book revie, the law of peoples

7/30/2019 Book Revie, The Law of Peoples

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555BOOKREVIEWThe Journal of Value Inquiry 36: 555562, 2002.

BOOK REVIEW

John Rawls, The Law of Peoples. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University

Press, 1999, 199 pp. (indexed). ISBN 0-674-00079-X, US$ 22.50 (Hb).

Reasonable people do not fight with other reasonable people. They do not

threaten other reasonable people with violence. They also do not fight or

threaten merely somewhat unreasonable people who are willing to accordothers similar treatment. It is possible to view John Rawlss publications of

the last two decades as working out the implications of these common sense

claims for political philosophy. The Law of Peoples extends to their application

to the legitimate foreign policy of a liberal democratic regime. In the course

of presenting the extension Rawls illuminates the relationship of his more

recent work on political liberalism to his earlier defense of the very egalitarian

theory of justice for which he is justly famous.

We begin by thinking about what justice requires of the social structure

that organizes the relations among people in an autonomous country. In the

course of thinking about the requirement we arrive at the conception of justice

proposed in Theory of Justice. We may, if we agree with Rawls, regard this as

the most reasonable conception of justice to govern the basic structure of

society, provided that it can be stable. We recognize, however, that good-willed

and reasonable people given the liberties protected by the conception will

themselves disagree to some extent about what justice requires, as well as about

the value of the institutions constituting a just society. We may not think that

the others would have ideas which are as reasonable as ours regarding these

matters, but we recognize that many of them are reasonable in the sense that

they have done their best to consider the matters aright, and that they share a

sense of reciprocal commitment to interacting with us on terms that we could

justify to one another. Furthermore, we recognize that the liberties to which

we are committed forbid acting with the purpose of stamping out other views,

and give other people equal democratic rights with ourselves. How then arewe to go about cooperating with these others to govern ourselves?

Rawls proposes that we try to identify a common core of political ideas

about which we can agree with other reasonable people and which will be

sufficient to ground arguments of principle and policy. The hope is that the

core political ideas can be accepted by other reasonable people with a

reciprocal commitment to treat us in the same way, without requiring the

repudiation of most of their other moral commitments. Where the line is to be

drawn between the political ideas and the more comprehensive ideas to be


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bracketed is not simply a pragmatic matter. While one consideration inidentifying the necessary core requirements of reasonableness is that we

provide ourselves with enough resources to justify the rough outlines of a basic

structure, it is also important that we can regard the basic structure as

reasonably just. Thus, the exact contours of the area of overlap between the

views we can regard as reasonable will depend to some extent on our own

conception of justice, and that conception is a function of what we ourselves

find most reasonable to think about justice. Rawls suggests that agreement to

treat people as free and equal, for political purposes, and to offer terms of

cooperation compatible with that idea and with the burdens of justice will be

sufficient, in part because it is sufficient to justify a basic structure that

guarantees important basic liberties and a minimum level of economic

resources (p. 87).

Peoples who agree to govern themselves through public reason beginning

with such starting points will still have to settle on particular social

arrangements, and this will involve them in arguments that turn on points of

disagreement among various more specific conceptions of justice. But as long

as the argument proceed in the spirit of offering the argument only to settle

political questions that must be settled on any reasonable view, and the

arguments are offered as something other reasonable people can accept without

thereby repudiating their own basic commitments, all will be acting reasonably.

Furthermore, Rawls suggests, people can regard the outcomes of democratic

procedures grounded in this mode of interaction as legitimate even whey they

regard the outcome as less reasonable than the one they themselves favored.They will agree that the issues must be settled even in the absence of consensus.

A society settling on decisions in this way will be stable for the right reasons.

Different societies proceeding in this way will wind up with different

institutions, and different liberal conceptions of justice may be dominant in

them. Insofar as they cooperate under a shared political conception of

reciprocal reasonable treatment, they constitute what Rawls calls a people.

How are the peoples of such diverse societies to govern their interactions with

other peoples? And how are they to interact with other decent but non-liberal

peoples, and with aggressive anti-liberal states as well as with societies in

circumstances too dire to make a liberal or decent society possible? These are

the questions Rawls sets out to answer in The Law of Peoples.The questions are answered by asking what parties who are the rational

representatives of liberal peoples would choose behind a modified veil of

ignorance. The veil is constructed to model what we would regard as fair

conditions and appropriate reasons for choosing a set of principles to govern

the basic structure of relations among peoples. The veil leaves them without

knowledge of their population size, territory, relative strength, and access to

natural resources. They do know that their economic conditions are sufficiently

favorable to allow a constitutional democracy, since they represent such


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peoples, but they do not know more than that about their level of economicdevelopment (pp. 3233).

The parties cannot rely on a comprehensive conception of the good to

choose principles, since as a people they have committed themselves to acting

only from political conceptions of their good acceptable to all reasonable

people. But Rawls thinks that these political conceptions are enough to give

them a set of fundamental political interests, including interests in protecting

their political independence, their individual political and civil liberties, their

territory and the security and well-being of their members. They also have

the interest of gaining as a people the equal respect of other peoples, and are

themselves willing to give this respect which includes a willingness to offer

other peoples fair terms of cooperation and to abide by them (pp. 3435).

Rawls believes that parties so situated will settle on a relatively familiar

set of principles, which we will ourselves regard as reasonable when we reflect

on them. These include:

1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and independence

are to be respected by other peoples.

2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.

3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind them.

4. Peoples are to observe a qualified duty of non-intervention.

5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for

reasons other than self-defense, except perhaps in extreme cases to

protect human rights.6. Peoples are to honor human rights.

7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions on the conduct of

war.

8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under unfavorable

conditions that prevent their having a just or decent political and social

regime (p. 37).

Rawls presents these principles as part of his ideal theory, principles which

liberal people would find appropriate for guiding their interactions with other

decent peoples. However, at least the last two of these principles actually have

more application when conditions are not ideal. Also, the qualifications to thefourth and fifth principle have to do with how to treat states that are not liberal

or decent because they violate human rights. Even so, liberal peoples

interacting with one another have no reason to reject these clauses. Hence they

can be accepted even in the ideal case.

The argument that these are the principles that would be chosen is not as

fully fleshed out as the arguments in A Theory of Justice for the principles

chosen there. But Rawls provides some indications of why he thinks liberal

peoples would find these principles most acceptable to govern their inter-


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actions. The insistence of each people to be treated as an equal rules oututilitarianism as a basis for cooperation, as it might require a nation to endure

great hardships in order to benefit another nation that is better off (p. 40). In

any case, the fact that liberal peoples do not themselves share a comprehensive

conception of the good undermines any very determinate basis for making the

sorts of comparisons of well-being that utilitarianism requires (p. 40). A people

committed to treating other peoples as equals would not allow a principle which

allowed war merely for the rational pursuit of its own interest. Hence the fifth

principle would be appropriate (p. 41). Much more is said on these issues, but

Rawls argues partially by presenting these principles in a way that makes them

seem reasonable to us, reasonable people not behind any veil of ignorance.

In the real world, not all nations are liberal, let alone decent. Yet, reasonable

people have to deal with other peoples and with the citizens of indecent nations.

It is not reasonable to allow just any deviation from our conception of what is

most reasonable to justify belligerent action or even the lack of respect for

other peoples. This point was already admitted when we committed ourselves

to cooperating with other liberal peoples who may or may not share our own

more determinate, and by our lights most reasonable, conception of justice.

Rawls thus asks whether there are any non-liberal peoples who could find the

outlined conception acceptable from their own perspective. If they could, our

sense that we should respect even the less reasonable as far as we can, would

then reinforce our choice of principles. Abiding by them would then allow us

to express our respect for non-liberal but decent peoples as well as for liberal

peoples. If such cooperation is possible, the commitment of political liberalismto cooperate with others on terms they could reasonably accept requires that

we do so.

Rawls argues that at least one sort of decent non-liberal people is possible,

decent hierarchical peoples. He argues that they too could accept the outlined

principles. A decent hierarchical people is peaceful and willingly conducts is

dealings with other peoples in such a way as to respect their independence,

including their religious and civil liberties. Internally such societies secure

for their members certain basic human rights, including a right to the means

of subsistence and security, to liberty including freedom of thought and

religion, to personal property, and to formal equality before the law. Officials

must sincerely believe themselves to be guided by the common good, wherethe idea of a common good requires that procedures be in place to consult

with representatives of various social groups. Finally, the members of decent

hierarchical societies must hold that laws create legitimate duties and

expectations for its members (pp. 6466, 71). Rawls claims that representatives

of such societies in an original position would adopt the same principles as

liberal peoples, since they are themselves non-belligerent, and since their

common good conception leads them to wish to secure the human rights and

good of the people they represent (p. 69).


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In addition to liberal and decent peoples, there exist states that do not honorthe law of peoples either in their conduct toward other societies or in their

conduct toward the rights of their own citizens. Rawls call such states outlaw

states, and he stipulates that their citizens do not form a people. Such states

are not owed the toleration and respect that is owed to liberal and decent

peoples, and they often threaten liberal and decent peoples. Thus, sanctions

aimed at securing compliance with the principles of international justice and

human rights are appropriately directed at such nations. Liberal and decent

societies have a right to fight wars of self-defense against such states (pp. 91

92). In extreme cases they also have a right to defend the human rights of

people within such states (p. 81). Outlaw states are not represented in the choice

situation that forms the argument for the law of peoples since their conduct is

too unreasonable to merit the respect that a liberal political philosophy accords

differing but reasonable views. However, the possible existence of such states

is one of the factors that justifies the principles governing war, as no such

principles would be necessary among decent and liberal peoples.

There are also societies too burdened historically, economically, or socially

to organize themselves either decently or liberally. They are also not parties

to the agreement that defines the law of peoples, but their existence justifies

the last of its principles. The principle does not require that better off societies

render aid to the point that an international difference principle might require,

so that the least well off are benefitted as much as possible. It only requires

whatever level of aid is necessary to allow such societies to organize

themselves liberally or decently. Thus it places a cap on the duty to aid, but italso provides qualitative guidance for the sorts of aid that are appropriate in

different circumstances (pp. 115199). The aid will be whatever sort best

serves the goal of raising the state to the requisite level (pp. 108111).

Readers familiar with Rawlss earlier work will see how The Law of Peoples

fits into the overall political view that generated A Theory of Justice and

Political Liberalism. The clear statements that reasonableness comes in

degrees, and that people can regard their own views as most reasonable even

while regarding divergent views as reasonable enough to underwrite duties

of respect are crucial to the argument. They also serve to explain how Rawls

can accept the core ideas inA Theory of Justice, while proposing the seemingly

less radical democratic theory ofPolitical Liberalism which constrains thepermissible means of implementing the ideas in the earlier book but does not

undercut the goal itself. Thus The Law of Peoples is valuable in extending the

deployment of liberal ideals to the international realm, and also in showing

more clearly the unity of the overall position.

Even if we find the overall package attractive, we may have doubts about

certain features of it. One such feature is the duty to aid expressed in the last

principle of the law of peoples. This principle is less demanding than a maximin

principle would be if applied on a global scale, inasmuch as it allows us to


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stop short of raising the economic well-being of the least well off beyond thelevel necessary to allow the people of a burdened society to become well-

ordered. Rawls suggests that the difference stems from taking the parties to

the agreement to be peoples as opposed to individuals. For the political

liberalism ofThe Law of Peoples a democratic people forms the fundamental

agent for purposes of international justice, whereas for a more cosmopolitan

view for which the main focus is on global justice among persons, we are more

likely to imagine a global original position of individuals (pp. 8283, 119

120).

The focus on peoples is not the whole explanation for the commitment to

only a limited duty of assistance. But to some extent it distorts the liberal

political impulse at the heart of the theory by making the rationale for the duty

to aid unclear. The import of the original position as an expository device is

to highlight what we take to be legitimate arguments for principles of justice.

Thus the original position ofThe Law of Peoples is to highlight legitimate

arguments for principles of international justice. Even if we have good reasons

to defer to the decisions of other decent peoples so that certain duties of non-

interference are vindicated, not every duty toward those in other countries will

take this form. We will have duties to citizens in unjust states, as the principles

Rawls presents would have us recognize. It is surprising that Rawls thinks

that several of the principles would result from an agreement among only

decent peoples, since the main benefits of the principles fall on the

unrepresented members of burdened societies and rogue states who go

unrepresented in the original position. The self-interested reasons for helpingindividuals burdened or oppressed in unjust states, reasons of peace and

stability, are often not sufficient to justify aiding them given the possible high

costs of doing so. More important, given the role of the original position as a

device to highlight good reasons, such self-interested reasons are not our best

reasons for providing such aid. The most important reasons liberal peoples

have to help those in unjust foreign nations fall out of a respect for them as

individuals, even if in an ideal world this would be expressed by heeding

representatives of the just peoples of which they would be members. This

presents a difficulty with taking only peoples as the parties to an original

position that is supposed to highlight our good reasons for accepting principles

of international justice.We should not ignore the role of a people as a possible agent with reciprocal

rights and duties. At various points Rawls offers remarks to justify the focus

on peoples. Their sovereignty is necessary to give people an incentive to take

care of the land and its resources, and we should no presuppose that a non-

liberal form of social cooperation is intolerable (pp. 3839, 8283). Rawlss

remarks might be supplemented with an argument that respect for individual

members of a just people might require giving great weight to their autonomy

and that they themselves would prefer to be represented as members of a


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sovereign people than individually. If that is the case, there may be no problemin allowing representatives of peoples and evaluate the arguments in a second

original position, as long as there is some way to represent the interests of

individuals not fortunate enough to find themselves a member of a just people.

The theory may also not have us take seriously enough reasons liberal and

decent peoples have to accept something more than the duty of assistance

outlined in the eighth principle. Behind a veil of ignorance it may well be

rational for peoples to be risk averse and to choose a maximin principle for

the distribution of economic resources for reasons similar to those guiding

the parties inA Theory of Justice. Or to make the point without employing

the device of representation, it may be unfair or disrespectful for one nation

to exploit the position of another to its maximal benefit without sufficient

concern for the well-being of its members, even if they are well enough off to

be well-ordered.

The mention of exploitation highlights one way in which the duty of

assistance is perhaps not enough. An international arrangement can be unfair

because relations of trade and economics can give advantage to one country

or group of its citizens at the expense of another country or group of its citizens.

The unfairness can have everything to do with the basic structure of laws and

institutions that make such relations possible and very little to do with foreign

aid or assistance. As various economic institutions extend their international

reach, the issue raised will become even more pressing. It was a strength ofA

Theory of Justice that Rawls highlighted the ways in which mutually

cooperative arrangements could be exploitative and called for the design ofinstitutions expected to minimize the bad effects on any given party. Something

similar would seem warranted even when the relevant parties are members of

different peoples. Rawls is not completely insensitive to this way of viewing

matters in The Law of Peoples. His discussion of principles of fair trade

suggests that unjustified distributional effects of trade will have to be taken

into account and compensated for by the duty of assistance. But that discussion

has not been well enough incorporated into the final principle to make clear

what it implies.

These criticisms should not hide the progressive nature ofThe Law of

Peoples. The commitment to political liberalism that Rawls uses to frame the

issues his principles are meant to address contains the resources to press theparticular criticisms we have considered. Insofar as respecting other reasonable

people is the core idea, we have reason to represent the interests of decent

people who are not lucky enough to be members of decent peoples. A tacit

recognition of the point explains why the principles in some respects go beyond

what an agreement between only peoples would require. Furthermore, where

the principles do not go far enough to protect the reasonable interests of the

less well off, an argument for far more generous principles can be made within

the position that frames the discussion. Even as they stand, the principles have


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progressive bite. If the better off and more powerful nations of the worldconduct themselves in accord with the principles outlined, it would be a large

enough step forward that Rawlss label of a realistic utopia might well be

appropriate for the resulting world order.

Mark van Roojen

Department of Philosophy

University of Nebraska Lincoln

1010 Oldfather Hall

Lincoln, NE 68588-0321

USA

book revie, the law of peoples

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