brandom, robert. - the social anatomy of inference

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Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchVol. LIH, No. 3, September 1993

The Social Anatomyof Inference

ROBERTBRANDOM

University of Pittsburgh

The message of this shopper's guide is Caveat Emptor. It aims to show

that semantic holism is optional, expensive, and costly to maintain. I agree

with these claims, and with the overall conclusion that there are practically

no closed options in semantics. I want to indicate how one might go about

overcoming some of the difficulties they point out with individuating concep-

tual contents by their inferential roles.

The main issue is how to understand the identity and individuation of such

generic semantic properties of thoughts or utterances as having or expressing

propositional, conceptual, or intentional content. It is made more precise by

these definitions:

A property is anatomic just in case if anything has it, then at least one other thing does.. If

a property is not anatomic, then.. .it is atomistic or punctate.'

In a weak sense, a semantic theory is holistic if it rules out the possibility of

punctate minds or languages-those having only a single belief or capable of

expressing only a single proposition. But there is also a stronger, if unavoid-

ably vaguer, sense in play:

Holistic properties are properties such that, if anything has them, then lots of other things

must have them too... [They are] very anatomic.2

There are good reasons to take conceptual contentfulness to be anatomic,

and so to reject the possibility of punctate minds or languages. Everything

turns on how conceptual contentfulness is demarcated, though, and I doubt

that such matters are amenable to the sort of knock-down demonstration of

the incoherence of all alternatives for which Fodor and Lepore apparently

yearn. Here is one way of putting the considerations I find persuasive. Every

physical object reliably responds differentially to its environment. A chunk of

iron rusts in water, and not in oil. Each repeatable response-type can be

thought of as classifying environing situations or stimuli, accordingly as

' [1].2

[2].

FODOR/LEPOREYMPOSIUM661



they do or do not tend to elicit a responseof thattype. In this way a certain

sortof contentis associated with states that mediatestimulus andresponse: a

spider classifies something (treats t in practice)as food by eating it. No-one

not in the grip of a theorywould be tempted to thinkthat in such cases the

iron or the spiderareapplyingconcepts-that the content theirresponsesac-

quire n thisway arespecificallyconceptualcontents.Whatmore is required?A trainedparrotor a photocell hooked up to suit-

able peripheralsmay produce utterances ndistinguishable rom a humanob-

server's That'sred, andmaybe reliablydifferentiallydisposedso to respond

tojust the same set of stimuli as the observer.What differencemakes the dif-

ference between mere responsive classification and responsive conceptual

classification? The insight underlying conceptual role semantics is that in

virtue of the role it plays in the observer'sbehavioraleconomy, the observer

understands its response, in a way the parrotand the photocell do not. Theobserver'spracticalgraspof theconcept'red'-over and above thereliabledif-

ferential responsive dispositions she shares with the parrot and the photo-

cell-consists in herdispositionsto take the applicationof the concept red as

a reason that warrants he applicationof otherconcepts,such as colored, and

as something that can itself be warrantedby the applicationof furthercon-

cepts, such as scarlet. In short,specifically conceptualclassification s distin-

guishedby its inferentialarticulation.

I think this is a good way to use 'conceptual',but there are others. The

important hingis not the word,butpicking out andunderstanding n impor-

tantphenomenon.Takinginferentialarticulation o be criterialof the concep-

tual as such cuts at important oints. If you think thereare other sorts of in-

tentionality (sentience without concept-mongering sapience), then you can

think of the explanatory target as conceptual intentionality or contentful-

ness-one species amongothers.If you object to calling it 'conceptual', ust

call it- inferentiallyarticulated'.Possession of inferentiallyarticulatedcontent is clearly an anatomicse-

manticproperty, or servingas premiseor conclusionin nontrivial nferences

requiresinferentialrelations to othercontents that also play such roles. Fur-

ther, nothingwouldcountas grasping such a content unless it involved being

disposedto treatsome inferences nvolving thatcontent as good and othersas

bad.3 If that is so, then therecannot be punctateconcept-graspingminds or

concept-expressinganguages.

This is a very weak claim, and the most telling argumentsFodorand Lep-ore presentkick in when one tries to go on with the story from here. Of the

many that deserve discussion, I'll focus on two. First, it is pointed out4that

3 As the authorssay, it is possible to deny such a connection between how content is in-

dividuated and what one must do to count as grasping it. Filing in the sketch offered

here would require ustifying this move.4 [166]-[172].

662 ROBERT BRANDOM





conceptualrole theoryseems to makesense only as one partof a two-factor

theory,which includes truthand reference as a further ndependentsemantic

dimension. But then one wants to know about the relations between them,

and worriesabout whatprecludesradicalmismatchesbetween the two dimen-

sions of intensionandextension, inferentialrole and truthconditions.

These challengesare well-taken.I think the right response is to show how

the extensionaldimension of semantic evaluationcan be understoodas an as-

pect of concept use-by explaining referentialroles in terms of inferential

roles. This is a tall order, and I can offer only a sketch here of how such a

story might go: To be prepositionally contentful is to occupy a position in

the space of reasons,as what can serve bothas.the premiseand as the conclu-

sion of inferences. Inferentialconsequencesarenecessary conditions,and in-

ferentialantecedentsaresufficientconditions; ogether hese articulate he cir-

cumstancesand consequences of applicationof concepts. The key to seeingwhy these should be understoodas truthconditionslies in the social natureof

the fundamentalnferentialpracticeof giving andaskingforreasons,and that

is a longer story. Concern with the representationaldimension of concept

use-distinguishing what thoughtand talk are about-is a feature of the es-

sentiallysocial practiceof assessing the truthof what others think or say.

Think first about the role of truthassessments in attributionsof knowl-

edge, thoughtof as justified truebelief. In taking you to have a belief, I at-

tributeto you a certainkind of prepositionallycontentful commitment-one

whose inferential articulation s manifested in the fact that by making one

claim you therebycommityourselfto others,whose contents follow as infer-

entialconsequencesfrom the one you acknowledge.In takingthat belief to be

justified,I attribute o you entitlement o thatcommitment-perhaps because

I take it to be an inferentialconsequenceof other commitmentsI takeyou to

be entitled to. What about truth?In taking your belief or claim to be true,

though, I am not attributing anything to you. I am ratherundertaking a

commitment myself-endorsing the claim thatI attribute o you, takingre-

sponsibilityfor it myself. The game of giving and askingfor reasons cannot

be understoodapart romthis social distinctionof perspective,between the at-

titudes each of us attributes,andthose we adopt. Given such a distinction,it

is possible to understandsemantic assessments of truth, and the truth-talk

that makes themexplicit.5

The primaryexplicitly representationalocutionin natural anguagesis de

re ascriptionsof propositionalattitude:John claims (or believes) of (or about)the first PostmasterGeneral that he is the inventor of bifocals. It is theirrole

in such ascriptionsthat distinguishes the intentionality-expressingsense of

5 I tell a fuller story correspondingto this promissory note in Pragmatism,Phenome-

nalism, and Truth-Talk, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. XII: Realism; 1988, pp.

75-93.

FODOR/LEPORE SYMPOSIUM 663





'of and 'about'from the rest-for instance from theiruse in thepen of my

Aunt and runningabout three miles . Whatthey express is differences of

social perspectiveregarding nferentialroles. In makingan ascriptionsuch as

the one above, I am doing two things: attributingone commitment to John

andundertaking notherone (the ascription)myself. So thereis anissue as to

who is taken to be responsible for using a certain expression ( the firstPostmasterGeneral ) n specifying the content of the ascribedcommitment.

If I attribute hat responsibility,I can make that clear by ascribing de dicto:

John believes that the First PostmasterGeneral is the inventor of bifocals. I

am claiming he would accept this way of putting things-the dictum.6But I

can make the de re ascription in the case where John accepts Benjamin

Franklin nvented bifocals, and it is me, not John,who endorsesthe substi-

tution-inference icensing identity claim thatBenjaminFranklinwas the First

Postmaster General. My talk of what his belief is of, about, or representsmakes explicit thatit is my commitments hatarebeing appealedto as auxil-

iary hypothesesin extracting he inferentialconsequences (and so specifying

the conceptual content) of the claim being attributed. t is along these lines

that I think the referential dimension of semantic assessment-talk about

what someone is talkingabout-can, like truth alk, ultimatelybe understood

in terms of the social structureof the inferential articulationof claims and

concepts.7

A second objection, more central to the book than the two-factorpoint,

turnson a worryabout how it is possible to individuate nferentialroles so as

to make sense of the possibilityof beliefs being sharedby people who do not

shareall theirbeliefs. For as Quine argued,what else one becomes committed

to as a consequenceof a given commitment,and whatevidence would entitle

one to it, dependson what otherclaims are available to serve as auxiliaryhy-

potheses. If all the inferences a claim is involved in are equally constitutive

of its conceptual content,then it seems any difference of belief will be a dif-ference of content. But then it seems thatpeople with some doxastic differ-

ences cannotcommunicate; here is no common stock of inferentiallyarticu-

lated propositional contents available to them both to agree or disagree

about.8

6 Possibly translated,with any indexicals suitably adjusted for actual speaker and cir-

cumstance.7 This sort of account is developed at length in Chapter Eight of my forthcoming book,

Making It Explicit.

8 And as the authorspoint out, if the possibility of transpersonal and, indeed, transtem-

poral) identity of content is surrendered,so is any intelligible notion of similarity of

content. For talk of similarity must be cashed out in terms of agreeing about the pro-

priety of many, though not all, of the same inferences and expression is involved in;

but sharing even one such inferential endorsementpresupposes sharing the conceptual

contents it involves-just what the strong holistic view is not entitled to.

664 ROBERTRANDOM





The obvious move is to privilege some of the inferencesa concept is in-

volved in as constitutiveof its content, treatingthe rest as warrantedby col-

lateral information.Graspingor sharingthe concept thenonly involves mas-

teringthese essential inferences.The trouble s that the conditionals that cod-

ify these inferential relationswill have to have a special status, and the up-

shot of Quine's argumentsagainstthe analytic-syntheticdistinction is thathecould find no trace in our discursive practice of such a special status. Of

course, as Fodor andLepore indicate,the fact that suchprivilegingcandidates

as unrevisabilityand a prioricitywon't do the job is hardlydecisive. Other

possibilities are not far to seek. (One that has not gotten the attention t de-

serves is Sellars' suggestion that the practicalstatus thatprivileges concept-

constitutive nferences s their counterfactualobustness.9)

Semantic molecularism of this sort stops shy of full-blown holism at

stronganatomism : he claim not only thatin order to have a proposition-ally contentfulbelief or grasp a conceptual content one must have or grasp

some others inferentiallyrelatedto it (which is weakanatomism ),but that

there is some one set of furtherbeliefs or concepts one musthave or grasp-a

differenceof quantifier cope. Weak anatomismrequiresthat concepts be in-

ferentially articulated,but does not takeit that there is some particular et of

privileged inferences that is necessaryand sufficientto count as graspingit.

Since it need not entail that sharingone belief requires sharing many, this

sort of view is dismissed as too weak to be worth the trouble of defend-

ing, '0 (even thoughit would rule out the possibility of punctateminds and

languages, which they areso fond of invoking).A betterreasonis that giving

up a single privilegedset of. content constitutive nferencesin favor of a dis-

junctive conception (conceivably of disjoint sets of inferences mastery of

which is sufficient for graspof the concept) reinstates the worry about com-

municationandthe sharingof concepts.The Quineanpragmaticquestion then

becomes urgent:Given that two interlocutorsendorse different inferences,what difference n practicecorresponds o the differencebetween their sharing

a concept (but in virtue of differentdisjuncts), and simply having different

concepts? Surely havingthe word or sentencein common is not sufficient.

Quine's own responseto the problemof makingsense of communication

given a holistic theoryof meaningis to move from concernwith meaning to

concernwithreference.A Zoroastrian ndorsesdifferent nferencesinvolving

tokenings of 'the sun' than I do, but we can nevertheless both be talking

about the same things-saying of the sun andof the class of things that emit

9 Locus classicus is Concepts as Involving Laws, and Inconceivable Without Them,

reprinted at pp. 87-124 of J. Sicha (ed.), Pure Pragmatics and Possible Worlds

[Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1980]. So conceived, meaning-constitutive relations are

not a priori: we need to find out a lot about the world and its laws to know what counter-

factuals to endorse.1 [31].

FODOR/LEPORE SYMPOSIUM 665





light that the one is includedin the other. Thus we can exchange extensional

information.This move is usually made in the context of a two-factor analy-

sis, but it makesjust as much sense where assessments of truthandreference

are understoodas aspectsof broadly nferential ocial functionalroles.

The key to understanding he sense in which inferentiallyarticulated on-

cepts are sharedis that such semantic assessmentshave a normativesignifi-cance. What is required o see through he difficultyaboutsharingholistically

individuated inferential commitments is a shift of perspective from a

Cartesianconcern with our grip on concepts to a Kantianconcern with their

grip on us. The conceptual content of one's beliefs and claims determines

what one is committed o andwhat would entitle one to those commitments.

Attributing use of a particularconcept is taking its user to be bound by

proprieties hat determinewhatinferences involving it are correct.It does not

require hattheconcept-useractuallymakeonly correct he correct nferences.If there is no privileged subset of content-constitutiveinferences, then

what inferencesare correct urnson whichauxiliaryhypotheses are trueof the

things one is talkingabout. These inferentialproprietiesare not determined

by any individual'sbehavior.Peoplewho producevery differentperformances

andexhibit verydifferentbehavioraldispositionsmay count as undertaking r

acknowledgingthe very same public obligations(and, in this connectionus-

ing the same words is not irrelevant,though it is not decisive either). After

all, differentpeople can undertake he samemarriageor mortgageobligations

by producing and being disposed to produce quite various sorts of perfor-

mances.

Differentinterlocutorsendorse differentclaims, thatit, take-truedifferent

auxiliaryhypotheses,andso may disagree about ust what everyone who ap-

plies the concept sun commits themselvesto-thereby.And they can recognize

thatdifferentpeople applythatconceptdifferently,reasondifferentlywith it.

Nonetheless, they can all take it thateveryoneis boundby the same proper-ties, ought to reason the same way; for they are all talking about the same

thing,and whatinferencesarecorrect s determinedby the facts (=trueclaims)

about the sun, whatever those may be. They are all beholden to the same

standards.And this is to say that we can understand hose who speak our lan-

guage as sharingourconcepts,even while understandinghoseconceptsinfer-

entially.

666 ROBERT BRANDOM

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brandom, robert. - the social anatomy of inference

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