National Council on Family Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Family Relations.http://www.jstor.orgThe "Family Relations" Doctrine: Extending Supreme Court Precedent to Custody Disputes between Biological and Nonbiological Parents Author(s): Mellisa Holtzman Source:Family Relations, Vol. 51, No. 4, Families and the Law (Oct., 2002), pp. 335-343Published by:National Council on Family RelationsStable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3700331Accessed: 11-08-2015 01:48 UTCYour use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspJSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsThe "Family Relations" Doctrine: Extending Supreme Court Precedent to Custody Disputes Between Biological and Nonbiological Parents* MellisaHoltzman** Custodydisputes between biological and nonbiologicalparentstypically are decidedon thebasis of one of two custody doctrines:the parentalrights or thebestinterestsdoctrine.Each of thesestandardshas faced criticismandan extensiveamount of legal andsocial scienceliteratureis devotedto pitting thesedoctrines against oneanother.Other scholarly workis focused on proposing alternatives to thesedoctrines.Herethe benefits and shortcomingsof thetwodoctrinesare reviewedand previouslyproposed alternativestandards are evaluated. Through a detailed analysisof 5 Supreme Courtcases,an entirely newdoctrine-the "family relations"doctrine-is suggested. The family relationsdoctrine gives considerable weight to thechild'scurrentand past relationships andhis or her "per- ceived" family. It protects thechild's presentpsychologicalreality while simultaneouslysafeguarding boththechild'sandtheadult's interestin maintainingpast relationships, or possibly even affectingfuture ones. n the early 1960s, research by Bowlby on socialattachment theory startedto get recognition within family law (Bowlby, 1969, 1973, 1980; see also Ainsworth, 1962). In 1973 Gold- stein, Freud, and Solnit released abook that was premised on the tenets ofsocialattachment theory, which ultimately had a profound impact on family law (Taub, 1984). Beyond the Best Interests of the Child suggested that in order to truly protect the bestinterests ofchildren involvedin custody disputes, courts needed to gobeyond their typical analysis of determining the child's best interests based on the income, education, available housing, available medical insurance, and soforth ofthe com- peting adults. Instead, courts needed to place the child with the adult to whom he or she was psychologically attached-that is, with the person towhom the child looked for daily emotional care (Goldstein, Freud, & Solnit, 1973). Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit's focusonthe importance of psychological attachments merged with the growing researchon social attachment theory and a burgeoning literatureon the in- tersection oflawand socialsciencetostimulate an important change in custody disputes between biological and nonbiological parents. Courts began todecidethese disputes byconsidering which ofthe adults might best serve the child's interests, rather than automatically placingcustody withthe biologicalparent (Davis,1987).However, doing sodid notinitiate a long-term trend toward using only the best interests standardin these dis- putes; instead, it intensifiedthe conflict between children's rights and parents' rights byaggravating the conflict between the two custody doctrines.The implications of this conflict are discussed here and two previously proposed alternative custody doctrines, the parental preference and the psychological parent doctrines, are considered. Because even these alternativesfall short of pro- tecting both children and adults in a fair and consistent manner, an entirely new custody doctrineis discussed, and the foundation for this newdoctrine isfound inthe rulings offive recent Su- preme Court cases. Background Although the phrase "custody dispute" typically evokes im- ages oftwo divorcing, biologicalparents engaged inabitter court battle, each vying for custody oftheir child, custody dis- putes alsoarise between biological and nonbiological parents. Theterm "nonbiological parent" refers to anyone whoisnot the biological parent ofa child, but who has nonetheless acted asa parent tothechild. Nonbiological parents can bedistin- guished from persons who are "third parties" toa family unit, such as babysitters, close family friends, and even grandparents with whom the child has never lived. Nonbiological parents have livedwith and economically and emotionally provided for the child ona daily basis. Stepparents,gay and lesbian coparents, foster parents, preadoptive or adoptive parents, and extended family members, such as aunts and uncles or grandparents with whom the child has lived, are nonbiological parents if they have functioned asa parent toachildwhoisnottheir biological offspring. Custody disputes between biological and nonbiological par- ents typically are decided based on one of two custody doctrines: the parental rights orthebestinterests doctrine. The parental rights doctrine holds that biological parents have a fundamental right tothe custody and control oftheir children and this right cannot be disturbed except for the most cogent reasons (typically parentalunfitness). In contrast, the best interests doctrineasserts that custody decisions should be made with the child's best in- terests in mind, such that the person whoisbest able tomeet the child's physical and emotional needs should be awardedcus- tody(Salthe,1990).Importantly, an underlying tension exists betweenthesetwodoctrines,therebycausing a significant amount ofdoctrinal conflict in custody disputes involving bio- logical and nonbiological parents. The best interests doctrine is fundamentally about protecting the welfare of children, whereas the parentalrights doctrineis fundamentally about protecting the rights of adults within the confines of the traditional family (e.g., biologicalparents raising their biologicalchildren). Children's interests and adult's rights do not necessarily have to conflict. In fact, for the vast majority of children their interests and the par- ents' rights coincide; biological parents have a right to the cus- tody of their children, and it is in the children's best intereststo be in the care of their biological parents(see Santosky v. Kramer, 1982).However, insituations where children have developed strong psychological attachmentsand parental-typerelationships 0 0 *This paper was presented at the 2001American Sociological Association Meetings in Anaheim, CA. **Department of Sociology, Ball State University,Muncie,IN 47306 (mkholtzman@bsu. edu). Key Words:child custody,family, law, parental rights. (Family Relations, 2002,51,335-343) 2002, Vol. 51, No.4 335 This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsz 0 with adults other than their biological parents, their best interests may conflict with the rights oftheir biological parents (see In Interest ofB.G.C.,1992; Inre AdoptionofBabyE.A.W.,1995; Petition ofKirchner,1995). Safeguarding thewelfareofchildren and protecting the rights of biological parents or traditionalfamilies are both highly regarded culturalvalues that are strongly rooted in this country's history. States are continually engaged inefforts aimed at bal- ancing a family's constitutionallyrecognized right to privacy and freedom from state interference (see Griswold v.Connecticut, 1965;Meyer v. Nebraska,1923; Piercev. Societyof Sisters, 1925) and the state's interests, as parens patriae, in protecting the welfare of children (see Prince v. Massachusetts, 1944). This balancing actisreflected inthefactthat when disputes arise between biological and nonbiological parents, the court is faced with tworelevant custody doctrines ratherthan one. Instead of relying solely on the best interests doctrine, as is customary in disputes between two divorcing biologicalparents, thecourts must balance the rights of adults and the interests of children by considering both the parentalrights doctrine and the best inter- ests doctrine.In custody disputes between two biological parents, a parental rights testis unnecessary because both parents are equally entitled to custody based on their biological relationship to the child; thus, judges pick between the adults by ostensibly focusing on the needs of the child. However, in disputes between biological and nonbiological parents, the competing adults are noton equal footing because their genetic relationship tothe childdiffers.Instead the rights oftheadultsnowmustbe weighed in addition to the interests of the child, so both custody doctrines may be relevant. The parentalrights doctrine allows judges to streamlinethe decision-making processbychoosing betweenthe competing adults strictly on the basis oftheir biological relationship to the child, whereas the best interestsdoctrineallows judges to engage in an analysis that is typical of divorce by choosing between the adults on the basis ofwho can best meet the child's needs (see Cahn, 1997). Although it is possible that the application of either doctrine willresult in the same outcome, it also is possible that reliance on one doctrine over the other may result in a different outcome. For instance, in cases where the child's psychological attachment figure isthe biological parent, the application ofei- ther doctrine willresult inthe same outcome-placement with the biological parent. In caseswhere the child's psychological attachment figure isthe nonbiological parent, application ofthe best interests doctrine will likely place custody with the nonbi- ological parent, whereas application ofthe parentalrights doc- trine will likely place custody with the biological parent. In the second scenario the doctrines conflict, and it isunder these cir- cumstances that judges are faced with a dilemma because they must decide which doctrine should be paramount in deciding the case. Unilateral Adoption oftheBestInterestsTest The potential for conflict between these two custody doc- trines has led scholars to advocate for the unilateraladoption of one or the other by the courts. For instance, Salthe (1990) argued that both the child's needs and the biological parent'srights could beaccommodated through the singular use ofthe best interests doctrine (seealsoO'Keefe,1991).The bestinterests doctrine wouldcontinue to protect biologicalparents where theyhave psychological relationshipswith their children;it also would pro- tect children from interruptions in their attachments,regardless of whetherthose attachmentswere to biological or nonbiological parents. However, unilateral adoption of the best interestsdoctrineis unlikely to consistently protect the needs of children and adults simultaneously.First, the best interests test can beused tosur- reptitiously maintainthe parentalrights doctrine ("Alternatives," 1963; Hill,1991). In disputes between biological and nonbio- logical parents, courts frequently find that it isin a child's best interests to be raised by his or her biological parents(see North- land v. Starr, 1998). Such a finding is based, in part, on the view that biological parents are the "natural"custodians of their chil- dren, and that the nuclear family isthe"foundation of society and civilization" (Kulan v. Anderson, 1939, p.991).Although there ismerit inthis perspective, itsindiscriminate application enables courts to achieve an outcome that is consistent with the parentalrights doctrinewithout actually employing that doctrine. Thus, it is possible that the best interests doctrine could be used to protect parentalrights while simultaneously squelching chil- dren's needs. Second, scholars have argued that the best interestsdoctrine elevates children's needs toofar above parents' rights. For in- stance, Richards (1992)argued that although the best interests doctrine does go a longway toward protecting children's psy- chological relationships, it also may open the floodgates too far, thereby allowing third parties who are not psychological parents to bring suit against the biological parents simply because they dislike the parents' lifestyle. Likewise, Kaas (1996)argued that a best interests test isunconstitutional precisely because it does elevate children's needs above parents' rights. Several Supreme Court precedents have protected the rights of biological parents; thus, any application ofthe best interests test that would strip away the constitutionallyrecognized special status of biological parenthood would beunconstitutional (seeMeyer v. Nebraska, 1923; Piercev. SocietyofSisters,1925;Santosky v.Kramer, 1982). The interests ofthe child and the biological parent must bebalanced against one another.To the extent that the best in- terests doctrine elevates children's needs above parents' rights, it isunable to do this. Finally, the best interests doctrineis unable to simultaneous- lysafeguard the interests ofchildren and adults because it, like most legal doctrines, is predicated onan adversarial system of law. The best interests doctrine pits adults against oneanother with the assumption that only one can win. Thus, although the child's needs matter, much ofthe actual focus ofthe dispute is onthe adults: oneadult winsand oneadult loses.Thechild's "win" isassumed, because it is tied to the winning adult's out- come. However, it is naive to assume that the child always wins in custody disputes. Awin for one parent may, in fact, signal a lossfor the child-lossofcontact with the losing adult, lossof an attachmentfigure, loss of previously established routines and family patterns, and so forth. In fact, some scholarly work sug- gests that in many (ifnot most) situations, for the child to win, both adults must win. Both parents could besaid to win ifthe childwasable tomaintain arelationship with both. Although this is commonplace in the case of divorce, it is much less com- mon in disputes between biological and nonbiological parents. Focusing lessonthe competition between the adults and more onthe ways that they each might beable toserve the child's needsovertimewould de-emphasize thecurrent adversarial quality of the best interests doctrine. According toBartlett (1984),custody lawisbased onthe 336 Family Relations This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsideaof"exclusive" parenthood, meaning thelaw recognizes only oneset of parents for each child (see also Boskey,1995; Henry,1993; Woodhouse, 1994). Inmost states, children can legally have only onemother and onefather. This means that stepparents, foster parents, and gay and lesbian coparents have no legally recognized relationship with their nonbiological chil- dren, and they cannot establish such a relationship without sev- ering the legal status of the biological parent.(Some states, such as Vermontand California, have allowed same-sex coparents to adopt their nonbiological children without terminating the pa- rental rights of the biological parent but this is still rare). To the extent that theadults and the children involved perceive these nonbiological relationships to be familial, parent-childbonds, the notion of exclusive parenthood does not meet their needs. It does not recognize that forchildren a parent-childrelationship can exist with more than one parent or set of parents. This suggests that the notion of exclusive parenthood that isenshrinedin cus- tody doctrine, including the best interests doctrine, makes it dif- ficult fortheinterests ofchildren and adults tobeservedsi- multaneously. Unilateral Adoption oftheParental Rights Test Singular use of the parentalrights doctrinealso would prove to be an unsatisfactoryway to accommodatechildren'sinterests and adults' rights. First, this doctrine results in the adult's rights being elevated far above the child's, thereby rendering the doc- trine incapable of adequatelyprotecting the interests of children. By conceiving of childrenas persons to whom biological parents have "rights," it is impossible for the parentalrights doctrine to simultaneously protect the independent rights ofchildren and adults (seeWoodhouse, 1992).Relatedly, thedoctrine ignores the fact that the child's psychological attachments may lieout- side the biological family ("Alternatives," 1963; Bartlett,1984). Second, the parental rights doctrine, likethe best interests doctrine, is predicated on an adversarial model, so it does little to promote notionsof"nonexclusive parenthood" (Bartlett, 1984). By focusing on the need to find the biological parent unfit to deny custody, the doctrine implies only one winner and treats the child's win or lossas a nonissue. If the biological parent is fit, he or she wins custody and the nonbiological parentloses; if the biological parent is unfit, he or she losesand the nonbiolog- ical parent wins by default. However, either scenario may result in a loss for the child, if his or her long-term best interestswould be promoted by maintaining an attachmentto both parentalfig- ures (Bartlett; Boskey,1995; Bowlby,1969;Erickson, 1963). Relatedly, a finding ofunfitness that results inthe termination ofthe biological parent's rights, insome instances, may hinder the child's long-term interests. Leaving open the possibility for establishing attachmentslater inlifeis importantbecause, al- though children (especially young children) initially may be un- interested in relationships with biologicalparents withwhom they have had little contact or scarcely know, their curiosity may be peaked later inlife.Thus, whereas it may beinthe child's best interests to remain in the custody of the nonbiological par- ent, it may not be in the child's best interests to simultaneously sever all ties to the biological parent.Even if a relationship with both sets of parents (biological and nonbiological) may beun- warrantedor unimportantat one stage of a child's life, fostering relationships with both setsof parents may be veryimportant emotionally for the child at a later stage of life (see Eagle, 1994; Woodhouse, 1994). Overall, then, society's interestin safeguard- ing thewelfareofchildren cannotbe easily accommodated through the use of the parentalrights doctrine. Alternative Custody Doctrines Because unilateral adoption of either the best interests doc- trine or the parental rights doctrine would dolittle tosimulta- neously meet the dual goals of society to protect children and adults, scholars have proposed a variety ofalternative custody doctrines-most notably ofwhichare the parental preference doctrine and the psychological parent doctrine (see Davis, 1987; Kaas, 1996; Richards, 1992). Both of these are basically a mod- ification ofthe original custody doctrines. The parentalprefer- ence doctrine builds on the tenets of the parentalrights doctrine, whereas the psychological parent doctrine builds onthe tenets ofthe best interests doctrine. The Parental Preference Doctrine According to proponents of the parentalpreferencedoctrine, all custody cases should begin with a preference for the biolog- ical parent, but this preference should be rebutableon the basis of the needs of the child (Kaas, 1996). Unlike the parentalrights doctrine, which protects the rights of biological parentsirrespec- tive of the needs of the children, under a parentalpreference test the preference for the biological parent can be overcome. Thus, even fit biological parents could lose custody underthis doctrine, ifthe child's emotional and psychological interests would best beserved by remaining in the custody of the nonbiological par- ent (see Inre Marriage ofButtrey, 1995).Proponents ofthis doctrine assert that a parentalpreference is the best way to pro- tectadults and children because the importance ofthe parent- child relationship is not sacrificedfor the needs of only the adults or only the children. Although the parentalpreference doctrineis an improvement overthebestinterests and parental rights doctrines, itisstill subject to the same criticisms that underminedthe effectiveness ofthe original doctrines. Like the parental rights doctrine, the parentalpreference doctrine remains adult-centered.Ratherthan focus on the interests of the adults and children simultaneously, the emphasis remains on the competing adults and who among them hasmore rights tothe child. Not only doesthe doctrine continue to be adult-centered, but it also precludes the recogni- tionof multiple parents bycontinuing toconceiveof custody outcomes in a winner-take-allfashion. The Psychological ParentDoctrine The psychological parent doctrinewas first introducedas an alternativetothe best interests and parentalrights doctrines in 1963 ("Alternatives," 1963; see also Davis, 1987). Like the best interests doctrine,this doctrinefocuses on the needs of the child, but it does so by attemptingto determinewho, among the com- peting adults, isthe child's psychological parent. The psycho- logical parent isthe person with whom the child has his or her primary affection-relationship.Proponentsof the doctrine argue that emotional attachmentsrather than biological relationships are fundamentalfor healthy child development and are, there- fore,mostcrucialfor determining custody(Goldstein etal., 1973). Although the best interestsdoctrineand the psychological parent doctrine seemsimilar inthis context, they are not nec- essarily so. In using the best interests doctrine,judges may con- sider thechild's psychological attachmentsaspart ofawhole list ofcriteria (including the income, housing, and insuranceof 0 0 2002, Vol. 51, No.4 337 This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsz 0 u w0 the adults) tobeaccounted for in determining the child's best interests. In using the psychological parentdoctrine,psycholog- ical attachmentsare the only criteriato be considered. This custody doctrine is problematic.First, the doctrinehas been criticized not necessarily on the basis of the outcomes pro- duced but on the basis of the theory upon which it is grounded. Given that the psychological parent doctrine isbased on the te- nets of psychoanalysis-a controversial theory in itself--schol- ars argue that it may beunwisetousethedoctrine in legal decision-making (Davis,1987; Waters & Noyes,1983). Addi- tionally, this doctrine, like the others, precludes the recognition of multiple parents. As Watersand Noyes note, because the doc- trine stresses the importance of a single attachment figure it "un- derestimates"the viability of shared parenting as a family struc- ture" (p. 505). Research demonstratesthat children are capable of and even profit from multiple simultaneousattachments (Ains- worth, 1989; Lamb, 1977). People form a variety of attachments throughout their lives, andeachofthese relationships offers unique benefits to the participants(see Ainsworth, 1989). Just as adults benefit in different ways from relationships with spouses, children, and close friends, it can be expected that children,too, will benefit from the maintenanceof multiple attachments.How- ever, none ofthe current custody doctrines, including the psy- chological parent doctrine, promote custody awards that recog- nize nonexclusive parenthood. ANew Custody Doctrine On the basisofthe problems each ofthese doctrines pre- sents, anew doctrine that accommodates adults' and children's rights simultaneously is needed. Moreover, for a new doctrineto have widespreadeffect, it needs to be based on more than schol- arly debate and social science research.The debate and research surrounding the psychological parent doctrinewas extensive and its impact on custody law was profound (Davis,1987; Guggen- heim, 1983; Smith, 1978). Yet, ultimately even the effect of this doctrine was piecemeal and sporadic. For instance, although the theory ofthe psychological parent doctrine influenced judicial decision-making in the state of New York immediatelyfollowing its introductioninto the law, it did not have the expected long- term effect. Judges apparently retreatedfrom the doctrine during the1980s (seeDavis; seealso Matter of Adoption of Male M, 1980; Dennis T. v. Joseph C.,1981). In contrast,judges in the state of Illinois were unaffected by the trend toward the psycho- logical parent doctrine. Illinois has a long history of protecting parents' rights and that tendency remained steady even after the introductionof psychological parent theory into the law (see In reTownsend's Custody, 1980; People exrel.Dizney v.Witt, 1975; Petition ofKirchner, 1995). Clearly, socialscientific re- search and scholarly articles recommendinga new custody doc- trine are not enough toaffectwidespread changes incustody law. However, using Supreme Court precedent as the basis for a new custody doctrine may be the key to getting it accepted be- causeitwould significantly bolster thedoctrine's legallegiti- macy. U.S. Supreme Court decisions set legal precedents for the entire country. Assuch,any doctrine predicated on Supreme Court rulings would likely be adoptedby each of the states more readily than one predicatedonly on social science research. The basis for a new custody doctrinecan be found in a series ofunwed father casesdecided bythe Supreme Court between 1972 and 1989. These cases have been interpreted to hold that an unwed father's right to his child is constitutionallyprotected only ifheestablishes a relationship with the child. Inshort, a biological connection tothe child isnot enough to ensure cus- tody and visitation rights; a father must forge an emotional con- nection withthechild (Hill,1991; Visconti,1988).However, several recent scholars suggested that alloftheunwed father casesshould be interpreted to protect family units rather than simply parent-childrelationships (Dolgin, 1993; Forman, 1994; McCarthy, 1988). I argue that the cases protect both established relationships and family units, albeit inconsistently.Importantly, it is precisely this inconsistency by the Court that allows for the formation ofa new custody doctrine that I call the "family re- lations doctrine." The remainderofthis article analyzes the un- wed father cases to demonstratehow these cases give rise to the family relations doctrine. The Unwed Father Cases: Protecting Relationships, Family Units, or Both? The Supreme Court decided itsfirst unwed father casein 1972. In Stanley v. Illinois (1972), the biological father of three children born out ofwedlock appealed from adecision by the Illinois Supreme Court tosustain adeclaration of dependency made by the state ofIllinois with respect to the children. Peter Stanley had cohabited with the biological mother of his children intermittently for18 years, had developed and maintaineda pa- rental relationship with all ofhischildren, and had never dem- onstratedhimself to bean unfit parent. Following the death of the children's mother, the state ofIllinois declared his children to be dependents and wards of the state; consequently,they were placed with court-appointedguardians. Stanley appealed, argu- ing that the placement ofhis children with guardians was a vi- olation ofhis due process and equal protectionrights given that he did not first receive a hearingregarding his fitness as a parent. He was presumed unfit based solely on the fact that he was not marriedto the children'smother.The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and reversed thestate court ruling. Importantly,although the Court's opinion doesnotdiscuss Stanley's relationship tohis children explicitly, the decision does foreshadow the relational emphasis that is present in future cases. Byrecognizing Stanley asa parent where prior Illinois law had defined only wed bio- logical fathers (and wed or unwed biological mothers) to be par- ents, the Court implied that relationships are a defining feature of parenting. Perhaps without fully articulatingit, the Court also was sug- gesting that, for unwed fathers, neither blood, marriage, nor par- ent-child relationships are enough to independently endow fa- thers with custodial rights. Instead, they alsomust establish a relationship withthechild'smother. TheCourt hinted atthis whenit justified itsdecisiontoreverse theIllinoisSupreme Court by noting that "the integrity of the family unit has found protection in the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmend- ment.., .theEqual Protection Clause ofthe FourteenthAmend- ment..., and the Ninth Amendment" (p. 651). In short, because theIllinoisdecisioninfringed upon theintegrity ofStanley's family unit, it was unconstitutional. The Court was more clear in the articulationof its decision- making rationale inQuilloin v.Walcott (1978).Here the Court ruled in favor ofa Georgia statute that allowed the adoption of a child by his stepfather over the objection of the child's biolog- ical father,Leon Quilloin. In this case, the biological father had had little to no contact with the child for 11 years. Because the 338 Family Relations This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsfather "had not taken steps to support or legitimate" his son, the Georgia Supreme Court found, and theU.S. Supreme Court agreed, that he was not entitled "as a matterof due process and equal protection to an absolute veto over adoption of his child" (p. 253).Instead, "any constitutionallyprotected interest [Quil- loin]might havehad waslost"onthe basisofhisfailure to legitimate his son (p. 254). Thus, one could argue that according to the Court, Quilloin forfeited his rights to his child because he did not establish a relationship with him. In fact, the Court jus- tified its decision, at least in part, byarguing that Quilloin had not only "never exercised actualor legal custody over his child," but healso had never been responsible for"the daily supervi- sion, education, protection, or care ofthe child" (p. 256). Again,although Quilloin washeldaccountable fornever establishing a parent-childrelationship with his son, a close read- ing ofthe casedemonstratesthat the Court alsowas thinking about Quilloin's failure toestablish a "family unit"withthe child and his mother. At the outset ofthe opinion, Justice Mar- shall noted that Quilloin and the child's mother "never married each other or established a home together" (p. 247). Even more important, the Court emphasized that Quilloin had never been "a de facto memberof the child's family unit," but the stepfather whowas proposing to adopt the child"was part ofthe family unit in which the child was in fact living" (p. 252-253,emphasis in original). The Court went on to justify its decision to uphold the Georgia Supreme Court's ruling on the basis of the fact that "the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence" (p. 255). A year later inCaban v. Mohammed (1979) the Court in- validated asimilar NewYork statute that enabled two children tobe adopted by their stepfather overthe objections oftheir biological father. However, unlike Quilloin, Abdiel Caban, the father inthis case, had established a"substantial" parental re- lationship (p. 387) with his children, and he had lived with their mother for 5 years. In fact, during the years they cohabited,they represented themselves as husbandand wife, althoughthey were not married; even after their separation Caban continued to ex- ercise visitation with his children.The Supreme Courtconcluded that the NewYork statute that allowed unwed mothers to with- hold consent regarding the adoption of their childrenbut did not similarly allowunwed fathers towithhold consent was uncon- stitutionalon the basis of the Equal ProtectionClause. The Jus- tices reasoned that "the present case demonstratesthat an unwed father may have a relationship with his children fully comparable to that of the mother," for after all, Caban, the children's mother, and the children had "lived together as a natural family for sev- eral years" and "membersof this family, both motherand father participated inthe care and support oftheir children" (p. 389, emphasis added). Ultimately, Caban retained his rights tohis children. The fourth unwed father case tocome before the Supreme Court, Lehr v. Robertson (1983), was perhaps the most explicit in its discussion of parent-childrelationships and the most am- biguous in its discussion ofthe importance ofa "family unit." In this case the biological father, JonathanLehr, was unable to prevent the adoption ofhis daughterby her stepfather because Lehr had"never had any significant custodial, personal, or fi- nancial relationship" with her, nor did he"seek toestablish a legal tie[with her] until after she was two years old"(p. 262). The Courtrefused to protectLehr'sinterestin his daughtersolely on the basis ofhis biological tie to her. Without an established relationship, hedidnot possessanyconstitutionallyprotected rights. Justice Stevens made this point explicit when he wrote: The significance of the biological connection is that it offers thenatural father an opportunity that noother male pos- sessesto develop a relationship withhis offspring. Ifhe grasps that opportunity and accepts somemeasure ofre- sponsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-childrelationship and make uniquely valuable contributionstothe child's development. Ifhefailstodo so, the Federal Constitutionwill not automaticallycompel a state to listen to his opinion ofwhere the child's best inter- ests lie. (p. 262) Thus, the Court wasclear that the lack ofa parent-child rela- tionship prevented Lehr from exercising anydecision-making power with respect to his daughter. The Court did imply that Lehr's failure to establish a family unit with his daughter and her mother wasan important factor as well.The Justices noted that, like the Quilloin case, allowing the adoption in this case would "give full recognition to a family unit already in existence" (p.263).Relatedly, the adoption would give"legal permanence" to the child's relationship with her stepfather-arelationship the two had enjoyed for nearly two years (p. 264). In the final casetocomebefore the Court, Michael H.v. Gerald D. (1989), the Justices were asked to invalidate a Cali- fornia statute that presumed any child born into a marriage was the legitimate offspring of that marriage. The appellant, Michael H., hadfathered achildwithawoman whowasmarried to someone else, Gerald D.Because the child was born during the woman's marriage to Gerald D., by virtue of the Californiastat- ute, he was presumed to be the child's father.In short, Michael H. had no recognized legal rights to his biological daughter be- cause the law assigned the status of parent of GeraldD. Michael H.'s relationship with his daughter wasnot merely biological. The child's mother had allowed Michael H. to establish a rela- tionship with the child; in fact, she referredto him as "daddy" (p.144). Thus, when his relationship with his daughter was in- voluntarily cut off, Michael H. sued for visitation rights. He was denied because hewasnotthe recognized legal father ofthe child. Hence, he brought suit to have the California statute that deemed Gerald D.to be the legal father declared invalid. Michael H. argued that the prior unwed father cases estab- lished a precedent that protected his rights, because he was the child's biological father, and hehad an established relationship with her. The Court rejected Michael H.'s interpretation ofthe prior casesastoonarrow. Theyargued that the unwed father cases did not rest merely on"biological fatherhoodplus an es- tablished parentalrelationship" but upon "the historic respect- indeed, sanctity would not betoostrong aterm-traditionally accordedto the relationships that develop within the unitary fam- ily"(p. 123). The Justices went on to note that "the family unit accorded traditionalrespect inour society, which wehave re- ferred toasthe'unitary family,' is typified, ofcourse, by the maritalfamily" (p. 124). Consequently,they ruled that the fam- ily unit that wasalready established between themother, her husband (Gerald D.),and the child was accorded constitutional protection. Michael H.'s desire to infringe upon that family unit by having hisstatus as a parent to the child legally recognized was not accorded such protection. Ultimately, byinvoking the family unit approach, the final unwed father caseostensibly elevated that decision-making ra- 0 0 2002, Vol. 51, No.4339 This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsz 0 u w0 tionale above the relational approach. On the basis of this, some scholars argued that the rulings ofeach prior casealsowere fundamentally about established family units: Those fatherswho did establish a family unit with the child's mother prevailed in their efforts to have rights to their children whereas those who did not failed (Dolgin,1993). Perhaps it is not that simple. The dissent inMichael H.asserted forcefully that the casesshould be read to protect parent-childrelationships(see p.142-144). It appears that the Justices, themselves, were not entirely precise intheir decision-making; sometimes relationships were para- mount (as in Lehr), sometimes family units were paramount(as in Quilloin), and sometimes both were paramount(as in Caban). This suggests that both relationships and family units were im- portant to the Justices in all cases. Because their application was not clearly articulatedor precisely defined, inconsistencies de- veloped in their approach. It isthese inconsistencies that allow for the formationofa new custody doctrine that is still founded upon this existing Supreme Court precedent. Extending theUnwedFatherCases To summarize, each ofthe five unwed father cases empha- sizesthe importance of relationships and family units.The Court's rulings in Stanley and Caban enabled unwed fatherswho had established relationships withtheir children and whohad livedwith the children's mothers ina "family unit" toretain rights to their children. In Quillion and Lehr the unwed fathers had their rights to their children terminatedbecause they did not have established relationships with their children, and they had never lived ina family unit with the mothers oftheir children. Finally, in Michael H. the unwed father lost rights to his child, despite his established relationship with her, because her mother wasmarried toanother man and the childwasborn into that family unit. I argue that a reading of the unwed fathercases that recognizes the emphasis on both relationships and family units and recognizes the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the ways the Justices applied these two decision-makingcriteria,opens the door foranew custody doctrine that protects established rela- tionships and family units. Icallthis the family relations doc- trine. According tothis doctrine, custody disputes should be de- cided by placing physical custody with the parents to whom the child is psychologically attached.Research suggests that attach- ments are based on the amount and kind of contact the child has with the adult (Curtis, 1980; Goldstein et al.,1973). Daily con- tact with a parent and daily reliance on the parent tomeet the child's needs willincrease the levelofattachmentbetween the childand theadult. Thus,although timeand contact are not perfect indicators of attachment,they do provide some insight into the relationshipthat exists between the child and the adult. Attachment alsocanbeassessedonthebasisofinformation provided by thechild,suchasastated desire tolivewitha particularparent orreferences tothenonbiological parents as "mom" and "dad." Typically the parent or parents in the child's currentfamily unit will be the adults to whom he or she is psy- chologicallyattached. Byfocusingonthecurrent family unit, the family relations doctrine protects continuity within the fam- ily. Physical custody withoneparent orsetof parents would not necessarily preclude legalrights vested inthe other parent or parents.Because the doctrineis not inherentlyadversariallike theothers, it emphasizes relationships rather than competition betweenadults. Consequently, theadversarial, winner-take-all flavor is gone, sothe doctrine does not preclude recognition of multiple parents. If relationships exist between the child and both the biological and nonbiological parents, the emphasis onde- veloped relationships ensures maintenanceof those relationships bylegally recognizing the parental status ofboth sets ofadults. Byvesting rights in both the biological and nonbiological par- ents, this doctrine facilitates continued relationships between the parents and thechild through shared decision-making forthe adults and continued visitation between the noncustodial parent and the child. This is especially important for gay and lesbian coparents or former stepparents who typically have no legally recognizedrelationship totheir nonbiological children, and therefore, are not entitled to visitation with the childrenover the objections ofthe biological parent (see Kazmierazakv. Query, 1999). The family relations doctrine alsodoesnot necessarily preclude the establishment of multiple relationships if they do not already exist. Overall, this doctrine goes a long way toward protecting the interests ofchildren and adults simultaneously. Protecting the interests of children and adults by preserving their attachmentsto one anotheris a worthy goal. Research sug- gests that socialattachmentsare a key to psychological well- being and that insecure orsevered attachmentsare associated with psychological maladjustment and psychopathology(see Ro- senstein & Horowitz, 1996; Ross,1995). For instance, Khaleque and Rohner (2002) found strong support for the contention that perceived parentalrejection results in maladjustment in children. Although this research wasfocusedon biological parent-child relationships, itcan beassumed that the perceived parental re- jection that would likely accompany the lossofa nonbiological parent would be psychologically damaging as well. Using Supreme Court precedent to fashion this new doctrine isnot without obstacles. First, the Justices certainly did not in- tend for the family unit argument to apply outside the confines ofthe biological family. They suggested as much in Lehr when they noted that "the adoption does not affect [the child's] rela- tionship with her mother", but it does give"legal permanence" to her relationship with her stepfather(Lehr v. Robertson, 1983, p.264).Likewise, in Quilloin they noted that the case was not one in which "the proposed adoption would place the child with a new set of parents"; instead, the result ofthe adoption would be"to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence" (Quilloin v.Walcott, 1978, p. 255). Second, despite my contention that the family relationsdoc- trine would accommodatecontact with multiple parents, the Jus- tices clearly did not intend for their rulings to be used to advo- catetheideaofnonexclusive parenthood. Theyexplicitly re- jected such an argument in Michael H. when they asserted that, despite the fact that it might be to the child's benefit to maintain relationships with both Michael H. and Gerald D., the idea that "a State must recognize multiple fatherhoodhas no support in the history or traditionsofthis country" (p.131), for after all, "natureitself makes no provision for dual fatherhood"(Michael H.v. Gerald D.,1989,118). Addressing some ofthe ambiguities and inconsistencies in- herent in the Court's decisions will help overcome these obsta- cles.First, the Court left the importance of biology in the deci- sion-makingprocess ambiguous. Because four of the five unwed father cases involved disputes between a biological father and a biological mother and her husband,the Justices were never in a position tohave tochooseunequivocally between a biological parent and a nonbiological parent.Regardless of their decisions, the children would remain in the custody of a biological parent. 340 Family Relations This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsConsequently,although the biological relationships were certain- ly an issue, the establishment of parent-childrelationships and family units were pushed tothe fore and used todifferentiate between those parents who had constitutionallyprotected inter- ests in their children and those who did not. In short, Iam suggesting that theCourt wasat alltimes faced with issues of biology because the biological fatherin each casestood to gain or loseaccess to his children on the basis of the Court'sdecision. However, I also am suggesting that the issue of biology nonetheless remained implicit, as four of the five cas- es were essentially disputes between two biological parents-the custodial biological mother who was attempting to limit the bi- ological father's rights to hischildren and the biological father whowas attempting toexertthose rights. Consequently, the competing parties couldnotbe distinguished onthebasisof biology alone, so the Justices differentiatedbetween them on the basisofestablished relationships. Had the Justices been faced with disputes between an unwed biological father and the chil- dren's nonbiological parent (e.g.,stepfathers who retained cus- tody oftheir stepchildren following the biological mother's death), the emphasis placed on the biological relationships cer- tainly would not have remained ambiguous. This means that the importance of biology, relationships, and family units never has been determinedrelative to one another.Because the importance of biology remained implicit in the Court's analysis, the unwed father casescreated precedents that effectively elevated estab- lished relationships and family units above biological ties. Two biological fathers won their cases because they had established relationships with their children and with their children's moth- ers; two biological fathers lost their cases because they had not established such relationships; and one biological father lost his case because he had done one ofthese things but not the other. Inand of itself,biology wasnotadeterminativefactor inthe decision-makingprocess. Even though the issueof biological relatedness wasnot a key factor in the decision, the cases had unforseen consequences for disputes between biological and nonbiological parents. In three casesaloss by the biological father resulted inthe non- biological father gaining recognized legal status asthe child's parent; the stepfathers in Quilloin and Lehr were able to adopt their stepchildren, and the "presumed" fatherin Michael H. was able tomaintain his legal status as father even though hewas not the child's biological or adoptive parent. Without explicitly articulatingit, or possibly even recognizing it, the Justices es- tablished precedents that emphasized established nonbiological relationships over biological ones. It is possible that in leaving the importance of biologyambiguous (orassumed) theCourt paved the way for these precedentsto be extended to cases where the dispute isbetween a biological and a nonbiological parent. For instance, the precedents could plausibly beusedto argue thatestablished parent-child relationshipsand familyunits should bethe determinativefactors in deciding the case rather than biology. Interpretedinthis way, the family relations stan- dard could be used to protect established relationshipswithin a nonbiological family unit. Second, the Justices were inconsistent in their applicationof theideaofa familyunit. Insomecases,theCourt protected previous biological family units, whereas inothers it protected current nonbiological family units. In each case, the family unit that was protected bythe Court wasonethat either no longer existed but had been composed of both biological parentsduring its duration (previous biological family unit) or currentlyexisted and contained one adult who was not biologically related to the child (current nonbiological familyunit). InCaban theCourt noted that the biological father,mother,and children had at one time lived together ina family unit. Consequently, the Justices made their decision to protect Caban's rights on the basis of the importance of protecting previous biological family units. Even though a new nonbiological family unit also had been established between the children, their biological mother, and their stepfa- ther, theCourt gave scant attention tothe current family unit. The Justices apparently saw no reason to give explicit protection to that relationship. In contrast,in Quilloin and Lehr no previous family unitexisted involving both biologicalparents butthe Court continued tostress the importance of family units by em- phasizing the child's current nonbiological family unit. In both cases,the Court justified itsdecision tosever the rights ofthe biological fathers totheir children because doing sowould le- gitimate the family units that already existed between the child, the biological mother, and the stepfather. In these cases, current nonbiological family units did enjoy explicit protection. In es- sence,iftheCourt had two family units tochoosefrom (one current and one previous), it emphasized the prior biological family unit over the current nonbiological family unit. When the Court was faced solely with a current nonbiological family unit, it protected that family unit; in doing so biological fathers were divested of rights to their children. Ultimately, the Justices rec- ognized the importance ofcurrent nonbiological and past bio- logical relationships in the lifeofa child but they refused to do so simultaneously. This refusal to validate both types of family units simultaneously represents an inconsistency inthe Court's analysis ofwhich the Justices were likely unaware. The Court explicitly rejected the notion ofnonexclusive parenthood in Mi- chael H.; yet, the Court's own precedentseffectively encapsulate thenotion ofnonexclusive parenthoodbyrecognizing the im- portance of past and present relationships. Nonexclusive parent- hoodvalidates past and present relationshipbysuggesting that courts allow children to maintainties to multiple sets of parents. Given that the unwed father precedents implicitly support non- exclusive parenthood, resolving the inconsistency between the Court's explicit statements and implicit outcomes means recog- nizing that, regardless of their intent, the Justices ultimately did create precedents that support nonexclusive parenthood. In short, the Court's recognition that both types of relationships are im- portant ismore significant than itsrefusal tovalidate each si- multaneously.Thus, by using these precedents to frame the fam- ily relations doctrine to accommodate past and present relation- ships, the doctrine could beused to protect children and adults by recognizing multiple parents. Conclusion Here Ihave argued that recent Supreme Court precedents setthe stage foranewcustody doctrine-thefamily relations doctrine. The hallmarkofthis new doctrine isthat it serves the interests of children and adults simultaneouslyby focusing cus- tody decision-making on past, present, and future emotional re- lationships. In other words, the doctrine has the ability to pre- serve multiple families.Predicating thedoctrine onSupreme Court precedent increases the legitimacy and the likelihood that the doctrine is adopted by the states. Widespreadacceptance of the doctrine would be beneficial precisely because it eliminates the problems associated with the best interestsand parentalrights doctrines. Specifically, it accommodatesthe interests of children 0 2002, Vol. 51, No.4 341 This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditionsand adults simultaneously. The family relations doctrinecan ac- count for the psychological attachmentsofchildren and adults because it emphasizes emotional relationships over biological re- latedness. It also promotes the idea ofnonexclusive parenthood because it isnot based on winner-take-all concepts and can pre- serve multiple family units. If accepted on a widespreadbasis, it must be noted that this doctrine certainly would not eliminate all problems in custody disputes between biological and nonbiological parents. Even if accepted theoretically or ideologically, the idea of multiple par- ents would not be without problems in implementation. For in- stance, among divorcing couples with joint legal or joint physical custody, it can be difficult for the adults to"share" childrenand cooperate with one another with respect tosuch things as visi- tation times, vacation planning, holiday get-togethers,disciplin- ary styles, and soforth. If cooperation isdifficult for twobio- logical parents, it seems reasonableto assume that child sharing would beevenmore contentious whensomeofthe adults in- volved are not biological parents. Although thesesorts of problems are certainly important, they are not sosevere asto completely preclude the adoption and implementation ofthe family relations doctrine. The prob- lems associated with joint custody among divorcing couples are widelyrecognized; yet, the practice of awardingjoint custody still predominates (Hess,1986).Moreover, although research finds that exposure to ongoing conflict between divorced parents ismore detrimentaltochildren than nocontact with thenon- custodial parent (seeOpie,1993), much research suggests that maintainingrelationships with both parents is a crucial factor in children's adjustment to divorce (Amato & Gilbreth,1999; Opie; Simons, Whitbeck, Beaman, & Conger, 1994; Wall & Amadio, 1994). We should expect that in the context of biological versus nonbiological disputes, maintainingrelationships with both sets of parentsgenerally would be beneficial to the child, despite the potential problems associated with multiple families. Implementing the family relations standardmeans getting family lawyers and family court judges to utilize this doctrine. The case analysis here can serve as the catalyst in this process. Lawyers and judges can use the logic outlined in this article to craft an argument incourt that would introduce the family re- lations doctrine. From there, reliance on precedent, debate over the new doctrine, and continued adaptation ofthe doctrine will help to spur its adoption in other courts and states. References -.(1963). Alternativesto "parentalrights" in child custody disputes involving third parties. Yale Law Journal, 73,151-170. Ainsworth, M. (1962). The effects of maternal deprivation: A review of findings and controversy in the context of research strategy. In Deprivationof maternal care:Areassessment of its effects (Public Health Papers No. 14). Geneva: World Health Organization. Ainsworth, M. D. (1989). Attachments beyond infancy. American Psychologist, 44,709-716. Amato, PR., & Gilbreth,J. G. (1999). Nonresidentfathers and children's well- being: A meta-analysis. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 61,557-553. Bartlett, K. T. (1984).Rethinking parenthood asan exclusivestatus: The need for legal alternativeswhen the premise ofthe nuclear family has failed. Vir- ginia Law Review, 70, 879-963. Boskey, J. B. (1995). The swamps of home: A reconstructionof the parent-child relationship. Universityof Toledo Law Review, 26,805-853. Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachmentand loss (Vol1). NewYork: Basic Books. Bowlby, J. (1973). Attachmentand loss (Vol 2). NewYork: Basic Books. Bowlby, J. (1980). Attachmentand loss (Vol 3). NewYork: Basic Books. Caban v. Mohammed,441U.S.380 (1979). Cahn, N.R.(1997).Reframing child custody decisionmaking. Ohio State Law Journal, 58,1-60. Curtis, C. (1980). The psychological parentdoctrinein custody disputesbetween foster parents and biological parents. Columbia Journal ofLaw and Social Problems, 16,149-192. Davis, P. C. (1987). "Thereis a book out...": An analysis of judicial absorption of legislative facts. Harvard Law Review, 100,1539-1604. Dennis T. v. Joseph C., 82A.D.2d125 (NY App. Div.,1981). Dolgin, J. L.(1993).Just a gene: Judicial assumptions about parenthood. Uni- versity ofCalifornia Law Review, 40,637-694. Eagle, R. (1994). The separationexperience ofchildren in long-term care: The- ory, research and implications for practice. American Journal ofOrthopsy- chiatry, 64, 421-434. Erickson, E. (1963).Childhood and society. NewYork: Norton. Forman, D.L.(1994).Unwed fathers and adoption: Atheoretical analysis in context. Texas Law Review, 72, 967-1045. Goldstein, J., Freud, A.,&Solnit, A.(1973).Beyond the best interests ofthe child. NewYork: Free Press. Griswold v.Connecticut,381 U.S. 479(1965). Guggenheim, M.(1983).The political and legal implications ofthe psycholog- ical parentingtheory. Review of Law and Social Change, 12,549-555. Henry, V. L. (1993). A tale ofthree women: A survey of the rights and respon- sibilities ofunmarriedwomen who conceive by alternativeinsemination and amodel for legislative reform. American Journal of Law and Medicine, 19, 285-311. Hess,PM.(1986).Promoting accesstoaccess with divorcing parents. Social Casework, 67,594-604. Hill,J. L. (1991).What does it mean to bea "parent"? The claim of biology asthe basis for parental rights. NewYork UniversityLaw Review, 66,353- 420. In InterestofB.G.C., 496N.W.2d 239,(IA S.Ct., 1992). In re Adoption of Baby E.A.W,658So.2d 961(FL S.Ct., 1995). In re Marriage of Buttrey, 538 N.W.2d 322(IA S.Ct., 1995). In re Townsend's Custody, 413N.E.2d 428(IL App. Ct., 1980). Kaas, C.W. (1996).Breaking up a family or putting itback together again: Refining the preference infavor oftheparent inthird-partycustody cases. Williamand Mary Law Review, 37,1045-1136. Kazmierazakv. Query, 736So.2d106 (FL App. Ct., 1999). Khaleque, A., & Rohner,R. (2002). Perceived parentalacceptance-rejectionand psychological adjustment:A meta-analysis ofcross-culturaland intracultural studies. Journal of Marriage and Family, 64,54-65. Kulan v. Anderson, 20N.E.2d 987(IL App. Ct., 1939). Lamb, M. (1977). Father-infantand mother-infantinteractionin the first year of life.Child Development, 48,167-185. Lehr v. Roberston,463U.S.248(1983). Matter of Adoption ofMale M, 76 A.D.2d839 (NY App. Div.,1980). McCarthy,EB. (1988). The confused constitutionalstatus and meaning of pa- rental rights. Georgia Law Review, 22,975-1033. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262U.S. 390(1923). Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491U.S.110 (1989). Northlandv.Starr,581N.W.2d 210(IA S.Ct., 1998). O'Keefe, J. G. (1991). The need to consider children's rights in biological parent v. third party custody disputes. Chicago-Kent Law Review, 67,1077-1105. Opie, A.(1993).Ideologies of jointcustody. Family andConciliation Courts Review, 31,313-326. Petition ofKirchner,649N.E.2d 324(IL S. Ct., 1995). People exrel. Dizney v. Witt, 324 N.E.2d 433(IL App. Ct., 1975). Pierce v.Society ofSisters, 268 U.S.510 (1925). Prince v. Massachusetts,321 U.S.158 (1944). Quilloin v. Walcott, 434U.S.246(1978). Richards, J. L.(1992).The natural parent preference versus third parties: Ex- panding the definition ofparent.Nova Law Review, 16, 733-766. Rosenstein, D.S.,& Horowitz, H.A.(1996).Adolescent attachmentand psy- chopathology. Journal ofConsultingand Clinical Psychology, 64,244-253. Ross,L.E.(1995).Reconceptualizing marital status asacontinuum ofsocial attachment.Journal of Marriage and the Family, 57,129-140. Salthe, E.P. (1990). Would abolishing the naturalparent preference in custody disputes be in everyone's best interest?Journal of Family Law, 29,539-548. Santosky v.Kramer,455U.S.745(1982). Simons, R. L., Whitbeck, L. B., Beaman, J., & Conger,R. D. (1994). The impact ofmothers' parenting, involvement bynonresidential fathers, and parental conflict onthe adjustmentofadolescent children. Journal of Marriage and the Family, 56,356-374. Smith, S.H.(1978).Psychological parents vs.biological parents: The courts' response tonewdirections inchildcustody dispute resolution. Journal of Family Law, 17, 545-576. 342 FamilyRelations z 0 u *w0 This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsStanley v. Illinois, 405U.S.645 (1972). Taub,N. (1984). Assessing the impact of Goldstein,Freud,and Solnit's proposals: An introductory overview. Review of Law and Social Change, 12, 485-494. Visconti, R. (1988). The legal relationship of a nonbiological father to his child: Amatterof equity. Universityof Detroit School of Law, 66,97-125. Wall, J.C.,& Amadio,C. (1994). An integrated approach tochild custody evaluation: Utilizing the "best interest" of the child and family systems frame- works. Journal of Divorce and Remarriage, 21(3-4), 39-57. Waters,E., & Noyes, D.M. (1983). Psychological parenting vs. attachmentthe- ory: The child's best interests and the risks ofdoing the right things for the wrong reasons. Review of Law and Social Change, 12,505-515. Woodhouse, B.B.(1992)."Who owns the child?": Meyer and Pierceand the child as property. Williamand Mary Law Review, 33, 995-1122. Woodhouse, B.B.(1994)."Out ofchildren's needs,children's rights": The child'svoiceindefining the family. Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law, 8,321-341. m 0 0 2002, Vol. 51, No.4 343 This content downloaded from 122.53.19.230 on Tue, 11 Aug 2015 01:48:01 UTCAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions