beyond the balkans
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Beyond the BalkansAuthor(s): Flora LewisSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 220-221Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045702 .
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Letters to the Editor
tal organizations working to promote
peaceful change in Cuba with fax machines
and desktop publishing capability, as it did so effectively in Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union. Licenses by other
nongovernmental groups to sell and donate
such items to nongovernmental organiza tions in Cuba are also easier to obtain.
I disagree with Dom?nguez that flood
ing Cuba with American tourists is a posi tive step toward ending Castro's
dictatorship. For this small island, so close
to the United States, unrestricted U.S.
tourism would provide a financial boon to
Castro. A recent study by the Center for
Strategic and International Studies also
concluded that such a change in the
embargo was more likely to slow rather
than accelerate the pace of change in
Cuba.1
THE HON. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI
D-NJ
Jorge Dom?nguez replies:
Congressman Torricelli's defense ofthe
Cuban Democracy Act (cda) calls atten
tion to the costs to Cuba of U.S. shipping
regulations that have the effect of raising the cost of transportation to Cuba. In fact, those regulations were implemented by
President Bush through executive order
prior to the enactment ofthe cda. The
shipping regulations and the cda s prohibi tion of third-country U.S. subsidiary trade
with Cuba are counterproductive. The cda
has already played a "starring role" in Fidel
Castro's political campaign to persuade Cubans to continue to support him. No
doubt the Cuban government will cite
Congressman Torricelli's letter to Foreign
Affairs as proof that Cubans suffer today
because of U.S. policy. However false that
"proof" is, the Cuban government has been
assisted by these U.S. policies in rallying domestic support and in evading its
responsibility for the Cuban economy's
collapse. Had Bush not instituted addi
tional penalties and had the cda not been
enacted, Fidel Castro's government would
have been much less able to rally patriotic
support. Thanks to the cda, the greatly isolated
Cuban government has rallied support from governments that are otherwise U.S.
allies. These governments object to the
extraterritorial reach ofthe cda. For the
first time ever, in late 1992 the U.N.
General Assembly condemned the U.S.
trade embargo toward Cuba. Only Israel
and Romania voted with the U.S. govern ment.
I urge Congressman Torricelli to focus
less on punishing the Castro government and more on the question I am sure moti
vates him: How to bring peaceful, democ
ratic change to Cuba? My article suggested that one way to begin is by dismantling forthwith all U.S.-imposed obstacles to the
free flow of ideas between the United
States and Cuba. If I read the congress mans letter correctly, I think that he, too, believes that moving in this direction will
contribute in due course to making Cuba
free.
BEYOND THE BALKANS
To the Editor:
Lord Owens distress (Spring 1993) at
charges that the plan for Bosnia proposed
by Cyrus Vance and himself endorses eth
nic cleansing and rewards Serbian aggres sion is understandable. There is no way to
1Ernest Preeg, Cuba and The New Caribbean Economic Order, Washington: csis, 1993.
[220] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72No.3
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Letters to the Editor
turn back the clock and undo serious inter
national mistakes, but a way must be found
to end the bloodshed. The main trouble
with the peace plan is that it doesn't go far
enough. It offers no real incentive to stop
fighting before the protagonists' irreconcil
able goals are met. If it can be implement ed, there is no reason to expect it to endure
any longer than until one side or another
feels it has a better chance for victory. In fact, the plan further "Balkanizes"
the area, creating ever more hostile frag ments. This is not only unsuitable in itself,
it is a pernicious precedent for the region if
it is to be considered the formula for
resolving disputes. Not long ago, Nevzat
Halili, leader ofthe ethnic Albanian party in Macedonia which claims to represent over 40 percent ofthe population ofthat
country but is probably closer to 25-30 per
cent, told me of his people's grievances.
They are in the coalition government and
the parliament, with minority guarantees, so I asked him what more he wanted. "I
would like a map like the one for Bosnia," he said, adding after a pause, "of course
without going through what they did to
get it."
The aim of international diplomacy and pressure should be the opposite?to reverse the disastrous course of events and
offer mutual advantages of security and
development within an expanded frame
work. In a word, the effort must be to de
Balkanize through a broad regional
approach. The one thing everybody in the
area seeks is to escape the historical trap of
backwardness, underdevelopment and iso
lation, and move toward the European mainstream. Of course, this need not mean
loss of nationality or cultural distinctive
ness, as the experience ofthe European
Community makes clear. But the present
direction reflects a belief that the way to
advance is for each group to push aside
others they feel are holding them down or
dragging them back, and get to the head of
the line on their own.
No piecemeal, step-by-step solution will
work. There needs to be a security network
with assured borders and minority rights
covering all the countries involved?
Albania, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, proba
bly Romania, possibly Hungary and all the states arising from the dissolution of
Yugoslavia. This should be launched at a
great nineteenth-century style conference, to be convened by the United States. Only in this way is there a chance of accommo
dating everyone, of convincing participants that each gains more in security than it is
asked to give up in concessions. It is neces
sary to assure that there will be long-term
regional planning, focused on infrastruc
ture needs?transportation, telecommuni
cations, energy and a base for tourism?
which would bring common benefits.
flora lewis, Senior Columnist
The New York Times
THE RUSSIAN WORK FORCE
To the Editor:
As Kyril Tidmarsh points out (Spring 1993), Russia has a massive work force, conditioned by its historical experience in
the pre-Soviet periods and which is a ques tionable fit to the sort of economy
President Boris Yeltsin's government has
sought to create. What can be done with
that workforce depends not only on its
characteristics, but on how the government deals with workers and their employers, and with trade unions and those who claim
to speak for the employers. The Yeltsin government's early answer
to the anticipated tensions of market tran
FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 i221]
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