Protracted ConflictAuthor(s): George ShepherdSource: Africa Today, Vol. 15, No. 1, Black/White Confrontation (Feb. - Mar., 1968), pp. 2-3Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4184858 .

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COMMENTARY

Protracted Conflict Events of the past year indicate that Southern Africa has entered (in the language

of field manuals of insurgency movements) the stage of "protracted conflict". But this must be seen as it really is, rather than the way we might wish it to be.

There are differing views about the contemporary philosophers of revolution, from Mao Tse Tung to Regis Debrey and Franz Fanon, about the way in which this protracted struggle should be fought. But the one point they do agree upon is the need for gradual intensification of violence. According to the book, the freedom fighters, by their sacrifice and heroism force a crystallization of popular support. And the op- pressing power is forced to use methods of re- taliation that exhaust its resources and intensifies popular hatred. By this process of protracted conflict, the country and the people are ripened for revolution and popular uprising.

Although this theory is fundamentally sound in a racist colonial situation, it may lead to a sense of false optimism and a misreading of the rele- vant facts. There are indications that this was the fatal blunder of Guevera in Bolivia, who perhaps listened too much to the theorist Debrey. And in Afri- ca, the liberation leaders should not take Fanon too literally when he said in Toward the African Revolution "We need only march and charge. It is not even a ques- tion of strategy." The time sched- ule and the strategy must be quite different for Southern Africa than Algeria.

Western liberals and radicals who support the objectives of the liberation movements are also de- luded in another way by the pass- ing of resolutions at the United Nations. Although the vote may be one hundred to one, this does not necessarily alter the power reali- ties one iota in Southern Africa. A

The world has seen, through the South West African Treason Trials how little the proclama- tions of the United Nations concerning the illegal actions of the South African Government mean to "God's chosen Afrikaner tribe" who now possess, in their 17,000 regular forces and 100,000 reserves, the most powerful army and air force in Africa, and who enjoy the friendship of the richest nation on earth.

There are certain realities that now must be recognized by all those interested in revolutionary change. The locus of events has shifted from the

capitals of the Western world to Southern Africa itself, where two major antagonists, consisting of racially and economically-aligned nations, are con- solidating their relationships and building their strength for an ultimate confrontation.

One of these alliances is anchored in South Africa and includes Rhodesia, the Portuguese territories of Mosambique and Angola, and has assimilated the satellites of Malawi, Botswana, and Lesotho. The ability of the Rhodesians to flaunt the U.K. and U.N. sanctions campaign is only one indication of the integration and sup- portive character of this system. In a recent paper for the African Studies Association, Prof. Larry Bowman outlined in realistic fashion the centrif- ugal force of the South African economy and potential military power on this "Subordinate State System", as he terms it. He concludes that this Southern African system is subordinate to the interests of the Western world and the West is not likely to allow it to slip away or to be de- stroyed. In fact, this system is being continuously re-enforced by Western nations through invest- ments and the under-cutting of the UN sanctions campaign against Rhodesia (See the article en- titled "The Failure of the Sanctions . . ." in this issue.) As Prof. Bowman so well documents, it is trade and military ties that count, not resolutions at the United Nations.

However, like so many realist studies, this view does not take into account the realities of the rival African system that is rapidly consoli- dating and competing for influence and control in Southern Africa. Centered in Zambia, which is painfully extricating itself from attachment to Rhodesia and South Africa, the alliance includes as major partners the Congo (Kinshasa) and Tan- zania. These are the African states most directly affected by the racism and rival economic and military power of South Africa. Other Pan-Afri- can states are supportive, as the recently-formed

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Military Training Committee of the O.A.U. indicates, but are not as di- X rectly involved. Al- ready, these three Af rican countries have fostered liber- -

ation movements in the protracted struggle for control in Rhodesia, the Portguese territor- ies, and South West Africa. They a r e building a rail sys- tem that will give them economic in- dependence. A n d, while officially non- aligned, they are in- creasingly import- ing arms from Communist powers to build a military force to counter the South African thrust. Tan- zania's recent negotiations for Chinese missiles is one step in this direction.

There are several important conclusions to this analysis which are supported and amplified upon in the articles of this issue.

First, the South African system is not going to come tumbling down at the blast of the U.N. trumpets; nor is the protracted conflict going to have a quick and dramatic victory as a logical consequence of the tide of nationalism from the North. It will not be a simple matter of picking off the most vulnerable countries first and start-

ing a- domino process from Angola to Rhodesia. South Africa has the capacity to sustain by force the system of white supremacy in the territory she now occupies over a considerable period of time.

Secondly, the power of South African assimi- lation cannot be easily extended. In fact, it will be increasingly contained by the African rival system. This system has the capacity as well as the desire to keep the protracted conflict going for an indefinite period of time. The Vietnam analogy is very appropriate here. The superior technology of the U.S. has been increasingly ab- sorbed and blunted by the NLF and the North Vietnamese who are weak but numerous and in- tensely disciplined. There can be no peace or stability in the area until the issue is settled. This is a very simple issue-African self-determina- tion. Yet its continual denial can lead to vast complications in the rising tempo of conflict, in- tensified racial feelings, and growing communist influence.

The logistics of Southern Africa are such that there can be only one final outcome, after the shambles of a protracted conflict, the people of Africa will prevail.

Most detached observers would now agree that the basis of a peaceful compromise has long since been destroyed. Stupidity, greed, and preju- dice hold power now in the minority Govern- ments of southern Africa. Those who would genuinely like to shorten the conflict should uti- lize all means to weaken the White Supremacy system and strengthen the capacity of the African states and Liberation movements to disarm the racist regimes of the South.

George Shepherd

Racism and Guerrilla Struggle in

Southern Africa Last summer a major campaign flared in

Rhodesia between African nationalist guerrillas and Rhodesian and South African military forces. This was, of course, only another phase of a guer- rilla struggle which began at the time of Rhodesian UDI in 1965 and which continues, in a quieter key, at the present time. And it is a struggle integrally linked with those in Angola and Mozambique, where guerrilla warfare has reached a self-generating stage, and in South West Africa. But two aspects, giving to the campaign a prominence in the British and American press which other phases have not had, have renewed speculation on the possibilities of a 'racial blood- bath' in Southern Africa and the role of those outside in averting this.

The two significant features of the campaign were Smith's request for South African military assistance and the fact that the Africans were a

joint Rhodesian-South African nationalist force. The calling in of South African troops was an ad- mission of weakness by the Rhodesians who had not been able, as Lawrence Fellows reported in the New York Times, to contain all the guerrillas all the time. South African assistance, a blatant manifestation of the "Unholy Alliance" of Rho- desia, South Africa and Portugal, included four helicopters, armoured cars, planes, troops already training with Rhodesian counter-guerrilla units, and others who were disguised as 'police'. Techni- cally this was an act of aggression by South Afri- can forces on territory still British soil in legal terms; a justified diplomatic protest from Zambia was, however, rebuffed by Britain.

Contested Guerrilla Action If the "Unholy. Alliance" has existed for some

years, the African nationalist organizations are

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