bingu death inquiry events of april 5th, 2012

7/29/2019 Bingu Death Inquiry Events of April 5th, 2012

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NATION onSundaymarch 10 2013

NATION ON SUNDAY, 10 MARCH 2013

2.2 EVENTS AT STATEHOUSE ON THE 5thOFAPRIL 2012

The Commissionreceived testimony that theday started normally. Thelate President had breakfastas usual. The PresidentialFood Taster, Mr. HarrisonMackenzie Nkhoma, toldthe Commission that onthat morning he, as usual,tasted the Presidentsbreakfast to ensure thatit did not contain harmfulsubstances. He confirmedthe food to be fine and itwas served for breakfast. Healso told the Commissionthat the President was verybusy that day and did nottake tea morning tea at theoffice as he usually did.

The State Househousekeeper, Mrs.Elizabeth Mvinda, told theCommission that she metthe President and the First

Lady around 9 oclock inthe morning as they werehaving breakfast. She hadjoined them as usual atthe table to discuss theprogramme for the day. Inaccordance with the dailyroutine, the housekeeperwas given the tasks for theday during this meeting.On this particular day,the President indicated tothe housekeeper that hewas not going to take tea

around the usual time thathe did which was around10 oclock in the morning.The housekeeper told theCommission that at thattime, the President lookedfine and his normal self,

How did Bingu die?

and there seemed to be noproblem at all with him.

After breakfast, thePresident was led tohis office by his closeprotection security officera Mr. Francisco Gideon.As usual, Mr. Gideoncarried the late Presidentsbriefcase and office keys.

Upon arrival in the office,Mr. Gideon opened thewindows and took leaveof the President. He thenproceeded to his normalposition near the lift closeto the door leading into thePresidents office.

After the President hadarrived in his office, hispersonal secretary, Mrs.Flora Muhara, went intothe office around justafter 9 oclock to greet the

President as a usual and alsoto give him some letters tosign, but she was not ableto do so as she retreatedbecause the President wason the phone.

That morning, the

President spoke onthe phone to severalGovernment officialsbefore attending to hisappointments. He spokewith the State HousePress Officer, Mr. AlbertMungomo, around 8 am.The President instructedMr. Mungomo to put

members of the media onalert because he wanted todeliver an Easter messageto the nation in theafternoon. He also spoke onthe phone with the DeputyChief Secretary, Mr. NectonMhura, who had called himto find out about the statusof his request for approvalto go outside the countryfor medical treatment.The President gave hisapproval.

The Inspector General ofPolice, Mr. Peter Mukhito,also told the Commissionthat he too spoke on thephone to the Presidentwhile the President wasin the office that morning.

It was the President whocalled him concerning theissue of security of propertyat the Presidential Villas inLilongwe.

The President alsospoke to the Directorof National IntelligenceServices, Mr. BintonyKutsaira, around 9:30 that

morning. Mr. Kutsaira toldthe Commission that thePresident sounded jovial.The President gave himcertain assignments to doin Blantyre.

The Presidents Advisoron Religious Affairs, Rev.Billy Gama, also talked tothe President the samemorning before 10 oclock.Their discussion centeredon the statement that Rev.Gama had drafted for the

President for the Easteraddress to the nation. Themessage was meant to beaired out to the Malawination the following dayon Good Friday. Theyalso discussed where the

President was planning togo and pray the followingday being Good Friday.

2.2.1 The PresidentsAppointments for the Day

The President hada schedule of eightappointments on thisparticular day. He had

four appointments in themorning and four in theafternoon. His morningappointments were asfollows: 10:00 - Hon. Mrs. PatriciaKaliati, MP, Minister ofInformation and CivicEducation. 10:30 - Hon. Mrs.Margaret Roka MauwaMP, Deputy Minister ofAgriculture, Irrigation andWater Development.

11:00 - Hon. Mrs. AgnesPenemulungu, MP forLilongwe City South East. 12:00 - Hon. Dr. JeanKalirani, MP, Minister ofHealthHis appointments in the

afternoon were due to startat 3 oclock and were asfollows: 3:00 - Dr. Bruce Munthali,

Chief Executive Officer ofTobacco ControlCommission. 3:30 - Mr. BrightMangulama, formerlyDirector of PublicProcurement but wasretired at the time.1123. Evidence of FormerADC, Major CyprianKondowe. 4:00 - Dr. Zikhale Ngoma,Democratic Progressive

Party Campaign Director. 4:30 - Mr. ChikumbutsoMtumodzi from Ministryof Disability.

Around 10:00 oclockthat morning, Hon. PatriciaKaliati arrived as expectedfor her appointment. ThePresidential aide de camp(ADC), Major CyprianKondowe, informed thePresident that the Ministerhad arrived and was waitingfor her appointment.

The President told theADC to lead her to theaudience room. The ADCled the Hon. Minister tothe audience room, andthen proceeded to fetchthe President from hisoffice. After the Presidentand theMinister greetedeach other, theADC leftthe room. After some 30minutes, Hon. Kaliati wasthrough with her audienceand she came out and left.

The ADC then wentagain into the Presidentsoffice and informed thePresident that Hon. RokaMauwa was also in for herappointment. The sameprocess was followed.

The Hon. Ministermet the President at theallocated time and left.

2.2.2 AppointmentWith Hon. Mrs. Agnes

Penemulungu, MP.

H o n . M r s . A g n e sPenemulungu,MP, testifiedto the Commission thaton the previous day, 4th

April 2012, she received acall from the ADC advisingher that the President had

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ibrary

The men at the centre of the drama that ensued after Mutharikas death: Gondwe (L) and Peter

This is an abridgedversion of the reportof the commission ofinquiry into the deathof former presidentBingu wa Mutharika.In these eight pages,we present events

that occured on April5 2012 before andafter Mutharikasdeath.


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granted her request for anappointment to meet him.She was advised that shewas to meet the Presidentthe following day, 5th April2012, at 11 oclock in themorning.

She, however, explainedto the ADC that the daywas not convenient to herbecause she was scheduledto go to the KamuzuInternational Airport toreceive the body of heruncle who had passedaway in South Africa. Shetold the ADC that the bodywas going to come throughthe airport aboard a SouthAfrican Airways at around12:30 in the afternoon.The ADC advised her toconsider adjusting herprogramme to the airportbearing in mind that shehad waited for a long timefor her appointment to begranted.

He advised hernot lose that chance.Accordingly, she adjustedher airport programmeto accommodate herappointment with the

President.On the day in question,5th April 2012, Hon.Penemulungu proceededto State House and arrivedat around 10:30 in themorning. She was searchedat the entrance and wasadvised to leave thediscussion notes that shehad prepared on a piece ofpaper at the reception. Shewas ushered to the waitingroom. The notes were later

handed back to her as shewas in the waiting room.It was Hon.

P e n e m u l u n g u srecollection that around11am, the ADC came tothe waiting room andadvised her that she was towait a little longer becausethe President was yet toconclude the appointmentbefore her. She recalledthat it was around 11:11am when the ADC came

to take her to the audienceroom. Since this was thefirst time for her to meetthe President at StateHouse, the ADC advisedher of the courtesy to standup as the President will beentering the room.

Once Hon. Penemulunguwas in the audience room,the ADC proceeded tobring the President. Whenthe President walked intothe audience room, Hon.

Penemulungu stood up asadvised and the Presidentgreeted her in Chichewa,Muli bwanji a Nandau?She 12 responded tothe greeting also inChichewa, Ndiri bwino

Bwana. She explained tothe Commission that the

name Nandau is what sheis popularly known by inpolitical circles as well asin Parliament. After thegreeting, the Presidentsat down and she also satdown. The ADC then leftthe room.

During the audiencewith the President, whichwas in Chichewa, Hon.Penemulungu started bythanking the President forgiving her the appointment.

In her ownwords shesaid to thePresident asfollows:

Z i k o m ok w a m b i r i

B w a n a .Nda t hokozak u t imwandipatsaappo in tment

yanga patapitanthawi yayitali.

Nd iku dz iw akuti tilipo maMP ambirikoma mwandivomera ine.

Ndathokoza kwambiri.Chinanso ndithokoze Bwanakuti ine ndinawina ku

Lilongwe City South Eastchifukwa cha pambuyo

pa inu. Munandithandizamisonkhano. Munabwera.

Ndikukuthokozani kwambiriBwana. NdikukuthokozaninsoBwana pa malonjezo amene ine

ndinapatsa anthu anga. Lonjezolimodzi munandithandiza mseumunandiyikira tala. Ndiye

Bwana ndikukuthokozanikwambiri. Pamenendimalankhula chonchoanali akugwedeza mutu

akuvomera.She went on and thanked

the President for constantlyhelping her constituency inmany ways.

After thanking thePresident, she informedhim that there were still somany challenges that herconstituency was facing.She advised the Presidentthat her constituencydid not have a clinic andrequested if considerationcould be given to have aclinic in the area. At this

point, the President askedHon. Penemulungu wherethe nearest clinic was andhow far it was. Her responsewas that the nearest clinicwas in Kawale which isabout 10 to 15 kilometersfrom her constituency.She further advised thePresident about the roadin her constituency that

goes to T/A Tsabango andasked if that road could beupgraded to tarmac. Shealso asked the Presidentto consider looking intoanother road from Area 23Market to Chipasula.

2.2.3 The Presidents

Collapse.The Commission heardthat barely 10 minutesinto the appointment withHon. Mrs. Penemulungu,as she was looking at herprepared notes which shehad in her hands at thetime, she noticed whenshe looked up that thePresident was just sittingstill, motionless. His handsand legs were stretchedstraight and the head was

leaning againstthe backrestof the chair inwhich he sat.Upon noticingthat, she calledout Bwana

Bwana!, butthere was noresponse. Shethen called againBwana! butstill there wasno response.

Quoting herown words, shesaid:

Bwana, Bwana!Ndikuonakuti sakundiyankha. Bwana!

Ndinakuwa tsopano,sakundiyankha. Ndiyendinayimirira kuthamangirakumene ndatulukira ku chitsekocha ADC. Ndinathamangakukamuyitana ADC,bwera udzawone kuno

Bwana sakundiyankha.Ndimalankhulana nawo. Ndiye

ADC analowa mwa msangamsanga anawapeza abwanawoali choncho ndithu.

She told the Commissionthat she was very terrified.As he was going to theaudience room, the

ADC asked Mr. BenfreyKamanga, one of the NIS

security detail sitting withhim, to accompany himinto the audience room.At the same time, theADC called the Presidentspersonal physician, Dr. DanNamarika, who was in hisoffice in the State House atthat time. The PresidentialGuard Commander, Mr.Duncan Mwapasa, themost senior security officerat State House, was alsocalled.

2.2.4 ImmediateResponse to the Collapseof the President.

When the ADC, Mr.Kondowe went into theaudience room in thecompany of Mr. Kamanga,they found that thePresident was seated in thechair and was breathingwith difficulties. He wasnot blinking. The ADCtried to talk to the President

but got no response. Hetouched his head and calledYour Excellency, YourExcellency, but he stayedstill and did not respond.He was breathing heavilyand was facing forward,upwards, without lookingat a particular person, evenif you looked straight athim. It showed that he wasnot paying any attention toanything being said to him.He was unconscious.

Upon realising thegravity of situation, theADC and Mr. Kamangacarried the President to hisoffice where they laid himon the carpet and loosenedhis jacket and removed his

wrist watch and took offhis shoes. At that time,the President was stillbreathing with difficulties.In no time, the Presidentspersonal physician, Dr.Dan Namarika, arrived inthe room. He noted uponarrival that the Presidentwas struggling to breathe.He tried to call him butthere was no response.He checked his pulse andarmpits and also checkedhis blood pressure.

Dr. Dan Namarika toldthe Commission that atthat time he did not havewith him the presidentialemergency medical kit.He told the Commissionthat he had left it in theambulance and he triedto call for the ambulance.Dr. Namarika further toldthe Commission that hecalled the Director Generalof State Residences, Mr.Edward Sawerengera,advising him that thePresident had collapsedand he immediately neededan ambulance to take thePresident to hospital.

From severaltestimonies, theCommission learnt thatDr. Namarika had actuallyleft his equipment at hishouse within the StateHouse compound. Seeingthe emergency of thesituation he advised Mr.Kondowe, Mr. Kamangaand Mr. Mwapasa, whoby then were together inthe Presidents office, toquickly rush the President

downstairs to take him tohospital.After giving the

instruction to rush thePresident to hospital, Dr.Namarika left the latePresident unattended andproceeded downstairsto the office of theDirector General of StateResidences.

It is in the testimonyreceived by the Commissionthat while downstairs,

Dr. Namarika burst intothe office of the DirectorGeneral, who at the timewas in a meeting with theDeputy Director General,Dr. Charles Thupi, shoutingin panic that he needed anambulance. After passingthe message Dr. Namarikarushed out of the officeand fortunately he metone of the Presidentialconvoy drivers, Mr. AaronMatabwa. He instructed

him to rush and quicklyget the ambulance andbring it to the front of thebuilding. After giving thatinstruction, Dr. Namarikajumped into the DeputyDirector Generals car and

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ibra

ry

Joyce Banda wasted no time to take over after Mutharikas death

Bwana Bwana!, but

there was no response.

She then called again

Bwana! but still there

was no response


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NATION onSundaymarch 10 2013 3

asked the driver, Mr. YesayaKhuze, to drive him to hishouse to pick his medicalequipment.

On the way to his house,Dr. Namarika met withthe Presidents personalnurse, Mrs. ThenjiweDissi Mittawa, at one ofthe gates to State House.Dr. Namarika advisedher that the Presidenthad collapsed. The nurseaccordingly rushed to theentrance of the State Housewhere she met the ADC,the Guard Commander,and Mr. Kamanga who hadgot downstairs through thelift carrying the President.

It is in evidence that atthis point the Presidentsnurse took the Presidentsblood pressure which read102/57, his pulse rate was74 and blood sugar was14.3.

2.2.5 Referral toKamuzu CentralHospital

It is in evidence thatwhen the President wasbrought downstairs he was

briefly kept in the lift asthey were waiting for thearrival of the ambulance.When the ambulancearrived, the President wasimmediately taken intothe ambulance that hadbeen parked directly bythe entrance of the StateHouse. The ambulancewas a black Toyota LandCruiser registrationnumber MG944AB. Atthis moment Dr. Namarika

had just returned from hishouse and he jumped intothe ambulance which thenstarted off for KamuzuCentral Hospital.

In the ambulance werethe ADC, Dr. Namarikaand Mrs. ThenjiweDissi Mittawa. Thenanother vehicle carriedthe Presidential GuardCommander, Mr. Mwapasa,the Director General ofState Residences, Mr.

Sawerengera, and Mr.Benfrey Kamanga.The Commission heard

in evidence that at the timethat the President was beingcarried into the ambulance,he was gasping for breathand groaning deeply. Thetwo vehicles started off atthe same time.

The Commission wasinformed that while onthe way to the hospital,the personal physician was

trying to secure the airwayto ensure that the Presidentwas breathing and thatthere was circulation (themedical procedure calledABC). He was, however,not able to complete the

process.The Commission was

informed that aboutNovember 2011, Dr.Namarika was involved

in a road accident on hisway to Ndata Farm House,the Presidents privateresidence in Thyolo.Following the accident,Dr. Namarika suffereda dislocation of his leftarm and was undergoingphysiotherapy at the timeof the Presidents collapse.Dr. Namarika told theCommission that he couldnot effectively use his leftarm because it had very

limited movement.The Commission

established that the doctorcould not successfullysecure the airway at thetime of the Presidentscollapse because for him todo that he had to intubatethe President. He couldnot intubate the Presidentbecause to do that, he hadto elevate the President toget the path to the neck.The doctor could not

manage to do that becauseof the limitation that hehad in the use of his armand that, in his own words,the President was so big.This was coupled with thefact that he did not have

the intubation kit at thetime that he had proceededto check the situation inthe Presidents office afterreceiving a call from the

ADC.The doctor told the

Commission that hetherefore only resortedto mouth to mouthresuscitation while intransit to the hospital. Anattempt was made to put anintravenous line (IV line),a drip as it is commonlyknown, on the Presidentbut this was not possible.They only managed toinsert a canula but no IV

line was mounted.The Commission was

informed that while intransit, attempts weremade to call KamuzuCentral Hospital on itsnumbers 01754725 and01756900 so that thehospital could prepare toreceive the President as apatient. But the calls couldnot get through.

Dr. Namarika told theCommission that out

of the 10 switchboardnumbers only those twonumbers were working.He explained that theHospital Director of KCH,Dr. Noordeen Alide, wasnot informed about the

emergency because Dr.Namarika did not have hisnumber readily.Apart fromthat Dr. Namarika notedthat the Hospital Director

in that capacity was anadministrator and it wasgoing to be necessary tocall him after stabilizationof the patient. The hospitalwas therefore not warnedor made aware that thePresident was being rushedto the hospital.

The Commission wasinformed that in theaccompanying vehicle to thehospital, the PresidentialGuard Commander made

calls to the InspectorGeneral of Police, Mr.Peter Mukhito, and tothe Director of NationalIntelligence Service, Mr.Bintony Kutsaira, advisingthem on the developments.The Director General ofState Residences made callsto Hon. Peter Mutharika.He also called the FirstLady, who at the time wasin her office within the StateHouse attending to her

morning appointments.According to the

testimony, the driveto the hospital tookapproximately 15 to 20minutes.

2.2.6 Arrival andReception at KamuzuCentral Hospital

Upon arrival at KamuzuCentral Hospital, the

ambulance went straightto the casualty sectionand parked at the carpark adjacent to theentrance of the CasualtyDepartment. The ADCand the Presidential GuardCommander rushed tothe intensive care unit(ICU) where they met ananesthetist, Mrs. StellaWarren, and asked forhelp.

Upon hearing of the

emergency involvingthe State President,Mrs.Warren immediatelyrushed out and went intothe ambulance that waswaiting outside. She toldthe Commission that as shewas rushing there she metDr. Isyu Mwakasungula ofthe Casualty Department,who had also been alertedabout the situation andwas looking for a trolley onwhich to take the President

into the ICU. When atrolley was identified, theambulance was beckonedto reverse to the entranceof the casualty section. Itreversed and the medicalstaff carried the President

onto the trolley.Mrs. Stella Warren

testified to the Commissionthat at the time shewent into the ambulancewhere the President was,she noticed that thePresident was dead. Dr.Isyu Mwakasungula alsotestified that at the timethat they were carryingthe President onto thetrolley, he was motionlessand there was no responseof any sort from him. Hiseyes were closed. In Dr.Mwakasungulas opinionit gave the impression thatthe President was criticallyill or unconscious or was

dead.2.2.7 Admission and

Treatment in the ICUAfter the President was

hoisted onto the trolley, hewas taken straight into theICU. He was laid on bedNumber 1. The bed wasvacant at the time becausethe patient who was therebefore had been dischargedearlier that morning. TheICU records indicate that

the President was admittedin the ICU at 11:30 am. Atthe time of the Presidentsadmission there were alsoother beds which werevacant in the ICU. TheCommission establishedthat some statements thathad been made in somequarters to the effect thatsome patients were movedout of the ICU to makeroom for the Presidentwere not true.

The medical personnelwho received the Presidentin the ICU observedthat the President wasunresponsive as theywere bringing him in theICU. His pupils werefixed and dilated. Thiswas confirmed on theICU records presentedto the Commission. Onthe records, the GlasgowComma Scale (GCS) wasrecorded as 3 out of 15,

meaning that there wasno eye response, no verbalresponse and no movement.The Commission wasinformed that, medically,this is the lowest a patientcan get to on that scale.The chances were that thePresident had already died.

After placing thePresident on the bedMr. William Banda, ananesthetist, took anintubation kit and started

intubating the President.In his own evidence, Mr.Banda explained that theprocess of intubation isa difficult one. It is verypainful to the patient andhe stated that, even in the

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Peter Mutharika and Henry Mussa share notes at a DPP rally


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case of a person who isunconscious, it is usuallya difficult process becausesuch people do react. Thisrenders it a rather difficultmedical procedure toadminister. Mr. William

Banda testified that in thiscase, however, there was noproblem at all when he wasintubating the President.There was no reactionwhatsoever and the tubejust went in without anyproblems as there wasno response from thePresident. To Mr. Banda,this was a sign of no life.

After the Presidentwas intubated, he wasalso ventilated through

an ambubag andthen connected to anelectrocardiogram (ECG)machine. It was noted thatthe ECG reading produceda straight line, which inmedical terms is referredto as asystole. A straightline is usually a sign of nolife. A central line was alsoinserted and the medicalpersonnel started givingthe President adrenalineand other drugs. However

the Commission receivedtestimony that someessential emergency drugswere not immediatelyavailable in the ICU suchthat some ICU staff wereassigned to look for thosedrugs elsewhere within oroutside the hospital.

A catheter was alsoinserted in a bid to collecturine samples. Howeverthere was no urine output,which was another sign of

no life.After this preliminary

process, the ICU teamstarted cardiopulmonaryresuscitation (CPR) onthe President. The processwas being supervised bythe Presidents personalphysician, Dr. DanNamarika. He could nothimself take part in theprocess because of thelimitations in the useof his arms as has beenexplained.

It was heard in evidencethat due to the compressionsduring the CPR, therewere some readings onthe ECG monitor. Thesewere however disappearingat each interval and theICU team concluded thatsuch readings were CPRdependent.

After doingCPRcontinuously forabout 30 minutes, it wasthe view of the ICU staffthat the President wasdead and that they shouldabandon the procedure.However, the Presidentspersonal physician, Dr. Dan

Namarika, advised that theCPR should continue.

During the CPRprocedure defibrillatorswere also brought in to tryand shock the President toinduce heartbeat. These

were tried on the Presidentup to the maximum levelfor four times but therewas still no response. Aftercarrying on with the CPRfor another 30 minutes,the staff in the ICU gottired.

The Presidents physicianwas asked if they could stopthe CPR but he refusedand insisted that it goeson. As the CPR continued,it was noted after an hour

that they had broken someribs on the President in theprocess. Dr. Carlos Valera,a specialist surgeon,placed chest drains onthe left and right side ofthe Presidents body. Thishad a negative effect onwhat would have beenthe intended effectivenessof the resuscitation. TheCPR however continuedon the instructions of Dr.Namarika.

In his testimony, theHospital Director, Dr.Noordeen Alide, explainedthat he received newsabout the late Presidentsillness and admission atKamuzu CentralHospitalfrom Mr. Albert Khuwi,a Pharmacist at KCH. Hetherefore rushed to thehospital and arrived therejust after 11:30 am andwent straight to the ICU.Having seen the frantic

efforts to resuscitatethe President, he madean impression of thesituation.

In his words, hewas of the viewthat the Presidentwas dead. He alsoinquired fromDr.Varela, theHead of SurgicalDepartment, whoconfirmed to himthat people shouldjust accept that thePresident was dead.Dr. Alide informedthe Commissionthat he proceededto the room beside theICU with a view to advisethe Chief Secretary, Mr.Bright Msaka, SC, whowas already there, of theposition.

Dr. Alide informedthe Commission thatbefore he could talk tothe Chief Secretary, thePresidents brother, Hon.Peter Mutharika, who wasalso in the room, stoodup. Dr. Alide introducedhimself and then advised

Hon. Peter Mutharika thatthe situation was hopelessand that they should startplanning for the next stage.He further advised Hon.Mutharika and Mr.Msaka,

that they will hear officiallyfrom Dr. Namarika. Aftertaking leave of them, Dr.Alide advised Dr. Namarikato proceed to inform thefamily on the matter. It is inthe evidence of Dr. Alide thatDr. Namarika reluctantlyproceeded to informHon. Peter Mutharika.It is on record that Hon.Mutharika responded bysaying that they shouldstill continue with the

resuscitation efforts sincethe CPR procedure couldbe continued for up to

three hours according tosome medical literaturethat he had come across.

Dr. Alide told theCommission that hefurther observed that therewas no senior official fromthe Ministry of Healthpresent at the hospitalat the time. He thereforecalled the PrincipalSecretary for Health Dr.Charles Mwansambo, whowas at that time in Zomba,and advised him about the

situation. He informed theCommission that after awhile, the other PrincipalSecretary for Health at thetime, Mr. Willie Samute,came to the hospital and

then later the Ministerof Health, Hon. Dr. JeanKalirani, also came.

Dr. Alide briefed Hon.Dr. Kalirani and Mr. Samuteabout the hopelessness ofthe situation. He advisedthat there was need to callDr. Wesley Sangala, themost senior anesthetistspecialist, to come andassess the situation and givethe way forward becausethe anesthetists who were

in the ICU were all at thelevel of clinical officers.Dr. Alide was given the go

ahead by the Minister andMr. Samute to contact Dr.Sangala.

It was the evidence ofDr. Wesley Sangala thathe received a call fromDr. Alide, the HospitalDirector, advising him of thedevelopment. Upon hearingthe news, Dr. Sangalaimmediately rushed to thehospital. When he arrivedin the ICU he found thatthe monitors were flickingbecause of the compression

during the CPR, and notedthat two chest drains wereinserted on both sides ofthe Presidents body. Hetouched the Presidentand his body was cold.

He immediately orderedthat CPR be stopped, andthen he checked on theECG. He noted that therewas nothing on the ECGmonitor. In his view, thePresident was dead. Thiswas around 1:50 pm.

After Dr. Sangala reachedthat conclusion, it is inevidence that a team offour doctors at the hospital,namely, Dr. Sangala, Dr.Alide, Dr. Varela and Dr.

Namarika proceeded to Dr.Alides office where seniorGovernment and other

officials hadrelocated tofrom the roombeside the ICU.There werethree seniorGove rnmentofficials in theoffice. Thesewere Hon. PeterM u t h a r i k a ,Hon. GoodallGondwe andthe ChiefSecretary, Mr.Bright Msaka,

SC.It was the evidence of

Dr. Sangala, Dr. Varelaand Dr. Alide that theteam told the three officialsthat the President hadpassed away. The doctorstold the Commissionthat this communicationwas in words or languagethat could not have beenunderstood in any otherway than to convey themessage that the Presidenthad died. Dr. Sangala told

the Commission that heand the other doctorsnoted that after thiscommunication, the roomwas dead silent.

The Commission wastold that it was at this point

that the late Presidentsbrother, Hon. PeterMutharika, began talkingabout the issue of thepostmortem examinationof the President. Dr.Sangala vividly recalledthat Hon. Peter Mutharikaactually mentioned theword autopsy in thediscussions. The issue wasdiscussed in the office andthe Hospital Director madecalls to Dr. Steve Kamiza,

a pathologist in Blantyre,who did not pick his call.He then called Dr. CharlesDzamalala, anotherpathologist in Blantyre,who picked his call butquickly told Dr. Alide thathe would call back. He didnot call back.

Back in the ICU, it wasagreed on instructions fromDr. Sangala that the bodyof the President be movedto the side room. This was

done. In the side room, thebody was covered in linenand a ventilator remainedconnected to give thesemblance that they werestill doing something tothe President as patient.It was then decided thatfamily members be calledin to view the body of thePresident.

It is in the testimonybefore the Commissionthat the first to proceed

and view the body was theFirst Lady, Madam CallistaMutharika. She went intothe side room, stood for afew seconds and came out.Then came the Presidentsdaughter, Mrs. DuwaMutharika-Mubaira, whowas accompanied by acertain lady, probably asecurity officer.

She went in and stood atthe door of the side roomand started crying. Shewas then led out. The thirdperson to come was Hon.Peter Mutharika. He camein and then left the room.The last person to comeinto the room was FatherTaylor, a Catholic priest.

Father Taylor told theCommission that he wasvisiting the hospital thatThursday.In the afternoon,he heard that the Presidenthad been taken ill and wasadmitted in the ICU. Heproceeded to the ICU wherehe met the First Lady. Heasked her if he could beallowed to go and see thePresident. He was told towait for a few minutes. He

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:NatioNL

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Symon Vuwa Kaunda and Patricia Kaliati were part of the MidnightSix

Dr. Alide briefed

Hon. Dr. Kalirani and

Mr. Samute about

the hopelessness

of the situation.


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was then allowed to go inand see him in the sideroom. He touched the bodyand observed that it wascold. He then said his prayerwhich was responded to inCatholic tradition by Mrs.Stella Warren who wasattending to the body andis a Catholic. To FatherTaylor, he gave the lastanointing prayer.

In her evidence Mrs.Stella Warren told theCommission that in theICU, there is a form onwhich the ICU staff recordall readings that patientsgenerate. She took the formand started writing the

name of the President andrecorded all the readings onthe machine and indicatingthat there was no response.She was however restrainedby the In Charge of ICU,Mr. Clement Kadyaudzu,who told her to write thateverything was fine asper instructions from Dr.Namarika.

Dr. Hetherwick Ntabasubmitted in evidencethat he proceeded to the

hospital when he heardthat the President had beentaken ill. Upon reachinghospital, he went straightto the ICU where he foundtheMinister of Health,Hon. Dr. Jean Kalirani. Hefound her escorting theFirst Lady,Madam CallistaMutharika, to the sideroom in the ICU wherethe President was. Whenthe First Lady and Hon.Dr. Kalirani came out of

the side room, he notedthat the First Lady wasvery distressed and was intears. Dr. Ntaba told theCommission that he andDr. Kalirani left the ICUtogether and headed forthe Hospital Directorsoffice. On the way, Hon. Dr.Kalirani briefed him thatthe Presidents state washopeless. She further toldhim that it was doubtfulif the resuscitation efforts

going on would bear anyresults.When the two went into

the Hospital Directorsoffice, they found Hon.Peter Mutharika, Hon.Goodall Gondwe andthe Chief Secretary,Mr.BrightMsaka, SC. Hon. Dr.Kalirani briefed the groupthat the resuscitation effortswere still underway butthere were doubts if theywere going to achieve any

results. She further noted tothe group that even in theevent that the resuscitationefforts succeeded, thePresident would not be thesame person as he will be

reduced to a vegetable.Asthey were discussing, Dr.Namarika came into theoffice and reported that theair ambulance team, whichhad earlier been contactedby the Chief Secretary, wasasking about the conditionof the President with a viewof finding out whether thepatient would be in a stablecondition to make the trip.

He went on to saythat since the Presidenthas failed to respond tothe resuscitation effortsfor some time, the airambulance team wouldnot come if he told themthat the President was no

more. It is in Dr. Ntabasevidence that the ChiefSecretary told Dr. Namarikato advise the air ambulancecrew that they were stilltrying to resuscitate thePresident because it wasstill very important that theair ambulance crew shouldcome.

It was in the evidenceof Mr. Willie Samute thathe received a call from hisfellow Principal Secretary,

Dr. Charles Mwansambo,about the Presidentsillness and admission atKamuzu Central Hospital.Upon hearing the news herushed to the hospital.

At the hospital he firstmet with the HospitalDirector, Dr. Alide, andthe Director of ClinicalServices at the Ministryof Health headquarters,Dr. Chithope Mwale. Theyproceeded to the Hospital

Directors office wherethey were joined by theHospital Matron. He wasgiven a quick brief aboutthe situation. He wasadvised that the situationwas very critical.

Mr. Samute told theCommission that as he,Dr.Alide, Dr. Chithope andthe Matron were there inthe office, the Ministerof Health, Hon. Dr. JeanKalirani, appeared. She was

briefed about the situation.She then proceeded to theICU. Mr. Samute submittedthat after some 30 minutesthe Minister came backfrom the ICU and told himthat the doctors were stilltrying but the situationwas hopeless. She evenwent further and statedthat if it was an ordinaryperson we would havesaid kuti talephera [thatwe have failed] but this

is HE. She then furtherasked everybody to leavethe hospital because theirpresence was attractingattention.

Mr. Samute was then

requested to handle thehigh profile people whowere lingering in thecorridor at the ICU. He ledthese high profile people,who included the ChiefSecretary, to the HospitalDirectors office. Theywere joined at the officeby Hon. Goodall Gondwe,Hon. Peter Mutharika and

later by others.It was further Mr.Samutes evidence thatbefore the high profilepeople left the hospital,they had a caucus in theHospital Directors office.Mr. Samute confirmed thatat some point, the doctors,including Dr. Sangala, wentto meet the high profilepeople in the Directorsoffice. He stated that as Dr.Sangala was going to see

the Ministers and the ChiefSecretary in the Directorsoffice, he told him thatsizili bwino [things arenot well].

It was Mr. Samutesevidence that his firstimpression, after Dr. Alidehad briefed him as he wasarriving at the hospital,was that it was very clearthat the President haddied. He stated that in ourMalawian culture he got

the sense that it was veryclear that the President haddied. He explained to theCommission that he left thehospital around 3 pm andwent home. He returned to

the hospital later in the dayand remained there untilthe ambulance had leftfor Kamuzu InternationalAirport in the evening.

According to the evidenceof Hon. Dr. Jean Kalirani,she had an appointmentfor audience with thePresident on that day. Herappointment was at 11:30

am, after the Presidentsappointment with Hon.Agnes Penemulungu. Whileat State House waiting forher turn, she noted a delayin being ushered into theroom for audience with thePresident, but had not beeninformed about the incidentof the Presidents collapse.She was later advised thatthe appointment wascancelled.

Hon. Dr. Kalirani

informed the Commissionthat she was later dulyinformed as Minister ofHealth that the Presidenthad been taken ill and wasadmitted at Kamuzu CentralHospital. She went to thehospital where she foundthe Presidents situationto be indeed critical. Inher few words to theCommission she explainedthat she was not aware thatthe President had died. She

only knew about the deathof the President when itwas officially announcedon MBC radio on 7th April,2012.

2.2.8 Arrival of AirAmbulance Doctorsand Preparations forDeparture

The Commission has itin testimony that around7 pm, the doctor and nursefrom SouthAfrica who camewith the air ambulancearrived at Kamuzu CentralHospital and went to theICU. They were collectedfrom the airport in a StateHouse vehicle. They enteredthe side room where thePresidents body was kept.Dr. Namarika gave the twohandovers as the nursewas busy connecting theirown machines to test the

patient. The two weretalking in their language,probably Afrikaans. In thecourse of monitoring themachines, the visiting nursetold the doctor asystole,meaning no life. The doctorthen immediately askedDr. Namarika whetherthe family members knewabout the death of thePresident to which hereplied that the familywas aware. The doctor

then asked Dr. Namarikawhether the public knewabout it to which Dr.Namarika answered thatthe public did not know.Then the doctor furtherasked Dr. Namarikaas to why the body ofthe President was stillconnected to the ventilator.Was it pretence that therewas still life? Dr. Namarikareplied confirming that itwas the case.

2.2.10 Events atKamuzu InternationalAirport

The Commissionreceived evidence that asthe ambulance was onits way to the airport, theGuard Commander issuedinstructions to the AirportCommandant, Mr. StevenMkandawire, advising himand all his staff to vacatethe apron where the air

ambulance had parked. Headvised him that only stafffrom State House shouldbe present. Afurther callwas also made to theOfficer-in-Charge, AirportPolice, Mr. Davis Mulepa,with a similar message. Allairport members of staff,including Airport Policeand the Officer-in-Charge,Immigration, Mr. HudsonMankhwala, and all hisstaff, vacated the apron

area and retreated to theiroffices.The ambulance carrying

the body of the Presidentarrived at the airportaround 9 pm. There were

some Cabinet Ministersand Government officials atthe airport. The ambulanceproceeded into the airportthrough the technical gate,and not through the VIPsection, and drove straightto the apron where the airambulance was parked. Thebody was taken into the airambulance. The First Lady,Madam Callista Mutharika,Dr. Namarika and thePresidents daughter, Mrs.Duwa Mutharika - Mubairawent into the air ambulanceas well, ready to take off.

Some few minutes afterboarding, the captain of theair ambulance alighted and

headed towards the mainterminal building of theairport. It was learnt thatthe pilots were refusing tofly because they did nothave clearance to fly a deadperson. They explainedthat they could not flyunder those circumstancesuntil they were givenclearance. They demandedthat the body be takenback into the motor vehicleambulance on the ground.

The air ambulance medicalpersonnel also demandedtheir linen back.

The medical personnelfrom KCH had to plead withthem as there was no otherlinen around, meaning thatthe body would remainuncovered without thatlinen. At this point, theFirst Lady, Dr. Namarikaand Mrs. DuwaMutharika-Mubaira alighted from theair ambulance and returned

to the VIP Lounge wherethey remained waiting.Discussions between

Malawi and South Africathen ensued. Accordingto the testimony by Mr.Bintony Kutsaira, theDirector of NationalIntelligence Service, theintelligence authorities inSouth Africa called theircounterparts in Malawiand made reference to theearlier request to fly the

Malawi President to SouthAfrica. They indicatedthat they had news thatthe President had diedand demanded to knowwhy there was need to flythe body to South Africa.Mr. Kutsaira told theCommission that followingthat discussion he talkedto the Chief Secretary, Mr.Bright Msaka, SC, to haveclarification on why thebody was being taken to

South Africa. Mr. Msakagave the clarification toMr. Kutsaira. The matterwas then clarified to theintelligence authorities inSouth African. They were

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advised that there was need totake the body to South Africa forpostmortem and embalming, andto allow for time for preparationfor burial. Mr. Kutsaira informedthe Commission that according

to his information, clearanceto fly the body to South Africawas later given by PresidentJacob Zuma through the SouthAfrican Ministry of ForeignAffairs. Mr. Kutsaira told theCommission that few dayslater, he got the approval ofthe President, after she hadassumed office, and travelled toSouth Africa specifically to briefhis counterpart regarding thedevelopments in Malawi duringthat time.

After the flight was clearedto land in South Africa, anothercomplication arose. The pilotsrefused to fly stating that theirflying time hours had expired.This caused further delay. It washeard in evidence that as themedical personnel were trying totake the body down from the airambulance, Hon. Peter Mutharikaasked them to wait. TheCommission was told that Hon.Peter Mutharika, as MalawisMinister of Foreign Affairs, made

calls to his counterpart in SouthAfrica to intervene on the matter.The Zimbabwe Ambassador toMalawi, who was also the Deanof Diplomatic Corps, and the

South African HighCommissioner to Malawi werealso called to the airport to tryand intervene in the stalemate.These two diplomats came tothe airport and proceeded towhere the air ambulance was.As these discussions were goingon at the airport, the Principal

Secretary for Health, Dr. CharlesMwansambo, made a call toKamuzu Central Hospital askingthem to prepare a bed in the ICUfor the President since it was notclear whether the air ambulancewas going to depart.

Dr. Hetherwick Ntaba testifiedto the Commission that whenthis stalemate was going on heraised with his colleagues therethe risk of the matter getting outof hand in trying to create a mediablackout on the state of health

of the President and suggestedto the Chief Secretary that itwould be better instead to takethe body to State House as thatwould provide better securityin managing the situation. Dr.Ntaba told the Commission thatthis proposal was presented toHon. Peter Mutharika and Hon.Goodall Gondwe who agreed tothe proposal. Thus, there wastherefore also the considerationof taking the body to StateHouse.

After lengthy discussions thepilots reluctantly agreed to fly.The First Lady, Dr. Namarikaand Mrs. Duwa Mutharika-Mubaira had to rush to boardthe air ambulance this second

time. It is in evidence that theair ambulance finally took offaround 12 midnight. There wasevidence from some airport staffthat the pilots took off in anabrupt manner leaving the people

wondering if a patient wouldsurvive such take off.

CHAPTER 3EVIDENCE TAKEN

REGARDING ISSUES OFTRANSITION OF STATEPOWER

3.1 EVENTS ON 5th APRIL,2012

3.1.1 Discussions at KamuzuCentral Hospital

The illness of the President,his admission at Kamuzu

Central Hospital (KCH) andhis eventual death, createdpanic among Cabinet Ministers,Government officials andDemocratic Progressive Party(DPP) functionaries. Discussionsregarding the issue of successionstarted right at the hospital in theafternoon of 5th April 2012.

It is in evidence that Hon.Peter Mutharika, Hon. GoodallGondwe and the Chief Secretary,Mr. Bright Msaka, SC, discussedthis matter as they were sitting in

the Hospital Directors office atKCH. They wondered what wasgoing to happen in the country,in terms of succession, bearing inmind that the Vice President, Rt.Hon. Mrs. Joyce Banda, had leftthe ruling party and had formedher own opposition politicalparty.

It was in evidence that duringthe discussions, the ChiefSecretary brought up the issue ofthe referral case. The three alsoconsidered the issue of national

security and wondered how itwas going to be handled. At theend, the meeting agreed that itwas important that ameeting be called on thematter with the securityofficers. It was furtheragreed that Cabinet becalled the following dayto be briefed and to beconsulted about thesituation.

The Chief Secretarytold the Commission

that, while at thehospital, Hon. PeterMutharika called himaside. Hon. Mutharikamentioned to the ChiefSecretary that this was aserious situation and asked him ifit would not be a good idea for theArmy (Malawi Defence Force) totake over Government. The ChiefSecretary told the Commissionthat he advised Hon. Mutharikathat it was not a good idea.However, in his own testimony

to the Commission Hon.PeterMutharika denied havingever at any point discussed sucha thing with the Chief Secretary.

The Chief Secretary told theCommission that having heard

the suggestion of an Army takeover from Hon. Peter Mutharika,he became uncomfortable. Heproceeded to meet the MalawiDefence Force Commander,General Henry Odillo, whowas still at the hospital at thattime. The Chief Secretary askedGeneral Odillo whether the Armyunderstood its role in times ofsuch events. He also asked theGeneral if he understood whatthe Constitution said in the eventof the death of the President.

The Chief Secretary told theCommission that it was very clearfrom the response of General

Odillo that the military in Malawicorrectly understood not only itsrole in the situation, but also theconstitutional provisions in theevent of death of the President.

He told the Commission thatthe response by General Odillogave him some comfort in the

way his office would handle thedevelopment.

3.1.2 Meeting Between theChief Secretary and the AttorneyGeneral

It is in evidence that thesame afternoon, 5th April 2012,the Chief Secretary called theAttorney General, Justice MaxonMbendera, SC, for the twoof them to meet at the ChiefSecretarys house. TheAttorneyGeneral proceeded to the ChiefSecretarys house around 3 pm.At the house, the Chief Secretaryinformed the Attorney Generalthat the President had been takenill and he was not giving him achance. He stressed that the

situation was grim. The ChiefSecretary then asked the AttorneyGeneral to provide a legal opinion

on what would be theway forward.

The Attorney Generaltold the Commissionthat when he was leavingthe house of the ChiefSecretary at that point,he got the impressionthat the President wasincapacitated by theillness but had not died.

The Attorney Generalproceeded to his officewhere he, together withhis staff, considered theissue of incapacitation ofthe President. At around

6pm on the same day, the AttorneyGeneral verbally advised theChief Secretary that in the eventof the Presidents incapacitation,the Vice President, Rt. Hon.Mrs. Joyce Banda, will have totake over as Acting President inaccordance with section 87 of the

Constitution of the Republic ofMalawi.

3.1.3 Call from the ChiefSecretary to the Chief JusticeThe Chief Secretary told the

Commission that on the sameday, 5th April 2012, in theevening he called the ChiefJustice, His Lordship JusticeLovemoreMunlo, SC, and askedwhere he was. The Chief Justice

told the Chief Secretary that hehad just crossed the border intoTanzania for a holiday. The ChiefSecretary explained the situationback home and asked him toreturn immediately because therewas need for him to be around.

The Commission establishedthat in that call the ChiefSecretary did not disclose to theChief Justice that the Presidenthad died.

3.1.4 Meeting at Hon. Peter

Mutharikas HouseAs had been resolved at themeeting among the three seniorGovernment officials held in theoffice of the Hospital Directorat Kamuzu Central Hospital, ameeting was convened at theresidence of Hon. Peter Mutharikain Area 43. The Malawi DefenceForce Commander, GeneralHenry Odillo, and the InspectorGeneral of Police, Mr. PeterMukhito, were invited to themeeting. The meeting was thus

attended by Hon. PeterMutharika,Hon. Goodall Gondwe, the ChiefSecretary,Mr. BrightMsaka SC,the MDF Commander, GeneralHenry Odillo, and the InspectorGeneral of Police, Mr. PeterMukhito.

The Chief Secretary toldthe Commission that at themeeting, Hon. Peter Mutharikaasked the MDF Commanderand the Inspector General ofPolice whether they were goingto stand with the Government

in the crisis. The Chief Secretarytold the Commission that beforeeither of the two could respond,he responded to the question onbehalf of the two. He informedthe Commission that he told themeeting that his view was that,firstly, the two officers had nothad time to meet their men andbrief them about the situationand, secondly, that he had alreadyadvised the two to follow the sidethat was consistent with the law.According to the Chief Secretary,

both the Army Commander andthe Inspector General of Policeagreed with the position thatthe Chief Secretary had taken.However, the Chief Secretarystestimony on the position that heindicated to have taken was notcorroborated by the testimony ofany of the persons who attendedthe meeting.

When the Chief Secretary wasrecalled to the Commission toshed more light on this matter, hetold the Commission that he did

not remember any substantivediscussions at the meeting heldat Hon. Mutharikas house anddid not believe that the Armywas asked to take over thecountry. He stated that nobody

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Chaired the commission of inquiry: Justice EltonSingini

Hon. Mutharika mentioned

to the Chief Secretary that

this was a serious situation

and asked him if it would not

be a good idea for the Army

(Malawi Defence Force) totake over Government


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NATION onSundaymarch 10 2013 7

talked about the Army takingover Government. He furtherstated that, at the meeting,Hon. Mutharika was seeking anopinion on what should be donein the circumstances. However,

he maintained his assertionduring his earlier testimonyto the Commission that Hon.Mutharika did approach him atthe hospital on 5th April 2012 onwhat the Chief Secretary thoughtabout the Army taking over.

According to the MDFCommander, General HenryOdillo, the meeting at thehouse of Hon. PeterMutharika,was chaired by Hon. GoodallGondwe.About the discussionsat the meeting, General Odillos

testimony to the Commissionwas in the following words:So the first individual who

opened up the discussion wasHon. Gondwe. I think to me hegave me the impression that hewas the leading speaker in themeeting. He made a few remarksand he indicated that since weall know what has happened thecountry might be on fire. So wehave to see how we handle thesituation. Now he approachedme with some suggestions that

the military should make anannouncement and after makingan announcement possibly takeover the situation of the countryuntil such a time that the politicalparty organized themselvesand then later on take over theleadership or power. The momentthat statement was made I wasextremely very uncomfortable. Itwas sensed that I was not literallysupporting that idea because atthat stage my first remark wasthat, well, we have a situation

here I think as a governmentits critical that you got to makedecisions. That was my firststatement, you got to make adecision, I think this is a criticalmoment; you got to make adecision. And then I was asked bythe Professor and said, well, whatdecision do you expect becausewe are all here, we are supposedto be making the decisions. I saidno this is a wrong forum. Andat that stage the Chief Secretaryintervened and said well I think

maybe we need to give more timeto the General to think over thissituation. Because unfortunatelyat that point I felt, as I said,uncomfortable because I thinkthere is no provision at all inthe Constitution which providesthe military taking over poweror getting involved in politics.So that is how it started. Weleft the meeting room. I and theInspector General we left at thesame time.

The meeting ended on that

note. General Odillo told theCommission that after themeeting he proceeded to summonsenior officers from the MDF fora meeting the following day tobrief them on the situation. The

following day the meeting tookplace at the MDF Headquartersat which General Odillo briefedhis senior officials about thesituation in the country followingthe Presidents illness and on the

need for the military to abide bythe Constitution. He informedthe Commission that he did notdisclose to the officers about thesuggestion of theArmy taking overbecause in his opinion he felt thathe needed not make the situationworse. In their testimony to theCommission two senior MDFofficers, Brigadier General IgnacioMaulana and Major GeneralJohn Msonthi, confirmed to theCommission that General Odillodid not inform them about the

suggestion for the Army to takeover Government.

The Commander furthertold the Commission that thefollowing day, in the evening, hereceived five phone calls whichhe identified as coming fromHon. PeterMutharikas phone,which he ignored. Shortly afterthe last call, he received a callfrom the Chief Secretary askinghim whether he had receivedsome calls on his phone whichhe did not answer and if he

knew who was calling him andwhy was he was not picking upthe calls. General Odillo told theCommission that he told theChief Secretary that he knewthat the phone calls were coming

from Hon. Mutharika and he saidthat he felt he had nothing to sayto him. When Hon. Mutharikatestified before the Commissionthe question of the phone callsto General Odillo was put to him

and he vehemently denied havingever called General Odillo on theevening of 6th April.

Upon recall on the matterof Army take-over, the MDFCommander maintained that atthe meeting held at Hon. PeterMutharikas house, Hon. GoodallGondwe, who presided over themeeting, did mention that therewas going to be bloodshed inthe country and wondered whatthe Army could do. Accordingto General Odillo, Hon. Goodall

Gondwe went further and saidthat the military should proceedand make an announcementand that it should control thepolitical situation in the country.General Odillo further told theCommission that the decisionsthat he was referring to in hisearlier testimony were supposedto be political decisions and hesaw that there was need to bequick enough because any delaysin announcing the death of thePresident would be opening

space for problems.On the issue of the meeting

at Hon. PeterMutharikas house,Hon. Goodall Gondwe told theCommission that he could recallthat he got a call around 4.15pm

reminding him about the meetingat Hon. PeterMutharikas house.He confirmed the attendance ofthe five of them at the meeting,that is, Hon. PeterMutharika,the Chief Secretary, the MDF

Commander, the InspectorGeneral and himself. Accordingto Hon. Goodall Gondwe, theChief Secretary did most of thetalking. He briefed them aboutwhat had happened and toldthe meeting that they should beprepared and be ready to dealwith the situation.

Hon. Gondwe explained thatthe MDF Commander was veryeloquent during the discussionsand that his view was that theMDF was going to handle the

security situation. To Hon.Gondwe, the head of the Armylooked fine in the discussions. Hemaintained that the discussionat the meeting centered aroundthe security issues relating tothe ability of the security organsto maintain law and order in thecountry if things got out of hand.

Upon recall on the meeting,Hon. Gondwe confirmed thatduring the discussions at thehospital earlier in the afternoon,it was observed that there was

a possibility of disorder in thecountry. Hon. Gondwe told theCommission that at the meetingthe security people were briefedabout the situation and it wasmentioned to them that during

that time there was a possibilityof public disorder bearing in mindthat the issue of succession, likelyto be taken to the judges, maytake a bit long to be decided bythe courts. He noted that in that

event there may be a vacuum.Hon. Goodall vehemently deniedthat there was any mention of theArmy making an announcementand taking over Government ofthe country.

According to the formerInspector General of Police,Mr. Peter Mukhito, when theCommission called him in thefirst instance, he stated thathe got a call from the MDFCommander, General Odillo,asking for directions to Hon.

Peter Mutharikas house.The Commander drove to

Police Headquarters inArea30, where he linked up withthe Inspector General and theyproceeded together to the housebut in separate vehicles.

According to the InspectorGeneral in his testimony athis first appearance before theCommission, the discussion atHon. Mutharikas house wasabout the readiness of the twosecurity branches to handle the

security situation. He was notvery clear on the issue of theArmy take over the first timethat he appeared before theCommission.

In response to a question

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by the Commission onwhether the issue ofthe MDF takeover wasdiscussed at the meetingat Honourable PeterMutharikas residence, Mr.

Mukhito confirmed to theCommission that indeedthe issue was mentionedthat when things getchaotic theArmy should beready to at least come in.He confirmed that it wasat this point that GeneralOdillo said that the Armycould not come in becauseit was a political problemand it needed to be sortedout politically.

The Commission having

looked and reviewedthe strength of theCommanders evidence,recalled the InspectorGeneral specifically for himto elaborate on his earlierstatement about the Armycoming in should there bechaos. In his testimony onrecall he said as follows:

Normally we do call theArmy to assist. I recall that Isaid those words. Perhaps thecontext in which I said thosewords was largely on the part of

security mainly on the internalsecurity that where the Policehas failed normally we invitethe Army to come in to assistnot necessarily taking overof the Government, no, but Iwas talking about the internal

security that where the Policehas failed, and examples likethe incidences that occurredon 20th July (2011), in both

Lilongwe and Mzuzu wherewe were incapacitated as PoliceService, we really invited the

Army to come in and reallythey did. So the coming in ofthe Army which I actuallyalluded to was in terms of

security and nothing else..When the Commission

asked the formerInspector General whetherduring that meeting theCommander of theMalawiDefence Force was askedif theArmy was ready to

run the affairs of State, heresponded as follows:Now going back to the

meeting which actually tookplace at the residence of theHonourable Professor in factI remember that there wasa proposal that in fact theywant to take the matter to thecourt. But now I think it wasbetween Honourable Gondweand Honourable Professorthere was that mention to sayif we take this matter to court

obviously there was going to bea reaction and now when thatreaction comes, are you as the

Army ready to take over. Thatwas really mentioned and itcame from I think in betweenthe two Honourable Professor

and Honourable Gondwe. Yesthat was mentioned..

Then the Commissionasked the former InspectorGeneral what GeneralOdillos response was. Hesaid:

The Generals responsewas that what we have here

is a political problem and asa political problem it has tobe resolved politically and notinvolve us as security agencies.That was the statement hemade. And when we came out,the Chief Secretary and therest remained behind and thiswhen we discussed as we wereboarding our vehicles (we tookthe position) that this was a

political problem and that wasour stand as the two securityorganizations..

Hon. Mutharika didindicate when he appearedbefore the Commission thefirst time that there wereseveral meetings at hishouse. A lot of people cameto the house, and peoplewere having meetingshere and there within thepremises of the house.He told the Commissionthat he did not rememberhaving attended themeeting which discussed

the suggestion of Armytake-over. He said it mayhave been because hewas busy on the phone.Hundreds of calls werecoming through his phonefrom people within and

abroad inquiring about theissue of the President.

When he appearedbefore the Commissionthe second time, followinghis own request to comeand clarify some matters,Hon. Mutharika told theCommission that thereason that he had decidedto come to the Commissionagain was that the lasttime that he had appearedbefore the Commission,he was asked about themeeting involving himself,Hon. Goodall Gondwe,the Chief Secretary, theMDF Commander andthe Inspector General ofPolice that took place at hishouse. He explained thaton the day that they had themeeting he had just heardthe news of the Presidentsdeath and was sleepingwhen the team came tohis house. He told theCommission that he hadtruthfully forgotten aboutthe meeting when he camebefore the Commission thefirst time.

Hon. Peter Mutharikafurther told theCommission that whenHon. Gondwe came back

from the United States,he asked him whether heremembered about themeeting.

He explained that Hon.Gondwe advised him thathe remembered about that

meeting. Hon. Gondwetold him that it was theChief Secretary who hadarranged the meeting andreminded him what wasdiscussed at the meeting.In his own words, Hon.Mutharika explained tothe Commission about themeeting as follows:

He [Hon. Goodall Gondwe]reminded me about themeeting, that the main pointabout the meeting was thatwe were concerned especiallyconsidering what happenedbefore, demonstrations,disorders. What would happenin the country that is in theevent that there is disorder? Isthe Army and the Police ableto contain it? You rememberhow on July 24th, was it 20th,the Police had difficultiescontaining the riots that time.We said are you ready in factthis time if there are riots?

And they said they were. AndI think that was the essence ofthe meeting. Now when after Itold Gondwe I called my formercolleague Mr. Kayira here[Secretary to the Commission]and said can you pass theinformation to the Chairman,

so he said no actually I neededto come in person to explain

that. Thats why I came hereto make sure because I thinkthe question you raised wasthat Hon. Gondwe and I hadbeen asking, I think the Army,to take over the Governmentor something. I just dont

think thats true because thatwas the same time we werewaiting for the referral. Ithink the referral had alreadybeen sent to court. So that wasthe essence of the meeting and

I thought it was importantthat I clarify that and I thinkGondwes testimony, I think,obviously it is confidential, histestimony is consistent withwhat I am saying that we were

simply interested toknow in the event of disorder

could they in fact contain it andthey said they could. So thatsessentially what it was. Thatswhy I came here..

The Commissionclearly established thatthe testimony of Hon.Mutharika on his recallin respect of the matter

was based on what Hon.Goodall Gondwe told himor reminded him.

3.1.6 MinistersConverge at Hon. GoodallGondwes House

It is the evidence of theformer Minister of Justiceand ConstitutionalAffairs,Hon. Ephraim MgandaChiume, that on 5thApril2012 he left Lilongwefor the North. When the

news of the illness of thePresident broke out hewas atMponela. He calledHon. Dr. Jean Kaliraniwho indeed confirmedto him the illness of thePresident. She advised him

to return to Lilongwe. Heimmediately returned toLilongwe. He further calledHon. Goodall Gondwewho confirmed that thePresident had indeed beentaken ill. This was around2pm. When he arrived inLilongwe, he went straightto Hon. Goodall Gondweshouse where he found himand Hon. Ken Lipenga. Heasked about the conditionof the President and Hon.Gondwe told him thatthe President was dead. Adiscussion ensued amongstthem on the development.Hon. Goodall Gondweasked Hon. Chiume histhoughts on what wouldhappen in the situation.Hon. Chiume told theCommission that headvised Hon. Gondwe thatthe Constitution was veryclear that the Vice Presidentwould take over.

As they were discussingthe matter at the house,they were joined by fewother Ministers, includingHon. Dr. Kalirani. TheDPP Secretary General,Mr. Wakuda Kamanga,also joined the group.They were informed that

the President was to beflown to SouthAfrica.Hon. Chiume told theCommission that they allknew within themselvesthat the President haddied. n

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The body of the late Mutharika arriving at Kamuzu International Airport in Lilongwe

bingu death inquiry events of april 5th, 2012

Documents