beyond federalism. estimating and explaining the territorial structure of government
TRANSCRIPT
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Beyond FederalismE Ex th Tt Stuctuf Gvt
Lbt Hh G M
N. 37 | A 2012
WORKING PAPER
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2 | KFGWorking Paper No. 37 | April 2012
KFG Working Paper Series
Edited by the Kolleg-Forschergruppe T T Pw E
Th KFG W P S v t t th ch ut f th K-Fchu b
th vb t b ubc. It t hc cc xch w t tth b
x bc ch t xt u c Eu th Eu U.
A KFG W P vb th KFG wbt t www.tfu.u c b t v
t tf-u@fu-b..
Cht f th u: Lbt Hh G M
Et tc uc: A Bbch D M
Hh, Lbt/M, G 2012: B F: E Ex th Tt Stuctu f Gv-
t, KFG W P S, N. 37, A 2012, K-Fchu (KFG) Th Tfv Pw f Eu
F Uvtt B.
ISSN 1868-6834 (Pt)
ISSN 1868-7601 (Itt)
Th ubc h b fu b th G Rch Fu (DFG).
F Uvtt B
K-Fchu
Th Tfv Pw f Eu:
Th Eu U th Du f I
Iht. 26
14195 B
G
Ph: +49 (0)30- 838 57033
Fx: +49 (0)30- 838 57096
tf-u@fu-b.
www.tfu.u
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Beyond Federalism | 3
Beyond Federalism
Estimating and Explaining the Territorial Structure ofGovernment
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks
Abstract
Th ut tht th bc c btw f ut vt h t w
v u ut f vt. Th tht v th tuctu f vt
c f th th h tht-jct t t t th utht f t-
t vt. O ut h b th c tht cut ftt, t t u, cv f
vt. Az t f 39 cut c 1950, c u w wth th f
tv ut, w vc f th cu ct f u. Th c b thz
t f t- btw v t f ct c ubc
v.
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Gary Marks Pf f Pc Scc t th Uvt f Nth C,
Ch H fu Dct f th UNC Ct f Eu Stu. M h
b N Fw t th Hv Itu (1986-87) Fw t th Ct
f Avc Stu th Bhv Scc t Stf 1991-92, VFw t th Wchztu B f Szfchu 2002-03. H h
h v fh t Scc Pqu, P (2002), Ktz Uvt,
G (2000), th Uvt f Twt, th Nth (1998). H w H
V Pf t McMt Uvt. I 1998 M w ct Ch f th
Eu Cut Stu Ac. M tch ch tt
th f cv c.
Ctct: @uc.u
T A
Liesbet Hooghe Zch T Sth Pf f Pc Scc t th Uvt
f Nth C Ch H, Ch Muv Gvc t th Vj Uvtt
At, cut Rch Fw t th KFG th Tfv Pw
f Eu. Sh f Ch f th Eu U Stu Ac f
th Eu Pc & Sct Sc f th APSA. H ch tt
uv vc bw bv th tt, Eu t,
c , c t, ubc .
Ctct: [email protected]
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Beyond Federalism | 5
Contents
1. Ituc 6
2. Thz Gvt Stuctu 7
2.1 Spaal Theory 7
2.2 So Informaon Versus Scale Economies 8
3. E Gvt Stuctu 11
4. Ex Gvt Stuctu 17
5. Rut 18
6. Ccu 23
Lttu 26
Ax 30
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1. I1
Th tuctu f vt th c f utht c u juc
uzz h. Phh f Hbb t M t Ot, c ct fR Ez t Ljht hv uht t x wh cut , hu b, ctz
wh th ctz.
Sc th c f th Ut Stt, vt tuctu h b ccv bc chc b-
tw ut f t. A ut t whch c b c-
ctt v ctz, but utht t wth th ct. A f t, b ctt,
utht btw vt ct vt uch w tht ch
f vt h cv whch t c (R 1987: 101). Mt tt,
th tv c vt ctu f.
Ech cc t cht, but , hh:
The contrast between Hobbes formulaon of the instuons of government and that formulated in the
American experiments in constuonal choice suggests that fundamentally dierent approaches exist
for the organizaon of governance in human sociees. In the one, a single center of authority, the sov-
ereign, is designed to dominate the whole. Each unit, as a sovereign state, is fully independent of other
units as sovereign states. In the other, no single center of authority dominates the rest: all assignments
of authority are subject to limits(Ot 1987: 22).
Th ut/f c t th ht f u ut f ctu chc, h -
uc ch ttu c tu, but t h t w tuctu u ut f
vt. It ccv v vt c f , th th (Wbb
2005: 67). It h ct t v f , but h uch t but
v ut , wh t hh u t ctu chc, t f-
v but ct f.
1 E v w t t th Cfc f Eut, Chc (2010), th Au M f th
Ac Pc Scc Ac, Wht, D.C. (2010), th Eu U Stu Ac Bt
(2011); th Cv Pc W Gu t th Uvt f Nth C, VU Uvt At,
F Uvt f B, Ch Uvt Pu, Du Uvt, th Eu Uvt Itut Fc,
H Sch f Gvc B, Uvt f Gv, L Uvt, Mh Uvt, Uvt
f Pbuh, Szbu Uvt, th IHS t V. Th uth tfu f ct b ct
t th t, wu c t th Mch Bu, Pb B, Tj Bz,
Jth H, S Hu, Mu Jchtfuch, Ch J, B Mu, J Ptu, Th
R, Aj H. Sch, Pc Sc, Mch St, Mch Tth, Sj W, ct t ut
wh uv vc, F Uvt f B, Dcb 2010, f hfu ct. W th
Eu C f ch tc; Cth D V, J K, Mch Tth f thc
vc; Dw Bc Aj H. Sch f h uubh t wth u. Th uth b
f ctc. W t tfu t Tj Bz th K-FchuTh Tfv Pw f Eu t th F Uvt f B f v u wth u tctu
vt wh w w w th . Th jct fu b th Eu Rch Cuc t
MLG # N.249543..
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Beyond Federalism | 7
O ut cct btw hct c tu f f v cu t-
tt t t v vt tuctu. Mu f vt tuctu hv tu t
cuu v ctc c. O h b t u c t. Hwv,
w x bw, th vt ct f t utht.
I th c, w t ut u f utht th t tt vt
39 cc. W vt th tuctu tt f vt tuctu, c
t th v uc f th z u f cut. Th tht cut wth
ftt t t b ctz u th th f xt whch h -
v fu f c f. Th tv c, tht uu cut t t b
ctz, ut f th c th ct f ubc th ub f ctbut
c.
I th xt c, w t ut th xct. W th t vt tuctu t
ct btw th, t t th ct f tv ut tu-
t. W ccu tht u tt th ccu f ctz
tht ut c b cv c c but th tuctu f
vt.
2. Tz G S
2.1 Spaal Theory
Th f ut hv b u t cct th z f cut wth t v f ctz.
Th t u th h c whch cb th c ct f cuc
b tc. Th ct cu cu cc th v v f c ubc
w tt ct (Azh/H 2005: 1165). If c v ubjct t
c, ctz v f ubc bc wtfu th tt th ,
c, ctz v bc v ct.
Th c ut th c t c xt. Th th ftt f
juc, th t c w ct hb juc, th th cc
f c v. Th ut f ubc th whch t u t-
btw th bt f c t cu th f fu t tz
th ct f c c f hb (A/S 2003; Ot 1972). Pfct -
f vt tuctu qu tht t vt v ct v f utut
f ubc wh bt c b th hc c f th juc (Ot
2005: 351; O 1969). Th c tht th cut, th th ct f c
v vt (Ot 2005: 357).
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A th f ut u tht cut htu, tht cquc,
cut ctz t t c t th fc f th v cu
(A t . 1995: 754; Bu 2004: 40; Fb 2001: 112).
Ec ch h c th tht cut ctz. Azh
H (2005: 1179) ccu tht [L] ct u ct, wh t
hc c th h f b f. F th b bbt f 0.18
() -t v th bbt f b f t 0.60. Pzz (1999: 113)
tht Wh th u f z cu th , Area hw but
c wth c ctz. G R (2003: 97) tht A xct, cut wth
area ct ctz () Populaon urbanizaon hv ct c-
tz f th , w th f ubqut .
2.2 So Informaon Versus Scale Economies
A tv t th ccv juc t- btw -
t t f, whch fv ctz, x c c v th
ubc , whch fv ctz. Bth f th t- uc b th ub f
th juc.
Th ut tht f qu ctz w ut th tb b z c-
t c ct wh ccv c- f z c f t
u (Aw 1991: 5; Kch/Dutch 1969: 735). W t c t
bt f vu c ctct wth th ucv c t tt th f
t t t th c. Th , cz cc, th b f th t
ttu th qu f ctz ctz (Aw 1961: 11).
Aw t u wth th Ft tht th jb f ft- t cv f
t th u wh th vtt c. Dc w
th, uch f b so cut t tz, tt t btch, c- xv t u z hch. A c b , f x, b
t c -bu b t ct wth th bw t th ht
cu th ct b wh h cc t t w b th b (St 2002:
1892f).
Gvt tf c b ccv c f t u wth cz, th f
tht qu f th v f ubc th tht f bu . Th -
vt E Ot (2010: 8) u f h c- ctbu t th tu f tt
vt:
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Advocates of the metropolitan reform approach assumed that size of governmental units would always
be posive for all types of goods and services. Scholars using a polical economy approach [by contrast]
assumed that size of governmental units would be posive or negave depending on the type of public
good or service. Those involving face-to-face delivery, such as educaon, policing, and social welfare,would show a negave eect of governmental unit size; those involving economies of scale, such as
highways and ulity systems, would show a posive eect.2
I th cc, th c f vt f ubc qu fc-t-fc v u
v. Th th c v f th htt f fc c c. Th ctxt f
hu tc v v f fc t. Stt-v c tu f c t-
, b wth th cc x f th T V Autht, t vcbu t
cb th t vt, c tc, c u (H 1938; Ptch 1943; Schz
t . 1991).3
T th xtt tht f , f ct c b xct t c wth u. Th
u, th cut t t ut fu u: [T]h f u
th t chv u t th vw tht th ub f ct th c u
ut b t t () Th ut bc v c f w t th ct f cuc t
b bc th c. (Aw 1991: 6).
O c wh th c f c t .. w f f wh ch
h t b vu h (T 2007: 63-69). Mz th cuc-
btw vt t u qu t wh tu t
th t w t ch th juc. Th -z t-u hch-
c tw t f u-v vc wh ch t cuct wth th ub
f t.4 L u qu t t tt v.
Th ub f tt vt v u fct h f , b ctt, z. If
th t c f c , cv, c , th th
f tv t. Th u cuct ct wth th u, th -
t ch , c cv btch. Such tz
t ctth th cc. Hwv, f fc c b uz -
2 Bct .
3 Th tht c u f u btw c ct c -
u c, vt, ch, uc c th Eu U. Sb
Zt (2010) thz th xtt vc: At th c f th w f cuv c
f v - v thuh fbc f xc f uu th t ctxt.
Sub-ut wth b th z v ubt bt f th bt w t
chv th , t cjuc wth th. Th b f t th
w t x th u th ccu. Th ut th c t
th, t f u tu f fc vt. F, th thv c v t th b b v b uch vw (Zt 2010: 2).
4 Th ub f v th hch th tu th f th u.
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, th u c b cut th uc t c.5 U fct h
f, vt tuctu vu t u z.
Th xtt t whch f qu uthtv ctz, t cct-, bt (Hh/M 2009; Ot 2006; T 2007). I c, th ct tt cu
jut c t c ctxt wthut w ub ct. Th v b: A
ct tu cu b c f c ct tv wh c c; th ct
vt cu t ct c t; th ct vt ht u c t t c-
ct t th vt f (B/Ct 1997; Lcw 2002; T 2007). Th vw
t th u tht f cc t qu c, u w c
vut wth th t w hv t.
Th bt f ctz xt t wth t ct. Th bcu th u f -
ctz juc b t t c f c. Dctz bc ct
wh th ct ct f ctz v f th ubc w th th ct ct f
th v b ch ub juc. Th x ct ct f ubc v
t t th u f th juc tht v t.
Bth th bt ct f ctz c b xct t v c vt c t-
f. Th f c f ct v f f u, f x, ch h,
wh tht f jb t, t, h c, vv f -th-jb
. S, t-ct utut f, tt, u, tw w uu qu
ut f ct, wh tht f ch t, ht, fu , wf v,
c w qu ut f ct (Ot/Ot 1971; Ot/P 1999).
Th ttu th v f ubc uc ub, but ct c f v-
t tuctu. S th tht vt tuctu h b th tt z f
cut th u tht cut t t b htu, fc t c
th v f ubc , u f v ub vt. A tv
vw tht cut u cv. If vt tuctu t b c wh
b f ct ct, wu xct tht, cv f th ftt
fc htt, cut wth u w b ctz.
Tw f ch wt w vut th vt f th c. Ft, w t t
vt tuctu b ub w. Sc, w ut ct f ct uc
vt tuctu. W tc th tu.
5 Th th f th c (A/S 2003; M/Hh 2000).
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Beyond Federalism | 11
3. E G S
I t th c t ut bv, w qu ut tut tht ) chv
vut th c f ub ctc; b) t th th f ub utht b c- ct w ct f f ct tt ct thuh vt tt f ub
c ; c) c u ub v f vt wh th xt; )
- uh t t v ut cut f cut.
W wh t c wht t b ub utht, wh th cct t
tht c b c (Acc/C 2001; Ect 1973). Th t vb
th utht xc wth cut b vt, tht , u vt
t btw c vt hv v u f 150,000 .6
R vt uh f f ut cut. Wh cc cut hv
uthtv c vt, th utht f tt vt v w c th cu-
t x h.
Oz f utht c w w-tbh t f cct. Autht -
t w, . ., w cz b bcu t v f cct c
f vc (Dh 1968). A vt h f utht, wth ct t
tt juc, v ct c. Th u u h thf c (A) th territory
v whch vt xc utht; (B) th depth f tht utht; (C) th spheres of acon
v whch t xc utht.
Wth ct t tt c f utht (A), vt xc utht t w juc-
c-xc utht v juc whch t t. Th th c btw self
rule shared rule (Ez 1987) whch h w cuc tu f f z
(A/B 2004; K 1998; L/E 1999; W 1998, 1999; Zb 2006). Wth ct
t th f utht (B), t t th t whch vt h t
v, c, xcuv z, th c u whch t c ct ut, t c-
ct t u wh b th vt. Wth ct t h f c (C),
t vt c hv utht v b f c. Autht v
tx bw, v ctu f c tt.
Th c v f f utht th t ut Tb
1 t Ax A B. Th h tth tt vb, whch w u
th bw.
6 Ax B t th u hw tht th ut t h but wh th ub f
tt t vb ct th .
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Table 1: Regional Authority Index (RAI)
S R: T b w
Itu th Th xtt t whch vt utu th th cctt. 03
Pc c Th f c f whch vt b. 04
Fc ut Th xtt t whch vt c t tx t u. 04
Rt Th xtt t whch w wth t tu xcuv. 04
S R: T b w
Lw Th xtt t whch tv ct . 02
Excuv ct Th xtt t whch vt ct c tvt .
02
Fc ct Th xtt t whch tv ct th tbu f txvu.
02
Ctu f Th xtt t whch tv ct ctu ch. 03
Suc: Hh, M, Sch (2010).
Table 2: Factor Analysis of Regional Authority
Components S Tw :
S- S
Itu th
Pc c
Fc ut
Rt
Lw Excuv ct
Fc ct
Ctu f
Evu
Ex vc (%)
Fct c
0.86
0.90
0.83
0.82
0.810.83
0.82
0.74
5.46
68.27
0.96 0.55
0.96 0.63
0.83 0.64
0.95 0.47
0.54 0.94
0.68 0.81
0.55 0.93
0.55 0.86
5.46 1.21
82.80
0.59
Nt: Pc ct fct , b -th t, tw ; = 39 (cut
c f 2006). F th tw-fct u, th hht c f ch bold. Rut f th
th t t (19502006) .
Th Cbch h c th cb bv f 39 cut 2006 0.93 whch u-
t tht th c b tt ct f ctuct.7 Th c ct
Tb 2 v tht th ht c ct wth th f f u h
u, but tht 68 ct f th vc c th h.
7 Th c t hv quvt tv. Th w u hv b hw t b qut
but t t tht cu f th t tf, cu u f
c c c (Shv t . 1997).
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Table 3: Measurement Instruments
Lijphart
(1999)
36 -1996
cc
2 t (1965, 1995)
Federalism (15). Cc v ct:
1= ut ctz;
2= ut ctz;3= -f;
4= f ctz;
5= f ctz
Ct: ) tt hv f f ctu t; b)
f f tt ctz ctz (..
th f w t th v ); c)
tt f t tt ct? (Ljht 1999:
188-191.)
Arzaghi
Henderson
(2005)
48 cut wth u v
10
v- tv f 19601995
Federalism (04). Th c, c, tv
b f ub vt v c x
:
c f vu ut vt tuctu (0 4)
c f xcuv (0 4)
c f c xcuv (0 4)
bt f th ct t u w v f vt
t v th c (0 4)
, t, fu vu utht f w v f
vt (0, 2 4)
vu h (0, 2 4)
B
(2006)
30 cut wth thc
u
u t f 19802000
Polical decentralizaon (05). Vc v f w
u v f vt tht hv t c-
w v t t u :
cc ct tu (0 1)
tu c v th w tx (0 1)
tu hv jt xcuv ct v
uc (0 1)
tu hv jt xcuv ct v ubc
c (0 1)
v whth ctu t bc
w (0 1)
Panizza
(1999)
76 cut
3 t (1975, 1980, 1985)
Decentralizaon rao (0100). Ccut 100 u c
ctz whch ct vt vu
ct f tt ubc ct vu (IMF t).
S
(2005)
23 OECD cc
u t f 1965-2001
Fiscal autonomy(0100). Autu ub-ct tx vu
ct f tt vt tx vu, xcu c
cut vu tx t th EU (OECD t).
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Table 4: Country Overlap
C Lijphart Arzaghi-
Henderson
B Panizza S
Aut
Aut
Bu
Bu
C
C
Cu
Czch Rubc
D
Et
F
FcG
Gc
Hu
Ic
I
It
J
Ltv
Lthu
Luxbu
Mc
Mt
Nth
Nw Z
Nw
P
Ptu
R
Ru
Sv
Sv
S
Sw
Swtz
Tu
Ut K
Ut Stt
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Nt: Cut t th f whch w hv R Autht c t f t vb
th Ax.
Tb 3 uz tv ut tut, Tb 4 t th cut tht ch tu-
t h c wth th R Autht Ix. Th t ct u Ljht F/
Ut whch h u t tt hth but cu versus Wtt cc.
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Beyond Federalism | 15
Th u h th tt ct tht ct t f th 36 cut- bv
(Ljht 1999: 186-95). Fu 1 tch bv th Ljht R Autht Ix f
1995 Tb 5 t c wh R Autht Ix c v th tw t v-
f th f tv u.
Figure 1: Lijphart and Regional Authority Esmates
Nt: Et (z-c) f 24 cut c t th Ljht tt R Autht Ix 1995.
Table 5: Regressing the Regional Authority Index on Alternave Instruments
M R 2 S.D. Cases D
Lijphart 2.41
2.57
Fc 1995
It 1995
Extt f utht f w ct ct
Extt f utht f w ct ct
Arzaghi-Henderson +2.10 P 1990, 1995 Extt f ct ct v
B 2.37 t 3.08 Bu 19892000 Rf f c, tx, ctu vt
w f & cu
Panizza 2.40 t 2.48 Bu 1980, 1985 Fc vu v. c utht
S 2.36 t 2.44
2.29 t 2.31
Bu 19891994
G 19732001
Autu tx v. c utht
Autu tx v. c utht
Nt: C t th f whch th u f th R Autht Ix tv
u qu t th tw t v. A v ct tht th t f th
tv u th th t f th R Autht Ix.
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Th tt c wth Ljht f It Fc, whch h th R Autht
Ix btw 1965 1995, but th Ljht tt. It ct w ,regioni,
1972 wth ct ct cuc ctc ub , hth, uc. I Fc,
Nc dpartements utht 1982 wh th w f ct t fct wtf t th t f ct ct dpartementcuc.
Th vc t th t f th c. A but f th v f
b Ljht 1995 c th xu, wh t btw 18 (Aut) 29.3 (G)
th R Autht Ix. Aut G bth f , but th h
ctt. I ctt t G Lnder, Aut Lnderhv utht v
v th b t f tx. Futh, ctz G t t t th
Lnder, but c c fKreise.
Azh-H t cb ctz P f 1990 1995 th
th R Autht Ix. At u th c btw ctz cct.
R vt P w w 1990 t ct utt ct c w
tt 1999 (Cuc f Eu 2000: 47f; Sch 2008: 156). Bc (2008) t
ch Bu f 1985 t 2000, wh th R Autht Ix u 1989 wh B
cu bt b c ctc, tx w, h u.
Pzz (1999) Stcu (2005) u u f c ctz b IMF OECD
tc. Th t t ub ct h f tt vt ct. Pzz h
t f 1975, 1980, 1985, wh Stcu ht t c u v u
f 1965 t 2001. Ou c th tw t v f th f Pzz
f Bu, th c f Stcu, f G. I bth cut, vt
xt cb utht, but th t ct b th c t. B cu
c t xc b- ctu w 1989, but c ctz w
bc u 1995. G Lnderxch tx ut f h u 1966 th
t uthtv ub vt cc.
Fu 2 th Stcu t t th f th R Autht Ix f 1999, th tt
wth t f th xu ub f cut h btw th c. Th futh th cut Fu 2, th t t h f vt vu. Sw J c bv
th Ut Stt; D F bv Bu Aut; v f th cut
bv G. N f th c cc wth th ttu ub vt th
cut . Fc u hv b u t ct tu f c f (Bw/Shh
2009; R 2006), but th t u f c ctz (R 2004;
Sch 2008; S 2010).
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Figure 2: Fiscal Decentralizaon
Nt: Et (z-c) f 23 cut c t th Stcu tt R Autht Ix f 1999.
4. E G S
W u u f cut thc c bcu th xct ct f
qu t c but u tt c. I t
t th cu ct w xt th fw ct ( Ax A f t).
Ethnicity. Sub cu bu u f tc hu h cv
c t f utht. Ethc cu hv ct c f-
c. R Uw (1983) ut tht cutu h cu t t
ctz f-u (G 1983). A, vt hthz t w bt
wh t c cu tht c w v f c cutu t u,xc, ut but f tc tht t f cut b t
cuct w tth (Dutch 1966; Hb t . 2007: 711).
Inequality. O xct tht v ch w t c ut
w ctz tbu (Bt/R 1997; Dh Ftj 2008; V Hut 2003).
Atv, f ctz f th c c ubt
f tht f th cut wh (A/S 2003: 63-67). B (2010) u tht
wth cv b t wt ctz t t t b t
c. Th vb t t w u t th tc f qut wth
c b t vb v , but w b t bv th t v f
ct c c 39 cut.
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Auence. L (1998) u tht cz ch cut b w t th ct f
vt t v cutu uc vt. A, th c f vt ch
cut cu h f ubc tht ct v t th v
(Ot/E 2003; Pt 1995).
Democracy.Dcc c t b v th utcc t f -
z ccut f th t ct u f f u (Hh t . 2010; Mu 2009)
Regional polical pares. R c f t utht.8 Wh
c f vt, t ctt f vt
b uc t vt t t t thu (H/V Hut 2009; S 2009; Sw/
M 2009).
5. R
Th t cu f Tb 6 Populaon Area u ct. WhArea t ch -
cc, Populaon h ct ct Regional Authority. Subqut cu
but tt. Th c cu t u f uct, th vc fct
(VIF). Muct t th t , t h t th t ct f
vb.9 A VIF < 3 w, but t th c tht bcu Area ct wth Populaon
(R=0.69) Inequality(R=0.24), t t th t wu b f t w uct wth
th vb. Th f th t fArea 1.98= 1.41 whch uc VIF-jut
t f 1.221.41= 0.87 . IfArea w t h f t vc wth th th t
vb, th t f t ct Regional Authority f t ch cc (t-value = 1.43).
Th VIF-jut t-value f Populaon 4.18.
8 G tt ct tht th cut u f t c t t t utht.
Hwv, th ct b z t t t, f Chhbb K (2004: 79) bv, t
t bc vt ctz utht.
9 Th VIF f t vb j 1/(1 Rj2), wh Rj2 th qu u c f
f vb j th t vb th . Th VIFj t th vc f vb j
x b th th t vb th . O VIF OB (2007).
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Table 6: Populaon, Area, and Regional Authority
N ()
R A
II
1603 (39)
V I
Factor
LDV
1603 (39)
Jackknife-
39
P 5.68***
(2.07)
2.30 0.10**
(0.05)
5.68**
(2.41)
Area 1.24
(1.22)
1.98 0.01
(0.02)
1.24
(1.51)
Ethnicity 11.48**
(4.61)
1.26 0.10
(0.11)
11.48*
(6.11)
Iq 3.92
(5.79)
1.75 0.02
(0.16)
3.92
(7.11)
A 1.79**
(0.86)
1.11 0.06**
(0.03)
1.79*
(0.97)
D 1.46***
(0.37)
1.23 0.00
(0.02)
1.46***
(0.45)
R 15.26***
(4.23)
1.33 0.16*
(0.09)
15.26**
(5.84)
Regional authorityt-1 0.99***
(0.00)
Constant 57.79
(12.43)
0.78
(0.38)
R2
F test
Mean
0.62
31.12***
1.57
0.995
Nt: N-tz bt cct; but t cut cut t th. ***
< .01, ** < .05, * < .10.
I Au c f 1950 t 2006 c 39 cc. Sc ccut f ch t ch
xt t t th cut v wht b u.
Th cu f Tb 6 t u vb jcf tt. Bth tt
ct tht Populaon ct x Regional Authority thtArea f t ch -cc. Ct f t v fRegional Authorityz cc tht th c btw
Populaon Regional Authority uu. Th t f Populaon Area but wh
w t vu cut f th .10 Th c th cc f
, cc, thct, uc. A t u xct f , but u
c ut h wh c VIF-jut t-vu.
10 Th t ct ct f u but wh w ct f ubz. T th xtt tht t
t ct ubc v ut , ubz hu uc th ct f
u ctz (Azh/H 2005). W tt bth th t ct f ub-
z t tc wth u, but tct ct ct (ut btb f th uth).
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Fu 3 t th ct f u utht u Clarify. Uctt ct wth
th xct vu fRegional Authority tt t th xt. A cut wth u f v
h xct R Autht Ix btw 7.1 9.7 wth 95 ct cc b,
wth v 8.4 u bt u. Th wu, f x, b cut whch vthv ct ct b tht t xcuv wth th w t t th t f
tx xc ctc, ubjct t ct vt, cc wf c. A cut wth
u f 50 h xct R Autht Ix f 14.1 (wth 95 ct
cc b f 9.8 t 18.2). R vt th cut ht th hv ct b,
b c ctc t ubjct t ct vt, w t t th b w th t f
tx, c , f x, b tv t c
v chb b u wth th ct vt.
Figure 3: Marginal Eect of Populaon on Regional Authority
Nt: M ct fPopulaon Regional Authoritywth 595% cc b. Th vc ct,
f t ht, u t v bw th (1.35 , .. Et), th
u (8.6 , .. Sw), t v bv th (48 , .. It Fc th 1960), cv.
Ljht (1999: 252), qu Dh Tu (1973), ct tht cut c th ut/f-
t t u z, but th cut t tct wh cut ctz
ut f. Cut tht Ljht c ut (Fu 4: w ) f (Fu 4:
hh ) v qut t th R Autht Ix. Th v cu h th
ut cut. Ic, f x, h v f tt vt (landsvun) tht xt
tc ct. Gc, b ctt, h c f 54 fctu (nomoi)
whch, f 1994 , w u b ct ct cuc cuc-ct fct. Cuc hv
ctc v uc, ht, , tt. Ct vht xtv,
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fct cu t ub ct tt t ub t. Nw Z,
whch h th u c th -h u, h 16 u b ct ct cuc
tht c t th b t f t tx whch b f ubc tt, v-
t c, cu , u, w v ct t.
Figure 4: The Federal/Unitary Straightjacket
Nt: Et f th 24 cut c t th Ljht tt R Autht Ix (RAI) f 1995.
Mut c b cv cut. Th v Tb 7 whch c ut f
c u t t f th t vb. Th t cu u th f
bv Ljht tt. Th c cu c Ljht u wth th R
Autht Ix f th t f c. A wu uct f Fu 4, Populaon ct
ct u Ljht u ct wh u th R Autht Ix.
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Table 7: Sensive Dependence on Alternave Measurement Instruments
D
N ()
Time period
Lijphart
46 (24)
1965, 1995
ArzaghiHenderson
100 (16)
196095
5 tv
B
209 (16)
19852000, u
Panizza
61 (24)
1975, 1980, 1985
S
742 (23)
19652001, u
D
b
Lijphart RAI Arzaghi RAI
-Henderson
B RAI Panizza RAI Stegar- RAI
P 0.50 6.39* *
(0.94) (2.43)
5.01* 0.02
(2.36) (2.74)
0.77 4.13
(0.53) (3.28)
6.79 5.78*
(5.33) (3.04)
2.99 5.21**
(5.45) (2.24)
Area 0.36 0.56
(0.34) (1.22)
4.60*** 4.61***
(0.88) (1.32)
0.20 1.98
(0.36) (2.34)
7.69** 0.30
(2.73) (1.57)
8.56** 1.19
(3.73) (1.27)
Ethnicity 2.08 10.51*
(1.67) (5.15)
0.39 1.78
(2.87) (4.32)
2.02** 13.44***
(0.74) (3.77)
22.02 7.38
(14.31) (5.28)
35.79* 11.50***
(18.49) (3.94)
Iq 0.59 0.61
(2.43) (8.39)
15.39 12.49
(11.57) (12.98)
3.36 9.41
(1.95) (9.61)
29.18 9.95
(29.39) (14.04)
24.11 11.12
(29.79) (9.26)
A 0.07 1.27
(0.22) (1.18)
1.76 2.53**
(1.35) (1.17)
0.81 9.16**
(0.61) (3.98)
13.89** 4.85
(5.60) (3.76)
4.25 4.49***
(3.09) (1.51)
D 0.81*** 3.67**
(0.26) (1.03)
1.47** 2.03**
(0.53) (0.74)
0.28*** 1.26**
(0.09) (0.47)
1.17 1.20
(1.36) (1.12)
4.80 2.84***
(2.86) (1.00)
Regional
1.35 12.29**
(1.20) (3.48)
54.25* 90.37*
(29.29) (44.42)
1.24 11.75**
(0.91) (5.09)
32.63** 9.36
(14.61) (7.04)
11.29 10.71**
(20.39) (4.05)
Constant 12.21 87.10
(4.70) (19.80)
57.18 37.20
(14.82) (15.50)
11.24 82.21
(5.34) (30.09)
26.10 66.29
(34.65) (22.36)
56.31 85.86
(49.01) (17.40)
R2
F test
0.45 0.67
32.92** 29.74***
0.76 0.64
122.50*** 35.89***
0.71 0.82
9.53*** 119.64***
0.46 0.65
8.33*** 19.50***
0.39 0.66
5.83*** 55.38***
Nt: N-tz bt cct; but t cut cut t th. ***
< .01, ** < .05, * < .10.
Subqut cu tv tut wth th R Autht Ix. Et f
Populaon ct wh th fArea ct f bth th Azh-H u f th R Autht Ix. Th ut t b v b th whch t t 16
cut wth u t th 10 . Th cu Aut, C, th Ut Stt
whch vt ctz. Th cct th cut th .
Th c btwArea Regional Authorityf th th Eh- cut,
th c f th 13 cut w v.
Bc ct cut t xz v thc u. Th w w f h u, whch
t vut th ct f ctz thc cct (Bc 2006, 2008), but uc t
tht v t ut c th h wth th R Autht Ix. A jc-
f vu cut uc ct t f t vb.
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Fc f u, cu th u b Pzz (1999) Stcu (2005), cArea
c Populaon ( cu f Tb 7). Wh w u th R Autht Ix f th
t f c, w c th v. A b x tht th c f tx
c v f vt cu v t tt v th u tht c tx wb ub f -t v hb tw u ct vc f whch th t tx
(Bch/K 2006).
Th vc t h u t th but th hth f th tuctu f ub-
vt. Wh th ut t ut bv t vt tuctu ub,
th cu w btb. Th t, c, x ctz ct f cuc-
whch h t tc. Hwv, th uc f cuc ct c 1950 h
t h th ct ct f c c ctz.11 Mv, cut t
uch htu th cut. Th uch-ct f Pzz (1999) A
S (2003) b whch tc f th ct ( ct) f cut
x f fc htt. Hwv, th c btw cut z th F (2003)
u f thc vt c 39 cc qu-cc jut 0.078 ( = 0.62). It
tu tht vt f c bc h t v u f t, but th cut hv
hh t f hc bt, ut, th hv fw tt . B ctt,
Eu cut, t th , ct tt wth cv u
cutu.
6. C
I ct th h b w cc wth th ct f ut v f-
c but c tu (Abh t . 2008), thc cct (Bw/Hub 2010), cc
(C t . 2008), c (B t . fthc; M t . 2007) t t but fw
tc ct ubh c. Ft , Bc (1970: 1105) f th chf
b:
A very common pracce whenever measurement is clearly recognized as being crude is to resort to a
relavely small number of ordered categories. In the extreme case the analyst may use dichotomies
in order to simplify his analysis. It may not be recognized that such very simple procedures produce
both random and nonrandom measurement errors that become increasingly serious as the number of
categories is reduced.
11 I w th 1950, Hbt S h c-uth hthz tht -tc th
t uc f vt t w tv uch c tht v th
f cuc hv uch t f ctz b (S t . 1956: 275; 279). Of
th 39 cut t wth h, Sw G hv bc ctz c 1950, wh 29
hv bc z.
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Th c h u tht th c th c th tu f vt. Th ctt btw
ut f vt fut, t t t hv tht-jct t t t
v c c. It ct u t th vt f ctu chc, but w
f f tht t h cut f ct t th th. B ccv vt tuc-tu chtu t, th ut/f c v t ch v v t
th c f f f Bh c.
Rch wh wh t u vt tuctu hv tt ct th hv
u c t th h f ub tx ct ct f ub uth-
t. Th - bcu vt c v c b u t t cct t c
hw t .
Th ut tut u h u th c btw f u h u
b f ch thv. W t f u h u ht -
t t th tu th f vt, th c f th c ctc, th
w , th xcuv cct, t, c ct, ctu w. Th
tut v t v f ut w btw
th, w tht th u f cut cqu f vt tuctu th
t . W c th ct ct f cutu htt, cc, uc
ctz.
Th u ctt wth th ut tht vt h b t btw
ctz, whch uc th ct ct f ubc , ctz, whch fctt
u btw vt cz (Aw 1961; Dutch 1966; Kch/Dutch 1969; T
2007: 55-69).
Th hth ctt wth th fct tht f cut, whch cu th Ut Stt,
Aut, C, v uch th ut cut. Hwv, th c b-
tw vt tuctu wh w t v ctz
-f cut. F, Fc, J, S, Sw, f x, z, but hv
ct v f ctz. Bcu t h v wth ch ct, th ut/
f c v v t th c f f th c tht wc Bh c v t v t th th f th c.
Wh hu c tht th u f cut th th t cqu f t v-
t? A cut ftt t bjct x f c v ctu, but t u v
chb. Th cu ch b whch ct vt tuctu, v,
tc. Th cu ch b whch u ct vt tuctu, f,
th bt f u uc ubc c. Wh w w but f
th w w but tc, th f thz uu th c w h
ctbut t th f cc c.
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Th cc th ct f u fut qu but hw w hu x
th tuctu f vt. Th z f cut u tuctu fct tht f bc,
h t th v b, th cu ch t c c but th c f w
v f vt th c f utht c x v. Th uch t but thch. Hw th fuc u f u th f f t
tt t th c u tht h c ? At t w th qu w
t cct th f t c ubc c wth ccut f vt
tuctu. B cfu b f t b th t vb, u u t
uc v t f cu ct, ut b th.
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L
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Ostrom, Elinor/Parks, Roger B. 1999: Nth Gtu th f ut: cjctu xSt f tt z, : McGinnis, Michael D. (.): Pctct LcPubc Ec: R f th Wh Pc Th Pc A, A Ab:Uvt f Mch P, 284-305.
Ostrom, Vincent1987[1971]: Th Pc Th f A Cu Rubc: D th Ac Ex-t, Lc: Uvt f Nb P.
Ostrom, Vincent/Elinor Ostrom 1971: Pubc chc: t ch t ubc t, : Pub-c At Rvw 31/2, 203216.
OBrien, Robert2007: A cu u f thub f vc fct, : Qut & Qu-t, 41: 67390.
Panizza, Ugo 1999: O th tt f c ctz: th, vc, : Ju f PubcEcc 74/1, 97-139.
Peterson, Paul E. 1995: Th Pc f F, Wht DC: B Itu.
Pritche, C. Herman 1943: Th T V Autht: A Stu Pubc At, Ch H:Uvt f Nth C P.
Riker, William H. 1987: Th Dvt f Ac F, Bt: Kuw.
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Rodden, Jonathan 2004: Cv f ctz: ut, :Cv Pc 36/4, 481-499.
Rodden, Jonathan 2006: Ht Px: Th P P f Fc F, Cb: C-b Uvt P.
Rokkan, Stein/Urwin, Derek1983: Ec, Tt, It: Pc f Wt Eu Ph, L-: S Pubc.
Sabel, Charles F./Zeitlin, Jonathan 2010: L f c: th w chtctu f xttvc th EU, : Sabel, Charles F./Zeitlin, Jonathan (): Extt Gvc th Eu U: Tw Nw Achtctu, Oxf: Oxf Uvt P, 1-28.
Schakel, Arjan H. 2008: V f th utht x, : R F Stu 18/2-3,143166.
Scholz, John T./Twolmby, John/Headrick, Barbara 1991: Stt v c ct v th buucc,: Ac Pc Scc Rvw 85/3, 829-851.
Shankar, Raja/Shah, Anwar2001: B th cc v wth : cc th f-c f vt c uc c , : W BPc Rch W P 2717, Th W B, Wht DC.
Shevlin, Mark/Miles, Jeremy N./Bunng, Brendan P. 1997: Sut c: Mt C v- f th ct f bt ct , : Pt I-vu Dc 23/4, 665-676.
Simon, Herbert A./Smithburg, Donald W./Thompson, Victor A. 1956: Pubc At, Nw Y:Kf.
Sorens, Jason 2009: Th c f ctz, : R F Stu 19/2, 255-272.
Sorens, Jason 2010: Th Itu f Fc F, : Pubu 41/2, 207-231.
Stegarescu, Dan 2005: Dctz f Gvt It W, Dct Dt,Mh: Ztu fu Euch Wtchfchu.
Stein, Jeremy C. 2002: If uc ct c: ctz v hchc ,: Ju f Fc 57/5, 18911921.
Swenden, Wilfried/Bart Maddens (.) 2009: Tt Pt Pc Wt Eu, L: P-v.
Treisman, Daniel2007: Th Achtctu f Gvt: Rth Pc Dctz, Pct:Pct Uvt P.
Van Houten, Pieter2003: Gbz f ut Eu, : Kahler, Miles/Lake, David (): Gvc Gb Ec. Pct, NJ: Pct Uvt P,87-109.
Was, Ronald L. 1999: C F St, 2 . Kt: Itut f Itvt R-, McG-Qu Uvt P.
Was, Ronald L. 1998: F, f c t, f, : Au Rvw f PcScc 1, 117-137.
Wibbels, Erik2005: F th Mt: Itvt Cct Ecc Rf thDv W, Cb: Cb Uvt P.
Wright, Deil S. 1988: Ut Itvt R, Mt, CA: B.
Zeitlin, Jonathan 2010: Pc T: Gvc c B th Gb Ec.SASE Au M, P A, 22-24 Ju 2010, Phh, USA.
Zibla, Daniel2006: Stuctu th Stt: Th F f It G th Puzz f F-, Pct: Pct Uvt P.
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A A
Table A.1: Operaonalizaon of Independent Variables (Tables 6 & 7)
Populaon Au u 000, 10. Suc: Penn World Table 6.3 (Ht t . 2009).
Area Au u 000 2, 10. Suc: Penn World Table 6.3 (Ht t . 2009).
Ethnicity Th bbt tht tw vu ct t f th cut u w b f
t thc u. D u h f thc u cut p1, p2, p3. . . ,
pn, th thc fcz x
F t v t f th tw . O cut wh thc
c t wh tt cctt cc t th Minories at Risktt
(2009) cv vu t f z. Suc: F (2003); vb h://www.tf.
u/~jf/ (cc Mch 2011).
Inequality Cct f v (CV) f GDP ct. Th u tz ccut
fw:
whyi th c ct f i, N th ub f , th
ct GRDP (uwht b u) cut:
Th f whch t ubc vb f cut. W u 2000
t t c 39 cut.
Suc: R GDP ct t f Eurostatwbt f EU-27, C Mc
(cc Mch 2011); OECD t f -EU cc (cc Mch 2011); Ru
f B Czzw (2007). F cu f th cct f v th
u f qut, Sh Shh (2001).
Auence Au c uct ct, cut c. L10. Suc: Penn World Table 6.3
(Ht t . 2009).
Democracy Freedom House x f ch cut- c 1972. Vu t b th uth t
1972. Th x u c f c ht cv b 7-t c f 1=t
cc t 7=t cc. Rc tht hh vu ct cc. Suc:
h://www.fhu. (cc Mch 2011).
Regional pares P f t th t f u b. N-c
t th vu f th t ct c . A t wh t h
xcuv ct b. Suc: Pt t v b Aj H. Sch ut b
th uth.
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Table A.2: Summary Stascs
M/Vb Mean S.D. Min M
Measures of Regional Authority
Itu Dth 2.08 1.48 0 5.76
Pc Sc 1.68 1.58 0 5.00
Fc Aut 1.41 1.55 0 4.94
Rt 2.77 2.29 0 7.97
Lw M 0.43 0.68 0 2.00
Excuv Ct 0.31 0.60 0 2.00
Fc Ct 0.40 0.71 0 3.00
Ctu Rf 0.80 1.34 0 5.98
Independent Variables
Pu 6.96 0.75 5.16 8.48
A 2.21 0.93 0.50 4.23
Ethct 0.12 0.20 0.02 0.60
Iqut 0.24 0.13 0.00 0.62
Auc 3.82 0.47 2.42 4.82
Dcc 12.1 1.60 3.00 13.00
R P 0.03 0.12 0.00 1.00
Table A.3: Correlaon Table for the Measures of Regional Authority
ID PS FA R LM EC FC CR
I D 1
Policy Scope .88 1F A .74 .85 1
R .93 .87 .73 1
Lw Mk .60 .61 .62 .54 1
E C .63 .75 .60 .58 .67 1
Fiscal Control .50 .52 .44 .43 .73 .52 1
C R .58 .60 .59 .52 .71 .50 .80 1
Nt: N=1603. ID=Instuonal Depth; PS=Policy Scope; FA=Fiscal Autonomy; R=Representaon; LM=Law Making;
EC=Execuve Control; FC=Fiscal Control; CR=Constuonal Reform.
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Table A.4: Countries, Start of Measurement (through 2006), Minimum, Mean, Maximum Value on Regional Authority
Index
C Start Min Mean M
Aut
Aut
Bu
Bu
C
C
Cu
Czch Rubc
D
Et
F
Fc
G
Gc
Hu
Ic
I
It
J
Ltv
Lthu
Luxbu
Mc
Mt
Nth
Nw Z
Nw
P
Ptu
R
Ru
Sv
Sv
S
Sw
Swtz
Tu
Ut K
Ut Stt
1950
1955
1950
1991
1950
1991
1960
1993
1950
1992
1950
1950
1950
1950
1990
1950
1950
1950
1950
1990
1992
1950
1991
1964
1950
1950
1950
1990
1976
1991
1993
1993
1990
1978
1950
1950
1950
1950
1950
18.02
17.00
14.00
1.00
22.60
.00
.00
.00
4.14
.00
1.09
6.00
28.42
1.00
8.00
0.00
.00
8.35
8.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
.00
13.50
.00
4.00
2.00
2.54
6.00
15.66
.00
.00
10.04
10.00
19.50
1.00
4.69
23.08
18.32
17.44
22.33
1.00
22.63
7.75
.00
3.50
7.90
.00
2.57
10.77
29.15
3.14
9.24
.00
1.49
13.63
8.25
.00
3.20
.00
.00
.00
13.73
6.00
7.37
4.82
3.43
8.81
17.50
2.57
.00
20.25
11.29
19.50
4.23
9.06
23.14
19.40
18.00
32.07
1.00
22.65
10.00
.00
7.00
10.19
.00
7.11
16.00
29.47
10.00
10.00
.00
6.00
22.74
10.00
.00
4.00
.00
.00
.00
14.50
9.00
10.00
8.00
3.59
11.00
19.00
6.00
.00
22.14
13.50
19.50
5.00
9.93
23.20
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A B: M R A
Th tut vut vu f vt ( vu tc t
wth c utu ttut) u b c ht f utht.
P uc (ctu, , ttut) tut wth c ttu c-ut f cut xt t chv b v t. Th tu c v f
vt bw th v wth v u t th 150,000 39 cc
(Tb A.4) v th 1950-2006. Ivu tht hv c ttut cu v f
th t t th u ct.
Th c ch bw ( Tb 1) t ut th ht tht ctut th tt v-
b f vt. Tb 2 t th c ct whch v tht th ht
c ct wth th f f u h u, but tht 68 ct f th
vc c th h. Th Cbch h c th f 39 cut
2006 0.93.
A) SELF RULE
1) Instuonal Depth
Fu ct uh. Th t u ct wh th fuc -u
t. Th c cb b th Nc t, dconcentraon, whch f
t t tht hchc ubt t ct vt. A cctt
t h th h f f vc bu, , but but
ct vt utt. Th tw ct uh t tht x-
c fu utht. Th f-v vt, th t h wth
th ct vt t th th hchc. Th fut c h whth-
f-vt , t, ubjct t ct vt vt (F 2010; I 2008).
I D
0: fuc -u t t th v;
1: cctt, -u, t;
2: -cctt, u, t ubjct t ct vt vt;
3: -cctt, u, t t ubjct t ct vt vt.
2) Policy Scope
Th cc wth utht v c (Bc 2006; K 2001;
Pt 1995; S 2010). Pc u t v : cc, cutu-uc, wf,
ctuv ccv c (u w, c, w tu t-u, c vt),
czh. R vt c whth th xc utht ,
, th f th t fu c . Th c ct t whth
vt c-xc utht v bh t cut, .. czh
c.
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Policy Scope
0: v w uthtv ctc;
1: uthtv ctc ), b), c) )
) cc c;
b) cutu-uc c;
c) wf c;
) f th fw: u w, c, w tu tu, c vt
2: uthtv ctc at least two f ), b), c), );
3: uthtv ctc ) t t tw f ), b), c);
4: t th ct f 3 u utht v czh.
3) Fiscal Autonomy
Fc ut vut t f vt utht t t th b t f
j tx t juc (OECD 1999; R 2004; Sch 2008). A ch v
b th OECD (1999), whch uh tw f utht (ct t f ct v-
t, h u wth ct vt), th f ct (b, t, vu t),
w t v ch tht uc () u (t c) u, (b) f
cu v f vt (t t c ub v) tht (c) cctu c t
th th t b u: .., utht c . W vt tx
wh b uh btw j tx wth th, btw th cct t
ct b t, t .
F A
0: th ct vt t th b t f tx;
1: th vt t th t f tx;
2: th vt t th b t f tx;
3: th vt t th t f t t j tx: c, ct,
ct, vu , tx;
4: th vt t th b t f t t j tx.
4) Representaon
R utht wth ct t t ccv th cct f ct t ct
c h: th c f t, b ct c b ub c h b
ct c th ; th c f xcuv, b x t f /ct u xcu-
v b.
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Assembly
0: th h b;
1: th h ct ct b;
2: th h ct ct b.
E
0: th xcuv t b ct vt;
1: u xcuv t b ct vt th b;
2: th xcuv t b b ct ct.
B) SHARED RULE
Th x uh fu vu f c c . A
ct w thuh t t th tu, uu th u-
chb. A vt h xcuv bt wth th vt f
c. A c-t th tbu f tx vu th cut wh.
F, t tt, vt xc utht v th ctu t u
th cut , th c f c utu , v t w ctu h wth
th ct.
1) Law Making
Lw ) th f tuctu t t th v (.. th
c v chb); b) whth vt ct t th c
chb; c) whth hv jt t t th; ) th v c
f th c chb.
Lw Mk
0.5 f ch f th fw chctc:
th ut f t th tu, .. th tbu f t t b wht,
th th cz, vt th cut wh;
vt t tv th tu;
t v v hv jt t th tu;
tu wth t h xtv v utht, .. c vt c b v-
b ujt th th chb
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2) Execuve Control
Excuv ct t th bt tht xcuv hv u wth th ct v-
t whth th v hv vt w (Wht 1988). T c v thc, uch ut b uz, t ad hoc, t c th xu, uch ut b
uthtv th ut ch c tht f b th ct.
E C
0: u btw ct vt vt t t
c;
1: u btw ct vt vt wthut b
utht;
2: u btw ct vt vt wth utht t
ch b c.
3) Fiscal Control
Th f t th f , t th xt, x vt, v th tt t-
bu f tx vu. Sh u tx c c f v xcuv h
u. Yt c xtc c cqu uh t b c t. R
vt uc th tbu f tx vu, cu tvt t,
ct th ctxt f tvt , ct v tv tu wth
vt t.
Fiscal control
0: vt th tv th tu t cut v th tbu f tx
vu;
1: vt th tv th tu t v th tbu f tx vu, but
t hv vt;
2: vt th tv th tu hv vt v th tbu f tx vu.
4) Constuonal Reform
Ctu f utht v th u f th (A 2004; B 2009; W
1998). Th ch uh btw ct (.. ctt ct -
tv) vt. Sc th u f th u t th xtt f
governmentutht, th f th v wht th tht f th f. S th qu
whth th ct vt ut ctt c ut f th
ctu; th th t f ctt th tv; ut f
th c t f vt?
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C R
0: th ct vt / ctt c ut ch th ctu;
1: tu th c f t ut v ctu ch; ctu ch
qu fu b qu t (.. v jt f );
2: vt ct t jt tu whch c f th fw:
- t ctu f
- tuc t
- th c hu th th chb
- qu c vt th th chb
- qu u fu
3: jt f vt c vt ctu ch.
R T
Cut c bt b c f ch cut.
Th t tw cu f th tb bw th R Autht Ix wth th Number of Tiers
cu ct. Dt th t c btw Populaon Number of Tiers ( = 0.67),
Populaon t cc, th t ct vb wh t hh VIF t t ccut.
Th th cu tt th ub f th t vb hw tht Populaon
Regional Pares ct ct wth th ub f u ct.
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Table B.1: Robustness Analysis: Number of Tiers as Independent and Dependent Variable
D V R A I
VIF
Nb T
P 3.37 3.40
(1.88)
0.65
(0.18)
Area 1.41 1.99
(1.19)
0.05
(0.08)
Ethnicity 10.89 1.27
(4.67)
0.17
(0.31)
Iq 3.43 1.75
(5.26)
0.14
(0.54)
A 1.45 1.12
(0.78)
0.10
(0.07)
D 1.32 1.25
(0.33)
0.04
(0.03)
R 11.26 1.41
(3.34)
1.13
(0.35)
Nb 3.55 2.11
(2.01)
Constant 42.59
(12.49)
4.29
(1.05)
R2
F test
Mean
N ()
0.65
29.66***
1.79
1603 (39)
0.53
14.72***
1603 (39)
Nt: N-tz bt cct, but t cut cut th.
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T K-F - E A E
I R
Th K-Fchu (KFG) w fu u-ch b th G Rch Fu 2008. It ct-c f th KFG t v cc u vt
whch vv ch tc c b t wth b cu bt wth u f ju ch.
Th K-Fchu Th Tfv Pw f Eub tth ch Eu th B-B-bu tuz th c wth th uv- ch tu. It x th f th EU -t ct f , z th ch ctf t xt u c th ch :
It th Pubc Sh
Cc, Ct B