black mischief: crime, protest and resistance in colonial kenya

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Black mischief: crime, protest and resistance incolonial Kenya

David M. Anderson

The Historical Journal / Volume 36 / Issue 04 / December 1993, pp 851 - 877DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X00014539, Published online: 11 February 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0018246X00014539

How to cite this article:David M. Anderson (1993). Black mischief: crime, protest and resistance in colonialKenya. The Historical Journal, 36, pp 851-877 doi:10.1017/S0018246X00014539

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The Historical Journal, 36, 4 (1993), pp. 851-877Copyright 1993 Cambridge University Press

BLACK MISCHIEF: CRIME, PROTESTAND RESISTANCE IN COLONIAL

KENYA*

DAVID M. ANDERSONSchool of Oriental and African Studies, University of London

A B S T R A C T . This article examines the history of African resistance to colonial rule among theNandi and Kipsigis peoples of Kenya's Western Highlands. Anti-colonial protest centred on theactivities of a group of ritual leaders, the orkoiik of the Talai clan, who were believed to possesssupernatural powers of prophecy and divination. Between the late i8gos and 1905, the orkoiyotKoitalel had come to prominence as a leader of resistance to conquest. After his defeat the Britishbriefly attempted to harness his Talai clansmen to the system of colonial government, promoting themas chiefs. This move was based upon a misunderstanding of the status of the orkoiik, whose powersoften stood in direct conflict with the authority of the elders and who were greatly feared by manyNandi and Kipsigis. By the igsos the orkoiik were deeply implicated in much criminal activity,especially the theft of livestock from European settler farmers. On three occasions orkoiik attemptedto organize armed risings.

The article concludes with a discussion of the place of the orkoiik in the historiography of Kenya.Although Koitalel and Barserion are commonly presented as heroes of a glorious resistance tocolonialism, it is suggested that this interpretation fails to reflect the deep ambiguity of the status ofthe orkoiik, and the complexity of the struggles that took place within African societies under colonialrule.

On a near-moonless night in June 1934, a group of eight Africans entered thecompound of a European-owned farm in the Kinangop area of NaivashaDistrict, Kenya Colony. The farm was the home of Alex and Stella Semini, asettler couple who had only been farming in the district for the past year. Theintention of their African visitors was burglary: the theft of money, firearmsand ammunition. Why these interlopers selected the Semini farm is unclear,but their simple burglary was to go horribly wrong, with consequences theycould not have foreseen. The burglars clumsily disturbed the family from theirsleep, and when Alex Semini went on to the porch to investigate, a struggleensued. In the general melee Alex Semini was speared and then beaten whilehe lay injured, and Stella Semini assaulted. Hearing the Seminis' farmlabourers coming to investigate the commotion, the African interlopers made

I am grateful to Roy Foster, John Lonsdale, Joseph Miller, Terence Ranger, Neal Sobania,Ed Steinhart and Richard Waller for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, and alsoto seminar groups at the University of Cambridge, University of Minnesota, and the School ofOriental and African Studies, University of London, whose constructive criticisms helped to shapethe ideas presented here.

85I

852 DAVID M. ANDERSON

their escape into the night, taking with them some of their booty but leavingbehind pieces of clothing and personal possessions dislodged in the fracas.These would later be crucial items of evidence in the apprehension andconviction of the criminals. Dazed and in a state of shock, Stella Seminibundled her husband into the family car, and the couple managed tomanoeuvre the vehicle over the two miles to the nearest neighbouring farm.Alex Semini passed into a coma later that night, and survived for the nextthree weeks, before finally succumbing to his wounds.1

News of the 'Kinangop Outrage', as these events came to be known, causedan immediate furore among the settlers of Naivasha and quickly became amatter of debate and concern throughout Kenya's White Highlands.2Rumours that Stella Semini had been sexually assaulted fuelled the 'BlackPeril' anxieties of the white settler community. The response of the police andthe administration was accordingly rapid and intense, and within days thefirst of a series of arrests was made. The police had identified the culprits asbeing Kipsigis, a people whose home reserve lay some 100 miles to the west ofKinangop, beyond the Mau escarpment (Fig. 1). A small number of Kipsigis- less than 100 - were employed on farms in the Naivasha district, but noneof those eventually charged with the murder of Alex Semini was found to bea resident of Naivasha (although one had previously been employed on theSemini farm).3 The Kipsigis people, along with their neighbours the Nandi,had long been stigmatized in European perceptions as habitual cattle thievesand were commonly portrayed as the most 'criminally' inclined of all Kenya'sAfrican peoples. That reputation had taken on a more sinister tone as attackson the property and person of European settlers and Asian traders in theWestern Highlands had steadily increased from 1928, reaching proportionswhich generated considerable alarm among sometimes over-anxious settlersand calmer colonial officials alike by 1933. Over this period thefts of livestock,money and firearms, which had initially been concentrated on the Europeanfarms in the immediate vicinity of the Kipsigis reserve, gradually increasedand spread over an ever-widening area. In the interpretation of the colonialgovernment, the 'Kinangop Outrage' conformed to this wider pattern ofcriminal activity involving the Kipsigis (and to a lesser extent their otherKalenjin neighbours).

1 This account is based upon the trial papers. Criminal Case 123 (1934), Rex. v. Kibet arap

Boregi and 6 others. P.R.O. CO 533/481/1. Eight persons were known to have been involved inthe crime, but only seven were prosecuted. For a brief reference to the case, but only in the contextof settler reaction, see Dane Kennedy, Islands of white: settler society and culture in Kenya and SouthernRhodesia, i8go-ig3g (Durham, NC, 1987), p. 133. This murder has taken its place in settlermythology, with perhaps predictable distortions. See the settler traditions collected by MaryGillett, Tribute to pioneers (privately published, Oxford, 1986), [no pagination, entries listedalphabetically], where Alex Semini is stated to have been 'murdered on his farm in 1954 duringthe Mau Mau rebellion'.

2 'Report of public meeting of Naivasha Farmers' Association', 2 July 1934, KNA [Kenya

National Archive] PC/RVP.6A/17/50.3 Criminal Case 123 (1934), trial transcript, CO 533/481/1.

CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 853

N A N D I Ethnic groups

Kisii Towns

Laikipia Districts

0 miles 30

Rumuruti

V///////AThomson's Falls //, Nanyuki

Fig. 1. Central and western Kenya.

Investigation of this spiralling pattern of lawlessness led, in the early monthsof 1934, to the revelation that much of this crime was 'organized', and thata particular section of the Kipsigis people were its principal instigators.Responsibility for this 'lawlessness' was attributed to the activities of the malemembers of the Talai clan, known by the Kalenjin term orkoiik (sing, orkoiyot),who were believed to possess ritual and supernatural powers. The ' KinangopOutrage' was believed to have been instigated by one of these ritual experts.By the time of the trial of the seven Africans accused of the murder of AlexSemini, the colonial administration had become convinced that the' witchcraft' of the Kipsigis orkoiik had been turned towards crime, and thatmuch of that criminal activity was deliberately directed against the authorityof the government.4 The victims of these crimes included African chiefs andtheir agents as well as Europeans and Asians, and the colonial authoritiescame to realize that some of these incidents had a political significance that

4 Governor Byrne to secretary of state, 3 May 1934, CO 533/441/1, summarizes the findings

of the government inquiry into the activities of the orkoiik.


went beyond-simple accumulation: crimes against colonial laws, protestagainst colonial authorities, and ultimately the aim of a general armedresistance were seen to be linked in a serious challenge to colonial rule in theWestern Highlands. The murder of Alex Semini, coming just as the Nairobiadministration was debating how to deal with the threat posed by theseAfrican 'gangsters', contributed significantly to the decision to take the drasticand unparalleled action of deporting the entire Talai clan from the KipsigisReserve and detaining them indefinitely in an alien and inhospitable area ofNyanza province in what was, in effect, an open prison.5

The 'outrage' on the Semini farm was part of white Kenyan history (andlater its mythology). It can also be too easily adopted into nationalisthistoriography as part of a tradition of resistance in which the leading orkoiikhave a heroic role. But Kenya has many histories; what historians think (oronce thought) important may not be what their subjects were most concernedwith. All African societies had their internal conflicts, which are revealed onlytangentially and perhaps misleadingly in their brushes with colonial authority.This is a case study of trying to see through the misperceptions which ourinherited historiography has imposed upon us. What mattered to the Kalenjinwas male generational conflict over livestock resources and access to thevarious forms of political and moral authority which underwrote, orpatronized, household strategies of accumulation, stock management andalliance. All this was problematic, even threatening, to those involved: disease,drought, enmity had to be combated. There were different, even conflictingmeans of doing so. There was the 'normal' authority of elders, exercising con-trol through seniority and the manipulation of kin and herds: and there weretwo forms of' abnormal' (and to varying degrees, abhorrent) means of insur-ance and seeking advantage. One was everyday witchcraft, available to all whowere malignantly inclined. There were also the 'prophetic' or divinatorypowers available only to the most senior and most proficient orkoiik, powerswhich could most successfully be invoked and harnessed during moments ofhigh social drama, when society was challenged from outside or when its ownmechanics of social change, such as the age-sets that regulated the relationshipsbetween generations, went through contested processes of transition. We haveto understand 'resistance', if we are to understand it as part of African, ratherthan merely colonial, history, as an external manifestation of this deeperrhythm of social life. And these rhythms changed as colonial rule created thepossibility of a new moral order - ultimately to be shaped by those elders whograsped the opportunities of Christianity, who accepted the political authorityof the new state, and who turned their energies to economic gain in anincreasingly agricultural (rather than cattle-keeping) economy. This new

5 'The Laibons Removal Ordinance' (no. 32 of 1934), was initially drafted and put before the

Colonial Office in May 1934. The amended ordinance became law on 25 Sept. 1934, Laws ofKenya, 1948 (Nairobi, 1948), Cap. 46. Comments on the provisions of this legislation are to befound among the papers in CO 533/481/1. The term 'gangster' was employed by the prosecutingcounsel in the Semini case, none other than Attorney-General William Harrigan, in his openingremarks to the court. Criminal Case 123 (1934), trial transcript, p. 4, CO 533/481/1.


world was inevitably built at the cost of the authority of the orkoiik, whosepowers were intrinsically linked to older social patterns, and whose successdepended upon the exploitation of the ambitions of younger men with as yetno household (and thus no moral authority) to their name. This essay is aboutthe ways in which the struggles of the orkoiik to adapt to the new rhythms ofthe colonial world were and have been perceived, and about the importanceof such perceptions in shaping our views of villains and heroes in the colonialpast.

Laibons, orkoiik and witchcraftWe must begin by dealing with the definition of certain terms and categories.The Kipsigis and the Nandi are sections of the broader group now known asthe Kalenjin, and in earlier ethnographic literature referred to as the 'Nandi-speaking peoples'.6 Among Kalenjin the term orkoiyot refers to the malemembers of specific clans, who are attributed with a variety of supernaturalpowers. Orkoiyot was not an ' office', and there was no automatic legitimacy forany person to claim to be the 'paramount' or 'senior' orkoiyot. The status of anorkoiyot depended entirely upon reputation, and that in turn depended uponthe fulfilment of prophecy, success in rain-making and divination, theacknowledged efficacy of medicines, and so on. Each practising orkoiyotoperated within a limited geographical area, which might contract or expandwith his reputation. However, certain orkoiyot were believed to hold greaterpowers, and people came from much further afield to consult such a person.These individuals also took a prominent role in rituals and ceremonies with adeeper significance for the wider community, most notably those involving thetransitional phases of age-sets.7

The powers of the orkoiyot were believed to be hereditary; that is to say, theywere thought to possess mental powers that were passed through the lineage.You could not learn to be an orkoiyot: you were born one. All male membersof specific clans among the Nandi and Kipsigis were, by definition, orkoiyot. Butit was recognized that though all had inherited the powers, only some wouldbe able to use them. This ambiguity as to the 'redistribution' of powersthrough each generation led to rivalry and competition within immediatefamily groups, most frequently between cousins, but sometimes also betweenbrothers and half-brothers. If you were born the son of a well-respected and

6 C. W. Hobley, Eastern Uganda: an ethnological survey (Anthropological Institute, occasional

papers no. 1: London, 1902) and A. C. Hollis, The Nandi: their language and folk-lore (Oxford, 1909)are the earliest works, but what have become the standard texts were published later. SeeG. W. B. Huntingford, Nandi work and culture (Colonial Research Studies no. 4, HMSO, London,1950); idem, The Nandi of Kenya: tribal control in a pastoral society (London, 1953); idem, Ethnographicsurvey of Africa: East Central Africa, part VIII, the southern Nilo-Hamites (London, 1953); E. E. Evans-Pritchard, 'The political structure of the Nandi-speaking peoples of Kenya', Africa, xin (1940),250-67 ;J. G. Peristiany, The social institutions of the Kipsigis (London, 1939); and I. Q. Orchardson,The Kipsigis (Nairobi, 1961, abridged version reprinted Nairobi, 1971).

7 Huntingford, Nandi of Kenya, pp. 38-52; Peristiany, Social institutions, passim; Orchardson,

The Kipsigis, chs. 4 and 5.31 HIS 36


powerful orkoiyot, the public perception was that you had a higher probabilityof inheriting similar powers. Rivalries within lineages were matched by thosebetween lineages, as each struggled for pre-eminence within the clan. Lessobviously, this led to a degree of fictive kinship: on the one hand, younger andaspiring orkoiik used their relationship to senior and highly regarded clansmenas a form of legitimation (and such patronage was an important aspect of thepolitical domain exercised by leading orkoiik); on the other, the wider publiccommonly assumed kinship between successive generations of powerful orkoiik.

The colonial authorities described the practices of the orkoiik (and laibons) asa form of witchcraft, and troublesome individuals were often prosecuted underthe witchcraft ordinance.8 This seems straightforward enough from theperspective of the colonial administration, but is both confused and confusingwhen explored from the perspective of the Kalenjin. Witchcraft (ponisiet), asNandi and Kipsigis understood it, was not confined to the members of theTalai clans, but could be practised by any person. Witchcraft was believed torequire skills which could be learned, and although in certain cases it wasthought to pass through the lineage, in general it was not consideredhereditary.9 Some orkoiik were recognized practitioners of witchcraft, but thiswas seen as being distinct from their potential to hold greater powers asmembers of an orkoiik clan. Orkoiik could be witches, but witches who were notmembers of the specific orkoiik clans could not be orkoiik: and there werebelieved to be many such people. To Kalenjin, witchcraft and the practices ofthe orkoiyot were two quite distinct phenomena. The important point here isthat colonial debate about the prevalence of witchcraft and the activities of theorkoiik assumed the two categories to be synonymous. From the perspective ofthe Christian missionary churches, who entered the Western Highlands in theearly years of this century, both were pagan and represented elements ofAfrican belief to which Christianity was implacably opposed: in the missionarymind the orkoiik were, like witches, practitioners of the black arts.10

A further confusion of terms must be explained. Throughout the colonialperiod male members of the Talai clan among the Kipsigis were referred to byEuropeans as ' laibon' rather than 'orkoiyot'. The activities of the Kipsigis laibonwere, in general terms, identical to those of the Nandi orkoiik. However, laibonis the name given to a category of ritual expert among the Maasai (the wordis from the Maa language, not Kalenjin), whose practices and social status arenot the same as those of the Kalenjin orkoiyot. The confusion stems partly fromthe tendency of early colonial officials to use laibon as a generic term for ' ritual

8 Witchcraft accusations were commonly used by district commissioners as the basis for

deportation orders to be issued against troublesome orkoiik. This involved the collection of swornaffidavits from local elders. See, for example, several cases from Elgeyo district reported in'Laibons, 1934-63', KNA PC/NKU/3/1/10.

9 Huntingford, Nandi of Kenya, pp. 107-11; Orchardson, The Kipsigis, pp. 119-22.

10 Huntingford, ibid. For an account of mission work among Kalenjin which deals with early

(pre-1914) perceptions of the orkoiik, see W. R. Hotchkiss, Then and now in Kenya Colony (New York,1937), and for an introductory discussion of mission conflict with the orkoiik Huntingford, Nandiwork and culture, pp. 116-18.

GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 857

expert', and to give the role of such an individual pronounced politicalovertones: this generic was avoided in the case of Nandi, where the prolongedresistance to British conquest in which the orkoiik were involved gave thecolonizer an early awareness of the precise Nandi term. At the same time,there is a strong historical connection between Kalenjin and Maasai ritualexperts throughout the Rift Valley and Western Highlands, and this alsocontributed to the blurring of indigenous categories and types in British eyes.11For the sake of simplicity, and also because (as we shall see) there are verygood historical reasons for doing so, I shall hereafter refer to all these ritualexperts among the Kipsigis and Nandi as orkoiik.

This historical connection is essential to an understanding of the colonialhistory of the Kalenjin. During the second half of the nineteenth century therole of the orkoiik among some sections of the Kalenjin was ' overlaid' byaspects of Maasai laibon practice. Although ritual experts throughout EastAfrica were commonly identified with a particular community, thatassociation was not necessarily bounded by notions of ethnicity: Maasai laibons,in particular, were widely consulted by non-Maa peoples during thenineteenth century.12 Some time during the 1860s a laibon named Barsabotwo(or Kapuso), from the Uas Nkishu Maasai (who had until then occupied thegrazing lands of the plateau adjacent to Nandi country), came to prominenceamong the Nandi. Nandi oral histories date the emergence of a pre-eminentorkoiyot, with greater powers and gaining a wider constituency than hadpreviously been the norm, to this event. Precisely what may have existedbefore this date, and how the role of the orkoiik may have been evolving at thistime, we do not know: but the arrival of Barsabotwo - the embodimentperhaps of the intrusion of a broader wave of influences brought into Nandiby Uas Nkishu Maasai refugees, defeated and scattered after internecinesquabbles with other Maasai herders - marks a watershed in Nandi perceptionof their recent history.13

The introduction of these influences among the Kipsigis came c. 1890,around the time that Kimnyole, according to some accounts Barsabotwo'sgrandson, was stoned to death by Nandi following a sequence of failedpredictions: whatever the power of the lineage, the status of any orkoiyotdepended upon performance. In the unsettled period surrounding Kimnyole'sdeath, part of his family departed from Nandi and moved south to settleamong Kipsigis. By the late 1890s one of this group, Kipchomber arap

11 J. L. Berntsen, 'Pastoralism, raiding and prophets: Maasailand in the nineteenth century'

(Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1979), and ' Maasai age-sets and prophetic leadership',Africa, xux (1979), 134-46.

12 J. L. Berntsen, 'The Maasai and the Inkidongi: prophets, followers and pastoralism in the

Rift Valley in the nineteenth century', paper delivered to the conference on 'Seers, prophets andprophecy', London, Dec. 1989, pp. 116.

13 P. K. arap Magut, 'The rise and fall of the Nandi Orkoiyot', in B. G. Mclntosh (ed.),

Ngano: studies in the traditional and modem history of East Africa (Nairobi, 1969); S. K. arap Ng'eny,'Nandi resistance to the establishment of British administration 1883-1906', in B. A. Ogot (ed.),Hadith 2 (Nairobi, 1970), pp. 104-26; G. W. B. Huntingford, 'The genealogy of the Orkoiik ofNandi', Man, xxiv (1935), 24.

31-2


Koilege, one of Kimnyole's many sons, had emerged as the most prominentorkoiyot among the Kipsigis. At the same time, another of Kimnyole's sons,Koitalel arap Samoie, had come to prominence among Nandi. WhetherKipchomber and Koitalel were fictive or real kin to Kimnyole is a moot point,although sources from the early 1900s appear to confirm that they wereperceived and presented as such then. As Nandi and Kipsigis prepared toencounter colonialism in the 1890s, the most prominent ritual experts amongboth peoples were therefore drawn from the same family: a lineage whoseorigins are widely attributed as being Maasai, and whose leading members arebelieved to have gradually recast the role of the orkoiyot to give themselvesgreater political power over the community.14 The extent of that power wasestablished in the resistance of the Nandi to colonial conquest.

Koitalel and Kipchomber

The Nandi orkoiyot Koitalel arap Samoie is a hero of African resistance tocolonialism in Kenya. His story is well known to most Kenyan schoolchildrentoday. Koitalel is portrayed as the military leader of the Nandi warriors intheir stubborn and protracted resistance to British colonialism between 1896and 1905.15 Having marshalled the Nandi and successfully held the colonialpower at bay for more than a decade, over which time the Nandi enduredseveral' punitive' raids and two major military campaigns against them by theBritish, Koitalel's glorious struggle was brought to an end by treachery. Withthe Nandi and the British locked in a war of attrition in 1905, Koitalel metwith a British officer, Captain Meinertzhagen, in a forest clearing under a flagof truce. Many accounts are given of what transpired in that clearing, butmost are agreed in the simple fact that Meinertzhagen drew his revolver andshot Koitalel.16 In the weeks following this event Nandi resistance crumbled,and along with it the resistance of the Kipsigis, whom Koitalel's brotherKipchomber arap Koilege had allegedly been mustering to support the Nandiin 1905.17

The events following Koitalel's death are less well known, yet form a crucialelement in understanding the internal struggles and divisions within Nandiand Kipsigis society over the colonial period. In establishing control of the

14 Ng'eny, 'Nandi resistance', pp. 97-102; S. C. Lang'at, 'Some aspects of Kipsigis history

before 1914', in B. G. Mclntosh (ed.), Ngano: studies in the traditional and modem history of East Africa(Nairobi, 1969), pp. 87-92.

15 William R. Ochieng', A history of Kenya (Nairobi, 1985), pp. 945. A. T. Matson, The Nandi

campaign against the British, i8g5~igo6 (Nairobi, 1974), provides a brief account (pp. 116), whilst hisNandi resistance to British rule, i8go-igo6 (Nairobi, 1972), is the first of what had been conceived asa multi-volumed and highly detailed study.

16 Col. R. Meinertzhagen, Kenya diary igo2-o6 (Edinburgh, 1957), pp. 232-39, gives a

protagonist's account of these events, with subsequent sections of the book discussing thecontroversy that led to three separate inquiries into Meinertzhagen's conduct. The oral history ofNandi provides many vivid accounts, which are consistent in asserting that the orkoiyot wasunarmed and held in his hand a small bundle of grasses, a symbol of peace.

17 Matson, Nandi campaign, p. 12.


Nandi and Kipsigis areas, the British first dealt with those Nandi whom theybelieved to have been in league with Koitalel: some were executed, othersdeported and imprisoned.18 Then, believing the position held by the orkoiikamong the Nandi and Kipsigis to be one of executive authority, they set aboutestablishing the rudiments of the new administrative structure by appointingseveral orkoiik as colonial chiefs. Among these was Kipchomber arap Koilege.19

This placed the orkoiik in a position of authority over the community whichhad no precedent. Worse still, it neglected the subtle, ambiguous andsometimes contradictory nature of the relationship between these ritualexperts and the main body of the Kalenjin. The orkoiik were both feared andrespected, for their powers could be exploitative just as they could beexploited. They were therefore deliberately kept at a distance from thecommunity, socially and politically, their power having no role in the runningof day-to-day affairs, their public authority confined to specific ritualfunctions. Indeed, the power of these ritual experts was in some senses'external' to the Kalenjin community, deliberately cordoned off: the orkoiiklay beyond the moral codes governing social behaviour, operating within aquite separate moral sphere defined by their own special status. For theMaasai the ambiguity of the relationship between the laibon and thecommunity has been summed up in a subtle observation that is equallyapposite for the Kalenjin orkoiik: Maasai could not live with the laibon, but norcould they live without him.20 Like the Maasai laibon, the orkoiik only cameinto a closer relation to the wider community at what might be termed liminalphases, especially those linked to the passage of age-sets and the organizationof initiation ceremonies, at which prominent orkoiik presided. Even in thesedeeply significant affairs, the role of orkoiik was complementary to, yet also inconflict with, the authority of the elders.

This conflict was most apparent in relation to male generational tensionssurrounding the acquisition of cattle and wives. Around the time of initiation,young men hoped to begin to acquire cattle of their own, which would markthe beginnings of herds which would provide the economic basis for theireventual marriage and the establishment of independent households. Elderswithin a family would commonly contribute to this process through variousarrangements of loaning or bonding out cattle, but this naturally placed theelder in a position of considerable authority regarding the redistribution ofwealth, and (by extension) over the ability of young men to marry andestablish households. The orkoiik intervened in this process in two importantrespects: first, leading orkoiik were consulted over the timing of initiations,

18 More than a dozen Nandi believed to be close associates of Koitalel were sentenced to five

years rigorous imprisonment in September 1906; see 'Nandi political prisoners, 190514', KNAAG4/4995.

19 C. M. Dobbs, 'Memorandum on the Lumbwa laibons', 12 May 1930, CO 533/441/1.

'Lumbwa' was the incorrect colonial name given to the Kipsigis people and their land.20

The phrase is drawn from Paul Spencer, ' The diviner's oracle and the prophet's domain inMaasai', Africa, LXI (1991), 360-70, and is also employed by Berntsen, 'Maasai and Inkidongi',p. 1.


being able to- effectively slow down or accelerate the passage of the age-setcycle (and thereby exert pressures on elders to redistribute wealth); andsecondly, the powers of the orkoiik were invariably invoked by young men inthe organization, sanctioning and conduct of cattle raids. Theft of cattlerepresented a means by which younger man might acquire wealthindependently of the redistribution of the wealth of their immediate relatives.For services rendered in regard to cattle raids, orkoiik were rewarded with ashare of the cattle seized, and so this was also an important element in theorkoiyot's own pattern of wealth accumulation. The orkoiik were thus placed ina strategic position in the mediation of generational conflicts concerning age-set transitions, and the social and economic transactions that followed in theirwake: the balance between them and male elders was a delicate one. So it wasthat, by placing orkoiik in a position of administrative authority, the Britishhad unwittingly turned the world of the Kalenjin on its head, undermining theauthority vested in elders by the community and placing orkoiik in a positionto challenge the accepted principles of moral order for their own advantage.21

It took the colonial administration some time to realize their mistake: ittook the orkoiik among the Kipsigis no time at all to capitalize upon theirunexpected opportunity. Although there was a steady trickle of complaints tothe administration from Kipsigis elders from 1907 onwards about the excessesof those orkoiik appointed as chiefs, it was not until 1911 that the administrationbegan to appreciate the enormity of their error. From 1912 onwards a numberof orkoiik were removed from positions of authority, largely for failing to carryout government orders. Over the next two years groups of elders levelled aseries of accusations of witchcraft against Kipchomber arap Koilege, claimingthat he was plotting to turn the people against the government. In 1914Kipchomber arap Koilege was tried under the witchcraft ordinance, alongwith several other orkoiik who had held the posts of chiefs and headmen. Hewas convicted and deported to Fort Hall, where he subsequently died.22

Shortly after Kipchomber arap Koilege had been taken away by the Britisha strange illness was reported to be sweeping through the Kipsigis reserve. Thedisease was named kusto, and it was said that people became suddenly feverish,and would writhe and agitate with severe sweats and acute swellings of theglands, and that within a few hours they would die. It was reported to theDistrict Commissioner that hundreds were dead and dying in every location,and it was alleged that the disease had originated in the locality whereKipchomber arap Koilege had lived. Although the District Commissioner andthe European doctor who rushed to Kericho found people who claimed to be

21 Huntingford, The Nandi, pp. 38-52, offers a general discussion of the relations between elders

a n d orkoiik.22

The deportation of Kipchomber and two other orkoiik, arap Boisio and arap Kiboyot, wassanctioned by the secretary of state on 26 Dec. 1913, under the removal of natives ordinance(1909). They left the Kipsigis reserve on 20 Jan. 1914, Kipchomber being taken to Fort Hall;Barton to Hemsted, 30 May 1928, KNA DC/NYI/2/8/1 . Kipchomber died in exile on 18 July1916, see District Commissioner [DC] Fort Hall to DC Nyeri, 19 July 1916, KNAPC/NZA.3/31/12.

CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 86l

smitten, they could locate no visible symptoms; and though everyone spokento claimed that many had died, no body was ever seen by a European. In hisreport on the incident, the District Commissioner concluded it to be a form ofhysteria, and ventured to suggest that it was in some way connected to thedeportation of Kipchomber arap Koilege. Later that same year, in the midstof a worsening drought, a group of Kipsigis petitioned the DistrictCommissioner for the return of the orkoiyot, on the grounds that his removalwas the cause of their present misfortunes.23

The history of the next twenty years in the Kipsigis reserve is dominated bythe struggle for ascendancy between the orkoiik of the Talai clan and thoseelders who came to oppose them. The evidence of elders' complaints againstthe orkoiik suggests that ' opposition' took many forms. Some elders indicatedthe alien character of orkoiik practice among the Kipsigis since the arrival ofKipchomber in the 1890s, and argued for their expulsion back to the Nandireserve: others reacted against the subversion of'tradition' displayed by theencroachment by the orkoiik into the domain of civil authority; others tiedtheir fortunes to those of their new colonial masters, and opposed the orkoiiksimply as enemies of law and order, following the ' official line'; others stillbecame converts to Christianity, and viewed the orkoiik as the pagan enemy inthe struggle for' hearts and minds'. On the other side were those who favouredthe orkoiik. The motives of these people are less easy to characterize, but amongthem were certainly those who wished to perpetuate Kalenjin resistance tocolonialism and also those who saw the orkoiik (rightly or wrongly) asprotectors of an older and preferred social order. There were also certainlymany who supported the orkoiik out of fear and a genuine belief that they heldthe power whether natural or supernatural - to inflict real harm andmisfortune. The patterns of motive, loyalties and patronage were made all themore complex by the various transformations that had occurred in the roleand functions of the orkoiik between the 1860s and 1910s - first by the intrusionof a Maasai element in the nineteenth century, then by the experience ofresistance to colonial conquest, and again by the early ' alliance' with colonialauthority.24 The tensions this generated within the community were thereforenovel, a product of recent 'crises'. But it would be wrong to label theseconflicts in simple terms of collaboration and resistance: the orkoiik stood at thecentre of the battle to redefine the moral order, to establish a new socialconsensus in a transformed world. We can follow that struggle through thecareers of leading orkoiik during the colonial period.

23 Acting provincial commissioner [PC] Nyanza to chief secretary, 4 May 1935, quoting from

the district political record book for 1914, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/116. On agitation for the returnof the orkoiyot see Dobbs, 'Memorandum on the Lumbwa laibons', 12 May 1930, CO 533/441/1,pp. 14-15- 24 Magut, 'The rise and fall', passim.


Barserion arap Kimanye

The struggle between the authority of the elders and the power of the orkoiikemerged among the Nandi in the months following Koitalel's death, but theramifications took longer to penetrate the consciousness of the colonialadministration than in Kipsigis. The reasons for this seem clear enough.Several leading Nandi orkoiik had been killed in the fighting of 1905, andothers had subsequently been deported by the government. Of those who hadsurvived, some had dispersed to other parts of the Western Highlands, andonly a rump remained in Nandi.25 Defeated and depleted by the events of1905-6, the Nandi orkoiik were in no position at that time to challenge theauthority of their new colonial masters. As among the Kipsigis, the Britishinitially sought to govern the Nandi through their orkoiik, appointingKoitalel's erstwhile rival, Kipeles, as chief.26 Kipeles held his colonial post,though to little effect, until his death in September 1911. The British thenappointed Lelimo arap Samoie, a son of Koitalel, as chief, in the belief thatthey were honouring local ' custom' in maintaining authority in the lineage.This was a grave error of judgement: Lelimo was little respected by the Nandi,his powers thought to be very limited in comparison to his brothers and half-brothers.27 Upon the death of Kipeles, in 1911, the power of the orkoiik amongthe Nandi had sunk to a low point, and a small group of elders were alreadyemerging as conspicuous allies of the British in their role as chiefs andheadmen. By 1918 it seemed to the colonial administration that the power ofthe orkoiik was a thing of the past, and that the Nandi were slowly settlingdown 'to an orderly way of life' under the pax britannica.28

This optimistic outlook was soon overshadowed by a very serious challengeto colonial authority among the Nandi. The challenge was led by an orkoiyotnamed Barserion arap Kimanye, the youngest son of Koitalel. Resident as a'squatter' on a European farm just north of the Nandi reserve, Barserion laybeyond the authority of the Nandi elders and beyond the immediate controlof the District Commissioner at Kapsabet in the Nandi reserve.29 FollowingKipeles' death, he emerged unrivalled as the most prominent Nandi orkoiyot.By 1920 the colonial officers in Nandi viewed him with suspicion: the initiationof a new age-set was imminent, and it was rumoured that Barserion was deeplyinvolved in the growing number of stock thefts from settler farms near theNandi reserve, and that he had sworn vengeance on the colonial governmentfor his father's murder.30

Barserion had reason enough to oppose the colonial government, but by theearly 1920s unrest among the Nandi was widespread, and it was by no means

25 ' N a n d i political prisoners, 1905-14 ' , K N A A G 4 / 4 9 9 5 .

26 Hun t ing fo rd , The Nandi, p . 25.

" Ibid. p. 52; Huntingford, 'The genealogy', p. 24.28

Nandi District Annual Report, 191819.29

Castle-Smith to Senior Commissioner [SC], Kisumu, 22 Oct. 1923, 'Report on Nandiunrest', p. 1, KNA PC/NZA.3/31/11.

30 Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu, 5 Oct. 1923, KNA PC/NZA.3/31/11.


all instigated by the orkoiyot. The years following the end of the first world warwere a difficult period among the Nandi. Influenza took its toll of the humanpopulation, and stock diseases swept through the cattle herds. At the sametime, the colonial government increased its demands for taxes and improvedits system of collection, compelling more Nandi to take employment on theEuropean-owned farms on the Uasin Gishu plateau, along the northernborder of the Nandi reserve.31 Most serious of all, in 1920 the governmentalienated a further 100 square miles of the Nandi reserve in the Kipkarrenvalley to provide farms for Europeans under the post-war Soldier SettlementScheme, and permitted further land grants to Europeans in the Kaimosi area.In 1906 the Nandi had lost substantial grasslands in the Songhor area as partof their punishment for resistance, and the alienations of 1920 furtherrestricted the grazing land available to several pororoisiek (territorial units,based on clans). Many Nandi viewed this as a hostile act on the part ofgovernment, and by 1921 it was apparent that the Nandi were againbecoming 'disaffected'.32

Although he was not entirely the source of this 'disaffection', Barserionbecame its focus.33 During 1932 Nandi elders petitioned the DistrictCommissioner on the subject of the ceremony of saket-ap-eito, an importantritual in the transition from one age-set to another. According to Nandi'custom' (as presented at the time), this ceremony involved a gathering of allthe murran of a single age-set under the guardianship of senior elders, butpresided over by the most prominent orkoiyot.3* Although the saket-ap-eitoshould be held every 14 years or so, no ceremony had been conducted sincebefore the troubles of 1905, and an unusually large body of men awaitedinitiation, many of them much older than would normally be expected. Nandielders earnestly pressed upon the administration the urgency of the situation.Adopting an attitude of non-interference, the administration permitted theorganization of the ceremony to go ahead. Barserion arap Kimanye was toofficiate, and it was proposed to hold the ceremony on the European farmwhere he then resided.35

In the months leading up to the saket-ap-eito, the authority of the eldersdiminished, giving way to the influence of the orkoiyot. 'Lawlessness' amongthe Nandi increased markedly, particularly the incidence of stock theft by theNyongi age-set, who were preparing to participate in the ceremony. Settlerswere quick to report these thefts, and also to comment upon what theyperceived as the growing 'truculence' of the younger Nandi men. Therealization that most of the Nandi labour from the settler farms on the Uasin

31 D iana Ellis, ' T h e Nand i protest of 1923 in the context of African resistance to colonial rule

in K e n y a ' , Journal of African History, x v n (1976), 562-6 .32

Hunt ingford, The Nandi, pp . 41 -2 .33

Ellis, 'The Nandi protest', remains the only detailed study of these events.34

H u n t i n g f o r d , Southern Nilo-Hamites, p p . 3 1 - 2 .35

For a detailed account of administrative actions concerning the saket-ap-eito see Castle-Smithto acting SC Kisumu, 22 Oct. 1923, 'Report upon Nandi unrest', KNA PC/NZA.3/31/11.


Gishu plateau >vould be absent for three days to attend the ceremony raiseda further crop of complaints.36 More seriously, rumours began to circulate theEuropean farms and the Nandi reserve that the ceremony was to be the signalfor a rebellion, led by Barserion arap Kimanye, to take back the Nandi landsfrom the Europeans and to avenge the death of Koitalel. With this intelligence,the gathering of several hundred Nandi men on a farm in the midst of theEuropean settler community began to take on a distinctly sinister appearancein the eyes of European officials.37 Uncertain of Barserion's intentions, and ofthe reliability of their own intelligence network, the administration dallied.Finally, only four days before the ceremony was due, Barserion and four elderswho had been prominent in the organization of the gathering were arrested bythe District Commissioner, accompanied by a detachment of armed police. Aweek later, the orkoiyot was brought before the magistrate at Eldoret, andsentenced to be deported to Nyeri, in the Kikuyu area of central Kenya.38

Unlike the 1914 disturbances among the Kipsigis, which had seen a groupof elders emerge in direct conflict with the orkoiik, the 1923 troubles in Nandiappear to have united a broad spectrum of Nandi society behind the orkoiyotand against the government. The driving force behind this was not the orkoiyothimself, but the resentments that still lingered over the injuries of a war thenstill strong in the memory, and the continuation of what seemed to be furtherpunitive measures in the further land alienations of 1920.

The road to Gwassi

With the deportation of Barserion arap Kimanye the administration had, forthe time being, gained the upper hand in the struggle against the Kalenjinorkoiik. Or so it seemed. However, in Barserion's absence, his Kipsigis cousins(the sons and nephews of his uncle Kipchomber arap Koilege) mounted achallenge of their own to the authority of the colonial government.

To place the actions of the Kipsigis orkoiik in context, we must first brieflyconsider the manner in which the colonial government sought to enforce lawand order among the Kalenjin during the 1920s and 1930s. Stock theft was thecrime with which the Kalenjin were most closely associated in the eyes of thegovernment.39 It had long been understood by the colonial administrationthat the orkoiik were involved in stock thefts. Their role in sanctioning andblessing pre-colonial cattle raiding by murran had continued in a modified form

36 Ibid. p. 2; J. J. Drought to SC Kisumu, 4 Oct. 1923; and Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu,

confidential, 13 Oct. 1923, all in KNA PC/NZA.3/31/11.37

Capt. Slade Hawkins to Castle-Smith, 22 Oct. 1923, 'Nandi unrest'; 'Statements regardingunrest', 15 Sept. 1923, and 'Evidence of Kipto arap Kimais' (East African Police), enclosures 3and 10 in Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu, 22 Oct. 1923, all in KNA PC/NZA.3/31/11.

38 Barserion was arrested on 16 October . Castle-Smith to SC Kisumu, 17 Oct . 1923, K N A

PC/NZA.3/31/11. He was deported to Meru early in 1924.39

The following section is based on David M. Anderson, 'Stock theft and moral economy incolonial Kenya', Africa, LVI (1986), 399-416.


in the colonial period, although the practice of large-scale raiding had ended.For his ritual and practical assistance in the organization of thefts and thedisposal or secretion of stolen animals, an orkoiyot stood to make considerablepersonal gain, in the form of livestock and other tribute; and there wasevidence that some orkoiik actively encouraged theft as a means ofaccumulating wealth for themselves. The inability of Kalenjin elders to stampout cattle rustling by the murran came to be viewed by the colonialadministration as confirmation of the general acquiescence of the widerKalenjin community in such crimes: the Kalenjin considered stock theft to bea 'sport' rather than a crime, it was alleged. The thrust of colonial sanctionagainst stock theft was accordingly aimed at cultivating a community moralityagainst the criminal activities of the murran. In prosecutions against stockthieves, or against those believed to have aided them, the colonial authoritiesfrequently invoked collective punishments: that is, the punishment of thewider community for the offence of one of its members.40 For example, theresidents of a particular location might be collectively fined if stolen livestockwere found within the location boundaries, the assumption being that theyknew the animals were there and should have reported the matter. Theenforcement of collective punishments had two broad effects: firstly, inbringing pressure to bear on chiefs and headmen to discourage stock theft, itpushed them into direct conflict with those orkoiik who were actively involvedin - and benefiting from - the activities of the murran; secondly, it pushed theorkoiik and the stock thieves into a more highly organized system of' rings' inorder to avoid detection and transfer stolen stock without implicating localKalenjin communities.

The colonial challenge to the involvement of the orkoiik in stock theft wastherefore moral as well as legal. It sought to turn the community, andespecially the chiefs, against the orkoiik and their agents. As the colonialauthorities stepped up the enforcement of legislation against stock theft duringthe 1920s, these tensions became more apparent, especially among theKipsigis. Matters came to a head in the middle of 1928, and rumbled throughthe next year. The transition of the Kipsigis' Maina age-set was thenimminent, a phase when (as we have seen) the orkoiik could exploit their closestrelationship with, and greatest influence over, the murran.*1 In 1928 thiscoincided with a serious and prolonged drought, which increased still furtherthe spate of stock thefts that officials had now come to expect when age-settransitions were due. But as the drought worsened, in July and August 1929,Kipsigis' 'lawlessness' took a different, and unexpected form: a series of arson

40 T h e collective punishments ord inance (1909) and the stock and produce theft o rd inance

(1913) bo th allowed magistrates the power to apply fines to communit ies for the offences of theindividual , and both further allowed punishment in respect of non-cooperat ion or the withholdingof information on the pa r t of any communi ty . As a control against abuse, these punishments hadto be referred to the governor for approval . See Anderson, 'S tock theft ' , p p . 404-6 .

41 Orchardson , The Kipsigis, p . 12. Dobbs , ' M e m o r a n d u m on the L u m b w a la ibons ' , 12 M a y

1930, CO 533/441/1. p. 21.


attacks began on the property of Africans in the Kipsigis reserve. Huts andgrain stores were set alight, and on several occasions these acts were clearlyintended to endanger life. As the months passed the attacks appeared to takeon a pattern: they were concentrated in those locations where theadministration had been most successful in its efforts to suppress stock theft,and the principal victims were those colonial chiefs, their headmen andretainers, who were known to have informed against stock thieves or to havespoken out against the orkoiik}2

These attacks brought the covert struggle between the elders and the orkoiik,which had simmered since the deportation of Kipchomber arap Koilege in1914, into the open. Elders once again began to seek the assistance of theadministration against the orkoiik. Prominent among these elders were earlyparticipants in the Christian churches that were then being established amongthe Kipsigis. We do not know enough about the discussions that took placeamong Kipsigis elders over this crucial period, and it would be unwise to viewthis as reflecting what might be termed a climate of' popular opinion' amongthe Kipsigis, but it appears that some individuals elected to take a standagainst the orkoiik. In coming forward to give evidence to the districtcommissioner, several elders requested that the orkoiik be removed from thereserve, on the grounds that their influence was ' evil' and that they should beremoved back to Nandi or Maasailand, from where they had come.43

Disturbed by the challenge to the authority of the chiefs, and concerned toreduce stock theft and subdue the crescendo of European settler complaintsabout the 'lawless Kipsigis', the administration mounted an investigation intothe activities of the orkoiik. The evidence accumulated by District Com-missioner Brumage led to the conviction and imprisonment of several orkoiikfor their involvement in stock theft, and gave a clearer picture of the extent oforkoiik activity in the 'handling' of stolen animals. In a reassertion of colonialauthority, a military levy force patrolled the Kipsigis reserve for 18 months tomaintain law and order, paid for by increased taxation. With the support ofhis provincial commissioner, C. M. Dobbs (who had considerable experienceof Kipsigis), Brumage went so far as to suggest that the entire clan should beremoved from the Kipsigis reserve, presenting signed affidavits from severalelders and chiefs to indicate that this was the wish of the people. But the

4 2 Beresford-Stooke to P C Nyanza, 15 Oct . 1929, K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 3 2 / 3 9 . The police were

warning of trouble in Kipsigis reserve from early in 1928; head of criminal investigationdepar tment to chief native commissioner, 22 Feb. 1928, K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 3 2 / 3 9 . It was believedthat the orkoiyot a r ap Boisio, who had been deported to Nyeri in 1914 along with Kipchomber, wasbehind these disturbances; Filluel to PC Nyanza, 24 April 1928, K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 3 2 / 3 9 . Forfuller details of his activities see ' A r a p Boisio', K N A D C / N Y I / 2 / 8 / 1 .

43 T h e inqui ry in to these events was conducted by D C Beresford-Stooke, assisted by the district

officer [ D O ] , Brumage , bo th unde r the direction of senior commissioner C. M . Dobbs . Dobbs toBrumage , 22 Sept. 1929; Brumage employed six Kipsigis ' a g e n t s ' to collect information on theorkoiik, Brumage , ' R e p o r t for week ending 16 November 1929 ' ; and Beresford-Stooke to Dobbs ,25 Sept. 1929, all in K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 3 2 / 3 9 . O n proposals to remove the orkoiik in 1930,suppor ted by the N a n d i local native council, see P C Nzoia to chief secretary, 23 J u n e 1930, K N ADC/KAPT/1/9/24.

GRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 867

suggestion was rejected as being too extreme a reaction to what were perceivedby most officials as simply the activities of a few criminal types.44

With the presence of the military patrol things were quieter in the Kipsigislocations over 1930 and the early part of 1931. Thereafter the situation rapidlydeteriorated. The normal pattern of stock thefts again spiralled, but crimes ofa new character became more common: thefts of cash, items of high value,firearms and ammunition from settlers and government officers. In the lastmonths of 1933 there was a rash of attacks on settler farms, in which twosettlers in Lumbwa were physically injured, and a substantial number of gunsstolen.48 In response to settler criticism and rumours of Kipsigis 'insurrection',and with a growing sense of unease at the pattern of events, the administrationmounted a second investigation into crime among the Kipsigis, bringing backDistrict Commissioner Brumage to conduct the inquiry.46 Over severalmonths of 1934, Brumage interviewed Kipsigis chiefs and elders, detained andinterrogated all the more important orkoiik, and reviewed the materialcollected in the district files. Playing one orkoiyot against another, exploitingthe rivalries between individuals (and often pretending he knew more than hedid), and coaxing the elders into believing that it would be safe to speak outagainst the orkoiik, Brumage began to assemble a fragmentary, but fascinatingpicture of recent events. His final report made a quite startling set ofrevelations about the extent of organized crime among the orkoiik, and itsconnection with anti-government activities.47

Several elements of this report are strikingly problematic, but highlysuggestive of the nature of the conflicts within Kipsigis society at this time.Many of the principal informants were young Kipsigis who had very recentlycome under the influence of Christian missionaries; others were beleagueredchiefs and elders, victimized by the orkoiik and pressured by the colonialadministration; at least one was a member of the Talai clan, whose immediatefamily was involved in a long-standing dispute with other leading orkoiik}*Above all else, the tone of the evidence assembled by Brumage conveys a veryreal sense of the tension and deeply rooted fear that surrounded the revelationof these events for those involved. The evidence presented in Brumage's reportclearly requires careful assessment, both for what it can tell us about Kalenjinsociety in this period and for what it tells us about the colonial mind. Brumagewas not a policeman, but his report was compiled in much the same manner

44 O n the levy force, see commissioner of police to D C Ker icho , 19 Oct . 1929, and related

papers in K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 3 2 / 3 9 . T h e events of 1928-9 were closely linked to an increase instock thefts along the Maasa i border with Kipsigis. Dobbs strongly advocated the removal of theorkoiik; Dobbs to PC Nzoia, 22 June 1930, KNA DC/KAPT/1/9/24.

45 Relevant correspondence on these events is to be found in 'Law and order: Lumbwa

laibons, 1930-34', KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115.46

Montgomery to colonial secretary, 8 Feb. 1934, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115.47

Brumage to P C Nyanza , 19 April 1934, K N A A G 3 / 2 9 .48

Crucial evidence was provided by Kibinot a r a p Rongoe, an orkoiyot whose family wereinvolved in a prot rac ted dispute with the family of K ipchomber . His role as a n informant, and hisconflicts with other orkoiik, cont inued at Gwassi; P C Nyanza to colonial secretary, 12 J u l y 1944,KNA MAA/9/974; PC Nyanza to DC Kisii, 11 Jan. 1949, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/99.


that any detective might draw together the strands of a case. Perhaps, overkeen to make connections and see patterns in the morass of detail, Brumagemay be guilty of having laid too much stress upon the degree to which theactivities of the orkoiik were orchestrated by powerful individuals. All the same,it is quite clear that, whether individually or collectively, the orkoiik weredeeply involved in what Brumage termed 'criminal activities'the theft ofproperty from both Africans and Europeans, along with actions whichcolonial law determined as forms of extortion. Brumage also gave thesematters a political slant, accusing the leading orkoiik of plotting a rising againstthe state. Thus, the colonial view of the orkoiik tarnished them at once ascriminal accumulators - lining their own pockets - and as subversive rebels,holding a political purpose against the legitimacy of colonial authority.

The burden of the evidence gathered by Brumage indicated that theKipsigis orkoiik were at the head of a sophisticated and well-organized criminalnetwork, operating throughout the Western Highlands. Several informantsalluded to a meeting of orkoiik that had allegedly taken place in the Buret areaof the Kipsigis reserve some time during 1928.49 Some presented this meetingas an effort to resolve a power struggle between rival orkoiik families. IfBrumage's recounting of this information is correct, the resolution of thestruggle was found in cooperation rather than conflict. The meeting wouldseem to have had two principal outcomes: first, it defined a group ofconfederates among the orkoiik who stood in direct opposition to government(the arson attacks in the Kipsigis reserve apparently began in the wake of thismeeting), and who agreed to accumulate resources with which to mount afuture rebellion; secondly, it seems that the eight leading orkoiik agreed upona division of territory, each identifying a 'domain' over which he had control.This territorial division extended over the entire Western Highlands,incorporating the lands of other Kalenjin groups and extensive areas ofEuropean settlement. Brumage described these territories as 'fiefdoms'.50

The eight orkoiik who were the principal parties of this agreement - the ' BigEight', as colonial officials came to call them-were all closely related.Brumage went to considerable trouble to reconstruct a family tree for theseorkoiik, taxing each of his informants as to the precise relationships ofindividuals and collecting details of orkoiik wives and their numbers ofchildren. His findings may not be biologically accurate (fictive kin may wellbe presented as real kin), but the evidence is strong to support the view thatthese relationships reflect Kipsigis perceptions. Four of the 'Big Eight' wereidentified as sons of Kipchomber arap Koilege: Ngasura arap Chomber,Kiboin arap Sitonik, Sauli arap Mibei, and Kiberenge arap Toinge. Another,Marumah arap Bore, was Kipchomber's nephew. The remaining three, thebrothers Chebuchuk arap Boigut and Telile arap Boigut, and Muneria arapTonui, were cousins of Kipchomber arap Koilege (see Fig. 2).51 All of these

48 Brumage to PC Nyanza, 5 Feb. 1934, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115, p. 8.

50 See KNA PC/NZA.3/15/117 for a detailed map outlining the 'fiefdoms' controlled by each

orkoiyot. s l Brumage to PC Nyanza, 5 Feb. 1934, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115.

CRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA

Barsabotwo (Kapuso)869

Kipsokon Kibogui Turugat Marasoi

arap Sokon

1Kipchoira. Koik

iberge

Ngasuraa. Chomber

ChomberKoilagen

1Kisano

1Kiboin

a. Sitonik

a. Kimnyole Kib(

1Ogui

1Baserion

a. Kimanye1

Saulia. Mibei

1Chebuchuka. Boigut

Koitalela. Samoei

1Lelimo

1Kiberengea. Toinge

sigut

Telile a.Boigut1

Kibore

Marumah

IonBo

ni a>iek

Muneriaa. Tonui

a. Bore

Fig. 2. Genealogy of the orkoiik.

men were found to be deeply involved in 'criminal activities', and each wasalleged to be at the head of a network of' lesser orkoiik' who were also involvedin crime. The networks of agents were found to include at least two chiefs,several location headmen and a number of other government employees.52

The eventual list of charges against each of the eight, along with several oftheir accomplices, was long. Marumah arap Bore was found in possession ofthree rifles and a quantity of ammunition, all hidden in a cave. Chebuchukarap Boigut was also found to have stolen weapons and ammunition, andseveral valuable jewels stolen from a settler farm were recovered from his hut.Muneria arap Tonui was found to be responsible for a wide range of crimesin the Nakuru and Rumuruti districts (and was later to be strongly suspectedof involvement in the 'Kinangop Outrage'). Most serious of all, Kiboin arapSitonik was in possession of no fewer than eight firearms, including three -303magazine rifles (one of which had been stolen from the police in 1929), and aMartini-Henry rifle that had been stolen from a forest department official in1928. A further four orkoiik were found to be hiding other stolen weapons andammunition. Numerous charges relating to old stock theft cases were alsobrought against many orkoiik. Where less concrete evidence could be found,charges were made under the witchcraft ordinance. As a result of theinvestigations of 1934 more than a dozen orkoiik were imprisoned, with hardlabour, for terms of between one and five years.53

52 Ibid. pp. 9-11; also, Brumage to PC Nyanza, 19 April 1934, KNA AG3/29.

53 Brumage to PC Nyanza, 5 Feb. 1934, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115, pp. 4-7; Byrne to Cunliffe-

Lister, 3 May 1934, CO 533/441/1, summarizing convictions of orkoiik and sending a first draftof the 'Laibons removal ordinance'.


Portraying-the orkoiik as the ' evil' and disruptive force among the Kipsigis,whose powerful influence was based upon intimidation and the fear ofwitchcraft, Brumage reiterated his earlier recommendation for the wholesaledeportation of the entire Talai clan from the Kipsigis reserve. The legal andmoral objections that had been raised to so extreme a measure in 1930 nowmelted away: the extent of Talai involvement in crime and witchcraft hadbeen substantively documented, and the alleged intention of the orkoiik tomount a rebellion gave these events a deeper significance than had beenapparent four years earlier. In May 1934, with the strong support of othersenior administrators, and no doubt conscious of settler anxiety about thesituation in the Western Highlands, the attorney general drafted legislation toprovide for the mass deportation of the orkoiik clan, and forwarded it toLondon for approval.54

While this extraordinary and unprecedented proposal was under con-sideration at the colonial office, Alex Semini was murdered. The 'KinangopOutrage' was soon rumoured to be yet another example of the activities ofKipsigis 'gangsters', a rumour given some substance by evidence gatheredwhich implicated the orkoiyot Muneria arap Tonui, who, it was claimed, hadgiven 'blessings' to the eight burglars before their raid on the Semini farm.Lingering doubts in London and Nairobi about the propriety of the proposedlegislation dissipated in the weeks following the 'Kinangop Outrage'.55 On 25September 1934, the day after seven Kipsigis had been found guilty in the highcourt of the murder of Alex Semini, the Laibons Removal Ordinance (no. 32of 1934) was added the laws of Kenya (Cap. 46).56 Over the following threeyears, all members of the Talai clan, men, women and children - more than700 persons in all - were removed, with a portion of their livestock and otherpossessions, to the Gwassi location in South Nyanza, where the bulk of themwere to remain, under direct supervision, until the mid-1950s.57

The official record of this forced migration portrays the removal of theorkoiik as marking the welcome end of tyranny in the Kipsigis reserve and therestoration of the ' traditional' authority of the elders. There were certainlysome Kipsigis who viewed events in these terms, but not all shared this senseof well-being. Aside from the involvement of orkoiik in organized crime,members of the Talai clan were recognized and respected practitioners of sucharts as divining, rain-making and witch-finding: who would now perform

54 On the detailed drafting of the ordinance, see Montgomery to chief secretary, 19 July 1934,

KNA PC/NKU/3/1/10.65

For discussion of the legislation in the colonial office, see CO 533/481 / 1 .58

For the Semini case see criminal case 123 (1934), Rex v. Kibet arap Boregi and 6 others, CO533/481/15. 'The laibons removal ordinance' (no. 32 of 1934), Laws of Kenya, 1948 (Nairobi,1948), Cap. 46; see CO 533/481/1.

57 On the selection of Gwassi see DC South Kavirondo to PC Nyanza, 27 March 1934, and

subsequent papers, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/115, and on the beginnings of the move itself, DCKericho to Acting PC Nyanza, 22 Oct. 1934, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/116. The first move of elevenfamilies (120 people in all, with their livestock) was completed on 10 Nov. 1934. By June 1937 thelast family had been moved, and 113 orkoiik with 647 dependants were resident in Gwassi; PCNyanza to chief secretary, 3ojune 1937, KNA PC/NZA.3/15/117.

rCRIME IN COLONIAL KENYA 871

these mundane, but essential social functions? The departure of the orkoiik lefta vacuum which the aspiring Christian churches were not yet in a position tofill. The position of the churches was strengthened after 1935, but the powerand influence of the orkoiik lingered on. On many occasions the administrationuncovered evidence of attempts by Kipsigis to contact the orkoiik at Gwassi,seeking to employ their services for ritual purposes.58 While the departure ofthe orkoiik was welcomed by some, it marked an immediate social crisis ofsignificant proportions for others: towards the end of 1935, following theimprisonment of several leading orkoiik and the beginnings of the deportationsto Gwassi, the strange illness known as kusto was once again reported to besweeping through the Kipsigis reserve. This time the administration weremore confident in asserting that this was nothing more than a minor outbreakof cerebral meningitis, but the district commissioner stated plainly that manyKipsigis saw this as part of the revenge to be exacted by the

' The promised land*

With the Kipsigis wing of the family removed from the Western Highlands, letus return to the story of Barserion arap Kimanye and the Nandi. Accused ofwitchcraft and revolt, Barserion had been exiled to central Kenya in 1923. Inhis absence, the Nandi had continued to consult other orkoiik-somc of whomcontinued to be actively involved in the encouragement of stock theft ondivinatory and other matters.60 Although the Nandi orkoiik remained a threatto progress and to law and order in the eyes of the administration, there is noevidence that their opposition to the policies of the colonial government tookthe same form as among the Kipsigis. Certainly, by the late 1920s none of theNandi orkoiik had achieved a reputation to match that of the exiled son ofKoitalel.

In 1929 the district commissioner reported that 'certain Nandi elders' werepetitioning for the return of Barserion. The reason for their request was statedto be the seriousness of the drought then afflicting the Nandi reserve, the eldershoping that the restoration of the orkoiyot might restore the fortunes of thepeople. This argument seems to have been accepted by the administration,and Barserion was permitted to return to Nandi, where he was compelled tolive at the government town of Kapsabet, under the watchful eye of the district

58 For example , Kiboin a r a p Sitonik and M u n e r i a a r a p Tonu i , two of t h e ' Big E igh t ' who were

exiled to Gwassi following prison sentences served in the 1930s, man ag ed to main ta in ' cons tantcontact with the Kipsigis ' from Gwassi, and as a result were moved to Mfangano Island in LakeVictoria du r ing 1944; P C Nyanza to colonial secretary, 31 Aug. 1944, and related papers , K N AMAA/9/974.

59 Dr Howell to D C Kericho, ' A mysterious disease among the natives of south L u m b w a

distr ict ' , 17 April 1935, K N A P C / N Z A . 3 / 1 5 / 1 1 6 . Like the similar events of 1914, Europeansbelieved this to be associated with an outbreak of cerebrospinal meningitis, a l though this wasnever established.

60 See 'Laibons and deportees, 1927-35', KNADC/NDI/4/i,for monthly intelligence reports

from the criminal intelligence department on the activities of orkoiik in Nandi, and on Barserion'sactivities in exile.


commissioner.61 But it also seems likely that the request for Barserion's returnwas part of a wider conflict within Nandi society, between those who wishedto restore the orkoiik to the prominence they had enjoyed in the recent past andthose who did not. Among other evidence, this is indicated by events thatfollowed Barserion's homecoming in 1930 when, within a few months of hisreturn, another group of elders (including a number of recent Christianconverts) complained to the district commissioner that the orkoiyot was'practising witchcraft'. Although the district commissioner found insufficientevidence to support this accusation, similar claims were reiterated at intervalsthroughout the 1930s. It is certain that all the Christian churches in Nandiviewed Barserion as an evil and potentially dangerous influence. For his ownpart, Barserion undoubtedly continued to ply his trade over this period, butthere is no evidence that his activities mounted a serious challenge to thegovernment, or to the Nandi chiefs. None the less, his presence remained afocus of attention for those elders and (increasingly) chiefs who sought toreduce the power and influence of the orkoiik among the Nandi.62

Barserion was to commit one final act, however, that brings our story fullcircle. In the late 1940s the question of land again became a critical politicalissue in the Nandi reserve, following the decision of the settler-controlleddistrict councils of Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia to repatriate the majority ofthe Nandi squatters and their livestock to the Nandi reserve. The squatterswere resident labourers, living and working on farms in the European-settledareas to the north and east of the Nandi reserve. Many squatter families hadresided on these lands since before 1920, but they were treated under the lawas tenants-at-will and thereby had no rights. The agreement by which mostworked for the Europeans permitted them to graze a stipulated number oftheir cattle on the farm. In the early days of European setdement this systemhad evolved as an essential element in securing labour - without grazingrights, Nandi simply would not work the farms. By the 1940s the economicposition of the farms had changed, and the majority of European landowners(though by no means all) desired to move towards a better-defined system ofcontract labour and to remove African-owned livestock from their lands inorder to implement fuller development on the farms and to remove the risk ofthe spread of stock diseases.63

After considerable debate, and a good deal of persuasion from the61

Barserion returned to Nandi in May 1930, after requests from the elders; DC Nandi to PCNzoia, 28 Dec. 1929, KNA DC/KAPT/1/9/23.

62 'Law and order: Barserion arap Kimanye, 1932-39', KNA PC/RVP/6A/17/27, for

accusations against the orkoiyot made by Nandi elders in 1932 and 1938. Also, Hislop to PC RiftValley, 12 Jan. 1935, KNA DC/NDI/4/1.

63 O n the squat ter system in general , the best account remains Roger van Zwanenberg , Colonial

capitalism and labour in Kenya 1919-1939 (Nairobi , 1975), ch. 8. O n the impor tance of the settlerpressures in the Western Highlands to remove squat ter labour , see David M . Anderson and DavidT h r o u p , ' Africans and agricul tural product ion in colonial K e n y a : the my th of the war as awatershed ' , Journal of African History, xxv i (1985), 327-46, and Chris topher P. Youe, 'Se t t lercapital and the assault on the squat ter peasantry in Kenya ' s Uas in Gishu District, 19421963',African Affairs, LXXXVII (1988), 393-418.


government, the Nandi chiefs agreed to accept the returning squatters backinto the reserve and to supervise the ' reabsorption' of thousands of head ofcattle. Part of the government plan to accomplish this involved a landclearance and resettlement scheme in the Nandi reserve and the compulsorysale of stock that was surplus to the calculated carrying capacity of theavailable land, along with the compulsory branding of all stock to berepatriated to the reserve. All of this implied more people and livestock withinthe Nandi reserve, and greater direction from government as to the use of theirland.64 Barserion, by then an old man, entered the political debate on thesequestions, predictably taking the side of those returning squatters who seemedlikely to lose their livestock and be made landless in this process of change.After an abortive campaign in 1951, as the main process of repatriation gotunder way, to persuade the squatters to march back to the farms and'repossess' the land, Barserion again seemed to disappear from the politicalarena. At this time government energies were diverted by the Mau Mauemergency, and the removal of Kikuyu labour from farms throughout manyparts of Kenya created openings for Nandi squatters then being repatriatedfrom the Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoia farms.85 This lessened the pressures ofabsorbing so many people and livestock back into the reserve, and lowered thepolitical temperature, albeit temporarily.

It was not until May 1957, with the Mau Mau emergency in its fourth year,that Barserion arap Kimanye made what was to be his final bid to avenge thedeath of his father, Koitalel. In the early months of 1957 the districtintelligence reports began to mention that Barserion was again active. Hissupporters had been seen travelling about the reserve and, mysteriously,several of them had made visits to Nandi squatters on the Laikipia Escarpment,on the eastern side of the Rift Valley.66 Nandi had only gone to Laikipia assquatters in any numbers during the Mau Mau emergency, replacing Kikuyulabour on the farms. Many Nandi expelled from Uasin Gishu and Trans Nzoiahad made their way to Laikipia instead of returning to the overcrowded Nandireserve. They had done this with the tacit knowledge of the administration,who viewed this strictly illegal procedure as neatly ameliorating theirdifficulties in accommodating more people in the Nandi reserve and solvingthe problems of labour shortage in those areas of Kenya where Kikuyu labourhad predominated.67

64 On the planning, implementation and political repercussions of the scheme to repatriate

Nandi squatters to the reserve, see papers in 'Return of Nandi stock from Uasin Gishu, 1944-59',KNA DC/NDI/5/2, and 'Nandi: return of squatter stock, 1954-57', KNA DC/NDI/5/3.

65 DC Kericho to D C Nandi , 15 J a n . 1955, K N A D C / N D I / 5 / 3 , for details of special branch

reports. T h e administration were concerned enough by the re-emergence of Barserion and by thedisaffection of those sections among the Nandi who supported him to secure approval from thesecretary of state (Lennox-Boyd) for the extensions of the laibons removal ordinance to apply toNand i ; see Baring to Lennox-Boyd, 29 Ju ly 1955, and ' M e m o , on laibons in Nand i ' , fromMinistry of African Affairs, 21 April 1955, both in K N A M A A / 9 / 9 7 4 .

66 Acting PC Rift Valley to D C Nandi , 27 April 1957, K N A D C / N D I / 5 / 3 ; D C Thomson's

Falls to PC Rift Valley, 2 May 1957, reporting Nandi activities on Laikipia.67

Acting PC Rift Valley to secretary for African affairs, 1 May 1957, KNA DC/NDI/6/1.


From the evidence of Nandi who took part in the events of 1956 and fromthe intelligence on his activities gathered by the government, it appears thatBarserion's scheme was to lead a rebellion of the Nandi squatters on Laikipiawho, taking advantage of the preoccupation of the British with Mau Mau,would turn on the European settlers, kill them, and claim Laikipia as theNandi's 'Promised Land'.68 The killing of Koitalel would thus be avengedand, symbolically at least, the lands taken from the Nandi as punishment forthe resistance led by Koitalel would be restored. On the day prior to theplanned insurrection Barserion and a group of his supporters were arrested onthe road between Kapsabet and Laikipia. On the next day the police roundedup a large number of Nandi squatters in the fringes of the Marmanet Forest,on the western edge of Laikipia. They also confiscated over 5,000 newly madearrows and large quantities of freshly prepared poisons.69

Protest and resistance in Kenyan historiography

Barserion arap Kimanye was once again deported in 1957, this time toMfangano Island in Lake Nyanza, where he remained until 1961.70 Hiskinsmen among the Kipsigis were allowed to return from Gwassi to theKipsigis reserve from the mid-1950s, where those orkoiik suspected of anti-government or criminal activities were kept under close watch. By then theinfluence of Kipchomber's immediate family was much diminished within theclan, many of the children were attending school and some had embracedChristianity. Back among Kipsigis, the orkoiik resumed many of their socialfunctions as diviners, and it may be assumed that some continued to maintainan interest in stock t^eft: but there was no significant political disturbanceinvolving the orkoiik in the last years of colonial rule.71 By the eve of Kenya'sindependence in 1963, it would appear that the civil authority of the elders,bolstered by the colonial state, had ultimately triumphed over the orkoiik. Butthat is too simple a conclusion: the pattern of gains and losses was morecomplex, and requires a more cautious and ambivalent assessment.

68 Barserion's intentions and plans are described fully, from intelligence reports, in DC Laikipia

to PC Rift Valley, 25 April 1957, KNA DC/NDI/6/1 .69

' A r m e d uprising by Nand i squatters aver ted ' , East African Standard (14 M a y 1957). Nand ichiefs were quick to condemn Barserion and his suppor ters ; see ' Repor t on visit of Governor toNandi, 5 July 1957', KNA DC/NDI/IO/2.

70 PC Rift Valley to DC Nandi, 29 July 1957, KNA DC/KAPT/1/9/25. Two of Barserion's

sons were also later deported to Mfangano Island, see 'Deportation Orders, 17 September 1959',KNA PC/NZA/1/15/27.

71 The decision to allow younger orkoiik to return to Kipsigis was taken in 1947, see minute by

chief native commissioner, 14 Feb. 1953, KNA MAA/9/974. The policy regarding theestablishment of a school for orkoiik children (devised in 1947) had originally involved theirsegregation. This policy was changed to one of integration in 1953; acting chief nativecommissioner to PC Rift Valley, 21 March 1953, KNA MAA/9/974. The decision to allow allsurviving orkoiik to return was announced to a baraza (public meeting) in the Kipsigis reserve on14 February 1961, the day on which their greatest opponent and staunch ally of the government,chief arap Tengecha, formally retired from office; PC Nyanza to colonial secretary, 2 Feb. 1961,KNA PC/NZA/1/15/27.


Kalenjin orkoiik have taken up a surprising and symbolically significantposition in the evolving historiography of Kenya since the 1960s. Thishistoriography has remained an arena for sharp political controversy, withinwhich highly divergent views of Kenya's past are contested. The theme ofresistance dominates this discourse, both of African resistance to colonialconquest and (more poignantly) African resistance in the Mau Mauemergency of the 1950s. The Mau Mau war was a struggle which dividedAfricans in Kenya among themselves, even dividing those Kikuyu com-munities who were at its centre. These divisions were not an accidentalproduct of the struggle, but were cultivated as a deliberate tactic: the Britishcolonial government mobilized a Kikuyu home guard to combat Mau Mau,and were conspicuously successful in keeping groups other than Kikuyu out ofthe armed struggle.72 While many Kalenjin may have sympathized with thearmed struggle, and some elements certainly organized themselves to supportthe Mau Mau land and freedom army, it remains true that the British, for verygood reason, considered the Kalenjin to be the most loyal of all the peoples ofKenya during the 1950s.73 Moreover, whilst the Mau Mau fighters may bethought to have ultimately won the war even in military defeat - in so far astheir activities can be seen to have dramatically altered the political landscapeof Kenya and brought the end of imperial rule much faster than mightotherwise have been the case they did not win the peace. The spoils of war- political power in the independent Kenya - went not to the freedom fightersfrom the forests, or even to their commanders, but instead to the more liberalelements in the nationalist movement of the 1940s and 1950s, most of whomhad argued throughout for constitutional settlement and remained, at best,ambivalent in their attitudes towards the armed struggle.74

The popular image of nationalist struggle that the state in independentKenya has consistently promoted is predictably devoid of the contradictionsimplicit in this rendering of the historical evidence. The process of nation-building has required a simplistic picture of a glorious nationalist struggleduring Mau Mau in which all Kenya peoples played a part.75 Yet withlandlessness - the most fundamental aspect of the land and freedom army'scharter - having not diminished in Kenya since independence, and with

72 Frank Furedi, The Mau Mau war in perspective (London, 1989); Carl G. Rosberg and John

Nottingham, The myth of Mau Mau (New York, 1966), chapter 8. For a very sophisticatedreassessment, J. M. Lonsdale, 'Mau Mausof the mind: making Mau Mau and remaking Kenya',Journal of African History, x x x i (1990) , 3 9 3 - 4 2 2 .

73 F . D . Corf ie ld , Historical survey of the origins and growth of Mau Mau, C m d . 1030 ( L o n d o n ,

i960), pp. 211-17.74

Lonsdale, 'Mau Maus of the mind', passim; John Spencer, KAU: The Kenya African Union,especially chapters 5-7; D. W. Throup, Economic and social origins of Mau Mau 1945-53 (London,Nairobi and Athens, Ohio, 1987).

75 T h e m o s t obv ious e x a m p l e r e m a i n s J o m o K e n y a t t a , Suffering without bitterness: the founding of

the Kenya nation (Nairobi, 1968). For the most recent example of the way in which textbooks forKenyan students avoid any controversy in this respect see D. N. Sifuna, 'Nationalism anddecolonisation', in W. R. Ochieng' (ed.), Themes in Kenyan history (Nairobi, 1989), especially pp.195-9-


politics continuing to be seen in largely local terms, the nationalistinterpretation has been undermined by class-based and ethnocentricalternatives.76 None of this is very surprising, yet it emphasizes that resistanceremains the most prominent yet also most problematic theme of Kenya'shistoriography.

This brings us back to Koitalel, Kipchomber and Barserion, and the way inwhich they have been portrayed in writings on Kenya's past. In his widelyread and highly praised novel Petals of Blood, Ngugi wa Thiong'o includesBarserion and Koitalel in his pantheon of true heroes of African resistance tocolonialism, invoking their names as a plea for justice and right.77 This literaryallusion reflects what might be considered the 'orthodox' view of manyKenyan-born historians. William Ochieng' has echoed this in his school anduniversity textbooks written for Kenyan students, while Atieno Odhiambo hasdescribed Koitalel as 'the greatest of the resisters'.78 In another literary work,Homecoming, Ngugi praises Koitalel as the leader of a 'violent peasantresistance' against colonialism, and in his work Detained he applauds Barserionas a leading Mau Mau activist.79 In the only work to deal at any length withKipchomber, Henry Mwanzi smears those who opposed the orkoiik as'collaborators' with colonialism.80 To these writers, the orkoiik are heroicfigures.

All history needs its heroes and heroines, but it must also have its villains:and, depending upon your perspective, the same individuals may fulfil bothroles. The orkoiik may be seen as heroes of resistance, yet they were also villainsof the piece among Kalenjin, who feared their power and the role they cameto assume in the years prior to and during colonialism. If we accept Koitalel,Kipchomber and Barserion simply as heroes of resistance, where does thisleave the elders who stood against the power of the orkoiik? Are theseindividuals to be stigmatized as colonial stooges, collaborators with theimperial power, and thereby opponents of the forces of African nationalism?This question has much importance for the writing of Kenya's history, andfor an analysis of present Kenyan politics. But the simplistic view of resistanceand collaboration cannot begin to explain the social and moral process inwhich the elders' 'collaborative' search for a new order that kept materialprogress under household control was fundamentally opposed to the occultpower of the orkoiik. The authority of the orkoiik was more appropriate to the

76 Maina wa Kinyatti (ed.), Thunderfrom the mountains: Mau Mau patriotic songs (London, 1980);

i d e m , ' M a u M a u : the peak of African political organizat ion and struggle for l iberation in colonialK e n y a ' , Ufahamu, x n (1983), 9 0 - 1 2 3 ; Furedi , Mau Mau war, in t roduct ion ; Lonsdale, ' M a u M a u sof the m i n d ' , passim. " Ngugi wa Th iong 'o , Petals of blood (London, 1977).

78 Ochieng ' , History of Kenya, pp . 9 4 - 5 ; E. S. Atieno O d h i a m b o , ' " M i n d limps after r e a l i t y " :

a diagnostic essay on the t rea tment of historical themes in K e n y a n writings since independence ' ,pape r delivered at the annua l conference of the Historical Association of Kenya , Nai robi (1976).

79 Ngugi wa Thiong'o, Homecoming: essays on African and Caribbean literature, culture and politics

(London, 1972), p. 49, and Detained: a writer's prison diary (London, 1981), pp. 48-9. CarolSicherman, Ngugi wa Thiong'o: the making of a rebel. A source book in Kenyan literature and resistance(London, 1990) deals with these themes in detail .

80 H e n r y Mwanz i , 'Koi ta le l a r a p Samoei ' , passim.


potentially violent entrepreneurial drive of livestock accumulation on therelatively open pasturage of pre-colonial times. Modern Kenya is the productof its collaborative elders who learned to exploit the state, with its newconcepts of fixed household property and agricultural production. In essence,those who opposed the orkoiik in the Western Highlands have inherited thepower of the colonial state:81 the parallels with the Mau Mau forest fightersare clear.

But resistance has more meanings than Kenya's historiography presentlyreflects. 'Africa, after all', Ngugi reminds us, 'did not have one but severalpasts which were in perpetual struggle'.82 This holds true as much for thehistory of the orkoiik within the context of Kalenjin social history as it does forthe more generalized reconstructions of the history of resistance to colonialismin Kenya, but one can surely inform our understanding of the other. Despitetheir prominence in the heroic litany of resistance, the deeper social history ofthese actors and their actions has been woefully neglected. In this, and inmany other respects, Kenya has many pasts yet to be fully explored.

81 For a splendid example see A. T. Matson,' Elijah Cheruiyot arap Chepkwony: a great Nandi

chief, in B. E. Kipkorir (ed.), Biographical essays on imperialism and collaboration in colonial Kenya(Nairobi, 1980), pp. 209-43. 82 Ngugi, Petals of blood, p. 214.

black mischief: crime, protest and resistance in colonial kenya

Documents

history of african resistance

protestand resistance

leader of resistance

semini farm

status ofthe orkoiik

historical journalhttp

stella semini

occasions orkoiik attemptedto