binding domestic identity and foreign policy

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Final Foreign Policy Paper Question 1

Both NSC-68 and NSS-2002 were born into imagined crossroads of the

American experience. As it became clear that the United States would

emerge from WWII strengthened, there was a flurry of domestic competition

for post-war American identity and place in the world. Some, like Henry Luce,

asserted a vision that imagined the duty of leadership in an often backwards

world. Others, like the NAACP and the institutions of the Jim Crow South,

rallied for a foreign policy that would either cast aside or affirm the domestic

status quo. In some ways, NSC-68 represented the collusion of these internal

ideological battles with the new specter of the communist menace. Coming in

the wake of September 11, NSS-2002 represented not simply a new awaking

to the terrorist threat, but an America searching for its place in a post Cold

War world. For most Americans, the booming 1990s obscured the reality of a

world decade that saw some of the most heinous civil war, pandemic disease,

genocide, and post-colonial power vacuum politics in history. It was a decade

in which transnational identity affiliations manifested themselves in ways as

diverse as new calls for an International Criminal Court, an enlivened

international humanitarian enterprise, and global terrorist networks. NSS-

2002 finds the Bush Administration trying to thread a line between classic

notions of national sovereignty and international involvement. In some ways,

it is nothing less than an attempt to assert a new transnational economic,

military, and political paradigm on American terms.

This paper undertakes a close textual analysis of each, in order to

demonstrate the similarities, both in rhetoric and objective, that bind the two.

Both set the United States in the contemporary moment and in so doing,

assert a specific mythology of America. Both lay claim to an enemy that

has significance not only as an enemy, but as a domestic specter. Global

Communism previously and Terrorism today represent a self-justifying

apparition as well as a real threat. Both documents assert a set of ideals that

are vague enough to be almost unanimously agreed upon by the American

public and explicit enough to be constantly contravened by administrations

actions. This is the true paradox of efficacy. If one is to judge success by the

extent to which a foreign policy engenders tangibly the values it asserts

rhetorically, both NSC-68 and NSS-2002 are miserable failures. If, however,

the criterion of success is the average Americans willingness to accept the


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asserted ideals and in turn understand their own sense of place, purpose,

morality and importance on the world stage, both have been enormously

successful.

Securing the Ideal

NSC-68 and NSS-2002 are similar in their assertion of an American

identity and vision that transcends foreign policy. Perhaps because they were

both created in times of transition, their first purpose is to lay claim to an

idea of America, from which later policy directives will naturally flow.

Although tenured with a slightly different tone, the projections of America

tread a markedly similar course.

In its very first section, NSC-68 claims that the fundamental purpose of

the US is to maintain the essential elements of individual freedom.1 Indeed,

American society was, for the writers, founded upon the dignity and worth of

the individual. This freedom is not the ends in and of itself, however, for

what springs from it is marvelous diversitythe deep tolerance, and

lawfulness2

NSS-2002 similarly, and much more frequently, takes the protection of

freedom as the fundamental and justifying lynch pin of American policy,

abroad and otherwise. In his introductory letter, President Bush files freedom

of speech, popular participation in government, freedom of worship, private

property, education and more under this banner. Importantly, however, NSS-

2002, unlike NSC-68 does not see freedom threatened by a competing

seductive ideology of totalitarianism. That struggle, claims Bush, was the

domain of the twentieth century.

The delineation and creation of an overarching enemy and threat is

also common to the two documents. In each, a real violent threat takes on

the form of an imagined archetypal specter which serves to place America on

the good side of a Manichean divide. For the framers of NSC-68, this

fundamental other was the Kremlin. For the Bush administration, it is

shadowy networks of global terrorists. Each is important in that their

rhetorical and psychological value gives American foreign policy a sense of

1 American Cold War Strategy 262 American Cold War Strategy 27


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epochal purpose. At the very beginning of the Cold War document, policy

makers write that

The United Statesis the principal enemy whose integrity and vitality must besubverted or destroyed by one means or another if the Kremlin is to achieve itsfundamental design.3

This sentiment is echoed a few pages later, when the document states

that we arethe only power which could release forces in the free and

Soviet worlds which could destroy it.4

It seems clear that, to some degree, America was selecting itself as the

Soviet Unions avowed enemy. This self-placement between the ideal of

freedom and the menace threatening it arises in NSS-2002, as well, although

terrorism has taken the place of communism. The third section of the

document, which focuses entirely on this threat, concludes by saying that, in

the war against global terrorism, we will never forget that we are ultimately

fighting for our democratic values and way of lifeIn leading the campaign

against terrorism, we are forging new, productive international relationships

and redefining existing ones in ways that meet the challenges of the twenty-

first century.5

This last sentence reflects a general stance taken in each document

that America is the ultimate leader in the defensible world. The tone of this

leadership is defensive in NSC-68. Indeed, it is in this document that the idea

of American defense of the free world, seems to come to rhetorical fruition.

In the post-WWII world, American policymakers recognized that

America and indeed, the American political ideal were uniquely suited to

drive the second half of the 20th century. Not only was it the only superpower

left unscathed, it seemed clear that the old enterprise of colonialism was on

its last legs. Although the logic was often racialist and culturalist, many

leaders were convinced that American-style federal democracy and open

economy was the panacea that could lift allies out of wartime misery and the

third world out of backwardness The Soviet Union, in offering an alternative

to both capitalist governance and economics, threatened (at least in the

minds of American leaders) to directly contravene the ideal of freedom. As

such, first the Truman Doctrine and finally NSC-68 affirmed Americas right

3ibid4 American Cold War Strategy, 345 NSS-2002, 7


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not only to defend herself but to defend against the forces of communism

and slavery6 on all fronts.

In 2002, the situation was different. NSS-2002 takes this sort of

rhetoric and entitlement to an entirely different level. In the document, the

Bush Administration declared that ideological competition against the

American system was over, and that the new war was against those radical

few who sought to contradict what was, apparently, a world consensus.

Indeed, terminology such as rogue state suggests a belief (or at least

assertion) that those states opposing the US and American policies were

fundamentally outside the global norm. In introducing the document, Bush

writes that We will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies

on every continent.7 Echoing the NSC-68 language of containment he

continues

The United States and countries cooperating with us must not allow theterrorists to develop new home bases. Together, we will seek to deny them sanctuaryat every turn. 8

The interesting thing about the American internationalism is that while

it affirms the necessity of lasting institutions like the United Nations, it not

only declares the United States right to undertake unilateral, preemptive

action, but states explicitly that Americas international cooperation will be

undertaken on its own terms.

The U.S. national security strategy will be based on a distinctly Americaninternationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests. Theaim of this strategy is to help make the world not just safer but better.9

Creating the Apparition

Even more than their emphasis on domestic identity as a starting point

for foreign policy, the two documents share in the creation of a rhetorical and

tangible other that serves not only to help place American on the good or

right side of a painful modern dichotomy, but indeed, serves to justify and

frame all resulting American action. While they manifested themselvesdifferently, the Kremlin of NSC-68 and NSS-2002s terrorists were not only

6 American Cold War Strategy, 287 NSS-2002, Intro8ibid9 NSS-2002, 1


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real threats, but functioned as ideologically affirming creations that wrenched

control over life and death from the hands of the average American.

Both NSC-68 and NSS-2002 assert that the otherhas a value system

fundamentally at odds with that of the average American. On page 29 of

American Cold War Strategy, the framers write unwillingly our free society

finds itself mortally challenged by the Soviet system. No other value system

is so wholly irreconcilable with ours, so implacable in its purpose to destroy

ours. Indeed, much of the first section is a philosophical diatribe which

explores the appeal of the Soviet systems slavery to human irrationality

and pits it directly against the freedom so nobly embodied by America.

NSS-2002 finds the contemporary administration attempting to create

the same dichotomy. On page 7, they write Freedom and fear are at war and

there will be no quick or easy end to this conflict. The verbal Manichaeism is

taken to the next notch a few pages later in the section about Weapons of

Mass Destruction. The Bush team asserts that the rogue states that had

developed during the 1990s shared a number of characteristics. Most

importantly, they sponsor terrorism around the globe, and reject basic

human values and hate the United States and everything for which it

stands.10

Perhaps even more interesting than the polarities themselves were the

ostensible purpose they seemed to have within the document and with

regard to the intended audience. In 1948, there was still much competition

for vision even within the Truman administration. Although the Truman

Doctrine had done much to assert the official position that communism was a

threat to be faced around the world, the degree to which the military would

be built up to these ends was still a pertinent discussion. During most of the

immediate post-war period George Kennan had been the leading voice on

American-Soviet relations. He was an originator of the notion of containment,

and thought that the mystical, Messianic movement11 of the Kremlin was

unsustainable with the correct application of American power. His voice was

gradually supplanted, however, by Dean Acheson and his new chief of Policy

Planning Staff, Paul Nitze.

10 NSS-200211 American Cold War Strategy, 6


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Ernest May suggests that Kennan and Acheson/Nitze differed on some

critical aspects of containment: the role of military and overtly hostile

rhetoric.

Kennan did no share Achesons belief that containment required substantialmilitary forces. He had misgivings about Trumans recent decisions on nuclear andthermonuclear weapons, and he had begun to criticize the stridency of administrationrhetoric. 12

NSC-68, then, was offered to Truman not simply as a policy document,

but one whose fundamental purpose was to convince the president that the

new, fanatical faith of communism was so wholly opposite to and totally

bent upon undermining every potential good contained within American

power and American ideals that nothing short of massive military build up

could ensure its defeat.

NSS-2002 found itself seeking a different target audience. While the

Cold War document was classified, NSS was created for popular consumption.

If NSC-68s purpose was to convince Truman of a certain set of

circumstances, then NSS-2002 was designed to propagate the Bush Admin

worldview among the general public. More subtly, it was written in a way

which strengthened the federal government by ensuring their unique mastery

over the situation.

Part of this was vocalizing the terrible danger of the terrorists. No

longer, asserts Bush and Co, are WMDs and other terrible weapons which

target civilians last resorts, but instead are weapons of choice. Indeed, in this

way, the new threat is even more menacing than the Soviet Empire.

The nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination toobtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the worlds strongest states, andthe greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us,make todays security environment more complex and dangerous.13

This complexity of the situation is found elsewhere in the document

as well. On Page 5, the writers give the War on Terrorism an epochal and

prophetic tone, saying that

The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in

our history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive

army over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the

persistent accumulation of successes some seen, some unseen.

12 American Cold War Strategy, 813 NSS-2002, 13


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In effect, the document enshrines fear by suggesting that this shadowy

enemy is so devious and so hard to uncover that the average American

citizen must be on total alert to the possibility of attack. Additionally, the

motivations and methods of the global terrorist threat are so monumental

that only the government could possibly understand the scope of action

necessary to remedy it.

Efficacy

Perhaps because it was not intended for a public audience, NSC-68 is

able to spend a little time talking about the psychological and ideological

dimensions of a successful containment policy. Indeed, it is explicit about the

need to demonstrate the power and integrity of the ideal of American

freedom in order to create internal ruptures within the citizens of the Soviet

state and its satellites. On Page 30, Nitze and co. write by practically

demonstrating the integrity and vitality of our system the free world widens

the area of possible agreement and thus can hope gradually to bring about a

Soviet acknowledgement of realities which in sum will eventually constitute a

frustration of the Soviet design. The document talks about how the

governments actions needed to consider the perception of Soviet citizens

who might rally behind the government that enslaves them.

Even more importantly, the document recognizes that certain means

are unavailable to it to protect its free system. Force is only acceptable as a

last resort and in a situation where the potential for turmoil caused by

American force is outweighed by the greater potential for horror of doing

nothing.

NSS-2002 pays little mind to the foreign perception of its actions. It

makes the case that the consensus surrounding the forces of freedom and

the actions necessary to uphold that ideal is so unbreakable that dissent or

misperception, internally or externally, is unthinkable, except by the

embittered few.14 The moral absolutism of the document revolves around

the troika of inviolable world principles: human dignity, political freedom, and

economic liberty.

14 NSS-2002 pg 1


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While the last sixty years has offered plenty of evidence that, at their

most basic, many of these principles are globally resonant, American

administrations and citizens have failed to recognize the degree to which

demonstrated hypocrisy undercuts the ideal of America. Throughout the

second half of the 20th century, Administrations seemed to forget that they

were fighting communism because it contravened political freedom, rather

than because it was called freedom. Too often, autocrats like Mohammed

Reza Shah were supported despite the same secret police, lack of political

choice, and lack of economic, press, and religious freedom railed against in

the Soviet Empire. With damaging frequency, the stated ideal of American

economic liberty was demonstrated to be more about access to markets than

the dignity of the individual. Thus there was at all times a competition

between the promise and mythology of America, a place where freedom and

dignity were sanctified and supposed to be upheld, and the on-the-ground

reality, which often found people languishing because of some remote

ideological struggle.

So too does today find the many of the assertions of NSS-2002

contravened not by ideal but by example. Notions of human dignity ring

hollow in light of Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo Bay. People cannot help but

question the political freedom of something as universally upheld as self-

determination when it is brought at the barrel of a gun and in the wake of

massive civilian bombing campaigns. Moreover, people cannot help but

question the consistency of our rhetoric when economically and strategically

useful autocrats such as the Saudi Royal Family are continuously supported.

Yet both NSC-68 and NSS-2002 have been remarkably successful at

coloring the tone of public American discourse. How could these two totally

different perceptions exist side by side? It seems to me that where both NSC-

68 and NSS-2002 succeeded domestically was in enshrining the ideals of

America in a way which resonated with the best hopes and aspirations of

citizens, and at the same time, bound the fate of individuals with the

common fate of the nation. The Soviet menace threatened the extinction of

the individual life and the life of the nation. So too does terrorism menace

both the person and the state. As long as this argument remains convincing


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to a majority of Americans, it seems unlikely that there will be a major

departure in the support of foreign policy.

Conclusion

NSC-68 and NSS-2002 are different documents. They were born into

unique historical moments and their recommendations and goals reflect each

administrations understanding of the exigencies of modernity. Yet at the

same time, they mirror each other in their close binding of domestic identity

and foreign policy. They are similar in their creation of an other which

serves not only to define America as good, but also heightens the

psychological and tangible power of the government. Finally, they both found

(and find, in the case of NSS-2002) contradiction in practice yet sustained

domestic support. A reading of one can inform the other, and indeed, it is

only by understanding the historical realities of each document that we might

learn how to progress and better calibrate ideal and reality.

binding domestic identity and foreign policy

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