THE NEW SCHOOL

Beyond the 38th Parallel: North Korean Refugees in South Korea

by

Emily Hwang

Thesis presented to the Global Studies Program in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

New York City

December 22, 2015

THESIS COMMITTEE:

Alexandra Delano, Associate Professor, Global Studies, The New School

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Alexandra Delano for her dedication as a professor and mentor to me throughout my semesters at The New School.

Thank you to Rachel Stine for your insight on working with North Korean refugees and Rachel

Lee for your support in securing funding for research in preparation for this project.

Lastly, thank you to my family and friends for lending your voices to this thesis by way of your survey responses and for your constant encouragement.

Table of Contents

I. INTRODUCTION II. CHAPTER 1// the past.

A. :: THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 1. Politics & Culture 2. The Emerging Black Market 3. Rise of a New Generation

III. CHAPTER 2// the present. A. ::REFUGEE EXPERIENCES

1. Means of Escape 2. Methods and Challenges in Integration 3. South Korea’s Response

IV. CHAPTER 3// the future. A. :BEYOND THE BORDER

1. Local Faith Communities 2. Ethnic Koreans 3. Moving Forward

V. References

Terms

Integration: According to UNESCO’s International Migration and Multicultural Policies, “Integration is a rather elusive concept. There are two basic interpretations: one refers to internal cohesion of a system; the second one designates the entry into the system of elements that had been part of the environment before, or the extension of the system to incorporate such external elements or units. The second meaning refers only to such entries and extensions that incorporate the new elements as parts that will contribute to the self­sustaining operations of the enlarged system.” Migration Policy states that, “There are two parties involved in integration processes: the immigrants, with their characteristics, efforts and adaptation, and the receiving society, with its interactions with these newcomers and their institutions. It is the interaction between the two that determines the direction and the ultimate outcome of the integration process. These two, however, are unequal partners. The receiving society, in terms of its institutional structure and the way it reacts to newcomers, has much more say in the outcome of the process.” Social Integration: According to the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, social Integration can be seen as a dynamic and principled process where all members participate in dialogue to achieve and maintain peaceful social relations. Social integration does not mean coerced assimilation or forced integration. Refugee: 1951 Refugee Convention which defines refugees as those "owing to a well­founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country." Defector: North Korean refugees are most often called “defectors.” According to the dictionary, “a defector is a person who gives up allegiance to one state in exchange for allegiance to another, in a way which is considered illegitimate by the first state. More broadly, it involves abandoning a person, cause or doctrine to which one is bound by some tie, as of allegiance or duty.” They may be called defectors due to the fact that China, which is one of the main entryways for those escaping North Korea, does not give them refugee status but instead calls them “illegal economic migrants.” Defectors can be repatriated to North Korea if they are caught in China which is a disregard of the Convention on the Status of Refugees Article 33 and the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Unusual Punishment, both of which China has signed on to. Assimilation: (dictionary) The process by which a person or persons acquire the social and psychological characteristics of a group: “Waves of immigrants have been “assimilated” into the American culture.” Acculturation: (dictionary) cultural modification of an individual, group, or people by adapting to or borrowing traits from another culture; also : a merging of cultures as a result of prolonged contact. : the process by which a human being acquires the culture of a particular society from infancy.

Introduction ­­­

“I would like to shed my North Korean identity, erase the mark it has made on me. But I can’t. I’m not sure why this is so, but I suspect it is because I had a happy childhood. As children we have a need, as our awareness of the larger world develops, to feel part of something bigger than family, to belong to a nation. The next step is to identify with humanity, as a global citizen. But in me this development got stuck. I grew up knowing almost knowing of the outside world except as it was perceived through the lens of the regime. And when I left, I discovered only gradually that my is a byworld, everywhere, for evil. But I did not know this years ago, when my identity was forming. I thought life in North Korea was normal. Its customs and rulers

became strange only with time and distance.

Thus, I must say that North Korea is my country. I love it . But I want it to become good. My country is my family and the many good people I knew there. So how could I not be a patriot?

This is my story. I hope that it will allow a glimpse of the world I escaped. I hope it will encourage others like myself, who are struggling to cope with new lives their imaginations never

prepared them for. I hope that world will begin, finally to listen to them, and to act.”

­ Hyeonseo Lee, “The Girl with Seven Names: A North Korean Defector’s Story” ­­­

As of March 2014, there are approximately 26,483 North Korean refugees living in South

Korea, 40% of whom are children and young adults between the ages of 10 and 29. North 1

Korean refugees are referred to as “defectors,” or “ a person who gives up allegiance to one state

in exchange for allegiance to another, in a way which is considered illegitimate by the first

state.” In South Korea, defectors are referred to as Tal Buk Ja (탈북자), meaning one who

escaped from the North. However, they prefer to be called Sae Toe Min (새터민), meaning

person in a new land, indicating a desire to be considered a resident of South Korea and not

merely an escapee of the North.

The trials facing North Korean defectors in escaping the regime, gaining asylum and

1 Go, Myong­Hyun. "Resettling in South Korea: Challenges for Young North Korean Refugees." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

entry into a country that will acknowledge their refugee status, and integrating into the free world

are countless. If caught, they confront the severe dangers of forced repatriation, imprisonment,

time in labor or concentration camps, and even public execution. Many refugees enlist the help

of brokers to aid them in their journey across the Tumen River border into China, through

countries in Southeast Asia, and then to South Korea, but are at risk of being swindled or

trafficked. Furthermore, the journey to safety requires burdensome amounts of cash and may

take as long as 20 years, as some refugees find themselves imprisoned at various points in transit.

Once North Korean defectors reach South Korea, trauma, stress, and the guilt of leaving

family members behind pose as psychological barriers to integration. The rates for posttraumatic

stress disorder among North Koreans in South Korea are approximately 29.5% to 37.7%, with

percentages higher in women than in men. Drop out rates for North Korean refugee children 2

and college students are higher than that of South Korean students, thereby contributing to

difficulty in securing high­paying vocations. Refugees reported to experiencing workplace

discrimination, social isolation, as well as disillusionment in regard to future goals.

The South Korean government, along with local and international NGOs and religiously

affiliated groups, have provided North Korean refugees with financial, psychological, and

vocational support to aid in the process of cultural transition. However, as Park Jin, the

chairman of the South Korean National Assembly’s Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Unification

Committee commented, “The settlement of North Korean defectors in the South is not something

that money alone can accomplish.” According to a Journeyman Pictures documentary on the

challenges of resettlement, what the country has yet to build is “a bridge to span fifty years of

2 Jeon, Hong, Lee, Lee, Han, and Min. "Correlation Between Traumatic Events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among North Korean Defectors In South Korea." Journal of Traumatic Stress, Apr. 2005. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

division and hostility.” 3

The two nations’ history of conflict and current armistice status marked by ongoing

tension further complexes the issue of North Korean integration. I believe that due to the fact

that South Korean citizens daily confront with inescapable proximity the possibility of war with

neighboring North Korea, they experience an ambivalence toward the issue of reunification and

an accompanying divisiveness in fully addressing the needs of the North Korean refugee

community.

Through this thesis, I propose that local faith communities and ethnic Koreans

(individuals of Korean descent who live outside of the Korean peninsula) will be increasingly

essential in the construction of a theoretical cultural bridge.

Local faith communities have provided resources such as “psychological first aid,”

pastoral care, and structures for community building in various multi­cultural contexts around

the world for many years. North Korea is devoid of religious freedom and yet, a 2003 survey

revealed that nearly 70% of refugees claimed to be religious, with three quarters identifying as

Christian. Some churches in South Korea have special services dedicated to North Korean 4

refugees and others offer financial and support services. In my research uncovering the role of

religious institutions in the integration of North Korean refugees into South Korean society, I

was able to draw parallels to the narrative of ethnic Koreans, who have characteristically relied

on local faith communities to provide support through the process of migration.

In many ways, the struggles pertaining to unbelonging, lack of visibility, language

struggles, and dual identities of ethnic Korean youth mirror that of North Korean refugees. One

3 N. Korea's Brainwashed Defectors Can't Cope in the Outside World. Journeyman Pictures, 2007. Youtube. 4Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.

may argue that all populations undergoing migration, diaspora, or cultural transition has threads

of commonality in their experiences. However, the shared nuances specific to the Korean

identity and the accompanying tension of contesting those particular set of values with that of a

foreign culture is what I believe link the narratives of these two seemingly contrasting

populations together.

The integration of North Korean refugees into South Korean society is unquestionably

linked to the conversation surrounding reunification, due to its potential increase in relevance

should the Korean peninsula merge into one entity. I will draw correlations between positive

perceptions towards reunification, unbiased attitudes toward the North Korean population, and

effort in integrative methods.

It is my belief that local faith communities can play a substantial role in resilience

building and integrative measures in diverse refugee communities, like that of North Korean

refugees. Furthermore, I propose that ethnic Koreans, who may or may not influenced by faith,

(according to the findings of an informal survey that will be further discussed in following

chapters) possess a nuanced understanding of biculturalism and migratory issues specific to the

Korean ethnicity and ability to see beyond politics into the hearts of North Korean refugees

afforded through the distance often required to observe a situation without personal bias.

Furthermore, the Western­ influenced individualist culture of ethnic Koreans contrasts with the

collectivist ideals of South Korean culture to provide a fluidity and transience regarding ingroup

and outgroups determinants, thereby allowing for increased levels of acceptance and appreciation

of diversity. I believe that both of these groups will increasingly essential to the integration of

North Korean refugees in the free world in the years to come.

CHAPTER 1// the past. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ :: THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA i. Politics & Culture ii. The Emerging Black Market iii. Rise of a New Generation i. Politics & Culture

­­­

“The greatest threat to the security of the people of North Korea comes from the government of North Korea.” Ari Fleischer

­­­

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is one of the most mysterious countries on

the planet. In order to understand the experiences of North Korean refugees and gain perspective

on their relevance to a broader political narrative, it is necessary to learn about the history of

conflict between North and South Korea. During the fourth century, the Korean peninsula was

united through a common national identity within the Chosun Dynasty, which ruled between

1392 and 1910. Korea belonged to China’s “tribute system,” which required it give gifts to the

Chinese court, acknowledging its superiority. Despite borrowing much of its culture and

language from China, Korea maintained an independent set of customs until the Cold War, when

Japanese forces colonized the peninsula. The current status of the Republic of Korea and the 5

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea as two separate nations is a result of the Cold War.

From 1910 to the end of World War II in 1945, the Korean Peninsula was Japanese

territory. Following Japan's defeat, Korea was divided into the Communist North under the

influence of the Soviet Union and a democratic South under the influence of the U.S at the 38th

5 "Korean History and Political Geography." Asia Society. N.p., n.d. Web. 22 Dec. 2015.

parallel, a line of division that was arbitrarily drawn by foreign forces. Kim Il Sung, a former

member of the Manchurian Guerrilla Army, came into power in North Korea and Syngman Rhee

was appointed the first president of South Korea by the U.S.

On June 25, 1950, 75,000 North Korean soldiers invaded South Korea, commencing the

Korean War, which was viewed by the international community as a war against international

communism itself. The casualty toll for the war has been reported to be 54, 246, including South

Korean, North Korean, American, and Chinese soldiers. On July 27, 1953, a ceasefire was 6

signed by both countries, making way for the establishment of a 2.5 mile wide demilitarized

zone (DMZ) running along the 38th parallel of the peninsula, separating North and South Korea.

The DMZ measures at 2.5 miles wide and consists mainly of mountainous land, signifying a

“buffer zone, off­limits to large troop concentrations and to heavy weaponry like tanks and

artillery.” The Military Demarcation Line (MDL) runs down the center of the DMZ and is one 7

of the most dangerous places in the world in that any individual who attempts to cross it would

likely get shot. 8

The armistice did not officially end the war and in fact, the two countries are technically

still at war today. In 1968, North Korean soldiers crossed the DMZ in an attempt to assassinate

former president Park Chung­ Hee. The incident was followed by a second attempt in 1973. In

1983, North Korea proved to be responsible for a bombing at a wreath­laying ceremony in

Burma where South Korean government officials were present. Among the casualties from the

bombing was Lee Bum Suk, South Korea’s former foreign minister. Throughout the 1990s and

2000s, minor skirmishes have resulted in an escalation of tension and hostility between the two

6 Korean War Fast Facts ­ CNN.com." CNN. Cable News Network, 3 July 2015. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 7 O'Neill, Tom. "Korea's DMZ: Dangerous Divide ­ National Geographic Magazine." 8 O'Neill, Tom. "Korea's DMZ: Dangerous Divide ­ National Geographic Magazine."

nations. More recent occurrences include a naval accident which accounted for the deaths of

four South Korean sailors in June 2002 and a threat to declare “all­out war” by the North 9

Korean government earlier this year, accompanied by the launching of “a 14.5 mm anti­aircraft

shell across the DMZ” and land mines that “seriously injured two South Korean soldiers.” 10

Despite their proximity, the two nations have developed at divergent paces on both

economic and social fronts. In the 62 years since the Korean War, South Korea has experienced

rapid economic growth under a Western influenced model of democracy and system of

technologically enhanced commodity production aimed at foreign trade. Additionally, lingering

Confucianist values that promote materialism, competition due to high population density, and a

culturally embedded idolization of perfectionism and achievement contributed to South Korea’s

emergence as an international hub of innovation. Currently, South Korea is ranked 15th in the

world by nominal GDP and 12th in purchasing power parity. It has transitioned from a 11

developing country to a high­income economy in record time.

Meanwhile, North Korea or the Democratic Republic of Korea has distanced itself from

the international communist movement, instead adopting its own ideology of national

self­reliance called “juche.” In 1992, a popular political campaign within North Korea was

“Socialism in Our Style,” which demonstrated the government’s disinterest in the practices or

influences of China or the Soviet Union and insistence on establishing a system of Communist

government entirely distinct from that of its predecessors. North Korea’s political tract

combines “extreme nationalism, Stalinism, Confucian dynasticism, even myths of racial purity.”

9 Tran, Mark. "North and South Korea: A History of Violence." The Guardian. N.p., 20 May 2010. Web. 15 Dec. 2015. 10 Lah, Kyung, and KJ Kwon. "Tired of Conflict: Life near the Korean DMZ."CNN. Cable News Network, 31 Aug. 2015 11 "The World Factbook." Central Intelligence Agency. Central Intelligence Agency, n.d. Web. 16 Dec. 2015.

(pg 12) Having an understanding of Korean blood as pure inevitably results in a paranoia and 12

disdain for any association or assimilation of a culture outside of its borders. North Korea’s

obsession with racial purity can be demonstrated in the propaganda that is slapped across public

spaces, currency, and schoolbooks, which idolizes metaphoric depictions of pure compliance

with the ideology of the state in juxtaposition with the seemingly obstructed political

perspectives of foreign, particularly Western, influences. North Korea views itself as a socialist

state but is identified by the international community as a totalitarian dictatorship, which is

described in the dictionary to be “a form of government in which the political authority exercises

absolute and centralized control over all aspects of life, the individual is subordinated to the

state, and opposing political and cultural expression is suppressed. “ North Korea’s 13

governmental structures support the erection and maintenance of a system of leadership that

assigns God­like authority to those in power, thereby confirming this perception.

Kim Il Sung, North Korea’s first leader, was born on April 15, 1912 in Pyongyang as

Kim Sŏng­ju. He grew up in a Christian home and was educated by Christian missionaries, later

bypassing the Soviet­Korean and Korean Communist Party to join the faction Manchurian

Guerrilla Army. Originally, he was not a politician and came to power in the North by chance.

However, he created for himself a personal deified identity as the “Great Leader” of North Korea

by taking Confucianist ideas and replacing them with Communist terms, leading with claims of

his unshaken willingness to die for the nation (충성) and introducing a political platform in favor

of Anti­Japanese and Anti­American attitudes and national reunification. Following Kim Il

Sung’s death, his son, Kim Jong Il, came to power. During Kim Jong Il’s reign, former South

12 Stephen Haggard, and Marcus Noland. Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2011. Print. 13 "Totalitarian Dictatorship." The Free Dictionary. Farlex, n.d. Web. 22 Dec. 2015.

Korean president Kim Dae Jung established a foreign policy known as the Sunshine Policy

through which the South Korean government provided unconditional aid, as well as increased

military and economic cooperation with North Korea. Despite the fact that Kim Dae Jung won

the Nobel peace prize in 2000 for his contribution in engaging North and South Korea in

peaceful dialogue, the success of the Sunshine Policy in promoting diplomatic relations within

the Korean peninsula is highly contested to this day. 14

The current leader of the DPRK is Kim Jong Un, who was supposedly educated in

Switzerland and fashions himself as the reincarnate of his grandfather, Kim Il Sung. The

birthdays of all three of these men, Kim Il Sung (April 15), Kim Jong Il (February 16), and Kim

Jong Un (January 8) are national holidays in North Korea, which are celebrated with the

distribution of food so citizens learn to associate wealth and provision with the leaders and place

their trust accordingly. 15

North Korea’s social classification system, known as songbun, sorts the population into

classes determined by their loyalty to socialist ideologies. The Kim family and national party

members head the social hierarchy. Following the Kim dynasty, the songbun system designates

war heroes, party members, and military officials as next in line of status and significance. Next,

are individuals who are university educated and can afford to live in the capital city of

Pyongyang, then members of the working class including farmers and industrial workers, and all

other citizens. This system of social organization accounts for massive inequalities, particularly

for vulnerable and marginalized members of the population, as it erases all possibility of social

mobility.

14 Popeski, Ronald. "Sunshine Policy Failed to Change North Korea: Report."Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 18 Nov. 2010. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 15 North Korean Politics and Culture, Hanyang University International Summer School, Immanuel Kim

Translated over the realm of human rights, the bizarre political ideology of North Korea

is the center of international controversy. In February of this year, the United Nations published

a 36 page initial report and 373 page report of detailed findings regarding human rights and

medical issues in North Korea. Continued poverty in the country has resulted in a systematic

lack of medical service and perpetually high mortality rates. A 2008 Census report stated that

life expectancy for North Koreans has declined since the 1990s at 65.5 for men and 72.7 for

women, which is 11 years less than that of South Koreans. North Korea suffers from food 16

shortages, a lack of medical supplies, unreliable sanitation systems, and citizens who use drugs

such as “ice” (methamphetamine) to self­medicate. Only 6% of North Korea’s budget went to

healthcare in 2008, according to the World Health Organization, demonstrating the national 17

government’s disregard for the basic needs of its citizens.

Despite severe developmental challenges, or perhaps because of them, the citizens of

North Korea are increasingly taking the reigns on their circumstances, particularly in regard to

the market economy.

ii. The Emerging Black Market

Yeonmi Park is a North Korean defector and Human Rights activist. Her father was a

businessman, but was later arrested for being involved with illegal trading activities. She and her

mother escaped the country following his arrest in 2007. She recalls that as a child, she watched

her mother’s friend get executed for selling pirated DVD’s. This left an understandably deep

16 Haub, Carl. "North Korea Census Reveals Poor Demographic and Health Conditions." PRB. Population Reference Bureau, Dec. 2010. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 17 Branigan, Tania. "North Korean Health System Crumbling as Shortages and Sanctions Bite." The Guardian, 23 Apr. 2014. Web. 15 Dec. 2015.

impression on her as she began to question the nature of a ruler and government she had been

taught to worship. These thoughts became more relevant when she was exposed to foreign films

and books such as “Titanic” and “Animal Farm.” As cited in Park’s recent interview with The

Washington Post, she claims that “Titanic opened my eyes to see that people can live differently,

and there is something else out there; the black market gave me an opportunity to be exposed to

the outside world, and Animal Farm set me free from brainwashing.” 18

The private market exposed a new generation of North Koreans to food, clothing, and

media from South Korea and other foreign nations. Essentially, these citizens have defied the

logic of the regime, whose aim is to proliferate a paranoia about the dangers of Western

influenced media. Access to technology despite government censorship depletes the power of 19

the regime and usurps the ruler of his power to exert complete control over the thoughts and

images influencing his subjects. According to Heung Kwang Kim, a North Korean defector and

former computer science professor at a university in the capital, 3.5 million computers and 1.5

tablets currently exist in the country. 1 in 50 North Koreans have access to some kind of

computing device and 3 million to cell phones. He claims that although the use of such devices

is prohibited, the awareness of their existence cannot be unlearned. Organizations such as the 20

North Korea Strategy Center have become one of the largest in smuggling data into the country,

moving nearly 3,000 USB drives with foreign movies, music, and ebooks across the border every

year. Founder Kang Chol­hwan believes this exposure reverses the brainwashing known to

prevail within the citizens of this nation as a result of propaganda campaigns. “And when this

18 "Ossowski, Yaël. "Long Live the North Korean Black Market." The Canal. The Panam Post, 20 Nov. 2014. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 19 Park, Yeon M. "Yeon­mi Park: The Hopes of North Korea's 'Black Market Generation'" Washington Post. The Washington Post, 25 May 2014. Web. 04 Dec. 2014. 20 North Korean Defector: 'Bureau 121' Hackers in China." CNN. Cable News Network, n.d. Web. 15 May 2015.

happens, it starts a revolution in their minds” he claims. However, Kang’s effort should not be

mistaken to be entirely altruistic. The value of a USB stick stocked with foreign films is

equivalent to “a month’s food budget for most middle­class North Korean families.” It seems 21

smugglers are motivated by profit just as much as they are motivated by politics. Nevertheless,

such efforts open up a channel of unregulated communication, allowing for foreign media

influence to penetrate the wall of isolation that separates North Korea from the rest of the world.

In fact, Thor Halvorseen who is the founder and president of the Human Rights Foundation in

New York City which delivers “bootleg DVDs, educational pamphlets and USB drives from

South Korea into North Korea via hydrogen balloon drops” insists that film is the most 22

powerful medium through which ideas of freedom can be transmitted globally. Just as the

United States ardently pursued to penetrate the Iron Curtain with American film, literature, and

radio during the Cold War, many organization like the Human Rights Foundation are aiming to

do the same. Hollywood films, even unoriginal romantic comedies, have potential to seriously

threaten totalitarian rule with their tales of desire and the triumph of the individual. Furthermore,

specific genres are gaining particular traction in black markets. Demands are increasingly high

for crime novels and thrillers, most of which are from Japan and which are available for illicit

rental by the hour. It is only recently that the interest in “subversive books” has drawn the

attention of North Korean customers, most of whom are students. Formerly, illegal literature

including classics in international politics and economics mainly attracted audiences comprised

21 Greenberg, Andy. "The Plot to Free North Korea With Smuggled Episodes of ‘Friends’." Wired.com. Conde Nast Digital, 1 Mar. 2015. Web. 16 Dec. 2015. 22 Crocker, Lizzie. "North Korea’s Secret Movie Bootleggers: How Western Films Make It Into the Hermit Kingdom." The Daily Beast. Newsweek/Daily Beast, 22 Dec. 2014. Web. 11 May 2015.

of writers and journalists, but now they are mostly university students, indicating a new wave of

enlightenment in the rising generation.

iii. Rise of a New Generation

There is hope of an impending political and cultural shift within North Korea with the

emergence of the “Jangmadang” generation, otherwise known as the Black Market Generation,

equivalent in age to the millennials of the U.S. In their 20’s and 30’s, the members of this 23

generation hold no true devotion to the Kim dynasty. Former generations were brainwashed

with strategic propaganda to worship a system of economic self­reliance and communism, but

the God­like image of Kim Il Sung has since faded from the memories of young North Koreans,

who have unprecedented access and exposure to markets and technology. 24

The possibility for political revolution within North Korea is marred by a number of

opposing forces. Limitation of travel due to the nation’s geopolitical monitoring system

organized according to songbun, lack of access to communication, and excessive government

surveillance put immense pressure on any citizen with social, economic, or political aims that are

not aligned with those of the state. However, the emergence of the black market economy in it

of itself is a testament to the small but powerful cultural shifts that are undoubtedly occurring

within North Korea. The capital city of Pyongyang experiences development at a significantly

different rate than a mountainous province that falls in the outskirts of the peninsula, but

economic progress is inevitably moving out from urban centers toward the periphery.

Researchers and social scientists who have lived in North Korea for upwards of ten years

23 "History of North Korea ­ Liberty in North Korea." History of North Korea. Liberty in North Korea, n.d. Web. 2 Dec. 2015. 24 "A Changing North Korea ­ Liberty in North Korea. Liberty in North Korea, n.d. Web. 2 Dec. 2015.

comment on the increased number of opportunities to participate in the private market and the

the rise of technological devices and automobiles in the capital. The significance of these

developments lies in their potential to familiarize the North Korean people with a mindset of

consumer agency that is individualized. With the veil lifted from the eyes of many young North

Koreans through technology and foreign media to the possibilities that lie across the border,

there is potential for the activation of desire and curiosity, alongside ideas surrounding human

rights, individualism, self­determination, personal liberty, and freedom. With the increase in

numbers of North Koreans leaving the country and seeking asylum in neighboring countries,

mainly South Korea, it can be induced that the border surrounding the DPRK is more porous that

anticipated. In the following chapter, I will discuss the factors that lead a North Korean to risk

their lives to escape the regime, methods and struggles in transit, and South Korea’s response as

it receives and supports North Korean refugees.

CHAPTER 2// the present. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ ::REFUGEE EXPERIENCES i. Means of Escape ii. Methods and Challenges in Integration iii. South Korea’s Response i. Means of Escape

­­­ “When we escaped North Korea, we wanted food. But when we went to South Korea, we wanted

freedom.” Eunsun Kim ­ A North Korean Refugee 25

­­­

Regardless of a defector’s intent in escaping the North Korean state­ whether they were

on the brink of starvation or simply found themselves in neighboring China while engaging in

black market activities and decided to stay­ leaving the country permanently is seen as an act of

political dissent and can result in severe punishment.

In the book “Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea,” which is 26

written by economists Stephen Haggard and Marcus Noland, one is exposed to the critical role of

the aforementioned black market economy in defining refugee experiences prior to defection.

North Korean refugees living in South Korea with a median age of 43 were inquired about what

percentage of their household income came from “private business activities at the time they left

North Korea.” Nearly half of the surveyed individuals reported that “all of their income came

from private business activities” while two­thirds reported that half or more of their income came

from these activities. Though quantitative inferences can not be drawn regarding the correlation

25 Eunsun Kim ­ A North Korean Refugee. Perf. Eunsun Kim. SVT/NRK Show "Skavlan", 2013. Youtube. 26 Haggard, Stephan, and Marcus Noland. Witness to Transformation: Refugee Insights into North Korea. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute For International Economics, 2011. Print.

between private market activity and defection, corresponding trends in the increasing power of

the black market and resulting economic self­sufficiency, rise in foreign influence and travel

outside of North Korean border can be identified. Most North Koreans who participate in the

private market are women, due to the fact that men work at state commissioned jobs and are not

able to participate as actively. As a result, reports show that a record­breaking 83% of the 292

defectors to come to South Korea within the first three months of 2015 were female. 27

The journey from North to South Korea is an extremely dangerous one. If caught,

consequences for defectors include forced repatriation, imprisonment, time in labor or

concentration camps, and even public execution. Thus, refugees leave with the knowledge that

their hunger, curiosity, or desire for freedom is costly, not only to themselves but to the family

members and friends they leave behind, who may be subject to interrogation and punishment if

knowledge of the national crime reaches authorities.

As the demilitarized zone (DMZ) that separates North and South Korea is heavily

guarded, despite the ease of transit in crossing the border this way, it is not an option as a means

of escape. Instead, defectors typically cross the Tumen River border to the North into China , 28

but they must then travel to other countries in Southeast Asia including Laos, Thailand, or

Myanmar and then to Thailand, where they can seek asylum at a South Korean embassy before

going to South Korea. Due to China’s notoriously harsh stance toward defectors and its history

of forced repatriations, North Koreans resort to this roundabout and clandestine journey to

freedom, which leave many stranded for months and years at various points in transit. China was

criticized to be “in violation of its obligations under international human rights and refugee law

27 Pearson, Ju­min Park and James. "It Now Costs $8,000 per Person to Defect from North Korea." Business Insider. Business Insider, Inc, 21 May 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 28 "Crossing Heaven's Border." PBS. PBS, 30 June 2009. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

over its treatment of North Korean refugees” in a 2014 United Nations Commission of Inquiry 29

report on human rights in the DPRK, but amendments to refugee law will not occur overnight.

As an article from the Council of Foreign Affairs states, China still is North Korea's “most

important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food, arms, and energy.” 30

The 3,000 mile endeavor not only requires extraordinary amounts of physical and

emotional endurance, but equally burdensome measures of cash. A recent Business Insider

article notes that in the past 3 and a half years since Kim Jong Un’s rise to power, defecting has

become much more dangerous and expensive. With enhancements in intelligence and

technology to track citizens, the stakes are higher for brokers, typically Chinese­ Koreans who

guide defectors to and through China for steep fees that have increased to $8,000. Non­profit 31

organizations like U.S. based Liberty in North Korea (LINK), which has led 405 defectors to

safety to date and operates on a transparent, donation­ based model, name lower, perhaps more

reasonable prices. LINK, in particular, claims that it costs $3,000 to not only rescue a North

Korean, but also provide them with “resettlement assistance and empowerment.” The 32

discrepancy in fees exemplifies a high level of corruption in broker dealings, and yet, it remains

the primary method that refugees rely on in their journey to freedom. According to surveys

conducted on North Korean refugees living in South Korea and China on methods of escape,

52% paid for assistance “such as bribing an official or eliciting the help of brokers,” 46% of

respondents escaped “with the help of family or friends” and 2% reported to receiving help from

29"UN Report Criticizes China for Treatment of North Korean Refugees Amid Worsening Situation." UN Report Criticizes China for Treatment of North Korean Refugees Amid Worsening Situation. Congressional­ Executive Commission on China, 19 Mar. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 30 Xu, Beina, and Jayshree Bajoria. "The China­ North Korea Relationship." Council on Foreign Relations, 22 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 31 Park, Ju­min, and James Pearson. "It Now Costs $8,000 per Person to Defect from North Korea." Business Insider. Business Insider, Inc, 21 May 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 32 "Refugee Rescues." Liberty in North Korea, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

an NGO or missionary group. It’s important to note here that a related survey­based study

makes relevant claims that “if North Koreans are caught and repatriated to North Korea while

residing in the border areas, they usually face relatively light sentences such as several days or

weeks in the labor camp, since the need for survival under the food crisis is understood in North

Korea. Yet when they are caught on the way to South Korea, and their association with South

Korean missionaries is revealed, it is considered a political act, and the sentence far exceeds

several weeks in the labor camp and might put their family members in North Korea in danger as

well.” Thus, the intensified repercussions of affiliating with a religious group could be a factor 33

for the statistically disportionate methods of escape.

As we will see in later chapters, the role of NGO and FBO (faith­ based organizations) is

more evident in the resettlement process once refugees reach South Korea. Still, a number of

organizations dedicated to aiding defectors trapped in China have developed in recent years.

This Asian “underground railroad” involves a large and diverse network of activists,

humanitarians, traffickers, and missionaries with varying methods and strategies but similar aims

in providing defectors with safe passage to South Korea, the United States, and other countries.

Joseph Kim, a North Korean defector turned New York City based college student, disclosed in a

recent interview with the Guardian that while in China, he was advised to seek out a Christian 34

church for food and support. South Korean­based, largely Presbyterian churches provide

financial and logistical support to underground networks in China which hide defectors and

provide escape routes. One such religiously­ based organization, called 318 Partners Missions

Foundation, was founded by a Korean­American businessman named Steve Kim, in order to

33 Choo, H. Y. "Gendered Modernity and Ethnicized Citizenship: North Korean Settlers in Contemporary South Korea." Gender & Society 20.5 (2006): 576­604. Web. 34 Pilkington, Ed. "Christianity Was the Only Way Out, Says North Korean Defector." The Guardian, 18 Oct. 2015. Web.

rescue trafficked North Korean women. The issue of trafficking is a significant one, considering

the lucrative market for brides among Chinese men, 30 million of whom are predicted to be

without female counterparts by the year 2020. According to a testimony by Steve Kim at the 35

Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing, traffickers work with brokers to trap women in

inner provinces of China, where they are often sold to farmers or brothels but are unable to report

any crimes committed against them for fear that they will be repatriated back to North Korea.

This all goes to say that escaping the North Korean state in search of safety is a

challenging and life­threatening endeavor that could take decades. The traumas associated with

the ever­present threat of repatriation, trafficking, violence, and imprisonment, along with the

psychological guilt of leaving one’s family behind in the process of transit will often leave

refugees in vulnerable states even after successful defection. Once North Korean refugees

arrive in South Korea, they are faced with additional trials associated with integrating into the

free world.

ii. Challenges and Methods in Integration

“South Korea is a status­oriented, conservative society—as is North Korea, although the status measures are quite different. In the South it’s not what position you hold in the ruling political party that matters but what schools you attended, what degrees you obtained, where you live, where you work, and what your family background is. Defectors bitterly joke that they left one class society in the North and now find that South Korea is equally class conscious, and the

defectors are not members of a favored class.” Kongdan Oh, Brookings Institution 36

According to the Ministry of Reunification, there are 26,483 North Korean refugees

living in South Korea as of March 2014, 40% of whom are children and young adults between

35 "Escaping North Korea: The Plight of Defectors." The Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing (TLHRC) (n.d.): n. pag. 23 Sept. 2010. Web. 10 Dec. 2015. 36 Oh, Kongdan. "Embracing North Korean Defectors: The "Small Unification" of Korea." The Brookings Institution, 09 June 2010. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

the ages of 10 and 29. In South Korea, defectors are referred to as Tal Buk Ja (탈북자), 37

meaning one who escaped from the North. However, they prefer to be called Sae Toe Min

(새터민), meaning person in a new land, indicating a desire to be considered a resident of South

Korea and not merely an escapee of the North.

Once North Koreans arrive in South Korea after a 3,000 mile journey, they are required

to spend approximately three months in a governmental resettlement program called “Hanawan,”

designed to aid them in the transition to South Korean society. Hanawon Resettlement Center,

or “The Office for Resettlement Assistance to NK Defectors” was opened in July of 1999.

“Hana,” means “one” in Korean, and “hanawon” translates to “institute of oneness.” Due to the 38

recent uncovering of North Korean agents who were found to have passed through the

resettlement program posing as refugees, defectors are first “grilled by intelligence agents trying

to weed out spies.” After initial interrogations with the National Information Agency and 39

Police Bureau, refugees are provided with shelter and basic social adjustment training. Initially

designed to last a year, the Hanawon program was shortened to 3 months and provides courses in

“stabilizing emotional and health conditions, enhancing the understanding about South Korean

society or narrowing the cultural gap, job consulting and training, and guiding the settlement

policies and procedures.” This includes medical treatment, provision of a bank account and 40

social security number, classes on how to function in a capitalist society, and language courses.

Although Korea shares a language, distinct differences in accents and usage exist due to the

development of the two nations as separate entities over the past 60 years. During their stay at

37 Go, Myong­Hyun. "Resettling in South Korea: Challenges for Young North Korean Refugees." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 38Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 39 Glionna, John M. "A Rare Look inside the Hanawon Center for North Korean Defectors." Los Angeles Times, 09 July 2009. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 40Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.

Hanawan, North Korean refugee will receive lessons on the South Korean accent. They will also

learn basic English words used in South Korea and computer skills.

Depending on individual preferences and aptitudes, refugees will then be transferred to

varying regions of the country to live in their own apartments or houses with resettlement money

provided by the government, and possibly a job. Within their regions, they are liable to

“protective care service to be given by 3 different protection officers” who oversee practical

matters related to housing, vocation, and security. Local centers called “Hanacenters,” 30 of

which exist across South Korea, are designated to maintain contact with them for a year­long

period, providing advising and support. Similarly, the Regional Consortium of Cooperative

Networks, which is financed by the Ministry of Unification, plays a significant role in areas

where over 100 refugees are located by providing much needed resettlement resources. 41

Certainly, refugees are in much need of support. Trauma, stress, fears related to safety,

and the guilt of leaving family members behind are all factors in potentially leading defectors to

depression, alcoholism, even suicide. The rates for posttraumatic stress disorder among North

Koreans in South Korea are approximately 29.5% to 37.7%, with percentages higher in women

than in men. Alongside PTSD, depression, anxiety, as well as physical traumas are possible 42

obstacles in integration. One study conducted at the Yonsei University College of Medicine in

Seoul, South Korea deduced that male survey respondents were “more vulnerable to alcohol 43

problems” and had higher depressive tendencies than did female respondents. An interesting

note is that in this study, male North Korean refugees showed a higher level of interpersonal

41Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 42 Jeon, Hong, Lee, Lee, Han, and Min. "Correlation Between Traumatic Events and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Among North Korean Defectors In South Korea." Journal of Traumatic Stress, Apr. 2005. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 43 Jeon, Yu, Cho, and Eom. "Traumatic Experiences and Mental Health of North Korean Refugees in South Korea." Psychiatry Investigation, 31 Dec. 2008. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

warmth than male South Koreans, which could indicate a need for social support that could be

left unmet by modern cultural standards and gender norms.

An ethnographic study conducted on the social exclusion and psychological adjustment

of North Korean adolescents proposed that the “emphasis on cultural homogeneity in South

Korea’s culture and negative perceptions of North Koreans” contributed to integrative barriers

including social isolation. This particular study surveyed teenaged North Korean refugees 44

living in group homes because they had been separating from their families. It explored the

potential challenges for young defectors resulting from the fact that cultural biases are most

prevalent in school and work settings. The roles of such concepts as hybridity, defined as

“cultural forms that emerge in the midst of migration, diaspora, transnationalism, and globalism”

in the shaping of identity and liminality, describing a sense of “ambiguity or disorientation, as

(North Korean refugees) find themselves belonging to neither the culture they left behind nor the

culture in which they are presently situated” is explored. 45

‘‘I am very dark skinned ... and short...saying weird things. So I stood out.’’ Jaehoon,

survey respondent and North Korean refugee

Young defectors reported feeling isolated from their peers at school due to the differences

in their appearance and speech. Some claimed to miss their North Korean friends and the

proximity and familiarity of neighbors in their hometown, in comparison to the independence

they felt in South Korea. One participant described South Korean teens as “slaves to digital

devices” and missed the natural beauty devoid of technology they enjoyed back home. They

44 Kim, M., Hong, Ra, and K. Kim. "Understanding Social Exclusion and Psychosocial Adjustment of North Korean Adolescents and Young Adult Refugees in South Korea through Photovoice." Qualitative Social Work, 25 Feb. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 45 Kim, M., Hong, Ra, and K. Kim. "Understanding Social Exclusion and Psychosocial Adjustment of North Korean Adolescents and Young Adult Refugees in South Korea through Photovoice." Qualitative Social Work, 25 Feb. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

found the academic pressure characteristic of the South Korean educational system difficult to

keep up with and observed that outward expressions of wealth and status were seen as displays

of power while the poor were discriminated against. Additionally, teenaged North Korean

refugees reported feeling upset at the lack of young people willing to give up their seats for

elderly passengers on the subway, let alone care for their aging parents, which was standard in

the DPRK. Prior to resettlement, many refugees dreamed of living in South Korea. Now that

they had achieved that dream, they found it difficult to plan next steps, but “all wanted to support

their group home and the North Korean refugee community.”

School dropout and youth unemployment rates are higher among young North Korean

refugees than South Korean teens, which in turn translates to increased difficulty in attaining

future professional employment. According to a statistical analysis on North Korean refugee 46

youth, “3.5% of elementary students, 12.9% of middle school students, and 28.1% of high school

students drop out of formal education,” rates that are much higher than that of South Korean

students (0.8% in middle school and 1.8% in high school). Despite governmental support, 47

many North Korean refugees find it difficult to secure high­paying jobs due to a number of

additional factors. South Korean labor market reserves low­level jobs such as dishwashing and

cleaning for women, while typical jobs for men require skills including computer literacy and

English proficiency. A lack of skills and education prevent men in particular from attaining

professional jobs and women from advancing into careers that can secure financial

self­sufficiency. This challenge is further exacerbated by the fact that the government will

46 Go, Myong­Hyun. "Resettling in South Korea: Challenges for Young North Korean Refugees." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, 8 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 47 Choi, Sheena. "Ethnic Brethren and the National “Other”: North Korean Youths in South Korea." Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration (n.d.): 51­57. Oct. 2011. Web. 9 Dec. 2015.

subsidize a refugee’s undergraduate university education, but not their graduate degree.

Additionally, refugees face hiring and workplace discrimination. A 2014 survey based study

conducted by the Ministry of Unification in partnership with Korea Hana Foundation One and

based on the responses of 12,777 refugees older than 15 showed that one in four refugees had

experienced discrimination in the past year. 68.6% of respondents claimed that “different speech

and methods of communication” was a factor in discrimination, along with 42% who attributed

“negative perceptions of refugees” and 19.2% who stated that a “lack of skill compared to South

Koreans” was a determinate in discriminatory attitudes. They were also found to be working

more hours (an average of 47 hours per week) than South Koreans (44.1 hours per week), but

earning lower wages (1,471,000 won or US$1,340) than their South Korean counterparts

(2,231,000 won (US$2,040). Furthermore, North Korean refugees tended to hold more

short­term employment and day labor positions. According to the Guardian, the chances of 48

joblessness is 6 times higher for a North Korean refugee than a South Korean. 49

With economic self­sufficiency being a pressing issue for many North Korean refugees,

some have gone to extreme ends in order to secure financial security. One result of this

challenge is the rise of “celebrity refugees” or defectors who share accounts of their lives to the

public in exchange for large amounts of money. Initially, refugees were provided small stipends

to mitigate travel costs when being interviewed. An official from the South Korean ministry of

unification claimed that fees vary depending on the quality of information being provided, but

now range from $50­$500 an hour. As the public demand to hear sensational stories of the Kim

regime intensified in recent years, a number of refugees resorted to fabricating segments of their

48Son, Won­je. "Survey: North Korean Refugees Report Discrimination, Lower Earnings." : North Korea : News : The Hankyoreh. N.p., 10 Feb. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 49 McCurry, Justin. "The Defector Who Wants to Go Back to North Korea." The Guardian, 22 Apr. 2015. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.

experiences to receive media attention and financial repercussions. Shin Dong­hyuk, refugee

and author of “Escape from Camp 14” who formerly testified before the United Nations general

assembly about human rights abuses occurring within the borders of his home country, revealed

earlier this year that the gruesome details that he shared about his life in a North Korean prison

camp were only partially true. The added caveat to omissions, additions and distortions of truth 50

within refugee stories is that it sensationalizes the experience to the point that there seems to be

no base in reality and as a result, the public loses a sense of true connection and empathy. The

ordinary repression of the North Korean state “doesn’t seem like a big deal when others are

claiming to have had family members executed for watching South Korean soap operas.” 51

iii. South Korea’s response

Under current president Park Geun­Hye’s leadership, the South Korean government, in

partnership with the United Nations General Assembly, sponsored a resolution condemning

human rights violations occurring in North Korea earlier this year. The resolution was supported

by 112 nations around the world. 52

Aside from the Hanawon Resettlement Center, the South Korean government provides

refugees with a base stipend of ₩6 million (about $5,600), along with bonuses to individuals over

the age of 60, single parents, and the physically handicapped. Additionally, “defectors can

receive incentive payments or subsidies (up to ₩24.4 million, about $22, 900) when they attend

50 Sang­hun, Choe. "Prominent North Korean Defector Recants Parts of His Story of Captivity." The New York Times. N.p., 18 Jan. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 51 Fified, Anna. "This Journalist Didn’t Just Interview North Korean Defectors, He Followed Them on Their Escape." Washington Post. The Washington Post, 20 June 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 52 "South Korea: Act to Save North Korea Refugees." Human Rights Watch. N.p., 24 Nov. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

job training, find employment and acquire certifications.” Due to the issue of defectors 53

circulating government­subsidized funds to brokers, these bonuses are awarded in portions.

Although the financial support of the government is abundant, one criticism is that an analysis of

the effectiveness of programs and a congruent coordination between private and public

integration efforts is lacking. 54

Governmental institutions such as “Foundation for North Korea” provided personal

financial advising, loans, medical treatment, psychological care, and educational opportunities to

individuals who have completed regional training. Additionally, NGOs operating from South 55

Korea, Japan, the U.S., and Europe have provided support to North Korean refugees in the form

of assistance in the underground railroad and advocacy. Citizens’ Alliance for North Korean

Humanitarian Rights, Commission to Help North Korean Refugees, Durihana, and Helping

Hands Korea, are South Korea- based NGO organizations, the latter two of which are Christian

based, that provide programs in food aid, advocacy, mentorship, and youth development among

the refugee community. 56

In addition to government sponsored aid, religiously affiliated groups, and local NGOs,

alternative methods of bridging cultural gaps have also been implemented by South Korean

citizens. In response to the need among newly arrived North Korean refugees to learn linguistic

nuances more akin to the South, a new smartphone app called “Univoca,” short for “unification

vocabulary” was created. The term “unification vocabulary” is a controversial one in it of itself,

in that it alludes to the vision of the Korean peninsula as one unified nation. Perhaps the act of

53Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 54Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 55Suh, You­Kyung, and Kyung Hee. "Some Problems of South Korean Government's Current Integrating Policies Regarding North Korean Defectors and Its Future Options." (n.d.): n. pag. Web. 56 Kim, Jungin. "A Study of the Roles of NGOs for North Korean Refugees' Human Rights." Taylor & Francis. Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies, 10 Mar. 2010. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

working toward methods of effective integration of North Korean refugees is a political

statement in itself in that it testifies to one’s support of a unified Korea, a point I will further

contend in the following chapter. Cheil Worldwide, the South Korean firm that devised the

“Univoca” app, did so by showing a South Korean grammar textbook to a group of young

defectors and had them select unfamiliar words. The app works by allowing users to take photos

of a word and get a North Korean translation and additionally, offers advice on simple tasks such

as ordering a pizza and even includes a list of dating terminology. South Korean lexicographer

Han Yong­Woo is currently working on the first unified Korean dictionary, as are other

linguistic experts who see the potential hidden in language to bridge the cultural barriers between

the two nations. 57

Many South Koreans have mixed responses to the population of North Korean refugees

living in their country. Inferences can be drawn from recent polls on the perceptions of South

Koreans on reunification. The latest Asan poll from January 2015 displays an 80% majority in

favor of a reunified Korea, but “younger people are less interested in the subject and also less

interested in paying an additional tax to support reunification.” 58

According to a Journeyman Pictures documentary on the challenges of resettlement, “it is

widely recognized that the South Korean government needs to do more for their new citizens…

the government always seems to be playing catch­up.” Kim Hyon­Uk, leader of the Catholic 59

Lay Apostolate Council of Korea claims that “the South Korean government has been guilty of

neglecting its duty. We have been silent too long– we have forgotten about it too long.” 60

57 Strother, Jason. "Korean Is Virtually Two Languages, and That's a Big Problem for North Korean Defectors." Public Radio International. N.p., 19 May 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 58 Feffer, John. "Korean Reunification: The View From the North." The Huffington Post. 16 June 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 59 Oh, Kongdan. "Embracing North Korean Defectors: The "Small Unification" of Korea." The Brookings Institution, 09 June 2010. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 60Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015.

Its immediate plans involve opening up more localized centers as extensions of Hanawon

and offering more intensive vocational training to refugees. Another idea is to incentivize hiring

refugees, particularly within small businesses that may have difficulty finding employees.

However, as Park Jin, the chairman of the South Korean National Assembly’s Foreign

Affairs, Trade, and Unification Committee poignantly commented, “The settlement of North

Korean defectors in the South is not something that money alone can accomplish.” According to

the aforementioned documentary, what the country has yet to build is “a bridge to span fifty

years of division and hostility.” 61

In the next and final chapter, I will discuss the potential within two groups, ethnics

Koreans and local faith communities, to contribute to building a cultural bridge of integration for

North Korean refugees living in South Korea.

61 N. Korea's Brainwashed Defectors Can't Cope in the Outside World. Journeyman Pictures, 2007. Youtube.

CHAPTER 3// the future. ­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­ :BEYOND THE BORDER i. Local Faith Communities ii. Ethnic Koreans iii. Moving Forward i. Local Faith Communities

The potential role of local faith communities (LFCs) in the development of resilience

through humanitarian crises, particularly in respect to “disaster risk reduction, emergency

response, and facilitating transitional and durable solutions,” is a largely neglected area of study

Yet, LFCs have provided resources such as “psychological first aid,” pastoral care, and 62

structures for community building in various multi­cultural contexts around the world for many

years. According to a refugee evaluation response collected by the United Nations High

Commissioners for Refugees (UNHCR) regarding the coping strategies in the face of crisis made

available through religion, “sometimes (refugees’) belief in God is more therapeutic than other

interventions and they can better express their issues through their religion­ through their

spiritual beliefs we can help them find solutions.” (Ager, Fiddian­ Quasmiyeh)

In Ghana and Liberia, UNHCR reports demonstrated that a method through which

refugees established bonds with host communities was a shared understanding of religious

beliefs and the act of communal prayer, emphasizing the potential in spiritual rituals to bridge

cross­cultural barriers. On a psychosocial level, prayer as a spiritual practice provides refugees

with immense benefits through the ability to see “their own role in the story of God in the world”

62Ager, J., E. Fiddian­Qasmiyeh, and A. Ager. "Local Faith Communities and the Promotion of Resilience in Contexts of Humanitarian Crisis." Journal of Refugee Studies 28.2 (2015): 202­21. Web.

which in turn, builds a “deep well of resilience that fosters hope and may mitigate the damaging

effects of trauma” (Holton, 2010: 71). Additionally, the UNHCR notes that recent surveys

conducted by the Organization for Refugee, Asylum and Migration prove that faith based

organizations had “views on providing services to lesbian, gay, transgender and intersex asylum

seekers and refugees” that were no better or no worse than secular organizations (Survey

response, UNHCR), further strengthening the argument that local faith communities can play a

substantial role in resilience building and integrative measures in diverse refugee communities.

Although religious freedom does not exist in North Korea, a 2003 survey revealed that

nearly 70% of refugees claimed to be religious, with three quarters identifying as Christian. 63

According to a survey conducted in March 2000, 66.2% of defectors were Christian when they

arrived at Hanawon Resettlement Center and there is “an entire floor of the education building at

Hanawon… devoted to religious education.” Some churches in South Korea have special 64

services dedicated to North Korean refugees and others offer financial and support services.

The concern with church groups and religiously affiliated humanitarian groups is a

seemingly manipulative tendency to take advantage of individuals in crisis for the purpose of

conversion. Some refugees state that “Christianity was the only way out” in navigating the 65

aforementioned “Asian Underground Railroad” to reach South Korea, while others note the

vague parallels between monotheism and North Korean juche ideology, which prioritizes 66

absolute loyalty to its deified leadership and total devotion to the state and adherence to its laws.

An example lies in the Ten Principles, North Korea’s essential creed of totalitarianism, which

63Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 64Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 65 Pilkington, Ed. "Christianity Was the Only Way Out, Says North Korean Defector." The Guardian, 18 Oct. 2015. 66 Kang, Ji­Min. "From Kim to Christ: Why Religion Works for North Koreans."North Korea News. N.p., 25 Sept. 2013. Web. 17

demands its citizens to “take the authority of the respected comrades Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong

Il and of the Party the absolute one.” 67

However, it seems church attendance and involvement does not necessarily indicate

religious conversion or an adoption of new theological principles. When churchgoing North

Korean refugees were surveyed on the reason they attended religious services in a recent study,

“69.4% cited peace of mind, 41.8% living a moral life, 35.7% to have a relationship with South

Koreans and 21.4% to get useful information about settling in South Korea.” A related 68

ethnographic research study on religious conversion claims that “a preoccupation with ideas was

not germane to... religious turnabout.” Instead, “a preoccupation with the self, and a state of

emotional turmoil rooted in the particular circumstances of the person’s life, dominated the

process.” This demonstrates that the particular theology or practices of a religion were less

important to converts than the role that religion played in the lives of individuals seeking a

religious community for a number of practical and personal reasons. Across the board in surveys

with Christian, Orthodox Jew, Hare Krishna devotees, and Baha’i converts, the most important

aspect of the experience was the “confirmation of their own selves through a promise of

everlasting acceptance.” 69

Indeed, one of the greatest needs of the North Korean refugees is social acceptance as

they grapple with transitions in perspective and identity, along with practical support in

integration. Yosep (Joseph) Cho is a Seoul based senior pastor of Muldaedongsan Church,

which provides resettlement and church services to North Korean refugees living in South Korea.

Cho runs a private school called Saeil (New Work) Academy on the third floor of his church,

67 "The Party's 10 Principles, Then and Now." North Korea News. N.p., 11 Dec. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 68 Strangers at Home: North Koreans in the South (n.d.): n. pag. International Crisis Group, 14 July 2011. Web. 1 Dec. 2015. 69 Ullman, Chana. "Haven of Last Resort." The Transformed Self (1989): 1­25. Web

where he aids refugee students who aim to take the college entrance exam. According to Cho,

“although the (South Korean) government helps the students get into colleges in South Korea,

once they in it is very difficult for them to keep up.” Therefore, the school, which is run by

volunteer instructors, all of whom are Christian, provides free private tutoring to students, as

well as emotional support. One student from Saeil Academy was recently accepted to medical

school at Korea University, one of the most competitive and prestigious universities in South

Korea. In this case, the role of the Christian church in embracing and equipping North Korean 70

refugees to survive and thrive within South Korean culture has proved to be highly effective.

Aside from refugee populations, immigrant communities have also sought out the social

and economic incentives provided by religious institutions. A population with similar struggles

of cultural integration and parallel narratives of utilizing faith based communities throughout the

process of diasporic transition is that of ethnic Koreans or individuals of heritage living outside

of the Korean peninsula.

ii. Ethnic Koreans [Korean Diaspora]

“The word “diaspora” originates from the Greek verb speiro, meaning “to sow,” and the preposition dia, meaning “over.” The ancient Greeks used this word to mean migration and

colonization...Eventually, however, the meaning of a diaspora changed to become quite negative, to describe a forced dispersion of people out of their homeland to their countries of exile.” 71

Inbom Choi

The Overseas Koreans Foundation Act, which was passed by the South Korean National

Assembly in 1998, defines overseas Koreans to be “all persons of Korean origin, regardless of

70 "Pastor: Young N. Korean Defectors Can Bridge the Gap." North Korea News. N.p., 03 Sept. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 71Choi, Inbom. "Korean Diaspora in the Making: Its Current Status and Impact on the Korean Economy." Institute for International Economics, n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

their nationality, who reside in foreign countries.” An estimated 7.2 million ethnic Koreans live

in 175 countries outside of the Korean peninsula, with 3 million living in China, 2 million living

in the U.S., and a little less than million living in Japan. Overseas Koreans live in Canada,

Australia, and the UK, raising the number of Koreans in the English speaking world to 2.5

million, as well as in countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Brazil. Following a 2010

bill extending voting rights to Koreans living outside of the peninsula, 2.8 million also hold

suffrage rights in South Korea.

According to a George Washington University study on the politics of diaspora

management, “the relationship with...overseas Koreans is a topic of increasing importance for 72

South Koreans since...it is directly relevant for Korea’s overall nation­building project” and is

linked to “debates about military services, adoptee­birth parent reunions, North­South relations,

and the reintegration of North Korean defectors.” It seems this interest is mutual, as research

shows that “overseas ethnic Koreans communities...try to maintain their ties with their

homeland,” and they are effective in doing so, as demonstrated by the 2,000+ Korean ethnic 73

enclaves that exist around the world. The formation of these diasporic communities exhibit a

strong intention to maintain fundamental cultural values, which binds the ethnic Korean

community with “an ethic of empathy and solidarity.” 74

A fundamental aspect of Korean ethnic communities in the United States is religion,

particularly Christianity. Approximately “three quarters of the Korean population in the U.S.

72 Mylonas, Harris. "The Politics of Diaspora Management in the Republic of Korea." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2009): n. pag. Web. 5 Dec. 2015. 73 Mylonas, Harris. "The Politics of Diaspora Management in the Republic of Korea." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2009): n. pag. Web. 5 Dec. 2015. 74 Mylonas, Harris. "The Politics of Diaspora Management in the Republic of Korea." The Asan Institute for Policy Studies (2009): n. pag. Web. 5 Dec. 2015.

regularly attend church services, either Protestant or Catholic.” A recent qualitative study on 75

multi­generational Korean Protestant churches claims that, “25% of non­Christian Korean

immigrants affiliate with Korean churches after arriving in the United States.” According to Min

(1992, 1371), “many probably began attending the ethnic church primarily because it met their

practical needs associated with immigrant adjustment.” Smith (1978, 1175) states that migration

itself is “often a theologizing experience.” Through its provision of practical services which are

attractive even to a non­believer, “fellowship, maintenance of cultural tradition, social services,

and social status and positions.” 76

The ethnic church serves a significant purpose in providing a sense of community to

immigrants, who are particularly vulnerable to experiencing the emotions characteristic of

sociocultural adaptation and an accompanying sense of marginalization, while “other voluntary

ethnic associations, which meet less frequently, often have specific requirements for membership

based on school, age, or occupation.” An ethnic Korean church has also become an institution

integral to maintaining cultural tradition by providing language classes or traditional problem.

For many Korean American children and adolescents, “Christianity and Koreanness often

become very closely associated in their lives.” Additionally, the church provides opportunities 77

for social status and recognition amidst the downward mobility characteristic of immigration.

Choi notes that “this function is more significant for Korean male immigrants, for whom holding

a staff position in the church is positively correlated with mental health.”

75 "Korean Americans­ Cultural Commonalities." (n.d.): n. pag. Web. <https://www.library.ca.gov/services/docs/korean.pdf>. 76 Hynes, Eugene, R. Stephen Warner, and Judith G. Wittner. "Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration."Contemporary Sociology 28.4 (1999): 442. Web. 77 Chai, Karen J,. "Competing for the Second Generation: English­ Language Ministry at a Korean Protestant Church." Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration (n.d.): 295­328. Web.

However, there are differences in the role that ethnic churches play in the lives of

first­generation immigrants (that is, an immigrant who was born in South Korea and relocated to

another) and second­ generation immigrants (the children of first generation immigrants). While

first generation church­goers within a Korean Protestant church prioritized “traditional and

rituals, preserving hierarchy, and financially supporting the church,” second generation believers

were “less concerned with formal structures and processes and instead stressed Christian ethics

and evangelism” which more individualistic views of Christianity as “accepting Jesus Christ as

one’s personal savior.” Herein lies a connection to the various roles that faith can play in the 78

psychosocial well being of an individual, particularly one affected by trauma. In fact, as the

benefits of faith to individual psychosocial wellbeing can be categories in two ways: intrinsic

beliefs or ideas, which parallel the focus of second generation Korean Americans and extrinsic

behavior and rituals, which most closely characterize first generation Korean American

Christians.

Do ethnic Koreans, many of whom hold psychological and political ties to their home

countries play a role in the resettlement of North Koreans in South Korea? Rachel Stine, a

development worker based in South Korea and former teacher at the Mulmangcho School, an

alternative academy for North Korean refugee youth, certainly thinks so. She claims that 79

“gyopos” (교포), a term used in South Korea to describe individuals of Korean heritage living

outside of the country, will be increasingly useful in the coming years to North Korean refugees

because they have the cultural understanding and language capacity of a native, but they have

78 Chai, Karen J,. "Competing for the Second Generation: English­ Language Ministry at a Korean Protestant Church." Gatherings in Diaspora: Religious Communities and the New Immigration (n.d.): 295­328. Web. 79 Mulmangcho School. N.p., n.d. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. <https://www.facebook.com/mulmangchoschool/info/?tab=page_info>.

also been exposed to uniquely Western perspectives and have faced similar migratory struggles.

80

According to an ethnographic case study on the cultural challenges of Korean American

students in classroom settings, young ethnic Koreans experience great ambiguity and

contradiction in reconciling their bicultural and bilingual identities. The study highlighted the

experience of one elementary school student of Korean American heritage named Min, for whom

“being bicultural meant that he needed to adjust to American culture while maintaining his

Korean identity… but the process had not been without ambiguity or contradiction when Min

could not feel the total sense of belonging to any one culture.” Some of the struggle in the 81

classroom context arose as a result of a the implicit impression that “what Min needed to do was

to blend into the existing cultural environment as much as possible.” As a result, Min never rose

his hand or gave his opinion in the classroom unless directly asked.

Min’s mother claims that his teachers, the majority of whom are white, rarely have

anything negative to say about him. She states that “most teachers seem to have a pretty positive

image of Asians… but they don’t know much about us,” lending credibility to the claim that

Asian Americans are an “invisible minority.” Min also experienced a conflicted attitude in 82

regard to his willingness to learn and practice the Korean language. Interviewed Korean parents

expressed a strong desire for their children to learn Korean as a way to maintain their ethnic

identity. In certain families, a child’s ability to speak Korean determined whether or not

intergenerational communication would be possible. However, as the study claims,

80 Ying, Loke Shi. "Minimalistic Visualizations Explain Differences In Eastern And Western Cultures." DesignTaxi, 30 Sept. 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 81 Godina, Heriberto, and Jeonghee Choi. "Korean American Cultural Differences in Classroom Literacy Activities: Observations from an Ethnographic Case Study." Journal of Multicultural, Gender, and Minority Studies (2009): n. pag. Web., 82 Yancy, George, and Haekwon Kim. "The Invisible Asian." The New York Times, 08 Oct. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

“language­minority children encounter powerful forces for assimilation as soon as they enter the

English­speaking world of the classroom… and may be driven to learn English at the expense of

losing their home languages.” In many ways, the struggles pertaining to unbelonging, lack of

visibility, language struggles, and dual identities of ethnic Korean youth mirror that of North

Korean refugees. One may argue that all populations undergoing migration, diaspora, or cultural

transition has threads of commonality in their experiences. However, the shared nuances

specific to the Korean identity and the accompanying tension of contesting those particular set of

values with that of a foreign culture is what I believe link the narratives of these two seemingly

contrasting populations together. Ethnic Koreans not only undergo similar processes of cultural

transition, they also adopt a certain level of Western­ influenced individualism.

South Korean culture is collectivist, promoting the goals of harmony, interdependence,

avoidance of open conflict, and sharp distinguishing between ingroups and outgroups. These

values contrast sharply with those of Western culture, which are more individualistic in nature

and centered around independence, acceptance of confrontation, and definition of self apart from

a group. The traits that distinguish a member of an ingroup from a member of the outgroup, or

in more simple terms, “the other,” can vary, but the exclusivity and even hostility toward a

nonmember make it notoriously difficult to penetrate and gain complete acceptance into an

ingroup within a collectivist culture. Meanwhile, the fluidity and transience of values

characteristic of the immigrant experience make it much more difficult for ethnic Koreans to

retain stringent standards regarding ingroup and outgroups determinants, thereby allowing for

increased levels of acceptance and appreciation of diversity.

To test the engagement of ethnic Koreans, specifically Korean Americans, of the North

Korean human rights issues and integration issues faced by North Korean refugees in South

Korea, I conducted an informal, online survey and sent it to my community of friends of Korean

origin through social media platforms. The survey was entirely voluntary and anonymous. Of

the 126 survey respondents, 79.37% (100) were between the ages of 18­25, 35.71% (45) were

Korean­born American citizens and 39.68% (50) were American citizens of Korean heritage for

a combined 75.39% with current citizenship based in the U.S. 89.68% (113) identified to be

Christians. Therefore, the population accounted for is predominantly comprised of young,

second­generation ethnic Koreans who identify as Christian.

Respondents were asked a series of questions to gauge their interest and engagement in

North Korean human rights and the issues surrounding integration among North Korean refugees

in South Korea. Alongside these questions, I asked questions surrounding faith as a way to

measure if there was a correlation between fervor of religious practice with engagement in issues

pertaining to North Korea. When asked how relevant they believed human rights issues in North

Korea to be, 53.17% (67) of total survey respondents stated “very relevant” while 30.16% (38)

stated “relevant” for a combined percentage of 83.33% reporting high levels of engagement.

Similarly, when asked how relevant a cause they believed efforts in integration for North Korean

refugees in South Korea to be, 44.44% (56) of total respondents answered “very relevant” and

38.89% (49) answered “relevant” for a combined total of 83.33% engaged participants.

87.3% of surveyed respondents claims that their religious beliefs had at least “somewhat”

of a bearing on their engagement with North Korea related issues, with 34.92% (44) stating that

it held “very much” of a bearing. However, I discovered that personal engagement did not

immediately transfer to a willingness to be directly involved in relief measures related to these

causes. When asked to gauge their level of interest to work on North Korean human rights or

refugee issues if given the opportunity, 69.85% claimed that they were at least interested, with

29.37% stating that they were “very interested.”

Perhaps the most significant finding of the survey was uncovered through the question of

whether or not respondents supported North and South Korea’s reunification, to which 67.46%

(85) answered yes, 3.97% (5) answered no, and 28.57% (36) answered that they were not sure.

However, of the 70 Korean­born American citizens, American citizens, and Korean­ born

foreign citizens (ethnic Koreans) who took the survey, 81.43% of whom cited their faith to be

“very important” in their daily lives and 77.14% of whom were between the ages of 18­25, 100%

were in favor of reunification. This indicates an overwhelmingly optimistic attitude held by

ethnic Korean young adults, the majority of whom hold strong commitments to their faith,

toward a unified Korea, which is arguably influenced by distance and perhaps a lack of

awareness into the implications of such a move. Yet, it sets this population apart as one holding

a unanimously supportive position in favor of reunification within an issue characterized by

conflict and controversy.

­­­

iii. Moving Forward “Reunification, when it happens, and it will happen, may be less turbulent if the ordinary

people of North and South can at least have some contact, be permitted to have family vacations together, or attend the weddings of nephews and nieces. The least that could be done for

defectors is to ensure that they know, when they risk everything to escape, that they will not be lost for ever to the people they left behind, that they have supporters and well­wishers the world

over, that they are not crossing the border alone.” The Girl with the Seven Names

This past summer, I was fortunate to study in South Korea and conduct some

ethnographic research in preparation to write this thesis on a grant from my university. I took a

course on North Korean politics and culture and another on research methods in social work,

while attending meetings for a nonprofit organization called Catacombs or Helping Hands

Korea. Helping Hands Korea is a Seoul­based Christian organization that was founded in 1990

by an American man named Tim Peters. Every week, I attended meetings where 8­10 people

including high school students with aspirations to become international diplomats, American

English teachers with a special interest in refugee issues, missionaries, and South Koreans who

had served as reunification activists for many years would gather. Some nights, we would

package seeds to be smuggled across the border to North Korea. Other nights, we would pray

for the individuals making their way to safety via the “Underground Railroad” and discuss

current events related to the Hermit Kingdom. During one meeting, we each shared about our

personal backgrounds and connection to the North Korean people. One ethnically Korean high

school student, who had been born in the U.S. but immigrated with her parents to South Korea to

attend school, shared that through her elementary and middle school education, she was taught to

have a negative perspective on North Korea. The North Korean government was presented in

her South Korean history books and classes to be a political enemy and its citizens deserving of

pity but also suspicion. Considering the two nations’ history of tension and even recent accounts

of conflict, it isn’t difficult to imagine why South Korean students are educated with these

particular perspectives.

Outside of the classroom, the ongoing “semi­war” between the two countries affects the 83

personal lives of young South Koreans. An example is compulsory military service for males

between the ages 20­30. Of the 27 countries in the world that require military service of its

citizens, South Korea has one of the longest conscriptions at 21 months. South Korean men are

separated from their educational trajectories, careers, and loved ones during this time and are

pushed physically and psychologically, sometimes to a dangerous level, as proven by recent

“suicides, mass shootings and, most alarming of all from the viewpoint of the top command, the

torture murder of a young soldier whose comrades literally bullied him to death.” On a societal 84

level, gender binaries are reinforced through the hierarchical and disciplinary military structure.

As one article claims, “without having service in the military, a 20­ or 30­ something­year­old

man is rarely accepted as a “man.” Kim Kwang­Sik, an expert in behavioral science at the 85

Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, was recently quoted to say that “soldiers basically have a

negative idea about enlistment.” He claimed there was serious cause for worry regarding the

“building tensions when faced with military confrontation with North Korea,” considering the 86

psychological instability of unwilling soldiers who are forced to serve in the South Korean army.

The realities faced by South Korean citizens, who daily confront with inescapable

proximity the possibility of war with neighboring North Korea, is fundamental to consider, as it

lends validity to the ambivalence with which South Koreans respond to the needs of the North

Korean refugee community. The medical and psychological services that the government

83 "Flight or Fight: Conscription Misery in South Korea." South China Morning Post. Post Magazine, 18 Jan. 2015. Web. 17 84 Kirk, Donald. "South Korean Armed Forces Face Enemy Within: Suicides And Murder." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015. 85 Kim, Stella. "A Dreaded Rite of Passage: South Korea’s Mandatory Military Service." Brown Political Review. N.p., 1 Dec. 2013. Web. 17 Dec. 2015./ 86 Kirk, Donald. "South Korean Armed Forces Face Enemy Within: Suicides And Murder." Forbes. Forbes Magazine, 10 Aug. 2014. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

provides to this population are ultimately reimbursed by South Korean citizens, further

narrowing the degree to which North Korean defection benefits the South Korean people.

This complex struggle does not have to be, and perhaps was never meant to be,

contended with and resolved exclusively within the community of those directly affected and

inhabiting the Korean peninsula. Existing examples of individuals and organizations from

around the world who have responded to the needs of the refugee population in an effective

manner include Southern California­ based Liberty in North Korea. Founded in 2004 at Yale

University’s Korean American Students Conference by Paul Kim and Adrian Hong, this

organization leads awareness tours across the U.S., collects donations to fund rescue missions,

and aids refugees in the resettlement process in South Korea. In a recent article by Rachel Stine,

LINK was commended for their positive portrayal of refugees, whom the organization is careful

not to present as “PTSD­addled welfare addicts” but as “survivors, each with a unique

personality and distinct career path.” In turn, donors to the organization, who contribute to

LINK’s impressive annual income of 1.5 million USD, are encouraged to give “not out of pity,

but with the knowledge that North Koreans can successfully integrate into the modern economy

and contribute positively to their neighborhood.” Hope, it seems, can be very powerful. 87

The case for full attention and efforts toward reintegrative methods for North Korean

refugees is stronger than ever. Andrei Lankov, a scholar of Korean studies at Kookmin

University in South Korea and the author of the book “The Real North Korea: Life and Politics

in the Failed Stalinist Utopia,” speculates that there are three possible scenarios for the future of

North Korea: the successful uprising of a communist dictatorship without political freedom but

87 Stine, Rachel. "The Stereotype of the Damaged North Korean Is Demeaning."The Huffington Post. TheHuffingtonPost.com, 15 Dec. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

economic security, an uprising and regime collapse followed by Chinese intervention, and lastly,

the same collapse with South Korean intervention and essential integration, much like what

happened in Germany 25 years ago. Having grown up in the Soviet Union and studied at Kim Il

Sung University in Pyongyang, Lankov considers the third option to be most likely. Pastor

Yoseph (Joseph) Cho of Muldaedongsan Church in Seoul, who has worked with North Koran

refugees for over 20 years, holds similar beliefs. He predicts that “the current North Korean

regime will collapse in three or five years” due to the fact that it is “an unsustainable regime; the

trend in history is that authoritarian regimes and totalitarian regimes are just no longer viable.” 88

In the case that the Korean peninsula is most likely headed toward reunification, the

undivided support of a population with positive views of a unified Korea and unbiased

perspectives on North Korean refugees, such that of ethnic Koreans, is needed. I see potential

for ethnic Koreans, who may or may not be motivated by faith according to my informal survey

and/or work through religious institutions to provide effective service, to play a major role in

bridging existing gaps in integration. It is my belief that this population’s nuanced

understanding of biculturalism and migratory issues specific to the Korean ethnicity and ability

to see beyond politics into the hearts of North Korean refugees, afforded through the distance

often required to observe a situation without personal bias, will be increasingly integral in the

years to come.

88 "Pastor: Young N. Korean Defectors Can Bridge the Gap." North Korea News. N.p., 03 Sept. 2015. Web. 17 Dec. 2015.

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