Justice for Hedgehogs: A Conference on Ronald Dworkin’s Forthcoming Book

Boston University School of LawSeptember 25-26, 2009

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Justice for Hedgehogs: A Conference on Ronald Dworkin’s Forthcoming Book

Friday, September 25

9:15 a.m.-9:30 a.m. Welcome and Introduction Dean Maureen O’Rourke, Boston University School of Law

9:30 a.m.-10:45 a.m. I. Truth and Metaethics Aaron Garrett, Boston University Department of Philosophy Russ Shafer-Landau, University of Wisconsin Department of Philosophy Daniel Star, Boston University Department of Philosophy Michael Smith, Princeton University Department of Philosophy

11:00 a.m.-12:15 p.m. Keynote Address: Justice for Hedgehogs Ronald Dworkin, New York University School of Law & University College London

12:30 p.m.-2:00 p.m. Lunch

2:00 p.m.-3:15 p.m. II. Interpretation Richard Fallon, Harvard Law School James Fleming, Boston University School of Law David Lyons, Boston University School of Law Lawrence Solum, University of Illinois College of Law Benjamin Zipursky, Fordham University School of Law

3:30 p.m.-4:45 p.m. III. Ethics and Free Will Anita Allen, University of Pennsylvania Law School Christine Jolls, Yale Law School Robert Kane, University of Texas Department of Philosophy T.M. Scanlon, Harvard University Department of Philosophy Amartya Sen, Harvard University Departments of Economics & Philosophy

September 25-26, 2009

5:00 p.m.-6:15 p.m. IV. Morality: Aid, Harm, and Obligation Kwame Anthony Appiah, Princeton University Department of Philosophy John Goldberg, Harvard Law School Frances Kamm, Harvard University Department of Philosophy & Kennedy School of Government Kenneth Simons, Boston University School of Law Susanne Sreedhar & Candice Delmas, Boston University Department of Philosophy

6:30 p.m. Reception

Saturday, September 26

9:30 a.m.-10:45 a.m. V. Politics and Justice I Ed Baker, University of Pennsylvania Law School Hugh Baxter, Boston University School of Law Linda McClain, Boston University School of Law Larry Sager, University of Texas School of Law Robin West, Georgetown University Law Center

11:00 a.m.-12:30 p.m. VI. Politics and Justice II Robert Bone, Boston University School of Law Samuel Freeman, University of Pennsylvania Department of Philosophy Stephen Macedo, Princeton University Department of Politics Frank Michelman, Harvard Law School Robert Sloane, Boston University School of Law Jeremy Waldron, New York University School of Law

12:30 p.m.-2:00 p.m.

Lunch

Response by Ronald Dworkin

About the Conference

Boston University School of Law will hold a conference on Ronald Dworkin’s forthcoming book, Justice for Hedgehogs, on September 25-26, 2009. Dworkin himself will give the keynote address on September 25 and a response on September 26. The Boston University Law Review will publish the papers and proceedings.

In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin defends the unity of value – the one big thing he knows – and argues against “several foxy causes”: value skepticism, value pluralism, value conflict, and, in particular, the supposed opposition between the values of self-interest and those of personal and political morality. He argues for the integration of ethics (the principles that tell human beings how to live well) and morality (the principles that tell them how they must treat other people), and for a morality of self-affirmation as against a morality of self-abnegation. In doing so, he develops accounts of the indispensable conditions of living well – dignity, self-respect, and authenticity – and of our moral duties to others regarding aid and harm. He also argues that law is a branch of political morality that is in turn a department of morality more broadly understood. The conference will include the following panels, taking up issues of the sort sketched below.

I. Truth and MetaethicsThe opening panel will assess Dworkin’s arguments for truth about value and against various forms of skepticism, including his rejection of Archimedean and meta-ethical attempts to address questions of ethics, morality, and justice from a standpoint outside of our ordinary ways of thinking about them.

II. InterpretationThis panel will respond to Dworkin’s arguments that interpretation in general seeks truth and that moral reasoning and legal interpretation are enterprises involving conceptual interpretation as distinguished from collaborative and explanatory interpretation.

III. Ethics and Free WillHerein of Dworkin’s arguments concerning the indispensable conditions of living well – dignity, self-respect, and authenticity – along with his response to the “no free will” challenge to ethical and moral responsibility.

IV. Morality: Aid, Harm, and ObligationThe issues to be considered include Dworkin’s arguments of substantive morality concerning duty, harm, and obligation, including associative and political obligation.

V & VI. Politics and JusticeThese two panels will take up Dworkin’s arguments about political morality, including his account of political, legal, and human rights; his interpretive conceptions of equality, liberty, and democracy; and his argument about the relationship between law and morals.

“The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” - Archilochus

All — including not only professors, law students, graduate students, and undergraduates but also members of the public — are welcome to attend. There is no registration fee, but if you plan to attend, please RSVP to Andrea Larsen, alarsen@bu.edu. If you have academic questions about the program, please contact Professor James E. Fleming, jfleming@bu.edu.

Ronald Dworkin is widely viewed as the most important legal philosopher of our time and as one of the leading figures in moral and political philosophy. In the words of one prominent scholar, Dworkin’s jurisprudential writings “constitute the finest contribution yet made by an American writer to the philosophy of law.” He also is a public intellectual who has written controversial and influential articles on matters of public political debate for many years, particularly in The New York Review of Books, garnering him praise as “our leading public philosopher.”

Professor Dworkin received an A.B. from Harvard University in 1953. After studying jurisprudence at Oxford as a Rhodes Scholar (B.A., 1955), he received an LL.B. from Harvard Law School in 1957. He clerked for Judge Learned Hand of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1957-58) and practiced law with the New York City law firm of Sullivan & Cromwell. In 1962, he began teaching at Yale Law School, and in 1968 became Wesley N. Hohfeld Professor of Jurisprudence there. In 1969, he succeeded H.L.A. Hart as University Professor of Jurisprudence at Oxford. In 1975, he began teaching at New York University School of Law, splitting each academic year between Oxford and New York. After retiring from Oxford in 1998, he became the Quain Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London and subsequently the Bentham Professor of Jurisprudence. At present, he is Emeritus Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London as well as Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law at New York University.

Professor Dworkin is the author of a number of significant works in the fields of jurisprudence, constitutional theory, and moral and political philosophy. His major books include Taking Rights Seriously (1977), A Matter of Principle (1985), Law’s Empire (1986), Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual Freedom (1993), Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (1996), Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (2000), Justice in Robes (2006), and Is Democracy Possible Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (2006). Furthermore, Dworkin’s work has been the subject of several full-length books, including Justine Burley, ed., Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin (2004); Stephen Guest, Ronald Dworkin (2d ed. 1997); Scott Hershovitz, ed., Exploring Law’s Empire: The Jurisprudence of Ronald Dworkin (2006); and Arthur Ripstein, ed., Ronald Dworkin (2007).

In 2007, Professor Dworkin was awarded the prestigious Holberg International Memorial Prize in the Humanities. He also recently received the Nicolas Luhmann Prize in the Sciences, University of Bielefeld, the Friendly Medal from the Practicing Law Institute, and the Jefferson Medal from the University of Virginia. Professor Dworkin is a Member of the Queen’s Counsel, a Fellow of the British Academy, and a Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. He has given many distinguished lectures around the world including the Oliver Wendell Holmes Lecture at Harvard, the Storrs Lectures at Yale, the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Stanford, and the Scribner Lectures at Princeton.

About Ronald Dworkin

Hugh W. Baxter clerked for Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the United States Supreme Court. His publications include Habermas: The Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (Stanford University Press, forthcoming 2010, in the series “Jurists: Profiles in Legal Theory”); “System and Lifeworld in Habermas’s Theory of Law,” 23 Cardozo Law Review 473 (2002); “Managing Legal Change: The Transformation of Establishment Clause Law,” 46 UCLA Law Review 343 (1998); and “Bringing Foucault into Law and Law into Foucault,” 48 Stanford Law Review 449 (1996).

Robert Bone holds the Robert Kent Professorship in Civil Procedure. He is author of The Economics of Civil Procedure (Foundation 2003) and many theoretical articles in civil procedure and intellectual property, including “Agreeing to Fair Process: The Problem With Contractarian Theories of Procedural Fairness,” 83 Boston University Law Review 485 (2003); “The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy and Procedural Efficacy,” 87 Georgetown Law Journal 887 (1999); and “Statistical Adjudication: Rights, Justice and Utility in a World of Process Scarcity,” 46 Vanderbilt Law Review 561 (1993). He is currently writing a theoretical piece on the nature of procedural rights.

James E. Fleming is The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar of Law. He is author of Securing Constitutional Democracy (University of Chicago Press, 2006) and co-author of Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions (Oxford University Press, 2007 with Sotirios A. Barber) and American Constitutional Interpretation (Foundation, 4th ed., 2008 with Walter F. Murphy, Barber, and Stephen Macedo). He is working on a book entitled Rights and Responsibility with Linda C. McClain. His writings on Dworkin include: “The Place of History and Philosophy in the Moral Reading of the American Constitution,” in Exploring Law’s Empire (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006), and “Rights, Responsibilities, and Reflections Upon the Sanctity of Life,” in Ronald Dworkin (Arthur Ripstein ed., 2007) (with Benjamin C. Zipursky).

David B. Lyons is Law Alumni Scholar. He has published a number of books in moral, political, and legal theory, including The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Clarendon Press, 1965); In the Interests of the Governed: A Study in Bentham’s Philosophy of Utility and Law (Clarendon Press, 1973); Ethics and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University Press, 1984); Moral Aspects of Legal Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1993); and Rights, Welfare, and Mill’s Moral Theory (Oxford University Press, 1994). He has written several articles assessing Dworkin’s work, including “Principles, Positivism, and Legal Theory,” 87 Yale Law Journal 415 (1977), and “Reconstructing Legal Theory,” 16 Philosophy & Public Affairs 379 (1987).

Linda C. McClain is Paul M. Siskind Scholar of Law. She is author of The Place of Families: Fostering Capacity, Equality, and Responsibility (Harvard University Press, 2006), co-editor of Gender Equality: Dimensions of Women’s Equal Citizenship (Cambridge University Press, 2009 with Joanna Grossman), and is working on a book entitled Free and Equal Association. Her many articles include “Constitutionalism, Judicial Review, and Progressive Change,” 84 Texas Law Review 433 (2005 with James E. Fleming). Her writings engaging with Dworkin’s work include: “Rights and Irresponsibility,” 43 Duke Law Journal 989 (1994), and “Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond ‘Empty’ Toleration to Toleration as Respect,” 59 Ohio State Law Journal 19 (1998).

About BU’s Faculty in Constitutional Theory, Jurisprudence and Political Philosophy

Kenneth W. Simons is The Honorable Frank R. Kenison Distinguished Scholar in Law. He clerked for Justice Thurgood Marshall of the United States Supreme Court. He has written numerous theoretical articles in torts, criminal law, and constitutional law, including “Reflections on Assumption of Risk,” 50 UCLA Law Review 481 (2002); “Dimensions of Negligence in Criminal and Tort Law,” 3 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 283 (2002); “The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values,” 54 Vanderbilt Law Review 901 (2001); and “The Logic of Egalitarian Norms,” 80 Boston University Law Review 693 (2000).

Robert D. Sloane is Associate Professor of Law. He has published in the fields of public international law, international human rights, and international criminal law, including “Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary International Legal Regulation of Nationality,” 50 Harvard International Law Journal 1 (2009); “The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the Contemporary Law of War,” 34 Yale Journal of International Law 47 (2009); “Prologue to a Voluntarist War Convention,” 106 Michigan Law Review 443 (2007); and “Outrelativizing Relativism: A Liberal Defense of the Universality of International Human Rights,” 34 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 527 (2001).

We are pleased to include the following members of BU’s Department of Philosophy.

Aaron Garrett is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Associate Chair of the Department of Philosophy. He is author of Meaning in Spinoza’s Method (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Berkeley’s Three Dialogues (Continuum, 2008) and editor of The Routledge Companion to Eighteenth Century Philosophy (Routledge, forthcoming) and Francis Hutcheson: An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, with Illustrations on the Moral Sense (Liberty Fund, 2003). He also has published many articles, including “Was Spinoza a Natural Lawyer?,” 25 Cardozo Law Review 627 (2003). He is currently working on a book on history and character in seventeenth and eighteenth century moral philosophy.

Susanne Sreedhar is Assistant Professor of Philosophy. She is the author of Hobbes on Resistance Defying the Leviathan (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming); The Continuum Companion to Hobbes (Continuum, forthcoming); “Defending Hobbes’s Right of Self-Defense,” 36 Political Theory 781 (2008); and “In Harm’s Way: Hobbes on the Duty to Fight for One’s Country,” in Hobbes Today (forthcoming). Her co-author Candice Delmas is a graduate student in the BU Department of Philosophy who is writing a dissertation on the problem of political obligation.

Daniel Star is Assistant Professor of Philosophy. He is working on two books, Knowing Better (under contract with Oxford University Press), and History of Ethics: Essential Readings with Commentary (under contract with Blackwell Publishing), and has published several articles in ethics and metaethics, including “Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism,” 21 Ratio 3 (2008); “Reasons: Explanations or Evidence?,” 119 Ethics 31 (2008) (with Stephen Kearns); and “Reasons as Evidence,” 4 Oxford Studies in Metaethics (forthcoming 2009) (with Stephen Kearns).

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