bibhu prasad routray · 2016. 5. 3. · southeast asia in 2015ipcs forecasts naxal violence in 2015...

IPCS Forecasts

Naxal Violence in 2015 Naxal Might and Ideology I Enclaves of Strength I The Maoist Expansion I

Combating Naxal Violence I A Strategy for the Government

Bibhu Prasad Routray

IPCS Special Report # 173 January 2015

IPCS Forecasts 2015 I Special Report #173, January 2015

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About the Author

Bibhu Prasad Routray

Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray is an

independent security analyst

and a Visiting Fellow at the

IPCS.

He writes a column for the IPCS titled Red Affairs.

See http://www.ipcs.org/columnist/bibhu‐prasad/

This report is an updated and compiled version of

his earlier commentaries for his column during

2014.

© IPCS, 2015

B 7/3 Lower Ground Floor

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Cover Photo Credit:

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CONTENTS Section‐I Naxal Violence in 2015: A Forecast

Continuing Decline

Persisting Weaknesses

Morale Boosting Assaults

Enclaves of Strength

Southern Expansion

Section‐II 2014: A Review

Naxal Might and Ideology

The Maoist Expansion

Combating Naxal Violence

A Strategy for the Government

Southeast Asia in 2015

IPCS Forecasts

Naxal Violence in 2015 Bibhu Prasad Routray

VisitingFellowIPCS

LeftwingExtremismin2015:AForecastAt the onset of 2015, left‐wing extremism (LWE) in India under the aegis of the CommunistPartyof India‐Maoist (CPI‐Maoist) is confrontedwithachoiceofeithercoming to termswiththe realities of itsweakness and revisit the strategy of sustaining a protractedwarwith thestate; or continuingwith carrying out periodic attacks on the security forces and other stateprotagonistswiththelong‐termaimofresurrectingitselfyetagaininthecomingyears.Although thepast few years have reinforced thenotion that CPI‐Maoist has ceased to be theforceitusedtobe,thereislittlehopethatin2015,theoutfitwouldhaltpursuingitsstrategyofcarryingoutintermittentraidsaswellasexpandingintonewerareas.Howthestaterespondstothischallengeviaitsreformulatedstrategywouldbesomethingtowatchoutfor.ContinuingDeclineIn 2014, the trend of declining fatalities in LWE‐related violence continued. According toprovisionaldata,only314fatalitieswereregistered,whichisthelowestsincetheformationofthe CPI‐Maoist in 2004. While Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand account 67 per cent of thesefatalities, Odisha, Maharashtra and Bihar are the other states that reported the remainingfatalities.TheCPI‐Maoist,whichoncewieldedinfluenceoveralmostone‐thirdofthecountry'sgeographicalexpanse,nowoperateswithaconstrainedpresenceinthesefivestates.AsuddenexpansionintheCPI‐Maoist'sareaofoperationisunlikelyin2015.Theoutfitwouldmostlybeinvolvedinguardingitsremaininginfluenceinthesestates.PersistingWeaknessAffectedbysurrenders,killingsandarrestsofa largenumbersof itscadres, theCPI‐Maoist isclearly on a back foot, necessitating a phase of tactical retreat when the outfit rebuilds itsstrength.Amongthemanydenominatorsthatpointatthestate'stighteninggripoverLWEistheformer'sabilitytocarryoutlargelypeacefulelectionsinvariousstates.JharkhandwentforanassemblyelectionsinNovemberandDecember2014.Additionally,theCPI‐Maoistlargelyfailedto carry out its threats of disrupting the poll; the over 66 per cent voter turnout – a recordpercentage in the state –demonstrateda growingpopular confidence in theState's ability toprovidesecurity.Astablegovernment,nowarealityinstate,hasanopportunityofheraldinganeraofdecisiveactionagainsttheextremists.Morale‐boostingAssaultsTheoperationalweaknessoftheCPI‐Maoist,however,hasnotcurtaileditsabilitytocarryoutperiodicattacksresultinginhighcasualtyamongthesecurityforces.Infact,suchattackswould


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remain part of the CPI‐Maoist's continuing attempt of seeking relevance, rebuilding itsorganisationalstrength,andinflictingsetbacksonthesecurityforces.Thefactthatthesecurityforces ineachof theLWE‐affectedtheatrescontinueto face issuesofcoordination, leadershipanddirection,wouldaidtheextremistefforts.Successfulattackssuchastheonethatresultedinthekillingof14CentralReservePoliceForce(CRPF)personnelinChhattisgarh’sSukmadistricton1December2014,hasalreadyledtoadefensivemindsetamongtheforces,withtheCRPFheadquarters insistingthatallmajoroperationsagainsttheextremistsmustbeclearedbythetopbrassoftheorganisation.Inviewofthis,thehighlypublicisedanti‐extremistsecurityforceoperations launched in Jharkhand in January 2015 may not result in its intended results ofwipingoutextremism.EnclavesofStrengthNewDelhi has assured the affected states of support in dealingwith LWE. However, for thestates,emergingfromaneraofoverwhelmingdependenceonthecentralforceshasprovedtobe difficult. Progress in enabling its own police forces to take a lead role in counteringextremism has remained a non‐starter. This is apparent in the significant level of popularcompliancetotheCPI‐Maoist'speriodiccalls forshutdowninvariousstates.Evenasthestatemakesadvanceestablishingitswritoverhithertoextremism‐affectedareas,severalenclavesofextremist domination, especially in states like Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Odisha wouldcontinuetomocktheofficialclaimsofsuccess.MissingBureaucracyResurrecting governance over the erstwhile Maoist‐dominated areas has proved to be NewDelhi'sAchillesHeel.Asofthebeginningof2015,theIndianMinistryofHomeAffairsispushingthe state governments to appoint "officers with zeal" as district magistrates andsuperintendents of police in the extremism‐affected districts. Even as the security forcesregistersomesuccessesinendingextremistdominationoverselectareas,bureaucraticinertiainkick‐startinggovernancehasremainedoneoftheprimaryhindrancesincementingsuccess.Government functionaries are either reluctant to function in such hazardous zones or areindulging in rampant corruption exploiting the lack of accountability a conflict situationprovides. The attempt to inculcate "zeal" among functionaries, both in the higher and lowerlevelsofbureaucracyislikelytobeatoughoneforthestategovernments.SouthernExpansionOne of the less highlighted aspects of the CPI‐Maoist's activities in 2014 was its foray intoKerala. With a handful of incidents involving attacks on a forest department office and anoutpost, and KFC andMcDonald’s outlets, theMaoists have announced their presence in thesouthernstate.WhileexpansionintonewareasremainsanavowedobjectiveoftheCPI‐Maoistexploitingfertilegrounds,thedividedofficialresponsehashelpedtheoutfitgainstrengthandsympathisers. Amid the Kerala police's steps to deal with the emerging threat, a seniorgovernment functionary has called for a stop to the hunt and has praised the Maoists for"energising the government machinery in tribal areas." The CPI‐Maoist would continue itsattempts tospread itsactivities intonewareas in2015.Sansanationalconsensusondealingwiththethreat,someoftheseareaswouldlapseintonewhuntinggroundsfortheextremists.


2014:AReviewI

TheNaxalMightandIdeologyNaxalitesandtheMightofaFragileRevolution1

Onthemorningof18October2014,ShivKumar,apersonnelbelongingtotheChhattisgarhArmedPolicewaspulledoutofapassengerbusinSukmadistrictbyagroupofCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist(CPI‐Maoist)cadresandkilled.Kumarwasillandwasonhiswaytothehospitalwhenthebushehadboardedwaswaylaidbyextremists.Onthepreviousday,RaghunathKisku,FounderMember,NagarikSurakshaSamity(NSS),ananti‐Maoistorganisation,waskilledbyMaoistsinGhatshilasub‐divisionofJharkhand'sEastSinghbhumdistrict.

Kumarwasthe69thsecurityforcepersonnelandKisku,the164thcivilian,tobekilledbyMaoistsin2014.OtheractivitiesperpetratedbytheMaoiststill15Septemberinclude125attacksonthepolice;40occasionsofsnatchingofweaponsfromthesecurityforces;andholdingof25armstrainingcampsand46janadalatsinareasundertheirinfluence.Whiletheoccurrencesoflargerattackshavesubstantiallydecreased,thenumbersofextremism‐relatedincidentsroughlyremainthesamecomparedtothecorrespondingperiodin2013–indicatingthecontinuationofthechallenge.

AndyetitisahardtimefortheMaoists.Till15September,1129CPI‐Maoistcadreswereneutralised,including49whowerekilledinencounters,and1080cadres,arrested.Whiletheoutfitcantakepridefromthesacrificesmadebythesemenandwomen,whatcontinuestotroubleitistheperpetualdesolationcreepingintoitsranksandfiles,leadingtoalargenumberofsurrenderofitsleadersandcadres.

Amongthe395whohavesurrenderedtill30SeptemberareleaderslikeGumudavelliVenkatakrishnaPrasadaliasGudsaUsendi,Secretary,DandakaranyaSpecialZonalCommittee(DKSZC),arguablytheoutfit'smostpotentmilitarydivisionbasedinBastarandhiswifeRaji;GPReddy,Member,theDKSZC,andhiswifeVattiAdime;andBhagatJadeandhiswifeVanoja.AccordingtotheChhattisgarhpolice,over140cadreshavesurrenderedbetweenJuneandSeptember2014inBastaralone,partlyduetothedisillusionwiththeoutfit'sideologyandpartlyconvincedbythepolice'smethodofhighlightingthediscriminationsufferedbythelocalChhattisgarhcadresatthehandsofthosedrawnfromAndhraPradesh.

PressstatementsoftheCPI‐Maoist,whilecondemningthesesurrendersasdemonstrationofopportunismanddesertionofthemovementbycorruptandpoliticallydegeneratedpersons,admitthattherevolutioniscurrentlyundergoingitsmostdifficultphase.TheCPI‐MaoisthasaccusedtheBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)‐ledgovernmentinNewDelhioflaunchingthethirdphaseofOperationGreenHunt,aruthlesswaraimedatannihilatingtheMaoistswhoarethe"biggestthreat"toits"pro‐reform"policies.Assertingthatithasmerelyonlyengagedina"war

1 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 20 October 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/naxalites-and-the-might-of-a-fragile-revolution-4705.html


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ofselfdefence,"theoutfithascalledfora"widespreadstruggletofightbackthethreatbyunitingalltherevolutionaryanddemocraticforces."

Itsprogressivelydecliningcapacitytoannihilateenemiessince2010–inspiteoftheabilitytopulloffsomeofthemostspectacularattacksonsecurityforcesandpoliticiansinrecentyears–hasremainedamatterofworryfortheCPI‐Maoist.Itsfailuretodisrupttheparliamentaryandstateassemblyelectionscoupledwitharegulardesertionofitscadreshasdescendedasanexistentialthreatontheoutfitthatoncecontrolledone‐thirdofthecountry'sgeographicalarea.Evenwiththepersistingbureaucraticinertiaandunimaginativesecurityforceoperations,mostoftheaffectedstateshavegainedintheirfightagainsttheextremists.

However,theoutfit'sdominationoverlargeswathesofareainChhattiagrh,OdishaandJharkhandwithsignificantpresenceinstateslikeBiharprovidesitwiththeabilitytocontinuewithitssmallambushes.Itsrecruitmentandfundraisingabilityappearstohaveshrunk.Andyet,theoutfitharpsaboutapeople'smilitia"nowinthousands"unitedbyapathyofthestateandcarefullycalibratedimageofthegovernmentbeingarepresentativeoftheexploitativeindustrialhouses.Hence,ascenarioinwhichsurrendersandkillingsoftheMaoistswouldpushtheoutfitintooblivionisremote.

TheIndianMinistryofHomeAffairs(MHA),aftermonthsofdeliberation,isnowarmedwithanewpolicytocountertheMaoists.Thepolicy,subjecttocabinetapproval,wouldremainopentouse"anyelementofnationalpower"againsttheextremists.Althoughitdoesnotruleoutpeacetalkswiththeextremists,itmakesthepeaceprocessconditionaltotheCPI‐Maoistrenouncingviolence.Itplanstomakethestatepolicetheleadcounter‐insurgentforceagainsttheextremistswhileassigningthecentralforces,especiallytheCentralReservePoliceForce(CRPF),theresponsibilityofholdingthecounter‐insurgencygridtogether"likeaglue."Whileimpressiveinitsnuances,theapproachisguidedbythebeliefthatitispossibletowipeouttheMaoistsbyforcealone.

Theimpactofthenewofficialcounter‐Maoistpolicyremainstobeseen.However,intheclashbetweenamilitarily'down‐and‐not‐yet‐out'CPI‐Maoistandtheofficialsecurityapparatusthathasitsownsetofseriousproblems,littlemorethanpersistenceofthelogjamcanbeexpected.

SixThousandPlusKilled:TheNaxalIdeologyofViolence2

Howdoesoneanalysethekillingsof6105civiliansandsecurityforcesinincidentsrelatedtoleft‐wingextremismbetween2005and2013?

GiventhattheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist(CPI‐Maoist),sinceitsformationin2004,hasbeenresponsibleformajorityofthesekillings,conventionalanalyseshavemostlyfocusedonbigandsmallincidentsthatproducedthesevictims.Whilesuchmethodsareusefulintermsofattemptingtograspthegrowingordecliningcapacityoftheoutfit,itisalsousefultoanalysetheunceasingviolenceasupshotofanideologythathasfordecadesunderlinedthenecessitytoshedtheenemy'sbloodtobringaboutachangeinsocialandpoliticalorder.

Threeleaders–CharuMazumdar,KanuSanyalandKondapalliSeetharamaiah–dominatethediscourseonNaxalism,whichbeganinthe1960s.Mazumdar,inhis‘EightDocuments’in1965,

2 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 15 September 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-naxal/six-thousand-plus-killed-the-naxal-ideology-of-violence-4657.html


exhortedtheworkersoftheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Marxist(CPI‐M)totakeuparmedstruggleagainstthestate.Heunderlinedthatactionandnotpoliticswastheneedofthehour.SuchcallsresultedinanumberofincidentsinwhichtheCPI‐MworkersstartedseizingarmsandacquiringlandforciblyonbehalfofthepeasantsfromthebiglandholdersinDarjeeling.Theseincidentswentontoprovidethesparkforthe1967peasantuprising.

FollowingtheformationoftheAllIndiaCoordinationCommitteeofRevolutionaries(AICCR),thatemergedoutoftheCPI‐MinNovember1967andwasrenamedasAllIndiaCoordinationCommitteeofCommunistRevolutionaries(AICCCR)inMay1968,Mazumdarfurtherreiteratedhisideaofkhatamorannihilationofclassenemies.Althoughincidentsofindividualassassinationsinfluencedbykhatamresultedinrepressivestateactiontargetingthenaxalitecadres,theCommunistPartyofIndia‐Marxist‐Leninist(CPI‐ML),whichwasformedin1969breakingawayfromtheCPI‐Marxist,continuedprofessingviolenceasthekeytoolofrevolution.

WhileMazumdar'spreferenceforusingviolencetooverthrowexistingsocialorderandseizingstatepowerremainedtheCPI‐ML'smodeofoperationtill1972,acounterideologywithastressonagrarianconsolidationprecedinganarmedstrugglewasreiteratedbyKanuSanyalfollowingMazumdar'sdeath.Sanyalwasnotagainsttheideaofanarmedstruggleperse.However,heopposedMazumdar'sadvocacyoftargetedassassination.

Inthesubsequentyears,theCPI‐MLsplitintoseveralfactions.AlthoughSanyalhimselfheadedafaction,hegraduallygrewredundanttotheextremeleftmovementandcommittedsuicidein2010.Towardsthelastyearsofhislife,SanyalmaintainedthattheCPI‐Maoist'srelianceonexcessiveviolencedoesnotconformtooriginalrevolutionaryobjectivesoftheNaxalitemovement.Onmorethanoneoccasion,Sanyaldenouncedthe“wantonkillingofinnocentvillagers”.Ina2009interview,SanyalaccusedtheCPI‐MaoistofexploitingthesituationinWestBengal'sLalgarh"byusingtheAdivasisasstoogestocarryforwardtheiragendaofindividualterrorism."

InAndhraPradesh,sincethe'SpringThunder'ofSrikakulamin1970,KondapalliSeetharamaiah,wasresponsibleforthegrowthoftheNaxalitemovementundertheaegisoftheCPI‐ML.AfterleadingafactionoftheCPI‐MLandformingthePeople'sWarGroup(PWG)in1980Seetharamaiahoversawaregimeofintenseviolence,thus,earningtheoutfitthedescriptionof"thedeadliestofallNaxalgroups".EvenaftertheexpulsionofSeetharamaiahin1991,thePWGanditsfactionsremainedthesourceofextremeviolencetargetingpoliticiansandsecurityforcesinthestate.

KanuSanyal'sreluctantsupportforarmedviolencewas,thus,somewhatanaberration.PlayingdowntheimportanceofmindlessbloodshedremainedaperipheraloftheNaxalitemovement.Eachtransformationofthemovementthereafterintermsofsplits,mergers,andformationofnewidentitiesescalatedtheingrainedproclivitytouseviolenceasaninstrumentofexpansionandinfluence.TheCPI‐Maoistrepresentedanaturalprogressionofthistrend.Andasthefatalitiesdatareveal,eachpassingyear,sinceits2004formationthroughamergeroftheMaoistCommunistCentre(MCC)andthePWG,itbecamemoreandmorereliantonviolence,rationalisingthestrategyasadefensivemechanismessentialtoitsexistence.

In2009KoteshwarRaoaliasKishenji,wholedtheoutfitinWestBengaltermedtheviolenceasa"struggleforindependence".Ganapathy,theCPI‐Maoistgeneralsecretary,reiteratedinhis


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February2010interviewthattheviolenceisonlya"warofself‐defence"ora"counter‐violence"inresponsetoa"brutalmilitarycampaignunleashedbythestate".MaoistSpokespersonAzad,whowaslaterkilledincontroversialcircumstances,rejectedtheappealforabjuringviolencebythenHomeMinisterPChidambaraminApril2010indicatingthatsuchamovewouldallowthe"lawless"securityforces"continuetheirrampage".Azadalsomaintainedthatwhiletheoutfitgenerallyavoidsattackingthenon‐combatants,"theintelligenceofficialsandpoliceinformerswhocauseimmensedamagetothemovement"cannotbespared.

Thusunderstood,fewconclusionscanbedrawn,incontrasttobeliefsthatapeacefulresolutionoftheconflictcouldbepossible.Itscurrentfrailtynotwithstanding,regainingcapacitiestomaximiseviolencewouldbeapriorityfortheCPI‐Maoist.Itwillcontinuetorejectothermethodsofsocialandpoliticalchangeandmaintainanunwaveringfaithintheutilityofviolence.Evenwhilerealisingthatatotalvictoryvis‐a‐visthestateisunattainable,theoutfitwouldremainanagentofextremeviolenceinitsownspheresofinfluence.

II

TheMaoistExpansion

SurrenderofGudsaUsendi:OminousbeginningfortheNaxals?3

Beginningof2014couldnothavebeenanyworsefortheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist(CPI‐Maoist).Theoutfitlostoneofitstrustedlieutenants.On13January,spokespersonofDandakaranyaSpecialZonalCommittee,GVKPrasadaliasGudsaUsendi,whonotonlywasinchargeofissuingpressstatementsonbehalfoftheoutfit,butwasalsoresponsibleforsomeoftheitsmilitarysuccessesinChhattisgarh,surrenderedtotheAndhraPradeshpolice.Hecomplainedofillhealthanddisillusionmentwiththeoutfit'sexcessiverelianceonviolence.HewouldreceivetheRupees20lakhwhichwasthebountyonhishead.Usendi'ssurrenderwasfollowedbyfewothersurrendersoflowandmiddlerankingcadresinChhattisgarh.

TheCPI‐MaoistcameoutwithanaudiostatementtrivializingtheimpactofUsendi'ssurrender.Callinghima'traitor',a'morallyflawed'individual;criticisinghiswayswiththewomencadresandthefactthatUsendichosetoabandonhiswifeandsurrenderwithanotherwomancadre,thestatementnotedthatsuchsurrenders,whichis'notanewphenomenonfortherevolutionarymovement'wouldhavenoimpactontherevolutionthattheMaoistsarewaging.

Atonelevel,thestatementappearstobeanaturalreactionoftheoutfit,whichhassufferedfromaseriesofsplitsandsurrenders,andhasalsolostanumberofseniorleaderstoarrestsandkillingsinthepastyears.Whiledeathsandarrestsareunavoidablepartsofitsmilitarycampaign,theoutfitismostperturbedbythepossibleimpactofthepublicdenouncementofitsideologybyitserstwhilelieutenants.Bycriticisingthesurrenderingcadresandidolisingtheoneswhogotkilledinencounterswiththesecurityforces,theMaoistswanttokeeptheirflocktogether.

Recenthistoryofleft‐wingextremisminIndiabearstestimonytothedamagingimpactofneutralisationofkeyleadersontheoutfit'soverallactivity.Kishenji'skillinginNovember2011

3 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 19 January 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-naxal/surrender-of-gudsa-usendi-ominous-beginning-for-the-naxals-4264.html


ledtothemarginalisationoftheMaoistsinWestBengal.SabyasachiPanda'sinAugust2012rebellioninOdishawasaserioussetbackfortheoutfit'splanofexpansioninthatstate.TheSeptember2009arrestofKobadGhandyandtheJuly2010killingofCherikuriRajkumaraliasAzadconstitutedblowstotheoutfit'spolicymakingapparatusaswellastoitsexpansionstrategyinsouthernIndia.Usendi'ssuddendeparturefromthescenewouldcertainlyaffecttheoutfit.Thattheoutfitwouldfindaleadertoreplacehimandwouldeventuallyovercomehislossis,however,adifferentdebate.

Attheotherlevel,thesatisfactionexpressedintheofficialcircles,postUsendi'ssurrenderthattheCPI‐Moistwouldeventuallycrumblebecauseofitsexcessiverelianceonviolenceanddisenchantmentofitscadresfromtheparty'sideology,maybemisplaced.ThatUsendi'ssurrenderandfairtreatmentaccordedtohimbythestatewouldleadtoastreamofsurrendersoftopcadresisfarfetched.ThatMaoistviolencewoulddieanaturaldeathwithoutanysubstantialeffortfromthestateisanunrealexpectation.

GroundrealityintheMaoistconflicttheatresmaybedifferent.Whilethelevelofviolenceorchestratedin2010,sofartheworstyearofMaoistviolence,resultinginthedeathsofover900civiliansandsecurityforceswouldpossiblyremainunmatched,anupswinginviolence,albeitmarginal,wasrecordedin2013overthepreviousyear.270civiliansandsecurityforceswerekilledin2013invariousstatescomparedto250deathsin2012.Inspiteofthekillingof151Maoistcadresin2013,theoutfit'slevelofviolencedidnotshowmuchsignsofabatement.StateslikeChhattisgarh,Jharkhand,BiharandOdisharemainedaffectedbysignificantamountofextremistmobilisationaswellasviolence.

Althoughdeploymentofabout150companiesofsecurityforcesminimisedviolenceduringthestateassemblyelectionsinChhattisgarh,therewaslittletosuggestthatthestateisintheprocessofdevelopingitswherewithaltoreplicatetheAndhraPradeshsuccessonitssoil.Bihar'suniqueapproachtowardstheproblemhasmerelytranslatedintoitsdiminishingabilitytoneutralisetheMaoists,whereastheextremistscontinuetokill,abductandsnatchweapons.WhileMaoistinroadsintothenortheastremainsmostlyanexaggeratedclaimbytheAssamgovernment,theCPI‐Maoistappearstohavemadeconcertedeffortsforexpansionintothesouthernstates.

In2013,smallvictorieswerescoredbythesecurityforcesagainsttheMaoists.ButtheyearalsowitnessedsetbacksintheformoftheDarbhaattackinChhattisgarhinwhich27peopleincludingsomeseniorpoliticianswerekilledandthekillingofanSuperintendentofPoliceinJharkhand.Moreover,thesecurityforcesinChhattsgarhwerealsoinvolvedinatleasttwoencountersinwhichciviliansratherthanextremistswerekilled,highlightingthepersistenceofintelligencecollectionproblems.Itisthecontinuingabilitytoinflictdamagesonthestate,whichwouldkeeptheCPI‐Maoistrelevantintheeyesofitssympathisers.

Usendi'ssurrenderwasanominousbeginningfortheCPI‐Maoist,butcertainlynottheendgame.


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MaoistsintheNortheast:RealityandMyth‐Making4

On9June2013,justbeforetheclockstruckmidnight,apolicecontingentinAssam'sTinsukiadistrictboardedtheChennai‐EgmoreExpress,minutesbeforeitsthree‐daylongjourney,andpulledout66youths.Acriticalintelligenceinputreceivedbythepolicehadindicatedthattheseyouthsfromteagardens,AhomandMorancommunitiesweregoingtojointheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist(CPI‐Maoist).FollowingtwodaysofinterrogationandconfirmationfromtheemployersoftheyouthsinChennai,allwerereleased.Tocoverupamajorembarrassment,thepoliceestablishmentforcedtheparentsoftheyouthstosignundertakingsthattheywouldproducetheirwardsbeforethepolicewheneveraskedfor.TheincidentinawaysummedthemindsetofthesecurityestablishmentinAssam,whichforthepastcoupleofyears,hasbeenpursuinganon‐existentenemy,invariablyunderpoliticalorders.

MediareportsontheallegedinroadsmadebytheCPI‐MaoistintotheNortheastingeneralandAssaminparticularhaveproducedalarmingnarrativescomprisingencounters,arrests,shadowyextremistgameplans,andavisionfortakingovertheregion.Whilefewoftheseincidentsarereal,most,liketheincidentnarratedearlier,areunsustainable.

ArrestedMaoistcadresidentifiedascentralcommitteemembers,traininginstructors,andkeyleadersoftheoutfit'seasternwinghavebeenfoundtobeoldmenintheagegroupof65to70years,acleardeparturefromthemainstreamMaoistmovementwhoseleadersandcadresaremuchyounger.Post‐arrest,thesocalledhighprofilecadreslikeAdityaBorahavebeengiveninstantbailbythecourtsinviewoftheweakandunsubstantiatedchargesbroughtagainstthem.ThesocalledextortionnotesrecoveredinupperAssamdistrictscontainexpressionssuchas‘Maubadi147’andsymbolsofarisingsun,indicatingtheinvolvementofpettycriminalsposingasMaoistsorevencadresoftheUnitedLiberationFrontofAssam(ULFA),whosepartysymbolistherisingsun.The‘disappearance’of300youthsfromvariousAssamdistrictshasbeendescribedasasuccessfulrecruitmentdrivebytheCPI‐Maoist.TheAssam‐ArunachalPradeshborderregionhasbeendescribedasthenewhotbedofMaoistactivity.HundredsofkilometresseparatetheareafromthenearestMaoistareaofactivityinWestBengal,violatestheprincipleofcontiguity,whichtheCPI‐Maoiststeadfastlyholdontoinitsexpansiondrive.

Suchdisquietingnarratives,asaresult,coexistwithsanerassessments,incidentallybysomeoftheseniorpoliceofficialsinAssam.Theyinfact,insistthatthereisnoconstituencyinAssamwhichtheMaoistscanexploittospreadtheirideology.InJanuary2014,Assam'sdirectorgeneralofpoliceconfirmedthat"MaoistshavealsonotyetbeenabletomakestronginroadsintoAssam."

ThepurposeofthiscolumnhereisnottoarguethatMaoistshavenoplansfortheNortheast.Theydo.However,thatisnotanearormedium‐termplanforsabotage,armedstruggleandcarvingoutofliberatedzonesintheregion,butamorerationalandrealisticstratagemforusingtheregion'sweaknessesandvulnerabilitiesforweaponsprocurementandservicesoftheinsurgentoutfitsfortrainingpurposes.ThejointdeclarationbetweenthePeople'sLiberationArmy(PLA)inManipurandtheCPI‐MaoistgoesbacktoOctober2008.Aspartofthedeclaration,thePLAin2010organisedarmstrainingcampsfortheMaoistcadresinJharkhand.MaoistleaderKishenji(whowaskilledinNovember2011)travelledtothePLAandNational

4 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 17 February 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/terrorism-in-northeast/maoists-in-the-northeast-reality-and-myth-making-4315.html


SocialistCouncilofNagaland‐Isak‐Muivah(NSCN‐IM)campsinManipurandNagalandrespectivelytodeepenpartnershipandexplorearmspurchaseandjointtrainingopportunities.TheNSCN‐IMpurchasedarmsfromaChinesecompanyintendedfortheMaoists.ULFAchiefPareshBaruahhascongratulatedtheMaoistsfortheirsuccessfulambushesinChhattisgarhandsentcondolencemessagesfollowingthekillingofMaoistsinencounters.

However,noneoftheoutfitsintheNortheasthaveeverexpressedanydesiretolettheMaoistsoperateinwhattheyconsidertobetheirexclusiveplayingfield.TheCPI‐Maoisthasindeedattractedsomeyouthsfromtheregion.ButthosejourneysfromtheNortheasttoMaoistcampsintheIndianmainlandinsomewaysresemblethoseundertakenbyMuslimyouthsfromallnooksandcornersoftheworldtojointheanti‐SovietMujahideeninAfghanistaninthe1980s.TheobjectivesofthosecadresarecertainlynottowageaguerrillawarinsidetheNortheastbuttoenforcetheranksoftheCPI‐Maoist,conformingtotheirpersonalideologicalaffiliation.

This,however,hasnotstoppedChiefMinisterTarunGogoifromrepeatedlydemandingthe‘Maoist‐affected’statusforAssam'sninedistricts,whichwouldentitletheaffecteddistrictstoRupees30croreadditionaldevelopmentalfundseveryyear.NotwithstandingNewDelhi'srejectionofthedemand,Gogoicontinuestolabelcivilrightsgroupsandanti‐dammovementsasMaoist‐backedandcallsfordeploymentofadditionalsecurityforces.Ifacceded,Assam,whichhasnotreportedasinglecivilianandsecurityforcefatalityinMaoistviolence,wouldrankalongwithsomeoftheworstextremistaffectedstatesofthecountry.

IIICombatingNaxalViolence

TransientandPermanentSuccess5

WouldtheMaoistscontinuetocarryoutintermittentattackstargettingthestateintheforeseeablefuture?Orwouldtheyeventuallydisintegrateanddisappearowingtoaleadershipcrisisbecausethestatehasbeenabletoneutralisesomeoftheirtopleaderswhiletheremainingaretoooldforacontinuousfight?TheanswerswouldshapetheresponsetowhathasbeenthemostpotentcaseofextremisminIndia.

CommentaryontheactivitiesoftheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist(CPI‐Maoist)hasbeeninastateoffluxinrecentyears.Commentatorshaveshiftedtheirpositionsalongwithincidentsandwithrisingordiminishingdeathtolls.Tworecentinstancescanbecited.NeutralisationofsevenMaoistsinGadchirolidistrictofMaharashtraon17February,forinstance,underlinedthatadvancementofthestateandweakeningoftheMaoists.However,followingtwoMaoistattackswithinafortnightinChhattisgarhthatkilled20securityforcepersonnelinFebruaryandMarch2014inDantewadaandSukadistricts,thenarrativeshiftedandthepotencyoftheextremistswasreconfirmed.TheMaoists,whoappearedtohavepreviouslyweakened,haveresurfacedasarealthreattothe2014LokSabhaelectionsincertainstates.

Muchofthesefluctuationsinanalysesowetheirorigintothestates’claimsofsuccessagainsttheextremists.Thereisnodenyingthefactthatthesecurityforceshaveindeedmadesome

5 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 17 March 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/combating-naxal-violence-transient-and-permanent-success-4341.html


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advancesintheMaoist‐affectedtheatres.Themostusualparametertojudgethisisthedipinviolenceinrecentyears.Comparedto2010,when1,005civiliansandsecurityforceswerekilledinextremistattacks,394deathsoccurredin2013.Additionally,combinedwithfiguresofkillingsofMaoistcadres,thenumberofsurrendersaswellasoccasionalconfirmationsfromtheoutfit,theCPI‐Maoist'scapacitytoorchestrateviolencehasbeeninterpretedashavingdeclined.

Iftheseconclusionsaretrue,howdoesoneinterpretthe28Februaryand11MarchattacksinChhattisgarh?Aretheseattacksonlyaberrationsandconstitutedesperateattemptsbytheextremiststoreiteratetheirpresence,moresobeforetheelections?Ordotheyindicatethatthesuccessofthestatewasmoreofatacticalfavourgrantedbytheextremistsandhence,thelullinviolencewasmerelytemporary?

WhiletheassertionthatMaoistshaveindeedkilledlessciviliansandsecurityforcesinrecentyearsissustainable,whetherthisdeclineinextremistviolenceisdemonstrativeofaugmentedcapacitiesofthestateremainsarelevantquestion.Withparticularreferencetothe11Marchattack,thesecurityforceestablishmenthasarguedindefenceoftheambushedCentralReservePoliceForce(CRPF)team,vouchingforitsbravery.WhilesomeargumentshavetriedtolocateMaoistsuccessesintheviolationofstandardoperatingprocedures(SOPs)bythesecurityforcepersonnel,theCRPFchiefhasstatedthatSOPsarenotsacrosanctandcanbeimprovisedifsituationsdemand.Similarly,criticismsregardinglackofintelligenceandcoordinationbetweenthecentralandthestatepolicehaveallbeenrebuffed.

Ifalliswellwiththemodeofoperations,whyarethesecurityforcesregularlyfallingpreytoattacksbyasocalledweakanddemoralisedextremistoutfit?Theanswertothisseeminglycomplicatedquestionisrelativelysimple.Thestate,withallitsinstrumentalitiesofpower,hasfailedtodominatetheextremism‐affectedterritoryunderquestion.Blameiteitheronthelackofadequatestrengthofsecurityforcepersonneloracohesivestrategytodislodgetheextremists,thefactremainsthatmuchoftheterritorywhichreportincidentsofviolencecontinuestoremainunderthegripoftheextremists.

Eitherthestate'ssuccessofneutralisingkeyMaoistleadersthroughencounters,arrestsandsurrendersoritsinflictingoflossesthroughdisruptionofmeansofcommunicationandlogisticshasnotenlargeditswritintotheungovernedterritories.Asaresult,securityforceraidsintoextremist‐heldterritories,whilemakingimpressivemediaheadlines,havenotconvertedthoseareasintostate‐onlyareas.Thelackofastrategytograduallyexpandthestate'sdominationisalsothereasonwhythedevelopmentinitiativesofthestatehavefailedtowinoverthetribals.Onecannotexpecttohaveloyalistsinareasthatarecontrolledbyone’sadversary.Andinsuchareasunderextremistdomination,thelossesundergonebytheoutfitarerecoveredfairlyrapidly.ThisispreciselythereasonwhythestatementoftheUnionHomeMinisterSushilKumarShindethatthestatewill‘takerevenge’forthe11MarchattackinChhattisgarhappearshollow.

Afewhoursafterthe11Marchattack,asocialnetworkpage,ostensiblysupportiveoftheextremists,uploadedapictureofabloodiedIndianmapalongwithaguntottingrebel."Politicsiswarwithoutbloodshedwhilewarispoliticswithbloodshed,"MaoZedong'sfamousline,wasscribbledacrossthepicture.Thepictureisapointertowardsthefuture.TheMaoistwaragainstthestate,aslongasitlasts,willbebloody.Theleastthatthestatecandoistoembarkupona


strategytoensurethattheareasinwhichtheMaoistslaunchthesebloodywarsareshrunkonagradualbasis.

MaoistAttackontheCRPF:TimeforNewCounter‐strategies6

The1December2014killingof14CentralReservePoliceForce(CRPF)personnelinChhattisgarh'sSukmadistrictbytheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist(CPI‐Maoist)shouldinvariablygodownasoneofthecountry'sworstsecurityforceoperationsinrecenttimes.Intermsofthekillingoftrainedpersonnel,lootingoftheirweapons,andthefollowupresponseofawellestablishedsecurityestablishmentinthestate,theattacksurpasseseventhefarbiggerextremistattacksofthepastinwhichtheforcehadlostfarlargernumberofpersonnel.TheincidentfurthergivesrisetothequestionwhetheravictoryovertheMaoistsisatallpossibleunderaCRPF‐Statepoliceforcecombinationformula?

Theattacktookplaceasover2000personneloftheCRPFwereconductingafour‐phaseoperationagainsttheextremistsinthedistrict.Asexpressedbytheinvolvedpersonneltothemedia,withoutmuchofintelligencetobacktheseinitiatives,therewaslittleobjectivebehindtheoperationsratherthanwhatbroadlyisdescribedasareadominationexercises.Duringtheendofthethirdphaseoftheoperation,asectionoftheforce,variouslydescribedasconsistingof200to700personnelcameunderattackbytheMaoists–whoapparentlyusedcivilianvillagersasshields.Therewaslittleresistancefromtheforces,whoasreportssuggestgotawayonly14fatalities.While12perishedinthecombat,twopersonneldiedwhilebeingshifted.HadtheMaoistspersistedandcontinuedtheirattacks,thetollcouldhavebeenmuchhigher,perilouslyclosetothe2010DantewadaattackinwhichtheCRPFlost76troopers.TheattackhasledtoanearlyconclusionoftheareadominationexerciseinSukma.

Theattackraisesseveralquestionsregardingtheabilityoftheforcethathasbeendesignatedasthecountry’sleadcounter‐insurgentforceaftertheKargilattack,vis‐a‐vistheMaoists.Thereareissuesofleadership,logistics,intelligenceandcoordinationwiththestatepoliceforce.However,noneoftheseconcernsarenew.Eachinvestigationfollowingamajorattackhasunravelledthesameillsaffectingtheforcethathasbeenfightingtheextremistsfornearlyadecadeandwhosebattalionstrengthintheconflicttheaterhasgrownmanifoldovertheyears.Whilesomeincrementalimprovementsinthewayoperationshavebeenconductedarenaturalandarethereforeverybodytosee,fundamentalissuessuchastheCRPFleadership'sstrategyoffightingthewarwithwell‐motivatedandadequatelysupportedpersonnelhavebeenchronicallyabsent.

Thisexplainswhythetransientsuccessesthathavepushedthe10‐yearoldCPI‐Maoistarguablytoitsweakeststatenotwithstanding,theCRPF'sownhistoryofengagementwiththeextremistsisrepletewithmistakes,setbacks,andaperennialsearchfortherightprinciplesofoperationalaccomplishment.Theforce'sprojectstogenerateintelligencebysettingupandedicatedwing;itsinitiativesofdevelopingbondswiththetribalpopulationbyprovidingthemwithgifts,medicalfacilities,andorganisingsportsandculturalevents;anditseffortstonarrowdownthedifferenceswiththestatepoliceforceshaveallachievedmarginalresults.Eventhe10‐battalionstrongCombatBattalionforResoluteAction(COBRA),raisedwiththespecificobjectiveof

6 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 15 December 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/maoist-attack-on-the-crpf-time-for-new-counter-strategies-4777.html


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fightingtheMaoists,whichhassincebeendilutedtomakethemdealwiththeinsurgentsofalldenominationsinthenortheast,haveminorachievementstodemonstrate,intheIndianMinistryofHomeAffairs(MHA)'sownassessments.

Theuncomfortableconclusiononecanderivefromthestate‐of‐affairsisthattheCRPF,initspresentstate,isnottheforcethatcandeliversignificantsuccessesintheMaoistconflicttheaters.Evenwithanever‐expandingbudgetofRs.12,169.51croresforthecurrentfinancialyear‐amountingtoalmost1/5thoftheMHA'sentirebudget–thesuccessivechiefsoftheforcehavefailedtoprovideitsfightingtroopseventhebasicoftheprovisions.Medianarrativesindicatesoldierskeepingthemselvesoperationallyfitwithrice,lentilsandMagginoodles.Worsestill,seenincombinationwithpoorconditionofthestatepoliceforcesandtheirvirtualirrelevancetotheconflictresolutionproject,itpointsatanignominiousfutureofapermanentstateofconflictinasizeablegeographicalexpanseofthecountry.

InresponsetotheSukmaattack,theMHAplanstoinductmoreforcesintoChhattisgarh.Suchamove,inthepipelinesincethenewgovernmentassumedpowerinNewDelhiinMay2014,isbasedonthepremisethatmorebootsonthegroundwouldbeabletoreversethesuccessoftheMaoists.Nothingcanbefartherfromtruth.TheCRPF'sfailureneedstobeseeninthecontextoftheoveralllackofimaginationamongthecountry'spolicymakersindealingwiththeMaoistthreat.EversincetheCPI‐Maoistemergedasamajorchallenge,lackadaisical,reactionary,andadhoc‐ishmeasureshavebeenpassedoffasofficialpolicies.Evenassuchexperimentationcontinues,thesoldiers,amongothers,arepayingwiththeirbloodandlivesinconflictsmainlandIndiansarecompletelyobliviousto.

IV

AStrategyfortheGovernment

ThedayPrimeMinisterNarendraModiunfurledthenationalflagfromtheprecinctsofthehistoricRedForttomarkIndia's68thIndependenceDay,theCentralReservePoliceForce(CRPF)authoritiesinChhattisgarhunfurledthetri‐colouratTadmetlainSukmadistrict.Flaghoistingatthesiteofthebloodiestmassacrethatclaimedthelivesof75CRPFpersonnelfouryearsagowasapparentlytomakeastatementthattheforceshavereclaimedtheterritoryfromtheextremistsandareassertingtheirauthorityoverthepieceofland.Thisavoidablesymbolism,inthebackdropofapparentextremistdominationoverthearea,inaway,sumsupthecountry'sstagnatedapproachtowardstheNaxalproblem.

Anti‐NaxalOperations:SeekingRefugeinSymbolism7

The2010attackatTadmetla(theninDantewadadistrictwhichwasbifurcatedin2012tocreatetheSukmadistrict)stillcountsastheworstattackevertohavebeencarriedoutonthecentralforcesbytheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist(CPI‐Maoist).ThelossofanentirecompanyoftheCRPFcastapallofgloom,andmoreimportantly,pushedtheforcesintoadefensivemindset.ItalsobroughtNewDelhi'sattemptstosubduetheextremiststhroughamulti‐theatremilitaryoffensivetoanabrupthalt.Subsequentinquirybyaretiredpoliceofficialrevealedseriouscommandandcontrollapsesamongtheforces.TheCRPFhasnotsufferedalossofthat

7 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 18 August 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-naxal/anti-naxal-operations-seeking-refuge-in-symbolism-4608.html


magnitudethereafter.Whetherthishasbeenachievedbyaddressingtheweaknessesexposedbytheattackormerelybybecomingmoredefensiveinitsapproachisdebatable.

Behindthe'successful'flaghoistingatTadmetla,however,werepainstakingpreparations.ACRPFcontingentconsistingofthespecialisedCommandoBattalionforResoluteAction(COBRA)commandosandledbyanInspectorGeneral,campedintheareaforseveraldays.AdetailedsanitisationexercisewascarriedoutintheareaduringwhichaCRPFpersonnelwasinjuredinanImprovisedExplosiveDevice(IED)explosionandhadtobeairliftedfortreatment.Aseniorofficialtoldthemediathattheceremonywasessential"tomarkthedominationofthisarea."

Extremismrelatedincidentsreportedin2014,however,donotindicateanysecurityforcedominationoverthearea.Sukmacontinuestobeamongtheworstextremism‐affecteddistrictsinChhattisgarh.On9February,twoCRPFpersonnel,includingaDeputyCommandant,werekilledand12othersinjuredinalandmineblastcarriedoutbytheCPI‐Maoist.Notfarfromthesitewherethetri‐colourwashoisted,threeCOBRApersonnelwerekilledandthreeothersinjuredinaNaxalambushon9April.Andon11May,extremistskilled15securityforcepersonnelatJeerumNullahinthedistrict.Severalotherincidentsofambush,attackandexplosionhavebeenreportedfromthedistrict.Infact,thedominationoftheextremistshasforcedtotheCRPFtotakeuponitselfthetaskofbuildingasevenkmroadstretchasnoprivatecontractorhasagreedtotakeupthejob.

InOctober2013,UnionHomeSecretaryAnilGoswamihadpulledupthecentralarmedpoliceforceorganisationsincludingtheCRPFoperatinginChhattisgarhfortheir"defensivestrategy."GoswamiregrettedthefactthattherewasalullintheactionbythesecurityforcesdespiteNewDelhi'sdirectivetoengageinresult‐orientedoperations.Theforceswerenotjustreluctanttocarryoutsustainedoffensiveoperationsagainsttheextremists,eventheroutineareadominationexerciseswereavoided.ItisnotclearwhethertheflaghoistinginTadmetla,withsignificantsanitisingpreparations,marksthebeginningofachangeinthetacticoftheforcesandisdemonstrativeofanewfoundvision.

ItisunfairtoblametheCRPFpersonneldeployedinChhattisgarhforthelullinaction,forthecurrentstateofaffairsemanatesfromapolicystagnationthatmarkstheanti‐Naxalinitiative.Apartfromtheirowninternalproblemsandthecontinuingconfusionwhethertoremainasupportingorleadcounter‐Naxalforce,lackofcoordinationwiththestateforces,lackofadequateprogressinstatepolicemodernisation,inertiaatthelevelofbureaucracy,andlackofanationalconsensuswithregardtosolvingtheNaxalissue,haveaffectedtheperformanceofthecentralforces.Thiscouldbepushingthemtofindrefugeinsymboliceventsratherthanattemptingdecisivegains.

Atonelevel,suchpolicystagnationisstrangeespeciallywhentheCPI‐Maoisthaslostseveralseniorleadersacrossstatesandhasfailedtomaintainalevelofviolencenecessarytokeepitsowninternalmechanismaliveandkicking.Attheotherlevel,however,itunderlinesthecountry'spredominantlyreactionarycounter‐insurgencydoctrine,whichdoesrelativelywellinrespondingtoextremistviolence,butditherswhenviolencedips,eitherduetothesetbackssufferedbytheextremistoutfitsorbecauseofthelatter'stacticalretreatdecision.

ThetaskforNewDelhi,thus,iswellcutout.Ithastofindawaytoinstillasenseofpurposeamongthestateaswellasthecentralforces.Ithastoensurethatthebureaucracyandgrass


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rootpoliticsworksintandemwiththesecurityforces.Anditmustensurethattheactsofsymbolismcometoagrandhalt.

A'New'Counter‐NaxalActionPlan8

DaysaftertheformationoftheNationalDemocraticAlliance(NDA)governmentinNewDelhi,contoursofanewpolicyvis‐a‐visLeftWingExtremism(LWE)remainedamatterofspeculation.Whethertoughmeasureswouldreplacetheadhoconesandclaritywouldsubstituteconfusionwerecommentedupon.SomeofthestatementsoftheHomeMinisterandtheMinistryofficialsintheearlydaysfollowingtheformationofthegovernmentraisedhopesthatapolicychange,ifnottheprospectofanimmediatesolutiontotheproblemcouldbeontheanvil.However,thenew29‐pointActionPlanevolvedbytheMinistryofHomeAffairs(MHA)foraddressingtheLWEchallengepointtowardsthecontinuationofthepastpoliciesanddoesnotindicatearadicaldeparturefromtheapproachpursuedbythepreviousgovernment.

Threeprincipalassumptionsmarkthenewcounter‐LWEpolicy:

a.Securityforceoperationsmustprecededevelopmentalinitiativesb.TheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist’s(CPI‐M)militarycapacitiescanbecrippledbytargetingitstopleadershipc.Securityforceoperations,withmodestgainssofarcanbemadeeffectivebyadditionalforcedeploymentandaugmentingintelligencecollection.

Whileeachoftheseassumptionsisrelevant,whethersuchmeasurescanbeimplementedwithoutbroad‐basedsecurityandgovernancesectorreforms,remainsamatterofdebate.

RulingoutnegotiationswiththeCPI‐MhasbeenoneofthemosthighlightedaspectsofHomeMinisterRajnathSingh'sstatementsinrecenttimes.Speakingon27June,Singh,atthemeetingofchiefsecretariesandDirectorsGeneralofPolice(DGPs)of10Naxal‐affectedstatessaid,“Thereisnoquestionofanytalksnow.Wewilltakeabalancedapproach.ButtheforceswillgiveabefittingreplyiftheNaxalslaunchattacks.”GiventhatseveralpastoffersfornegotiationshavebeenrebuffedbytheCPI‐M,Singh'sstatementaimstoserveasafoundationforaprimarilyforce‐basedapproachtotheLWEchallenge.

ThenewactionplaninvolvesadirectivetotheIntelligenceBureauto“infiltrateintoMaoistranks”andfollowaspecificpolicyoftargetingthetopleadershipforneutralisation.TheNaxal‐affectedstateshavebeenadvisedtoraisecommandoforcessimilartotheGreyhoundsofAndhraPradesh.Similarly,10additionalbattalionsofcentralarmedpolicepersonnelarebeingdeployedinChattisgarh’sBastarregionbytheendof2014forarenewedoffensiveagainsttheextremists.Thenewpolicyfurtherspeaksofcreatingaseriesofincentivesfor“goodofficers”toserveinMaoist‐affectedareasbyofferingthemmonetaryincentivesandcareerbenefits.

Allthesemeasures,incidentally,haveremainedtheMHA'scounter‐LWEapproachinthepast.None,however,achievedmuchsuccessduetoarangeofdeficienciesthatincludelackofabilityaswellascoordinationbetweenthecentralaswellasstatesecurityforcesandtheintelligenceagencies.YearssincetheLWEemergedasamajorsecuritythreattothecountry,bothtechnicalintelligence(TECHINT)aswellashumanintelligence(HUMINT)gatheringmechanisms

8 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 21 July 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/a-new-counter-naxal-action-plan-4572.html


continuetosufferfromseriousshortcomings.ThereisanacutelackofenthusiasticparticipationofthestatepoliceforcesinNewDelhi’soveralldesignthatneithersupplementsnoraimstoreplacethecentralforcesincounteringtheextremists.Thenewplanissilentonthewaystoremovesuchloopholesandmakeoperationsaprincipallystatepolice‐ledinitiative.Giventhefactthatstatebureaucracyhasremainedmostlyapathetictorestartgovernanceinareasclearedbythesecurityforces,policiesneedtogobeyondtherhetoricof'postingofgoodofficers'innaxal‐affectedareas.

Inthepreviousyears,evolvinganationalpolicyconsensusonachallengethataffectsatleast10stateshasremainedoneofthemainchallengesforNewDelhi.The29‐pointActionPlanfallsshortofaddressingtheproblem.Itmerelyexhortstheaffectedstatestoappointnodalofficerstoincreasecoordinationatthecentreandasksthechiefministersandhomeministerstovisittheaffectedareasintheirrespectivestatestodevelopafavourableimageofthegovernmentamongthetribalpopulation.Intheabsenceofarewardsystemtomakethenon‐conformingstatesfallinlinewithacentralapproach,suchmeasuresofimprovingcoordinationarelikelytobemetwithlackofenthusiasm,ifnotresistancebythestatesruledbynon‐BharatiyaJanataPartyparties.

ThecurrentLWEsituationismarkedbyscaleddownviolencebytheextremistswhounderstandablyareintoaconsolidationmodeaftersufferingsomereversals.Recruitmentactivitiesstillcontinue,sodotheeffortstoideologicallyreshapethemovementthatseemstohavedeviatedsignificantlyfromitsoriginalobjectivesandstrategies.Atacticalretreatofthisnatureoftencreatestheillusionofvictoryamongthepolicymakers.Atthesametime,lowlevelviolencecreatessignificantopportunitiesforthegovernmenttorevisititsownstrategies,makeinroadsintotheextremistareas,andprepareforfutureescalations.WhethertheMHAwouldusethetimewellissomethingtowatchoutfor.

TacklingNaxalViolence:AnAgendafortheNewIndianGovernment9

Inawaythechallengeofleft‐wingextremismthenewNationalDemocraticAlliance(NDA)governmentinNewDelhifacesbearscloseresemblancetothesituationthatconfrontedtheUnitedProgressiveAllianceregimeinitssecondtenurein2009.However,giventhattheCongressparty‐ledgovernmentfailedtocontainthethreat,theincumbentBharatiyaJanataPartygovernmentneedstorevisittheoverallapproachandnotrepeatthepastpolicesthatcontributedtothesurvivaloftheextremistoutfit.

In2009,theCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist(CPI‐Maoist)wasintheupswingwithadramaticspikeinthedeathsofciviliansandsecurityforces.Extremism‐relatedincidentsandfatalitiesamongtheciviliansandthesecurityforcesincreasedby41percentand25percentrespectively,in2008.StatessuchasMaharashtraandWestBengalcontributedsignificantlytothisupswing,withtheeasternIndianstatebecomingthethirdmostextremism‐affectedstateofthecountry,in2009,with255incidentsand158fatalities.TheCPI‐Maoistwasindeedlookingatexpandingitssphereofinfluence.

9 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 16 June 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/tackling-naxal-violence-an-agenda-for-the-new-indian-government-4514.html


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TheUPAgovernmentsoughttotametheriseofextremismwithanironhand..ThechangeofguardsintheUnionMinistryofHomeAffairs(MHA)followingthe2008Mumbaiterroristattacksledtoaseriesofbrainstormingsessions,andanewpolicyaimingtoannihilatetheCPI‐Maoist,titled‘OperationGreenHunt’tookshape.However,hopeexpressedbythethenHomeSecretarythatsecurityforceswouldbeabletoliberatetheareasquicklyandtheciviladministrationwouldkick‐startdevelopmentworkinthoseareasmetanearlyendin2010withtheCentralReservePoliceForcereceivingaseriesofsetbacksatthehandsoftheextremists.

Overthenextfouryears,theUPAgovernmentexperimentedwithacocktailofforce‐centricanddevelopment‐orientedapproach.However,evenwithimprovementsintheoverallsituation,theCPI‐Maoistcontinuestoremainaformidableadversary.Aspertheofficialdata,eachdayoftheyearrecordedoverthreeMaoist‐relatedviolentincidentsresultinginthedeathofatleastonecivilianorasecurityforcepersonnel,in2013.Anidenticalsituationhasprevailedoverthefirstsixmonthsof2014aswell.Maoistsmighthavebeenpreventedfromexpandingtheirareaofoperationsintonewerterritories,buttheoldtheatressuchasChhattisgarh,Jharkhand,Bihar,partsofOdishaandMaharashtracontinuetoreportsignificantviolence.ThenumberofattackscarriedoutbytheCPI‐Maoistandcloseto50deathsinthedaysprecedingandfollowingtheparliamentaryelectionsunderlinesthemilitarycapacitiesoftheextremists.

Threesignificantdeficiencies,amongmany,thathavemarkedIndia'sresponsetothechallengeofleft‐wingextremismare:first,thereisnonationalconsensusonwaystomeetthechallenge.Statesandministrieshavedebatedonwhethertopursueasocialdevelopmentoraforce‐centricmodelofconflictresolution.Second,althoughthesecurityforceshavemadesomeadvancesvis‐à‐vistheextremists,theciviladministrationcontinuestobeareluctantpartnerinreintegratingtheformerNaxalhotbedsthroughdevelopmentadministration.Third,thereisanacuteleadershipcrisisatthepoliticalaswellasthesecurityestablishmentlevels,hinderingsuccess.ThesedeficienciesmustbeaddressedbythenewgovernmentinNewDelhiinordertomakeasubstantialimpactintheextremist‐dominatedareas.

PolicyPrescriptionstoDealwiththeRedMenaceFirst,theunityofpurposeisakeyelementforsuccessinanycounter‐insurgencycampaign.Thelackofsuccessvis‐à‐vistheNaxalsispredominantlyrootedinthediverseaswellasconflictingprescriptionsmadenotjustbythestates,butalsobythevariousdepartmentswithintheUPAgovernment.Annualmeetingsofthechiefministersorganisedbythegovernmentmerelyprovidedplatformsforairingdiverseopinions,butmadelittleprogressintermsofarrivingatacommonapproach.Thenewgovernmentmustfindawaytobridgethedividebetweentheprescriptions.Theprimeministeraswellasthehomeministermustnotbeseenasdetachedactorsexpressinghelplessnessatthestate‐of‐affairs,butshouldleadfromthefront.

Second,contrarytothecommonperceptionthatperiodicmilitarysetbackssufferedbythesecurityforcesaretheprimaryreasonsforthecontinuingextremistdomination;thelackofenthusiasmoftheciviladministrationisabiggerreasonforareasfreedfromtheextremistsrelapsingintochaos.DevelopmentprojectsplannedfortheSarandaregioninJharkhandisanexampleofthismalaise.Asolutionmustbefoundtomakethebureaucracybothatthecentreaswellasinthestatessensitiveandparticipatoryinthedevelopmentprojects.


Third,smallachievementswouldremaincriticalforthestate'scampaignagainsttheCPI‐Maoist.AleafmustbetakenfromthebookoftheMaoists,whoperseveredforyearstofindsupportamongthetribalpopulationandsubsequentlydominatetheareas.Thestatemustattemptincrementalandnon‐reversibleprogressagainsttheextremists.

Naxalism:TheInsufficiencyofaForce‐CentricApproach10

InthefirstweekofMay2014,securityforceslaunchedafreshanti‐NaxaloperationattheSarandaforestsinJharkhand'sWestSinghbhumdistrict.TheoperationwasstartedfollowingintelligenceinputsthatasquadofarmedMaoistshadenteredtheforests.Fewdaysintotheoperation,thestatepoliceDirectorGeneralofPolice(DGP)ledacontingentoftroopsandspentanightdeepinsidetheforests.Themotivewastomakeapoint.ThemediapersonnelweretoldbyanassertiveDGP,“WehaveconqueredSarandaandnobodycandisputeitnow.”

Itwas,however,strangefortheDGPtoaffirmthesuccessofhisforces,forSarandahadreportedlybeenconqueredthreeyearsback.ConsideredtobeaMaoistliberatedzone,whichhousedtheCommunistPartyofIndia(CPI‐Maoist)'sEasternRegionalBureau(ERB)headquartersandalsoalargenumberofarmstrainingcamps,theimpregnabilityofSarandahadbeenshatteredin2011.

BetweenJulyandSeptember2011,about10battalionsofCentralReservePoliceForce(CRPF)personnelconductedOperationAnacondaseekingtoliberatethearea.Notmanyencounterstookplaceduringtheoperations,probablyduetofactthattheMaoistshaddecidedtodesertthearearatherthantoputupafight.Thestatedulyclaimedvictory.Thedominationofthesecurityforcesoverthe855‐squarekilometreareahadapparentlybeenestablished.

TherecoveryofSarandawasimportantfortworeasons.Firstly,itcameafterthefailureandsubsequentabandonmentofOperationGreenHunt,themulti‐theatrecounter‐Maoistoperationwhichwaslaunchedin2010.TheOGH'sfailure,followingaseriesofMaoistattacksonsecurityforces,hadconvincedtheMHAofthecriticalityofsmallareaoperationsasopposedtoanation‐wideblitzkriegagainsttheextremists.TherecoveryofSarandathroughafocussedareaapproach,thus,becameareaffirmationofthefactthatanincrementalapproachiskeytoultimatelydefeattheextremists.

Secondly,fortheUnionMinistryofRuralDevelopment,Sarandabecameatestcaseforadevelopment‐ledsolutiontotheMaoistproblem.UnderMinisterJairamRamesh,supportwasextendedtoJharkhand's'SarandaDevelopmentPlan'thatsoughtallrounddevelopmentforitsinhabitants.Itwashopedthattheestablishmentoftheciviladministration'swritovertheareawouldprovideabulwarkagainsttherelapseoftheareaintoextremism.Amongtheschemessoughttobeimplementedintheareawerehousing,connectivity,forestrights,watersheddevelopment,drinkingwater,andemploymentaswellasfreedistributionofsolarlanterns,bicyclesandtransistors.

Underidealcircumstances,theretreatoftheextremistsfromtheareaandinterventionofthedevelopmentadministrationwouldhavebeenabletomakewonders.However,thegovernment'sambitiousplansofseekingloyalcitizensamongthetribalpopulationwere 10 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 19 May 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/naxalism-the-insufficiency-of-a-force-centric-approach-4445.html


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nullifiedtoalargeextentduetothelackofenthusiasticparticipationbytheciviladministration.Aprominentnewspaper'sop‐edpiecesummedupthedevelopmentsinSaranda,ninemonthsaftertheSDPcameintobeing."Ninemonthson,policecampssoledevelopmentinSarandaPlan",thepieceappearinginTheHindu,June2012,read.Otherreportsdetailedhowbicyclesprocuredfordistributionwererustinginthegovernmentoffices,solelybecausenoofficialwaspreparedtodothegroundworkofpreparingalistofbeneficiaries.

Overthepassingmonths,evenasMinisterRameshpleadedtothemediatogiveSDPa"secondchance",Sarandasawonlyahaphazarddevelopmentinitiative,providingenoughopportunityfortheextremiststoattemptacomeback.Althoughtheareahasnotseenmuchviolenceinrecenttimes,thenecessityforre‐launchingasecurityforceoperationtodominateanareathathadalreadybeencleared,underlinesthereversalofgainsmadebythestate.

Intheneardecade‐longendeavourofconquestvis‐à‐vistheCPI‐Maoist,arealisationhasdawnedoverthepolicy‐makersthattheextremistscannotbedefeatedthroughmilitarymeansalone.Therefore,inspiteofwhatappearstothehumanrightsandcivilsocietyorganisationstobeapredominantlymilitaryeffortagainsttheMaoists,anumberofdevelopmentalaswellasperceptionmanagementinitiativeshavebeenundertakenbythegovernment.However,thisstrategyof"clear,holdanddevelop"hasnotbeenabletomakemuchheadwaymostlyduetothefactthattheciviladministrationhasremainedsomewhatreluctanttobuildupontheaccomplishmentsofthesecurityforces.

ForthenewgovernmentinNewDelhi,waystomakethebureaucracyanenthusiasticpartnerinthecounter‐Naxalendeavourswouldremainakeychallenge.ThepoliticalleadershipbothinNewDelhiaswellasintheaffectedstateswouldhavetomakeextraefforttoinjectvigourintowhattillnowremainsamostlyasluggishciviladministrativeestablishment.Infact,JharkhandDGP'svictoryspeechon6Mayunderlinedthekeystepsrequiredtoavoidrelapseofrecoveredareasintoextremism."Thevillagersnowrequireimmediateadministrativeattention",hesaid.

NaxalViolence:OldChallengesfortheNewGovernment11

ThattheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Maoist(Maoist)doesnotbelieveindemocraticprinciplesandanelectoralprocessistoowellknown.The2014LokSabhaelectionsprovidedtheextremistoutfitwithyetanotheropportunitytoreassertitsvisionforthecountry.Inwordsandaswellaswithaccompaniedviolence,itprovedoncemorethattheprobabilityofanegotiatedsettlementtothelong‐standingconflictisratherlow.

TheCPI‐MaoistreleasedthreesetsofsomewhatcontradictorystatementsinMarch2014,twosignedbythespokespersonoftheoutfit'sCentralCommittee(CC)andoneonbehalfoftheoutfit'sEasternRegionalBureau.Dated24March,theCCreleaseditscustomaryboycottofelectionscallingtheaffair"anotherhugefinancialburdenonthepeople",whichcannottransformthe"presentexploitativesystem."Critiquingallthepoliticalpartiesfortheirdishonestpoliciestowardsthetribals,thestatementtermedthegovernment'speaceproposals"deceptive."

11 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 21 April 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/naxalite-violence/naxal-violence-old-challenges-for-the-new-government-4395.html


Interestingly,another19‐pagedocumentwasreleasedbytheCConthesameday,whichcontainedanswersto11questionsposedbythemediapersonstotheoutfit.Respondingtoaquestionontheoutlookoftheoutfitonpeacetalkswiththegovernment,thespokespersonstatedthatwhiletheoutfitis"notagainstPeaceTalkswiththegovernment",sincetalksare"anintegralpartofthepoliticalstruggle."However,fivedemandswereoutlinedwhichthegovernmentmustfulfilbeforeapeaceprocesscouldbegin.TheseincludeddeclaringtheCPI‐Maoistapoliticalmovement;de‐proscribingtheoutfitanditsfrontorganisations;initiatingjudicialinquiriesintothekillingsofitsseniorleaders;stoppingofsecurityforceoperations;andreleasingarrestedleaders/cadresoftheoutfit.

Thestatementsurprisinglywashailedastheoutfit'sdeclarationforpeacebythemedia,ignoringthefactthattheconditionsoutlinedhaveremainedanintegralpartoftheoutfit'sstatementsinthepast.Whiletheoutfitexpectsthegovernmenttofulfilsomeofitsmostimpiousdemands,theoutfititselfhasrebuffedtheminimumconditionlaiddownbythehomeministryto"stopviolencefor72hours"astheloneconditionforstartingofapeaceprocess.

FewdayspriortothereleaseofthetwinCCstatements,theCPI‐Maoist'sEasternRegionalBureauhadissuedafour‐page'short‐termvisiondocument'appealingthemassestochosebetween"realdemocracy"ora"pseudo‐democraticsystem."Thisdocument,whicheffectivelyconstitutedamanifestooftheoutfit,reiteratedtheneedfora"newconstitution"includingprovisionsfor"equalsocio‐economicrightstowomen"and"deathpenaltycompulsoryformolestationandrape."Itfurthercalledfor"freedomofspeechandexpression,righttocongregateandprotest,formanorganisation,primaryhealthcare,accesstoprimaryeducation,primaryandminimumemploymentandcompulsoryparticipationindailygovernancesystem."Theoutfitadditionallypromisednottosuppresstheseparatistmovementswiththepowerofthegun,butto"honournationalistmovementsandself‐decisiontoallowthemdignifiedandpeacefulco‐existence(sic)."

Neithertheproclamationofintentforpeacenorthedeclarationofitsownmanifesto,however,stoppedtheoutfitfromcarryingoutaseriesofattacksonsecurityforcepersonnel,pollofficialsaswellasciviliansintheaffectedstatesthatwenttopolls.Comparedtothe2009LokSabhapolls,duringwhich19peoplewerekilledbytheoutfit,tillthewritingofthearticle,atleast20civiliansandsecurityforceshadbeenkilledinMaoistattacks.

Thesecontrastingsignalsemanatingfromtheoutfitsignifytwopossibilities.One,peacenegotiationasaninstrumentofconflictresolutiondoesnotfigureintheimaginationoftheextremistoutfitanditsutterancesonapeaceprocessaremerelyrhetorical.Two,theoutfitintendstouseviolenceasabargainingtoolincaseapeaceprocesswiththegovernmentcomestofruition.

Facedwiththisdeceptiveextremiststrategy,theactionplansofthepoliticalclasstodealwiththechallenge,remainshighlyfractured.Goingbythemanifestosofthepoliticalparties,theprobabilitythatthenewgovernmentinNewDelhiwouldbeabletoaddresstheanomaliesofthepastandchartanewcourselooksblurry.

WhiletheCongressandtheBharatiyaJanataParty(BJP)promisetodealwiththeproblemwitha"firmhand"andapolicyof"zerotolerance"respectively,theAamAdmiParty(AAP)prefersa"multi‐lateraldialogue."TheCommunistPartyofIndia‐Marxist(CPI‐M)opinesinfavourof


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"specificmeasurestotacklethesocio‐economicproblems"faced"particularlybythetribalpeople."TheBJPinsiststhat"talkswiththeinsurgentgroupswillbeconditionalandwithintheframeworkoftheconstitution."TheCongress,ontheotherhand,issilentontheprocessofdialogueandpreferstopursue"adevelopmentagendatoempowerpeople"intheaffectedareas.WhiletheCPI‐Minsiststhatleft‐wingextremismis"notjustasecurityissue,"theAAPreiteratesthat"socio‐economicdevelopmentandeffectivepoliticalde‐centralisation"holdthekey.

Aprojectthatattemptstoreconcilethesestarkdifferencesisnotonlydifficult,butislikelytoproduceacompromisedandineffectivepolicy.Thus,inallprobability,left‐wingextremismwillcontinuetobeachallenge,inhibitinggrowth,developmentandgovernance,intheforeseeablefuture.