bigbasket

9B15M010

BIGBASKET.COM1

Arpita Agnihotri and Saurabh Bhattacharya wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveycases.com. Copyright © 2015, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2015-06-30

In a country such as India, customers were used to the idea of selecting their own tomatoes and bananas. BigBasket.com (henceforth referred to as BigBasket), India’s first online grocery retailer, was ready to break this mind-set. In 2013, the two-year-old online grocery retailer had a customer base of over 100,000 and was growing. Customers were signing up at an aggressive rate of 20 per cent per year, based on word-of-mouth marketing.2 As the customer base increased, so did customer loyalty, with an astounding 65 per cent retention rate. With a commitment to providing a top-quality product assortment at competitive prices, BigBasket successfully provided last-mile delivery to customers across three cities in India — Bangalore, Hyderabad and Mumbai. While traditional brick and mortar grocery retailers were struggling with losses, even after several years of operations, BigBasket became the first online grocery retailer to report breakeven in March 2014 in one of the cities where it operated.3 On the other hand, brick and mortar grocery retailers had started using a hybrid model and critics believed that hybrid models had more profit potential than pure online grocery retailers. Even venture capitalists showed a herd mentality — they did not mind funding, for example, a fifth or sixth baby product or discount deal site, but remained skeptical about the profitability of online grocery retailing.4 Despite these challenges, BigBasket had managed to arrange funding from venture capitalists. It had received the largest amount of Series A funding amongst the entire online retail industry in India. It came up with innovative, customer-centric policies, which not only boosted customer confidence but also enhanced overall profit margins. Venture capitalists and critics were watching BigBasket and wondering whether this new idea had a future. Could BigBasket permanently change the shopping habits of customers? Was the breakeven a short-term phenomenon for BigBasket or would it achieve similar performance in other cities? Was online grocery retail going to be profitable in the long run? COMPANY BEGINNINGS Encouraged by angel investors K. Ganesh and Meena Ganesh, BigBasket.com was founded in September 2011 by five individuals, namely V.S. Sudhakar, Hari Menon, Vipul Parekh, V.S. Ramesh and Abhinay Choudhary. The team of five was not new to the business, as each had ample experience in managing both online and offline retail. In 1999, they had launched Fabmart.com, India’s first e-commerce website. Its primary area of business included music, books, toys and jewellery. However, the company failed due

9B15M010 to inadequate Internet penetration in India in the early 2000s. In 2003, the team rebranded Fabmart into Fabmall, an offline grocery supermarket. Within two years of operations, Fabmall was acquired by the Hyderabad-based retail brand Trinethra Super Retail,5 which was acquired and finally integrated into Aditya Birla Group’s More brand in 2007.6 Menon, the CEO and founding member of BigBasket, was upbeat about the novel business concept and hopeful that the team’s second attempt at retail would succeed. This was because, firstly, the Internet in India was maturing, with faster speeds and more people adapting to Internet transactions. By the end of 2013, there were approximately 213 million Internet users in India.7 Secondly, the online grocery space was completely vacant. Following the entry of Flipkart (the most successful e-retailer in India), new players were making inroads into online retail, but not into online grocery retail. Clearly, shoppers were ready for and interested in online grocery retail, as revealed by the fact that a lot of Google-searching was being done with the keyword “online grocery” (see Exhibit 1). The online grocery sector also showed potential because grocery shopping was monotonous and working people did not want to physically go to grocery stores to make purchases.8 Thirdly, the BigBasket team’s past experience in the retail sector encouraged it to venture into the unoccupied online grocery space. Finally, the team at BigBasket did not believe in “me-too” ideas. K. Ganesh, one of the co-founders and seed funders of BigBasket, said, “We are fans of Greenfield ideas that address big pain points and basic needs of the common man. We don’t like me-too ideas such as the fifth deal site or the eighth baby product or the tenth apparel site.”9 ONLINE DRIVERS AND TARGET SEGMENTS Most grocery items such as pulses, grains and rice are repeat purchases for consumers, who naturally find it a tedious exercise to visit stores to buy these mundane products. Consumers do not find excitement in purchasing them. In addition, other factors push people away from grocery shopping. It is physically tiring; customers have to struggle to find parking; they have to wander store aisles in search of the right items; they have to queue to pay; they have to carry heavy groceries back to their cars; and they have to unload them at home. This irritates them.10 For other customers, especially working couples, scarcity of time is also an issue. Instead of enjoying weekends with their families and children, working couples end up spending much of their days in department stores making weekly grocery purchases. Thus, for this segment of consumers, the presence of an online grocery store like BigBasket was a boon. Most of the time, it was a tech-savvy11 male who ordered groceries on behalf of the family. At times, working women also participated in ordering groceries online. Apart from working couples, BigBasket also focused on women who were involved either in weekly purchases or party purchases. In terms of income, although India’s middle-class segment consisted of only 5 per cent of the total population, it was growing at a rate of 7 per cent on average.12 Although price-sensitive, this class was willing to pay more for convenience. Abhinay, a co-founder of BigBasket, said that almost 30 per cent of the firm’s customers were double-income postgraduates who had at some point lived abroad.13 In terms of attitude towards shopping, BigBasket focused on customers who planned their grocery purchases for one or two weeks and were not impulse buyers. This was because delivery costs were high and delivering individual items to impulse purchasers would not be profitable for BigBasket. This was also the reason why BigBasket fixed a minimum order size of US$16.1514 for free home delivery.

9B15M010 INDUSTRY AND COMPETITION Market Potential The market size of online grocery retail in India in 2013 was $1 billion, representing only 2 per cent of the total grocery market, but it was expected to reach $17 billion by 2017.15 Trends were visible not only in India but also across different countries. For example, in North America and the United Kingdom, the online grocery retail market size was expected to be $15.4 billion and $0.99 billion, respectively, in 2013 (see Exhibit 2). But at the same time, online grocery retail was equally as challenging as traditional grocery retail. The online grocery retail industry was capital-intensive in nature and the economics of e-retailing in general were not applicable to grocery retailing. This is because groceries are perishables and same day or next day delivery has to be assured, unlike in other retailing, where even a weeks’ time can be taken to make deliveries. Thus, a city-specific model, unlike region specific model in non-grocery e-retailing, had to be followed in online grocery retail. The presence of perishables made online grocery retail capital-intensive, as more investments were required in a) warehouses or distribution centres (DCs) for storing groceries, b) logistics for home delivery services and c) managing technology, which enabled the smooth functioning of these processes. In the long run, it was more efficient for online grocery retailers to have their own DCs, rather than picking customer orders from organized retail stores, as space utilization was high in DCs and products were laid out in a more efficient manner to reduce time.16 Similarly, if an online grocery retailer opted for complete automation of the picking process, it could further save on labour costs and increase its speed. Nevertheless, compared to a non-automated warehouse, which usually required investments of $4 million, an automated warehouse required investments of around $35 million.17 This was one of the primary reasons why e-commerce retailers or traditional retailers failed to successfully venture into the online grocery retailing business. Furthermore, same-day or quick delivery was also critical. “Timely and fast delivery is very important for consumers especially when it comes to food or groceries, since it’s an immediate need,” explained Pragya Singh, associate vice-president at retail consultancy Technopak.18 This further complicated the logistics issues. Moreover, the success rate of online grocery retailers across different countries was also not promising. It was supposed to be the “next big thing” during the dot-com boom, but failed to take off. For example, Webvan, the poster child of the dot-com bubble, proved to be one of the biggest failures in the online grocery retail industry. Critics believed that most of the failures in this industry could be attributed to aggressive expansion, complex infrastructure and the logistics models adopted by companies, which still remained a great challenge.19 Competition BigBasket faced competition from different types of players. In the grocery retail segment in India, traditional Kirana stores,20 modern stores (organized retail), online grocery stores and hybrid stores all co-existed. Traditional Kirana shops (neighbourhood stores) had theadvantage of trust and rapport with customers. Hence, consumers were able to get groceries on credit. Compared to modern stores, online retailers were at an advantage, since their expenses for the rental of retail space, utilities (e.g., power bills) and employing store staff were minimal. “We do not have overheads such as rents, power, etc. In places such as Mumbai, rents will kill you. We need just two to three warehouses to cover the entire city,” explained Vipul Parekh, co-founder and chief marketing officer at BigBasket.21 However, the firm had to incur logistics costs, particularly for last-mile delivery. Nevertheless, even after incurring these costs, its overall margins were three to four percentage points more than traditional or modern retailers (see Exhibit 3). As Sudhakar, a co-founder of BigBasket, said: “Head to head with

9B15M010 modern retailers, I figure we can save 10 per cent in costs because things like rent, utilities, staff and shrinkage simply don’t exist at the last mile for us. And compared to their 3 per cent net profit margins, I think we can get to 6 to 7 per cent.”22 However, critics believed that overall profit margins could not exceed 2 to 3 per cent, as gross margins were reportedly around 12 to 15 per cent. Fruits and vegetables had higher margins, at around 16 per cent, but their shelf life wasshorter. Thus, many online grocery retailers did not enter this segment. But BigBasket did not find shelf life to be a problem. Menon explained, “Fruit and vegetables are procured only on order, except for those with a longer shelf life, such as potatoes and onions. This reduces loss of stock by 3 to 4 per cent.”23 Among pure online players (see Exhibit 4), BigBasket was the biggest in India by virtue of its size and market share. This happened because, in the Indian e-commerce market, where other e-grocers found it difficult to expand and some like Shopveg.in had even shut down due to a lack of funds to continue operations, BigBasket had not only grown in other cities such as Hyderabad and Mumbai but had also become the first Indian online grocery retailer to get seed money and several rounds of funding from venture capitalists.24 In the first round of funding, BigBasket received $10 million. “No venture capitalist (VC) can write a ‘Series A’ cheque of that size. And we were clear this isn’t a $2 million or $3 million investment business,”25 said K. Ganesh. The past experience of the team in this business, especially Menon’s eight or nine years of experience in grocery retailing, as well as the vested confidence and trust of angel investors, had all contributed towards securing the Series A funding. According to K. Ganesh, “One of the reasons we got into this business is because it isn’t ‘VC-able.’ It means two pony-tailed youngsters out of college can’t enter it. It’s our competitive barrier to entry!”26 However, Sudhakar believed that more than competition, customer experience was important in this business. He said, “The issue is not how many online players are competing, but how many transactions you can do, while maintaining customer experience.”27 Other pure online e-retailers included LocalBanya and EkStop. However, compared to BigBasket, their product range and registered base of customers was far less. For example, while the number of registered users of BigBasket was over 100,000, there were only 17,000 users of LocalBanya (see Exhibit 5). EkStop, Zopnow and MyGrahak were other online grocery retailers, and all of them including LocalBanya were limited to a single-city model. To begin with, only BigBasket had offered same-day delivery. However, gradually, other players had also offered same-day delivery (see Exhibit 4). Similarly, a few online grocery retailers dealt with only organic and imported products. For example, Farm2Kitchen.com offered only organic food products. BigBasket, on the other hand, offered both organic, imported (gourmet) and day-to-day food products. One more category of online retailers existed, who served as an Internet face of the traditional Kirana stores of India. AaramShop belonged to this category. Customers who logged on to AaramShop.com selected the nearest Kirana store from their home and ordered items, and AaramShop relayed the information to the store via text messages and emails. Within two to three hours, the order was delivered to the customer. Though this model provided the advantage of shopping from a nearby store, it also suffered from the flaw of inconsistencies in last-mile delivery, as AaramShop had little control over delivery. In online grocery retailing, one of the critical success factors is to keep tight control over warehouse and transport operations.28 Consistency in performance cannot be reached if the retailer does not have control over last-mile delivery. To assure complete control and consistent delivery, BigBasket did not even rely on third-party logistics. It had its own fleet and warehouses. According to analysts, the threat to e-tailers like BigBasket was mostly from hybrid retailers like the Future Group, which provided groceries both directly, as a door-to-door service (Big Bazaar Direct), and through a brick and mortar format (Big Bazaar, the largest brick and mortar modern retailer in India). Tesco, a successful retailer in the United Kingdom, also operated both online and offline retail formats.

9B15M010 CHALLENGES IN ONLINE GROCERY RETAIL IN INDIA The biggest challenge in the online grocery retail space was the complex nature of the supply chain.29 Complexity arose from various sources. First, margins were low and products had to be delivered the very same day, as customers could not wait two to three days for the delivery of groceries. Secondly, a huge variety of products had to be kept, and processes needed to be such that perishables could be managed with minimum spoilage. Thirdly, an individual city-based model had to be followed and last-mile delivery had to be planned, which made logistics very difficult. Thus, the entire supply chain became complex in nature.30 Hence, unlike other e-retailers who followed a standard hub and spoke model, in grocery e-retailing a hub and spoke model was followed in every city of operation. This implied that warehouses (hubs) had to be established in each city individually, unlike in the traditional model, where several cities (spokes) shared one large warehouse, which was usually located in a major city. In India, the major cities are Kolkata in the east, Chennai and Bangalore in the south, Ahmedabad and Mumbai in the west and Delhi in the north. Furthermore, to combat wafer-thin margins, BigBasket focused on weekly purchasers rather than impulse buyers, so that the minimum order size exceeded a particular level. Similarly, apart from regular groceries, BigBasket offered high-margin products to buyers, such as pet food. Margins in this segment were of the order of 30 per cent. BigBasket also focused on private-label brands, which improved the margins by 20 to 25 per cent. Menon explained, “We sell 10,000 SKUs, of which 300 are our own branded staples.”31 LEVERAGING TECHNOLOGY BigBasket used technology to its advantage in the front-end, which was the customer, and in the back-end, which was streamlining operations. Because of its home delivery facility, BigBasket had comparatively better access to personal and purchase information related to customers. A brick and mortar retailer could access this data only if the customer had a loyalty card for the store, which was not common in India. Consumer information helped BigBasket manage its inventory at almost a zero level. “The ability to gauge demand is the key to success in this business as you do not want to end up with too much inventory,” said Menon.32 Thus, unlike traditional retailers who stocked inventory for almost two to three weeks, BigBasket maintained inventory for only one to two days, thus saving inventory costs. Realizing the criticality of technology, BigBasket had also developed its data analytics software completely in-house. Its team of 20 engineers had indigenously developed real-time analytic software, which made sourcing almost automatic, i.e., the process of ordering goods from suppliers did not require any human interface.33 Similarly, they had developed software algorithms that sent triggers to the head of operations when orders began to overshoot capacity so that more delivery vans could be arranged. For using Global Positioning System (GPS) devices to track delivery vans, BigBasket allied with AssetTrackr, a Bangalore-based company. Thus, when a customer placed an order, the customer’s geocode34 and delivery slot information were fed into the AssetTrackr system, which then created virtual maps of delivery zones and also recorded the time of delivery. It delivered goods on time 99.3 per cent of the time.35 BigBasket also allied with Ezetap, a mobile point-of-sale solution provider, so that the customer could also pay using credit card upon receipt of groceries. Thus, the firm offered the customer the convenience of using either cash or credit card upon the delivery of their order. ADVANCING SUPPLY CHAIN TOWARDS PROFITABILITY BigBasket believed in a flexible supply chain. Thus, it first started with a just-in-time philosophy in a particular city. This implied that after getting orders from customers, “pickers” picked the orders from organized brick and mortar stores and then delivered them to the customers. Once a particular level of

9B15M010 orders that justified investments in warehouses was reached, BigBasket developed its own warehouses, which Menon referred to as the “warehouse stocking model.”36 By 2013, BigBasket had warehouses in Bangalore and Mumbai and was planning to open a warehouse in Hyderabad by the middle of 2014. Having its own warehouses had several advantages in terms of better control as well as better margins, according to Menon.37 When BigBasket first built a warehouse in a city, it initially procured from wholesalers like METRO Cash & Carry, but gradually started eliminating all the intermediaries in the value chain of grocery retail and moved towards direct procurement from companies. By the end of 2013, BigBasket was directly procuring from 150 suppliers and was in the process of adding 40 to 50 more such suppliers. Direct procurement led to an increase in gross margins by 20 to 23 per cent.38 Furthermore, within the first month of its existence, BigBasket also launched private-label brands, as these had higher profit margins. Thus, it tied up with suppliers who picked rice, pulses and spices from mandis39 and packed them on behalf of BigBasket. As BigBasket moved towards direct procurement, it planned to further eliminate these vendors by procuring directly from the mandis. Additionally, BigBasket had a special sourcing route for perishables. As quality with perishables was an issue, BigBasket procured fruits and vegetables directly from farmers. It called this the “farm-to-home” philosophy.40 OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT BigBasket’s Bangalore warehouse was 10,000 square feet in size in 2012, and was gradually being upgraded to 80,000 square feet.41 BigBasket’s warehouses consisted of around 10,000 stock-keeping units (SKUs) and 1,000 brands. BigBasket employed pickers and packers, who picked and packed approximately 2,000 orders per day during weekends and 1,500 to 1,600 orders per day during weekdays. The average order amounted to approximately $21.65.42 Since the pickers dealt with the sensitive task of picking the orders, BigBasket took all precautions to avoid problems. Hence, pickers were not allowed to receive or make phone calls during picking in the warehouse. A scanner was tied on their wrist, which scanned the orders being picked and also informed them about real-time orders.43 DELIVERY MANAGEMENT BigBasket developed a business model which assured “on-time delivery.” BigBasket relied on a hub and spoke distribution model for efficient, fast delivery. It had warehouses in each city where it operated. From these warehouses, products were transported to three main hubs in the city from where the final delivery of groceries took place. Fruits and vegetables were procured just a few hours before, according to BigBasket’s “farm-to-home” model.44 At BigBasket, route planning was completely automated. When a customer placed an order, based on location and direction, route-planning software clustered all the orders on the same route together. Based on several parameters like van capacity and the number of available vans (which were 50 to begin with), slots were offered to customers. BigBasket, by owning a fleet of vans, had complete control over logistics and delivery, thus raising customer satisfaction. Nevertheless, if a delivery was not made within the stipulated time, then consumers were given a 50 per cent discount on the total order value. SALES AND MARKETING BigBasket followed a city-specific model for marketing. “We will be doing city-specific marketing as we are not operating nationally,” explained Menon.45 He elaborated, “We will focus on below-the-line (BTL) activities in malls and apartments besides poster and banner campaigns, radio ads and some print ads in

9B15M010 local newspapers.”46 Thus, BigBasket partnered with local media, such as radio, and put advertisements in print media. Nevertheless, it was word-of-mouth by customers that helped BigBasket most in gaining customers.47 For example, in educational institutes like Indian Institute of Management-Bangalore and IBS-Hyderabad, if someone commented positively on an alumni website about BigBasket’s services and products, this won more buyers. Word-of-mouth marketing was important and approximately 45 per cent of customers came through references, while 20 to 30 per cent came through online searches.48 Thus, the customer acquisition cost49 was very low compared to other online grocery retailers or e-retailers. Taking advantage of low acquisition costs, BigBasket was able to offer timely price promotions and discounts, which were the most important promotional tools for modern grocery retailers. Thus, BigBasket’s customer acquisition strategies were on par with those of modern grocery retailers. CUSTOMER CENTRISM BigBasket had a customer-centric philosophy. Hence, it operated seven days a week and accepted orders from customers 24 hours per day. Delivery was made in four time slots — Slot 1: 7-9:30 a.m. (Mumbai, Bangalore and Hyderabad); Slot 2: 10-12:30 p.m. (Mumbai, Bangalore and Hyderabad); Slot 3: 4.30-7 p.m. (Mumbai), 5-7.30 p.m. (Bangalore), 4-6.30 p.m. (Hyderabad); and Slot 4: 7:30-10 p.m. (Mumbai and Bangalore) and 7-9.30 pm (Hyderabad). Customers had the option of choosing one of the slots. Also, if the order bill exceeded $16.15, then shipping was made free for customers; otherwise a nominal home delivery charge of $0.35 was levied.50 BigBasket made special logistics arrangements to cater to spikes in demand. For example, orders booked on weekend days were 10 per cent more compared to weekdays, so delivery provisions were made accordingly. Likewise, the first and last weeks of a month received more orders compared to the second and third weeks. These trends were observed because most of the customers of BigBasket were working couples belonging to Generation Y.51 BigBasket’s product categories and SKUs were twice as many as those of any normal brick and mortar retailer, making it a “one-stop shop” service provider.52 For example, it offered cut and peeled vegetables, stationery, and gourmet and organic products, apart from normal groceries. A few ranges of products, such as the gourmet or organic categories, were rarely available in modern and traditional retail stores of India. Since the grocery business was socio-culturally sensitive, the products also varied from city to city. Furthermore, to woo and retain customers, BigBasket provided a repeat-purchase option on its website, where registered customers could buy the items they had ordered in their last purchase. This made shopping even faster for customers. The website was also user-friendly, as recognized by customers.53 Customers who were registering with BigBasket for the first time had to pin their addresses on Google Maps and in case they were unable to do so, the customer-friendly call centre executives, who operated between 7 a.m. and 10 p.m., guided them through the process. In addition, the customer care representative gave complete details to the customer regarding money-back policies in case of spoilage, breakage, leakage, missing items, late delivery, etc. Since grocery purchases were mostly repetitive in nature, the website offered customers an option of saving their grocery list and using it for subsequent orders. This also helped busy customers to quickly complete the mundane task of buying groceries. One of the biggest challenges of online grocery shopping was that it was virtual shopping and consumers were not able to physically touch and assess the quality of products before purchasing them. In order to counter these problems, firstly, BigBasket provided complete product details with nutritional facts, the quantity in which the product was available (e.g., a 500-gram or 1,000-gram packet), an image of the product, etc. to make the purchase easier for the

9B15M010 customer. Secondly, for fruits and vegetables, which formed 20 per cent of online consumers’ shopping baskets,54 BigBasket realized the significance of emphasizing the quality of these products and initiated the “farm-to-home” concept. Fruits and vegetables were procured directly from farmers, rather than from the mandis. Thus, perishables were warehoused only for a few hours. Because of this philosophy, not only was BigBasket’s shrinkage rate very low (0.2 percent), but it was observed that on average there was an increase of seven percentage points in a consumer’s perishable purchases. Finally, BigBasket also ensured same-day or, at a maximum, next-day delivery. This was important, as consumers disliked waiting for groceries. BigBasket was, in fact, so fixated on increasing its delivery speed that the delivery boys were instructed to wear flat sandals instead of shoes, so that they could quickly take them off and wear them again when entering and exiting the customer’s home during the delivery. PRICING STRATEGY The prices of vegetables and private-label brands were very competitive in comparison to those offered by modern retail stores (see Exhibit 6). Furthermore, BigBasket wanted to provide the best-quality products at the most competitive prices.The farm-to-home model, where fruits and vegetables were sourced directly from farmers, assured the best quality at reasonable prices. Repeat customers of BigBasket ordered goods on average 35 to 40 times in 2013, despite the fact that these consumers had several other options for shopping.55 This reflected how price-sensitive consumers were loyal to BigBasket. Like organized brick and mortar retailers, BigBasket also provided timely discounts and coupons. For example, it accepted Sodexo coupons along with credit cards and cash as a method of payment. FUTURE OF BIGBASKET According to K. Ganesh, the success of online grocery retail lay in the “effective marrying of technology, Internet, domain knowledge and logistics.”56 It was due to this integration that BigBasket finally broke even in Bangalore in March 2014. This breakeven in Bangalore happened when BigBasket was earning a gross margin of 20 per cent. In this city, BigBasket registered a compound annual growth rate of 30 to 40 percent and its repeat customers made up 65 percent of its business.57 Furthermore, the average customer bill size was $21.65, compared to $15 for a typical supermarket. This not only reflected customers’ satisfaction with BigBasket’s services, but also how efficiently it managed its operations, so that required products were available all the time. Furthermore, amongst online e-grocery retailers, BigBasket was the market leader with estimated revenues of $4 million, followed by Zopnow, whose revenue was approximately $2 million, and finally by MyGrahak.58 Although BigBasket led the pure online grocery category, competitors like AaramShop, who were not pure online retailers and had alliances with traditional Kirana stores, were expanding at a much faster rate. Thus, AaramShop had already made its presence felt in 36 cities, while BigBasket was still struggling with expansion in cities such as Delhi in the north and Pune in the west.59 Furthermore, as Big Bazaar, the largest brick and mortar retailer in India, was expanding its online channel, Big Bazaar Direct, critics were of the opinion that soon, hybrid retailers like BigBazaar would outperform pure online retailers like BigBasket. Analysts also felt that the future of grocery retail belonged to those who had hybrid models rather than pure online models. In international markets, hybrid players like Tesco had been more successful. But trends were the reverse in the United States (see Exhibit 7).60 Lastly, given the thin margins of the online grocery business, even venture capitalists remained skeptical about its profitability in the long run. Despite these challenges and with complete optimism, BigBasket planned to expand to other cities in India including metropolises like Delhi and Chennai by the end of 2014. It also aimed to

9B15M010 earn revenues of around $56 million in fiscal year 2014–2015.61 According to Menon, such a fast expansion was not risky, as the learning cost was zero. “You can do things at far cheaper cost in the new city as there’s no cost of learning,” Menon said.62 He added, “The first city took up a huge amount of the US$10 million [Series A funding], and a good chunk went into learning and trying a few things, but none of that is required in each new city.”63 In order to accomplish its plans, in September 2014 BigBasket raised $33 million in its Series B round of funding from Helion Advisors and Zodius Capital along with its existing investors Ascent Capital and Lion Rock Capital.64 Would BigBasket remain ahead of the competition by growing rapidly in other Indian cities and reporting profits across all cities of its operations, thus becoming the future of online grocery retail in India? This was yet to be seen.

9B15M010 EXHIBIT 1: AVERAGE SEARCH VOLUME FOR KEYWORDS RELATED TO ONLINE SHOPPING AND

GROCERIES IN INDIA

Source: Developed by the authors using P. Hans, “Virtual Grocer,” MoneyToday, August 2013, http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/online-grocery-shopping-vegetables-new-trend-in-india/1/197141.html, accessed April 6, 2014.

EXHIBIT 2: CROSS-COUNTRY INTERNET PENETRATION AND ONLINE GROCERY PENETRATION

(2013)

3600

19001600

1300130013001000 880 720 590 480 480 390 390 390

0500

1000150020002500300035004000

AV

ER

AG

E S

EA

RC

H V

OL

UM

E

KEYWORDS

84 84 86

9491

149 9 11

22

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

US France Germany Holland UK

Percentage

Country

Internet Penetration (% of TotalPopulation)

Online Grocery Penetration (% ofTotal Population)

9B15M010

EXHIBIT 2 (CONTINUED): CROSS-COUNTRY COMPARISON OF OVERALL GROCERY RETAIL MARKET AND ONLINE GROCERY RETAIL MARKET (2013)

Source:Developed by the authors using “The State of Online Grocery Retail in Europe,” SyndicatePlus, May 21, 2014, http://syndicateplus.com/the-state-of-online-grocery-retail-in-europe, accessed October 27, 2014.

EXHIBIT 3: APPROXIMATE COST AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL COST

Activity Traditional retailing (%) Online grocery

(%) Cost of goods sold 75 72 Operating cost 17 13 Distribution 4 6 Corporate overhead 3 3 Net profit potential 1 6

Source: J.D. Macht, “Errand Boy,” Inc., www.inc.com/magazine/19961101/1863.html, accessed May 22, 2014.

984.5

266.89 297.01

43.46

259.3

15.4 8.51 1.84 0.36 0.990

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

US France Germany Holland UK

$ Billion

Country

Overall Grocery Retail Market Size($ Billion)

Online Grocery Retail Market Size($ Billion)

9B15M010

EXHIBIT 4: COMPARISON OF ONLINE GROCERY PLAYERS IN INDIA

Company

City/Cities of

Operation (India)

Type of Player Delivery

Type Free

Shipping Payment Options SKUs

Available Food

Products

LocalBanya. com

Mumbai, Domestic (Pure

Online)

Same Day/

Next Day

Only for Orders above $8.17

Internet Banking, Cash on Delivery (COD), Credit

or Debit Card on Delivery, Credit and Debit

Card Payment at Checkout, Food Coupons

>7,000 Domestic (Normal)

Zopnow Bangalore Local (Pure

Online) 3 Hr. Free

Internet Banking, COD, Credit and Debit Card Payment at Checkout,

Food Coupons

>8,500 Domestic (Normal;)

MyGrahak.in Delhi/NCR Local (Pure

Online)

24Hr (Next Day)


Internet Banking for Any Value, COD for Orders

above $817 N/A

Domestic & Imported (Normal)

naturesbasket. co.in

Mumbai, Delhi/NCR, Bangalore, Hyderabad

Domestic (Hybrid)

3 Hr/ Next Day


Internet Banking, COD, Credit and Debit Card Payment at Checkout

N/A Domestic (Gourmet)

Farm2Kitchen. com

Across the Country

Domestic (Hybrid)

N/A


Internet Banking, Credit and Debit Card Payment at Checkout, Cash Cards

N/A Domestic

(Only Organic)

AaramShop. com

Across the Country (52

Cities)

Domestic (Market-place)

Same Day

Depends on the Local

Retailer

Depends on the Local Retailer

N/A Domestic &

Imported (Normal)

BigBasket. com

Mumbai, Bangalore

Hyderabad,

Domestic (Pure Online)

Same Day/Next

Day


COD and Card on Delivery, Credit and Debit

Card Payment at Checkout, Food Coupons

>10,000

Domestic & Imported (Normal, Organic,

Gourmet, i.e., All Types of

Food) Source: Developed by the authors from: www.localbanya.com/delivery-details; www.localbanya.com/faq; www.localbanya.com/about-us; www.localbanya.com/; www.zopnow.com/delivery.php#list; www.zopnow.com/delivery.php#3hour; www.zopnow.com/payments.php#delivery; www.zopnow.com/payments.php#howdoi; http://inc42.com/buzz/hyperlocal-delivery-startups-gains-momentum-after-zopnow-grofers-peppertap-gets-funded/; www.zopnow.com/;www.weareopen.in/Contact-Us; www.weareopen.in/24-Hours-Dispatch; www.weareopen.in/Free-Shipping; www.weareopen.in/Cash-on-Delivery; www.weareopen.in/; www.naturesbasket.co.in/HTML/AboutUs.aspx; www.naturesbasket.co.in/HTML/PaymentPolicy.aspx; www.naturesbasket.co.in/index.aspx; www.farm2kitchen.com/index.php/organic-food-home-delivery-cities-india?___store=default#.VW7DI9KqpHw; www.farm2kitchen.com/index.php/shipping-delivery?___store=default; www.farm2kitchen.com/index.php/secure-payment-pricing?___store=default; www.farm2kitchen.com/index.php/; https://www.aaramshop.com/aaram-shop/store-locator; www.aaramshoppro.com/2012/07/amazon-says-it-cant-scale-same-day.html; https://www.aaramshop.com/faqs#; https://www.aaramshop.com/; http://bigbasket.com/about-us/; http://bigbasket.com/?next=%2F, accessed May 22, 2014.

9B15M010

EXHIBIT 5: USER BASE AND AVERAGE ORDER SIZE

Company City of Operation User Base Average Order Size

($) BigBasket.com Bangalore, Mumbai, Hyderabad 100,000 21.65

LocalBanya.com Mumbai 17,000 21.20 Zopnow.com Bangalore 25,000 21.20

Note: Data is as of April 30, 2013. Source: Developed by the authors from http://techcircle.vccircle.com/2013/05/29/how-bigbasket-is-breaking-out-of-the-pack-in-grocery-e-tailing-and-whats-next-on-cards/; http://bigbasket.com/in-media/in-media-11Nov13/; http://vyapaari.in/knowing-customer-better-customer-service/; http://yourstory.com/2014/05/grocery-veggies-e-tailer-localbanya-processes-600-orders-daily-raise-5m-soon/; http://forbesindia.com/printcontent/35899; http://retailview.in/blog/tag/zopnow/, accessed June 1, 2014.

EXHIBIT 6: PRODUCT PRICE COMPARISON OF BIGBASKET.COM WITH ORGANIZED BRICK AND

MORTAR RETAIL STORES (HYDERABAD, INDIA)

Category Item Weight/pc Price in $ at

Organized Retail Stores*

Price in $ at BigBasket.com**

Fruits

Apples (Shimla) 3pc 1.96 1.60 Bananas (Robusta)Large 1kg 0.41 0.46

Oranges (Kinnow) 1 kg 0.98 0.75 Guavas 1 kg 0.65 0.65

Grapes (Bangalore) 1 kg 1.09 0.82 Figs 10 pc 1.06 0.82

Pomegranates 1 kg 3.26 2.77 Kiwis 3 pc 1.96 1.86

Strawberries 1kg 3.52 3.13

Vegetables

French Beans 1kg 0.98 0.62 Lemons 6 pc 0.29 0.34

Cucumbers 1kg 0.52 0.42 Coriander 1kg 3.43 3.43 Cauliflower 3 pc 1.57 1.22 Potatoes 1 kg 0.46 0.36 Tomatoes 1kg 0.33 0.23

Onions 1 kg 0.33 0.36 Capsicum 1kg 0.73 0.64 Cabbage 3pc 1.11 0.98

Peas 1kg 0.39 0.47 Button Mushrooms 1kg 3.26 3.26

Sweet Corn 3 pc 0.78 0.69 Carrots 1kg 0.82 0.82

Dry Fruits

Peanuts 1kg 1.96 1.89 Almonds 1kg 16.15 15.01 Cashews 1kg 14.19 12.23 Resins 1kg 7.41 7.01

Meat Fresh Chicken 1kg 3.69 3.30

Mutton 1kg 7.88 7.81 Note: *Average price of items across three organized retail stores (Big Bazaar, Spencer and More) in Hyderabad, for a period of seven days from May 1, 2014 to November 1, 2014. ** Average price of items atBigBasket.com (Hyderabad website), for a period of seven days from May 1, 2014 to November 1, 2014. Source: Developed by the authors.

9B15M010 EXHIBIT 7: PERFOMANCE OF HYBRID AND PURE ONLINE GROCERY RETAILERS ACROSS THE

GLOBE (2013)

Country Total Grocery Retail

Revenue ($

Millions)

Total Online

Grocery Retail

Revenue ($

Millions)

% of Online Grocery Retail

Revenue as Compared to

Total Grocery Retail

Revenue

Total Grocery Retail

Revenue (Excluding

Online Grocery Retail

Revenue) ($ Millions)

Grocery Retailer Type

U.S.A.

AmazonFresh 60 60 100 0 Pure Online Player

Peapod 525 525 100 0 Pure Online Player

FreshDirect 400 400 100 0 Pure Online Player

Safeway 36,139 200 0.55 35,939 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)

France

Carrefour 35,438 775 2.20 34,663 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)

GroupeAuchan 20,200 1,025 5.07 19,175 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)

U.K.

Tesco 43,579 2,500 5.74 41,079 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)

Sainsbury’s 24,632 1,000 4.06 23,632 Hybrid (Online + Physical Store)

Ocado 852 852 100 0 Pure Online Player

Source: Developed by the authors using “The State of Online Grocery Retail in Europe,” SyndicatePlus, May 21, 2014, http://syndicateplus.com/the-state-of-online-grocery-retail-in-europe, accessed October 27, 2014.

9B15M010 ENDNOTES 1 This case has been written on the basis of published sources only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives presented in this case are not necessarily those of BigBasket.com or any of its employees. 2 D. Ganguly and D. Gupta, “Online Grocers Like Bigbasket, Satvikshop and Ekstop All Set to Make the Big Leap Home,” The Economic Times, April 17, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-04-17/news/38616471_1_grocery-indiatimes-shopping-bigbasket-com, accessed March 28, 2014. 3 “Chasing Profits, Kishore Biyani’s Future Group Shut 40% of Food Bazaar Stores In 2013,” The Financial Express, April 5, 2014, www.financialexpress.com/news/chasing-profits-kishore-biyanis-future-group-shut-40-of-food-bazaar-stores-in-2013/1238493, accessed March 28, 2014. 4 R. Dharmakumar, “Groceries Online, Will It Click?” Forbes India, June 16, 2012, http://forbesindia.com/article/work-in-progress/groceries-online-will-it-click/33064/1, accessed March 28, 2014. 5 “Trinethra Acquires Grocery Retail Chain Fabmall,” Business Line, December 22, 2004, www.thehindubusinessline.in/2004/12/23/stories/2004122302630400.htm, accessed April 10, 2014. 6 “Trinethra: Birla’s First Retail Takeover,” The Economic Times, January 3, 2007, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2007-01-03/news/28401908_1_trinethra-food-retailing-retail-foray, accessed January 31, 2015. 7 S. Srivastava, “E-Commerce Blooms with Rising Internet Penetration,” The Indian Express, December 28, 2013, http://archive.indianexpress.com/news/ecommerce-blooms-with-rising-internet-penetration/1212632, accessed April 2, 2014. 8 “Study Finds Factors That Have Changed Consumer Buying Behaviour in India,” The Times of India, February 6, 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/Study-finds-factors-that-have-changed-consumer-buying-behaviour-in-India/articleshow/29962568.cms, accessed April 12, 2014. 9 “K Ganesh Invests in Local Services Delivery Platform Delyver.Com,” Reuters, June 14, 2012, http://in.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/k-ganesh-invests-in-local-services-deliv-idINDEE85D0CN20120614, accessed April 15, 2014. 10 S. Ganguly, “E-Buying Picks Up as Indians Now Shop for Breads and Butter Online,” The Economic Times, July 4, 2013, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2013-07-04/news/40371791_1_indian-shopper-retailers-struggle-retail-space, accessed April 2, 2014. 11 Tech-savvy refers to a segment of people who have a lot of knowledge about modern technology, especially computers. Such people are highly proficient in using computers and especially the Internet. Cambridge Dictionaries Online, http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/business-english/tech-savvy, accessed April15, 2014. 12 P. Bhattacharya, “The Rise of India’s ‘Neo Middle Class,’” Live Mint, December 31, 2012, www.livemint.com/Opinion/1bdWFKo9ImvhFySfrCI3aJ/The-rise-of-Indias-neo-middle-class.html, accessed March 29, 2014. 13 “Click on That Shopping Cart,” The Hindu, January 20, 2013, www.thehindu.com/features/metroplus/click-on-that-shopping-cart/article4323209.ece, accessed April 8, 2014. 14 All currencies are in US$ unless otherwise stated. On January 31, 2015, US$1 = INR62.10. 15 “Technology Driving Growth In Grocery E-Retailing in India,” The Economic Times, April 24, 2012, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-04-24/news/31392612_1_online-retailers-grocery-customer, accessed March 26, 2014. 16 L.H. Harps, “Best Practices in Today’s Distribution Centre,” inbound logistics, May 2005, www.inboundlogistics.com/cms/article/best-practices-in-todays-distribution-center, accessed April 9, 2014. 17 C., Guglielmo, “Can Webvan Deliver the Goods?” Inter@ctive Week, February 7, 2000, www.zdnet.com/article/can-webvan-deliver, accessed April 16, 2014; Both the cost of a non-automated warehouse ($4 million) and the cost of an automated warehouse ($35 million) in 2000, if adjusted for inflation,were around $5.5 million and $48 million, respectively, in 2014 (“Inflation Calculator,” DaveManuel.com, www.davemanuel.com/inflation-calculator.php, accesssed July 12, 2014). 18 A. Shrivastava, “Online Grocery Stores Set Their Clocks Faster,” ETRetail.com, June 5, 2014, http://retail.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/e-commerce/e-tailing/online-grocery-stores-set-their-clocks-faster/36101323, accessed June 25, 2014. 19 P. Relan, “Where Webvan Failed and How Home Delivery 2.0 Could Succeed,” TechCrunch, September 27, 2013, http://techcrunch.com/2013/09/27/why-webvan-failed-and-how-home-delivery-2-0-is-addressing-the-problems,accessed April 23, 2014. 20 Kirana stores are small, usually family-owned shops selling groceries and other goods. Many Kirana shops sell products other than food, such as clothing, household items, stationery, toys, tools and medicines. Small Kirana stores, which are generally located on the corners of streets and known as katta or tapri, sell cigarettes, tobacco and tea. See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/kirana, accessed April 20, 2014. 21 R. Kamath, “Spurred by Amazon Model, Online Supermarkets Push Ahead,” Business Standard, July 20, 2013, www.business-standard.com/article/companies/spurred-by-amazon-model-online-supermarkets-push-ahead-113071900746_1.html, accessed April 28, 2014. 22 Forbes India, op. cit. 23 T. Khan, “Wafer-Thin Margins,” Business Today, May 13, 2012, http://businesstoday.intoday.in/story/e-grocery-start-up-funding-in-india/1/24338.html, accessed April 18, 2014.

9B15M010 24 S. Gulati, “How Bigbasket Is Breaking Out of the Pack in Grocery E-Tailing and What’s Next on Cards,” techcircle.in, May 29, 2013, http://techcircle.vccircle.com/2013/05/29/how-bigbasket-is-breaking-out-of-the-pack-in-grocery-e-tailing-and-whats-next-on-cards, accessed April 17, 2014. 25 Forbes India, op. cit. 26 Ibid. 27 P. Abrar, “Grocery E-Tailer Bigbasket in Talks to Raise Rs 300 Crore,” The Economic Times, April 21, 2014, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-04-21/news/49290932_1_grocery-300-crore-talks, accessed June 12, 2014. 28 “Retail Operations: Six Success Factors for a Tough Market,” Ernst and Young LLP, 2013, www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Retail_Operations_-_Six_success_factors_for_a_tough_market/$FILE/EY_Retail_Operations_-_Six_success_factors_for_a_tough_market.pdf, accessed May 18, 2014. 29 Business Today, op. cit. 30 S. Sengupta, “Hari Menon on Taking Bigbasket to Rs 100 Crore Revenues,” BigBasket.com, July 4, 2013, http://bigbasket.com/in-media/in-media-04jul13, accessed April 11, 2014. 31 Business Today, op. cit. 32 V. Krishna, “Now, Add to Online Cart: Groceries,” Business World, September 29, 2012, www.businessworld.in/news/business/internet/now-add-to-online-cart-groceries/553224/page-1.html,accessed May 23, 2014. 33 K.V. Kurmanath, “E-Commerce Site Bigbasket Bets on Technology to Cut Costs,” Business Line, May 27, 2013, www.thehindubusinessline.com/industry-and-economy/info-tech/ecommerce-site-bigbasket-bets-on-technology-to-cut-costs/article4756748.ece, accessed January 5, 2014. 34 A geocode refers to the geographic code or pin code of a city or area. Geocoding can be defined as the process of locating points on the surface of the Earth from alphanumeric address data. See “A Flexible Addressing System for Approximate Geocoding,”www.geoinfo.info/geoinfo2003/papers/geoinfo2003-25.pdf, accessed January 9, 2014. 35 “Interview with Hari Menon, CEO and Founder Bigbasket.Com,” Retail Angle, January 21, 2013, www.wwww.retailangle.com/Newsdetail.asp?Newsid=4665&Newstitle=Interview_with_Hari_Menon,_CEO_and_founder_Bigbasket.com, accessed April 10, 2014. 36 According to Hari Menon, CEO of BigBasket.com, “When you reach a particular volume, you move from the just-in-time model to what is called the warehouse stocking model. That is where we are as far as Bangalore is concerned. We buy products directly from the supplies, like Unilever and Procter & Gamble, we buy from farmers and mills and stock the products in the warehouse. We stock a certain number of days of sales, depending on the product and sales. We are able to set initial inventory levels and then decide what the re-ordering levels are. So it is all completely automated.” See, “Hari Menon on taking BigBasket to Rs 100 crore revenues,” BigBasket.com, July 4, 2013, http://bigbasket.com/in-media/in-media-04jul13/, accessed April 20, 2014. 37 “Read More on: Start-up Corner | Vipul Parekh | Hari Menon | Sushanto Mitra | Abhinay Choudhari | V S Ramesh | V S Sudhakar,” BigBasket.com, http://bigbasket.com/in-media/in-media-11Nov13, accessed March 21, 2014. 38 M.A. Chanchani, “We Want to Scale Up Profitably: Hari Menon, CEO, BigBasket.com,” techcircle.in, March 7, 2012, http://techcircle.vccircle.com/2012/03/07/we-want-to-scale-up-profitably-bigbasket-com-ceo-hari-menon, accessed May 10, 2014. 39 In South Asia, a mandi or sabzimandi is the name given to a wholesale market dealing with fresh fruits and vegetables. Most towns and cities of India have one or more than mandi. 40 “Hari Menon on Taking Bigbasket to Rs 100 Crore Revenues,” BigBasket.com, op. cit. 41 R. Kamath and A. Soni, “Meet the New- Age Grocers,” The Economic Times, March 17, 2014, www.business-standard.com/article/companies/meet-the-new-age-grocers-114031700051_1.html, accessed January 31, 2015. 42 “Grocery E-Tailer Bigbasket in Talks to Raise Rs 300 Crore,” The Economic Times, op. cit. 43 Ibid. 44 V. Minda, “BigBasket Uses AssetTrackr’s Vehicle Tracking Solution to Optimize ‘on-time’ Delivery,” AssetTrackr, July 15, 2013, www.assettrackr.com/blog/case-study/bigbasket-uses-assettrackrs-tracking-solution-to-optimize-on-time-delivery, accessed April 24, 2014. 45 “Bangalore-Based E-Grocery Store Bigbasket.Com to Expand to Mumbai and Hyderabad,” Buzzom, July 25, 2012, www.buzzom.com/2012/07/bangalore-based-e-grocery-store-bigbasket-com-to-expand-to-mumbai-and-hyderabad, accessed June 14, 2014. 46 Ibid. 47 “Online Grocers Like Big Basket, Satvikshop and Ekstop All Set to Make the Big Leap Home,” The Economic Times, op. cit. 48 “A Basket for One and All,” Business Standard, November 11, 2013, www.business-standard.com/article/companies/a-basket-for-one-and-all-113111100012_1.html, accessed April 10, 2014. 49 The customer acquisition cost is made up of the resources that a business needs to acquire one more additional customer. The CAC approximates all the sales and marketing communication costs to acquire an individual customer. See www.forentrepreneurs.com/startup-killer/, accessed April 20, 2014. 50 BigBasket.com, http://bigbasket.com, accessed April 20, 2014.

9B15M010 51 Millennials, or the Millennial Generation, also known as Generation Y, are a demographic cohort. There are no precise dates for when the generation starts and ends. Commentators use beginning birth years from the early 1980s to the early 2000s. See www.generationy.com/definition/, accessed April 20, 2014. 52 “Grocery E-tailer BigBasket.com Raises $10M from Ascent Capital,” techcircle.in, March 5, 2012, http://techcircle.vccircle.com/2012/03/05/grocery-e-tailer-bigbasket-com-raises-10m-from-ascent-capital, accessed May 10, 2014. 53 “Testimonials from Our Customers,” BigBasket.com, http://bigbasket.com/customer-speak, accessed April 12, 2014. 54 A. Chandr, “Reliving a Bigger, Better Dream,” The Indian Express, May 25, 2013, www.newindianexpress.com/cities/bangalore/Reliving-a-bigger-Better-dream/2013/05/25/article1605148.ece, accessed April 12, 2014. 55 “Just One Click to Fill the Fridge,” The Times of India, November 8, 2012, http://mobilepaper.timesofindia.com/mobile.aspx?article=yes&pageid=8&sectid=edid=&edlabel=BGMIR&mydateHid=02-11-2012&pubname=Mirror+-+Bangalore&edname=&articleid=Ar00800&publabel=MM, accessed May 31, 2014. 56 “Tutorvista Founders to Invest in Bigbasket.Com and 3 Other Ecommerce Verticals,” IndiaDigitalReview.com, January 16, 2012, www.indiadigitalreview.com/news/k-ganesh-meena-ganesh-invest-bigbasketcom-and-3-other-ecommerce-verticals, accessed May 22, 2014. 57 Business Today, op. cit. 58 “Zopnow Takes a Crack at Online Grocery,” IBN Live, August 30, 2013, http://ibnlive.in.com/news/zopnow-takes-a-crack-at-online-grocery/418386-55.html, accessed July 1, 2014. 59 “Big Basket Approaching Break Even in Bangalore; Looking to Raise INR 200 Cr; Awaiting PM’s Approval,” iamwire, June 17, 2014, www.iamwire.com/2014/06/big-basket-approaching-break-bangalore-raise-inr-200-cr-awaiting-pms-approval, accessed July 1, 2014. 60 M. Raskino, “Safeway to Adopt British Tesco’s Successful E-Grocery Model,” Gartner, July 3, 2001, https://www.gartner.com/doc/334191/safeway-adopt-british-tescos-successful, accessed April 14, 2014. 61 R. Kamath and A. Soni, “Meet the New-Age Grocers,” Business Standard, March 17, 2014, www.business-standard.com/article/companies/meet-the-new-age-grocers-114031700051_1.html, accessed June 12, 2014. 62 M. Sharma, “Indian Online Grocery Startup Plans $15M Expansion across Nation,” ZDNet, April 26, 2013, www.zdnet.com/in/indian-online-grocery-startup-plans-15m-expansion-across-nation-7000014504, accessed May 7, 2014. 63 Ibid. 64 “Bigbasket Raises Rs 200 Cr,” Business Standard, September 15, 2014, www.business-standard.com/article/companies/bigbasket-raises-rs-200-cr-114091400782_1.html, accessed September 16, 2014.

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