bhr politics internals

Upload: affnegcom

Post on 30-May-2018

218 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    1/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Political TheoryPolitical Theory................................................................................................................................................................................................................................1Partisanship Still Exists................................................................................................................................................................................................................2Bipartisanship Key to Pass........................................................................................................................................................................................................ ......3Divided Government Not Significant..............................................................................................................................................................................................4A2 Bipartisanship Key to Pass.........................................................................................................................................................................................................5Bipartisanship Turn Ignores Presidential Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................6Bipartisanship Turn Ignores Presidential Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................7Bipartisanship Turn Ignores Presidential Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................8Bipartisanship Turn Ignore Presidential Agenda..........................................................................................................................................................................9Lame Duck No Push...................................................................................................................................................................................................................10.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................10Lame Ducks = Advantage..............................................................................................................................................................................................................11Lame Duck Destroy Party..............................................................................................................................................................................................................12Lame Duck No Vetoes................................................................................................................................................................................................................13Political Capital Key to Agenda.....................................................................................................................................................................................................14Presidential Leadership Key to Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................................15.......................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................15Presidential Leadership Key to Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................................16A2 Bush Takes Blame....................................................................................................................................................................................................................17President Gets Credit/Avoids Blame........................................................................................................................................................................................ .....18Presidents Get Blame/Credit Agencies.......................................................................................................................................................................................19Blame Game Conflicting Agenda...............................................................................................................................................................................................20Concessions Key to Agenda...........................................................................................................................................................................................................21A2 Concessions Key to Agenda.....................................................................................................................................................................................................22

    Public Support Key to Agenda.......................................................................................................................................................................................................23Party Control Key to Agenda.........................................................................................................................................................................................................24GOP Base Key...............................................................................................................................................................................................................................25Presidents Control Agenda.............................................................................................................................................................................................................26Winners Win..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................27Lobbyists Key to Agenda...............................................................................................................................................................................................................28A2 Lobbyists Key..........................................................................................................................................................................................................................29Filibuster Not Prevent Pass.........................................................................................................................................................................................................30Income President Need Party Unity...............................................................................................................................................................................................31Coattails Key President Agenda.....................................................................................................................................................................................................32Vetoes Need Political Support................................................................................................................................................................................................. ...33

    1

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    2/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Partisanship Still Exists

    Partisanship still exists

    Nivola 6/16Pietro S., Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ The Brookings Institution, Is 2008 a Post-Partisan Year?http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0610_postpartisan_nivola.aspx?p=1, WEDNESDAY JULY 16, 2008

    The speculation these days is that American politics may be at the dawn of a post-partisan age. The profoundphilosophical divide between Democrats and Republicans is said to be narrowing, and a new era of bipartisan comity just around the corner. Exhibit A:

    Witness the rise of two seeming centrists as the presidential front-runners, McCain and Obama. Not so fast. Achasm continues to separate the parties on salient issues. For all the relatively moderate-sounding tenor of the campaigns so far, thesubstantive contrast between the candidates is deep and starkarguably sharper than between contenders in the last twopresidential elections . In 2004, Democratic nominee John Kerry spoke of winning the war in Iraq, not about a firmtimetable for pulling American combat troops out. Nor did he champion high-level discussions, no preconditions asked, with Americasnastiest foes. BarackObamas stance on these important matters clashes head-on with McCains. In 2000, Vice President AlGore (whose running mate was Senator Joe Lieberman) flirted with populism in some of his rhetoric. But, unlike Obama, Gore never distancedhimself from NAFTA, one of the Clinton administrations signature achievements. NeitherKerry nor Gore proposed plans foruniversal health care coverage, now a centerpiece of the Democratic agenda.

    Parties are still divided among each other

    Nivola 6/16Pietro S., Senior Fellow of Governance Studies @ The Brookings Institution, Is 2008 a Post-Partisan Year?http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0610_postpartisan_nivola.aspx?p=1, WEDNESDAY JULY 16, 2008

    The ostensibly orthodox party lines of the McCain and Obama candidacies might eventually melt away wheneither of these men becomes president. A healthy discount factor should always be applied to campaign rhetoric.Yet, one doubts that either candidate would be able to disown with impunity his clearest campaign promises. Obama,for example, has accorded himself precious little wiggle-room in his commitment to withdraw expeditiously from Iraq. Similarly, McCain has not lefthimself much space to renege on such matters as his pledge to extend (deficits notwithstanding) the Bushadministrations tax reductions. Powerful constituencies in the respective party bases will hold these leaders to their word, or at least punish themif they stray. Ask George H.W. Bush what happened to a president who first uttered read my lips and then tried to say, in essence, I changed my mind.

    So, two notes of caution: Dont discount campaign positions entirely, and dont be too beguiled by the style or tone inwhich they get packaged. President Bush came to the White House claiming to be a uniter, not a divider. Thespirit of the slogan had been heard before. As a presidential candidate in 1968, Richard M. Nixon, too, had told the nation that it needed aleader who would unite America. But in both cases it was just a matter of time before the talk of unity, change and new politics faded, and old partisan

    polemics resurfaced with a vengeance. Why the polarization of our parties has become a firm fixture in American politics, and if anything has intensified, is

    a long story thats been the focus of a three-year joint study by the Brookings and Hoover institutions. The central finding of the study is thatthe roots of our polarized politics lie not only in the postures of political elites--such as contestants appealing tothe staunchly liberal or conservative partisans in nominating primaries and caucuses, delegates attending party conventions, politicianselected to Congress in safely liberal or conservative states or districts, and so forth. Polarization now also runs quite deep within themass electorate. There, Democratic and Republican voters remain very much at odds on a significant range ofquestionseverything from how leniently to treat undocumented immigrants to what Americas role in the world should be.

    2

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    3/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Bipartisanship Key to Pass

    Bipartisanship key to overcome presidential vetoes

    Ornstein 5/14Norman J. Ornstein, Scholar at American Enterprise Institute, A Week of Activity Can't Mask the Hard Feelings in Congresshttp://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.27994,filter.all/pub_detail.asp, Wednesday, May 14, 2008

    The good news is that Congress is buckling down to a full schedule of meaty, substantive issues, the most robust plannedagenda in a long time. The bad news? It will be nothing short of a miracle if we end up the weekwith anythingsignificant that is on its way to presidential signature--or if we see any signs of hope that we are emerging from the prolongedunhealthiness in our politics and policy process in Washington. The plans for action range from the long-awaited omnibus farm bill to the war funding in thesupplemental with its range of add-ons, including a new GI bill and an extension of unemployment benefits. Add to those the Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act to force states and localities to engage in collective bargaining with its police and firefighters, the flood insurance bill and the

    attempt to suspend contributions to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. This week, indeed this whole month, will be a key test in whether thepolitical process in Washington can rise above the dysfunction that has been the norm for this Congress . Last week,the House was dominated by interminable delays and protests by the minority at the majority's abuse of the regular order by bypassing the AppropriationsCommittee and process. Leave aside the irony of indignation coming from lawmakers who made a habit of bypassing the regular order on appropriations and

    elsewhere; the spectacle reflected a House as deeply divided along partisan lines as it was in the previous Congress--and a Housewith no common denominator of trying to do something to solve the problems we have at home and abroad. The problem has been exacerbated,of course, by the president. President Bush signaled after the 2006 elections that he believed that he and the newly elected Democratic Congress could

    do some business together, on immigration, education, energy and the environment, among other issues. But when his immigration plan wentdown the tubes in the Senate--driven in that direction when only 12 of 49 Republican Senators rallied behind their own president's signaturedomestic goal--the aim of significant progress on policy built around a significant working relationship withDemocrats went with it. What followed was a string of vetoes (after six years of none) and even more veto threats that bothconstipated the legislative process and gave Congressional Republicans traction to block action or at least gum up the works. It also gave CongressionalDemocrats traction to use the process any way they could to gain leverage over the president in a protracted policy war.

    3

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    4/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Divided Government Not Significant

    The legislative and executive branches are able to withstand the effects of divided government

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 221 third paragraph

    4

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    5/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    A2 Bipartisanship Key to Pass

    Just because a bill is bipartisan doesnt mean that it ensures passage

    PR Newswire US 7American Diabetes Association: Embryonic Stem Cell Research Offers Great Promise for Americans with Diabetes;ADA Urges U.S. House of Representatives to Pass Reintroduced Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act; H.R. 3 Offers Best Hope to Advance Search for aDiabetes CureLexis, January 10, 2007 Wednesday

    The American Diabetes Association (ADA) -- the nation's leading voluntary health organization supporting diabetes research, information and advocacy --today urged the U.S. House of Representatives to pass the Stem Cell Research Enhancement Act (H.R. 3). The ADA is astrong supporter of the legislation, which would accelerate stem cell research by easing existing restrictions and supporting research that uses embryonic

    stem cells, while maintaining strict ethical guidelines. Congress passed the legislation last year with bipartisan support, but wasunable to overcome President Bush's veto. A vote on the reintroduced legislation is expected in the House of Representatives on Thursday.

    5

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    6/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Bipartisanship Turn Ignores Presidential Agenda

    Organized bipartisanship in Congress leads to Congressional agenda but not presidential agenda

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 4 last paragraph through pg 5 last paragraph

    6

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    7/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Bipartisanship Turn Ignores Presidential Agenda

    Organized congressional consensus ignores presidential agenda

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 8 last paragraph through pg 9 third paragraph

    7

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    8/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Bipartisanship Turn Ignores Presidential Agenda

    Strong unification in congress ignores the presidential agenda very hard for president to build

    political resources after congressional majority shifts

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 12 second paragraph through third paragraph

    8

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    9/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Bipartisanship Turn Ignore Presidential Agenda

    Political methods today have led to Congress controlling the agenda majorities ignore the

    presidential agenda and support theirs instead

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 214 third paragraph through pg 215 first paragraph

    9

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    10/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Lame Duck No Push

    Lame ducks cant push policies

    The Sunday Telegraph (London) 7Allies desert 'lame duck president' Unable to pass domestic policy and with his hands tied abroad, Bush can achieve no more, say his former aidesLexis, April 8, 2007 Sunday

    Mr Nuzzo branded Mr Bush a "lame duck'' who had forfeited the support of senior Republicans. They spoke out after a week inwhich a former member ofMrBush's inner circle launched a withering description of how the president had"become more secluded and bubbled-in'' with a shrinking band of loyalists. Matthew Dowd, the chief strategist of the 2004 re-election campaign, said that Mr Bush had lost his once fabled "gut-level bond with the American people'' and called for him to respond to a growing publicdesire to pull out of Iraq. The sense of a presidency unravelling was reinforced last week when it was revealed that several of Mr Bush's key aides were todepart the White House, including deputy national security adviser, Meghan O'Sullivan, the architect of the surge strategy to boost troop numbers in Iraq,and Peter Wehner, a strategic thinker who sold Mr Bush's ideas to the power players in Washington. Mr Frum said: "The Bush White House has always beena strong band of brothers. But the same things that bring your triumphs also bring your tragedy. There is little difference of views. If you're wrong, it's hard

    to change direction.'' Domestically, MrBush is seen to have failed on two pressing issues. His plan to overhaul social securitypolicy, once seen as potentially a key part of his legacy, is stillborn, and he is at odds with his own party over plans to relax immigration rules.The root cause of his weakness is the Democrats' seizure of both the Senate and House of Representatives in

    November's mid-term elections.Without sufficient support to push legislation through Congress, the president wasfinished, said Mr Frum. "There's no domestic agenda,'' he said. "There's no possibility at all of the president advancing

    anything that is acceptable to both the Republicans and Democrats.'' Mr Nuzzo, who served as policy director for George Bush,added: "He's a lame duck. Any affirmative domestic policy is at an end. Republicans have lost patience with theBush administration. At this point the only parts of the presidential office he can fulfill are those that do not requirecooperation with the legislative branch - which means foreign policy.''

    10

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    11/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Lame Ducks = Advantage

    Lame ducks have an advantage they can force Congress to have to override their veto

    Christian Science Monitor 7Bush's lame-duck advantageLexis, April 27, 2007, Friday

    As his term winds down in disarray, President Bush enjoys what could be called the lame-duck advantage: Hedoesn't have to worry about losing at the polls. He has devoted little attention after the Virginia Tech massacre to issues such as campussafety and gun control, except to reiterate support for gun ownership. He has left it to the Democrats to take on the gunproblems thatusually divide Congress. Senate majority leader Harry Reid says, "I hope there's not a rush to do anything. We need to take a deep breath." Earlierin his administration, Mr. Bush might have by now accepted the resignation of Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, a liability for the administration. But

    these days, Bush is playing the "loyalty card" all the way. After Mr. Gonzales's disastrous appearance before the Senate JudiciaryCommittee last week, Bush said he has more confidence than ever in his beleaguered attorney general. For Democrats, themost ticklish situation has become the $124 billion emergency spending bill for Iraq and Afghanistan. With growing sentiment for ending military

    involvement, the Democrats are looking for some compromise with the White House: a timetable, benchmarks; the latest being advisory opinion. TheWhite House, less concerned about losing votes in the next election, is sticking to its guns (almost literally). Thelegislation passed by Congress this week - with its Iraq withdrawal schedule - is certain to be met with a presidentialveto. And, since he is less concerned about voters, Mr. Bush apparently feels he can afford a veto, which is not likely to

    be overridden anyway.

    Lame Duck does not mean the President is powerless

    The Hotline 7BUSH; MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHINGLexis, July 27, 2007 Friday

    National Journal's Cannon looks at whether or not Bush can be considered a lame duck, noting that Bush "is not extinct, but his troubles aremanifest." GMU prof. James Pfiffner: "President Bush may be a lame duck politically, but he is not a lame duck as chiefexecutive and will lose many of his powers only" upon leaving office; "He is still head of the executive branch andcommander-in-chief, and has many unilateral powers that he can -- and has -- used." But "it's indisputable that Bush'sinfluence has waned, both inside and outside his political party." Many will try to point a specific date at which Bush became a lame duck, but "it couldsimply be that Bush's ability to drive great events was compromised many months before the storm," when he was sworn in for a 2nd term. "The 22nd

    Amendment introduced a systematic weakness to the highest office in the land."

    11

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    12/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Lame Duck Destroy Party

    Lame ducks are destructive to their party

    The Advertiser (Australia) 6A lame duck in the White HouseLexis, November 10, 2006 Friday

    IT IS concerning that at a time of world tension on many fronts, the United States congressional elections have left President George W. Bushpublicly humiliated and politically shackled. His authority, both in the United States and the world, has been diminished. He has become aRepublican lame duck in the White House. Although President Bush will remain in the White House until the 2008 elections, in the turn ofa page in history, his Republican Party has lost control of the House of Representatives, the Senate and , presumably, theconfidence of the American people. He has responded by accepting the resignation of Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld but a scapegoat ishardly likely to neutralise the mounting disenchantment in the United States over the long-term military engagement in Iraq. The Democrats mustuse their new-found congressional potency conservatively and responsibly. They have the power to veto anylegislative initiatives. That path would be foolish and destructive. It will be more dangerous for the Republicans, and morebeneficial to the Democrats, to let the administration govern with only limited constraints.

    12

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    13/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Lame Duck No Vetoes

    Lame Ducks issue empty veto threats

    Riechmann 7Deb, Associated Press Writer, Bush pushes agenda without CongressAugust 16, 2007 Thursday 7:32 PM GMT

    With 17 months left in office, Bush has veto power and an arsenal of other executive powers to change policy. But hiscritics say he moved across a symbolic line toward lame duck status on Monday when his longtime political adviser, Karl Rove,announced he was leaving the latest in a growing line of senior officials to head for the door in the closing months of the administration. Rove said there wasunfinished business on energy, education and health care that the president would continue to pursue, with or without Congress' help. Rove said theadministration might end up doing things by executive action. "We have No Child Left Behind, which we can either do by law or regulation; we want to do it

    by law," Rove said. "The energy, 20-in-10 we can do both by legislation and regulation." The Democratic Congress is going to be challenging Bush everystep of the way on his agenda, the budget and particularly the war in Iraq as he runs out of time and influence and 2008 elections overshadow him. JohnPodesta, former White House chief of staff for President Clinton, said Bush is "running into a brick wall in Congress" and will be forced to use executiveaction to further his domestic policy desires. "Hardly a bill goes by that he doesn't issue a veto threat," Podesta said. "The places where he could find

    common ground, he's in a `Just say no' mode. I find that kind of surprising given the place he's at in his presidency." White House advisersblame the Democratic Congress for some inaction on the president's agenda, although it was Bush's fellowRepublicans who helped sink his immigration bill. The White House says Bush still has clout in Congress and points to recent legislativesuccesses: signing a bill to implement many remaining recommendations of the Sept. 11 Commission and getting temporary authority to expand thegovernment's ability to eavesdrop without warrants on communications that pass through the United States.

    13

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    14/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Political Capital Key to Agenda

    Political Capital key to push agenda

    USA TODAY 7Bush's job-approval rating stuck below 40%; Only Nixon, Truman had longer slumpsLexis, April 9, 2007 Monday

    Bush's job-approval rating in a USA TODAY/Gallup Poll taken Monday through Thursday is 38%. His standing has stayed below 40% for seven consecutive

    months. Since the advent of modern polling, only two presidents have suffered longer strings of such low ratings. One was HarryTruman, whose popularity sank during the final 26 months of his tenure as the Korean War stalemated. The other was Richard Nixon during the 13 months

    leading up to his resignation amid the Watergate scandal. "It's pretty hard for a president to get ratings this low in general, and thento be in the position where you basically don't budge -- that's been reserved for some of the least popularpresidents during the worst times of the last 60 years," says Jeffrey Jones of the Gallup Poll, who analyzed the historic data. White Housespokeswoman Dana Perino said Bush pays little attention to polls and is "laser-focused" on such issues as fighting terrorism and reforming immigration. "Ifwe're reviewing consecutive streaks, one of the most impressive is our 60-plus months of economic growth and 42 months of job creation," she said. "Look,we're aware of the polls," Perino said. "We realize the war is unpopular and that people wanted to see a change. That's why the president announced a new

    strategy in Iraq and Gen. (David) Petraeus is starting to implement it." Faltering public support drains a president's political capitaland makes it more difficult for him to persuade others to follow his lead -- for instance, to support embattled Attorney GeneralAlberto Gonzales or pass an Iraq spending bill without restrictions.

    Political capital key to agenda

    The Daily Telegraph (London) 6How president's 'political capital' has slipped awayLexis, November 8, 2006 Wednesday

    MrBush also took on his own party, this time on immigration reform. His business-friendly proposal for a guest-worker programme divided Republicansin Congress, many of whom insisted upon tougher enforcement and the construction of a fence along the Mexican border. The failure to achieve hisgoals on either of the two biggest domestic policy issues of his second term drained strength from his presidencyand undermined confidence that he could control the agenda and spend the political capital he had trumpeted.

    14

    http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4187408363&returnToId=20_T4187411609&csi=8213&A=0.5579780393796756&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=Richard%20Nixon%20&indexType=Phttp://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4187408363&returnToId=20_T4187411609&csi=8213&A=0.5579780393796756&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=Richard%20Nixon%20&indexType=Phttp://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4187408363&returnToId=20_T4187411609&csi=8213&A=0.5579780393796756&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=Richard%20Nixon%20&indexType=P
  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    15/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Presidential Leadership Key to Agenda

    Divided government frequently hits a roadblock where the only way for presidents to pass their

    policies is through cooperation with Congress

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 39 second paragraph through pg 40 first paragraph

    15

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    16/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Presidential Leadership Key to Agenda

    Presidential leadership in Congress is key to ensure legislation and the agenda

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 216 second paragraph through third paragraph

    16

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    17/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    A2 Bush Takes Blame

    Politicians avoid getting the blame rather avoid potential blame than take credit

    Weaver 86Kent, a professor at the Public Policy Institute at Georgetown University The Politics of Blame AvoidanceJournal of Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Oct. - Dec., 1986), pp. 371-398

    Politicians are motivated primarily by the desire to avoid blame for unpopular actions rather than by seeking toclaim credit for popular ones. This results from voters' 'negativity bias': their tendency to be more sensitive to real or potentiallosses than they are to gains. Incentives to avoid blame lead politicians to adopt a distinctive set of political strategies,including agenda limitation, scapegoating, 'passing the buck' and defection (jumping on the bandwagon') that are different than those theywould follow if they were primarily interested in pursuing good policy or maximizing credit-claimingopportunities. These strategies in turn lead to important policy effects, including a surrender of discretion even when it offers important credit-claimingopportunities.

    Policymakers have increased needs to avoid taking blame

    Weaver 86Kent, a professor at the Public Policy Institute at Georgetown University The Politics of Blame AvoidanceJournal of Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Oct. - Dec., 1986), pp. 371-398

    Fiscal stress has given politics an increasingly zero-sum cast. Programs are forced to compete in the political marketplace for funds.Budget deficits have also increased the involvement of budget guardians (notably the Office of Management and Budget andcongressional Budget commit- tees) in public policymaking. These developments have undercut the ability of clientele and policyspecialists to keep decision-making within a narrow (and favorable)policy subsystem, and have forced politicians toengage in more loss-allocating activities. Incentives for blame avoidance have also increased in recent yearsby thedecline of party as a determinant of electoral behavior. Incumbent legislators have responded to party decline '[b]y developing areputation with a minimal amount of partisan or ideological content, . . . induc[ing] constituents to evaluate them separately from the state of the nation and

    the performance of parties and administrations' (Ferejohn and Fiorina, I985: 94-95). In this situation, voters are likely to continue returningthe incumbent unless they are given a reason not to. Legislators know it, and their potential opponents know it.Thus legislators must be concerned primarily with avoiding giving their opponents a popular election issue. Butchallengers have been given new tools as well. In particular, the ability of television advertising to present quick, simple negativeimages in voters' minds can undermine confidence in the incumbent, reinforcing legislators' reluctance to voteagainst positions likely to appeal to poorly informed constituencies.

    17

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    18/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    President Gets Credit/Avoids Blame

    Decisions by policymakers are based around accepting credit or avoiding blame

    Weaver 86Kent, a professor at the Public Policy Institute at Georgetown University The Politics of Blame AvoidanceJournal of Public Policy, Vol. 6, No. 4, (Oct. - Dec., 1986), pp. 371-398

    GENERATING AND AVOIDING BLAME: Policymakers' motivations are not determined entirely by thedistribution of costs and benefits among their constituents. They are also determined by the way choices are structured (Riker, I986).If, for example, alternatives which place policymakers' and constituents' interests in direct conflict can be kept off theagenda, policymakers may be able to reduce blame-avoiding behavior. On the other hand, the importance of blame-avoiding motivations among policymakers can provide an important boost to those with opposing views. Themotives of those opponents may be based on their own notions of good policy or desire to claim credit with theirown political constituencies rather than upon blame avoidance. Nor is it necessary that a majority of policymakers (legislators, forexample) have strong blame-avoiding motivations for there to be a substantial impact on public policy: it is enough that blame-avoiders hold the balance of

    power in decision-making. If sponsors of 'hard to vote against' legislation such as Congressional pay freezes and Social Security benefit increases can forcethe issue onto the agenda and shape it in such a way that it activates blame-generating pressures, they can use others' fears of electoral retribution to force

    blame-avoiders to support their own proposals.

    President will receive credit

    18

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    19/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Presidents Get Blame/Credit Agencies

    The President will take the credit or blame for agency actions

    19

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    20/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Blame Game Conflicting Agenda

    Blame games occur when Bush and Congress have conflicting agendas

    Gilmour 1John B. Department of Government College of William & Mary, Sequential Veto Bargaining and Blame Game Politics as Explanations of PresidentialVetoeshttp://jbgilm.people.wm.edu/veto.pdf

    Until recently there has been little scholarly consideration of why presidential vetoes occur, perhaps because the answer seemedobvious. Vetoes occur, one might reasonably conclude, because Congress passes bills the president does not want to become law. Passage ofoffensive legislation is undeniably the root cause of vetoes, but that explanation is incomplete. It begs the question of why Congress

    passes bills that the president will veto even though the president is in frequent communication with Congress about whether he will veto proposed bills.Given the ample communication between branches, it is surprising that differences cannot be resolved without a veto. Vetoes represent bargaining failures,and the cause of these failures requires explanation. There are currently two well-developed, contradictory theories explaining why presidential vetoes occur.

    A blame-game theory holds that vetoes occur because Congress deliberately provokes them by passing bills thatthe president detests, knowing they will be vetoed. The sequential veto bargaining theory holds that vetoes occur because Congress lacks completeinformation about what bills the president will sign, and sends the president bills unsure of whether they will be vetoed. This paper tests these alternative

    explanations and finds thatblame game politics accounts for far more vetoes than incomplete information.

    20

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    21/33

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    22/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    A2 Concessions Key to Agenda

    Concessions wont work Democrats are skeptical

    The New York Times 7Democrats Face Limits In Reshaping Bush BudgetLexis, February 6, 2007 Tuesday

    One development could reopen the tax cuts to revision this year, Democrats say: a signal from the administration that it would bewilling to consider a repeal of some cuts for the wealthiest as part of a deal to pay for other priorities. The issues mostoften mentioned that might entice Democrats to the bargaining table with the administration would be a package to finance future Social Security benefits,

    possibly combined with a curb on some benefits. Democrats might also want to cut a deal over the alternative minimum tax, which was devised to make surethat wealthy taxpayers with numerous deductions paid some taxes but which is increasingly ensnaring the middle class because of inflation. Democrats say

    that in both cases the administration would have to move first to put discussion of taxes on the table. Both Treasury Secretary Henry M.Paulson Jr. and Rob Portman, director of the Office of Management and Budget, have dropped hints of such deals, ruling out ''preconditions'' for talks onSocial Security. The implication is that private investment accounts to replace Social Security for future retirees are not a requirement for a deal. ''By sayingthere are no preconditions and we should all come to the table, that was a change in position,'' Mr. Portman told reporters Monday, noting that in the past the

    administration had pushed its plan for the investment accounts from the outset. He also said it was an ''olive branch'' to propose theaccounts but to delay their enactment until 2012. Democrats remain skeptical and distrustful. They note, for instance, a recentcomment by Vice President Dick Cheney to Fox News that overtures by Mr. Paulson and Mr. Portman did not signal a change in administration attitudes on

    taxes, only a desire to get Democrats to negotiate. Moreover, despite Mr. Portman's talk of olive branches, Democrats see onlytrapdoors. They say Mr. Bush's claim to reach the goal of balancing the budget by 2012 rested on what they see as shaky assumptions.

    22

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    23/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Public Support Key to Agenda

    Public support key for Bush to push policies

    USA TODAY 7'Lightning rod' reshaped politicsLexis, August 17, 2007 Friday

    The Wall Street Journal, in an editorial: "The events ofSeptember 11 and Iraq have made this predominantly a war presidency, and that fact has alsocolored Rove's record for better or worse. For the better, itprovided the political capital to retake the Senate in 2002, pass theBush tax cuts that spurred the economy, and frame the Bush Doctrine. ... For the worse, the trouble in Iraq sapped Bush'spublic support early in his second term and diminished his ability to pass major domestic reform. ... Rove is no Merlin orRasputin. ... He is above all a George Bush man. His rare mastery of history, demographics and policy made him a formidable political force, and we suspectit is his success far more than his methods that infuriates his critics."

    Public support is key to the presidents agenda

    CNN 53-29, Lexis

    KING: The president won that election, Dana, but he is in the middle of another campaign to get his domestic agenda, principally Social Security, through

    the Congress. They cannot be happy at the White House about the timing of this. Are they worried? BASH: Well, certainly they understand here that thepresident's credibility and that hispublic support is really crucial to getting his domestic agenda passed, primarily SocialSecurity. And they do understand that his poll numbers, as we've been reporting over the past several days, have -- they have been going down.

    23

    http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4173548238&returnToId=20_T4173552105&csi=8213&A=0.2825158556570956&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=George%20Bush%20&indexType=Phttp://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4173548238&returnToId=20_T4173552105&csi=8213&A=0.2825158556570956&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=George%20Bush%20&indexType=P
  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    24/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Party Control Key to Agenda

    Party control is key to ensure legislative success for president divided government poses unique

    challenges

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 217 second paragraph through pg 218 first paragraph

    24

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    25/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    GOP Base Key

    GOP base key to the agenda

    Chaddock 7Gail Russell, Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor, Bush tries to win back GOP lawmakersJune 14, 2007

    ForPresident Bush to pull off a legacy in the final 19 months of his presidency, he needs to shore up supportwithin GOP ranks on Capitol Hill, especially among those who will face voters in 2008. From immigration and the Iraq war to embryonic stem-cellresearch and hirings and firings at the Justice Department, Republican lawmakers are increasingly breaking with the president onkey votes - and the defections are coming from many who were once his staunchest supporters. Thirty-eight Senate Republicans voted against movingahead on immigration reform last week, sidelining Mr. Bush's top domestic priority. Then, on Monday, seven Republicans - five of them up for reelection in2008 - joined all Senate Democrats in a vote of no confidence in Attorney General Alberto Gonzales. But the most searing intraparty rows could come inearly September, when Congress plans a close look at progress in the war in Iraq. "If President Bush had been a more popular president running a moreeffective war in Iraq, Republicans would still be in the majority, and that's how many of them still look at it," says Jennifer Duffy, senior analyst with theCook Political Report. Until Republicans lost control of the House and Senate in the midterm election in November, Bush sustained a level of support from

    his own party that his father and President Ronald Reagan seldom approached. Senate Republicans have backed Bush on key votes about85 percent of the time during his presidency, according to a January survey by Congressional Quarterly. But the Iraq war and, most recently,the president's support for comprehensive immigration reform have eroded Bush's standing with his Republican base and emboldened Republican lawmakers

    on Capitol Hill to go their own way. "The problem for the president is that the coalition of ... Republicans who are alienated

    and opposing him shifts from issue to issue, so it requires different responses and palliatives," says Ross Baker, a politicalscientist at Rutgers University in New Brunswick, N.J. GOP senators who are straying

    25

    http://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4221536261&returnToId=20_T4221543470&csi=7945&A=0.280728981150146&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=President%20Bush%20&indexType=Phttp://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4221536261&returnToId=20_T4221543470&csi=7945&A=0.280728981150146&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=President%20Bush%20&indexType=Phttp://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4221536261&returnToId=20_T4221543470&csi=7945&A=0.280728981150146&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=President%20Bush%20&indexType=Phttp://www.lexisnexis.com/us/lnacademic/search/XMLCrossLinkSearch.do?bct=A&risb=21_T4221536261&returnToId=20_T4221543470&csi=7945&A=0.280728981150146&sourceCSI=9369&indexTerm=%23PE0009XP1%23&searchTerm=President%20Bush%20&indexType=P
  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    26/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Presidents Control Agenda

    Presidents control the agenda setting

    26

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    27/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Winners Win

    Presidents can use wins to create momentum

    Ornstein 4Norman, scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, ACT TWO: FOR BUSH, NO CAKEWALK IN CONGRESSLexis, November 14

    There are other ways the president could begin his second term. Perhaps he'll be able to start with some issues that are left overfromhis first term, such as medical malpractice reform and his comprehensive energy bill, using his political capital to ram them through, andthen using the capital replenished by those victories to build momentum until he's ready to fight the larger battles on SocialSecurity and taxes.

    Political capital decreases if not used it helps regenerate itself when used

    Ornstein 2Norman Ornstein, scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, What cards should Bush play?Lexis, January 28, 2002

    That lesson is as clear now as it was then: Political capital is perishable. You use it oryou lose it. It is a lesson Bush junior has mentionedhimself, and one his political advisers, Karl Rove, refers to often. Bush now has an approval rating in the mid-80s, a bit lower than at his peak, but still

    stratospheric. He has erased any serious doubts about his qualifications to serve, or the legitimacy of his victory. He has as much political capital in thebank as there is gold in Fort Knox. So what does he use it for? A string ofdomestic issues are possibilities, but economic stimulus sits atop the heap.If he uses hispolitical capital skillfully, he will first help Americans, many of whom are hurting as a result of the recession, and he will getmore political capital back in return.

    27

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    28/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Lobbyists Key to Agenda

    Lobby groups are extremely prevalent in government

    28

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    29/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    A2 Lobbyists Key

    Lobbyists no longer have an influence in government anti-corruption bill limits their influence

    The Philadelphia Inquirer 7Extreme makeover, Congress editionLexis, January 23, 2007

    The U.S. Senate has approved one of the strongest anti-corruption bills in a generation to crack down on cozinessbetween lobbyists and lawmakers. Showing an unusual level of bipartisan cooperation, senators agreed to shed more light on their fund-raisingpractices. They even committed to paying a more honest fare when lobbyists fly them hither and yon on corporate jets. It's rare that lawmakerstake such concrete steps to limit the corrupting influences that protect their incumbency. The House, which earlieradopted new ethics rules but must now match the Senate's stricter lobbying guidelines, should make sure Congress doesn't lose momentum in thisneeded effort. Then House-Senate negotiators should send completed legislation to the president as soon as possible.

    29

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    30/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Filibuster Not Prevent Pass

    Filibusters dont obstruct Senate business constructed approach to them

    Ornstein 3Norman J. Ornstein, Scholar at American Enterprise Institute, The Debate to End All Debatehttp://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.17199/pub_detail.asp , Wednesday, May 14, 2003

    Attempts to change the Senate's filibuster rule rarely succeed, partly because the attempts themselves arevulnerable to filibuster. In 1975, Senator Walter Mondale, with assistance from Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, proposed that Rule 22 be revised

    by a simple majority vote, with the move to change the rules itself not subject to filibuster. The result was even more extended debate, followed by bitternessand recriminations; eventually the vice president apologized to the Senate. Four years later, as vice president, Mr. Mondale discussed ruling that the Senatewas not a continuing body from one election to the next and thus could write its rules afresh--with no filibuster. Fearing the fallout, he wisely dropped the

    idea. While filibusters have long been a major weapon for senators and parties, their use has changed over the past40 years. For most of its history, the filibuster resembled the one depicted in Mr. Smith Goes to Washington: one ormore senators would take to the floor and debate around the clock to block action on something about which theyfelt deeply. Of course, these filibusters were inconvenient to the Senate and interfered with the rest of the legislative calendar. So in1961, Senate leaders adopted a two-track approach, allowing other business to go on while a filibuster took place,avoiding the cots-in-the-hall drama and pain of the old-fashioned filibuster. Instead, there would be periodic votes to see if the three-fifths quota could be

    reached. This had the effect of making filibusters almost routine. Filibusters now happen all the time, but basicallychange nothing about Senate business--except to raise the bar for passage from 51 votes to 60. This is wrongheaded and unfortunate. For mostissues, a sliding scale of cloture votes, to allow for extended debate but also force eventual votes, makes sense. (For significant and highly charged issues--including judicial nominations--the traditional 24-hour filibuster process still should apply.) Dr. Frist has proposed something similar for all presidentialnominations. But reform should proceed in a straightforward fashion under existing rules.

    30

    http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.17199/pub_detail.asphttp://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.17199/pub_detail.asphttp://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.17199/pub_detail.asp
  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    31/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Income President Need Party Unity

    Difficult conditions for incoming presidents collapse their legislative leadership empirically

    proven

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 192 last paragraph through pg 193 second paragraph

    31

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    32/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Coattails Key President Agenda

    Coattails ensure presidential success in Congress

    Conley 3Richard S., Assistant prof. of political science @ University of Florida, The Presidency, Congress and Divided Government

    pg 17 second paragraph

    32

  • 8/14/2019 BHR Politics Internals

    33/33

    HBR SDI 08 Politics Internals

    Vetoes Need Political Support

    Vetoes mean nothing without political support

    Abramowitz and Kane 6/16Michael and Paul, Washington Post Staff Writers, Congress Easily Overrides Medicare Vetohttp://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/07/15/AR2008071501361_pf.html, Wednesday, July 16, 2008

    President Bush sought to block a bill yesterday aimed at forestalling an 11 percent cut in payments to doctors taking care of Medicare patients,but Congress quickly overrode his veto. The House voted 383 to 41 to override the veto, while the Senate voted 70 to 26, in both casesfar more than the two-thirds necessary to block the president's action. With organized medicine and other lobbiespromoting the popular measure in an election year, Republicans broke heavily from the White House. A total of 153House Republicans voted to defy the White House, 24 more than in a June 24 vote that started the momentum toward passage of the Medicare doctors' bill

    yesterday. Twenty-one Senate Republicans voted for the bill this time, including four senators who had voted "nay" in thetwo previous Medicare votes. The Medicare bill is the third, along with the recent farm bill and a water resources bill, to become law despite Bush's veto.

    Overall, Bush has vetoed 12 pieces of legislation during his presidency, At issue in this bill was how the government should respondto a planned reduction in Medicare doctors' fees, mandated by a formula that requires the cuts if certain spending targets are not reached. Under the formula,a 10.6 percent cut in fees for doctors was supposed to go into effect July 1, but Congress overwhelmingly voted instead to reduce the reimbursement toinsurance companies that serve Medicare beneficiaries under its managed-care program. Those reductions would allow the postponement of the pay cut todoctors for 18 months, but would cost the insurers $14 billion over five years.