Right to Information (Sec 7, Art III, 1987 Constitution)MA. CARMEN G. AQUINO-SARMIENTO,petitioner,vs.MANUEL L. MORATO (in his capacity as Chairman of the MTRCB) and the MOVIE & TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD,respondents.Araullo, Zambrano, Gruba, Chua Law Firm for petitioner.Francisco Ma. Chanco for respondents.BIDIN,J.:pAt issue in this petition is the citizen's right of access to official records as guaranteed by the constitution.In February 1989, petitioner, herself a member of respondent Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB), wrote its records officer requesting that she be allowed to examine the board's records pertaining to the voting slips accomplished by the individual board members after a review of the movies and television productions. It is on the basis of said slips that films are either banned, cut or classified accordingly.Acting on the said request, the records officer informed petitioner that she has to secure prior clearance from respondent Manuel Morato, as chairman of MTRCB, to gain access to the records sought to be examined.Petitioner's request was eventually denied by respondent Morato on the ground that whenever the members of the board sit in judgment over a film, their decisions as reflected in the individual voting slips partake the nature of conscience votes and as such, are purely and completely private and personal. It is the submission of respondents that the individual voting slips is the exclusive property of the member concerned and anybody who wants access thereto must first secure his (the member's) consent, otherwise, a request therefor may be legally denied.Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that the records she wishes to examine are public in character and other than providing for reasonable conditions regulating the manner and hours of examination, respondents Morato and the classification board have no authority to deny any citizen seeking examination of the board's records.On February 27, 1989, respondent Morato called an executive meeting of the MTRCB to discuss, among others, the issue raised by petitioner. In said meeting, seventeen (17) members of the board voted to declare their individual voting records as classified documents which rendered the same inaccessible to the public without clearance from the chairman. Thereafter, respondent Morato denied petitioner's request to examine the voting slips. However, it was only much later,i.e., on July 27, 1989, that respondent Board issued Resolution No. 10-89 which declared as confidential, private and personal, the decision of the reviewing committee and the voting slips of the members.Petitioner brought the matter to the attention of the Executive Secretary, which in turn, referred the same to respondent Morato for appropriate comment.Another incident which gave rise to this petition occurred in a board meeting held on June 22, 1989. In that meeting, respondent Morato told the board that he has ordered some deletions on the movie "Mahirap ang Magmahal" notwithstanding the fact that said movie was earlier approved for screening by the Board with classification "R-18 without cuts". He explained that his power to unilaterally change the decision of the Review Committee is authorized by virtue of MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 (dated June 22,1988) which allows the chairman of the board "to downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial."Petitioner informed the Board, however, that respondent Morato possesses no authority to unilaterally reverse a decision of the review committee under PD 1986 (Creating the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board).After the matter was referred by the Deputy Executive Secretary to the Justice Secretary, the latter opined that PD 1896 does not vest respondent Morato any authority to unilaterally reverse the decision of the review committee but declined to comment on the constitutionality of Res. No. 10-89 on the ground that the resolution thereof is a judicial prerogative (Rollo, pp. 38-42).The Justice Secretary's opinion to the contrary notwithstanding, respondent Morato opted to ignore it.Hence, this petition anchored on the following:A. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY APPROVING AND ENFORCING RESOLUTION NO. 10-89 ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION BECAUSE THE SAME VIOLATES ARTICLE III SECTION 7 OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.B. MTRCB RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND CONSTITUTES AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS.C. MORATO AND THE MTRCB BY REFUSING TO ABIDE BY OPINION NO. 1 SERIES OF 1990 OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE AND BY INSISTING ON THE VALIDITY OF RESOLUTION NO. 88-1-25 ACTED CAPRICIOUSLY, ARBITRARILY, IN BAD FAITH, IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION, AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.Petitioner therefore seeks the nullification of 1) MTRCB Resolution No. 88-1-25 which allows the Chairman of the Board to unilaterally downgrade a film (already) reviewed especially those which are controversial and 2) MTRCB RESOLUTION No. 10-89 (dated July 27, 1989) declaring as strictly confidential, private and personal a) the decision of a reviewing committee which previously reviewed a certain film and b) the individual voting slips of the members of the committee that reviewed the film.Respondents argue at the outset that the instant petition should be dismissed outright for having failed to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.We disagree. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrate remedies simply provides that before a party litigant is allowed resort to the courts, he is required to comply with all administrative remedies available under the law (Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 [1988]). The rationale behind this salutory principle is that for reasons of practical considerations, comity and convenience, the courts of law will not entertain a case until all the available administrative remedies provided by law have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given ample opportunity to act and to correct the errors committed in the administrative level. If the error is rectified, judicial intervention would then be unnecessary.Nonetheless, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not absolute. The applicability of the principle admits of certain exceptions, such as: 1) when no administrative review is provided by law; 2) when the only question involved is one of law (Valmonte v. Valmonte, 170 SCRA 256 [1989],citingAguilar v. Valencia, 40 SCRA 210 [1971]; Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359 [1984]; Bagatsing v. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306; Del Mar v. Philippine Veterans Administration, 51 SCRA 340 [1973]; Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 [1959]; 3) where the party invoking the doctrine is guilty of estoppel (Vda. de Tan v. Veterans' Backpay Commission [1969]; 4) where the challenged administrative action is patently illegal, arbitrary and oppressive (Azur v. Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]; National Development Co. v. Collector of Customs of Manila, 9 SCRA 429 [1963]; 5) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that would greatly prejudice the complainant (Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 [1967]; Azuelo v. Arnaldo, 108 Phil. 293 [1960]; 6) where to exhaust administrative review is impractical and unreasonable (Cipriano v. Marcelino, 43 SCRA 291); and 7) where the rule of qualified political agency applies (Demaisip v. Court of Appeals, 106 Phil. 237 [1906]).The issue raised in the instant petition is one of law, hence the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedy relied upon by respondents is inapplicable and cannot be given any effect. At any rate, records are replete with events pointing to the fact that petitioner adhered to the administrative processes in the disposition of the assailed resolutions of public respondents prior to filing the instant petition by, among others, writing the Executive Secretary and bringing the matter to the attention of the Office of the President (Rollo, pp. 145-147). Respondents' claim that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies must therefore fail.Having disposed of the procedural objection raised by respondents, We now proceed to resolve the issues raised by petitioner. In this regard, We find respondents' refusal to allow petitioner to examine the records of respondent MTRCB, pertaining to the decisions of the review committee as well as the individual voting slips of its members, as violative of petitioner's constitutional right of access to public records. More specifically, Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution provides that:The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions,as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. (emphasis supplied)As We held inLegaspi v. Civil Service Commission(150 SCRA 530 [1987]), this constitutional provision is self-executory and supplies "the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature (Id. at 165). What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State Policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28)." (See also Taada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 [1985]; Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256 [1989]).Respondents contend, however, that what is rendered by the members of the board in reviewing films and reflected in their individual voting slip is their individual vote of conscience on the motion picture or television program and as such, makes the individual voting slip purely private and personal; an exclusive property of the member concerned.The term private has been defined as "belonging to or concerning, an individual person, company, or interest"; whereas, public means "pertaining to, or belonging to, or affecting a nation, state, or community at large" (People v. Powell, 274 NW 372 [1937]). May the decisions of respondent Board and the individual members concerned, arrived at in an official capacity, be considered private? Certainly not. As may be gleaned from the decree (PD 1986) creating the respondent classification board, there is no doubt that its very existence is public is character; it is an office created to serve public interest. It being the case, respondents can lay no valid claim to privacy. The right to privacy belongs to the individual acting in his private capacity and not to a governmental agency or officers tasked with, and acting in, the discharge of public duties (See Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,supra.) There can be no invasion of privacy in the case at bar since what is sought to be divulged is a product of action undertaken in the course of performing official functions. To declare otherwise would be to clothe every public official with an impregnable mantle of protection against public scrutiny for their official acts.Further, the decisions of the Board and the individual voting slips accomplished by the members concerned are acts made pursuant to their official functions, and as such, are neither personal nor private in nature but rather public in character. They are, therefore, public records access to which is guaranteed to the citizenry by no less than the fundamental law of the land. Being a public right, the exercise thereof cannot be made contingent on the discretion, nay, whim and caprice, of the agency charged with the custody of the official records sought to be examined. The constitutional recognition of the citizen's right of access to official records cannot be made dependent upon the consent of the members of the board concerned, otherwise, the said right would be rendered nugatory. As stated by this Court inSubido v. Ozaeta(80 Phil. 383 [1948]):Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examinations is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it.If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy.(emphasis supplied)It is significant to point out that this Court in the 1948 case of Subido v. Ozaeta, supra,upheld the right to information based on the statutory right then provided in Sec. 56 of the Land Registration Act (Act 496, as amended). Consequently, We see no cogent reason why said right, now constitutionalized, should be given less efficacy and primacy than what the fundament law mandates.The Court is not unaware of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees) which provides, among others, certain exceptions as regards the availability of official records or documents to the requesting public, e.g., closed door Cabinet sessions and deliberations of this Court. Suffice it to state, however, that the exceptions therein enumerated find no application in the case at bar. Petitioner request is not concerned with the deliberations of respondent Board but with its documents or records made after a decision or order has been rendered. Neither will the examination involve disclosure of trade secrets or matters pertaining to national security which would otherwise limit the right of access to official records (See Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,supra).We are likewise not impressed with the proposition advanced by respondents that respondent Morato is empowered by PD 1986 to unilaterally downgrade or upgrade a film reviewed especially those which are controversial. The pertinent provisions of said decree provides:Sec 4. Decision. The decision of the BOARD either approving or disapproving for exhibition in the Philippines a motion picture, television program, still and other pictorial advertisement submitted to it for examination and preview must be rendered within a period of ten (10) days which shall be counted from the date of receipt by the BOARD of an application for the purpose . . .For each review session, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee composed of at least three BOARD members to undertake the work of review. Any disapproval or deletion must be approved by a majority of the sub-committee members so designated. After receipt of the written decision of the sub-committee, a motion for reconsideration in writing may be made, upon which the Chairman of the Board shall designate a sub-committee of five BOARD members to undertake a second review session, whose decision on behalf of the Board shall be rendered through a majority of the sub-committee members so designated and present at the second review session. This second review session shall be presided over by the Chairman, or the Vice-Chairman. The decision of the BOARD in the second review session shall be rendered within five (5) days from the date of receipt of the motion for reconsideration.Every decision of the BOARD disapproving a motion picture, television program or publicity material for exhibition in the Philippines must be in writing, and shall state the reasons or grounds for such disapproval. No film or motion picture intended for exhibition at the moviehouses or theaters or on television shall be disapproved by reason of its topic, theme or subject matter, but upon the merits of each picture or program considered in its entirety.The second decision of the BOARD shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture or television program in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines, who may himself decide the appeal, or be assisted either by an ad hoe committee he may create or by the Appeals Committee herein created.An Appeals Committee in the Office of the President of the Philippines is hereby created composed of a Chairman and four (4) members to be appointed by the President of the Philippines, which shall submit its recommendation to the President. The Office of the Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs shall serve as the Secretariat of the Appeals Committee.The decision of the President of the Philippines on any appealed matter shall be final.Implementing Rules and RegulationsSec 11. Review by Sub-Committee of Three. a) A proper application having been filed, the Chairman of the Board shall, as the exigencies of the service may permit, designate a Sub-Committee of at least three Board Members who shall meet, with notice to the applicant, within ten days from receipt of the completed application. The Sub-Committee shall then preview the motion picture subject of the application.b) Immediately after the preview, the applicant or his representative shall withdraw to await the results of the deliberation of the Sub-Committee. After reaching a decision, the Sub-Committee shall summon the applicant or his representative and inform him of its decision giving him an opportunity either to request reconsideration or to offer certain cuts or deletions in exchange for a better classification. The decision shall be in writing, stating, in case of disapproval of the film or denial of the classification rating desired or both, the reason or reasons for such disapproval or denial and the classification considered by the Sub-Committee member dissenting from the majority opinion may express his dissent in writing.c) The decision including the dissenting opinion, if any, shall immediately be submitted to the Chairman of the Board for transmission to the applicant.Sec 12. Review by Sub-Committee of Five. Within five days from receipt of a copy of the decision of the Sub-Committee referred to in the preceding section, the applicant may file a motion for reconsideration in writing of that decision. On receipt of the motion, the Chairman of the Board shall designate a Sub-Committee of Five Board Members which shall consider the motion and, within five days of receipt of such motion, conduct a second preview of the film. The review shall, to the extent applicable, follow the same procedure provided in the preceding section.Sec 13. Reclassification. An applicant desiring a change in the classification rating given his film by either the Sub-Committee of Three? or Committee of Five mentioned in the immediately preceeding two sections may re-edit such film and apply anew with the Board for its review and reclassification.Sec 14. Appeal. The decision of the Committee of Five Board Members in the second review shall be final, with the exception of a decision disapproving or prohibiting a motion picture in its entirety which shall be appealable to the President of the Philippines who may himself decide the appeal or refer it to the Appeals Committee in the Office of the President for adjudication.On the other hand, the powers and functions of the MTRCB Chairman are found in Section 5 of the same decree as follows:Sec. 5. Executive Officer. The Chairman of the BOARD shall be the Chief Executive Officer of the BOARD. He shall exercise the following functions, powers and duties:(a) Execute, implement and enforce the decisions, orders, awards, rules and regulations issued by the BOARD;(b) Direct and supervise the operations and the internal affairs of the BOARD;(c) Establish the internal organization and administrative procedures of the BOARD, and recommend to the BOARD the appointment of the necessary administrative and subordinate personnel; and(d) Exercise such other powers and functions and perform such duties as are not specifically lodged in the BOARD.It is at once apparent from a reading of the above provisions of PD 1986 that respondent Morato, as Chairman of the MTRCB, is not vested with any authority to reverse or overrule by himself alone a decision rendered by a committee which conducted a review of motion pictures or television programs.The power to classify motion pictures into categories such as "General Patronage" or "For Adults Only" is vested with the respondent Board itself and not with the Chairman thereof (Sec. 3 [e], PD 1986). As Chief Executive Officer, respondent Morato's function as Chairman of the Board calls for the implementation and execution, not modification or reversal, of the decisions or orders of the latter (Sec. 5 [a],Ibid.). The power of classification having been reposed by law exclusively with the respondent Board, it has no choice but to exercise the same as mandated by law,i.e., as a collegial body, and not transfer it elsewhere or discharge said power through the intervening mind of another.Delegata potestas non potest delegari a delegated power cannot be delegated. And since the act of classification involves an exercise of the Board's discretionary power with more reason the Board cannot, by way of the assailed resolution, delegate said power for it is an established rule in administrative law that discretionary authority cannot be a subject of delegation.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Resolution Nos. 10-89 and 88-1-25 issued by the respondent Board are hereby declared null and void.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.Grio-Aquino and Romero, JJ., took no part.G.R. No. 74930 February 13, 1989RICARDO VALMONTE, OSWALDO CARBONELL, DOY DEL CASTILLO, ROLANDO BARTOLOME, LEO OBLIGAR, JUN GUTIERREZ, REYNALDO BAGATSING, JUN "NINOY" ALBA, PERCY LAPID, ROMMEL CORRO and ROLANDO FADUL,petitioners,vs.FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR.,respondent.Ricardo C. Valmonte for and in his own behalf and his co-petitioners.The Solicitor General for respondent.CORTES,J.:Petitioners in this special civil action for mandamus with preliminary injunction invoke their right to information and pray that respondent be directed:(a) to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos; and/or(b) to furnish petitioners with certified true copies of the documents evidencing their respective loans; and/or(c) to allow petitioners access to the public records for the subject information. (Petition, pp. 4-5; paragraphing supplied.]The controversy arose when petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent Belmonte the following letter:June 4, 1986Hon. Feliciano BelmonteGSIS General ManagerArroceros, ManilaSir:As a lawyer, member of the media and plain citizen of our Republic, I am requesting that I be furnished with the list of names of the opposition members of (the) Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guarranty (sic) of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. We understand that OIC Mel Lopez of Manila was one of those aforesaid MPs. Likewise, may we be furnished with the certified true copies of the documents evidencing their loan. Expenses in connection herewith shall be borne by us.If we could not secure the above documents could we have access to them?We are premising the above request on the following provision of the Freedom Constitution of the present regime.The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. (Art. IV, Sec. 6).We trust that within five (5) days from receipt hereof we will receive your favorable response on the matter.Very truly yours,(Sgd.) RICARDO C. VALMONTE[Rollo, p. 7.]To the aforesaid letter, the Deputy General Counsel of the GSIS replied:June 17, 1986Atty. Ricardo C. Valmonte108 E. Benin StreetCaloocan CityDear Compaero:Possibly because he must have thought that it contained serious legal implications, President & General Manager Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. referred to me for study and reply your letter to him of June 4, 1986 requesting a list of the opposition members of Batasang Pambansa who were able to secure a clean loan of P2 million each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos.My opinion in this regard is that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so ordered by the courts.As a violation of this confidentiality may mar the image of the GSIS as a reputable financial institution, I regret very much that at this time we cannot respond positively to your request.Very truly yours,(Sgd.) MEYNARDO A. TIRODeputy General Counsel[Rollo, p. 40.]On June 20, 1986, apparently not having yet received the reply of the Government Service and Insurance System (GSIS) Deputy General Counsel, petitioner Valmonte wrote respondent another letter, saying that for failure to receive a reply, "(W)e are now considering ourselves free to do whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue our desired objective in pursuance of public interest." [Rollo, p. 8.]On June 26, 1986, Valmonte, joined by the other petitioners, filed the instant suit.On July 19, 1986, theDaily Expresscarried a news item reporting that 137 former members of the defunct interim and regular Batasang Pambansa, including ten (10) opposition members, were granted housing loans by the GSIS [Rollo, p. 41.]Separate comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition was given due course and the parties were required to file their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was deemed submitted for decision.In his comment respondent raises procedural objections to the issuance of a writ of mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to exhaust administrative remedies.Respondent claims that actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the Board of Trustees of the GSIS. Petitioners, however, did not seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees. It is therefore asserted that since administrative remedies were not exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.To this objection, petitioners claim that they have raised a purely legal issue,viz.,whether or not they are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of their constitutional right to information. Hence, it is argued that this case falls under one of the exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies.Among the settled principles in administrative law is that before a party can be allowed to resort to the courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available under the law. The courts for reasons of law, comity and convenience will not entertain a case unless the available administrative remedies have been resorted to and the appropriate authorities have been given opportunity to act and correct the errors committed in the administrative forum. However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to settled exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved [Pascual v. Provincial Board, 106 Phil. 466 (1959); Aguilar v. Valencia, et al., G.R. No. L-30396, July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 210; Malabanan v. Ramento, G.R. No. L-2270, May 21, 1984, 129 SCRA 359.] The issue raised by petitioners, which requires the interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to information, is one which can be passed upon by the regular courts more competently than the GSIS or its Board of Trustees, involving as it does a purely legal question. Thus, the exception of this case from the application of the general rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is warranted. Having disposed of this procedural issue, We now address ourselves to the issue of whether or not mandamus hes to compel respondent to perform the acts sought by petitioners to be done, in pursuance of their right to information.We shall deal first with the second and third alternative acts sought to be done, both of which involve the issue of whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with a controversy directly involving the constitutional right to information. InTaada v. Tuvera,G.R. No. 63915, April 24,1985, 136 SCRA 27 and in the recent case ofLegaspi v. Civil Service Commission,G.R. No. 72119, May 29, 1987,150 SCRA 530, the Court upheld the people's constitutional right to be informed of matters of public interest and ordered the government agencies concerned to act as prayed for by the petitioners.The pertinent provision under the 1987 Constitution is Art. 111, Sec. 7 which states:The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.The right of access to information was also recognized in the 1973 Constitution, Art. IV Sec. 6 of which provided:The right of the people to information on 'matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated. The postulate of public office as a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution (in Art. XI, Sec. 1) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be were empty words if access to such information of public concern is denied, except under limitations prescribed by implementing legislation adopted pursuant to the Constitution.Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather and the obligation to check the accuracy of information the disseminate. For them, the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies offull public disclosure*and honesty in the public service.**It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government.Yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. As stated inLegaspi,the people's right to information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law."Hence, before mandamus may issue, it must be clear that the information sought is of "public interest" or "public concern," and is not exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee [Legazpi v. Civil Service Commission, supra,at p. 542.]The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern". As observed inLegazpi:In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citezen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public. [Ibid. at p. 541]In theTaadacase the public concern deemed covered by the constitutional right to information was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citezens. InLegaspi, it was the "legitimate concern of citezensof ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles" [Supraat p. 539.]The information sought by petitioners in this case is the truth of reports that certain Members of the Batasang Pambansa belonging to the opposition were able to secure "clean" loans from the GSIS immediately before the February 7, 1986 election through the intercession of th eformer First Lady, Mrs. Imelda Marcos.The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter. Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More particularly, Secs. 5(b) and 46 of P.D. 1146, as amended (the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977), provide for annual appropriations to pay the contributions, premiums, interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay. Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. Thus, one of the reasons that prompted the revision of the old GSIS law (C.A. No. 186, as amended) was the necessity "to preserve at all times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System" [Second Whereas Clause, P.D. No. 1146.] Consequently, as respondent himself admits, the GSIS "is not supposed to grant 'clean loans.'" [Comment, p. 8.] It is therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with the greatest degree of fidelity and that an its transactions were above board.In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern.A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced through mandamus proceedings,viz., that the information sought must not be among those excluded by law.Respondent maintains that a confidential relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the indiscriminate dissemination of information.Yet, respondent has failed to cite any law granting the GSIS the privilege of confidentiality as regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based merely on considerations of policy. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is, and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of the government, and of the people themselves as the repository of all State power.Respondent however contends that in view of the right to privacy which is equally protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the documents evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be deemed outside the ambit of the right to information.There can be no doubt that right to privacy is constitutionally protected. In the landmark case ofMorfe v. Mutuc[130 Phil. 415 (1968), 22 SCRA 424], this Court, speaking through then Mr. Justice Fernando, stated:... The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: "The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. UItimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute. state, In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual has become increasingly important as modem society has developed. All the forces of technological age industrialization, urbanization, and organization operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society." [at pp. 444-445.]When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this case. Apparent from the above-quoted statement of the Court inMorfeis that the right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. As held in the case ofVassar College v. Loose Wills Biscuit Co.[197 F. 982 (1912)], a corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature [Cf.Atkinson v. John Doherty & Co., 121 Mich 372, 80 N.W. 285, 46 L.RA. 219 (1899); Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 22, 31 L.R.A. 286 (1895)), and hence may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed to be violated.It may be observed, however, that in the instant case, the concerned borrowers themselves may not succeed if they choose to invoke their right to privacy, considering the public offices they were holding at the time the loans were alleged to have been granted. It cannot be denied that because of the interest they generate and their newsworthiness, public figures, most especially those holding responsible positions in government, enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, their actions being subject to closer public scrutiny [Cf.Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. v. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and 82398, April 29, 1988;See alsoCohen v. Marx, 211 P. 2d 321 (1949).]Respondent next asserts that the documents evidencing the loan transactions of the GSIS areprivatein nature and hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to information on matters of public concern which guarantees "(a)ccess toofficialrecords, and to documents, and papers pertaining toofficialacts, transactions, or decisions" only.It is argued that the records of the GSIS, a government corporation performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of the people's right of access toofficialrecords.It is further contended that since the loan function of the GSIS is merely incidental to its insurance function, then its loan transactions are not covered by the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the right to information which is applicable only to "official" transactions.First of all, the "constituent ministrant" dichotomy characterizing government function has long been repudiated. InACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government Corporations and Offices(G.R. Nos. L-21484 and L-23605, November 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 6441, the Court said that the government, whether carrying out its sovereign attributes or running some business, discharges the same function of service to the people.Consequently, that the GSIS, in granting the loans, was exercising a proprietary function would not justify the exclusion of the transactions from the coverage and scope of the right to information.Moreover, the intent of the members of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, to include government-owned and controlled corporations and transactions entered into by them within the coverage of the State policy of fun public disclosure is manifest from the records of the proceedings:xxx xxx xxxTHE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco).Commissioner Suarez is recognized.MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. May I ask the Gentleman a few question?MR. OPLE. Very gladly.MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.When we declare a "policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions" referring to the transactions of the State and when we say the "State" which I suppose would include all of the various agencies, departments, ministries and instrumentalities of the government....MR. OPLE. Yes, and individual public officers, Mr. Presiding Officer.MR. SUAREZ. Including government-owned and controlled corporations.MR. OPLE. That is correct, Mr. Presiding Officer.MR. SUAREZ. And when we say "transactions" which should be distinguished from contracts, agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?MR. OPLE. The "transactions" used here I suppose is generic and, therefore, it can cover both steps leading to a contract, and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.MR. SUAREZ. This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction.MR. OPLE. Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. [V Record of the Constitutional Commission 24-25.] (Emphasis supplied.)Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution which, though not binding upon the Court, are nevertheless persuasive, and considering further that government-owned and controlled corporations, whether performing proprietary or governmental functions are accountable to the people, the Court is convinced that transactions entered into by the GSIS, a government-controlled corporation created by special legislation are within the ambit of the people's right to be informed pursuant to the constitutional policy of transparency in government dealings.In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission,supraat p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387.] The petition, as to the second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e., "to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDP-Laban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific [Lemi v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 443.] The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare the list requested.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby granted and respondent General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans granted to Members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with this decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary.SO ORDERED.Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.G.R. No. L-72119 May 29, 1987VALENTIN L. LEGASPI,petitioner,vs.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,respondent.CORTES,J.:The fundamental right of the people to information on matters of public concern is invoked in this special civil action for mandamus instituted by petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi against the Civil Service Commission. The respondent had earlier denied Legaspi's request for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. These government employees, Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, had allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles who passed the civil service examinations for sanitarians.Claiming that his right to be informed of the eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, is guaranteed by the Constitution, and that he has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy to acquire the information, petitioner prays for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent Commission to disclose said information.This is not the first tune that the writ of mandamus is sought to enforce the fundamental right to information. The same remedy was resorted to in the case ofTanada et. al. vs. Tuvera et. al.,(G.R. No. L-63915, April 24,1985,136 SCRA 27) wherein the people's right to be informed under the 1973 Constitution (Article IV, Section 6) was invoked in order to compel the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions and other presidential issuances. Prior to the recognition of the right in said Constitution the statutory right to information provided for in the Land Registration Act (Section 56, Act 496, as amended) was claimed by a newspaper editor in another mandamus proceeding, this time to demand access to the records of the Register of Deeds for the purpose of gathering data on real estate transactions involving aliens (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383 [1948]).The constitutional right to information on matters of public concern first gained recognition in the Bill of Rights, Article IV, of the 1973 Constitution, which states:Sec. 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.The foregoing provision has been retained and the right therein provided amplified in Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution with the addition of the phrase, "as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development." The new provision reads:The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by law.These constitutional provisions are self-executing. They supply the rules by means of which the right to information may be enjoyed (Cooley, A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations 167 [1927]) by guaranteeing the right and mandating the duty to afford access to sources of information. Hence, the fundamental right therein recognized may be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any ancillary act of the Legislature. (Id.at, p. 165) What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest (Constitution, Art. 11, Sec. 28). However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty under Art. III Sec. 7 have become operative and enforceable by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in a mandamus proceeding such as this one.The Solicitor General interposes procedural objections to Our giving due course to this Petition. He challenges the petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the civil service eligibilities of the government employees concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the information he seeks.1. To be given due course, a Petition for mandamus must have been instituted by a party aggrieved by the alleged inaction of any tribunal, corporation, board or person which unlawfully excludes said party from the enjoyment of a legal right. (Ant;-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012 [1947]). The petitioner in every case must therefore be an "aggrieved party" in the sense that he possesses a clear legal right to be enforced and a direct interest in the duty or act to be performed.In the case before Us, the respondent takes issue on the personality of the petitioner to bring this suit. It is asserted that, the instant Petition is bereft of any allegation of Legaspi'sactual interestin the civil service eligibilities of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, At most there is a vague reference to an unnamed client in whose behalf he had allegedly acted when he made inquiries on the subject (Petition, Rollo, p. 3).But what is clear upon the face of the Petition is that the petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right. It has been held that:* * * when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws * * * (Tanada et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L- 63915, April 24, 1985, 136 SCRA 27, 36).From the foregoing, it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which possesses the right.The Court had opportunity to define the word "public" in theSubidocase,supra,when it held that even those who have no direct or tangible interest in any real estate transaction are part of the "public" to whom "(a)ll records relating to registered lands in the Office of the Register of Deeds shall be open * * *" (Sec. 56, Act No. 496, as amended). In the words of the Court:* * * "Public" is a comprehensive, all-inclusive term. Properly construed, it embraces every person. To say that only those who have a present and existing interest of a pecuniary character in the particular information sought are given the right of inspection is to make an unwarranted distinction. *** (Subido vs. Ozaeta,supraat p. 387).The petitioner, being a citizen who, as such is clothed with personality to seek redress for the alleged obstruction of the exercise of the public right. We find no cogent reason to deny his standing to bring the present suit.2. For every right of the people recognized as fundamental, there lies a corresponding duty on the part of those who govern, to respect and protect that right. That is the very essence of the Bill of Rights in a constitutional regime. Only governments operating under fundamental rules defining the limits of their power so as to shield individual rights against its arbitrary exercise can properly claim to be constitutional (Cooley,supra,at p. 5). Without a government's acceptance of the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution in order to uphold individual liberties, without an acknowledgment on its part of those duties exacted by the rights pertaining to the citizens, the Bill of Rights becomes a sophistry, and liberty, the ultimate illusion.In recognizing the people's right to be informed, both the 1973 Constitution and the New Charter expressly mandate the duty of the State and its agents to afford access to official records, documents, papers and in addition, government research data used as basis for policy development, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. The guarantee has been further enhanced in the New Constitution with the adoption of a policy of full public disclosure, this time "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law," in Article 11, Section 28 thereof, to wit:Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. (Art. 11, Sec. 28).In theTanadacase,supra,the constitutional guarantee was bolstered by what this Court declared as an imperative duty of the government officials concerned to publish all important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature as well as all executive orders and proclamations of general applicability. We granted mandamus in said case, and in the process, We found occasion to expound briefly on the nature of said duty:* * * That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents withno discretion whatsoever as to what must be in included or excluded from such publication.(Tanada v. Tuvera,supra,at 39). (Emphasis supplied).The absence of discretion on the part of government agencia es in allowing the examination of public records, specifically, the records in the Office of the Register of Deeds, is emphasized inSubido vs. Ozaeta, supra:Except, perhaps when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it.If it be wrong to publish the contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to devise a remedy.*** (Subido v. Ozaeta,supraat 388). (Emphasis supplied).It is clear from the foregoing pronouncements of this Court that government agencies are without discretion in refusing disclosure of, or access to, information of public concern. This is not to lose sight of the reasonable regulations which may be imposed by said agencies in custody of public records on the manner in which the right to information may be exercised by the public. In theSubidocase, We recognized the authority of the Register of Deeds to regulate the manner in which persons desiring to do so, may inspect, examine or copy records relating to registered lands. However, the regulations which the Register of Deeds may promulgate are confined to:* * * prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured * * * (Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387)Applying theSubidoruling by analogy, We recognized a similar authority in a municipal judge, to regulate the manner of inspection by the public of criminal docket records in the case ofBaldoza vs. Dimaano(Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 71 SCRA 14). Said administrative case was filed against the respondent judge for his alleged refusal to allow examination of the criminal docket records in his sala. Upon a finding by the Investigating Judge that the respondent had allowed the complainant to open and view the subject records, We absolved the respondent. In effect, We have also held that the rules and conditions imposed by him upon themannerof examining the public records were reasonable.In both theSubidoand theBaldozacases, We were emphatic in Our statement that the authority to regulate the manner of examining public records does not carry with it the power to prohibit. A distinction has to be made between the discretion to refuse outright the disclosure of or access to a particular information and the authority to regulate the manner in which the access is to be afforded. The first is a limitation upon the availability of access to the information sought, which only the Legislature may impose (Art. III, Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution). The second pertains to the government agency charged with the custody of public records. Its authority to regulate access is to be exercised solely to the end that damage to, or loss of, public records may be avoided, undue interference with the duties of said agencies may be prevented, and more importantly, that the exercise of the same constitutional right by other persons shall be assured (Subido vs. Ozaetalsupra).Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be compelled by a writ of mandamus in aproper case.But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution. The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee.3. The incorporation in the Constitution of a guarantee of access to information of public concern is a recognition of the essentiality of the free flow of ideas and information in a democracy (Baldoza v. Dimaano, Adm. Matter No. 1120-MJ, May 5, 1976, 17 SCRA 14). In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time (Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,102 [1939]), access to information of general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making (87 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1974]) by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the nation.But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Under the Constitution, access to official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national security (Journal No. 90, September 23, 1986, p. 10; and Journal No. 91, September 24, 1986, p. 32, 1986 Constitutional Commission). It follows that, in every case, the availability of access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and, (b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or public concern.a. This question is first addressed to the government agency having custody of the desired information. However, as already discussed, this does not give the agency concerned any discretion to grant or deny access. In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee. To hold otherwise will serve to dilute the constitutional right. As aptly observed, ". . . the government is in an advantageous position to marshall and interpret arguments against release . . ." (87 Harvard Law Review 1511 [1974]). To safeguard the constitutional right, every denial of access by the government agency concerned is subject to review by the courts, and in the proper case, access may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus.In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.The public concern invoked in the case ofTanada v. Tuvera, supra,was the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws which are to regulate the actions and conduct of citizens. InSubido vs. Ozaeta, supra,the public concern deemed covered by the statutory right was the knowledge of those real estate transactions which some believed to have been registered in violation of the Constitution.The information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were appointed. The Constitution expressly declares as a State policy that:Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and except as to positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential or highly technical, by competitive examination. (Art. IX, B, Sec. 2.[2]).Public office being a public trust, [Const. Art. XI, Sec. 1] it is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities for their respective positions.b. But then, it is not enough that the information sought is of public interest. For mandamus to lie in a given case, the information must not be among the species exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee.In the instant, case while refusing to confirm or deny the claims of eligibility, the respondent has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public. Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed. Petitioner's request is, therefore, neither unusual nor unreasonable. And when, as in this case, the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.WHEREFORE, the Civil Service Commission is ordered to open its register of eligibles for the position of sanitarian, and to confirm or deny, the civil service eligibility of Julian Sibonghanoy and Mariano Agas, for said position in the Health Department of Cebu City, as requested by the petitioner Valentin L. Legaspi.Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.Feliciano, J., is on leave.LEO ECHEGARAY,petitioner, vs.SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NPUNO,J.:For resolution are public respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of this Court dated January 4, 1999 temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.It is the submission of public respondents that:"(1)The Decision in this case having become final and executory, its execution enters the exclusive ambit of authority of the executive authority.The issuance of the TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of executive authority;(2)Theissuanceofthe temporary restraining order x x x creates dangerous precedent as there will never be an end to litigation because there is always a possibility that Congress may repeal a law.(3)Congress had earlier deliberated extensively on the death penalty bill.To be certain,whatever question may now be raised on the Death Penalty Law before the present Congress within the 6-month period given by this Honorable Court had in all probability been fully debated upon x x x.(4)Under the time honored maxim lex futuro, judex praeterito, the law looks forward while the judge looks at the past, x x xthe Honorable Court in issuing the TRO has transcended its power of judicial review.(5)At this moment, certain circumstances/supervening events transpired to the effect that the repeal or modification of the law imposing death penalty has become nil, to wit:a.The public pronouncement of President Estrada that he will veto any law imposing the death penalty involving heinous crimes.b.The resolution of Congressman Golez, et al., that they are against the repeal of the law;c.The fact that Senator Roco's resolution to repeal the law only bears his signature and that of Senator Pimentel."In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department ofthe position of the House of Representatives on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law."The Resolution was concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressmen.In their Consolidated Comment, petitioner contends:(1)the stay order x x xis within the scope of judicial power and duty and does not trench on executive powers nor on congressional prerogatives;(2)the exercise by this Court of its power to stay execution was reasonable;(3)the Court did not lose jurisdiction to addressincidentalmattersinvolved or arising from the petition; (4)public respondents are estopped from challenging the Court's jurisdiction; and (5)there is no certainty that the law on capital punishment will not be repealed or modified until Congress convenes and considers all the various resolutions and bills filed before it.Prefatorily, the Court likes to emphasize that the instant motions concern matters that are not incidents in G.R. No. 117472, where the death penalty was imposed on petitioner on automatic review of his conviction by this Court.The instant motions were filed inthiscase, G.R. No. 132601, where the constitutionality of R.A. No.8177(Lethal Injection Law)andits implementing rules and regulations was assailed by petitioner.For this reason, the Court in its Resolution of January 4, 1999 merely noted the Motion to Set Aside of Rodessa "Baby" R. Echegaray dated January 7, 1999 and Entry of Appearance of her counsel dated January 5, 1999. Clearly, she has no legal standing to intervene in the case at bar, let alone the fact that the interest of the State is properly represented by the Solicitor General.We shall now resolve the basic issues raised by the public respondents.IFirst.We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the execution of the petitioner.Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin litigation."[1]Tostartwith, the Court is not changing evena commaof itsfinal Decision.It is appropriate to examine with precision the metes and bounds of the Decision of this Court that became final.These metes and bounds are clearly spelled out in theEntry of Judgmentin this case,viz:"ENTRY OF JUDGMENTThis is to certify that onOctober 12, 1998a decision rendered in the above-entitled case was filed in this Office, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:`WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED insofar as petitioner seeks to declare the assailed statute (Republic Act No. 8177) as unconstitutional; but GRANTED insofar as Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are concerned, which are hereby declared INVALID because (a) Section 17 contravenes Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No. 7659; and (b)Section 19 fails to provide for review and approval of the Lethal Injection Manual by the Secretary of Justice, and unjustifiably makes the manual confidential, hence unavailable to interested parties including the accused/convict and counsel.Respondents are hereby enjoined from enforcing and implementing Republic Act No. 8177 until the aforesaid Sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 are appropriately amended, revised and/or corrected in accordance with this Decision.SO ORDERED.'and that the same has, onNovember 6, 1998become final and executory and is hereby recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment.Manila, Philippines.Clerk of CourtBy:(SGD)TERESITA G. DIMAISIPActing ChiefJudicial Records Office"The records will showthat before the Entry of Judgment, the Secretary of Justice, the Honorable Serafin Cuevas, filed with this Court on October 21, 1998 aCompliancewhere he submitted the Amended Rules and Regulations implementing R.A. No. 8177 in compliance with ourDecision.On October 28, 1998, Secretary Cuevas submitted a Manifestation informing the Court that he has caused the publication of the said Amended Rules and Regulations as required by the Administrative Code.It iscrystalline that the Decision of this Court that became final and unalterable mandated:(1)that R.A. No. 8177 is not unconstitutional; (2)that sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are invalid, and (3)R.A. No.8177 cannot be enforced and implemented until sections 17 and 19 of the Rules and Regulations to Implement R.A. No. 8177 are amended.It is also daylight clear that this Decision wasnot altereda whit by this Court.Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized thewell established jurisprudence on this issue as follows:[2]x x x"the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the case.By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same.Even after the judgment has become final the court retains its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it.[3]There is a difference between the jurisdiction of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final.[4]x x x For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire which can render the execution unjust or impossible.[5]In truth, the argument of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court.As aptly pointed outby the petitioner,as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably ruled in thecase ofDirector of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance,[6]viz:"This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been pronounced and the period for reopening the same has elapsed, the court cannot change or alter its judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . .When in cases of appeal or review the cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order.Butit does not follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed completely to the Executive.The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of execution of a capital sentence,it must be accepted as a hypothesis that postponement of the date can be requested.There can be no dispute on this point.It is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be postponed, even in sentences of death.Under the common law this postponement can be ordered in three ways:(1)By command of the King; (2)by discretion (arbitrio)of the court; and (3)by mandate of the law.It is sufficient to state this principle of the common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the facts that show the need for postponement.If one of the ways is by direction of the court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the emergency and to order a postponement.Then the question arises as to whom the application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the circumstances is under investigation and as to who has jurisdiction to make the investigation."The power to control the execution ofits decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction.It cannot be the subject ofsubstantial subtraction for our Constitution[7]vests the entirety of judicial powerin one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as maybe estabished by law.To be sure, the most important part of a litigation,whether civil or criminal, is theprocess of execution of decisionswhere supervening events may change thecircumstance of the parties andcompel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the litigants to prevent unfairness.It is because of these unforseen, supervening contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice.[8]For this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court or judicial officer,allauxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary to carryit into effect may be employed by such court or officerand if the procedure to be followedin the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules."It bears repeating that what the Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give itreasonble time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by petitioner.The Court, contrary to popular misimpression, did not restrain the effectivity of a law enacted by Congress.Themore disquieting dimension of the submission of the public respondents that this Court has nojurisdiction to restrain the execution of petitioneris that it candiminish the independence of the judiciary.Since the implant of republicanism in our soil, our courts have been conceded the jurisdictionto enforce theirfinal decisions.In accord with this unquestioned jurisdiction, this Court promulgated rules concerning pleading, practice and procedurewhich, among others,spelled out the rules on execution of judgments.These rulesare all predicated on the assumption that courts have the inherent, necessaryand incidental power tocontrol and supervisethe process of execution of their decisions.Rule 39 governs execution, satisfaction and effects of judgments in civil cases.Rule 120 governs judgments in criminal cases.It should be stressed thatthe power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure was grantedby our Constitutions to this Court to enhance its independence,for in the words of Justice Isagani Cruz "without independence and integrity, courts will lose that popular trust so essential to the maintenance of their vigor as champions of justice."[9]Hence, our Constitutions continuously vested this power to this Court for it enhances its independence.Under the1935Constitution, the power of this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedurewas grantedbut it appeared to be co-existent with legislative power for it wassubject to the power of Congress to repeal, alter or supplement.Thus, its Section 13, Article VIII provides:"Sec. 13.The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same.The Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines."The said power of Congress, however,is not as absolute as it may appear on its surface.InIn re Cunanan[10]Congressin the exercise of its power to amend rules of the Supreme Court regarding admission to the practice of law, enacted the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953[11]which considered as a passing grade, the average of 70% in the bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to August 1951 and 71% in the 1952 bar examinations.This Court struck down the lawas unconstitutional.In his ponencia, Mr. Justice Diokno held that "x x x the disputed law is not a legislation; it is a judgment - a judgment promulgated by this Court during the aforecited years affecting the bar candidates concerned; and although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain thatonly this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of these departments would be a clear usurpation of its function, as is the case with the law in question."[12]The venerable jurist further ruled:"It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongsexclusivelyto this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license."By its ruling, this Courtqualifiedthe absolutist tone of the power of Congressto "repeal, alter or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, and the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines.The ruling of this Court inIn re Cunananwas not changed by the1973 Constitution.For the1973 Constitution reiteratedthe power of this Court "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, x x x which, however, may be repealed, altered or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa x x x."More completely, Section 5(2)5 of its Article X provided:x x xx x xx x x"Sec. 5.The Supreme Court shall have the following powers.x x xx x xx x x(5)Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, and the integration of the Bar, which, however, may be repealed, altered, or supplemented by the Batasang Pambansa.Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights."Well worth noting is that the1973 Constitution further strengthenedthe independence of the judiciary by givingto it theadditional power to promulgate rules governing the integration of the Bar.[13]The1987 Constitutionmolded an evenstronger and more independent judiciary.Among others,it enhanced the rule making power of this Court.Its Section 5(5), Article VIII provides:x x xx x xx x x"Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:x x xx x xx x x(5)Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court."The rule making power of this Court was expanded.This Court for thefirst timewas given the power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights.The Court was also grantedfor thefirst timethe power to disapprove rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies.But most importantly, the 1987 Constitution took awaythe power of Congress to repeal, alter, or supplement rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure. In fine, the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is no longer shared by this Court with Congress, more so with the Executive.Ifthe manifest intent of the 1987 Constitution is to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, it is inutile to urge, as public respondents do, that this Court has no jurisdiction to control the process of execution of its decisions, a power conceded to it and which it has exercised since time immemorial.To be sure, it istoo late in the dayfor public respondents to assail the jurisdiction of this Court tocontroland supervise the implementation ofits decision in the case at bar.As aforestated, ourDecision became final and executory on November 6, 1998.The records reveal that after November 6, 1998, or on December 8, 1998,no less than the Secretary of Justice recognized the jurisdiction of this Courtby filing a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to compel the trial judge, the Honorable Thelma A. Ponferrada, RTC, Br. 104, Quezon City to provide him "x x xa certified true copy of the Warrant of Execution dated November 17, 1998 bearing the designated execution day of death convict Leo Echegaray and allow (him) to reveal or announce the contents thereof, particularly the execution date fixed by such trial court to the public when requested."The relevant portions of the Manifestation and Urgent Motion filed by the Secretary of Justicebeseeching this Court "to provide the appropriate relief" state:x x xx x xx x x5.Instead of filing a comment on Judge Ponferrada's Manifestation however, herein respondent is submitting the instant Manifestation and Motion (a)to stress,inter alia, that the non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his statutory powers, as well as renders nugatory the constitutional guarantee that recognizes the people's right to information of public concern,and (b) to ask this Honorable Court to provide the appropriate relief.6.The non-disclosure of the date of execution deprives herein respondent of vital information necessary for the exercise of his power of supervision and control over the Bureau of Corrections pursuant to Section 39, Chapter 8, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, in relation to Title III, Book IV of such AdministrativeCode, insofar as the enforcement of Republic Act No. 8177 and the Amended Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 is concerned and for the discharge of the mandate of seeing to it that laws and rules relative to the execution of sentence are faithfully observed.7.On the other hand, the willful omission to reveal the information about the precise day of execution limits the exercise