bostock - kripke on identity and necessity

8/2/2019 Bostock - Kripke on Identity and Necessity

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Kripke on Identity and NecessityAuthor(s): David BostockSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 109 (Oct., 1977), pp. 313-324Published by: Blackwell Publishing for The Philosophical QuarterlyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2218951 .

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313

KRIPKE ON IDENTITY AND NECESSITYBY DAVID BOSTOCKI

Kripke- holds both that proper names are rigid designators, and thatidentity-statementsn whichboth termsare rigid designators are necessarilytrue ifthey are true at all. My purpose in this paper is to examine his argu-ments forthese theses, particularly the second of them, and to show thatthey are inconclusive.Kripke's main argumentforthe second thesis is most clearly expoundedin his article "Identity and Necessity", and is most easily stated in the idiomof possible worlds. In this terminologya rigid designator is definedas onethat designates the same thingin all possible worlds in which it designates.Suppose, then, that 'a' and 'b' are two rigid designators, and that 'a-b' istrue. Then 'a' and 'b' each designate the same thing in one possible world,viz., the actual one. So, since they are rigid, they each designate the samething in all possible worlds in which they both designate. That is to saythat 'a=b' is true in all possible worlds in which 'a' and 'b' both designate,and hence that 'a exists & b exists -- a=b' is true in all possible worldswhatever, and is thereforea necessary truth. This, says Kripke, is all hereally means when he claims, speaking loosely, that 'a=b' is a necessarytruth.First, it is worthnoting that this formalargumentcontains a flaw. ForsurelywhenKripke claims (speaking loosely) that 'a=b' is a necessary truth,we are to understandhimas intendingto rule out the possibilityofa existingwhile b does not (and vice versa). But this does not follow simply fromthestated definitionof a rigid designator. That definition does not by itselfrule out the possibilitythat 'a' and 'b' are both rigiddesignators, that 'a=b'is true (in the actual world), and that there are possible worlds in which'a' designates while 'b' does not. Maybe somethingdoes prevent this situa-tion arising,but if so it is not just the definition f a rigid designator. Whatelse mightit be? To answer that we shall need a more informativeaccountofrigiddesignatorsthan is given by the definition n termsofpossible worlds.We shall need some way oftellingwhetheran expressionis a rigid designator,some way of tellingwhat an expression does designate in various possibleworlds.Now Kripke does give us an account of what he means by a possibleworld, namely that it is what we may call a "counterfactual situation",

1See "Identity and Necessity", in Identityand Individuation, ed. Munitz (1971),pp. 135-64 (hereafter N); also "Naming and Necessity", in Semantics of NaturalLanguage, edd. Davidson and Harman (1972), pp. 253-355 (hereafterNN).


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3 4 DAVID BOSTOCKconceived s a situation fthis,the actual,world IN, p. 148). To use hisoun example,whenwe say 'If Nixonhad bribed uchand sucha Senator,Nixon wouldhave got Carswellthrough',we are speakingof Nixon andCarswell who are, of course, nhabitants f the actual world), nd sayingwhatwouldhave happened n this,the actual,world fa certain counter-factual ituation" ftheworldhad beenactual. To say,then, hata desig-natordesignates hisorthat n a certain ossibleworld s to saythat thasthat designationn a certaincounterfactualituation, nd I think his inturnmustbe takento meanthatit has thatdesignationwhen t occurs nthesentenceorsententialhat-clause)whichwe use to specifyhe situation.For the pointwhichKripkemainly nsistsupon is that whenwe say 'IfNixon had . . .' it is Nixon wmere talking of, and not (e.g.) some possiblecounterpartfNixon. That is,theword Nixon' s used to designateNixonwhient occurs n counterfactualentences; nd this s Kripke'smainwayof llustrating hathemeansbytheclaimthat Nixon' s a rigiddesignator.So thisyieldsthefollowingriterion: n expressions a rigiddesignatorfandonly f t is used todesignate he amething oth nordinary"factual")assertionsnd in counterfactualssertions.Moreexplicitly,t has to desig-nate the same thingwhen it occurs in any counterfactual,2.e., in anyspecificationf a counterfactualituation, nd what t theredesignates asto be the same thing s it ordinarily esignatesn ordinary, actual, sser-tions. Two commentsn this criterionreworthmaking t once.First,on thisaccountofthematter here s no needfor nyextra caveataboutpossibleworlds n which hedesignator oesnotdesignate nything,which ndeed s a whollymisleadingway oftalking. For thedesignatorsnot itself hought f as occurringn thisor thatpossibleworld;what s inquestion hroughouts our actualuses ofthedesignator,n thisworld, heworldbeingas it is. Kripkehimselfs at painsto pointout thathe is notconsidering ow the word would be used by people in a counterfactualsituation a differentossibleworld);he is concernedwithhowweactuallydo use the word to describethat counterfactualituation that possibleworld) IN, p. 145). To illustrate,f I specify situation s one in whichNixon neverexisted, hen specify situation uchthat, f t wereactual,theword Nixon' (used as we use it) woulddesignatenothing.But in factthesituations notactual,so infacttheworddoesdesignate, nd indeed tdesignatesNixon even as it occurs n the specificationf the situation sone nwhich heresnoNixon. For it s theactualNixon andnot,ofcourse,anycounterpartfhim)thatwe areexcluding romhesituationnquestion.In a word, Nixon' designatesNixonbothn thefactual ssertion Nixon sstill alive' and in the counterfactualssertion ifNixon had neverlived,then . . .' (cf. NN, p. 290).

20fcoursetherewill be counter-examples hat are not allowed to count,for xamplewhen the designatoroccurs in quotation marks or in reportedspeech. Besides, I mayname mydog 'Nixon'. For simplicity forego ny more exact statementofthecriterion.


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KRIPKE ON IDENTITY AND NECESSITY 315Second, it should be noticed that the present criterionforbeing a rigiddesignator does not anywhere introduce the notion of possibility. Now wemight take it to be an essential feature of Kripke's definitionof a rigid

designator that it confinesattention to what the designator designates inpossible worlds. Perhaps Kripke should be interpreted s allowing that evena rigid designator may designate differenthings n impossibleworlds. If so,when we rewriteKripke's definition n terms of the behaviour of the desig-nator in counterfactuals, t will be importantto add a restriction o counter-factuals withpossible antecedents. I do not myselfthinkthat this would betrue to Kripke's intention,but anyway it is easily seen that ifthe restrictionis essential then we cannot hope to find non-circular rgumentfromrigidityofdesignationtothenecessityof dentity. For in orderto determinewhether'a' and 'b' are both rigiddesignatorswe should then have to determinefirstwhich counterfactuals containing them had possible antecedents, and thiswould involve (interalia) determiningwhether the antecedent of 'if a hadnot been b, then .. .' was a possible one. But a verdict on that point wasprecisely what the argument was hoping to establish. Clearly the projectmust collapse into circularity fwe have to reach the correct verdict beforethe argumentcan get started. Hence, ifthe argument s to achieve anything,it must at least be possible to carry it throughby starting with the sup-positionthat the antecedent is possible. (We shouldthenconclude,ifKripke'sargument works, that the initial supposition was mistaken and that theantecedent is after all impossible. But wleshould now reach the result as aconsequence ofargument,and not as a preconditionforgettingthe argumentstarted.) But this is to grantthat Kripke's argumentmust, if t is to achieveanything,be capable of being conducted withoutthe restriction o possibleantecedents in the definitionof 'rigid designator'. Hence I deliberatelydonot include that restriction.Now let us try out this criterionon a test case. Let us take over theusual (inaccurate) storyabout 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker', viz., that Everestwas named "Everest" when seen from ndia and "Gaurisanker" when seenfromTibet. And forvividness let us add to the story that there was oncea border dispute between India and Tibet, each claiming possession of themountain. Now, presupposingthis background, considerthe counterfactualIf Everest and Gaurisankerhad turnedout to be differentmountains,there would have been no border dispute between India and Tibet.I take it to be uncontroversialthat this counterfactualis intelligible,andforthe reasons given above I take it that nothing, n this initial stage of theargument,can be made to depend upon the question whether the situationenvisaged in the antecedent is a possible one. (Notice, incidentally,that wecan and do quite intelligiblyuse counterfactualswithimpossible antecedents,forexample in reductio d absurdumarguments.) No doubt in Kripke's viewthe antecedent is not possible, for if it is possible that Everest and Gauri-sanker should have turned out to be different,hen it is also possible that


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316 DAVID BOSTOCKthey should have been differentan inferenceKripke himselfendorses,NN,p. 332). I lave chosen to write "turnedoutto be different" nlybecause thisis the more normal way of putting the counterfactual: it is the supposeddiscoveryof the difference hat would have prevented the border dispute.But any reader who supposes that something mighthang on this point maysubstitute a counterfactualwhich begins 'if Everest and Gaurisanker hadbeen differentmountains'-say one that continues '. . . that fact wouldhave been discovered in the course of the borderdispute between India andTibet'.

Anyway, our question is: do the words 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker', astheyoccur in this counterfactual,designate the same thingas theyordinarilydesignate, viz., Mount Everest? It is, I hope, fairly clear that neither ofthem is being used to designate any othermountain, so the alternative toconsider is that one or both of them is not being used to designate at all.And in view of the symmetry n their occurrence, it seems rather odd tohave one of themdesignatingand the othernot, so the relevant alternativeseems to be that neitherof themdesignates. But how could that be? How,one might ask, are we supposed to know what mountain or mountains arebeing talked of-what situation the counterfactualsituation is-if neitherof those expressionsdesignates a mountain?Well, the obvious suggestion s that the propernames are in this contextstanding n fordefinitedescriptions, incedefinitedescriptions re wellknonilto be capable of introducinga topic of discourse without thereby referringto anything. Furthermore, n the set-up I have described (whichis presumedknowxno the speaker) it is evidently quite in orderto say that the speakeris bearing in mind how Everest came to be named "Everest" and how itcame to be named "Gaurisanker", and that he would not have expressedhimselfas he did ifhe had not had these facts in mind. So I have no strongobjection to the view that he is hereusing 'Everest' more or less as shorthandforthe definitedescription the mountain named "Everest" when seen fromIndia', and similarly for 'Gaurisanker'. The counterfactual could thus bere-expressedasIf the mountain called "Everest" when seen from India and themountain called "Gaurisanker" when seen from Tibet had turnedout to be differentmountains, there would have been no borderdispute between India and Tibet.But unfortunatelyt is not at all clear that the availability ofthisparaphraseyields the solutionto our problem. That problemstillremainsas theproblemwhether, n the paraphrase, the two definitedescriptionsdo each designatea mountain. And how could we settle this issue?The only really strong ground that I know of for saying that a non-empty definitedescription does not designate (in a certain occurrence) iswhenwe cannot plausibly take that descriptionas having major scope. Thismay be tested for by applying the Russellian expansion. Of course it is


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KRIPKE ON IDENTITY AND NECESSITY 317debatable whetherwe should regard the Russellian expansion as preservingthe sense quite unchanged, or as providing only a rough and ready para-phrase, but I think we need not enterthat issue here. It will be enough if,when we apply differentRussellian expansions correspondingto differentways of assigning the scope, one is clearly a much better paraphrase thanthe others. But on this test the descriptions n our example can, and indeedmust, be assigned major scope. Obviously it would be quite wrongto applythe Russellian expansion withinthe subjunctive construction,to getIf therehad been just one mountain called "Everest" when seen fromIndia, and . . .The speaker knows that there in fact is just one mountain which was called"Everest" when seen from ndia, and he is not taking this to be a merelycounterfactualsupposition. In fact he is not taking this fact to be governedbyhis opening 'if' at all, and the only plausible Russellian expansion is onethat correspondsto major scope forthe two descriptions,viz.:There is just one mountain which was called "Everest" when seenfrom ndia, and there is just one mountain whichwas called "Gauri-sanker" when seen fromTibet, and if those mountains had turnedout to be differentmountains there would have been no border dis-pute between India and Tibet.So far as this test is concerned, then,the definitedescriptionsmay perfectlywell be taken as referring.Of course this does not settle the matter. I would not wish to say thata description can always be taken as referringf it has major scope. Forexample the description 'the sole teacher of Aristotle' obviously has majorscope in the sentence 'Socrates was the sole teacher of Aristotle', but it ishardly natural to take the descriptionas therereferringto Plato). On theother hand, I would not wish to say either that a descriptioncan never betaken as referring, nd on this point at least Kripke and I seem to be inagreement. Kripke is perfectlyhappy to call a definitedescriptiona desig-nator-indeed, he thinksthat somedefinitedescriptionsare rigiddesignators(e.g., 'the square root of25', NN, p. 145). So the discussion so far s entirelyinconclusive. No doubt there are further considerations that could beadvanced on either side, but I do not see any way of settlingthe matterconclusively, so I now abandon the attempt. Instead, let us consider theconsequences of settlingthe question one way or the other.On one view we say that in our originalcounterfactual henames 'Everest'and 'Gaurisanker' do notdesignate,and we explain how this can be by sayingthat in this particular context they are merely abbreviating definitedescrip-tions which do not (here) designate. This, of course, involves abandoningthe claim that those names are rigid designators according to our counter-factual criterion. This view would be consistentwithKripke's position,ifwetake Kripke's position to be that rigid designatorsdo not have to designateas usual in counterfactuals with impossibleantecedents, for I have alreadymentioned that Kripke does think that the antecedent here is impossible.


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318 DAVID BOSTOCKB1ut then, as I also pointed out, on this view Kripke's argumentcollapsesinto circularity: the antecedent is impossible because the designators arerigid, and the designators are rigid, despite the fact that in this examplethey do not designate as usual, because in this example the antecedent isimpossible.But the other view, which seems to me equally (and perhaps more)defensible, is that our names do designate as usual even in the presentexample. Of course theyalso bringto mind the associated descriptions,andthat is what makes the counterfactual ntelligible,but it seems perfectly llright to ma,intainthat they can do this as well as designating. We mayperhaps compareFrege's doctrineabout ordinaryfactual identity-statements,which is that the two names involved do referto whatever they ordinarilyreferto, but what makes the statement interesting if it is interesting) sthat they also have different enses. Without necessarily accepting all ofFrege's views on the sense of a proper name, we call say much the sameabout our counterfactual: the two names do designate as usual, but whatmakes the counterfactual ntelligibleand what gives it its point is that thetwo names are also associated in some way with different efinitedescrip-tions, and that (at any rate in this context) theydo bringthose descriptionsto mind. In this way we keep to the letter (thoughpossibly not the spirit)of the doctrine that names are rigid designators, according to our originaland unrestricted counterfactual criterion. To prevent the collapse intocircularity, et us perseverewith this second view.So we now grant that 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker' do designate as usualin our counterfactual,and (forthe sake of argument) in all others; they arerigid designators. From this premise we are supposed to be able to arguethat the statement 'Everest and Gaurisanker are the same (mountain)' is anecessary truth,because it is true "in" all possible worlds, i.e. all possible(counterfactual) situations. How is this argument supposed to proceed?The only route that I can see runs somethinglike this. Our premise is (i)that the expressions 'Everest' and 'Gaurisanker' designate the same moun-tain when they are used in the specificationof any counterfactualsituation.From this I thinkwe are asked to infer ii) that the mountains Everest andGaurisankerwill be the same mountain n any counterfactualituation.Grantedthis,we can add (iii) that any possiblesituation s (or may beviewed s) a counterfactualituation, nd thereforehosemountainswillbethe samemouantainn anypossiblesituation,which eemsto be theresultwe are after. But, as our own examplevery clearly hows, ii) does notfollowfrom i). From the premisethat the expressions re used to designatethe same mountain in ourspecification fthe situation, t byno means followsthatthemountainsrethesamemountainnthesituation.Onthecontrary,in ourexamplethe situation s specifieds one in which heyare differentmountains.

Perhaps it will help if I put the objection more generally in this way:


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KRIPKE ON IDENTITY AND NECESSITY 319the number fentities eferredowhen pecifyingcounterfactualituationneednotbe thesame as the number fentitiesn thesituation o specified.Onesimple llustrationfthisprincipleswhere,when pecifyingsituation,I refer o an entitywhich s notin the situation t all. For example, mayspecify situation s one in whichNixon doesnot exist,or (say) as one inwhichNixon's mother ad no children. n either ase I refero Nixonwhenspecifyinghesituation, utNixon snot nthesituation specify.Anotherillustrations where n specifying situation refer o twodistinct hings,but in the situation o specified heyare one. For example,consider hecounterfactualIf the East Indies and the West Indieshad beenthe samegroupof slands as Columbus upposed), hieworldwouldhave beenmuchsmaller han t in fact s'. Here it would be veryreasonable o say that nspecifyinghesituation refer o twogroups f slands,butinthe situationso specified here s onlyone group. Our original xamplewith Everest'and 'Gaurisanker's thereverse fthis,for t is a case where n specifyingthesituation refertwice)to onemountain, nd in the situation pecifiedthere re two. Thereseems to menothing misswiththissuggestion,ndif amright hen t seemsquiteclearthat there sno inferencerom igidityofdesignationas defined y our counterfactualriterion)o whatcan co-herently e supposed ohappen n counterfactualituations.Andwith hisKripke'smainargument orthenecessity fidentity tatements ollapses.IIAlongside nd in supportof this "main" argument hatwe have beendiscussing, ripkealso employs challengewhich s worth ome considera-tion. His opponentmaintains hatthe dentity etween verest nd Gauri-sanker,betweenHesperusand Phosphorus, nd (perhaps)betweenCiceroandTully s ineach case a contingentne. In hisopinion, hings ouldhavebeenotherwise.Kripkechallenges imto specifynmoredetaila situationin which heywouldhave beenotherwise.He asks (changing heexamplenow) "Are there eally ircumstancesnderwhichHesperuswouldnothavebeen Phosphorus?",3nd goes on to maintainthat no such situation simaginable.Let us see whetherwe can meetthischallenge.It seemsobviousthat the orbitofHesperusmighthave beendifferentfromwhat tnow s,yetmightnfacthavebeen uchthattheeveningppear-ancesofHesperus when eenfrom arth)were ndistinguishableromwhatthey renow. Similarlyheorbit fPhosphorusmight ave beensuchthatthemorningppearancesof Phosphoruswere ndistinguishableromwhatthey renow. I take it to be uncontroversialhateither fthese ituationstakensinglys a possibleone. The nextstep s to claimthat bothtogetherare possible. If this s admitted, henKripke'schallenges met,becauseasituation n whichHesperushas one orbit and Phosphorus nother s evi-dently situationnwhich hey redifferentlanets.

3NN, p. 306; IN, p. 153.


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320 DAVID BOSTOCKKripke s hardly ikelyto agreethat this meetshis challenge.He willgrant,no doubt,that a situation n which here re twosuchplanetswithdifferentut synchronizedrbits, xactlyreproducing etweenthemtheappearancesofVenus as seen from arth, s a possibleone. He will alsoagree cf.NN, p. 155)that fthishad beenthesituation hen hereference-fixing rocedureswhichwe in factused to fixthereferencesf Hesperus'and 'Phosphorus'wouldhave fixed wodifferentlanets s thereferencesfthoseexpressions.But hewillgo on to saythat nfacttheworld s not ikethat,and in fact the twoexpressions efer o the sameplanet. We arenotsupposedto be consideringowthoseexpressionswouldhave beenused iftheworldhad beendifferent,utrather ow thewords re in factused,theworldbeingas it is. Andthe question s: couldwe,now,properly escribethat possiblesituation s a situation n whichHesperusand Phosphorusweredifferentlanets?What,he might ay,wouldmakethe one planet nour imagined ituation he same planetas Phosphorus, nd the otherthesameplanetas Hesperus?But herewe can surely eply oKripke nhisowncoin.4Which ntitiesfiguren a counterfactualituationsnotsomethinghathas to be discernedbyusing telescope, husbringingo light hesimilaritiesnddissimilaritiesbetweenthat situation nd the actual one, so that we can assesswhetherwe have counterparts.Rather,we stipulatewhichentitiesfigure n thesituationwhenwe specify he situation n the first lace. So our reply ssimply o stipulate hat the situation s one in whichPhosphorushas theoneorbit nd Hesperus he other. By ourstipulation,t is PhosphorusndHesperus hatwe aretalking bout.Andhere, think heargument eaches stalemate.For Kripke'sonlyreplyseems to be that we cannot tipulate hat-or rather, fwe do, thesituationwe specifys not after ll a possibleone. Whynot? Because,saysKripke, t is notpossiblethatHesperusand Phosphorus hould have been

differentlanets. But that, fcourse, s preciselyhequestion t issue. So,as I say,stalemate. IIII do not believe that Kripke offers s any furtherrguments n thistopic. The two argumentsust discussed re fairly learly he only argu-ments o be found n the article Identity nd Necessity", nd theseargu-mentsare therepresentedwithout elianceon any positivetheory fhownamesrefer. n the ater eries, Naming ndNecessity",Kripkedoesbeginwitha detailed discussion fthe questionhownamesrefer, ut again hisviewson the necessity f identity-statementsre then ndependently re-sented pp. 303-8),and there s no veryclose connection etween he two.His "causal theory"ofnames could be takento be an explanation fhownamessucceed nbeingrigiddesignators-unlike most)definiteescriptions-but clearly t is not the onlypossibleexplanation, nd the onlyclaim

I4N, pp. 146-7;NN, pp. 266 ff.


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KRIPKE ON IDENTITY AND NECESSITY 321relevant o ourproblems the claimthattheyarerigid. As we have seen,whenrigiditys defined y ourcounterfactualriteriont maybe disputedwhether hisclaim s correct, ut even f t is theconclusion ripkedesireswillnot follow. I shallnow concludewitha briefdiscussion f a differentargumentor conclusionwhichhas somesimilarityo Kripke's, ndwhichbeginsfrom ne of thethingshe says aboutrigiddesignators.But I thinktheargumenttselfs notto be found nKripke'sownwritings.In "Identityand Necessity"Kripke does not explicitlypresentourcounterfactualriterion or igid esignators,ut nsteadproposes his est:adesignatora' is rigid fand only fthe sentencea mightnothave beena'has no reading nwhich t can be seen as saying omethingrue pp. 148-9).Where a' is takenas a definiteescriptiont is quiteclearthat this entencehas (at least) twodistinct eadings, epending n thescopeassigned o thefirst ccurrencef a'. For example, aking a' as 'thehighestmountain ntheworld'wemayreadthefirst ccurrencef a' as havingmajorscope,sothatthe whole entencemaybe paraphrasedConcerninghe highestmountain n the world: t mightnot havebeenthehighestmountain nthe world.So taken,the sentence s presumablyrue,on theground hat there ouldhave beenothermountains igher hanEverest. But alternatively emayread the sentencen a way thatgivesthe modal operatormajorscope,sothat theappropriate araphrases ratherIt mightnot have been that: thehighestmountain n the world sthehighestmountain nthe world.So read,the sentences presumably alse, incethehighestmountainmustcertainly e self-identical,hichevermountaint is. (But thesentence ouldbe takenas trueon thisreading, n theground hattheremightnothavebeen a highestmountain t all. The convention,n discussinghismatter,is to ignore hatwayofcountingttrue.) Anyway, nthefirstwayofreadingthesentencet is true, nd thereforethehighestmountainn the world' snot a rigiddesignator.But Kripkeclaims,veryplausibly, hat where a' istakenas a namethere s no truereading f oursentence; or xample, hereis no wayofreadingEverestmight othave beenEverestunderwhich t can be seenas expressing truth; nd similarlywhere a' isa rigiddefinite escription.Onepossible xplanation or hisdivergences that n thecase ofnamesthere s no distinctionf scope to be made. But the lineof argumentwerequirewillnotadoptthisexplanation; t willsay rather hatwe can makethe same scope-distinctionithnames,but thatwithnameseach readinghas the same truth-value.That is, we can distinguish etweenConcerningverest: t mightnothave beenEverestand It might othave beenthat:Everest s Everest.


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322 DAVID BOSTOCKBut both refalse. (Indeed,wemight ttempt o distinguishetween hemon theground hat the secondcan be counted s true,but in theway wesaid was not allowed to count:we might egard he secondas trueon thegroundthat theremightnot have been such a thingas Everest. But Iconfess do not find hisaltogether onvincing.)Anyway, he first laimwe make s thatoursentence an be read in thefirstway,and so read it isfalse.That is,wemayassertIt is not the case that: concerningverest: t mightnothave beenEverest.SinceEverestdoesexist, his s equivalent oConcerningverest: it is not the case that it mightnot have beenEverestwhichwemay convenientlybbreviate oConcerningverest: t is a necessary ruth hat t is Everest.The next claim s thatwhenthesesentences re read in the firstway,with the first ccurrence fthe name (or description) avingmajorscope,identity oeslicense substitutionorthat occurrence.We could argueforthisfirst y pointing ut thatthere re manyother intensional)ocutionsin whichthe scope of a nameor descriptioneemsrelevant, nd in all oftheseidentity oes license substitution henthe name or description asmajorscope. For example,Concerning rtcutt:Ralphbelieves hat he is a spyhas the sametruth-values

Concerningheonlymanhe knowswho s not a spy: Ralph believesthat he is a spyprovidedthat Ortcutt s in factthe onlyman Ralph knowswho is not aspy. Next we could strengthenhe argument y consideringnstances foursentence-forma mightnothave beena' inwhich here s a descriptionwhichhas majorscope. Mostsentences ftheformConcerningheso-and-so: it mightnot have been the so-and-so' re true,and theyremain rueupon substituting orthe first ccurrence f the definite escriptionnyotherexpressionwith the same reference.On the otherhand, ifwe takeonethat s false, ayConcerninghesquareroot of25: it mightnothave beenthesquarerootof 25thenthis remains alseunderany suchsubstitution.Onemight t first einclined o say thatifwe replacetheopening hrasewith, .g., Concerningmyfavourite ddnumber', henthetruth-value illnotbe preservedventhough he reference aybe. But this nclinationmustbe dismissed s dueto a confusionwith the other eadingof the sentence,where ndeedthesubstitution ouldnotpreserveruth-value. o finally eapply hisprincipleto ourpresent ase,andwe deducethatsinceConcerningverest, t is a necessary ruth hat t is Everest


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KRIPKE ON IDENTITY AND NECESSITY 323and since (as we are supposing)Everest s in factthe same mountain sGaurisanker,t followshatConcerning aurisanker:t is a necessary ruth hat it is Everest.This is thefirsttageoftheargument,ut it is onlythe firsttage. For sofar we have used the premise hat 'Everest' is a rigiddesignator, ut notthepremise hat Gaurisanker's also.The unusedpremisesConcerning aurisanker:t is a necessaryruth hat t is Gaurisanker.Putting histogetherwithourprevious esultwe can evidently educeConcerning aurisanker:t is a necessary ruth hat t is Everest ndit is a necessaryruth hat t is Gaurisanker.Fromthis t certainlyeems o follow hat

Concerning aurisanker:t is a necessaryruth hat tis bothEverestand Gaurisanker.But here thinkwe stick. It does not eemto follow rom his thatIt is a necessaryruth hat omethingsbothEverest ndGaurisankerbecause it does not follow hat it is a necessary ruth hat somethingsEverest.Nor does it seemto follow hatIt is a necessary ruth hatifsomethings Everest or Gaurisanker)then omethings bothEverest nd Gaurisanker.At any rate this inference ertainly ails forother ntensional perators(suchas 'Ralph believes hat') in place of it is a necessary ruth hat'. Itseemsthatonce ourmodaloperatorhas been assigned henarrowercopethere s no way of inferring conclusionn which t has majorscope. Sowe mustrestcontentwith heconclusionwehave,orperhapsroundoff heargument y applying xistential eneralizationo concludewithThere s somethinguch that t is a necessary ruth hat t,Everest,and Gaurisanker,re all identical.Kripkemight e contentwiththisconclusion.The premise romwhichourargumenttartedwas that wherea' is a rigiddesignatorwemayassert

Concerning: it is a necessaryruth hat t is a.Kripkemightwellclaimthat thispremise an properly e expressedn theidiomofpossibleworlds sConcerning: in everypossibleworld n which t exists, t is a.Andhe mightgo on to say that thiswas preciselyhepointhe was tryingto express n hisformal efinition,hat a' is a rigiddesignatorfand onlyif tholdsthatConcerninga': in everypossibleworld n which t designates, tdesignates .He might lso goonto add that thedifficultieshichwefound arlierwhentryingo applyhisformal efinitionvia ourcounterfactualriterion)roseonlybecausethestepof"semantic scent"which s here nvolved s in thiscase not so harmless s usual. Further,fwe stickto the "materialmode"version hroughout,t becomes asier to see how theflawwhich beganbypointing ut (p. 313 above) is overcome.For the arguments simply his.


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324 DAVID BOSTOCKSinceEverest s Gaurisanker,verypossibleworldwhichcontainsEverestcontainsGaurisanker,nd viceversa. Further, ince n everypossibleworldwhichcontainsEverest, t is bothEverestand Gaurisanker,t follows hatin everypossibleworld whichcontainsEverest,Everest is Gaurisanker.The somewhatongwindedeasoningwhich have just beenspelling ut isperhapsa perfectly ood way ofparaphrasinghistrainof thoughtwhileavoiding he diomofpossibleworlds.But there readvantages nthe ongwindedersion, orwith hatversionit is mucheasier to see theweak pointsofthe argument.First, t clearlyrevealsa pointthat s noticeably bscuredn Kripke'sowndiscussion, iz.,thatthe wholeargument eliesuponourbeingable to use theusual idiomsfor"de re" modality,n whicha modal operator s applied to somethinglessthana whole entence. n Kripke'sownterminology,nd notcountingthe phrase possibleworld',modal operatorsnearlyalways occur in tra-ditionalde dicto onstructions;n particular, is conclusions stated n thisform,houghf amright here s nowarrant or his. So onelineofobjec-tionwouldbe tomaintain hatthesede re ocutions reingeneralmeaning-less,and thereforehat therequiredway ofreading he crucial entenceamightnot have been a' is simplynot available.5 It is, however,ratherdifficultotto acceptthiswayofreading hesentencewherea' is a definitedescription,nd a positionwhich s closer o ourordinaryntuitionsmightbe to acceptthederereading ordescriptions,ut deny t fornames. An-otherpossibilitywould be to admitthede rereading ornames,butto saythatwhen o read the crucial entences true.We argue, hat s, that t isnot a necessary ruth, oncerningverest, hat it is Everest,for t mighthave been something lse.6 And a third ine of objectionwould be thatevenwhen n occurrencef a nameordescriptions read withmajorscope,we cannot ssumethat dentitywill icense ubstitutionor hatoccurrence.Certainly he argumentwhich sketchedforthis principlewas farfromconclusive, nd we have alreadyhad occasionto noticethat theprinciplefails for counterfactuals.f in the counterfactualiscussedon pp. 315-7above we substitutethe mountain alled "Everest"when eenfromndia'for the mountain alled"Gaurisanker"when eenfrom ibet',theresult sevidentlyo render he wholeunintelligible. ut thesedescriptions ustbeassignedmajorscope nthatcounterfactual.Merton ollege, xford

5Doubtless Quine would take thisview.6There are hints of this view in what Dummett says ofSt. Anne (Frege, PhilosophyofLanguage,pp. 111-6. But see also pp. 131-2).

bostock - kripke on identity and necessity

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