EuropeanCommissionandHighRepresentative,2015).GAPIIhasfourpriorities,threethematicandonecrosscutting.

Thethreethematicprioritiesare:• ensuringgirls’andwomen’sphysicalandpsychological

integrity,• promotingeconomicandsocialrightsandempowermentof

girlsandwomen,and• strengtheninggirls’andwomen’svoiceandparticipation.

Thecrosscuttingpriorityisinstitutional,andpresentedasapreconditionforachievingtheotherthree:• shiftingCommissionservicesandtheinstitutionalculture

oftheEuropeanExternalActionService(EEAS)tomoreeffectivelydeliveronEUcommitments.

Thisincludesincreasingthenumberofwomenheadsofdelegation,boostinggenderexpertisewithintheEUinstitutionsanddelegations,andincreasingthenumberofprogrammesandprojectsinwhichgenderequalityisaprincipalorsignificantobjective.

TheUKandGAPIITheUKhasbeenactiveinGAPII’sdevelopment,particularlyinensuringastrongfocusonresultsandontheEUinstitutions’internalworkingsandculture.TheUKwasaleadingvoiceintheCouncil,alongwithanumberoflike-mindedcountries,insupportoftheinclusionofsexualandreproductivehealthandrightsinbothGAPIIandtheEuropeanConsensusonDevelopment.Thisrequiredsignificanteffort,asoppositionwasraised.NumerousUKnationalexpertshavebeensecondedtoEEASandthedelegations,andUKcivilsocietyleadershavecontributedvitalexpertise.

TheUK’sInternationalDevelopment(GenderEquality)Act2014,whichintroducedadutytohaveregardforgenderinequalityandreportoneffortstoremedyitandtoadvancewomen’sempowerment,isseenasanexampleofbestpractice(EuropeanCommissionandHighRepresentative,2017).DFID’s2018Strategic

VisionforWomenandGirlsprovidesfurtherevidenceoftheUK’scommitmenttogenderanddevelopment,althoughtheUKdoesnotgoasfarasSweden,whichhasproducedafeministforeignpolicy(GovernmentOfficesofSweden,2018).TheUKhasalsoprovidedleadershiponsexualviolenceinconflict.AttheUNlevel,theUKandEUhavesupportedeachother’sworkaroundgender,forexample,intheadoptionofResolution2242(2015)ontheroleofwomenincounteringviolentextremism.

ThebudgetandGAPIIGAPIIencouragestheEUanditsmemberstatestoincreasetheproportionofODAdirectedtowardsprogrammeswithagendercomponent.Yet,withareducedbudgetfollowingBrexit,thereisconcernabouttheabilitytomaintainGAPII’simplementation.Istheenvisionedinstitutionalculturalshiftalreadysufficientlyanchoredtokeepgenderontheagendawhenresourcesarescarce?

GAPIIdoesnotpromiseextraresources.Itstates,‘CommissionServicesandEEAS…willworktowardsensuringadequatefinancialandhumanresources’(EuropeanCommissionandHighRepresentative,2015,para.B).Thisistobedoneinseveralways:throughimprovedpartnershipandcoordination,including,potentially,theprivatesector;bycloselymonitoringexternalrelations’resourceandbudgetallocationstogender;andby‘identifyingmeansofensuringadequatefinancialsupport’.Theemphasisison‘moreeffectiveandefficientuseofresources’(ibid.,p.13).ResourceallocationforGAPIIimplementationisnowanimportantquestion,asmemberstatesarenegotiatingthenextmultiannualfinancialframework(MFF).AfundinggapleftbytheUK’swithdrawalcouldmakethisprocessmoredifficult.

BrexitisalreadyhavingadirectfinancialimpactonUKaidrecipients.Thefallinthepound’svaluefollowingthe2016referendumhasreducedtheamountofmoneyavailabletoUKcivilsocietyorganisations(CSOs),includingthoseworkingongenderequalityandwomen’sempowerment.UKCSOswillbefurtheraffectedbytheirlossofEUfunding(Bond,2017,p.6).ThiswillimpactCSOsworkingonHIV/AIDS,reproductivehealth,andfamilyplanning,andtheirdevelopmentpartners.AlthoughsomeactorsintheCommissionandEEAShavedemonstratedstrongcommitmenttogenderequalityandwomen’sempowerment,genderisnotnecessarilyperceivedbyallasatoppriority.Whenresourcesarescarce,gendertendstobepusheddowntheagenda,treatedasaluxuryaffordableonlyintimesofplenty.GAPIIseekstoensurefullinstitutionalisationofactionfavouringgenderequalityandwomen’sempowerment,thusprovidingabufferagainstpoliticalandfinancialchange.

BrexitandGAPIIThereisasenseintheEUinstitutionsthattheUKwillbemissedasagenderanddevelopmentpartner.However,GAP


IIseemstohavegainedsufficientinstitutionalmomentumtocontinueregardlessoftheUK’scontribution.ThereiscurrentlystrongpoliticalleadershipforGAPII,includingDevelopmentCommissionerNevenMimicaandHighRepresentativeFedericaMogherini.Mimica,forexample,declaredin2015thathewouldbe‘themostvocalmalefeminist’intheCollegeofCommissioners.‘Genderisdefinitelyapriority’,hesaid,‘andthiswillbeevermorevisibleinourconcretedevelopmentactions’(Gotev,2018).

QuestionsremainonfutureUKcooperationwiththeEUandlike-mindedmemberstatesongenderanddevelopment.TheEUandOECDencouragecoordinationofaidactivities,asawaytoimproveaideffectiveness.Insomecountries,forexample,Ghana,theUKisworkingwithEUinstitutions,EUmemberstates,andothercountries,suchasNorwayandSwitzerland,throughjointprogramming.Thereispotentialhereforcontinuedcooperationandsharingofexpertise.Inaddition,theUKisactiveintheDACNetworkonGenderEquality(GENDERNET).AccordingtoBond(2017),UKCSOswanttocontinuetohaveavoice,tocooperatewithEuropeancivilsocietynetworks,andtoensurethatBrexitdoesnotdisadvantagethepartnerstheyworkwithintheglobalSouth(Bond,2017,p.4).

ThefutureofGAPIIwillbeinfluencedbyfactorsotherthanBrexitaswell.Thebroaderpoliticalandinstitutionalcontext,includingthenewCommission,EuropeanParliament,andMFF,willlikelyhavemoreinfluencethanBrexitontheEU’scommitmenttogenderequalityandwomen’sempowermentandonitssuccesstowardsthesegoals.Moreover,the(gendered)impactofEUdevelopmentpolicydependsonmorethanjustGAPII(Allwood,Guerrina,andMacRae,2013).Trade,migration,andclimatechangeareexamplesofUKandEUpolicyareasthatareinsufficientlygendermainstreamedandwhichhavesignificantgenderedimpact(Allwood,2014,2015).Tradepolicyaffectswomenandmendifferentlyduetostructuralinequalities,suchastheunequaldivisionofunpaidcareworkandwomen’slimitedaccesstoandcontroloverresources(EuropeanParliament,2018,paraB).Tradeliberalisationcanincreasegenderpaygaps(ibid.,para15).Inits2018ReportonGenderEqualityinEUTradeAgreements,theEuropeanParliamentcalledforallnecessarymeasurestobetakentopromotegenderequalityandwomen’sempowermentintrade.

ConclusionDevelopmentNGOsareworkinghardtoensurethatBrexitdoesnotadverselyaffectdevelopingcountriesandthepeoplelivinginthem.However,Brexitisnotthemainfocusoftheirconcernssurroundinggenderequalityandwomen’sempowerment.Here,theyareworkingtoensurethatGAPIIcontinuestobeeffectivelyimplemented,thatgenderbudgetingguidesformulationoftheMFF,thatgenderequalityisconsideredinEUtraderelations,andthatcivilsocietyinEuropeandinpartnercountrieshasthecapacitytoworkwiththeEUandholditaccountable.

References• Allwood,G.(2014),‘GendermainstreamingandEUclimate

changepolicy’,EuropeanIntegrationOnlinePapers,SpecialIssue1,18.

• Allwood,G.(2015),‘Horizontalpolicycoordinationandgendermainstreaming:ThecaseoftheEuropeanUnion’sglobalapproachtomigrationandmobility’,Women’sStudiesInternationalForum48,doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2014.10.004.

• Allwood,G.,R.Guerrina,andH.MacRae(2013),‘UnintendedconsequencesofEUpolicies:ReintegratinggenderinEuropeanstudies’,Women’sStudiesInternationalForum39,doi:10.1016/j.wsif.2013.05.001.

• Bond(2017),TheimpactofBrexitonUKandEUinternationaldevelopmentandhumanitarianpolicy:ViewsfromUKandEuropeancivilsociety.London:Bond.

• CotonouAgreement(2000/483/EC),PartnershipagreementbetweenthemembersoftheAfrican,CaribbeanandPacificgroupofstatesoftheonepart,andtheEuropeanCommunityanditsmemberstates,oftheotherpart,Protocols.Finalact.

• DFID(2018),DFIDstrategicvisionforgenderequality:Acalltoactionforherpotential,ourfuture.London:DepartmentforInternationalDevelopment.

• EuropeanCommission(2006),TheEuropeanconsensusondevelopment.Brussels:EuropeanCommission.

• EuropeanCommission(2007),CommunicationfromtheCommissiontotheEuropeanParliamentandtheCouncil:Genderequalityandwomen’sempowermentindevelopmentcooperation.Brussels:EuropeanCommission.

• EuropeanCommission(2010),EUplanofactionongenderequalityandwomen’sempowermentindevelopmentcooperation,SEC(2010)265Final.Brussels:EuropeanCommission.

Forafulllistofreferencesseethewebversionofthisarticleonourwebsite:http://ecdpm.org/great-insights/beyond_brexit/europes-gender-action-brexit/

AbouttheauthorGillAllwoodisprofessorintheSchoolofArtsandHumanitiesofNottinghamTrentUniversity.


High stakes: Brexit, security,and defenceBrexit comes at a critical moment for the UK, with its global aspirations, and for the EU, as it seeks to revive enthusiasm for the European project through a series of security initiatives. Failure to reach agreement will damage all concerned in the short term, but may leave the EU more focused and capable in the longer term.

BySimonDuke

Amisom exercise at sea, EUCAP Somalia.Photo: Francesca Marretta

BritaingoesglobalPrimeMinisterMaypresentedthefirstglimpseofherplanforBritain’spost-Brexitforeignandsecuritypolicyon17January2017inaspeechatLancasterHouse,repletewithnolessthan18referencesto‘GlobalBritain’.Thetermwasenthusiasticallyadoptedbyhergovernment,butremainslargelyunformulatedinpolicyterms.TheUKgovernmentcalledfora‘deepandspecialpartnershipwiththeEUthatgoesbeyond

existingthirdcountryarrangements’inapositionpaperonsecurity,defence,anddevelopmentof12September2017.MaythenreassuredherEuropeanpartnersinFlorenceon22SeptemberthattheUK’s‘determinationtodefendthestability,securityandprosperityofourEuropeanneighboursandfriendsremainssteadfast’.TheUK’sclaimtoabespokepost-BrexitrelationshipwiththeEUrestsonitspastandcurrentcontributionstotheEU’sCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy

(CSDP)and,forinternalsecurity,uponitscontributionstothecollectiveefforttocounterterrorismandorganisedcrime,aswellastodefendagainstcyberandhybridthreats.TheMaygovernmenthasreinforcedthesenseofentitlementbynotingthattheUK’sdefenceexpenditureisthelargestintheEU(andsecondlargestinNATO),thatithasthelargestdefenceindustry,andthatithascontributedtothemajorityofCSDPoperationsandmissions.


Yet,bythetimeoftheMunichSecurityConferenceinFebruary2018,theunderlyingmessagehadsubtlyshifted.Settingoutthegovernment’snegotiationposition,Maycalledfor‘anewTreatytounderpinourfutureinternalsecurityrelationship’.RegardingsecuritybeyondtheEU,shecalledforalooser‘agreement’,observingthatotherformsofassociation,suchasbilateraloradhocgroupings,couldincorporatetheUK.

Leadershipanddiplomaticsupport…butnotmanybootsAcloserexaminationoftheUK’sactualrecord,basedondatafromtheEuropeanUniversityInstitute,showsthatofthe35pastorcurrentCSDPmissionstheUKcontributedto25,withanaverageof15.72personnelpermission.Acrossallthemissions,theUK’spersonnelcontributionsequalled2.3%ofthetotalcontributionsbyEUmembers(or4.3%ofthoseoperationsandmissionstowhichitcontributed).TheUK’scontributionspaleincomparisontoFrance,Italy,andSpain,whichhavecontributedappreciablymoretocivilianandmilitaryoperationsoverall.Ononlyoneoccasion,aregionalmaritimecapacitybuildingmissionfortheHornofAfricaandtheWesternIndianOcean(EUCAPNESTOR),hastheUKledthepersonnel

contributions(with19personnel).AngusLapsley,formerUKAmbassadortothePoliticalandSecurityCommittee,andothershavearguedthattheUK’scontributionstoCSDPoperationsandmissionshavetendedtobe‘moreaboutleadershipanddiplomaticsupport’.

Significantly,allexceptoneoftheCSDPoperationsandmissionstowhichtheUKdidnotcontributewereinAfrica.Innearlyallofthese,Franceassumedthelead,alsotyingitsleadershiproletoitsownstrategicinterests.Thishasimpliedgreatercommitmentsofpersonnelandresources,oftenas‘frameworknation’.AfricaoperationsinwhichtheUKhasbeeninvolved(ATALANTA,SOPHIA,andEUCAPNestor)havefocusedonprotectingtheintegrityofsea-lines-of-communication(SLOCs).ForATALANTA,theUKprovidestheoperationalheadquarters(ItalyandSpainarevyingforitspost-Brexitrelocation).Presumably,post-BrexittheUKwillcontinuetocontributethroughNATO,thusparadoxicallyreinforcingtheneedforparalleloperationswiththesameobjectives.

AsimilarpatternisevidentintheUN.ThemajorityofUNpeacekeeperssince2000havebeendeployedtosub-SaharanAfrica,

whichisofrelativestrategicinsignificancefortheUK,comparedtotheBalkans,Afghanistan,andIraq.

PrimafacieitcouldbeconcludedthattheEU’ssecurityoperationsinAfrica,especiallysub-SaharanAfrica,willbelittlechangedbyBrexit.Moregenerally,itisdifficulttoavoidtheconclusionthattheUKhasexaggerateditscontributiontoCSDPoperationsandthusthebasisuponwhichitcaninsistuponabespokesecurityanddefencerelationship.FortheUKthecriticalquestioniswhetheritwillwishtoassociatewithCSDPmissionsoroperationswhenithasnosayinshapingtheirunderpinningprioritiesanddecisions.

NavelgazingTheUK’sprimarypost-BrexitsecurityinterestliesincontinuedassociationwithaspectsoftheEU’sinternalsecurity,nottheexternaldimensions,asMichelBarnier’sslideof15May(reproducedinthisvolume)suggests.TheUKwishestomaintainitsaccessto,aswellascontributeto,theEuropeanArrestWarrant,thesecond-generationSchengenInformationSystem(SISII),theEuropeanCriminalRecordsInformationSystem(ECRIS),andthePassengerNameRecord(PNR)database,alongsidetherelevantEUagencies(notablytheEUAgencyforLawEnforcementCooperation,Europol).BritishinterestsareclearlymatchedontheEUsidebythedesirabilityofsecuringcontinuedUKinputintothedatabases.Nevertheless,thequestionofdataprotectionandwhethertheUKwillacceptlegalrecourse,presumablythroughtheEuropeanCourtofJustice,willbecritical.Mayhasbeencontradictoryonthispoint.ShevowedtoendthejurisdictionoftheCourtinherLancasterHousespeech,butappearedtoacceptitinthiscontextattheMunichSecurityConference.

FailuretofindagreementonthenominallyinternalaspectsofsecurityPoliceacademy,Somalia.PhotoEUCAPSomalia,FrancescaMarretta


couldhaveimplicationsforNorthAfricaandtheSahel,whereeffortstostemirregularmigration,thegrowthofjihadistgroups,trafficking,organisedcrime,andterrorismarealreadyprovingchallenging.LackofaccesstotherelevantdatabaseswouldleavetheUKmorevulnerableandweakentheEU’seffortsintheseregions.TheongoinguncertaintiesoverGibraltarandCyprus(bothofwhichmayberelevantinfuturemilitarydeploymentsandintelligence)andlackofEUaccesstoUKexpertiseandfundingmaysimilarlythwartEUeffortsgoingforward.Theprospectofdiminishedoverallpost-BrexitEUfundingmayreducetheUnion’sleverageatatimewhentheEUisintentonexternalisingitsbordermanagementandincreasingdefences

MovingaheadwithoutBritain?TheEUhasbeenfarfromidlesincetheUK’sJune2016referendum.AflurryofinitiativesinEUsecurityanddefencefollowedtheunveilingoftheUnion’sGlobalStrategy,whichappearedonlydaysafterthereferendum.ThisledFedericaMogherini,theHighRepresentative,toassertthat‘morehasbeenachievedinthelasttenmonthsthaninthelasttenyears’,astatementsherepeatedatthe2017editionofTheStateoftheUnionconferenceinFlorence.Thisprogresswas,atleastinpart,duetotheUK’santicipatedexitfromtheEU.TheambitionistomovetowardsaEuropeanDefenceUnionfeaturingcoordinateddefencereviewsandalegalframeworktoattainsharedcommongoalsalongsideCommissionfundingfordevelopingthenecessarycapabilities.

Evenifmuchofthisprogresstodateexistsprimarilyonpaper,itneverthelessraisesbroaderquestionsabouttheextenttowhichUKdefenceindustries,someofwhicharemultinational,willhaveaccesstoEUresearch

anddevelopmentfunding.MorecoordinationattheEuropeanlevel,alongwithpoolingandsharingcapabilities,mayultimatelychallengelonger-terminteroperabilitywiththeUK.

Actions conjointes?TheUK’spost-BrexitbilateralsecuritytiesmaybeofmostconsequenceforEurope’ssecurity.NoneismoreimportantthanFrance.TheAnglo-FrenchCombinedJointExpeditionaryForcecouldconceivablyprovideausefulbackstop.TheUKandFrancemayalsosupporteachotherontheirrespectivestrategicpriorities,asoutlinedattheJanuary2018Anglo-FrenchsummitattheRoyalMilitaryAcademySandhurst,wheretheUKagreedtoprovideChinookhelicopterstosupportFrance’songoingBARKHANEoperation,inadditiontotheexistingRAFstrategicairtransportflights.FrancehasagreedtodeployFrenchtroopstotheUK-ledNATObattlegroupinEstoniain2019aspartoftheAlliance’sEnhancedForwardPresence.

BilateralsecurityrelationsmayalsobestrengthenedthroughPresidentMacron’sEuropeanInterventionInitiative(EII)which,whilelackinginspecifics,isintendedtobelaunched‘withpartnersthathavethenecessarymilitarycapabilitiesandpoliticalwill’.Franceisanxioustofindwaysforpost-BrexitUKto‘opt-in’toEuropeandefenceandsecurity,andtheEIIcould,intime,offerthepotentialformultilateralcooperationoutsidetheEUandNATO.

IftheEU-levelinitiativesunveiledin2016failtomaterialise,theonusmayagainfallonFranceandtheUK,asthemostmilitarilycapableandexperiencedEuropeanpowers,toprovidethebackboneofEurope’sharderautonomoussecurityguarantees.ThiswouldputthefocusofsecuritycooperationoutsidetheEUandprobablyNATO,relyinginsteadonthe

EIIorflexiblecoalitionsofthewilling.Thiscouldopenthewayformoretrade-offsbetweenUKandFrenchstrategicinterests.

ConclusionsThestakesarehighforallconcerned.FortheUKitisinconceivabletobetruly‘global’withoutbeingEuropean.ThismaywellimplyacompromisewherebytoensurecontinuedaccesstoEUdatabases,theUKmayhavetodemonstratemoreconcretelyitswillingnesstocontributetotheEU’sexternalsecurity.FortheEU,muchofthehoped-forreinvigorationoftheEuropeanprojectrestsonthesuccessofthevarioussecurityinitiativesunveiledin2016.GiventheUK’spreferencetodeployhigh-endmilitaryresources,ratherthanrankandfileinfantry,thedirecteffectofBrexitonEUcrisismanagementoperationsinAfricawilllikelybesmall,withtheexceptionofmaritimeoperations.Itis,nevertheless,possiblethatbilateraldefenceandsecurityties,particularlythosebetweentheUKandFrance,mayprovideopeningsforstrategictrade-offsandjointinvolvementinAfricansecurity.

AbouttheauthorSimonDukeisprofessorattheEuropeanInstituteofPublicAdministration(EIPA),Maastricht,andseniorresearchfellowatMaastrichtUniversity.Heisalsoauthorof'WillBrexitDamageourSecurityandDefence?TheImpactontheUKandEU',Palgraveduelaterin2018.Twitter:@eu_eipa


ECDPM’s relevant work

How will Brexit affect the Caribbean? Overview and indicative recommendationsErrol Humphrey, ECDPM paper, August 2016

On 23 June 2016, in a referendum on whether Britain should maintain its EU membership, 52% of British voters opted to leave the Union. The vote to exit the EU (Brexit) has given rise to political and economic uncertainty in the UK and raised concerns among its international partners.

How Brexit may affect ACP-EU relations: an historical perspectiveWalter Kennes, ECDPM paper, January 2018

The Brexit weakens the arguments in favour of a continued close association between the European Union (EU) and the Caribbean and Pacific ACP states like under the Cotonou Agreement. This is mainly because these states became associated with the EU as a direct result of the UK’s accession to the European Economic Community in 1973.

Sailing new waters in international cooperation.Mariella di Ciommo and Meritxell Sayós Monràs, ECDPM paper, 30 March 2018

The EU Global Strategy and the European Consensus on Development present the drivers for the EU’s engagement with more advanced (MADCs) and middle-income developing countries (MICs) but do not offer clear guidance. This is partly due to tensions among different objectives: for example, between an emphasis on the EU’s neighbourhood and the global 2030 Agenda; or between the EU’s short-term and long-term interests.

All together now? EU institutions and member states’ cooperation in fragile situations and protracted crisesAlexei Jones and Vera Mazzara, ECDPM paper, June 2018

Ever since the EU ventured into development cooperation, questions were raised on how its institutions and member states could better coordinate their activities. Numerous initiatives were launched to put into practice their repeated commitment to work more closely together, particularly in situations of fragility and protracted crisis.

http://ecdpm.org/publications/brexit-affect-caribbean/

http://ecdpm.org/publications/brexit-affect-acp-eu-relations-historical-perspective/

http://ecdpm.org/publications/brexit-affect-caribbean/

http://ecdpm.org/publications/brexit-affect-acp-eu-relations-historical-perspective/

http://ecdpm.org/publications/sailing-new-waters-international-cooperation/



http://ecdpm.org/publications/all-together-now-eu-institutions-member-states-international-cooperation-in-fragile-situations-protracted-crises/

http://ecdpm.org/publications/all-together-now-eu-institutions-member-states-international-cooperation-in-fragile-situations-protracted-crises/

b

In June 2016, the United Kingdom shocked Europe by voting for its withdrawal from the

European Union. The political follow-up to the vote to exit the EU gave rise to uncertainty

in the UK and raised concerns among its international partners, while within the EU

some consider Brexit to remove obstacles for further integration. Over two years later,

negotiations are still taking place, although some progress is being made, there is still

little clarity on what Brexit will mean in practice for the long run.

What does it imply for EU-UK relations in the future? How will it impact development, trade

and international cooperation between Europe and Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific?

As negotiations unfold, ECDPM will provide analysis and facilitate dialogue around these

questions. In this dossier, you can find our latest Brexit analyses and blogs.

Go to: http://ecdpm.org/dossiers/brexit-international-cooperation/

Brexit and international cooperation

To follow our work on the Mutliannual Financial Framework:

Go to: http://ecdpm.org/dossiers/multiannual-financial-framework-mff/

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