Beyond the BalkansAuthor(s): Flora LewisSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993), pp. 220-221Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045702 .

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Letters to the Editor

tal organizations working to promote

peaceful change in Cuba with fax machines

and desktop publishing capability, as it did so effectively in Eastern Europe and the

former Soviet Union. Licenses by other

nongovernmental groups to sell and donate

such items to nongovernmental organiza tions in Cuba are also easier to obtain.

I disagree with Dom?nguez that flood

ing Cuba with American tourists is a posi tive step toward ending Castro's

dictatorship. For this small island, so close

to the United States, unrestricted U.S.

tourism would provide a financial boon to

Castro. A recent study by the Center for

Strategic and International Studies also

concluded that such a change in the

embargo was more likely to slow rather

than accelerate the pace of change in

Cuba.1

THE HON. ROBERT G. TORRICELLI

D-NJ

Jorge Dom?nguez replies:

Congressman Torricelli's defense ofthe

Cuban Democracy Act (cda) calls atten

tion to the costs to Cuba of U.S. shipping

regulations that have the effect of raising the cost of transportation to Cuba. In fact, those regulations were implemented by

President Bush through executive order

prior to the enactment ofthe cda. The

shipping regulations and the cda s prohibi tion of third-country U.S. subsidiary trade

with Cuba are counterproductive. The cda

has already played a "starring role" in Fidel

Castro's political campaign to persuade Cubans to continue to support him. No

doubt the Cuban government will cite

Congressman Torricelli's letter to Foreign

Affairs as proof that Cubans suffer today

because of U.S. policy. However false that

"proof" is, the Cuban government has been

assisted by these U.S. policies in rallying domestic support and in evading its

responsibility for the Cuban economy's

collapse. Had Bush not instituted addi

tional penalties and had the cda not been

enacted, Fidel Castro's government would

have been much less able to rally patriotic

support. Thanks to the cda, the greatly isolated

Cuban government has rallied support from governments that are otherwise U.S.

allies. These governments object to the

extraterritorial reach ofthe cda. For the

first time ever, in late 1992 the U.N.

General Assembly condemned the U.S.

trade embargo toward Cuba. Only Israel

and Romania voted with the U.S. govern ment.

I urge Congressman Torricelli to focus

less on punishing the Castro government and more on the question I am sure moti

vates him: How to bring peaceful, democ

ratic change to Cuba? My article suggested that one way to begin is by dismantling forthwith all U.S.-imposed obstacles to the

free flow of ideas between the United

States and Cuba. If I read the congress mans letter correctly, I think that he, too, believes that moving in this direction will

contribute in due course to making Cuba

free.

BEYOND THE BALKANS

To the Editor:

Lord Owens distress (Spring 1993) at

charges that the plan for Bosnia proposed

by Cyrus Vance and himself endorses eth

nic cleansing and rewards Serbian aggres sion is understandable. There is no way to

1Ernest Preeg, Cuba and The New Caribbean Economic Order, Washington: csis, 1993.

[220] FOREIGN AFFAIRS Volume72No.3

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Letters to the Editor

turn back the clock and undo serious inter

national mistakes, but a way must be found

to end the bloodshed. The main trouble

with the peace plan is that it doesn't go far

enough. It offers no real incentive to stop

fighting before the protagonists' irreconcil

able goals are met. If it can be implement ed, there is no reason to expect it to endure

any longer than until one side or another

feels it has a better chance for victory. In fact, the plan further "Balkanizes"

the area, creating ever more hostile frag ments. This is not only unsuitable in itself,

it is a pernicious precedent for the region if

it is to be considered the formula for

resolving disputes. Not long ago, Nevzat

Halili, leader ofthe ethnic Albanian party in Macedonia which claims to represent over 40 percent ofthe population ofthat

country but is probably closer to 25-30 per

cent, told me of his people's grievances.

They are in the coalition government and

the parliament, with minority guarantees, so I asked him what more he wanted. "I

would like a map like the one for Bosnia," he said, adding after a pause, "of course

without going through what they did to

get it."

The aim of international diplomacy and pressure should be the opposite?to reverse the disastrous course of events and

offer mutual advantages of security and

development within an expanded frame

work. In a word, the effort must be to de

Balkanize through a broad regional

approach. The one thing everybody in the

area seeks is to escape the historical trap of

backwardness, underdevelopment and iso

lation, and move toward the European mainstream. Of course, this need not mean

loss of nationality or cultural distinctive

ness, as the experience ofthe European

Community makes clear. But the present

direction reflects a belief that the way to

advance is for each group to push aside

others they feel are holding them down or

dragging them back, and get to the head of

the line on their own.

No piecemeal, step-by-step solution will

work. There needs to be a security network

with assured borders and minority rights

covering all the countries involved?

Albania, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, proba

bly Romania, possibly Hungary and all the states arising from the dissolution of

Yugoslavia. This should be launched at a

great nineteenth-century style conference, to be convened by the United States. Only in this way is there a chance of accommo

dating everyone, of convincing participants that each gains more in security than it is

asked to give up in concessions. It is neces

sary to assure that there will be long-term

regional planning, focused on infrastruc

ture needs?transportation, telecommuni

cations, energy and a base for tourism?

which would bring common benefits.

flora lewis, Senior Columnist

The New York Times

THE RUSSIAN WORK FORCE

To the Editor:

As Kyril Tidmarsh points out (Spring 1993), Russia has a massive work force, conditioned by its historical experience in

the pre-Soviet periods and which is a ques tionable fit to the sort of economy

President Boris Yeltsin's government has

sought to create. What can be done with

that workforce depends not only on its

characteristics, but on how the government deals with workers and their employers, and with trade unions and those who claim

to speak for the employers. The Yeltsin government's early answer

to the anticipated tensions of market tran

FOREIGN AFFAIRS -Summer 1993 i221]

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