boer, k. de (on hegel; the sway of the negative)

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Hegel Bulletinhttp://journals.cambridge.org/HGL

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Karin de Boer. On Hegel: The Sway of theNegative. Basingstoke, New York: PalgraveMacmillan, 2010. ISBN 978-0-230-24754-3 (hbk).Pp. 266. 54.

Natalia Baeza

Hegel Bulletin / Volume 34 / Issue 01 / May 2013, pp 124 - 134DOI: 10.1017/hgl.2013.7, Published online: 17 April 2013

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S2051536713000073

How to cite this article:Natalia Baeza (2013). Hegel Bulletin, 34, pp 124-134 doi:10.1017/hgl.2013.7

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Hegel Bulletin, 34/1, 124134doi:10.1017/hgl.2013.7

r The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2013

Review

Karin de Boer. On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative. Basingstoke, New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. ISBN 978-0-230-24754-3 (hbk). Pp. 266. 54.

Karin de Boers On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative offers an incisive interpretationand critique of Hegels philosophy, from which the author draws the framework forher own philosophical position. De Boers interpretation of Hegel stands out in

the literature in a number of ways. First, her methodology flouts traditionalinterpretive strategies in that it consists neither in trying to uncover what Hegelreally wanted to say, nor in trying to reconstruct a better version of Hegel byridding his philosophical system of potential tensions or contradictions. Rather, deBoer attempts to think the unthought in Hegel by locating a fundamental tensionthat, she argues, exists prior to the system, makes the system possible, and isnonetheless inexpressible from within the system. This strategy simultaneously offers acomprehensive and incisive new perspective on the Hegelian philosophy and pavesthe way for de Boers articulation of a new philosophical position in its own right.

De Boers study constitutes an important contribution to the renewed interestin Hegel that has recently risen both west and east of the Atlantic, and isconversant with both analytic and continental readings of Hegel. In terms of itscontent, the work can be aligned with recent interpretations that highlight thenon-totalizing strands in Hegels thought (e.g., Nancy and Malabou), yet it standsout by the fact that de Boer neither argues that Hegels thought is in truth nottotalizing, nor that Hegel can be saved from his totalizing tendencies, but ratheracknowledges the totalizing order of the Hegelian system while showing that this

order presupposes a tension that both makes the system possible and constantlythreatens to unravel it. De Boer thus does not deny the totalizing strands in Hegelbut rather shows their ineluctable fragility from withinthe totality. On Hegel: The Sway ofthe Negativeshould be of great interest to experts and students of Hegel, and de Boersapplication of her interpretation to a philosophical analysis of modernity broadensthe scope of the book far beyond issues of Hegelian interpretation. One of the mostimpressive dimensions of de Boers study is its achievement of a careful balancebetween expert textual interpretation and original philosophical work.

De Boers approach to the interpretation of Hegel is critical in a Hegelian

sense: she develops a fundamental tension internal to Hegels philosophy, showsit to be irresolvable within the confines of Hegels system, and develops a new

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philosophical position on the basis of this tension. Drawing heavily from some ofHegels early works (especially the Essay on Natural Lawand the Jena System Drafts),de Boer argues that there is a tragic strand in the Hegelian philosophy that iscovered over in, but remains essential to, Hegels mature system. The book opens

with arguments for de Boers thesis that Hegel developed his mature dialecticalmethod through reflection on tragedy and the logic of tragic conflicts. But themature dialectical method, already operative in Hegels account of tragedy in thePhenomenology, occluded a key component of his early reflections on tragedy inthe Essay on Natural Law. The key difference between the two accounts of tragedyhas to do with the way in which Hegel conceives of how the opposing principlesinvolved in a tragic conflict are related to each other before their oppositionemerges, and of how the opposition is resolved in the end.

In the early account, the opposing principles are initially entangled, meaning

that each principle requires the other (each depends on the other for its ownmeaning), and either principles separation from the other threatens mutualdestruction for both principles. Tragic conflict develops as each principleattempts to disentangle itself from the other and establish itself as absolute. Theresolution of conflict is achieved when one principle is finally able to subjugatethe other. Hegel conceives of the resolution as necessary insofar as he judges thatthe subjugated principle was never truly independent, but was rather alwaysimplicitly only a dependent moment of the victorious principle. Yet de Boerargues that this retroactive conceptualization of the resolution as necessary issomewhat of a tour de force, for there is no principled philosophical reason to thinkthat the opposition was not one between two independent principles, or twoequally strong determinations of one principle, such that neither could havebecome dominant in the end. Hegels later analysis of tragedy in the Phenomenologyforestalls this possibility by replacing the initial entanglement of oppositeprinciples with a primal unity, whose self-differentiation into two opposing andmutually dependent principles gives rise to tragic conflict. The conflict is resolved

when both opposing principles give up their claim to independence and are

subsumed under a third principle that synthesizes them, which principle just is amore mediated (self-conscious) version of the original unity. With this newaccount, Hegel rules out the threat of an asymmetricaland undecidableconflict thatloomed large in the early account, where the principles were entangled withoutbeing mere moments of a third principle.

The logic that governs Hegels later account corresponds to his conception ofabsolute negativity, which always begins with an original unity from which conflictsdevelop but are always finally resolved under a higher unity. However, de Boerdetects a different logic in the early account, which she terms the logic of

entanglement and sees as governed by tragic (rather than absolute) negativity.De Boers chief goal in the book is to argue that Hegels account of absolute

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negativity, which came to define his mature method, simultaneously presupposesand covers over tragic negativity. Accordingly, de Boer sets out to disclose therole of tragic negativity behind the back of Hegels system, and to develop it intoa philosophical principle on its own right. The overall structure of the book is an

application of Hegels own method of immanent critique, which aims to meet aphilosophical position always in the positions own terms and to use only resourcesinternal to the position in order to push it to its limits and into a more adequateposition. Accordingly, de Boers employs only resources internal to the Hegelianphilosophy in order to show the limits of the systems driving principleabsolutenegativityand to move beyond it.

In order to locate traces of tragic negativity behind the Hegelian system, deBoer first focuses on the logical structure of Hegels Science of Logic, where the fullforce of absolute negativity is deployed at the level of pure concepts, and she then

turns to Hegels system as a whole. The chapters on the Logic (2, 3, 4, and 8)argue that the Logic contains a basic presupposition, already operative at thebeginning of the book, which is taken for granted as absolute, although it is infact only one strand in an original entanglement that is not itself thematized in thebook. But if this entanglement is a hidden presupposition of the Logic, and sincethe Logic is presupposed by the other parts of the systemthe philosophies ofnature and spiritthe initial entanglement is a presupposition of each part of thesystem and of the system as a whole. The chapters on the philosophies of natureand spirit (5, 6, and 7) flesh out the nature of the fundamental entanglementallegedly necessary for, but covered over by, the Hegelian system.

The chapters on the Logic contain some of the most fascinating and originalmoments in de Boers text. De Boer argues that the notion of absolute negativity,on which the systematic achievement of Hegels philosophy hinges, presupposesthe concept as suchthat is, the principle of the objectifying activity thatproduces the pure concepts constitutive of both knowledge and the objects ofknowledge (De Boer 2010: 52). For Hegel, it is the self-determination of theconcept through the development of internal oppositions that makes the

empirical world possible as a world of knowable objects. And yet it is the fact thatthese determinations are all mere moments of the concept as such that allowsphilosophy to reconstruct the unity of the concept and reach absolute knowingat the end of the Logicthat is, knowledge of the concept as a self-determiningactivity that makes any and all knowledge of objects possible, and that alsodetermines the objects themselves. So, the movement of conceptual oppositionsin the Logic, and their necessary culmination in absolute knowing, presuppose theinitial unityof the concept as a whole, as well as the idea that this unity gives waythrough its self-determination to the conceptual oppositions that are developed in the

text. But the oppositions remain moments of the original unity of the concept, and thisensures that absolute knowing is ultimately achieved through a self-conscious

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reconstruction of the original unity. The original unity of the concept is thuspresupposed by the Logic as a whole.

Yet, de Boer argues with expert textual analysis and philosophical acuity, thepresupposition of the concept with which the Logic begins covers over

something more fundamental. To show this, de Boer engages in a detailed andnovel interpretation of the logical structure internal to the three divisions of theLogic (corresponding to the realms of being, essence, and the concept) and ofthe relation between these divisions. She argues that each of these spheres isgoverned internally by a different form of negativity. The sphere of being isgoverned byabstract negativity, by which the negation of a concept simply results inthe surrender of that concept and its replacement by its contrary. The sphere ofessence, on the other hand, is governed by what de Boer terms contradictorynegativity, which does not merely negate a concept and surrender it to its contrary,

but rather considers both concepts as defined by their opposition andinsurmountable entanglement, and is thus a remnant of the tragic negativityin Hegels early accounts of tragedy. But this kind of negativity cannot dissolvecompletely the alleged independence of contrary determinations, which is whyfor Hegel the sphere of essence must give way to the sphere of the concept. Thislast sphere is governed by absolute negativity, which considers concepts that havealready achieved the unity of contrary determinations in the history of thought,and also defines the methodical principle of the Logic as a whole.

On the basis of this account of the three spheres of the Logic, de Boer builds aintricate account of how they come together to form the system of pure conceptsas a unified whole. The aim of the account is to show that the macro-structure ofthe system presupposes not only the original unity of the concept, but, behindthis unity, an original entanglement and attempt at disentanglement. The unity ofthe system presupposes that the concept is a primordial unity that divides itselfinto the subordinate spheres of being and essence. The concept first separatesfrom itself the subordinate sphere of abstract negativity, thus opening up thesphere of being, because this negativity is needed to give rise to the one-sided

concepts necessary for ordering sense perceptions into knowledge of empiricalobjects, and thus for thinking anything at all. The beginning of the Logicpresupposes and deliberately repeats the retreat of the concept as suchor itsself-limitationthat Hegel considers to have originated the actual historyof thought (De Boer 2010: 79). Yet the one-sided concepts of the sphere ofbeing cannot determine reality as such, and they therefore give way to thecontradictory negativity of the sphere of essence, which begins to annul theone-sided opposition of concepts by considering them, rather, as entangled inirresolvable oppositions such as appearance and essence, cause and effect, etc.

Since Hegel thinks that this sphere is also inadequate to determine reality as such,he subsumes it in the end to the sway of the absolute negativity of the concept.

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But de Boers main points are (1) that we should reconstruct the relation betweenthe different spheres in Hegel as presupposing, in the history of thought, a primordialunity of the concept, which primordial unity divides itself off (disentangles itsconstitutive strands) into the spheres of being and essence in order to give rise to

the possibility of knowledge, and then returns to the unity of the concept inabsolute knowing through the reconstruction of how opposing determinationsconstitute only moments of the concept; and consequently (2) that we mustunderstand the Logicas itselfrepeatingthe act of the concepts self-diremption intobeing and essence (even though the act itself is not explicitly thematized but onlyassumed), and then self-consciously reconstructing the movement by whichbeing and essence return to the unity that the concept was always already.

This interpretation is an attempt to look at what happens behind the explicitcontent of Hegels text and first makes the starting point of the Logic possible.

De Boers interpretation is at odds with a common reading that views theprogression from each sphere of the Logic to the next as moving forward linearly,so that the sphere of being is negated by the sphere of essence, and then the latteris in turn negated by the sphere of the concept. Rather, if de Boer is right, there isa different logic behind this linear progression, according to which being andessence begin as entangled in the concept, and the movement of conceptualdeterminations recounted in the Logic is fueled by both spheres attempt todisentangle themselves from the other. As de Boer sees it, the first division of theLogic recounts the attempt of the sphere of being to disentangle itself andestablish itself as absolute (as fully and independently determining reality assuch), but it fails, and then the sphere of essence attempts to establish itself asabsolute but equally fails. In the end, both being and essence turn out to havebeen all along mere moments of the concept, and the absolute negativity ofthe concept is alone able to establish itself as absolute. De Boer thus does not seethe sphere of being as asymmetrically subsumed to essence, but rather assymmetrically entangled with essence. This reading of the structure of the Logic isrigorous, rich in detail, original, and deeply consequential for the interpretation of

Hegel, for, if the relation between the spheres of being and essence is conceivedas symmetrical and as following the tragic logic of entanglement, then thepresupposition that this entanglement results from the initial, primordial unityofthe concept comes to the fore as theessential presupposition by which the Logic isheld together, and, once this presupposition is isolated, it becomes possible tofocus on it and call it into question.

And this is precisely what de Boer goes on to do. She proposes that we can readthe explicit content of the Logic as expounding the second and third stages of thelogic of tragic conflicts: the stage at which opposing determinations attempt to

disentangle themselves from each other and establish themselves as absolute,and then the stage at which one determination establishes itself as absolute over

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thoughts attempt to establish itself as absolute and extricate itself from anoriginal entanglement with language and time, and she says moreover thatthe history of philosophy requires the effacement of the original entanglement(De Boer 2010: 156).

Returning to her analysis of the Logic, de Boer conducts an immanent critiqueof Hegels concept of teleology and argues that its interpretation in terms ofabsolute negativity covers over an initial entanglement. More specifically, sheargues that Hegels distinction between external and internal purposiveness doesnot ultimately hold because it originates from a struggle between two externalities

where each seeks to establish itself as end and the other as a subordinate means.Whereas Hegel argues that the end-relation ultimately necessarily subsumesthe means as a moment of itself, de Boer argues that the victory of eitherdetermination to establish itself as end (and the other as means) is never

guaranteed. For de Boer, the collision between means and ends is tragic ratherthan absolute, so its result is undecidable (De Boer 2010: 175).

De Boers analyses of the concepts initial entanglement with time, language, andthe struggle between means and ends in the end-relation all point to the idea that theprinciple that defines Hegels view of the conceptabsolute negativityis not fullyindependent, but rather entangled with the principle that defines time, language, andthe struggle between means and ends, which Hegel reduces to abstract negativity butde Boer reinterprets in terms of the tragic negativity characteristic of the logic ofentanglement. Mere abstract negativity is a product of the attempt by absolutenegativity to reduce its other (i.e., tragic negativity) to a mere dependent moment ofitself. The conclusion to de Boers critical study of Hegel, then, is that the veryprinciple by which the system is built, the principle of absolute negativity, bothpresupposes and conceals a primordial entanglement with tragic negativity. Sheclaims moreover that Hegels absolute negativity results from the attempt todisentangle itself from tragic negativity and to reduce the latter to a mere moment ofitself, to abstract negativity (De Boer 2010: 179). This effort takes place on thehistory of thought, and in fact de Boer sees the asymmetrical opposition between

absolute and abstract negativity to be a presupposition of philosophy since Greekthought, and to be grounded in the attempt of absolute negativity to reduce tragicnegativity to a mere abstract moment (De Boer 2010: 179).

In the last chapter, de Boer employs the notion of tragic negativity she hasdeveloped in order to provide a concrete analysis of modernity. She argues thatthe socio-political collisions of modernity are best understood in light of tragicnegativity. De Boer argues both that Hegels conception of modernity contains atragic strand worth rescuing (though in the end Hegel subsumes it to absolutenegativity), and that Hegels overall view of history as driven by absolute

negativity is ultimately one-sided; a more encompassing view, and one that canbetter account for the socio-political collisions of modernity, must also take tragic

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negativity into account. In particular, de Boer looks at Hegels view on the problemsof poverty, the ability of the state to harmonize the universal and individual wills, andhow Hegels view of the conflict between particularity and universality applies tomodern intercultural conflicts in advanced liberal societies. She argues that Hegel is

not certain that these collisions can be resolved, and she claims that the logic ofentanglement can better explain why these collisions are becoming ever morepolarized rather than reconciled, and why, against the more optimistic Hegelian view,the outcome of these conflicts is in principle undecidable.

On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative is most impressive in its theoretical analysis ofHegel, and specifically in the masterful way by which de Boer applies a Hegelian-style of immanent criticism to the Hegelian system as a whole. Still, the impactofde Boers criticism on the Hegelian systemthat is, exactly how the criticismtransformsthe systemremains unclear at the end of the book. Although de Boer

wants to develop a new philosophical position on the basis of the tension that theauthor discovers in Hegel, de Boer maintains that her position is nota dialecticalresolution [Aufhebung] of the contradiction that she develops within the system(i.e., the fundamental conflict between absolute and tragic negativity). Rather, sheclaims that her own position neither refutes nor dialectically transforms theHegelian system into a higher absolute philosophical position, but rather adds anew strand to it: the notion of tragic negativity does not replace absolutenegativity but belongs alongside it; each is on its own one-sided and insufficient,and must rather be understood as ineluctably entangled with the other (De Boer2010: 202). On this view, the space of reasons is not delimited by the sway ofabsolute negativity alone. The logic of entanglement rather entails that the space

which allows human life to interpret itself is delimited by the irresolvable tensionbetween tragic and absolute negativity (De Boer 2010: 207).

It remains however unclear under what guise absolute negativity survives thiscontextualization. Consider that de Boers view seems to be that Hegels system isthe result of the attempt by absolute negativity to disentangle itself from tragicnegativity, and to establish itself as supreme over the latter. This means that the

entire Hegelian system(driven by absolute negativity) becomes a one-sided positionthatexists in opposition to another position (i.e. to tragic negativity). But this entailsthat the Hegelian system, and its driving negativity, are not absolute. If absolutenegativity exists in an irresolvable tension with another form of negativity, thenthe absoluteness of absolute negativity is unmasked as delusive, indeed, as

falsethe absolute negativity of the system is shown not to be really absolute. Tosay that the negativity that drives the system forward is absolute is to say that allone-sided positions of consciousness or thought succumb to it, and that it itselfcannot be negated. But, then, to say that there is a determination (tragic negativity)

that absolute negativity presupposes but cannot encompass, entails that absolutenegativity is not absolute, and, similarly, that the Hegelian system is not absolute.

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Thus the very idea that absolute negativity is not the full story seems necessarilyto annihilate Hegels conception of absolute negativity, rather than merely to adda new dimension or context to it.

Moreover, de Boer argues that the relation between absolute and tragic

negativity is one of irrevocable entanglement. But the logic of entanglement isitself defined by tragic negativity. So, if the overarching relation between absoluteand tragic negativity is defined by entanglementthat is, by tragic negativitythen, it would seem, absolute negativity is ultimately subsumed under tragicnegativity, rather than merely limited by being set in a relation of irrevocabletension with tragic negativity. The point can be put as follows: For any twoelements, if they are entangled, then their relation is defined by tragic negativity.It follows that, if tragic and absolute negativity are entangled, their relation isdefined by tragic negativity. Tragic negativity entails that neither element can

reduce its contrary to a subordinate moment (De Boer 2010: 126). This means,in turn, that absolute negativity cannot reduce its contrary to a subordinatemoment. Therefore, absolute negativity is not, in fact, absoluteits claims to becapable of reducing all opposing principles to a subordinate moment is false. Butthen, all we are left with is tragic negativity as itself an absolute principle. Thereare two reasons why this is a problematic result. First, it is an aporetic result, since the

very meaning of tragic negativity is that it relates two principles that are such thatneither can become absolute over the other, which entails that it itself cannot beabsolute. Second, if tragic negativity is interpreted as superseding absolute negativity,then in a sense we simply fall back inside the Hegelian system, at least insofar as afinal positive and all-encompassing position emerges as supreme in the end. De Boerclearly wants to forestall this possibility, but it is unclear that she can do so. Ifentanglement characterizes the fundamental relation between tragic and absolutenegativity, then it seems to follow (1) that tragic negativity subsumesabsolute negativityunder it as one of its proper moments, and (2) that absolute negativity turns out inthe end not to be truly absolute. To preclude these conclusions, one would have tosay that the tragic negativity that defines entanglement does not characterize and

encompass the fundamental relation of tragic and absolute negativity; that tragicnegativity does not apply at this fundamental level. But then we are left in need ofboth an explanation of why tragic negativity does not apply here, and an account ofthe relation that does apply.

The issue, in the end, is that the relation of entanglement and the wayin which it connects absolute and tragic negativity remains in need of morefleshing out. In general, the meaning and philosophical significance of de Boersnotion of entanglement, though extremely thought provoking and philosophi-cally promising, is not entirely perspicuous. Recall that de Boer takes the logic of

entanglement to illuminate an aspect of philosophical issues that has traditionallygone unseen. For instance, the fact that pure thought is initially entangled with the

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externality of language is supposed to explain something fundamental about thehistory of philosophy: that this history requires the effacement of the originalentanglement (De Boer 2010: 156), and that, however, because of the logic of entanglement, pure thought cannot in the end establish itself as absolute over the

externality (objectifying tendency) of language. But what is it about the originalrelation of entanglement that gives impetus to the development of a struggle fordisentanglement? Is this process of disentanglementnecessaryfor the determinationsto acquire a determinate identity, or not? For example, is the disentanglementnecessary for absolute negativity to be what it is in Hegel, or in the history ofphilosophy in general? And why does disentanglement require an effacement orforgetting of the initial entanglement?

Finally, the fruitfulness of de Boers notion of disentanglement remains, to mymind, also unclear. De Boer suggests that the notion helps to explain the

impossibility, or perhaps just the strong unlikelihood, of finding resolutions forfundamental conflicts (so, for instance, the initial entanglement between languageand pure thought allegedly explains why the objectifying tendency in languagecannot be overcome in philosophy, and the notion of entanglement is also supposedto explain the exacerbation of various socio-political collisions characteristic ofmodernity). But, for the notion of entanglement to do explanatory work here, weneed an account ofwhyprinciples that are entangled cannot become independent, ortend not to become independent from each other.

Chapter 1 says that the logic of entanglement conceives of contrarydeterminations as dependent on each other and such that the attempt of one toestablish itself over the other threatens both with destruction (De Boer 2010:26). Presumably, the dependence at issue would help explain both why fulldomination of one contrary over the other would destroy both determinations,and why the struggle for disentanglement is not, or tends not to be, successful.But de Boer does not explain in what sense the contrary determinations dependon each other. This dependence must not be so fundamental as to be tied to theidentity conditions of the contrary determinations, since de Boer insists that it

remains possible for one determination to win out over the other (hence tragicconflicts remain until the end undecidable). A determination can maintainits identity even if it really does establish itself as absolute over the other, whichmeans that the determinations identity does not involve the determinationsdependence on its contrary determination. But, then, in what sense exactly iseach determination dependent on the other?

As far as I can see, the book does not clarify why the logic of entanglementhelps explainthe inability of contrary determinations becoming independent, northe reason why, in their dependence (of whatever kind), each determination is

strongly unlikely to succeed in establishing itself over the other. De Boer doesnot deny that the collision between entangled contraries may be resolvable;

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she stresses only that the outcome is by right, undecidable (De Boer 2010: 206). Yet,somehow, the logic of entanglement is supposed to explainwhy conflicts betweenentangled contrary determinations tend to become more and more polarized andnot to reach a resolution. But if all we get by way of explanation is the assertion

of necessary undecidability, it is not clear that we get an explanation at all.Finally, I should add a word about de Boers application of the logic ofentanglement to the socio-political conflicts of modernity. Tragic negativitycertainly provides an interesting framework for thinking about the intransigenceof these conflicts at a variety of levels. However, I am not sure that theframework provides any new insights. Consider de Boers analysis of interculturalconflicts. De Boer argues that the logic of entanglement explains why the attemptby minority groups, or by the majority culture of advanced liberal states, toimpose itself on the other actually radicalizes both sides and makes their

opposition more hostile. The logic of entanglement entails, first, that we alwaystend to efface rather than face the entanglement of contrary determinationsand, second, that this effacement induces their polarization rather than theirreconciliation (De Boer 2010: 201). Still, de Boer says that we should try to resistprocesses of polarization by all means (ibid.). I take it this entails that thepolarization is not necessitated by the fact of entanglement. Yet it is caused or insome sense driven by the logic of entanglement. But what exactly is it about therelation of entanglement that leads to polarization, or causes a strong tendencytoward polarization? It seems to me that, unless this more fine-grained questionis answered, the notion of entanglement does not actually help us understand

why conflicts tend (but need not) become polarized, which is essential forunderstanding how to go about resisting polarization. But perhaps de Boersframework does not seek to answer this kind of question, and should rather beseen as a way of framing social phenomena, in particular modern social conflicts,in a way that accounts for some of their most puzzling characteristicstheirseeming intransigence, the growing polarization of opposite sides, etc.

As I said at the beginning, Karin de Boers book carefully combines

philosophical interpretation and critique of Hegel with the development of anindependent philosophical position based on the logic of entanglement. Bothelements are full of originality and acuity. The interpretation and critique of Hegelare rigorous and well developed, and certain to engage anyone interested inHegel. The original position that de Boer develops on the basis of her critique ofHegel, on the other hand, is not fully developed in this book, but it abounds inintriguing, thought-provoking, and philosophically exciting possibilities.

Natalia Baeza

Universita degli Studi [email protected]

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