Civil Wars and the International Arms TrafficAuthor(s): George ShepherdSource: Africa Today, Vol. 14, No. 6, Black Power and Africa (Dec., 1967), p. 5Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184840 .

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Civil Wars and the International Arms Traffic

The 18th and 19th century misery caused by the slave trade is comparable in many ways with the loss of life and suffering resulting from the sale of arms to African governments locked in protracted civil wars. These arms are sold osten- sibly for cold war purposes but are used to put down internal insurrections. The recent massive involvement of the Soviet Union in this ruthless power game in Africa has vastly complicated the scene.

Civil wars arising out of separatist or irreden- tist aspirations of minority ethnic groups have grown in number since the first major conflict (1960) in the Congo over the Katanga secession. There have been five of these protracted conflicts since 1960 and the two most recent and important involve Nigeria and the Sudan. The war over Biafra in Nigeria has taken untold tens of thou- sands of lives and created nearly two million refugees. The attempt of the Sudan Government to suppress the rebellion of the Africans of the Southern Sudan has lasted for five years and the loss of life from the famine and disease of the struggle as well as the direct fighting is in the hundreds of thousands.

Regardless of what one believes about the wisdom or failings of great power policies in re- lation to these conflicts, one point seems perfect- ly clear-that they have all compounded the human tragedy by permitting the arms they have supplied for external defensive purposes to be used by these Governments in the brutal slaugh- ter of dissident tribesmen who, on many occasions, have fought only with bows and arrows.

The outcome of the struggle in Nigeria has largely been determined by the superior arms employed by the Federal troops. Although techni- cally inferior to the Nigerian forces the Ibos have fought furiously with an adult population pre- pared to die rather than capitulate uncondition- ally. Paradoxically, the major source of arms for Biafra has been Portugal, whose motives could only be to try to win an ally. The Ibo readiness to take arms from such a source indicates how desperate they are. Secretary Rusk stated in August 1967 that the United States refused an ap- proach by the Nigerian Government early in the conflict to supply small arms. The British at first delayed arms shipments but later acceded to Ni- gerian Government pressures against a policy of neutrality that appeared to favor Biafra.

However, the fact that both the United States and the United Kingdom had equipped and sup- plied the Nigerian forces prior to the civil war inevitably implicated them. Russian support for the Nigerian Government in August 1967 in the form of fighter and transport planes and some maintenance personnel vastly shifted the balance in favor of the Nigerians. Russian explanation that this was "on a strictly commercial and cash basis" can hardly be accepted considering the

consequences of this intervention. It is far more likely that the Russians sought to take advantage of the Western dilemma over Biafra. There can be little doubt that the U.S.S.R. has gained a major entering wedge into an area previously closed to her, by this move. The effect of the Rus- sian move was to seal the fate of Biafra because the Western powers believed they could not af- ford to let the Russians come between them and the Nigerian government, despite considerable sympathy for Biafra in America and Great Britain. As Conor Cruise O'Brien has pointed out in the Dec. 21, 1967 issue of The New York Re- view of Books, these two powers might have saved Biafra if they had been so disposed. They did not-in part, because it is painfully true hu- manitarian considerations are secondary in Afri- ca to Cold War calculations of Western diplomacy. The U. S., acting largely through our intermedi- ary in these matters, Western Germany, has helped equip the Sudanese armed forces. These weapons have not been employed in any signifi- cant way against an Arab version of aggression in the Middle East, although an air wing was sent to Nasser's aid in the latest crisis. Most of the Sudanese army has been tied up for five years in the three provinces of the Southern Sudan fighting a growing dissident movement led by the Anya Nya. Northern soldiers have used Vietnam pacification techniques that have led to a massive refugee exodus (UN estimates are 150,000).

Because of animosity toward the West over the latest Middle East crisis, the Sudan has shift- ed its military orientation to the Soviet Union and concluded a ?40 million agreement.

The Anya Nya sent an appeal to the Soviet Union on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary, in which they said, "Alas, it is only against our in- nocent and defenceless people of the Southern Sudan that those Soviet arms will be used." This plea fell on deaf ears in Moscow as it had prev- iously in Washington. Great powers appear heed- less of the effects of their rivalries upon the lives of those for whose affections they are competing. Outside powers are not entirely responsible for the failures and strife of African nations, yet they have a large measure of responsibility for inten- sifying these clashes and making more difficult a negotiated settlement between the conflicting African groups themselves.

An international arms agreement on the sup- ply of weapons to Governments and groups en- gaged in civil war is desperately needed. And the United Nations should be given authority to supervise and police such an agreement.

George Shepherd

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