bill of rights and due process cases

7/21/2019 Bill of Rights and Due Process Cases

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Fundamental Principles and Bill of Rights

Republic of the Philippines Supreme Court Manila THIRD DIVISION

ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI vs PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,G.R. No. 168081; October 17, 2008

D E C I S I O N

REYES, R.T., J .: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who was dismissed because of

his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline company.He is now before this Court via a petition for review on certiorari claiming that he was illegally

dismissed. To buttress his stance, he argues that (1) his dismissal does not fall under 282(e) of the LaborCode; (2) continuing adherence to the weight standards of the company is not a bona fide occupationalqualification; and (3) he was discriminated against because other overweight employees were promoted insteadof being disciplined.

After a meticulous consideration of all arguments pro and con , We uphold the legality ofdismissal. Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. T his is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflectiveof his moral character.

The Facts

Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc.(PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (58) with a large body frame. The proper weight for a man of hisheight and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by theCabin and Crew Administration Manua l[1] of PAL.

The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on anextended vacation leave fromDecember 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns. Apparently,petitioner fail ed to meet the companys weight standards, prompting another leave without pay from March5, 1985 to November 1985.

After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioners weightproblem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line withcompany policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989. He was formallyrequested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on severaldates. He was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to doso. He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989 .[2]

On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check. It was discovered that he gained, instead oflosing, weight. He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status was retained.

On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residenceto check on the progress of his effort to lose weight. Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from hisprevious weight. After the visit, petitioner made a commitmen t [3] to reduce weight in a letter addressed toCabin Crew Group Manager Augusto Barrios. The letter, in full, reads:

Dear Sir:I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217

pounds to 200 pounds from today until 31 Dec. 1989. From thereon, I promise to continuereducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal weight is achieved.Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule youwill set for my w eight check.

Respectfully Yours,F/S Armando Yrasuegui[4]

Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained

overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until suctime that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards. Again, he was directed to report every two wefor weight checks.

Petitioner failed to report for weight checks. Despite that, he was given one more month to complwith the weight requirement. As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates. He wasreminded that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight standards .

Again, petitioner failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting his passport fprocessing at the PALStaff Service Division.

On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight checwould be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight check dates .[6] Again, petitioner ignthe directive and did not report for weight checks. On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain hisrefusal to undergo weight checks .[7]

When petitioner tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds. Clearly, he was stillover his ideal weight of 166 pounds.

From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for lenie

on the latter part of 1992. He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violacompany standards on weight requirements. He was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge within wto file his answer and submitcontroverting evidence .[8]

On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer .[9] Notably, he did not deny beingoverweight. What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL siaction has been taken by the company regarding his case since 1988. He also claimed that PAL discrimagainst him because the company has not been f air in treating the cabin c rew members who are similarlysituated.

On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he wasundergoing a weight reduction program to lose at least two ( 2) pounds per week so as to attain his idealweight.[10]

On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his idweight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him w hich spanned a period covering a total of

almost five (5) years, his services were considered terminated effective immediately. [11]

His motion for reconsideration having been denied ,[12] petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dism

against PAL.

Labor Arbiter, NLRC and CA Dispositions On November 18, 1998, Labor Arbiter Valentin C. Reyes ruled[13] that petitioner was illegally

dismissed. The dispositive part of the Arbiter ruling runs as follows:
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WHEREFORE, in view of the f oregoing, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring thecomplainants dismissal illegal, and ordering the respondent to reinstate him to his formerposition or substantially equivalent one, and to pay him:

a. Backwages of Php10,500.00 per month from his dismissal on June 15, 1993 untilreinstated, which for purposes of appeal is hereby set from June 15, 1993 up to August 15,1998 at P651,000.00;

b. Attorneys fees of five percent (5%) of the total award .SO ORDERED.[14]

The Labor Arbiter held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of the nature of the jobof petitioner .[15] However, the weight standards need not be complied with under pain of dismissal since his

weight did not hamper the performance of his duties .[16]

Assuming that it did, petitioner could be transferred toother positions where his weight would not be a negative factor .[17] Notably, other overweight employees, i.e.,Mr. Palacios, Mr. Cui, and Mr. Barrios, were promoted instead of being disciplined .[18]

Both parties appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) .[19] On October 8, 1999, the L abor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing the reinstatement of

petitioner without loss of seniority rights and other benefits .[20] On February 1, 2000, the Labor Arbiterdenied[21] the Motion to Quash Writ of E xecutio n[22] of PAL. On March 6, 2000, PAL appealed the denial of itsmotion to quash to the NLRC .[23] On June 23, 2000, the NLRC rendered judgmen t [24] in the following tenor:

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the Decision of the Arbiter dated 18November 1998 as modified by our findings herein, is hereby A FFIRMEDand that part of thedispositive portion of said decision concerning complainants entitlement to backwages shallbe deemed to refer t o complainants entitlement to his full backwages, inclusive ofallowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent instead ofsimplybackwages, from date of dismissal until his actual reinstatement or finality hereof.

Respondent is enjoined to manifests ( sic) its choice of the form of the reinstatement ofcomplainant, whether physical or through payroll within ten (10) days from notice failingwhich, the same shall be deemed as complainants reinstatement through payroll andexecution in case of non-payment shall accordingly be issued by the Arbiter. Both appeals ofrespondent thus, are DISMISSEDfor utter lack of merit .[25]

According to the NLRC, obesity, or the tendency to gain weight uncontrollably regardless of theamount of food intake, is a disease in itself. [26] As a consequence, there can be no intentional defiance orserious misconduct by petitioner to the lawful order of PAL for him to lose weight .[27] Like the Labor Arbiter, theNLRC found the weight standards of PAL to be reasonable. However, it found as unnecessary the Labor Arbiterholding that petitioner was not remiss in the performance of his duties as flight steward despite beingoverweight. According to the NLRC, the Labor Arbiter should have limited himself to the issue of whetherthe failure of petitioner to attain his ideal weight constituted willful defiance of the weight standards of PAL .[28]

PAL moved for reconsideration to no avail .[29] Thus, PAL elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals(CA) via a petition forcertiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure .[30]

By Decision dated August 31, 2004, the CA reversed[31] the NLRC:WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the petition. The assailed

NLRC decision is declared NULL and VOID and is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondentscomplaint is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.[32]

The CA opined that there was grave abuse of discretion on the par t of the NLRC because it lookedwrong and irrelevant considerations [33] in evaluating the evidence of the parties. Contrary to the NLRC rthe weight standards of PAL are meant to be a continuing qualification for an employees position .[34] Thto adhere to the weight standards is an analogous causefor the dismissal of an employee under Article 282(e)the Labor Code in relation to Article 282(a). It is not willful disobedience as the NLRC seemed to suggest .the CA, the element of willfulness that the NLRC decision cites is an irrelevant consideration in arriving at aconclusion on whether the dismissal is legally proper. [36] In other words, the relevant question to ask is notone of willfulness but one of reasonableness of the standard and whether or not the employee qualifies orcontinues to qualify under this sta ndard. [37]

Just like the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL arereasonable .[38] Thus, petitioner was legally dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed

weight standards .[39]

It is obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposescaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight .[40] On May 10, 2005, the CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration .[41] Elaborating on its e

ruling, the CA held that the weight standards of PAL are a bona fide occupational qualification which, in casviolation, justifies an employees separation from the service. [42]

Issues In this Rule 45 petition for review, the following issues are posed for resolution:

I. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDINGTHATPETITIONERS OBESITY CAN BE A GROUND FOR DISMISSAL UNDERPARAGRAPH (e) OF ARTICLE 282 OF THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES

II. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDINGTHATPETITIONERS DISMISSAL FOR OBESITY CAN BE PREDICATED ON THE BONA

FIDE OCCUPATIONAL QUALIFICATION (BFOQ) DEFENSE;

III. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDINGTHAT PETITIONER WAS NOT UNDULY DISCRIMINATED AGAINST WHEN HEDISMISSED WHILE OTHER OVERWEIGHT CABIN ATTENDANTS WERE EITHFLYING DUTIES OR PROMOTED;

IV. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT BRASIDE PETITIONERS CLAIMS FOR REINSTATEMENT *AND+ WAGES ALLEGEDLY FBEING MOOT AND ACADEMIC.[43] (Underscoring supplied)

Our Ruling

I. The obesity of petitioner is a ground for dismissal under Article 282(e) [44] of the Labor Code

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than that they constitute acontinuing qualification of an employee in order to keep the job. Tersely put, an employee may be dismissedmoment he is unable to comply with his ideal weight as prescribed by the weight standards. The dismissal oemployee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. As explained by the CA:

x x x*T+he standards violated in this case were not mere orders of the employer;they were the prescribed weights that a cabin crew must maintain in order to qualify forand keep his or her position in the company . In other words, they were standards that
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establish continuing qualifications for an employees position. In this sense, the failure tomaintain these standards does not fall under Article 282(a) whose express terms require theelement of willfulness in order to be a ground for dismissal. The failure to meet theemployers qualifying standards is in fact a ground that does not squarely fall under grounds(a) to (d) and is therefore one that falls under Article 282(e) the other causes analogous tothe foregoing.

By its nature, these qualifying standards are norms that apply prior to and after anemployee is hired. They apply prior to employment because these are the standards a jobapplicant must initially meet in order to be hired. They apply after hiring because anemployee must continue to meet these standards while on the job in order to keep his job. Under this perspective, a violation is not one of the faults for which an employee can be

dismissed pursuant to pars. (a) to (d) of Article 282; the employee can be dismissed simplybecause he no longer qualifies for his job irrespective of whether or not the failure toqualify was willful or intentional. x x x[45]

Petitioner, though, advances a very interesting argument. He claims that obesity is a physical abnormalityand/or illness. [46] Relying on Nadura v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. ,[47] he says his dismissal is illegal:

Conscious of the fact that Naduras case cannot be made to fall squarely within thespecific causes enumerated in subparagraphs 1(a) to (e),Benguet invokes the provisions ofsubparagraph 1(f) and says that Naduras illness occasional attacks of asthma is a causeanalogous to them.

Even a cursory reading of the legal provision under consideration is sufficient toconvince anyone that, as the trial c ourt said, i llness cannot be included as an analogouscause by any stretch of imagination.

It is clear that, except the just cause mentioned in sub-paragraph 1(a), all the othersexpressly enumerated in the law are due to the voluntary and/or willful act of the

employee. How Naduras illness could be considered as analogous to any of them isbeyond our understanding, there being no claim or pretense that the same was contractedthrough his own voluntary act .[48]

The reliance on Nadura is off-tangent. The factual milieu in Nadura is substantially different from the caseat bar. First, Nadura was not decided under the Labor Code. The law applied in that case was Republic Act (RA)No. 1787. Second, the issue of flight safety is absent in Nadura , thus, the rationale there cannot applyhere. Third, in Nadura , the employee who was a miner,was laid off from work because of illness, i.e.,asthma. Here, petitioner was dismissed for his failure to meet the weight standards ofPAL. He was notdismissed due to illness. Fourth, the issue in Nadura is whether or not the dismissed employee is entitled toseparation pay and damages. Here, the issue centers on the propriety of the dismissal of petitioner for hisfailure to meet the weight standards of PAL. Fifth, in Nadura , the employee was not accorded due process.Here, petitioner was accorded utmost leniency. He was given more than four (4) years to comply with the weightstandards of PAL.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that obesity is a

disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly shows that it is possible for him to loseweight given the proper attitude, determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearingon December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that *t+he issue is could I bring my weight down to idealweight which is 172, then the an swer is yes. I can do it now. [49]

True, petitioner claims that reducing weight is costing him a lot of expenses. [50] However, petitionerhas only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of the company physician, per the adviceof PAL.[51] He chose to ignore the suggestion. In fact, he repeatedly failed to report when required to undergo

weight checks, without offering a valid explanation. Thus, his fluctuating weight indicates absence of willpowrather than an illness.

Petitioner cites Bonnie Cook v. State of Rhode Island , Department of Mental Health, Retardation andHospitals ,[52]decided by the United States Court of Appeals (First Circuit). In that case, Cook worked fromto 1980 and from 1981 to 1986 as an institutional attendant for the mentally retarded at the Ladd Center thatwas being operated by respondent. She twice resigned voluntarily with an unblemished record. Evenrespondent admitted that her performance met the Centers legitimate expectations. In 1988, Cook re-afor a similar position. At that time, she stood 52 tall and weighed over 320 pounds. Respondent claimthe morbid obesity of plaintiff compromised her ability to evacuate patients in case of emergency and it also her at greater risk of serious diseases.

Cook contended that the action of respondent amounted to discrimination on the basis of a

handicap. This was in direct violation of Section 504(a) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 ,[53]

which incorpthe remedies contained in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Respondent claimed, however, that morbobesity could never constitute a handicap within the purview of the Rehabilitation Act. Among others, obesia mutable condition, thus plaintiff could simply lose weight and ri d herself of concomitant disability.

The appellate Court disagreed and held that morbid obesity is a disability under the Rehabilitation and that respondent discriminated against Cook based on perceived disability. The evidence included etestimony that morbid obesity is a physiological disorder. It involves a dysfunction of both the metabolic sysand the neurological appetite suppressing signal system, which is capable of causing adverse effects withmusculoskeletal, respiratory, and cardiovascular systems. Notably, the Court stated that mutability is relevantonly in determining the substantiality of the limitation flowing from a given impairment, thus mutability onlyprecludes those conditions that an indiv idual can easily and quickly r everse by behavioral alteration.

Unlike Cook, however, petitioner is not morbidly obese. In the words of the District Court for theDistrict of Rhode Island, Cook was sometime before 1978 at least one hundred pounds more th an what iconsidered appropriate of her height. According to the Circuit Judge, Cook weighed over 320 pounds in1988. Clearly, that is not the case here. At his heaviest, petitioner was only less than 50 pounds over his ide

weight. In fine, We hold that the o besity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flightattendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code that justifies his dismissal frothe service. His obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it,*v+oluntariness basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any externaforce influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes under Article 282, whethey be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, iconsidered voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d). [54]

II. The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational qualification defenEmployment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex, religion, or national or

unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing th job. The qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ).[55] In the United States, therefew federal and many state job discrimination laws that contain an exception allowing an employer to engagean otherwise unlawful form of pr ohibited discrimination when the action is based on a BFOQ necessary to th

normal operation of a business or enterprise .[56]

Petitioner contends that BFOQ is a statutory defense. It does not exist if there is no statute providifor it.[57] Further, there is no existing BFOQ statute that could justify his dismissal .[58]

Both arguments must fail.

First, the Constitution ,[59] the Labor Code,[60] and RA No. 7277[61] or the Magna Carta for DisablePersons[62] containprovisions similar to BFOQ.
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Second, in British Columbia Public Service Employee Commission (BSPSERC) v. The British ColumbiaGovernment and Service Employees Union (BCGSEU) ,[63] the Supreme Court of Canada adopted the so -calledMeiorin Test in determining whether an employment policy is justified. Under this test, (1) the employer mustshow that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally connected to the performance of the job ;[64] (2) theemployer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessar y[65]to the accomplishment of that work-relatedpurpose; and (3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to accomplishthe legitimate work-related purpose. Similarly, in Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol ,[66] this Court held that inorder to justify a BFOQ, the employer must prove that (1) the employment qualification is reasonably related tothe essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantiallyall persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job .[67]

In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to

BFOQ .[68]

BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for satisfactory jobperformance. [69] In Duncan Association of Detailman-PTGWTO v. Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc. ,[70] the Court did not

hesitate to pass upon the validity of a company policy which prohibits its employees from marrying employees ofa rival company. It was held that the company policy is reasonable considering that its purpose is the protectionof the interests of the company against possible competitor infiltration on its trade secrets and procedures.

Verily, there is no merit to the argument that BFOQ cannot be applied if it has no supportingstatute. Too, the Labor Arbiter ,[71] NLRC,[72] and CA[73] are one in holding that the weight standards of PAL arereasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its business and for reasons of public policy, is bound toobserve extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers it transports .[74] It is bound to carry itspassengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautiouspersons, with due regard for all the circumstances .[75]

The law leaves no room for mistake or oversight on the part of a common carrier. Thus, it is onlylogical to hold that the weight standards of PAL show its effort to comply with the exacting obligations imposedupon it by law by virtue of being a common carrier.

The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely transport itspassengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its employees, most particularly the cabin flightdeck crew who are on board the aircraft. The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strictnorms of discipline upon its employees.

In other words, the primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crewis flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all times in order to inspirepassenger confidence on their ability to care for the passengers when something goes wrong. It is not farfetchedto say that airline companies, just like all common carriers, thrive due to public confidence on their safetyrecords. People, especially the riding public, expect no less than that airlinecompanies transport theirpassengers to their respective destinations safely and soundly. A lesser performance is unacceptable.

The task of a cabin crew or flight attendant is not limited to serving meals or attending to the whimsand caprices of the passengers. The most important activity of the cabin crew is to care for the safety ofpassengers and the evacuation of the aircraft when an emergency occurs. Passenger safety goes to the core ofthe job of a cabin attendant. Truly, airlines need cabin attendants who have the necessary strength to open

emergency doors, the agility to attend to passengers in cramped working conditions, and the stamina towithstand grueling flight schedules.On board an aircraft, the body weight and size of a cabin attendant are important factors to consider in

case of emergency. Aircrafts have constricted cabin space, and narrow aisles and exit doors. Thus, thearguments of respondent that *w+hether the airlines flight attendants are overweight or not has no directrelation to its mission of tran sporting passengers to their destination; and that the weight standards hasnothing to do with airworthiness of respondents airlines, must fail.

The rationale in Western Air Lines v. Criswel l [76] relied upon by petitioner cannot apply to hiscase. What was involved there were two (2) airline pilots who were denied reassignment as flight engineersupon reaching the age of 60, and a flight engineer who was forced to retire at age 60. They sued the airlinecompany, alleging that the age-60 retirement for flight engineers violated the Age Discrimination in EmploymAct of 1967. Age-based BFOQ and being overweight are not the same. T he case of overweight cabin attendis another matter. Given the cramped cabin space and narrow aisles and emergency exit doors of the airplaneany overweight cabin attendant would certainly have difficulty navigating the cramped cabin area.

In short, there is no need to individually evaluate their ability to perform their task. That an obesecabin attendant occupies more space than a slim one is an unquestionable fact which courts can judiciallyrecognize without introduction of evidence .[77] It would also be absurd to require airline companies toreconfigure the aircraft in order to widen the aisles and exit doors just to accommodate overweight cabin

attendants like petitioner.The biggest problem with an overweight cabin attendant is the possibility of impeding passengers evacuating the aircraft, should the occasion call for it. The job of a cabin attendant during emergencies is tospeedily get the passengers out of the aircraft safely. Being overweight necessarily impedes mobility. Indeean emergency situation, seconds are what cabin attendants are dealing with, not minutes. Three lost secondscan translate into three lost lives. Evacuation might slow down just because a wide-bodied cabin attendant isblocking the narrow aisles. These possibilities are not remote.

Petitioner is also in estoppel. He does not dispute that the weight standards of PAL were made knoto him prior to his employment. He is presumed to know the weight limit that he must maintain at alltimes.[78] In fact, never did he question the authority of PAL when he was repeatedly asked to trim dowhis weight. Bona fides exigit ut quod convenit fiat . Good faith demands that what is agreed upon shall bedone. Kung ang tao ay tapat kanyang tutuparin ang napagkasunduan .

Too, the weight standards of PAL provide for separate weight limitations based on height and bodyframe for both male and female cabin attendants. A progressive discipline is imposed to allow non-compliancabin attendants sufficient opportunity to meet the weight standards. Thus, the clear-cut rules obviate any

possibility for the commission of abuse or arbitrary action on the part ofPAL.

III. Petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that he was discriminated against by PAL .

Petitioner next claims that PAL is using passenger safety as a convenient excuse to discriminate aghim.[79] We are constrained, however, to hold otherwise. We agree with the CA that *t+he element ofdiscrimination came into play in this case as a secondary position for the private respondent in order to escthe consequence of dismissal that being overweight entailed. It is a confession-and-avoidance position thatimpliedly admitted the cause of dismissal, including the reasonableness of the applicable standard and theprivate respondents failure to comply. [80] It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove hisaffirmative allegation .[81]

Since the burden of evidence lies with the party w ho asserts an affirmative allegation, petitioner haprove his allegation with particularity. There is nothing on the records which could support the finding ofdiscriminatory treatment. Petitioner cannot establish discrimination by simply naming the supposed cabinattendants who are allegedly similarly situated with him. Substantial proof must be shown as to how and wh

they are similarly situated and the differential treatment petitioner got from PAL despite the similarity of hissituation with other employees.Indeed, except for pointing out the names of the supposed o verweight cabin attendants, petitioner

miserably failed to indicate their respective ideal weights; weights over their ideal weights; the periods theywere allowed to fly despite their being overweight; the particular flights assigned to them; the discriminatingtreatment they got from PAL; and other relevant data that could have adequately established a case o fdiscriminatory treatment by PAL. In the words of the CA, PAL really had no substantial case of discriminameet. [82]
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We are not unmindful that findings of facts of administrative agencies, like the Labor Arbiter and theNLRC, are accorded respect, even finality .[83] The reason is simple: administrative agencies are experts in matterswithin their specific and specialized jurisdiction .[84] But the principle is not a hard and fast rule. It only applies ifthe findings of facts are duly supported by substantial evidence. If it can be shown that administrative bodiesgrossly misappreciated evidence of such nature so as to compel a conclusion to the contrary, their findings offacts must necessarily be reversed. Factual findings of administrative agencies do not have infallibility and mustbe set aside when they fail the test of arbitrariness .[85]

Here, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC inexplicably misappreciated evidence. We thus annul theirfindings.To make his claim more believable, petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guarant y[86] of theConstitution. However, in the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by theConstitution cannot be invoked .[87] Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of

private individuals .[88]

Indeed, the United States Supreme Court, in interpreting the FourteenthAmendment ,[89] which is the source of our equal protection guarantee, is consistent in saying thatthe equal protection erects no shield against private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful .[90] Privateactions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee .[91]

IV. The claims of petitioner for reinstatement and wages are moot .As his last contention, petitioner avers that his claims fo r reinstatement and wages have not been

mooted. He is entitled to reinstatement and his full backwages, from the time he was illegally dismissed up tothe time that the NLRC was reversed by the CA .[92]

At this point, Article 223 of the Labor Code finds relevance:

In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separatedemployee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory,even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to w ork under the sameterms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the

employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall notstay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

The law is very clear. Although an award or order of reinstatement is self-executory and does notrequire a writ of execution ,[93] the option to exercise actual reinstatement or payroll reinstatement belongs tothe employer. It does not belong to the employee, to the labor tribunals, or even to the courts.

Contrary to the allegation of petitioner that PAL did everything under the sun to frustrate hisimmediate return to his previous position, [94] there is evidence that PAL opted to physically reinstate him to asubstantially equivalent position in accordance with the order of the Labor Arbiter .[95] In fact, petitioner dulyreceived the return to work notice on February 23, 2001, as shown by his signature .[96]

Petitioner cannot take refuge in the pronouncements of the Court in a cas e [97] that *t+he unjustifiedrefusal of the employer to reinstate the dismissed employee entitles him to payment of his salaries effectivefrom the time the employer failed to reinstate him despite the issuance of a writ of execution [98] and even ifthe order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employerto reinstate and pay the wages of the employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher

court. [99]

He failed to prove that he complied with the return to work order of PAL. Neither does itappear on record that he actually rendered services for PAL from the moment he was dismissed, in order toinsist on the payment of his fullbackwages.

In insisting that he be reinstated to his actual position despite being overweight, petitioner in effectwants to render the issues in the present case moot. He asks PAL to comply with the impossible. Time andagain, the Court ruled that the law does not exact compliance with the impossible .[100]

V. Petitioner is entitled to separation pay .

Be that as it may, all is not lost for petitioner. Normally, a legally dismissed employee is not entitleseparation pay. This may be deduced from the language of Article 279 of the Labor Code that *a+n employeewho is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and othprivileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetaryequivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actualreinsta tement. Luckily for petitioner, this is not an ironclad rule.

Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act social justice,based on equity. [102] In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct(2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee .[103]

Here, We grant petitioner separation pay equivalent to one- half (1/2) months pay for every year ofservice.[104] It should include regular allowances which he might have been receiving .[105] We are not blin

fact that he was not dismissed for any serious misconduct or to any act which would reflect on his moralcharacter. We also recognize that his employment with PAL lasted for more or less a decade.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED in thatpetitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui is entitled to separation pay in a n amount equivalent to one- half (1/2) mpay for every year of service, which should include his regular allowances.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT ManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004 REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.RESOLUTIONTINGA, J.:

Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President on December 17, 2003.Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioners Certificate ofCandidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous sinCommissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include petitioner as they believed had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No. 6558. Petitioners Motion forReconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioners Motion forReconsideration and on similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the samunder the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004. The COMELEC declared petitiothirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are notnominated by a political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national constituency

Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then, Commissioner Tancangco had retired.In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari , petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions which were allegedly renderviolation of his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1Constitution, 1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who can af ford to wage a nationwcampaign and/or are nominated by political parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indireamended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign peoplechoose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since he is the most qualified am
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all the presidential candidates, i.e. , he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of thepresident, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under hisleadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in othercountries, and he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form forthe Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that the form does not provide clearand reasonable guidelines for determining the qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for thecandidates bio -data and his program of government.First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.Implicit in the petitioners invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring " equal access to opportunities forpublic office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in hiscase, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations

imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilegeto the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such athrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration ofPrinciples and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not self- executing, 2 andthere is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest ofthe policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional rightbut merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. 3 The disregard of the provision does not giverise to any cause of action before the courts. 4 An inquiry into the intent of the framers 5 produces the same determination that the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26, Ar ticle II had read, "The State shall broadenopportunities to public office and prohibit public dynasties." 6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr.successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the phrase "ensure equal access,"and the substitution of the word "office" to "service." He explained his proposal in this wise:

I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is important would be

equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would necessarily mean that the governmentwould be mandated to create as many offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as arealso possible . That is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that weshould not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer and to limitoffices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal opportunities to access to it,I change the word "broaden." 7 (emphasis supplied)

Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive measures that wouldaccommodate as many people as possible into public office. The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicatesthe design of the framers to cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and notreflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded as the source of positiverights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in the absence of legislation since its eff ective means andreach are not properly defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this rubricappear to be entirely open-ended. 8 Words and phrases such as "equal access," "opportunities," and "publicservice" are susceptible to countless interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not

the intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous foundation from which innatelyunenforceable rights may be sourced.As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may be subjected to limitations.Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to seek elective office are found in the provisions 9 of theOmnibus Election Code on "Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10,2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to give due course to or cancelaCertificate of Candidacy .

As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination, however, the equal access claunot violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to beborne by any one who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no showing that person is exempt from the limitations or the b urdens which they create.Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of Section 69 of the Omnibus ElecCode and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated 10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands ato be accorded due weight.Clearly, therefore, petitioners reliance on the equal access clause i n Section 26, Article II of the Constitution ismisplaced.The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who hnot evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to en

that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account tpractical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greaterthe opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources inpreparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from theconduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviatethese logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely atextbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions. As the United StatSupreme Court held:

[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing of a significantmodicum of support before printing the name of a political organization and its candidates on theballot the interest, if no other, in avoiding confusion, deception and even frustration of thedemocratic [process]. 11

The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it promulgated Resolution No. 6558 oJanuary 2004, adopting the study Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed the COMELECs Comment :

There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of candidates for nationalpositions because the election process becomes a mockery even if those who cannot clearly wage anational campaign are allowed to run. Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List oCandidates, Voters Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs the government. For the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of votes, an additionpage would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY MILLION PESOS (P450,000,000xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they cannot wage a deccampaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no matter how slim. 12

The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance of "nuisance candidates" to rin the elections. Our election laws provide various entitlements for candidates for public off ice, such as watcin every polling place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers, 14 or even the receipt of electoralcontributions. 15Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations of which ar e dependent othe number of candidates in a given election.Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy becomes even more galling. Theorganization of an election with bona fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix cand

with no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair the electoral procesThis is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note j oke. The body would be bogged by irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posat the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice on the part of the State.Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisancecandidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes, "their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of the compelling State inteensure orderly and credible elections by excising impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that dist


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and detract from the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the administration ofelections 16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will ensure thepromotion of free, orderly and honest elections. 17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona

fide candidates for public office shall be free f rom any form of harassment and discrimination. 18 Thedetermination of bona fide candidates is governed by the statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorilydefined in the Omnibus Election Code.Now, the needed factual premises.However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper application in the case of thepetitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailedresolutions of the COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in determining thatpetitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court from reviewing at this instance whether the

COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarilytake into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents purportedly evincing hiscredentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properlypass upon the reproductions as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appendedany document to their respective Comments .The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal and factual. The basis of thefactual determination is not before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of furtherevidence is in order.A word of c aution is in order. What is at stake is petitioners aspiration and offer to serve in the government. Itdeserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due process.As to petitioners attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate o f candidacy, suffice it to say that the formstrictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what acertificate of candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the candidatepossesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by the Constitution and other

election laws.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC forthe reception of further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is anuisance candidate as contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and report its findings to this Courtwith deliberate dispatch.SO ORDERED.

EN BANC [G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997]WIGBERTO E. TAADA et. al.vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, et. al.D E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN, J.:

The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by the membership theretoof the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international business and economic relations amongst

states. It has irreversibly propelled the world towards trade liberalization and economicglobalization. Liberalization, globalization, deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, areushering in a new borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretoforetraditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export subsidies, import quotas,quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best inspecific industries in a market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age- old beggar -thy-neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of goods and services. In

the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru, Increased participation in the world economyhas become the key to domestic economic growth and prosperity. Brief Historical Background

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World War, plans for theestablishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand political body, the United Nations -- wdiscussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton Woods. The first was the World Bank (WB) which was to addresrehabilitation and reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the third, the International TradeOrganization (ITO), which was to foster order and predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateralprotectionist policies that invite challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasincluding its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never took off. What

remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. GATT was a collection of treatiesgoverning access to the economies of treaty adherents with no institutionalized body administering theagreements or dependable system of dispute settlement.

After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the Kennedy Round, the TRound and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth to that administering body -- the World T radeOrganization -- with the signing of the Final Act i n Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTOAgreement by its members .[1]

Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding member with the goaarticulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the Senate (infra), of improving P hilippine access toforeign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particulaagricultural and industrial products. The President also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities forthe services sector x x x, (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty associated with exporting x x x, and ( theattraction of) more investment s into the country. Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mentiohis letter, the Philippines - - and this is of special interest to the legal profession - - will benefit from the WTOsystem of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent WTO settlement bodies called

Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly througnegotiations where solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and whenaturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.The Petition in Brief

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and products of membercountries on the same footing as Filipino s and local products and (2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/orimpairs the constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before thisCourt assails the WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constituti on to develop a self -rand independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give preference to qualifiedFilipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods.

Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in worldwide tradeliberalization and economic globalization? Does it prescribe Philippine integration into a global economy thliberalized, deregulated and privatized? These are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on constitugrounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by the President of the Philippines of t

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) f or the prohibof its implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the assignment ofpublic officials and employees, as well as the use of government properties and resources by respondent-heaof various executive offices concerned therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 9dated December 14, 1994.The Facts

On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary ofthe Department o f Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the Government of th
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Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the UruguayRound of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act, for brevity).

By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, agreed:(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competentauthorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated August 11, 1994 fromthe President of the

bill of rights and due process cases

Documents