blockages to development in mexico (tesis rita perez)

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Blockages to Development in Mexico:Security, Militarization and Social

Exclusion in Neoliberal Times

Development and Planning UnitMSc in Development Administration and Planning

September 2007

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Rita Lida Perez Valencia

Contents

Contents...................................................................................................................................21. Introduction ........................................................................................................................32. Militarisation in Latin America...........................................................................................5

The Mexican context ..........................................................................................................7 Neoliberal Governmentality and Security.........................................................................10

Neoliberalism and Social Exclusion.................................................................................12Indications of social exclusion in Mexico.........................................................................13The formation of the Shadow State...................................................................................15Privatisation of security.....................................................................................................16

4. Militarisation via the War on Drugs..................................................................................18“Privatisation” of the War on Drugs.................................................................................23Los Zetas: An illegal private military company ..............................................................24

5. Militarisation of the borders: containing and regulating migration..................................26Mexico’s Northern Border................................................................................................26The Security and Prosperity Partnership...........................................................................28Mexico’s Southern Border................................................................................................30

The Plan Puebla Panama...................................................................................................316. Militarisation to repress and contain rebellion..................................................................33The end of the “transition to democracy”.........................................................................33Gradual process of militarisation to control rebellion and social discontent....................36

.............................................................................................................................................397. Conclusion.........................................................................................................................40Bibliography..........................................................................................................................41

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1. Introduction

This paper argues that there is an ongoing process of militarisation in Mexico which iscaused by changes at the international, national and societal levels. These changes are

linked to the neoliberal economic and social model that has been operating in Mexico andmany other countries for more than 20 years. Neoliberalism can be defined as adevelopmental model which claims that the greatest social advances will be made throughthe unrestricted operation of market forces, free movement of capital and goods (but not of labour), and as little state intervention as possible, but in fact promotes the interests of anarrow elite at national and global level and makes substantial recourse to state interventionwhere violence or the threat of violence is required to promote the interests of those elites,and actually reinforces and reproduces social exclusion and inequality (Lükber, 2004;George, 1999). The neoliberal model is also linked to the expansion of capitalism and the protection of American interests around the globe.

Opposition to neoliberal policies has taken several forms: from the struggle of peasants inBrazil, Korea and Nepal to the globalisation of resistance in the Social World Forum.Some responses have been peaceful while others have resorted to violence. What can not bedenied is that this is an ongoing struggle. In order to contain and suppress this resistance, anew and more sophisticated process of militarisation is taking place around the globe, under different justifications: the War on Terror, the War on Drugs and the increasing need tocontrol migration from South to North.

In order to assess the process of militarisation that Mexico is going through, this paper describes and analyses the process at three distinct levels:

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At a global level, there has been a recent change in the official discourse whichemphasises security issues. This has repercussions in Mexico as well. From the War on Terror to the War on Drugs, security has become the latest form for legitimising aninterventionist policy by the super power, the United States.

• At the national level, there is a very clear involvement of the political elites in

facilitating the implementation of security policy. However, this is not merely a servileattitude. The emergence of a “shadow state” as defined by Gledhill (1996), helps toexplain the process through which the political elite has implemented neoliberalism and benefited from the social and economical changes brought about by it. Furthermore, itcan also be argued that the process of militarisation also protects their interests.

• At the level of society, there has also been a change towards what can be called the

“Privatization of Security”. This is within the logic the “neoliberal governmentality”,described in detail below, and is part of the downsizing of the State. In developingcountries like Mexico, the breakdown of public security institutions, corruption and thesimple inability of the State to cope with organized crime and delinquency have pushed people to try to provide security for themselves.

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From the emergence of Private Security Companies to the mushrooming of gatedcommunities and bodyguards, the relationship between the state and security haschanged.

In order to document and explain these processes, the first chapter will be devoted to the

historical background of militarisation of Latin America in recent times as well as thespecific context for Mexico. The second chapter provides the theoretical framework inwhich the concepts of governmentality, social exclusion and the shadow state are explored.

The third section is divided in three, explaining the different reasons for the increasingmilitarisation of Mexican state and society. The first of these relates to the War on Drugs,the second one to measures to contain migration and the third one to measures to repressrebellion. Finally, conclusions are drawn.

The method adopted in this paper is to analyse these trends with reference to a range of themes and issues in Mexico, the United States and beyond. This includes a range of events, policies and trends which are analysed within the overall context of militarisationand social exclusion in order to provide evidence that collectively and cumulativelysupports the overall argument summarised above.

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2. Militarisation in Latin America

For many years, Latin America has been considered as one of the most violent regions of the world. For many people Colombia and Brazil are the countries that first come to mind,

but the perception is applicable to Mexico as well. Kidnappings, armed robbery and drugrelated crime are not uncommon news in television and newspapers. Even foreign touristsare warned by embassies and guide books. Violence in the societies of Latin America has along history however. It can be traced in the first instance to the original violence inflictedthrough the traumatic process of colonization (Paz, 1993). A stratified and racist societyemerged from the Conquest in which the elites typically suppressed rebellion throughviolence. The process of achieving Independence in the 19th century was not peacefuleither.

Spanish and Portuguese domination were displaced from Latin America in the 19th century, but a new power was ready to take their place. In the eyes of the United States elites, the

Americas were destined to fall within their control. This was stated in a very clear way inthe Monroe Doctrine as early as 1823, under which European interventionism in theAmerican continent would be seen as a threat to United States national security. This newrelation of forces characterised the 20th century and provides the context for much of today’s violence.

However, American domination on the region did not take the form of colonialism, at leastnot in the traditional form. Neo-colonialism came by different means such as economic,social and political control and pressure exercised through corporations like the UnitedFruit Company or through support to regimes that responded to American interests. Duringthe Cold War the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine was invoked again when Cuba after the

revolution declared itself a Socialist country and established ties with the USSR.

The marginalization of most of the population in the region under this context led to armedstruggles from the 1960s onwards in countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala.In others like Chile, Argentina and Brazil, military regimes loyal to American interests brought ‘order’ and stability through coups which characterized themselves by a violentsuppression of dissidence. Clear strategies of state terror were designed to keep the population under control. The School of the Americas was established in Panama in 1946to train Latin-American militarist in counterinsurgency operations. According to School of Americas Watch (2007), more than 60,000 soldiers have graduated since then. Famousgraduates included Leopoldo Galtieri and Guillermo Rodriguez, who were directlyresponsible for coups in Argentina and Ecuador, respectively. Other not so famousgraduates were involved in the formation of death squads, paramilitary groups, intelligenceservices or running the logistics of the abduction and killing of hundreds of thousands inthe continent. This period of violent suppression from the 1960s to the 1990s represents thefirst phase of militarisation of Latin America.

The 1990s witnessed the end of the Soviet Union, the dimishing attraction of Communismas a political model, and a corresponding transition from military regimes in Latin Americato democracatic ones. However, a good illustration that things have not actually changed

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that much, in spite of the triumphalism of those lauding the new democratic spirit is that theSchool of the Americas was never closed. Instead of that and in line with the spirit of theage, it was renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation(WHINSEC). To date the number, nationalities or names of the graduates remains a secret.Even the United States Congress has been unsuccessful in getting this information1 .

As things began to change in the 1990s, official discourse, defined as the set of understandings, frames of reference and meanings that reflect the social and political worldof elites, celebrated the end of the era of dictatorship and armed struggle and the beginningof a more democratic and pluralistic society. Adoption of neoliberal policies generated anew kind of social, political and economical engineering which linked to the socialdegradation can help to give an account of the increase of violence in the last two decadesof the 20th century for the whole region:

“Homicide rates began to rise in almost every country of the region towards the end of the1980s, affecting both countries with a long tradition of violence such as Colombia andothers which had traditionally been peaceful like Costa Rica. This trend continued in the1990s, to the point where the number of victims of violence increased three to four timesover the course of 20 years.” (Briceno and Zubillaga, 2002:19)

In the region this violence can be explained through different factors. Ineffectivefunctioning of the criminal investigation and justice systems is a key factor. When the ratesof crime increase in such a way, the judicial system is simply incapable of keeping up,notwithstanding the corruption that also generates impunity for criminals. The phenomenon of social exclusion and economic degradation previously mentioned is also avery important factor.

Another characteristic of the violence in Latin America is the lethality associated with it.This is directly attributable to the wide availability of guns. Arms proliferation in theregion is linked to the increase in drug trafficking, but also to the armed conflicts in the1970s and 1980s. Manufacturing weapons has been one of the most profitable businessesin the 20th century and they need a market, which is not always legal:

“The illegal gun trade also stems from overproduction by weapons manufacturers in needof an expanding market. There are more and more firearms in the world, and they are not products that are consumed once and disappear; they are, rather, recycled among thedifferent circuits of legal and illegal distribution.” (Briceno and Zubillaga, 2002:26)

Furthermore, in Central America, there are entire generations that grew up witnessing

incredible violence generated by the armed struggle of the 1970s and 1980s. Thedehumanization created by this violence led to the deadly gangs such as the Mara

Salvatrucha and the M18 which have influence in El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico and theUnited States.

1 “The House of Representatives approved a report accompanying the FY 2008 Defense Appropriations billthat demands the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (SOA/WHINSEC) release to the public the names of all students and instructors who attended the school during the fiscal years of 2005 and2006.” School of Americas Watch available at http://soaw.org/article.php?id=1573

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The Mexican context

Even though Mexico shares much of this violence now, its political history has been

different to that of Latin America. Mexico never had a coup or an armed conflict of thesame dimensions as the ones that Central America had. Mexico’s relationship with its ownarmed forces and with the United States have also been different. In order to understandthe role that the military plays in the political scenario and its linkages with violence a brief historical account is required.

The Mexican Revolution in 1910 was the first revolution of the 20 th century. It was anarmed struggle that lasted 10 years in which different leaders fought for different objectivesand ideologies. From Francisco Villa to Madero, Emiliano Zapata and the Flores Magón brothers, the only thing that was a common cause at the beginning of it was the desire tooverthrow the dictator Porfirio Diaz. The end of the Revolution was achieved with betrayals, power alliances, suppression of the insurrectional forces and the amalgamation of the different armed forces into one national army. Years after the end of the Revolution, inorder to prevent further uprisings within the military structure:

“President Lázaro Cárdenas incorporated the army as an official sector of the ruling party.Until 1940, the army had a quota of congressional seats. In exchange for this access to political power, the army acceded to such doctrines as regular rotation of zonecommanders, to prevent regional caudillos (leaders) from emerging.” (Weinberg, 2002:352)

This is perhaps one of the most decisive differences between Mexico and other LatinAmericas and which helped to prevent a coup. Apart from this, the state formulatedstrategies that went from cooptation to repression of any insurrection that could unleash thecommunist threat in the backyard of the United States.

Mexico underwent a process that has been described, not without irony, as “theinstitutionalization of the revolution” with the formation of the Partido de la Revolucion

Institucionalizada (PRI). The one party dictatorship lasted for 70 years and during it:

“In exchange for the Mexican military staying out of politics, PRI granted the militaryalmost complete internal autonomy and placed it beyond public scrutiny or even legislativeoversight. Mexico’s Congress exerts little real control over military budgets. The militaryis responsible for making its own decisions about its size and about weapons and equipment purchases, budgets, and contracts. Circumventing civilian oversight, the defence minister comes from within the military.” (Freeman and Sierra, 2005:268)

By saying that the military stayed out of politics, this only means that they did not have theambition of overthrowing the civil regime. However, the army did play a historical role inthe repression of social movements: from the detention of railway strike leaders in 1958,the massacre of students in Mexico City’s Tlatelolco Square in 1968 to the combat of LucioCabaña’s guerrilla group in the state of Guerrero in the 1970s and 1980s.

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Human Rights violations by members of the army have been documented by internationalorganisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, but to date, as will be seen below, the institution enjoys impunity and is protected by the state.

Another visible trend has been the influence of the U.S. over the security forces, which hasincreased along with the implementation of neoliberal policies and the commercialintegration represented by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This iswhat has been considered as the “third link” according to United States Secretary of Defence during the Clinton administration, William Perry. Through neoliberal policiesMexico was “integrated” with the U.S. economically, politically and also militarily:

“Between 1982 and 1990, Mexico leased, purchased, and received as aid more militaryequipment and services from the United States, under all categories of assistance, than in allof the previous thirty years. Between 1984 and 1993, Mexico received ten times thenumber of U.S. arms than it had amassed from 1950 to 1983.” (Norget, 2005:125)

As showed in the following graphic, this military aid has grown significantly over the lastyears and surpasses the aid given for economical and social programmes.

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 est. 2005 req.

U S D o l l a r s ( m i l l i o n s )

Military and Police Aid

Economic and Social Aid

Source: data from the US State Department, Bureau for International Narcotics and LawEnforcement Affairs, cited in Freeman and Sierra (2005).

From the preceding discussion it can be seen that Mexico differed from the Latin Americanexperience in many ways during the 20 th century. Despite this, the military played animportant role within the state, and is an increasingly important element in the nexus of relationships linking Mexico’s elites and their social and political fortunes with that of the

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United States. The rest of this paper examines the way that the process of militarisation of Mexican society is increasing as those links deepen. The next chapter examines thetheoretical perspective through which these processes can be understood, while thefollowing chapter looks at specific themes in detail.

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3. Theoretical Framework

Having established in the preceding brief review the historical context for the argument setout in this paper, this chapter reviews the theoretical framework for it in more detail. It begins by explaining the neoliberal governmentality and the role this encompasses for both

the elites and the masses. It goes on to investigate the broad relationships betweenneoliberalism and social exclusion before outlining the impacts in terms of poverty andmigration, the formation of the “shadow state” and the partial privatisation of securityissues.

Neoliberal Governmentality and Security

The theory of governmentality developed by Foucault provides a comprehensiveframework of security in terms of control of the population and as a tool for governmentaccording to the ideology of the state. Governmentality refers to:

“The ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations,and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that hasthe population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, andapparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument.” (Foucault, 2007:108)

In this sense, it has been argued that neoliberal governmentality has a defined set of characteristics which can be matched in societal terms as ‘governing from the distance’ andin terms of the individual with the basic principles of homo economicus.

In this theory, the individual is the perfect maximizer of resources, willing to invest inhimself in order to succeed in a world of competition and opportunities. The unlimited

needs of consumption of the homo economicus which propel the economy are going to befulfilled by the market. In the neoliberal governmentality, society is conformed by:

“Self-regulating subjects whose consciousness is thoroughly colonized by the principles of a market society, in the sense that incremental resources are to be obtained through self-organization and self-help” (Gledhill 2006:7).

This logic has certain limitations in its application. Certain cultures find it easier to adaptto the new order than others. Industrialized societies that had undergone processes of alienation and technification of life are in fact the model for this new order. The elites indeveloping countries that aspire to this kind of life (and have the means to afford it) have

not opposed resistance, but on the contrary, have already started the process of homogenization, even if with certain ‘local differences’.

This is the process of the formation of the ‘global elite’, a clear outcome of globalization.This English speaking select group might have differences in terms of religion, skin colour and traditions but their aspirations are not that different. Preferences for exclusive brandswhile shopping in the same high profile centres of global finance (i.e. New York, London,

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or Tokyo) can actually bring together representatives of the global elite such as the IndianAnil Ambani, Russian Vladimir Potanin and Mexican Carlos Slim Helu.

On the other end, for those who cannot afford it, the ideas of self-organization and self-helphave adopted different characteristics and consequences. In the case of Mexico, the

materialization of the homo economicus ideology became the National Programme for Financing Microbusiness ( Programa Nacional de Financiamiento al Microempresario)

popularly known as the Changarro Programme. This was a main feature of the ex- president Vicente Fox discourse. Changarro can be translated as any corner shop, shoerepair shop or street food stall. Something which has always existed as a survival strategyas part of the informal economy not only became institutionalized, but formed part of thenew economic strategies for the government: to help the poor to help themselves.Changarrismo had arrived in the middle of the privatisation of health and educationalservices.

In an economy that has the lowest GDP growth rates in Latin America for 2007, 3%compared to a regional 5% according to ECLAC, the changarro programme can only provide a picture of a country full of street food stalls and corner shops where smallamounts of money exchange hands while everybody just tries to get by. This is the way inwhich neoliberal governmentality has been applied and it has certainly had an impact on thesubjects within reach.

“Neoliberal strategies of rule, found in diverse realms including workplaces, educationalinstitutions and health and welfare agencies, encourage people to see themselves asindividualised and active subjects responsible for enhancing their own well being.” (Larner 2000:11)

However, there are certain sectors and communities, the most traditional and ‘backwards’,that have only had restricted access (if any at all) to such agencies and programmes. Their survival has been grounded in strategies that are completely defiant to the logic of neoliberalism. They are, indeed, pre-capitalist societies that remained like that, precisely because of the exploitation that characterized colonial rule and was subsequently perpetuated in independent Mexico. This is perhaps, the greatest difference that exists between the North and South, not only in geopolitical terms, but also in geographical termsfor Mexico. It is not a coincidence that the EZLN (Zapatista) uprising took place inChiapas, one of the poorest states in Mexico that has a numerous indigenous population. Itis also not a coincidence that other mass social movements, like the current one in the stateof Oaxaca, are taking place in the south.

One of these practices that defies the logic of Neoliberalism is the Tequio. Tequio is thetradition of communal work that has existed for centuries in the indigenous communities of Oaxaca. Many of the social relations of these communities can not be explained in narroweconomic terms. This is undoubtedly, the last frontier where the neoliberalgovernmentality of ‘government at a distance’ clashes with other traditions which arelabelled as radical in the official discourse. In some respects, it can be said that these pueblos, these communities are confronting the three types of struggle identified byFoucault:

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“Generally, it can be said that there are three types of struggles: against forms of domination (ethnic, social and religious); against forms of exploitation that separateindividuals from what they produce; or against that which ties the individual to himself andsubmits him to others in this way (struggles against subjection, against forms of

subjectivity and submission)” (Foucault, 1994:331).

This is particularly the case of the women of those communities. As the Zapatista leader,Comandante Esther, said in her speech to the Mexican Parliament in 2001, women suffer from the oppression of being poor, being indigenous and being women. This kind of rebellion, of ‘radicalism’ is particularly dangerous because it has escaped (albeit throughsubmission to the more traditional and colonial forms of exploitation) the institutions and procedures of the exercise of power that Foucault described as part of governmentality.Therefore, to contain and repress these forms of rebellion the use of the apparatuses of security becomes indispensable.

Neoliberalism and Social Exclusion

Militarization and social exclusion in Mexico are two parts of the same reinforcing logic inwhich order and security are defined in discourse and in practice. In this sense, socialexclusion as a concept is preferred over poverty due to its multi-dimensionality and itsinherent concept of deprivation, which better explain social processes:

“In distinction to poverty, which has primarily been thought about in economic terms,social exclusion encompasses deprivation in a number of spheres, of which low income is but one. Insecurity of employment, lack of access to health care, lack of social networksand inability to gain access to judicial fora are recognized as equally debilitating.” (Francis2002:75)

Furthermore, poverty not only has been reduced most of the time to measurements of income, but also has been appropriated as a concept by the dominant discourse:

“Eradication of global poverty was considered yet another reason for consolidating the present structures of governance, both at the international and national levels... The needswhich development and poverty-eradication programmes seek to identify and assessthrough their experts and planning institutions are basically the needs of a certain‘economy’, a certain idea of poverty, and a particular category of consumers and tax payerswhose rights and interests should be protected.” (Rahnema, 1992: 164)

Of French origin and widely used in Europe, the concept of social exclusion is also relevantin Latin America because it provides an account of political and social aspects of marginalization:

“Distributional (economic) and relational (social) issues lie at the heart of the concept of social exclusion. The concept goes beyond the economic and social aspects of poverty. Italso embraces the political aspects such as civil and political rights and citizenship that

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determine a relationship between individuals and the state as well as between the societyand the individual.” (Bhalla and Lapeyre, 2004:17)

This becomes of a fundamental relevance when the history of Latin America and of Mexicoin particular is taken into consideration. Poverty in its own does not explain the systematic

and structural causes of that poverty. The concept of social exclusion encompasses a widerange of economical, social and political issues and also implies causation, power andresponsibility. In order to have exclusion we need to have someone or something thatexcludes. In this sense, this paper argues that the logic of neoliberalism that currentlydominates the globalization process is in itself a process of exclusion.

The construction of the state, of its governmentality and the different historical processes of domination and oppression can be linked to the current crisis in which certain aspects of ‘Mexicanness’ are rejected while others are embraced. This crisis precisely determines therelationship between the individual and the state in such a way that the concept of socialclosure as conceived by Silver (1994) becomes necessary in order to go beyond the officialdiscourse of civil and political rights (which mainly come to the front at election time).

“Exclusion arises from the interplay of class, status and political power and serves theinterests of the included. Social “closure” is achieved when institutions and culturaldistinctions not only create boundaries that keep others out against their will, but are alsoused to perpetuate inequality. Those within delimited social entities enjoy a monopoly over scarce resources. The monopoly creates a bond of common interest between otherwiseunequal insiders. The excluded are therefore simultaneously outsiders and dominated.”(Silver, 1994:543)

It is argued in this paper that the system of social closure in Mexico has changed since theimplementation of the neoliberal model, which is in itself part of the globalisation process.The social pact that emanated from the Revolution and which was institutionalised in aseries of practices of what is known now as the old regime of the PRI ( Partido de la

Revolucion Institucionalizada) ended with Mexico’s debt repayment crisis in 1982.

The implementation of Structural Adjustment and more importantly, the privatisation of previously state owned enterprises and the social sector have unleashed a set of changeswhich led to a different and more restrictive social closure. The dream of social mobilityand equal opportunities that the urban middle class and part of the rural poor had cherishedand which emanated from the Revolution had come to an end. This can be illustrated by a brief review of some of the empirical evidence on social exclusion.

Indications of social exclusion in Mexico

Social exclusion as such is not investigated in Mexico. However, certain processes can beused as indicators. In the official discourse the use of the concept of poverty is still preferred, but investigating it empirically can be a tricky task. According to the socialscientist Julio Boltvinik from one of the most prestigious academic institutions in Mexico, El Colegio de Mexico, differences between the government’s figures and independentfigures show very significant discrepancies, based on the calculation of the poverty line.

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For example, for the Technical Committee (Consejo Nacional de la Política de Desarrollo

Social, CONEVAL) of the Social Development Ministry (Secretaria de Desarrollo Social,

Sedeso), the poverty line is 1, 200 pesos per person per month (60 US$ approximately).However, as Boltvinik points out, this does not consider basic needs like clothes or shoes.His own independent research, on the basis of which he suggests a line drawn at 2,000

pesos per person per month (100 US$ approximately), considers basic needs but still thisincome is not sufficient for savings. ( La Jornada, 18-09-2005).

However, even the figures provided by CONEVAL portray a dramatic scenario: “Morethan 18,790,000 Mexicans, that is 18.2 percent of the population, suffers from “fooddeficiency”, which is one of the worst forms of marginalization, because it implies not being able to eat. Furthermore, 25,950,000 Mexicans suffer from poverty in terms of capabilities, meaning that their income is insufficient for food (canasta alimentaria) andthat they are not able to afford health and education services” 2 (La Jornada, 03-07-2007)

Furthermore, the way in which poverty is measured leaves no room for other considerations, such as the inequality gap that exists between socially excluded Mexicansand Carlos Slim Helu, the second richest man in the world according to Forbes magazine:

“In the past year his fortune, now approaching $50 billion, has grown by $19 billion, anincrease that eclipses any gain by any other billionaire in the past decade... His wealthcomes to 6.3% of Mexico's annual economic output; if Gates had a similar chunk in theU.S., he'd be worth $784 billion.” (Forbes 2007)3

It seems that Mexico has been a country full of opportunities for Mr. Slim Helu in the lastfew years, but for many the lack of employment and closure of opportunities for socialmobility within the country has forced them to migrate.

“The 1990 Census included 4.3 million immigrants from Mexico. By 2000, this populationmore than doubled to 9.2 million with a further increase to 9.8 million in 2002. Theundocumented population from Mexico increased from two million in 1990 to 4.8 millionin 2000 and to 5.3 million in 2002. Thus, between 1990 and 2002, the undocumented population from Mexico increased by about 250,000 to 300,000 per year on average;evidence from successive Current Population Surveys suggests that the annual inflowsincreased dramatically around 1997 or 1998.” (Passel 2004:45)

2 “Más de 18 millones 790 mil mexicanos, es decir 18.2 por ciento de los habitantes del país sufren de

"pobreza alimentaria", que es una de las peores formas de marginación, porque quienes la padecen noalcanzan a cubrir los mínimos para comer y nutrirse. Además, 25 millones 950 mil mexicanos padecen pobreza de capacidades -es decir, insuficiencia del ingreso para adquirir la canasta alimentaria y pagar losgastos en salud y educación-, y 49.7 millones sufren pobreza de patrimonio, lo que significa que uno de cadados connacionales se encuentra en esta situación.” (Translation is mine)

3 http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2007/0326/134.html

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http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2007/0326/134.html

http://www.forbes.com/free_forbes/2007/0326/134.html



The formation of the Shadow State

Notwithstanding the strains placed on the socially excluded in Mexico, the process of implementing neoliberalism in the country has provided significant gains for the elite.Even the World Bank has some ideas of the causes of the accumulation of power andwealth in some hands which led to the social closure described above:

“The presence of public and private monopolies and oligopolies that constrain the country’seconomic competitiveness and the weakness of regulatory agencies is not a coincidence, or a natural result of Mexico’s economic development process. This is a result of the specificways in which Mexico has been governed since the early 20th century. Economic andfinancial liberalization pursued since the early 1990s might be expected to have changedthis historical pattern. But, as we have seen, this has not brought about the expected impacton efficiency and competitiveness of the economy as a whole. Nor have these reforms beenable to break the pattern of economic concentration and regional polarization thatcharacterized the Mexican economy before the political transition started.” (World Bank 2007:41)

If the political structure created in the early 20 th century is to blame, political reform was tofollow the prescribed formula of economic and financial liberalization. In 2000, VicenteFox, from the PAN (National Action Party) won the elections marking the shift from asingle-party regime to a multi-party one. Yet, in reality little has changed and the“transition to democracy” in Mexico has not harmed the system of social closure.

This is because regardless of the political party in power, the political elite has not stoppedenjoying from privileges that plagued the processes of privatization and liberalization. This

dominant group has adapted and benefited from the changes brought by the neoliberaleconomic model.

This kind of process is what Gledhill explains and from which the term ‘shadow state’ isformed:

“Although old corporatist techniques of rule continued to be used, along with selectivecooptation and repression, to smooth the implementation of the economic reforms whichearned President Salinas and his associates such a high reputation in Washington, thetransformation of the Mexican economy brought diminishing possibilities for accumulatingwealth simply by plundering the public sector and favoured the consolidation of “shadow

state” networks behind the formal façade of the Mexican political regime, networks thatSalinas and his associates were determined to dominate.” (Gledhill, 2006:18)

The concept of a shadow state describes in an organic way the changes that the politicalelite went through to adapt to the neoliberal governmentality and in this sense provides acomprehensive framework for what has been described as ‘the marriage of finance and politics’ (Centeno, 1992).

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“The neoliberal transformation of the state has reinforced the integration of the politicalclass with powerful business groups which have benefited from a range of politicallyengineered forms of economic assistance, some of which shade into corruption, in additionto a variety of state organized measures to defuse popular challenges to the neoliberaleconomic model.” (Gledhill, 2006:21)

In this new order of things and in a technocratic world, politicians become businessmenand vice versa. Furthermore, some of those businesses are indeed linked not only to theinformal sector, but also to illegal activities. One of the central arguments of this paper is precisely that the rise of drug trafficking has increased as one of the most profitableactivities that emerged from this shadow state. In turn, its impact in the political,economical and social life of the country has had devastating results. The increase of violence and the use of the military to tackle it represent also outcomes that at the sametime reinforce the same logic. This argument will be further explored in the section thatcorresponds to the War on Drugs.

Privatisation of security

Part of the downsizing of the state has involved the privatisation of certain aspects of the provision of security. If other aspects of social life, from education to social welfare isincreasingly seen as an individual and personal responsibility, security and protection alsoshare the same principle. The emergence of private security and military companies thatconduct operations in settings as different as South Africa, Kosovo, Kabul, Bogota andMexico have contributed to the creation of this new scenario. Both security and violenceare being commodified.

This seems to be a contradiction because at the same time, one of the aspects in which thestate remains strong within neoliberalism is precisely security. Neoliberalism depends on astrong state that will promote stability and will protect the interests of property owners.This is the main logic behind the militarization of Mexico.

The state is certainly not being rolled back in the provision of security. Rather, certainaspects of its provision are being subcontracted. Protection and security are a profitable business nowadays and the private sector wants a share of it. At the same time, the state benefits from this deal, because the dirty work of repression can be outsourced to privatesecurity and military companies. None of these companies are accountable to an electorateand have no identifiable ideology.

The use of mercenaries is certainly not new. Old empires used them, but since theformation of the nation state they have been condemned as illegitimate and immoral.However, private security and military companies are now a global industry:

“Privatised security today essentially refers to an industry that is exclusive and self sufficient of the state, trading in professional military and security services, equipment,training, logistics and know-how. They are businesses, profit-driven entities that marketthemselves on their ability to provide specialised state-like security services.” (Small,2006:6)

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Indeed, private security companies are not part of the state, but they do depend on it for the provision of contracts. The links between politicians and these companies are sometimesembarrassingly close, as in the famous case of the company Halliburton which providesmilitary logistics in Iraq. Dick Cheney, the now Vice President from the United States was

the former Halliburton CEO.

At the same time, private security and military companies are becoming stronger in termsof manpower because they have more resources. This has resulted in army desertions andfewer people enrolling to the army. And as will be explored in the discussion below, not all private security companies are necessarily legal. The increase in militarisation is not only brought about by these developments within the state, but also through their manifestationat the level of wider society. This privatisation in Mexico, as well as in other LatinAmerican countries has been witnessed in particular in the proliferation of gatedcommunities, which deepen the logic of segregation and exclusion:

“The arrival of gated communities with their physical barriers makes social differencesmore evident in the city landscape. This has led to a new kind of urban social segregationthat is legitimised by law and socially and culturally accepted and has different impacts.”(Roitman, 2003:22)

The use of bodyguards and Private Security Companies for the transportation of money andvaluables has also increased. These changes reinforce the logic of social exclusion andclosure, because when security and protection are commodified, only those who can affordit have access to them.

As a result of these changes at the societal level, two patterns can be identified in Mexico.While militarisation of public security is increasing under the justifications of the War onDrugs, combat to organized crime and border security, there is a parallel process of privatisation of security. The fear and insecurity that currently prevails in Mexico is beingused to justify the increasing militarisation while pushing those who can afford it to findtheir own ways of protection while reinforcing the logic of social closure and segregation.

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4. Militarisation via the War on Drugs

Having outlined the theoretical context, now the following chapters look at specificexamples of how militarisation has developed at the levels of international, national and

societal levels. This chapter examines how this has been occurring, taking the case of militarisation as expressed through the course of the so-called War on Drugs. The chapter looks first at how this has taken place in the international sphere. It then continues toexamine this at the national and societal levels.

It is important to understand that these divisions between the level of international nationaland societal are largely artificial. This is useful for analytical purposes of understandingmajor social developments, but it is also important to point out that in reality social processes are linked and the interplay between each is more complex than it is possible todo justice to in the course of this brief analysis. Nonetheless, it is possible to use them todescribe key trends and developments, so the overall analytical framework is of value.

In Latin America once that the Cold War was over and the communist threat had beendefeated, the United States had few justifications to continue with its interventionist policy.What was at stake is not only the control over natural resources, but the hegemony of theremaining super power. The War on Drugs came to fill that gap.

In societies with rising levels of inequality and ruled by the logic of neoliberalgovernmentality, resources become scarcer, and this generates conflict and social unrest.This ‘disorder’ can manifest itself at different levels. It can fluctuate from participation insocial movements and insurgency to an increase in those illegal activities that form part of the informal economy and help to keep the established social relations from breaking down

completely. Such activities include, for example, those associated with the production,distribution and consumption of drugs.

It can be argued therefore that this ‘disorder’ is exported from the core countries of theglobal economic system (which comprise major markets for drugs) (Biel, 2006). However,the disorder has to be somehow controlled, because if not it could ultimately represent athreat to the core. Repressive measures are therefore needed to guarantee the recovery of that lost control.

There are at least a few similarities between the War on Drugs and the War on Terror, evenwhen the first one is not necessarily fought by an occupying force, but by national armies:

• The enemy is not visible and does not have a clear military structure. The enemy can be

everywhere, at ‘home’ as in the case of the British citizens in the London bombings of July 2007 of July and in training camps in Pakistan. In the case of drug trafficking, theenemy is as much in Colombia, where cocaine is illegally manufactured as it is in thestreets of New York where it is distributed and consumed. The enemy has transnationalnetworks and uses sophisticated technology in its operations. As in any other

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transnational corporation (TNC) in these neoliberal times, communication within thesenetworks is vital.

• Leadership interdiction has been used as a strategy to combat enemies in both the War

on Terror and the War on Drugs. The description of the enemy as a hydra is another

common feature of both ‘wars’. In the same way in which the detention of a kingpin of a cartel or an Al Qaeda warlord (though these are very rarely captured alive) iscelebrated triumphantly in the media, it has been proved that these actions have littleimpact if any in diminishing the operations of these organizations:“Removing one set of international drug dealers has often simply cleared the way for rivals and new entrants to the drug trade, rather than reducing the size of the drugmarket.” (Youngers and Rosin, 2005:7)

Kenney acknowledges that leadership interdiction is a necessary component of these‘wars’, but is however not sufficient on its own (Kenney, 2003:188). This is perhaps,one of the clearest signs of how futile these efforts have been even in terms of the

official discourse.

• The War on Drugs is a war that cannot be won by military means only. In the occupied

areas, that is, the areas in which combat has taken place or that can be described ashighly militarized, i.e. Afghanistan, and certain regions of Mexico like Guerrero andChiapas, the army follows the strategy of winning Hearts and Minds. This is a strategydeveloped in the Vietnam War which aims at obtaining the support of the population.The army gets involved in activities like distributing goods and providing services for the population, while a campaign of disinformation is orchestrated in mainstreammedia. Rumours also play a key role in this kind of campaign (Kelly, 2004).

Beyond the official discourse and the results of these practices, this paper argues that both‘Wars’ pursue a common interest: the expansion of American influence in the Middle Eastand in Latin America. These areas are particularly important not only for their naturalresources and their geopolitical relevance, but also because the chaos that has beenexported to these areas from the core in the form of natural and social degradation hasreached unsustainable levels and therefore needs to be ‘controlled’. In this sense, Biel(2006:117) explains that: “The rise of core order is really reflected in an export to the periphery of a disorder which negatively reflects the order established within the core”.

This is particularly the case in the militarization of the periphery under the War on Drugs.Much of the violence associated with the traffic and consumption of drugs has affected

certain areas within the core (mainly the depressed regions where the distribution takes place, i.e. the Bronx in New York or the deprived areas of London), but most of thisviolence remains in countries in the periphery such as Colombia, and increasingly inMexico. As shown in this graphic, the strategy of destroying drugs where they are producedor seizing them in transit has not resulted in an increase of prices that would in turndiscourage possible buyers (Youngers and Rosin, 2005). Quite the opposite, cocaine andheroine prices have actually decreased in the last 20 years.

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Source: Washington Office on Latin America4

It is not the case, however, that drug trafficking does not represent a very real threat notonly to the United States, but also to the countries of the periphery involved in the trade.The amounts of money and power along with the impunity and patronage involved have ledto an ever increasing violence that have led to an extremely high death toll already. As the body count continues, there seems to be narrow chance for a change of policy and the tradecontinues growing:

“The drug war mentality ensures that U.S. drug control resources are skewed towardinterdiction and law enforcement efforts. But such policies, which fail to take into accountthe complex social and economic roots of both the illicit drug production and consumption,tend to shift the pattern of players in the drug trade without significantly reducing the tradeitself.” (Youngers and Rosin, 2005:4)

Some of the economic roots of violence mentioned above were in turn fostered by changesrelating to the introduction of neoliberal policies in the agricultural sector. The “Reform of the Countryside” which began with the reform to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution onland tenure and effectively meant the revival of the large estates or latifundios, along withthe reduction of agricultural subsidies, had a massive impact on the lives of Mexico’s

peasants. NAFTA was the culmination of this process of agricultural form, by opening upthe country to imports from subsidised producers in the United States. These changes notonly accelerated the migration trend to the north, but also gave impulse to drug traffickingforces both at the level of the political elite in the form of “shadow state” and also at thegrassroots level, where the involvement of impoverished peasants in production and trafficgrew.

4 Available at http://www.wola.org/media/Drug%20Policy/drugpostcard.jpg

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“Drug trafficking bosses learned how to take advantage of the frustration of poor peasants,who facing the lack of support from the state, decided to switch from the cultivation of corn, beans and other staples to the cultivation of marihuana and poppy in order to mitigate poverty and marginalization... This fact was admitted by the minister of the SocialDevelopment Ministry (Sedeso) in the last year of Vicente Fox administration, Josefina

Vázquez Mota. She stated: ‘I am not exaggerating when I say that poverty should be anational security problem. When we analyzed the zones with the highest proportion of drug cultivation we realized that they match almost exactly with the zones with highestlevels of poverty and inequality in our country.” ( Proceso, 1597, 10-June-2007) 5

This shows that Mexico went from being a zone of trafficking to become an important zoneof drug production. Politicians and high ranking businessmen had always been involved inthe traffic, as the specialist Astorga explains:

“Since the beginning of the drug business, the best known drug traffickers in Mexico wererelated in special official reports in Mexico and the U.S.A to high ranking politicians.More precisely, these politicians were suspected of being directly involved in the illegaltrade and even of controlling it.” (Astorga, n.d.:4)

However, this involvement became more evident and was used as a justification for theUnited States to militarize the War on Drugs in Mexico. Mexican politicians lostcredibility after what became known as the Camarena affair in 1984. Enrique Camarenawas an undercover agent of the US Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA) in Mexico whoinformed the authorities of a plantation of marihuana of about 12 square kilometres inChihuahua state. A renowned trafficker, Caro Quintero, was the owner and his ties withthe political elite soon became clear. Camarena and a Mexican pilot, Alfredo Zavala werekidnapped, tortured and killed, and their bodies dumped. The investigations conducted bythe DEA were systematically blocked by the Mexican Federal Security Directorate (DFS).

“In 1992, DEA protected and paid witnesses, recruited among Caro’s associate gunmen and bodyguards accused Ruben Zuno Arce, ex-President Echeverria’s brother in law and owner of the house in which Camarena was killed, Manuel Bartlett, Secretary of Government, andEnrique Alvarez del Castillo, Attorney General of having planned the crime. Zuno, wasdetained in the U.S.A in 1989, judged and sentenced to life imprisonment in 1992.”(Astorga, n.d.:10)

The strategy to militarize and to use drug trafficking as an excuse for Americanintervention existed before the Camarena affair took place.

5 “Los capos supieron aprovechar la frustración de ejidatarios y comuneros, quienes ante la falta de apoyo delestado decidieron cambiar los cultivos de maíz, frijol y otros granos básicos por mariguana y amapola para paliar la pobreza y la marginación...Este hecho lo admitió el último año de la gestión foxista la entoncessecretaria de Desarrollo Social (Sedesol), Josefina Vázquez Mota: “No estoy exagerando cuando digo que la pobreza debe ser un problema de seguridad nacional. Cuando analizamos las zonas de mayor cultivo deenervantes, vemos que coinciden casi exactamente con las zonas de mayor pobreza y desigualdad en nuestro país.” (p. 16, Proceso. 1597/ 10 de Junio de 2007) Translation is mine.

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“The “War on Drugs” declared by President Reagan in the 1980s, and continued during theBush administration, enhanced the power of “drug warriors” who did not hesitate to usetheir information to damage the political elite’s image and credibility. They waited untilone of their agents was killed, but they knew it long before.”(Astorga, n.d:10)

This incident helped to legitimise the involvement of the Mexican military in The War onDrugs, while at the same time exposing the involvement of the political elite. The justifications used in the official discourse for this militarization are the following:

• The army is the only organization with the resources, technology, training and

manpower to combat drug production and trafficking.

• The army is a more reliable institution due to its code of conduct and honour.

Therefore it is less likely to be co-opted and fall under pressure.

However, both arguments have been proven wrong with time and on more than one

occasion. From the involvement in corruption of high ranking officials6

to mass desertionof soldiers to join the different cartels, Mexico’s recent history is full of examples of thisfailure.

Perhaps the clearest proof of this is that trafficking has not decreased at all since 1987, butquite the opposite. The involvement of the political elite has actually increased as drugtrafficking became even more profitable. It is indeed, on of the most profitable activities of the shadow state. From Raul Salinas, brother of the ex-President Carlos Salinas, accused of money laundering (BBC News, October 20, 1998) to the latest scandal involving a man of Chinese origin, Zhenli Ye Gon and the latest electoral campaign, the shadow state is asinvolved as ever.

At the same time, levels of violence associated with drug trafficking have increasedconsiderably:

“At least 1,400 people have died in attacks since January 2007, figures that far exceed thosefor the same period in 2006 and 2005. Areas not previously hit by large-scale drugviolence, such as Veracruz state and the city of Monterrey, have been affected.” (Meyer and Atwood, 2007:1)

Apparently the ´third link´ has benefited also the same organisations that it is meant tocombat considering that:

6 Mexico’s drug czar appointed by the Zedillo administration in 1996 was convicted for protecting one of the

most important cartels. “General Gutierrez Rebollo was convicted of drug trafficking, racketeering andcorruption and sentenced to 40 years in prison. He was later convicted of handing out military firearms todrug traffickers and sentenced to an additional 31 years and 10 months.” (Herald Tribune, November 1,2006)

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“Mexican officials estimate that 70% of the weapons confiscated from organized crimegroups in Mexico are manufactured and purchased in the United States.” (Meyer andAtwood, 2007:4)

The militarization has not decreased the violence or reduced the trafficking and has brought

what would be considered as ‘collateral damage’ in the terminology of war: death andhuman rights violations such as torture, rape and arbitrary detentions that are not being brought to civilian justice. The death of Ernestina Asencion, a 73 year old indigenouswoman who was raped by soldiers and the recent death of two women and two children (1-June, 2007, La Jornada) at the hands of soldiers in Sinaloa are just two examples. Evenwhen these crimes were committed against defenceless civilians, no one has been broughtto justice.

It is not rare, after all, that a military institution covers its own ‘war crimes’ by judgingthem in military courts. This is another chilling coincidence with the War on Terror.

“Privatisation” of the War on Drugs

A current trend can be identified regarding this aspect: both the government and the cartelshave “privatised” their defence and offence apparatuses. This can be illustrated withreference to the Plan Mexico and the emergence of Las Zetas, a private drug militia.

The Plan Mexico is a United States-led initiative to eradicate the drug trade in Mexicocurrently being negotiated between the United States, Mexico and Canada within theframework of the Security and Prosperity Partnership meeting that took place inMontebello, Canada in August 2007. In order to avoid any resemblance to the previousdisastrous Plan Colombia, the point of not sending American soldiers has been stated byPresident Bush and President Calderon. However, beyond this point, it is difficult to seehow these two plans differ from each other.

A clear component of this Plan, is the use of private security companies. Although its mainfocus is on the drug war, it is also intended to target terrorism (Fazio, La Jornada, 27-August-2007.) Furthermore, according to the journalist Luis Guillermo Hernandez, from La Jornada, the Mexican government has already started leasing part of its securityoperations. Verint Technology Inc, an American company has signed a contract worthalmost 3 million dollars. The company:

“From New York, specialized in intelligence and formed by ex Pentagon and ex FBImembers, is currently conducting operations from the offices of the Subprocuraduría de

Investigación Especializada en Delincuencia Organizada (IEDO). Its mission is tomonitor and capture private communications (emails, chats, texts, faxes, telephones,mobiles and internal networks) under the pretext of fighting organized crime andterrorism.” (Fazio, La Jornada, 27-August-2007.)7

7 “La empresa neoyorquina especializada en inteligencia y constituida por ex militares del Pentágono y exagentes de la FBI, funciona en las oficinas de la Subprocuraduría de Investigación Especializada enDelincuencia Organizada (IEDO), en la colonia Guerrero. Su misión es monitorear o “captar” todas las

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The process of militarization that has been unleashed to “control” drug trafficking alongwith the political patronage in the form of shadow state has actually generated further impunity and violence. The logic of the concept of “national security” along with the protection of elites interest have been imposed over the well being and the safety of

citizens. This is further the case when the themes of privatisation and militarisation mergewith the development of illegal paramilitary groups.

Los Zetas: An illegal private military company

Los Zetas are effectively a group of mercenaries, a private army that was formed by theGolf Cartel, one of Mexico’s leading drug trafficking organisations, between 1997 and1999, parallel to the militarization of the war on drugs pursued by the Ernesto Zedilloadministration.

“The Golf cartel, under the leadership of Osiel Cardenas started to recruit ex members of aspecial command within the army, the Grupo Aeromóvil de Fuerzas Especiales, GAFE , inorder to form what is now known as Los Zetas.” (p.7-9 Proceso, 1595 / 27 May 2007)

Cooptation with amounts of money that members of the army will simply never see in frontof them was the most used strategy along with intimidation techniques. Los Zetas isformed not only of common soldiers, but also of higher members within the militaryhierarchy. With specialized training in intelligence and combat techniques and a militarydiscipline, they have turned out to be a deadly force. They not only have the knowledge touse sophisticated weapons, but also have the latest technology and equipment.

It has been stated by the Mexican Government´s Procuraduria General de la Republica,that Kaibil deserters have also joined Los Zetas. Comprising a unit of the Guatemalanmilitary, the Kaibiles are one of the most feared Special Forces units in Latin America,originally trained to combat insurgency during the civil war in that country. They are wellknown for their survival techniques and also for their violence.

It is important to remember that they are mercenaries at the end of the day and thattherefore, like any other group, their loyalty is mainly linked to the money and privilegesthey receive for their “services”. Effectively they represent an illegal private militarycompany.

Los Zetas represent perhaps one of the biggest challenges that Mexico faces today. Notonly because of their violence, but also because they are a sign of the decomposition of traditional institutions. In a society ruled by neoliberal governmentality and with a systemof social closure, anything can be bought with enough money, including highly specialized protection and security for one of the most profitable businesses of our time: drugtrafficking.

comunicaciones privadas (correos, chat y mensajes electrónicos, faxes, llamadas telefónicas de aparatos fijos,celulares y redes internas) con el pretexto de combatir “el crimen organizado y el terrorismo”.

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Militarization of the War on Drugs has not yielded results in decreasing the traffic, production and consumption of drugs, but it has had a high social, political and economicalcost. It is expected that the Plan Mexico will further deepen this process as well as securinga privileged position for American interests and Private Security Companies.

The involvement of the army in public security under the argument of the War on Drugs inMexico has already led to human rights violations. Furthermore, little will be achieved aslong as the shadow state is directly involved in the drug production and trafficking.

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5. Militarisation of the borders: containing and regulating migration

This chapter looks again at the issues of social exclusion and militarisation illustrated thistime through attempts to control and regulate migration. It reviews the relationships

between these themes at both Mexico’s northern and southern borders in order to illustratethe links between neoliberalism, social exclusion, and the Mexican elite’s relations with theUnited States, thus encompassing the international and national levels. The followingchapter then returns to the issue of resistance to social exclusion and the militarisation thatthis brings, reviewing the issues of neoliberalism and social exclusion at a societal level.

Mexico’s Northern Border

As previously discussed, migration to the United States can be considered as both asymptom and a solution of the social exclusion and marginalization prevalent in Mexico.Mexico is undoubtedly the largest source of immigrants for the United States. In the March

2002 Current Population Survey it was estimated that there are 32.5 million immigrants inthe United States; of those, 9.8 million, or 30 percent, are from Mexico (Migration PolicyInstitute, 2004). This flow has increased considerably since the implementation of NAFTA.

“Although the Mexican economy has achieved substantial productivity increases since1988 and 1994 – also in comparison to other countries – real wages have continued to fall.This increasing gap since the start of the liberalization strategy is relevant in terms of thesustainability of the economy.” (Dussel Peters, 2004:136)

Beyond the macroeconomic figures, the implementation of neoliberal policies such as theliberalization of key sectors of the economy, the privatisation of public services and the

rolling back of the state from social provision have had disastrous consequences for themajority of the population, particularly in the rural areas. The agricultural sector, and in particular subsistence farmers, have been particularly affected since the beginning of NAFTA.

“The wages agricultural workers earned in this sector fell dramatically between 1991-2003.While agricultural employers gained under NAFTA, subsistence farmers suffered a massiveloss of income. Some farm leaders state that farmers who are still growing corn and beanssubsist on an average of 35 cents per day. Poverty increased by 50 percent in the poorest,female headed households since the implementation of NAFTA.” (White et al, 2003, p. 19)This is why migration increased in such a dramatic way, as illustrated above.

The size and importance of remittances have equally increased. It is quite likely that theoverall economic indicators, including the already low rate of 3% annual GDP growth,would be very different without remittances. According to the World Bank, remittances toMexico have increased from US$ 7.5 billion in 2000 to US$ 21.8 billion by 2005 and areestimated to have reached US$ 24.5 billion in 2006. (Source: World Development Indicators database, April 2007).

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http://www.worldbank.org/data/dataquery.html






Remittances make the chaos of the periphery more manageable while providing a reservearmy of labour within the U.S. However, although providing enormous benefits for theUnited States, this flow of people also needs to be controlled and regulated.

“This reserve labour army is fundamental for the creation of the North American labour

market. But the creation of labour markets at global, regional or sub regional levelsnecessarily requires the regulation of labour migrants´ flows. Developed countries arecontrolling and directing such flows according to the new capital flexible accumulationneeds.” (Sandoval, 2007:25)

Some of these needs are actually south of the border. The maquiladora (sweat shop) modelis actually very efficient because operational costs for TNCs are reduced to a minimum andsince environmental and labour regulations are lower or easier to overcome, they are able toleave behind levels of social and environmental degradation that Industrialized countrieswould find unacceptable.

The elites have to guarantee stability and a good “investment climate” for TNCs whilecooperating in keeping migration at a convenient level for the North. This involvesMexican migrants and also those who come from further south. This is why the MexicoU.S border is so important. This idea of controlling migration has existed since theimplementation in 1986 of the US Immigration Reform and Control Act which targetedemployers of illegal immigrants by imposing sanctions and penalties. However, in 1989the launching of the War on Drugs moved the emphasis to having physical control of the border. In 1993 the United States “Operation Hold the Line” attempted to implement this policy, marking a clear shift towards deterring emigrants or making it more difficult or expensive to cross the border.

The link between migration and security has become stronger in the post 9/11 context. Onone hand, immigrants have historically been accused of generating unemployment for thenative population and increasing crime rates. They have been feared for being different andin general, their different language and religion have tended to create confusion and fear.They clearly represent the “other”. However, 9/11 repositioned this existing link betweenmigration and security in such a way that now it is acceptable to think that weak border controls lead to insecurity. In the United States, this link is very clear and it alsoencompasses “aliens”. A month after the attacks,

“President Bush issued the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 2, “CombatingTerrorism Through Immigration Policies,” which locked immigration and security together bureaucratically. That same week, Bush signed the USA Patriot Act, which expandedfederal powers to detain and prosecute aliens. Political speech was specially targeted: animmigrant engaging in a peaceful political demonstration, for example, or giving money toan organization active in support of, say, health clinics in Gaza, could be detainedindefinitely and deported, or prosecuted and imprisoned. The broad and vague definitionsof “terrorist” activity or organizations were particularly worrisome to civil rights experts,and the USA Patriot Act has been the centre of a civil liberties storm since it was proposed.The act and other new federal measures have forged a policy linking migration and nationalsecurity as never before.” (Tirman, 2004:2)

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This process had two immediate effects regarding Mexican migration and the Mexico-U.S border:

• Intensification of the low-intensity warfare tactics in the border, which includes the

increase of almost “800 per cent the number of National Guard members deployedalong the border” (Delgado Wise 2004:151). To date, the Border Patrol has 12,000members and the border between Mexico and the United States is probably one of themost militarised in the world.

• Extension of interior immigration policing practices.

“The recent criminalization of immigration law, the sequestering of immigrationenforcement from court oversight and the enrolment of proxy immigration officers atsub-state scales have been actively pursued so as to make interior enforcement newlycentral to US immigration geopolitics.” (Coleman, 2007:54).

This corresponds to the new measures that the Bush administration is taking, whichinvolve new requirements for employers. They will be forced to fire workers whoseinsurance number could not be verified. Heavy sanctions and penalties are expected bythe employers if they do not fulfil these requirements. Hiring illegal immigrants hasachieved officially the status of a criminal offence. (La Jornada, 11 August 2007)

The next attempt to control and regulate migration, under the justification of security is theSecurity and Prosperity Partnership.

The Security and Prosperity Partnership

Officially launched in March 2005 as a “trilateral effort” between the United States,Mexico and Canada, the Security and Prosperity Partnership has received little attentionfrom the media. Its main objectives according to the official website are “To increasesecurity and enhance prosperity among the United States, Canada and Mexico throughgreater cooperation and information sharing.” (http://spp.gov/) Regarding security, the idea of external threats is fundamental. The document shows afocus on border security, but migration as such is not mentioned:

“We will establish a common approach to security to protect North America from externalthreats, prevent and respond to threats within North America, and further streamline thesecure and efficient movement of legitimate, low-risk traffic across our shared borders. As part of out effort we will:

• Implement common border security and bio protection strategies

• Enhance critical infrastructure protection and implement a common approach to

emergency response.

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http://spp.gov/

http://spp.gov/



• Implement improvements in aviation and maritime security, combat transnational

threats, and enhance intelligence partnerships.

• Implement a border facilitation strategy to build capacity to improve the legitimate

flow of people and cargo at our shared borders.”

Another ambiguity of the text is the meaning of “legitimate flow of people”. However, onecan assume that it stands for “legal”, as in documented and approved. The NAFTA trade agreement effectively changed the way in which these countriesinteracted in economic and political terms. This is the case because policies had to bechanged and rearranged to serve NAFTA and by this we should understand, to serve theinterests of the Transnational Corporations, who benefited the most from the agreement8.

The Security and Prosperity Partnership represents the third link the military integrationthat was not fully contemplated under NAFTA. At the same time the idea is to remove thelast existing barriers for the flow of capital and goods. Energy is however, the other

important component in the “partnership”:

“The Bush administration has three fundamental objectives embodied in its Security andProsperity Partnership: to create more advantageous conditions for transnationalcorporations and remove remaining barriers for the flow of capital and cross border production within the framework of NAFTA; to assure secure access to natural resources inthe other two countries, especially oil; and to create a regional security plan based on"pushing its borders out" into a security perimeter that includes Mexico and Canada.”(Carlsen, May 30, 2007)

It is still difficult to know what this partnership is going to involve in practical terms and its

consequences due to the lack of information given to the public. As Carlsen (2007) puts it:

“The ‘silent integration’ that is the follow-up to NAFTA relies on anonymity, noaccountability to Congress or the public, the absence of public debate, and as littleinformation to the public as possible.”

8 Chapter 11 of NAFTA is about the rights of foreign investors within the United States, Mexico and Canada.“When the government of Mexico halted construction of a hazardous waste-disposal site in the municipalityof Guadalcazar, following an envioronmental review, it was immediately challenged under Chapter 11. TheUS company Metalclad claimed that its rights to minimum international standards of protection had beenviolated, and that it had been subjected to a form of expropriation. The Chapter 11 tribunal upheldMetalclad’s claim, forcing Mexico to pay $16m in compensation” (Oxfam :234)

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The secretive way in which the ‘negotiations’ are taking place 9 shows not only that inreality the politicians and policymakers involved feel that there is no need anymore for public approval or discussion of matters related to ‘security’, because they will be able toimpose the agreement under the security justification. The same argument that led to theWar on Terror and the War on Drugs. In the same way in which we learned that “There

was No Alternative”, now we are meant to believe that this integration (which in deedrepresents subordination) is also for our own benefit and beyond, that we do not have analternative again.

Mexico’s Southern Border

The process of militarisation to contain and regulate migration is also underway in thesouth of the country, in order to contain the inflow from Central and South America. “PlanSur”, or “The Southern Plan” relates to the border with Belize and Guatemala which is thefirst migratory filter. Effectively, it represents an effort for sealing that border, while:

“The second wall will be installed along the Coatzacoalcos-Salina Cruz corridor whichtraverses the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. This will be used to intercept and regulate Mexicanworkers travelling in their own country.” (Fazio, 2001:3)

Immigrants from these countries suffer from all sorts of human rights violations in Mexicanterritory from gangs and police corporations. They are left at mercy of these groups due totheir vulnerability. This has been documented by NGOs and the UN migration commission(Masiosare, La Jornada, 9-Feb-2003). Buses travelling in the south of Mexico are stoppedand searched by members of the Federal Preventive Police ( Policía Federal Preventiva, or PFP) and by the immigration police. Everyone on the bus has to show a valid ID and insome cases, people are asked to sing the national anthem or to answer a question onMexican history.

The Mexican elite thus cooperates with dominant groups in the United States bymilitarising the southern border. This policy becomes clear when the numbers of arrests of the latest special operations to control organised crime in Mexico are analysed. Accordingto the records of the Policía Federal Preventiva (PFP), from December 2006 to March of 2007, of 1,180 arrested in the so-called Federal Joint Operation against Organized Crime,39.4 per cent were illegal immigrants. (La Jornada, 29th July-2007)

9 The meeting held in Banff, Canada Sept. 12-14, 2006i a good example of this: “Sponsored by the non-governmental North American Forum, the governmental and high-level nature of the secret meeting wasdifficult to conceal once Canadian groups publicized the draft agenda. The meeting was chaired by former U.S. Sec. of State and Bechtel executive George Schultz, former Mexican Finance Minister Pedro Aspe, andformer Alberta premier Peter Lougheed; keynote addresses were slated to be provided by then-Sec. of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Canadian Ministers of Energy Greg Melchin and Public Safety Stockwell Day.Luminaries of the U.S. military-industrial complex mixed with government officials including ThomasShannon, Assistant Sec. for the Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs in the State Department, Adm. TimKeating, Commander of NORAD/USNORTHCOM, and officials from energy, natural resources, and defensedepartments.” (Carlsen, May 30. 2007)

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However, the plans for the southern region have a wider strategic importance for control of the rest of Latin America.

Recent years have seen a change towards the left in other Latin American countries. Theinception of left-leaning leaders such as Chavez in Venezuela, Morales in Bolivia and to a

much lesser degree, Kirchner in Argentina and Lula in Brazil, has appeared as a definingtrend in the politics of the continent. The failed coup orchestrated against Chavez in 2002and the subsequent attempt to destabilise Bolivia are clear signs of the American attemptsto reverse this trend. But American influence in those countries has diminished. Ecuador has even dared to expel the World Bank representative for that country and refuses to getadvice from the IMF. The main characteristic that brings together the governments of allthese countries is a very strong criticism of the neoliberal model, at least in the officialdiscourse.

This is why the United States is trying to create some regional counterbalance and Mexico plays a key role in this plan. The idea is to create a zone of influence that will go fromMexico to Colombia, the other right wing country that has also been loyal to Americaninterests while undergoing a similar process of militarisation. This plan, known as PlanPuebla Panama will also open vast amounts of natural and social resources to foreigncapital.

The Plan Puebla Panama

“The Puebla Panama Plan (PPP) is part of a comprehensive program combining political,economic and military interventionism. Official propaganda and rhetoric, however, have presented it as a plan that will bring peace, development and new jobs to the region of southeast Mexico and Central America. The PPP is a genuine expression of contemporarycapitalism and, as such, is part of a vast and renewed process of privatization andtransnationalism in southeast Mexico and in the whole of Central America. Strictlyspeaking, it is part of the United States' imperial geopolitical strategy for the continent.Participants include sectors of finance capital, multinational consortia and Mexican andCentral American oligarchies. One of the principal objectives of the project is to assure theexploitation of labor and strategic resources in the region as well as to ensure market penetration by U.S.-based transnational corporations.” (Fazio 2001:1)

Officially launched in 2001 by the then President Vicente Fox (who had previously beenPresident of Coca Cola in Mexico), the Plan received several criticisms. The officialdocument indeed looks like as a business plan in which Mexico’s natural and socialresources are for sale. Following the critical discourse analysis that Hodge and Coronado(2006) applied to the Plan, the conclusion is that the official discourse positions Mexico asa commodity.

“The presidential office writes a political document that echoes the forms taught inundergraduate business textbooks...The region is offered as if a commodity for sale. Itsdepressed economy and low wage economy are presented as an opportunity for the benefitof others.” (Hodge and Coronado 2006:540)

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Mexico has always been divided in two: The rich, “developed”, industrial North and the“poor”, traditional and indigenous south. It can be said that the south actually shares morein common with Central America that with the north of the country and it has helped fundthe development process of the north, at least in terms of providing energy from its oil

reserves and from the hydroelectric dams of the southern states of Veracruz, Tabasco andChiapas. However, this periphery of the periphery (Biel, 2006) has received little inexchange. For these reasons, the maquiladoras (assembly plants for United States tiedclosely to the United States) have mainly remained in the north and centre of the country.The Plan Puebla Panama is the plan to expand this model of social and environmentaldevastation to the southern region, while containing and regulating migration. Both processes require militarisation, the first one to placate the already evident resistance to thismodel and the second one to stop the inflow of people beyond those required for the labour force.

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6. Militarisation to repress and contain rebellion

“It is not possible for neoliberalism to become the world’s reality without the argument of

death served up by institutional and private armies, without the gag served up by prisons,without the blows and assassinations served up by the military and the police. Nationalrepression is a necessary premise of the globalization neoliberalism imposes. The moreneoliberalism advances as a global system, the more numerous grow the weapons and theranks of the armies and national police. The numbers of the imprisoned, the disappeared,and the assassinated in different countries also grows.” (Subcomandante Marcos 2001:110)

Repression and militarisation to contain rebellion are certainly not new in Latin America or Mexico. However, what is new is the systematization of repression in order to advance aglobal system that is based on a façade of pluralistic societies that cherish democraticvalues.

The end of the “transition to democracy”

Processes as different as the fall of the USSR and the subsequent dismantlement of thecommunist bloc, the end of the military dictatorship in Chile or of the regime of Franco inSpain have been celebrated as “transitions to democracy”. By reading the official discourseit might seem that democracy has indeed been sweeping the globe for at least two decades.However, for vast populations across the world political representation has not increased.In most of Latin America, as previously explained, inequality and social exclusion havegrown. This is undoubtedly the legacy of 20 years of Structural Adjustment Programmes

which represented the first step towards the imposition of neoliberalism and of a particular type of globalisation that to this day has not really “worked for the poor”.

In the year 2000 in Mexico, the PRI lost the presidency for the first time in 70 years, withthe candidate of the PAN, Vicente Fox taking over. Since then, Mexico has also undergoneits own “transition to democracy”. However, in reality, little has changed in terms of economic, political and social policies. This particular kind of globalization imposed by Neoliberalism requires consensus:

“A multi-party system could be established, characterised by consensus over broad policyoptions –increasingly, a fatalistic acceptance of the need to ‘facilitate’ those processeswhich go under the name of globalisation.” (Biel 2000: 330)

This multi-party system that is advanced by the United States is supposed to represent the pinnacle of democracy. But it has not been a democracy that brings social justice and voiceto the excluded. The concept has instead been subverted to represent the interests of thefew and in doing so, has lost its real meaning:

“Democracy in the dominant discourse is based on de-linking it from the issue of social justice. That does not work, because if democracy does not result in social progress, people

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no longer find it credible. The main reason for the move backwards towards religiousfundamentalism, ethnic solidarities and so on is the failure of democracy.” (Amin2003:103) The transition to “democracy” in Mexico as understood within the framework of the

dominant discourse was the result of the exhaustion of the PRI dictatorship. In fact, thiswas evident since 1988, when the first fraudulent presidential election took place. Althoughit has never been widely acknowledged by the international institutions and media, CarlosSalinas de Gortari whose administration ran from 1988 to 1994, was an illegitimate president who was able to win the election only through fraud:

“When the [electoral] returns came in on July 6th, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas (son of thenationalist ex president Lázaro Cardenas) was in the lead: the 55 per cent of tally sheets inthe possession of FDN ( Frente Democratico Nacional ) poll workers showed Cárdenas with40 per cent to Salinas’s 36; government tabulations showed similar results. But then camethe moment that has defined public responses to the current electoral crisis: the PRI interior minister announced on national TV that the vote-counting computer had crashed. When thesystem was back up again later that night, suddenly Salinas was ahead.” (Giordano,2006:10)

This was undoubtedly the first sign of the end of the one party regime, but the PRI managedto stay in power not only for Salinas’ six year period, but for another six years, withErnesto Zedillo replacing him. 2000 was the year of the transition with Vicente Fox fromthe PAN finally taking over from the PRI by capitalizing on the general discontent againstPRI. However, neoliberal policies remained unchallenged and the popular enthusiasm withwhich the Fox administration was initially seen, soon disappeared. Economic performanceremained low, with annual GDP growth averaging a low 3% compared to the 6% that the president had promised in his electoral campaign.

By 2006, the candidate from the PRD ( Partido de la Revolucion Democrática), AndresManuel Lopez Obrador seemed to be the likely winner in the new presidential poll. Having been ahead in opinion polls for two years prior to the election, the actual result was decidedin favour of the PAN, for whom the official election result showed a margin of victory of less than 0.5%. It was strongly suspected that the result had been rigged, with sections of the PRI colluding with the PAN in the fraud.

The social and political cost of this has not yet been seen:

“The outcome of Mexico’s 2006 election has only exacerbated the country’s deep socialfractures. López Obrador supporters who placed their faith in the ballot box have seen their votes literally trashed by the IFE [Federal Electoral Institute], the official guardians of thecount, with the backing of TRIFE [Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary], theconstitutional guarantor of Mexico’s ‘democracy’. Their outrage looks set to grow as theconsequences of the electoral fraud convert into government policy. Millions have lost anyhope of changing institutional or electoral paths.” (Giordano, 2006:23)

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The lack of political space for discussion or negotiation along with the breakdown of the political and institutional pact that emerged from the Revolution are creating a situation inwhich traditional actors are also losing their influence. Simultaneously, the administratorsof the electoral system have proven their servile attitude towards power. The officialdiscourse of transition to democracy is losing its credibility due to processes like this.

However, it is important to acknowledge that US economic interests are not contested byany of the three main parties precisely because they share a common ground in theconsensus previously mentioned. Only a small section within the PRD advocates for therenegotiation of NAFTA and in 2001, the three parties voted against a law on indigenousrights resulting from the 1996 accords between the government and the Zapatista EZLNorganisation that would have solved the insurgency issue in Chiapas. Furthermore, thethree parties have unleashed repression in the areas where they govern against socialmovements that oppose the neoliberal governmentality (the year long strike by students atUNAM, the National Autonomous University of Mexico, the country’s largest university in1999 - 2000 and the more recent repression of unrest in the town of Atenco near to MexicoCity are just two examples).

However, this electoral fraud proves that the multi-party system is not free of internalcontradictions. At the end of the day what is still at stake is the control over the morelimited resources controlled by the state, the proceedings of its still ongoing dismantlementand the consolidation of the shadow state. Apart from showing the voracity and desperationamong the political elite, what emerges in clear way is the prevailing system of socialclosure.

The only way to contain the social and environmental degradation unleashed by neoliberal policies and the discontent created by this social closure is through repression andmilitarisation. The lack of legitimacy of the current administration makes it a more anxiousone and this anxiety can lead to a less calculated use of repression and violence. This suitsAmerican interests of counterbalancing the left wing wave that has been going through therest of Latin America. The army in Mexico is getting even more involved in publicsecurity operations while enjoying of impunity and a rising budget:

“Weak in terms of legitimacy, President Felipe Calderon is clinging to the armed forces.With his decision of increasing the Army’s budget, he is not only answering to an olddemand, but also started to build real support among the military towards the use of force by the government. In exchange for this budgetary increase, the army is going to be moreinvolved in public security matters, reinforcing the tendency of the last two administrationsof transferring soldiers and naval officers to this kind of function.” ( Proceso, 1572, 17th-Dec-2006. p.11)10

10 “Débil en su legitimidad, el presidente Felipe Calderon se abraza a las Fuerzas Armadas. Con su decision

de aumentar los ingresos del Ejército y la Marina, hizo más que responder a una vieja demanda desoída:empezó a construir una base real de apoyo entre los militares ante las acciones de fuerza de su gobierno. Peroa cambio de aumento en su presupuesto, los involucrará cada vez más en labores de seguridad pública,reforzando la tendencia de los últimos dos sexenios de transferir soldados y marinos a ese tipo de labores.”(Proceso, 1572, 17 de diciembre de 2006 p.11) (Translation is mine)

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Only when the interests of the political elite along with US interventionism under the logicof neoliberal governmentality are analysed, the logic of militarization and social exclusioncan be understood.

Gradual process of militarisation to control rebellion and social discontent

If plurality and democracy are meant to rule the political arena, the army can not be sent tothe streets to suppress demonstrations and destroy social movements in the manner thattook place more frequently in the period from the late 1960s to the early 1980s. There areexceptions to this rule and this is because power is never monolithic, but full of contradictions and different actors try to advance their own agendas. But the full blownoption is kept as a last resort and selective repression is generally preferred.

Therefore, repression has followed a low intensity model in the last 20 to 25 years and this process is gaining momentum. For example, if the model of repression prevalent in theCold War had been used against the EZLN uprising in the state of Chiapas in 1994, it couldhave been expected that the local communities that supported the uprising would have been bombed, as happened just over the border in Guatemala in the 1980s. But both national andinternational civil society organisations mobilized quickly to protest and military operationswere stopped after 12 days. This does not mean by any means that the war against thosecommunities was over. Instead, it was replaced by low intensity warfare in the subsequent period.

Similarly, a model of low intensity repression has been used against social movements.Some of these strategies are indeed very old. What is new is the denial of the mereexistence of the rebellion and its repression. In the facade of democracy and pluralism, theexistence of exclusion and dissent can not be acknowledged. Exclusion can only beunderstood in terms of poverty and as such is supposed to be dealt with throughinstitutionalized means, such as the Secretaria de Desarrollo Social, or SocialDevelopment Secretariat (Sedeso).

Implemented at least since 1999, the model of low intensity repression follows the same pattern which consists of:

1. Infiltration by the government. Professional agitators are infiltrated by the governmentand their objective is to provoke a repressive response while creating a bad image of thesocial movement that the media exploits. At the same time they use violence todiscourage others from participating actively.

2. Mass media campaigns to discredit the aims and objectives of the social movement aswell as its participants. Particularly radical characters with a criminal background or professional agitators are portrayed as leaders. Stereotyping is a particularly effectivestrategy because it also reinforces the logic of social exclusion. As Silver (1994)explains, exclusion is the result of the interplay of class, status and political power. Inthis sense, these same categories are used to create a particular stereotypical image of the participants of social movements. Labelling and assumptions which are in fact part

36



of the official discourse are used and reinforced in the media ad nauseam. In the caseof the urban poor a common assumption is that their lack of education can make themeasy prey for manipulation. In case of the UNAM student strike, the widespreadmessage was that students from public institutions (who come mainly from lower middle classes) were just lazy and that being on strike was an excuse to avoid studying.

The case of the indigenous people is also particularly interesting:

“The identification of indigenous people as seditious guerrillas fuels existingstereotypes of them as dangerous, primitive, hostile and subversive, stereotypes thathave deep historical roots in the Mexican collective cultural memory... Mexico’s ruralspaces in its southern states have become not merely the marginalized zones inhabited by indigenous peoples, but bastions of insurgent mobilization that pose a threat to therule of law and a stable social order. Thus indigenous, insurgent groups are representedas a virus in and on the social body. Essentially, they are dangerous and malevolent andmust be rounded up, disciplined, and contained.” (Norget, 2005:135)

3. Cooptation of leaders through money or official positions within the governmentstructure. In a strict sense, this is not a new strategy and has yielded some results.

4. Ignoring the demands of the social movement. The idea is that it eventually the energyof the rebellious population wears off with time. Participation decreases as people gettired or their pressing needs force them to abandon the social movement. Many protestssuch as the 1999 UNAM student strike and the more recent protest movement in thestate of Oaxaca have lasted more than a year.

5. Public security forces that had been previously militarised or that have been created for this specific purpose, such as the Federal Preventive Police ( Policía Federal

Preventiva, PFP), repress what is left of the movement. The PFP was created in 1999and as Meyer and Atwood argued (2007), this represented the first conscious attempt toerosion civil responsibility of public security while benefiting the military:

“The PFP included (in 1999) a little over 5,000 military personnel – about half the totalforce – serving in positions that were supposed to be temporary until enough newcivilian agents could be selected and trained. Eight years later, the military continues tohave a strong presence within the PFP, and the number of military personnel in its rankshas actually increased.” (Meyer and Atwood, 2007:2)

With a military structure and an ever increasing number of responsibilities, whichinclude combating drug trafficking, the PFP has been mainly used to patrol highways insearch of illegal Central American immigrants and to repress social movements.However, the idea of having a police force which is dressed in grey and not in green incharge of these operations goes much better with the official discourse of democracyand plurality. However, this is not to say that the militarisation of public security has been reduced to the creation of the PFP. This process of militarisation of publicsecurity is presented to the population as the only option to fight insecurity. As ZavaletaBetancourt argues, this process included other state institutions and has been establishedfor many years:

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“From 1994, the PRI and PAN elites started a strategy of contention of socialmovements that has led to the militarisation of the country (Sosa Elizaga, 1998). This process involved the inclusion of members of the army in police corporations.”(Zavaleta Betancourt, 2006:30).”11

6. Physical and psychological torture is used selectively to terrify individuals and todiscourage overall participation. This has been widely documented by internationalorganisations like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. This strategy stillfalls under the old technique of state terror:

“Terrorism not only kills political opponents but also terrorizes more broadly in the population, so that even potential collaborators are eliminated. The people the stateseeks to affect through generalized terror are usually different from its political targets,which gives terror a somewhat random, unpredictable quality. In the atmosphere of terror, everyone knows that they are at risk of becoming victims because everyday lifehas become uncertain. This is precisely what state terror is supposed to accomplish, toengender fear in everything people do so that the opposition does not gainsympathizers. In this environment people fear and mistrust many things in their everyday lives, such as a knock on the door, a neighbour’s question or gossip, a child’sindiscretion, an unknown person’s gaze, even a wrong number on the telephone.”(Menjivar and Rodriguez, 2005:17)

However, within the new facade of democracy and pluralism, only the subversive partof the population experiences the consequences of state inflicted terror. By imposing aninformational siege in the media, the rest of the people do not even know what ishappening and if they do, information is presented in such a way in which state violenceis both minimised and justified.

7. Paramilitary groups or death squads are trained and paid by the government to confrontthe social movement. In the media and as part of the official discourse, these groups areshown as “citizens taking action on their own hands” or “opposing groups from adifferent religious or ethnic background”. This does not mean that these divisions arenot real, but they are exploited in order to keep the hands of the government clean:

“Customarily, new members of paramilitaries are recruited from within local populations, often by taking advantage of existing divisions within communities.Incentives for joining are financial, but the power and status that such an affiliation promises are also significant attractions. Recruiting individuals from the local region as paramilitaries blurs the distinctions between perpetrators and victims (Zur, 1998). Bythis means, state officials and representatives of the federal government can keep their moral image clean and sustain the impression that unrest is rooted in local conflicts.”(Norget, 2005:132)

11 “A partir de 1994, las elites priistas y panistas iniciaron una estrategia de contencion de los movimientos

sociales que han conducido a la militarizacion del pais (Sosa Elizaga, 1998). Este proceso supone la inclusiónde militares a las corporaciones policíacas.” (Zavaleta Betancourt, 2006:30). (Translation is mine)

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39



7. Conclusion

The change in the official discourse at an international level to put security concerns at thecentre of the political agenda has unleashed an ongoing process of militarisation, and since

2001, of open warfare on the part of the United States. This change is linked to the protection and expansion of American interests around the world.

Mexico, due to the complicity of its political elite, its system of social closure as describedabove and its geographical proximity to the United States is currently also going throughthis process. The justifications for this are the War on Drugs, the need to contain migrationto the United States and the repression of social discontent. The War on Drugs has shown poor results in decreasing the production, traffic andconsumption of illegal drugs. The involvement of the shadow state in the whole process,guarantees that little will be achieved. In the mean time, the militarization under this

justification has had a high cost in terms of “collateral damage”.

The militarization of the borders is in reality trying to regulate migration from Mexico andCentral America, not to stop it. At the same time, under the same justification, the Securityand Prosperity Partnership and the Plan Puebla Panama are being implemented to guaranteeaccess from the United States to the social and natural resources of the region. This islikely to generate more degradation which in turn will require of further militarization.

These changes position Mexico in a different place within the region, in contrast to thoseother Latin American countries that currently have governments which are much morecritical to American interventionism and neoliberal policies.

Furthermore, recent experience in Mexico shows that the members of the shadow state arestill dealing with the discontent and rebellion generated by the logic of social exclusionthrough repression and militarization. However, following the facade of democracy and pluralism, this repression has changed, assuming a form of low intensity. This makes itmore sophisticated and selective, but not less violent.

The Security and Prosperity Partnership and the Plan Mexico are the latest phases of this process of militarisation. It is expected that the privatization of security will play a key rolein both programmes, following the overall trend that is also part of the neoliberalgovernmentality. The privatization of security is not only an issue that challenges themodern nation state, but also affects relationships within societies. When security iscommodified, the logic of exclusion and marginalization are reinforced.

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