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The Global arcTic

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UL K O P O L I I T T I NE N I NST I T UUT T I

UT R I K E SP O L I T I SK A I NST I T UT E T

T H E F I NNI SH I NST I T UT E O F I NT E RNA T I O NA L A F F A I RS

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With exciting economic opportunities and serious environmental challenges, the Arctic istransformingandre-emergingasageopoliticallyimportantregion.

MajorglobalplayerswithinandwithouttheArcticarepayinggreaterattentiontotheregion.

WhileRussiaisatraditionalArcticstatewithsignicanteconomicandsecurityinterestsintheregion,China,theUS andtheEU havealsoexpressedtheirArcticinterestsmoreexplicitly.eyarekeentotapintotheeconomicpotentialandhaveasayinthewaytheregionbecomesaccessed,exploitedandgoverned.

Asaresult,theArcticisnolongeraspatiallyoradministrativelyconnedregion,butisinsteadtakingitsnewforminthemidstofcontemporaryglobalpolitics.

eglobalizationandeconomizationoftheArcticwillmostlikelydownplayenvironmentalismandreducetherelativeinuenceoftheindigenouspeopleandsmallArcticstatesinArcticaairs.

Arcticgovernanceisalsolikelytoturnmorecomplexandcomplicatedastheeconomicandpoliticalstakesareraised.

The Global arcTic

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The FiNNish iNsTiTuTe oF iNTerNaTioNal aFFairs 3

Introduction1

Kiruna,thenorthernmostcityofSwedenlocatedinSwedishLapland,hostedtheeighthbiannualmin-isterialmeetingoftheArcticCouncil(AC)on15May,2013.Traditionally,theAChasbeenaregionalco-operativeforumwithalimitedmandateonissues

of sustainable development and environmentalprotection.isnotonlyconstructedtheArcticasaninternalaairoftheAC memberstates2andnon-staterepresentatives,butalsoexcludedhighpolitics,mostnotablyeconomyandsecurity,fromtheACagenda.

Fromthisperspective,twooutcomesoftheKirunameetingwerenotable.First,themeetingdecidedtograntseveralextra-ArcticplayersChina,India,Italy,Japan,theRepublicofKorea,Singaporeand

conditionally the EU the status of permanentobservers.isdecisionwentagainstthetrendofself-imposedexclusionofthe AC fromtheextra-Arcticworld,previouslyrearmedonlytwoyearsagointhe2011Nuukministerialmeeting,andlegiti-mizednewstakeholdersinArcticaairs.

Second,theKirunameetingplacedimportantnewemphasisontheeconomyfortheArcticCouncil.eKirunaDeclarationstatedthattheACrecognizethecentralroleofbusinessinthedevelopmentoftheArctic,anddecidetoincreasecooperationandinteractionwiththebusinesscommunitytoadvancesustainabledevelopmentintheArctic. 3Comparedtothepreviousenvironmentalemphasis,thisnewfocusintheocialdiscourseishighlysignicant.

eKirunadecisionsreectthenewdynamicsthattheArcticregionisfacingtoday.Asanopeninggeopoliticalfrontierwithexcitingeconomicoppor-tunitiesandseriousenvironmentalchallenges,the

1 Thisbriefingpaperwasdraftedasapartofabroaderresearch

projectTowardsGeopoliticsofFlows,fundedbytheFinnish

ScientificAdvisoryBoardforDefenseandNationalEmergen-

cySupplyAgency.

2 Canada,Denmark(Greenland),Finland,Iceland,Norway,

theRussianFederation,SwedenandtheUnitedStatesof

America.

3 ArcticCouncil(2013)TheKirunaDeclaration,http://www.

arctic-council.org/index.php/en/document-archive/

category/425-main-documents-from-kiruna-ministerial-

meeting.

Arcticisgaininganincreasingamountofattentionfromarangeofpoliticalactors, bothwithinandwithouttheArcticitself.Asaresult,theArcticcannolongerbeunderstoodasaconnedregionorasasetofspecicsoftissuesdealtwithbytheArctic states and local communities themselves.Instead,itisemergingbothasaglobalspaceandas

aninstantiationofcontemporaryglobalpolitics.

ispaperinvestigatesthekeyArcticinterestsoffourmajorglobalplayersthatarepayingincreasingattentiontotheopeningnorthernregion:Russia,China,theUS andtheEU.Insodoing,thepaperilluminates some of the key drivers behind theglobalizationoftheArctic.epaperconcludeswithsomeremarksontheglobalnatureofthecon-temporaryArcticanditsconsequences.

Russia: The key player in the Arctic

RussiaisthemostimportantplayerintheArctic,withsignicanteconomic,securityandgovernanceinterestsintheregion.isisprimarilybecauseofnaturalresources.Over20%ofundiscoveredglobalhydrocarbonreservesarelocatedintheArcticareaandmostofthemintheRussianArctic.4esenatu-ralresourcesarevitaltoRussiannationalsecurityandeconomy;oilandgasaloneaccountforroughly20-25%ofRussianGDP.5Russiasdomesticsocialprogrammes,infrastructureinvestments,andmili-tarymodernizationareallcriticallydependentonrevenuesfromnaturalresourceexport.

Similarly,hydrocarbonsprovideimportantleverageforRussianforeigninuence.isisespeciallythecasewithenergy-dependentEurope,whereathirdofthenaturalgasconsumedisimportedfromRus-sia.eArcticplaysanincreasingroleinthisequa-

tionasastrategicallyvitalresourcebaseforRussia.Sofar,theRussianArctichasbeenresponsiblefor

4 Zysk,Katarzyna(2011a)TheEvolvingArcticSecurityEnvi-

ronment:AnAssessment,inBlank,StephenJ.(ed.)(2011)

Russia in the Arctic,Carlisle:StrategicStudiesInstitute,pp.

96-97.

5 Simola,Helietal.(2013)Perspectives on Russias nergy

Sector,BOFITOnline,3/2013,p.4.

6 Ratner,Michaeletal.(2012)EuropesEnergySecurity:Op-

tionsandChallengestoNaturalGasSupplyDiversification.

CRSReportforCongress,March15,2013.

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about10-15%ofRussianGDP and25%ofitsforeignexports7andtherearesystematiceortstoincreasethesegures.

RussiasincreasingnorthwardfocusisalsoduetothefactthatRussiasmaturehydrocarbonsourcesinWestern Siberia are slowlydryingup.Recent

hydrocarbonactivitiesintheRussianArctichavetakenplaceprimarilythroughonshoreprojectsinkeylocationssuchastheYamalPeninsulaandinnascentoshoreprojectsontheArcticseabedintheBarents,PechoraandKaraSeas.eseoshoreprojectshaveoftentakentheformofjointventuresbetweenRussianandinternationalenergycorpora-tions.issignalsRussiasneedtoseekinvestmentsandtechnologicalknow-howthroughinternationalcooperation.

However, key offshore projects such as theShtokhmangaseldandPrirazlomnoyeoileldhaveturnedouttobeextremelychallengingandhavebeensueringfromcontinuousdelaysandshuingofforeignpartnersupuntiltoday.Russiahasalsosetitssightsonresourcebasesoutsideitsterritorialbordersand submitteda claimfor theextensionofitscontinentalshelftothe UN Com-missionontheLimitsoftheContinentalShelf(CLCS)processasearlyas2001.

Inordertoaccess,exploitanddeliverArcticnatu-ralresourcestoglobalmarkets,RussiaalsoaimstodevelopcriticalinfrastructureintheNorthernSeaRoute(NSR),includingports,search-and-rescue(SAR)centres,routeadministration,ice-breakingcapability, andoil spill response capabilities. Inaddition,non-maritimepartsoftheArctictrans-portsystempipelines,aviationroutes,railways,androadsandtheoverallsocio-economiccon-ditions of the region require development and

modernization.

Russia also has security interests in the Arctic.Russiaseekstoprojectitssovereignauthorityinitswide Arctic region through improved bordercontrol(FSB),toprovidesafetyandsecurityespe-ciallyintheNSR,andtomaintaincredibleforcestosecurecriticalinfrastructures.Russiaalsoseekstomaintain,developandprojectacrediblemilitaryforceprimarilynaval,aerialandmissile assets

7 Zysk(2011a),p.97.

intheregioninordertobeabletoreactinvariouspolitico-militaryscenarios,aswellastodetertheexpansionofunwantedforeignmilitarypresenceintothe(Russian)Arctic.

RussiaalsohasstrategicmilitaryforcesintheArctic,mostnotablytheNorthernFleetanditsballistic-

missilesubmarines(SSBN

s).esemobileforcesareofincreasingstrategicimportanceduetothechallengesthatRussianland-basedintercontinentalballistic-missilecapabilityfacestoday.8However,developmentsinRussianhardpowerintheArctichavebeenrelativelymodest,especiallyifcomparedtotheColdWarera,andthereiswidespreadagree-mentthatinsteadofre-militarizationorthepoten-tialforahotconict,Russiaisseekingtogovernitsincreasinglybusynorthernfrontandsecureitsintereststherein.9

WhileRussiaseekstomodernizeandprojecthardpowerin theArctic,it isa pragmaticplayerthathasreliedoninternationalcooperationtomaintainstability conducive to economic activity in theregion.Ithasresolvedlong-standingborderdis-putesthroughbilateralnegotiationsandendorsedmultilateralgovernanceintheArctic.IthasalsoendorsedtheArcticCouncilasthelegitimateinsti-tutionalgovernanceframework,includingitsrecentKirunadevelopments.EvenifRussiaislikelytohar-bourconcernsaboutthegrowingroleofChinaintheregionanditsgovernance,onthewhole,RussiaseemstohavelittletoloseintheACco-operationastheforumcannotproduceindependentandbindingresolutionswithoutRussiasconsent.

Russia has also supported the United NationsConventionontheLawoftheSea( UNCLOS)asthelegitimatemultilaterallegalframeworkforgovern-ingtheArcticOcean,includingtheresolutionof

maritimeboundary issues, resource disputesonthecontinentalshelves,andmaritimenavigationdisagreements. The key question that remains,

8 Golts,Alexandr(2011)TheArctic:AClashofInterestsor

ClashofAmbitions,inBlank(2011);Zysk,Katarzyna(2011b)

MilitaryAspectsofRussiasArcticPolicy:HardPowerand

NaturalResources,inKraska,James(ed.)(2011)Arctic Se-

curity in an Age of Climate Change.Cambridge:Cambridge

UniversityPress.

9 Lasserre,Fredericetal.(2012)Isthereanarmsraceinthe

Arctic?,Journal of Military and Strategic Studies,14(3/4).

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however,ishowcommittedpragmaticRussiaistosupportingmultilateralgovernanceintheArctic,forexampleintheeventofapotentiallyunfavourableCLCSdecisionregardingRussiasclaimtoextendhercontinentalshelf.

Inaddition,Russiaalsohasaprimarilyeconomically

relatedinterestinArcticresearch,forexampleinstudyingitscontinentalshelf.RussiahasbeenlessconcernedthanWesternnationswiththethemeofsustainabilityinitsArcticpolicy,anditsenviron-mentalismhasmanifestedmostlyinaninteresttocleanupnuclearandotherwasteintheArcticarea.RussiasexpressedinterestintheindigenouspeoplealsoseemspeculiargiventherecentdevelopmentsinitstightenedNGOlegislationingeneralanditsattentiontotheleadershipissuesoftheRussianindigenousNGOs(e.g.RAIPON)inparticular.

China: Preparing for the Arctic opening

ChinaapproachestheArcticasaglobalpowerandanArcticstakeholderaectedbyArcticdevelop-ments.ChinasintereststowardstheArctichavebeengrowingsteadilyandithasbecomeapartofChinesestrategicdiscourse.Overall,however,theArcticremainsarelativelyminoraspectofChinasocial foreign policy.10 Chinas growing Arcticinterest must thus be understood primarily asfuture-oriented,reectingitsaspirationtobepre-paredfortheArcticopeninganditsconsequences.

eprimarymotiveforChinasgraduallyincreas-ingArcticinterest istheeconomy.As agrowingeconomy and a non-littoral Arctic stakeholder,ChinaaimstosecureaccesstoopeningArcticship-pingroutes,whichcouldoersubstantialsavingsinmaritimetransportanddiversifyChinesesecurityof

supply.ChinaalsoseekstostrengthenitsabilitytoaccessArcticresourcebases,includingrichshingwatersintheArcticOcean,raremineraldepositsinGreenland,andhydrocarbonsinRussia.11

To promote these interests, China hasupgradeditsdiplomaticrepresentationintheNordicregion;

10 Jakobson,LindaandPeng,Jingchao(2012)ChinasArctic

Aspirations,SIPRIPolicyPaperNo.34,November2012.

11 Jakobson,Linda(2012)NortheastAsiaTurnsitsAttentionto

theArctic,NBR AnalysisBrief,December17,2012.

signednumerousbilateralagreements,suchasthe2013FreeTradeAgreementwithIceland;supportedChineseprivateinvestments,suchasintheminingindustryinGreenland;acquiredoshorestakesandashareintheYamalLNGprojectinRussiaforitsnationalenergycompany;andevenleasedaportinNorthKoreaforapotentialhubforArctictransport

inthefuture.

GlobalandArcticwarmingoersnotonlyeconomicopportunities,butalsobringsaboutcomplexchal-lenges forChina. For example, due to changingweatherpatternsChinawillexperiencerisingsealevelsandfoodsecurityproblems.Consequently,ChinahasaninterestindeepeningitsknowledgeonclimatechangeintheArcticinordertobeabletomitigateandadapttotheeectsitwillhaveonChinesesociety.ishasledChinatobothinvest

innationalresearchcapabilityandpromoteinter-national co-operation in scientic research onenvironmentalandArcticissues.

ParticipationinArcticgovernanceisalsoagrowinginterestforChina.e UNCLOS servesasthekeylegalframeworkthatChinarecognizesintheArctic.AsChinalacksdirectaccesstotheArcticOcean,italsorecognizesthesovereignrightsofArcticlittoralstates.However,China emphasizesthat interna-tionalmaritimelawguaranteesitcertainrightsintheArcticmaritimeenvironment,suchastherightof scientic research, thefreedomofnavigation,andalsopotentially the right to exploit naturalresourcessuchashydrocarbonsandsheryintheinternationalwatersoftheArcticOcean.12

atsaid,Chinacontinuestohaveavitalnationalinterestin foregrounding theimportance ofsov-ereigntyandterritorialintegrityfortwospecicreasons:rst,topreventexternalinterferenceinits

owndomesticaairs;andsecond,todefenditsownsovereigntyclaimsintheSouthandEastChinaSeasthatdonotrelyontheUNCLOSprocedure.

WhileendorsingtheUNCLOSintheArctic,Chinahas nevertheless expressed two particular con-cerns.First,Chinaisconcernedthattheextensionof sovereign territory, and especially nationalExclusiveEconomicZones(EEZs),risksshrinkinginternationalwatersintheArctic,thuspossibly

12 JakobsonandPeng(2012),pp.16-18.

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weakeningitsrighttobenetfromhydrocarbonand sh resources in those common waters.Second,ChinahasalsobeenconcernedabouttheRussian management of the NSR and especiallyaboutthehighice-breakerservicefeesthatRussiademandswithreferencetoUNCLOSArticle234.Astheworldslargestshippingnationwithover40%

ofitsGDP

derivedfromtheshippingindustry,ChinafearsthatthepotentialcommercialadvantageoftheNSRcouldshrinkconsiderablyifRussiacontinuestoimposehighservicefeesonthevoyage.1

Chinahasalsoactivelysought,andwas recentlygranted,permanentobserverstatusintheArcticCouncil.isreectsChinasviewthatArcticstatesdonothaveamonopolyonArcticissuesduetotheirglobalnature,andthattheACwithoutChinawouldbeaninadequateinstitutionalbodytodealwith

Arcticissues.epermanentobserverstatusconfersonlylimitedrightsonChinaintheAC,anditwillhavenovotingrights,forexample.However,Chinamostlikelyconsidersthatobserverstatusnotonlytransformsit into a legitimateArcticplayer,butalsothatpermanentobserversthemselvesmaywellgainmoreinuenceintheACinthelongrun,thusenhancingChineseArcticinuenceovertime.

The United States: From a reluctant

to an emerging Arctic player

eUS hastraditionally been areluctantArcticpower14thathaspaidalimitedamountofpolicyattentiontotheregion,andonlyprimarilytoitsownArcticbackyard,Alaska.Lackofpublicaware-ness,longdistances,thelow-threatenvironment,budgetaryconcerns,andmorepressingglobalissueshaveallensuredthattheArctichasremainedinthebackgroundofpolicy-making.

WhiletheArcticcontinuestobearelativelyminortopic on the overall US foreign policy agendatoday,theUS hasstartedtopaycloserattentiontotheregionwiththepublicationofkeystrategicdocumentsandhigh-proleparticipationinArctic

13 Conley,Heather(2012)NewSecurityArchitecturefor

theArctic:AnAmericanPerspective,AReportoftheCSIS

EuropeProgram,p.40;JakobsonandPeng(2012),p.18.

14 Huebert,Rob(2009)TheUnitedStatesArcticPolicy:The

ReluctantArcticPower,SPP BriefingPapers2(2),May2009.

aairs.Inshort,theArctichasgraduallyemergedasanewforeignpolicyfrontierintheUS .15

eexploitationofnaturalresourcesgas,oil,andmineralsistheprimarydriverofcontemporaryUSpolicyintheArctic.ToenhanceUSenergysecurityandtheeconomy,theObamaadministrationhas

encouragedtheresponsibledevelopmentofdomes-ticoilandgasproduction.Inrecentyears,duetoadecliningtrendinproductioninexistingoileldsontheAlaskanNorthSlopecoupledwithalackofnewonshoresites,therehasbeendomesticpressuretoexploreoshoreoilintheBeaufortandChukchiSeas.16MajorenergycorporationsfromtheUSandabroadhaveacquiredlicencesforoshoreproduc-tionblocks.eseeorts,however,havebeenchal-lengingandbesetwithdelaysduetoUSadministra-tionpressureafterrecentenvironmentalaccidents.

Inaddition,advancesinunconventionalgasandoilproductionhavereducedtheurgencytogoArctic.

Secondly,theUS alsohasarangeofsecurityinter-estsintheArctic.Importantly,partsof US strategicdeterrence,globalmissiledefenceandearlywarn-ingarchitecturearesituatedoroperationalintheArcticregion.eissueoffreedomofnavigationintheArcticisanotherimportantsecurityinterestfortheUS .isisbecauseaccessibleandopeninter-nationalmaritimeroutesarearteriesoftheglobalandUS economyandkeyenablersofexiblepowerprojectionbytheUS military.

Consequently,theUS isadamantaboutdefendingfreedomofnavigationandopensealanesglobally,includingonmaritimeroutesintheRussian(NSR)andCanadian(NWP)Arctic.isputstheUS atoddswithvariouslittoralnationsthatemphasizetheirrespectivesovereigntyintheiradjacentmaritimearea.estatusofArcticmaritimeroutesisamat-

terofglobalstrategicsignicanceduetothewiderimplicationsthatanunfavourableprecedentintheregionwouldhavefortheprincipleoffreedomofnavigationingeneral.17

15 Conley,Heather(2013)TheNewForeignPolicyFrontier:

U.S.InterestsandActorsintheArctic,AReportoftheCSIS

EuropeProgram.

16 Conley(2012),p.3;Huebert(2009),pp.4-7.

17 Conley(2012),pp.20-23;Kraska,James(2011)TheNew

ArcticGeographyandU.S.Strategy,inKraska(2011),pp.

258-262.

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The US also has an interest, though currentlyinadequatecapability,inprovidingsafetyandlawenforcementintheincreasinglybusyandnaviga-bleArcticmaritimeenvironment.atsaid,theUS Arcticborderdoesnotrankashighinstrategicimportanceasitssouthernbordersdo,andAmeri-canpolicy-makershavebeenrelativelycontentto

haveCanadaupgradeitsArcticcapabilitytogoverntheNorth-AmericanArctic.

Thirdly, the US remains unshielded from theeects of global climate change. To understandandrespondtocomplexenvironmentalchallenges,theUS hasinvestedinscienticresearchonArcticenvironmentaldynamics.Infact,theUS hasbeenaforerunnerininternationalclimateresearch,withnotableclimatescholarsandestablishedandpres-tigiousresearchinstitutes.1

e US approach toArctic governance hasbeenambivalent.WhiledefactoadheringtotheUNCLOS,thecontinuingfailuretoratifythetreatyhampersUS leadership in Arcticmultilateral governance.Non-raticationalsodeniestheStatesalegitimatelegalframeworktoensurefreedomofnavigationandsettledisputesinthemaritimeenvironment,mostnotablyintheNWPandNSR.Non-raticationalsoworksagainstUS economicinterestsbydenyingthecountryalegitimatelegalframeworktoseekanextensiontoitsArcticEEZ.Todate,theUS hasfol-lowedPresidentTrumansunilateralistproclama-tionthatresourcesinorbelowtheUS continentalshelfarethesolepropertyoftheUnitedStates.19

eUS policyontheArcticinstitutionalgovernancehasalsobeenambivalent.Initially,duringthe1990s,theUS sawtheArcticCouncilashavingonlylimitedpoliticalimportance,status,androle.Lateron,duetoagrowingawarenessoftheeconomicprospects

andgeopoliticalstakesofthewarmingArctic,theUS waswillingtoconsiderthegroupofveArcticlittoralstates(theArcticFive)asaformattodis-cusstopicalissues,includingthoserelatedtosover-eigntyandsecurityintheArctic.isemphasisdefactomarginalizedtheprospectsofthe ACfurther.However,inrecentyears,theUS hasreversedits

18 Conley(2012),pp.27-28.

19 Cohen,Ariel(2011)RussiaintheArctic:ChallengestoU.S.

EnergyandGeopoliticsintheHighNorth,inBlank(2011),

p.11.

policyon theCouncil and nowregards itas thepre-eminentforumforinternationalcooperationintheArctic.20Afteralongsilence,theUS hasalsoendorsedtheinclusionofnewobserversincludingChinaintheAC.isnotonlyrearmsUS com-mitmenttomultilateralismintheArctic,butalsoexpressesincreasingUS willingnesstostrikenew

bargainswithrisingpowers,suchasChina,withintheparametersofthepost-hegemonicliberalmul-tilateralorder.

The European Union: The Arctic gets closer to Brussels

eEuropeanUnionhasstartedtoshowincreas-inginterestinArcticaairs.eEU isintimatelyconnectedtotheArcticregionthroughitsArcticMemberStatesaswellasvariousEU competences,

policiesandregulationswithadirectbearingontheArcticinareassuchastheenvironment,climatechange, trade, energy, research, transport, andshery.atsaid,theEU hasneverbeenaforerun-nerinArcticgovernance,norhasitbeenacceptedasalegitimatestakeholderbyallArcticstates.iswasmostlybecauseoftheEU spoliticallyinsensi-tivestancetowardssealingandwhalingandbecauseoftheEuropeanParliamentspoliticallyunfeasibleinitialposition,whichsuggestedacomprehensiveinternationaltreatytogoverntheArcticregiononthebasisoftheAntarcticTreaty.21

Overtime,however,theEU hascometoadoptamore politically aware and conciliatory tone initsArcticpolicy.22 Today, theEU sArcticpolicymaintainsthatArcticgovernanceshouldbebuiltonexistingmultilateralframeworkstheUNCLOS,theArcticCouncil,andtheInternationalMaritimeOrganization(IMO)insteadofanewArctictreaty,whilesimultaneouslybearinginmindandrespect-

ingthesovereigntyandnationalinterestsofArcticstatesthemselves.Duetotheinuenceofvariousmember states with divergent interests, the EUcontinuestolackacoherentArcticstrategyand

20 SeePedersen,Torbjrn(2012)DebatesovertheRoleofthe

ArcticCouncil,Ocean Development and International Law

43,p.149.

21 Wegge,Njord(2012)TheEU andtheArctic:EuropeanFor-

eignPolicyintheMaking,Arctic Review on Law and Poli-

tics3(1),pp.15-17.

22 Ibid.,pp.17-18.

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movesforwardatthelevelofpolicystatements.WhiletheEU hassoughtagreaterroleintheArctic,ithascometorecognizethattheArcticstatesaretheprimaryactorsintheregionandthattheEUshouldfocusitsgrowingengagementonsupport-ingexistingsuccessfulco-operationandprovidingassistanceinmeetingnewchallengesintheregion.

erstEU Arcticinterestrelatestoglobalclimatechange,whichhasvariousenvironmental,social,economicandgeopoliticalimplicationsfortheArc-ticregionaswellasforEurope.WhiletheEU hastackledclimatechangeatthegloballevel,itsemerg-ingArcticclimatepolicyhasstartedtoemphasizeup-to-dateknowledgeofregionalclimatedynam-icsandtheneedtoinvestinArcticenvironmentalresearch.eseeortsareidentiedasrequiringcoordination between theEU, Arctic states and

Arcticstakeholders.

Secondly, the EU also has signicant economicinterestsintheArctic.EuropeisamajordestinationforArcticresources.Around25%ofArcticoilandgasoutputisdestinedforEurope,and80%oftheshcaughtinIcelandand60%inNorwayaresoldintheEU.23Consequently,theEU seekstosecureaccesstoArcticresourcebasesinthecontextofintensifyingglobalcompetition,andtoinuencepolicydevelopmentintheArcticstatestowardsfavourableresourceexploitationandmanagement.

Almost90%oftheEUstradeiscarriedoutatsea.Asaresult,theEU hasastrategicinterestinthefuturedevelopment,securityandstabilityofArcticmari-timeroutesthatmaybecomegloballyimportant.Mostnotably,theEU supportsthedevelopmentofthePolarCodeintheIMO ,agreementsonsearchandrescueandoilspillresponsecapabilityintheAC,aswellastheprincipleoffreedomofnavigation

onArcticmaritimeroutes.WithregardtotheNSR,inparticular,theEU hasexpresseditswillingnesstoassistinthedevelopmentofsustainableshippingontheroute.

23 Cavalieri,Sandraetal.(2010)EU Arctic Footprint and Pol-

icy Assessment: Final Report,December21,2010,p.41;

Neumann,AntjeandRudloff,Bettina(2010)Impact of EU

Policies on the High North: The Cases of Climate Policy and

Fisheries,Directorate-GeneralforExternalPoliciesofthe

Union,PolicyDepartment,EuropeanParliament,p.8.

irdly,theEU alsoseekstoinuencethesocio-economicdevelopmentofArcticstatesandstake-holdersthroughinvestmentinresearchandfundingforcross-borderco-operationintheArcticregion.Tofosterfurtherregionalco-operation,theEU hasalsoengagedinactivityintheArcticareaviaitsNorthernDimension(ND)jointpolicywithRussia,

NorwayandIceland.

eEU alsoendeavourstohaveastrongerpresenceinArcticgovernance.eEU isalreadyamemberofseveralrelevantregionalinstitutionalframeworks,suchastheBarentsEuro-ArcticCounciland theNordicCouncilofMinisters.eEU smostlikelyforthcomingstatusasapermanentobserverintheAC will increase itspossibilities to inuence theArcticdevelopment,tostayinformedontheArcticdevelopmentandotherArcticstakeholderscon-

cerns,andtosucceedinintensifyingandglobalizingpolicycompetitionwithnewArcticstakeholders.24

Conclusion: The global Arctic and its consequences

eArcticistransformingandre-emergingasageopolitically important region. New economicprospectsinenergy,mineralandmaritimetrans-portsectorsoersignicantopportunitiesforthetraditionalArcticstates,someofwhicharealreadyactive players in the region, such asRussia andNorway,andsomeofwhichareslowlyturningtheirattentiontotheArctic,suchastheUS .

Newprospectsarealsoattractingtheattentionofnewplayersthatarekeentotapintotheeconomicpotentialandhaveasayinthewaytheregion isaccessed,exploitedandgoverned,includingChinaandtheEU.eneteectof theseandotherdevelopmentsisthattheArctictodayisaglobal

Arctic:itcannolongerbeperceivedasaspatiallyoradministrativelyconnedregion,butisinsteadtakingonanewformanddynamicsinthemidstofcontemporaryglobalpolitics.

Whilethereareunresolvedandcontentiousissuesinthe global Arctic (e.g. the status ofmaritime

24 Heininen,LassiandBailes,AlysonJK (2011)Strategy Papers

on the Arctic or High North: A Comparative Study and Anal-

ysis.InstituteofInternationalAffairs,CentreforSmallState

Studies,p.93.

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The FiNNish iNsTiTuTe oF iNTerNaTioNal aFFairs

passagesandextensionofcontinentalshelves)thatmaysparkdiplomaticdisputesorevenconicts,theregionischaracterizedbymultilateralcoopera-tionandgovernance.atsaid,therearedivergentpoliticalintereststoendorseArcticmultilateralism.Russia, for example, utilizes multilateralism tocreatea stableinvestmentenvironment,whereas

ChinareliesonittolegitimatelyaccessArcticaairsasanon-aggressiverisingpowerandextra-Arcticstate.WhileatraditionallyreluctantArcticplayer,the US currently sees Arcticmultilateralism asthemostprominenttooltoestablishitspresenceandpromoteitsinterestsintheregionwithintheframeworkofitsgeneralsmartpowerstrategy.eEU endorsesmultilateralisminitsexternalpolicyingeneralandintheArctictopresentitselfasarelevantglobalactorandanormativepowerinasituationwhereitsglobalrelevanceisdecreasing.

eglobalizationoftheArcticandthenewfocusontheeconomywillhavevariousconsequencesin the region. Firstly, the focus on sustainabledevelopmentinArcticgovernanceislikelytosuerfromasharperfocusontheeconomythatfavoursenvironmentallychallengingbutgloballyinterest-inghydrocarbonextractionandmaritimetransportindustries.Secondly,theindigenouspeopleintheArcticwillmostlikelyloseinuencewiththeintro-ductionofnewmajorplayersintotheArcticgov-ernance.Attheveryleast,itisunlikelythatChina,forexample,wouldcontributetotheenhancementofindigenousinuenceinArcticaairsgivenitseconomicemphasis,interestindomesticstability,aswellasitshistorywithChineseminorities.

irdly, newactors, interests anddynamics arebound to aect the traditional Arctic states. Ingeneral,theemergenceofnewmajorplayerswillreduce,albeitwithexceptions,theinuenceoftra-

ditionalandespeciallysmallArcticstates.Yet,forsome,theappearanceofnewmajorplayersmayinfactbeaboon.Iceland,forexample,maystandtogainfromincreasingChineseinterestintheregionbyreceiving direct foreigninvestments after itseconomiccrisis.Andlastly,Arcticgovernanceislikelytoturnmorecomplexandcomplicatedastheeconomicandpoliticalstakesareraisedwiththeintroductionofnewglobalplayersintheregion.


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isbN 978-951-769-386-8

issN 1795-8059

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