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BRAZIL: ITS ‘CORDIAL’ POWER POTENTIAL Mathilde Chatin PhD candidate King’s Brazil Institute - IPSA Congress Montreal 2014

‘And nobody is afraid of her; that is a great charm’ (Austen Jane (1815) Emma apud Narlikar 2010, p.107)

The emergence of territorial and demographic ‘monster’ countries (Kennan 1994, p.143), like Brazil, challenging the post-Cold War power equilibrium, is one of the recent trends and major global transformations. Huntington (1999) referred to a ‘uni-multipolar system’ to depict the evolving structure of the world order.

Talking about Brazil, Celso Amorim, current Brazilian Minister of Defence and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, wrote: ‘our voice is heard with greater attention, not because we scream louder, but because we are more respected’ (Amorim 2010, p.230). 85% of Brazilian diplomats think Brazil has a more important international role than ten years ago and 91% that it should have a stronger international presence in the future (Souza 2008, p.10). Is Brazil ‘a country of global stature’ (Estadão 2013), as former Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Patriota, claimed? Or it is still the ‘eternal country of the future’?

Considering Brazil’s historical aspiration of greatness1 among Brazilian elites, meaning that the country should have an important role to play in international affairs, Brazil is aiming at greater acknowledgement of its significance as an undeniable rising global player2. As formulated in the country’s national anthem3 and expressed by Joaquim Nabuco in 1908, ‘Brazil has always been conscious of its size and has been governed by a prophetic sentiment with regard to its future’ (Lafer 2000, p.207). Consequently, Lula said in 2009: ‘Brazil must live up to the hugeness God gave it when he created the world and that our diplomats gave us when they divided the geographical space’ (Rolland & Lessa 2010, p.162).

Brazil has been ‘geo-strategically fortunate’ (Armijo & Sotero 2007, p.45) within a region often pictured as peaceful, with few interstate conflicts since the end of the 19th century. Though the country shares a border with most countries in the subcontinent, it was engaged in war only twice in its entire history. Brazil has not developed an ‘aggressive-expansionist’ nature and, due to its historical experience, has favoured principles and values like non-intervention, ‘strict’ respect of national sovereignty, peaceful resolution of conflicts, etc.

As opposed to other rising powers, Brazil is not a military power; though it has undergone a process of modernisation of its armed forces for ‘dissuasion’ purposes, the country claims it does not pretend to become one: among other examples, Brazil has no nuclear weapons since its Constitution limits its nuclear activities to peaceful purposes; its military spending is low and its armed forces are small compared to those of the US or other emerging powers. But, to what extent can this ‘cordial’ profile (Vidigal 2010) be the country’s foreign policy line of conduct in a ‘multi-polarising’ world order?

In this paper, we assess whether, thanks to its ‘cordial’ power profile (Vidigal 2010) based on its soft power as opposed to hard power potential, Brazil can become a ‘relevant’ power on the international scene with limited military strength and question the realist approach to power, according to which military capability is an essential asset for an influential state in international relations. Considering this objective, we evaluate the gap between Brazil’s role                                                                                                                1 ‘Grandeza’ in Portuguese. 2 Brazil’s foreign policy behaviour has, in certain cases, been associated with that of a ‘middle powers’, but as argued by Burges (2014), it is not consistent with its ‘ambitions to be a great power, which has major influence over the governance of a multipolar world’. 3 ‘Giant by thine own nature, thou art beautiful, thou art strong, an intrepid colossus, and thy future mirrors thy greatness’.

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conception as ‘non military oriented’, ‘pro-multilateralism’, ‘defender of Southern interests’ etc., and its role performance in view of identified ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ roles.

As a result, in the first section of this paper, we look at role theory, particularly when applied to international relations, and explain the notions of role conception, expectation and performance. Then, we turn to an examination of the concepts of soft power as opposed to hard power, prior to determining ‘ideal type’ ‘hard’ versus ‘soft’ roles, or in other words, role expectations. In the final section, we provide with a case study analysis of Brazil and of its ‘soft’ role conception compared to its role performance.

*** 1. Role theory in International Relations

To begin with, we present role theory and its application to international relations, while focusing on the distinction between role conception, expectation and performance.

First, Holsti (1987, p.7) described the notion of role as a ‘persistent pattern of a state’s foreign policy behaviour’ when applied to international relations. Therefore, the idea of role can be useful to explain foreign policy and foreign policy culture, which Tewes (2002, p.25) defined as ‘a subset of a larger political culture, as a collective model of nation-state identity, embodied in custom or law, that affects how members of a given foreign policy elite conceive the aims of foreign policy, and what significance they ascribe to military force, multilateralism and societal interests for the conduct of foreign policy’.

Thus, national role conceptions (NRCs) are ‘domestically held political self-views or self-understandings regarding the proper role and purpose of one’s state in the international arena’ (Krotz 2008, p.2). As per Holsti’s definition, NRCs ‘include policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules, and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate regional systems’ (Holsti 1970, p.246). It is the ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of the foreign policymakers toward, or in, the external environment (Holsti 1970, p.246). NRCs are based on a set of norms and beliefs policymakers feel committed to and which correspond to the expected planned action-orientation. These norms reflect geographic position, size and similar ‘objective’ criteria, also influenced by historical experiences.

NRCs ‘provide long-standing guidelines or standards for behaviour. Their longevity and stability are assets to explain long-term patterns of behaviour’ (Wish 1980, p.547). In fact, they are shaped by ‘guidelines of behaviour’ and the core norms behind them: actors may often act with reference to a particular role providing them with an action-orientation. Or, according to Holsti, as belief systems, which are ‘deep-rooted legac(ies) of experience and political culture’ (Hill 1988, p.30), role conceptions organise ‘perceptions into a meaningful guide for behaviour’ (Holsti 1963, pp.38-39). As a result, they can be thought as a ‘road map’ that foreign policy-makers use (Golstein & Keohane 1993). Actually, Cooper asserted: ‘thinking about foreign affairs - like any other kind of thinking - requires a conceptual map which, as maps do, simplifies the landscape and focuses on the main features’ (Cooper 1996, p.8).

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Graph 1: role theory

(Harnisch et al. 2011, p.26)

Besides, ‘role expectations’ refer to roles that other actors prescribe and expect the role-beholder to enact (Tewes 2002, p.25). For corporate actors, such states or international organisations, they often comprise domestic and/or individual expectations as to what the appropriate role is and what it implies, in other words, ego expectations on the one hand, and implicit or explicit demands by others, i.e. alter expectations on the other hand (Harnisch et al. 2011, p.8).

Lastly, ‘role performance’, or ‘role enactment’, refers to the behaviour of an actor when performing a role (Harnisch et al. 2011, p.9). According to Holsti (1970, p.245), it is the actual foreign policy of a government, including patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions undertaken and commitments to other states. Role performance is interesting in comparison to role conception and role expectation. Graph 1 shows two categories of ‘sources’, ideational and material, which impact national role conception, and role performance in sequence.

Here above, we have introduced role theory and its application in the study of international relations. We distinguished between role conception, role expectation and role performance before turning to our study of soft power and hard power in the perspective of suggesting ‘ideal type’ ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ roles.

*** 2. Soft power versus hard power

Power is what is called an ‘essentially contested concept’4 - one of these concepts that ‘inevitably involve endless disputes about their proper uses on the part of their users’ (Gallie 1956, p.169). In this section, we turn to the analysis of soft power, as opposed to hard power. This study will enable us to establish ‘ideal type’ ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ roles followed by states in international relations. As previously mentioned, one of our objectives is to find out how far Brazil can question the realist conception of power, by surpassing the ‘military handicap’, and become a ‘significant’ power.

                                                                                                               4 Waltz wrote a ‘proper definition remains a matter of controversy’; Gilpin explained that it is ‘one of the most troublesome in the field of IR’.

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First of all, the notion of soft power is not an entirely novel concept. Already Machiavelli had observed: ‘it may be better for a prince to be feared than loved but the prince is in greatest danger when he is hated’ (Nye 2011, p.82). Among other scholars, Carr (1939, pp.120-121) distinguished between military, economic and ‘power over opinion’; he commented: ‘the art of persuasion has always been a necessary part of the equipment of a political leader’. Galtung (1973, p.33) discerned ‘ideological power’ from remunerative power and punitive power; that is, the power of ideas, ‘powerful because the power sender’s ideas penetrate and shape the will of the power-recipient through the media of culture’. Dahl (1963, p.35) cited information, social standing, values, attitudes and decision-making rules among political power resources; Lasswell and Kaplan (1980) highlighted ‘non-material’ bases and ‘values’ of power, like respect, rectitude, affection and enlightenment; Morgenthau (1948, p.159) divided a state’s power capabilities into ‘tangible’ and ‘intangible’ resources, i.e. ideology, national morale, prestige and quality of diplomacy.

As conceived by Nye (2004, p.2), soft power is opposed to hard power or ‘command power’, which is the ability to ‘make others do what they would otherwise not do’. In other words, ‘you can command me to change my preferences and do what you want by threatening me with force or economic sanctions’ and inducements (Nye 2004, p.6). Hard power is coercive5 force and typically represents a realist view of the concept of power. While soft power is pull, hard power is push (Nye 2011, p.20). Kenneth Waltz (1979, p.113) explained: ‘in international politics, force serves, not only as the ultima ratio, but indeed as the first and constant one’. Or as suggested by Morgenthau (1948, p.29): ‘in international politics, armed strength as a threat or potentiality is the most important factor for the political power of a nation’. In this perspective, we aim to determine whether Brazil can contradict the idea that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun (Zedong 1964), and become a ‘relevant’ actor in international relations based on its ‘soft power’ potential.

Graph 2: spectrum of power behaviours

(Nye 2011, p.20)

Soft power is the ‘ability to attract or co-opt one to what you want’ (Nye 2004, p.2), as defined by Nye. Graph 2 represents the spectrum of power behaviours from hard ‘command’ power to soft ‘co-optive’ power, as conceptualised by Nye. Soft power resides in the ability to ‘shape’ the preferences of others and align those preferences to your own. Thus, it is the ‘power of attraction’ or the ‘power of persuasion’, derived from the ability to set the international agenda, in other words, ‘to frame the issue’. Soft power rests on three factors: the culture of a country, its political values and its foreign policy (Nye 2004, p.11). Nye (2004, p.5) commented: ‘a country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries - admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness - want to follow it’. The values a government champions in its behaviour at home (like democracy), in international institutions (such as working with others) and through its foreign policy (for example, promoting peace and human rights (HR)) fuel its legitimacy (Nye 2004, p.14). As Tharoor (2012, p.325) pointed out: ‘a country’s soft power emerges from the world’s

                                                                                                               5 Coercion involves ‘making credible threats to which the target might or might not acquiesce, or engaging in unilateral moves, which undermine the bargaining position of the weaker state’.

H A R D

Command Coerce Threat Pay Sanction Frame Persuade Attract Co-opt S O F T

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perceptions of what a country is all about’. Like Adam Smith observed that an invisible hand leads people when making decisions in a free market, decisions in the marketplace for ideas are often shaped by soft power; in other words, an attraction persuading one to go along with others’ purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place (Nye 2004, p.7). Lastly, Celso Amorim (BBC 2010) described soft power as the ‘use of culture and civilisation, not of threats. It means believing in dialogue, not force’. This quote illustrates the Brazilian perspective of the concept related to the country’s global profile, and its approach to international relations. Graph 3 suggests three soft power variables - global integrity, integration and image - which we will rely on to analyse Brazil’s global perspectives and actions.

Graph 3: soft power variables

(Ernst & Young 2012)

Following this study of the notion of soft power compared to hard power, we will deduct resulting ‘ideal type’ ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ roles followed by states in international relations.

*** 3. ‘Soft’ versus ‘hard’ roles

As a result of introducing role theory and its usefulness in international relations on the one hand, and soft power in opposition to hard power on the other hand, we are now able to establish ‘ideal type’ ‘soft’ compared to ‘hard’ roles. Actually, an ‘ideal type’ is a standard for measurement permitting to assess how far reality is more or less close to its constitutive criteria (Harnisch et al. 2011, p.59).

In view of the idea of soft power, we propose some of the following ‘soft’ roles: - Peaceful as opposed to aggressive-expansionist, militaristic or war prone: no history of

expansion and waged few/not recent wars, - Promoter of mediation and peaceful resolution of conflicts: acts as ‘bridge-builder’,

encourages negotiation, compromise, persuasion and consensus, while rejecting the unnecessary and unilateral use of force,

- Reliable member of the international community: long-lasting institution member; plays a responsible and constructive role in international institutions, propagator of compliance to and respect of international law and treaties,

- Institution user and collective actor: active institution member, favours multilateralism, ‘works in the system’, looks to institutions for solving problems,

- Regime deepener: promotes and aims at strengthening existing international regimes and institutions,

- Agenda-setter: potentially ‘norm creator’; agenda setting, namely the ‘process of raising issues to salience among the relevant community of actors’ (Livingston 1992, p.313),

- Role model: seen as a model that, most probably, weaker partners aspire to emulate,

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- Good partner: bases its relations with its partners on solidarity, commonality of values and promotes fair-burden sharing.

Differently, ‘hard’ roles would entail: - Potentially holder of nuclear weapons: all nuclear weapon states (NWS) recognised by the

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC); the two largest arsenals of nuclear weapons are those of the US and Russia (former USSR), the two Cold War superpowers; NWS have otherwise strong military capacity,

- Militaristic, military competence: high military spender, large and professional armed forces, vast and modern high technology military equipment; as we detail below, this is the case of ‘established powers’, like the US, some European states and the BRIC countries, most of which are members of the UNSC,

- Aggressive-expansionist past: history of expansion (colonial or borders), ‘war-waging’ (all UNSC permanent members have a history of colonialism, imperialism or territorial expansion),

- Guardian of global peace and security: prone to unilateral action, ‘trigger-happy’, projection of power; the US and established European powers have a tendency for interventionism,

- Sanctions promoter: uses/promotes/participates in collective economic sanctions to enforce international norms,

- Makes the rules of the game: at the origin and core of the International System; imposes its will; the US and established European powers are founders of the post-WWII international regime, working in their favour (UNSC veto-permanent members, weight in IMF or World Bank, etc.).

Considering those proposed ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ roles, we move to a study of Brazil’s case, its non-military profile and its ‘soft’ potential.

*** 4. Brazil: not a military power

This paper evaluates Brazil’s potential as a ‘quintessential soft power’ (Armijo & Sotero 2007, p.43) to become a ‘relevant’ power in IR. First of all, Brazil ‘auto-proclaims’ itself as a ‘peaceful country by tradition and conviction (Ministry of Defence 2008, p.8) in a peaceful region’, and Brazilian diplomats and government officials reiterate the country’s ‘peace-loving, non aggressive-expansionist’ nature. According to Brazil’s 2008 National Defence Strategy, ‘this pacifist trait is part of the national identity’ (Ministry of Defence 2008, p.8).

Scholars emphasise the tendency in South America to seek pacific conflict resolution and it is common to read about the ‘peaceful nature of IR’ in the region (Herz 2010, p.602). During the second half of the 20th century, only two interstate wars can be reported: the 1982 war between Argentina and the UK over the Falkland Islands; and the 1995 border war between Peru and Ecuador (Herz 2010, p.602). Still, one must acknowledge the low relevance of the region in strategic terms (Fraga 2007): the presence of the US in the hemisphere, the effective action of the countries in the search for quick solutions to crises (Scardamaglia 2008) or the lack of serious outbreaks of conflict6 help explain the inter-state peace in the region. In this context, while Brazil has borders with ten out of the twelve countries in South America (all in the subcontinent except Chile and Ecuador), the country has been ‘geo-strategically fortunate’ (Armijo & Sotero 2007, p.45), since only two major military actions outside its boundaries can be found in Brazil’s entire history: the Paraguayan War (1864-1870) and the participation of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in WWII (Bertonha 2010, p.110). Brazil has not been at war                                                                                                                6 Like those in the Middle East or Asia.

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with its neighbours for over 140 years, which is an exceptionally long time (Miyamoto 2009, pp. 24-26).

Roberto Unger (2008), former Minister for Strategic Matters, expressed: ‘no country in the modern world, of dimension comparable to ours, is less belligerent than Brazil’. In comparison to ‘recognised’ or other rising powers, Brazil is not a military power, since its military potential remains limited, and the Brazilian political elite claims the country does not currently pretend to become one. Upon hearing Brazil described as a ‘tiger’, one South American diplomat replied: ‘yes, but it is a vegetarian tiger’ (Kenkel 2013, p.85).

As explained above, nuclear weapons are key instruments in the power ‘toolbox’ of a ‘pro-hard’ state: the NWS recognised by the NPT are the UNSC permanent members; the two major nuclear weapon arsenals are those of the US and Russia, the Cold War superpowers. Among the BRIC, Brazil is the only state with no nuclear weapons (Bertonha 2010, p.109): its Constitution (Art.21)7 is the only one worldwide apart from New Zealand’s to limit nuclear activities to peaceful purposes (Chatin 2013, p.2). In fact, following the military regime and the revealing of the ‘parallel’ nuclear programme, Brazil renounced to the ‘nuclear weapon option’. In South America generally, the absence of weapons of mass destruction has been well established (Herz 2010, p.602): for example, the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty created a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) all through Latin America; Brazil and Argentina cooperated to avoid an nuclear arms race in South America, for instance through the Brazil-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) or the Nuclear Energy Binational Commission (COBEN) (Jesus 2012b).

Besides, ‘pro-hard’ states are military powers with high military spending, large armies, ‘updated’, or even technologically advanced, military equipment, as well as skilled and innovative armament builders. Brazil’s military spending is low compared to that of the US or other BRIC, amounting to over US$33 billion in 2012. Its military expenditure equalled an estimated 1.5% of GDP in 2012 (1.9% of world share). It represents less than 5% of US spending, alone responsible for nearly two-thirds of worldwide military spending8, or 20% that of China, which underwent a 177% increase over 2003-20129 (SIPRI 2013). Also, the size of the Brazilian armed forces (318,000 men) is about 14% that of China or 20% that of the US10 (IISS 2013). Lastly, from Brazil, only Embraer is among the world’s 100 largest arms producing and military services companies; those are mostly originated from the UNSC permanent members, with several others coming from India (SIPRI 2013).

Alsina (2009, p.183) argued that, from its independence in 1822 onwards, Brazil has never had a defence apparatus that was really relevant11. An ex-advisor to the Ministry of Defence12 commented: ‘we are incapable to do anything. Our capacity is fictional. I believe that if we went to war, we would not have the condition to sustain the fighting for one day. Effectiveness to defend Brazil is zero’ (Rodriguez 2013, p.133). In other words, Brazil armed forces ‘are not really prepared for a real choc’13 (Rodriguez 2013, p.133). In 2008, while the Ministry of

                                                                                                               7 Art. 21: ‘all nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by the National Congress’. 8 US$682 billion. 9 China announced a 12.2% increase of its defence budget for 2014, which equalled US$166 billion in 2012 and represented 9.5% of world share. Brazil’s military spending represents 36.5% that of Russia (US$90.7 billion) and about 72% that of India (US$46.1 billion). 10 Respectively, 2,285,000 and 1,520,000 men; Brazil’s armed forces represent 24% that of India (1,325,000 men) and about 38% of that of Russia (845,000 men). 11 During several decades in the 19th century, the Brazilian Marine enjoyed naval supremacy in South America, which does not mean the squadron was relevant in worldwide terms. 12 General Director, Campus in Brasilia School of Defence of the Ministry of Defence, Air Force Brigadier Delano Menezes. 13 Coordinator for International Relations, Campus in Brasilia School of Defence of the Ministry of Defence, Colonel Luiz Otávio Sales Bomfim.

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Defence had the third-largest budget14, the majority of its spending went into personnel (90% for the Army, 80% for the Navy and 46% for the Air Force) (Diniz 2010, p.167). Over 2000-2011, Brazil allocated only 14% of its defence budget in material investment and acquisition versus 30% for China and India (Hofbauer et al. 2012). Brazil’s military equipment is obsolete (Gomes 2012): only 53 of the 100 ships and two of the five submarines can navigate, just two of the Marine’s A-4 jets are in condition to fly; not even half of the planes can take off and most exceed fifteen years of use (Chatin 2013, p.3). As Valladão (2005) suggested, when the environment of international competition is Grotian, Brazil enters in the ‘game’, but when it moves towards a Hobbesian environment, it exits the scene.

Yet, President Rousseff declared in 2013: ‘we are indeed a peaceful country, but no way will we be a defenceless country’15 (Bloomberg 2014). In fact, Brazil has decided to undergo a modernisation process of its military: ‘the South American giant does not want to limit its hugeness to a question of money, and to avoid being seen as a politico-military dwarf, embarked in a rearmament strategy aimed at reducing its vulnerability with regards to the new and old powers’ (BBC 2012a). According to Celso Amorim, Brazil should increase its defence spending to 2.3% of GDP (i.e. reach the level of the other BRIC) to gain a defence structure compatible with its growing projection abroad (Defesanet 2012). Rising steadily since the mid-1990s (up to 30% over 2001-2010) (Chatin 2013, p.3), Brazil’s military spending ranked eleventh worldwide in 2012 and first in Latin America (SIPRI 2013).

The ‘dissuasion’ purpose of this process has been consistently stressed and permits the ‘sustainability’ or ‘compatibility’ with Brazil’s ‘peaceful-country’ rhetoric. According to Proença and Diniz’s (1998, p.3) definition of ‘dissuasion’, as the way to ‘discourage the enemy from any military action, demonstrating a cost and risk perspective, where losses surpass the gains’, this modernisation program demonstrates a ‘defensive’, rather than ‘aggressive-expansionist’ attitude. Military power has both a direct form (i.e. physical violence) and an indirect form, namely a symbolic one, which means that it does not need to be used, but it should be a credible-reliable material base (Bertonha 2010, p.114; Alsina 2009, p.175; Nye 2004, p.31). Rocha Paiva (2012), Brazilian General, explained: ‘dissuasion, strategy or effect, is a less aggressive option than action, therefore more coherent with Brazil’s pacific profile and history in international relations’.

Contrarily to some of the other BRICS, Brazil is ‘enviable’16 since it has no imminent security challenges. Still, defence documents and officials insist that Brazil ‘must be ready to deal with any threat’ (Defensenews 2014) and identify strategic areas, such as the Amazon or the ‘Blue Amazon’, where the pré-sal offshore oil reserves are located; those are directly related to Brazil’s ‘flagship’ modernisation projects, like the nuclear-powered submarine17 (contract for transfer of technology signed with France in 2008) and the fighter jets (recent contract with Sweden’s Saab for the acquisition of 36 Gripen NG) (Defensenews 2014). To strengthen cooperation in the area of defence and security and avoid external interference, as well as to reassure its neighbours of its intentions, Brazil initiated the Council of South American Defence (CSD) and also revitalised the South Atlantic Zone of Peace and Cooperation (ZOPACAS) (Abdenur & Souza Neto 2014, p.7). Here, we should acknowledge some ‘realist’ tendencies within Brazil (Alsina 2009), which stress that if the country wants to be a power, it must be a ‘credible’ military power: even Rio Branco argued that ‘persuasive means (were) to (his) opinion, the only ones at the disposal of a nation like Brazil, that (did) not yet possess a                                                                                                                14 Representing 8.35% of government spending, which is below the budget of the Ministry of Social Welfare (40.93%), Health (10.27%), but above the budget of the Ministry of Education (6.2%) and Work and Employment (5.6%). 15 Or as previously said differently by Celso Amorim: ‘a pacific country like Brazil cannot be confused with a disarmed one’. 16 Interview of B S Prakash, former Indian Ambassador to Brazil (June 27, 2014). 17 Interestingly, the countries in possession of nuclear-powered submarines are permanent members of the UNSC, except India also looking for a permanent seat in the UNSC.

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force sufficient to impose its will on a military power’ (Bueno 2003, p.220). They also establish links with Brazil’s status as an emerging power: while former Brazilian President Collor de Mello argued that ‘Brazil’s defence needs increase at the same time that the country’s international weight grows’ (Defesanet 2012), the 2008 National Defence Strategy underlines that ‘if Brazil is willing to reach its deserved spot in the world, it will have to be prepared to defend itself’ (Ministry of Defence 2008, p.8).

In this section, we have assessed Brazil’s military competence in view of the ‘peace-loving’ rhetoric, and estimate that the country fits better the ‘soft’ than ‘hard’ criteria. As stressed by a Brazilian official, from a global point of view, one can perfectly use the fact that one doesn’t have military18 (Rodriguez 2013, p.131).

*** 5. Brazil’s ‘soft’ profile

Colonel Bomfim said: ‘I believe that Brazil has soft power and that it needs to explore that more. This is what we have that has most value in the International System’19 (Rodriguez 2013, p.132). The focus of this paper goes beyond Brazil’s popular culture, including ‘brands abroad’ ranging from carnival, samba, football, capoeira or ‘friendly’ character, which acts as a ‘business’ card; actually, ‘tradition and culture’ (35%) is the most cited element contributing to the country’s positive image (BBC 2012b).

* Brazil’s ‘diplomatic GDP’ is superior to its ‘economic’ and ‘military GDP’ (Almeida 2010, p.164). Its diplomatic tradition is long lasting, dating back to the Baron of Rio Branco, Itamaraty’s20 patron, who diplomatically solved Brazil’s border disputes with Bolivia and Ecuador. Marcelo Neri, President of Brazil’s Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA), explained: ‘Brazil has a natural vocation for diplomacy and dialogue. It is impossible to avoid the Brazilian spirit. The Brazilian (is) the mediator of conflict led by diplomacy’ (Chatin 2013, p.6). Brazil favours dialogue, persuasion and mediation, defined as ‘the intervention between conflicting parties to promote reconciliation, settlement or compromise’ (Jesus 2012a, p.186). Brazil’s contribution to the Tehran declaration is a suitable illustration, since the country decided to intervene in the Iran nuclear dispute and to avoid new rounds of sanctions against Iran that felt more trusting to deal with emerging nations (Chatin 2013, p.8). Though accused of diplomatic immaturity by UNSC permanent members, Brazilian diplomats believed diplomacy was the least damaging option with Iran, especially since Tehran’s political isolation would only radicalise the Iranian position (Chatin 2013, p.6). As an official from the Brazilian Embassy in Washington commented: ‘we try to engage, never to exclude or isolate’21.

Brazil also offered its contribution to solve the Israel-Palestine conflict. ‘We are a peaceful country. We choose to settle our disputes diplomatically - and we encourage others to act the same way’, as Celso Amorim (2010, p.214) stressed. In what he termed his ‘mission of peace’, and since the peace process was in need of ‘someone with neutrality’, Lula was the first Brazilian President to officially visit Israel and the Palestinian territories in March 201022, after declaring in November 2009 that the US was incapable of negotiating a resolution of conflict and should step aside in favour of other actors (Datz & Peters 2013, p.49). When Brazil

                                                                                                               18 Secretario de Assuntos Internacionais - Ministério da Fazenda, Ambassador Cozendey. 19 Coordinator for International Relations, Campus in Brasilia School of Defence of the Ministry of Defence, Colonel Luiz Otávio Sales Bomfim. 20 Brazilian Ministry of External Relations. 21 Interview of Benoni Belli, Minister Counsellor - Brazilian Embassy in Washington; conducted in writing (June 16, 2014). 22 Adding to his refusal to visit Herzl’s grave, Lula criticised Israel’s policies towards Palestine.

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recognised Palestine along the 1967 borders in December 201023, Lula explained: ‘Brazil has historically defended, particularly during my administration, the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people for a cohesive, safe democratic, and economically viable state coexisting in peace with Israel’ (Datz & Peters 2013, p.48). As Hurrell (2010b, p.13) explained, Brazil’s ‘diplomatic soft power has depended on the claim that it can act as an interlocutor with many different kinds of states and political systems’.

* According to its Constitution (Art. 4), Brazil looks for the ‘defence of peace’ and prefers the ‘peaceful resolution of conflicts’, stressing that force should only employed in last resort after the exhaustion of all ‘non-military’ alternatives. As per Kenkel (2012, p.17), Brazilians are convinced that assuming global responsibility does not necessarily mean an increased readiness to use military force. In this perspective, Brazil proposed the notion of ‘Responsibility while Protecting’ (RwP) to complement the concept of ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (RtoP). The Brazilian proposal leaves no doubt as to the scepticism that the country entertains regarding the effectiveness of military action (Kolb 2012), which could do ‘more harm than good’. In fact, the ‘cautious’ Brazilian position (Fonseca 2010, p.72) emphasises the first and second pillars of RtoP (primary state responsibility and the development of cooperation measures to help in prevention), which should not be diminished in relation to the ‘most controversial’ third pillar (Wojcikiewicz 2014, p.42), allowing action by the international community, including force (Fonseca 2010, p.72). In 2009, former Brazilian Ambassador to the UN Maria Luiz Ribeiro Viotti declared: ‘the third pillar is subsidiary to the first one and a truly exceptional course of action, or a measure of last resort. Among the two pillars directly related to the international community, the one regarding assistance and capacity-building must certainly concentrate our attention and energy’ (Kenkel 2012, p.25).

Also illustrating Brazil’s ‘demon-isation’ of the use of force (Hamann 2014), the country has traditionally favoured participating to peace operations under Chapter VI of the UN Charter - stressing the peaceful settlement of disputes - rather than Chapter VII - authorising the use of force. Nevertheless, with the largest contingent in the mission and an uninterrupted succession of Brazilian Force Commanders, Brazil’s ten-year contribution of troops to MINUSTAH, largely a ‘Latin American’ mission24, was a first25 and the country’s widest deployment since WWII. Though Brazil had to resort to force in the ‘robust’ initial phase of MINUSTAH (2005-2007), it is a promoter of ‘soft peacekeeping’ (Krishnasamy 2010). Interestingly, the motto of the Brazilian armed forces is ‘braço forte, mão amiga’26. Facilitated by cultural affinity - since Brazil has preferred participation in Portuguese speaking countries (Angola, Mozambique, East Timor) and Haiti (afro-descendent population) - ‘friendly’ character and adaptability - due to

                                                                                                               23 Otherwise, one of Lula’s first steps in office was to open a Brazilian representative office in Ramallah, headed by a diplomat with the rank of Ambassador; Brazil was the only Latin American country to attend the Annapolis Peace Conference at the end of November 2007; in February 2008, Celso Amorim went on a five-nation visit to the Middle East, including Israel and the Palestinian territories; in September 2011, in the opening session of the 66th UN General Assembly, President Rousseff asserted that Palestine needed to be represented as a full member of the UN and that the only way for Israel to achieve real peace and security was through the creation of a free and sovereign Palestinian state; in October 2011, Brazil voted in support of Palestinian membership in UNESCO, and on November 29, 2012, it supported the resolution granting Palestine non-member observer status at the UN; MERCOSUR has signed free trade agreements with both Israel (December 2007) and Palestine (December 2010); Brazil upped its support for the Palestinian refugees through a marked increase in its contribution to the UN Relief and Works Agency annual budget: in 2010, Brazil’s contribution stood at US$200,000, which it supplemented with an additional donation of US$500,000 for the reconstruction of the Nahr el-Bared refugee camp in Lebanon, and the next year, with a five-fold increase, raising its contribution to a little short of US$1 million, with a focus on the delivery of food aid and educational programs to Gaza, etc. 24 Ambassador Sardenberg (2005, p.355), former Permanent Representative of Brazil to the UN, wrote: ‘specifically the participation of Brazil and other Latin American countries indicates that MINUSTAH will be conducted in an impartial way, in consonance with international law and democratic values, and the respect of Haitian sovereignty’. 25 Since 2013, General Santos Cruz is Force Commander of MONUSCO in Congo. 26 Translation: ‘strong arm, friendly hand’.

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similar conditions of misery at home - permitting more proximity to the population and influenced by ACISO (Ação Cívico Social)27, Brazil’s ‘soft peacekeeping’ activities range from engineering work (e.g. in Haiti, only the Brazilian contingent has the equipment to transform asphalt), medical assistance to social activities, like capoeira, samba or football, including projections of the Brazilian matches in the Haitian slums during the FIFA World Cup (Brazilian Army 2014). As Hédi Annabi, Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) to Haiti, stressed: ‘it corresponds to the ideal of UN peacekeeping, according to which peace cannot ultimately be imposed through force, but must be consolidated by winning hearts’ (Chagas 2010, p.719).

Beyond peacekeeping, Brazil has encouraged democratic values, especially by aiming at the stability in its region. In his memoirs, Cardoso commented that ‘Brazil always defend(ed) democratic order’ (Stuenkel 2013b, p.344); according to the findings of Vilela and Neiva (2011), ‘South America’ was the region most cited along the ‘Democracy’ theme under Lula and even more under Cardoso28, and 74% of Brazilian diplomats believe that ensuring democracy in South America is ‘extremely important’ (Souza 2008, p.35). Already more assertive about ‘democracy promotion’ under Cardoso29, Brazil engaged under Lula to resolve a constitutional crisis in Bolivia in 2003, and in Ecuador in 2005. The same year, Brazil supported the OAS in assuming a mediating role during a political crisis in Nicaragua. In 2009, simultaneously defending regional autonomy30, Brazil and the US clashed over how to deal with the coup in Honduras. In 2012, Paraguay was suspended from MERCOSUR after the impeachment of its President, regarded as a ‘parliamentary coup’ (Stuenkel 2013b, pp.344-345). Though denounced as ‘not behav(ing) consistently’ (Burges & Daudelin 2007), being ‘tepid’ (Burges 2008, p.65), or ‘ambivalent and often unpredictable’ (Piccone 2011, p.139), ‘one can say that Brazil has been quite supportive of efforts to protect democracy in the Americas since 1990’31 (Burges & Daudelin 2007, p.8).

* Brazil has shown ‘intellectual leadership’ and positioned itself as an ‘agenda-setter’. Though its initial effort to promote RwP faded, Brazil presented itself as a ‘norm entrepreneur’ (Stuenkel 2013a; Benner, 2013), offering alternative perspectives. In addition, following NSA’s intrusions into the communications of foreign leaders, including Dilma Rousseff, Brazil’s President announced in September 2013 that she would develop proposals of a civilian multilateral framework for the governance and use of the Internet (Lemos 2014). In November 2013, Brazil and Germany joined forces to press for the adoption of a UN Resolution to promote the right of privacy on the Internet32 (Foreign Policy 2013). Ronaldo Lemos, Brazilian lawyer33, commented that ‘the US ha(d) lost ground in the debate on the Internet, the responsibility of moving forward on this ha(d) fallen to Brazil’ (Inter Press Service 2014). In April 2014, the country hosted the NetMundial, Global Multistakeholder meeting on the Future of Internet Governance. At a national level, Brazil passed the ‘Marco Civil’ law to protect Internet neutrality, equal access as well as freedom of expression, and argues for ‘multi-sector’

                                                                                                               27 Activities undertaken by the Brazilian army to promote assistance to communities. 28 29.8% under Lula and 34.7% under Cardoso. 29 Brazil intervened in Paraguay in 1996 to avoid a military coup - through Mercosur and the OAS to obtain higher leverage - and ultimately convinced General Lino Oviedo not to stage a coup d’état against then President Juan Carlos Wasmosy. The Brazilian President again played an important role during political crises in Paraguay in 1999 and 2000. In 2002, Brazil actively engaged in Venezuela, when a group sought to illegally oust Hugo Chávez, who was reinstated 48 hours later. 30 Other examples include Brazil’s reactions to US plans to use military bases in Colombia and to the patrolling of the US Navy IV Fleet. 31 Santiso (2002, p.415) went further to write that Brazil played an exemplary and fundamental role in strengthening democratic norms and clauses across the region. 32 President Rousseff said: ‘through this resolution, the General Assembly establishes, for the first time, that human rights should prevail irrespective of the medium and therefore need to be protected offline and online’. 33 Ronaldo Lemos is one of the creators of the ‘Marco Civil’ law.

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governance of the Internet (Inter Press Service 2014): Brazil ‘can change significantly the way the Internet is organised, and influence other countries to do the same’, Ronaldo Lemos explained (TechCrunch 2014). He also pointed out that ‘if one looks at emerging countries, China has total control over the Internet; Russia has recently adopted laws restricting the rights of users, like it had already happened in India. Brazil’s approval of a law concerned with public interest, represents a victory for democracy’ (Veja 2014).

* As praised by Celso Amorim, ‘it is the great skill of Brazil to be everybody’s friend’ (BBC 2010), facilitating the country’s capacity to act as a ‘bridge-builder’ (Burges 2013). Brazil has opened to ‘non-traditional’ partners34 and developing regions. While Europe was most referred to by Cardoso than Lula, contrarily, the Middle East, Asia and Africa, were regions more cited by Lula than Cardoso (Vilela & Neiva 2011). Beyond trade35, this policy of ‘autonomy through diversification’36 (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007) can be illustrated by the following examples: Brazil has the fifth largest number of embassies in Africa37, increasing from 17 to 37 in a decade38. Also, Lula was the first Brazil Head of State to officially visit the Middle East; among the BRIC leaders, Lula was the Head of State39 who travelled the most to Africa over 2000-2009; Lula spent 54 days in Africa, more than in North America, while Cardoso was there only 13 days (Folha de S. Paulo 2011). Lastly, Brazil hosted the first South American-Arab countries Summit (Bertazzo 2012, p.15) and Lula was guest of honour at the Africa Union Summit. Although Lula’s ‘charismatic diplomacy’ (Ricupero 2010) was sometimes pictured as a ‘frenzy of diplomatic activity’ (Burges & Daudelin 2011, p.38) and President Rousseff ‘toned down’ this dynamism, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recognised that ‘Brazil is positioned in a very strategically good position to make consensus between the developed and developing countries’ (UN News Centre 2013).

* Brazil is a strong advocate of multilateralism, i.e. ‘an institutional arrangement for coordinating relations among three or more states in accordance with certain principles of conduct’ (Mittelman 2013, p.29). Brazil favours compliance to international law and the respect of international agreements, as first illustrated by Brazil’s insistence that ‘Annex I’ (i.e. developed countries) undertake greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reductions as per their commitments under the Kyoto Protocol (Hurrell & Sengupta 2012). Brazil also fiercely condemned the intervention in Iraq launched without UN authorisation, and more recently accused NATO states of surpassing their mandate during the intervention in Libya and bringing about regime change with Gaddafi’s death, as well as civilian collateral damage. ‘We must avoid excessively broad interpretations of the protection of civilians (which) could create the perception that it is used as a smokescreen for intervention or regime change’ (ICRtoP 2011), Ambassador Viotti stressed.

Brazil voices concerns about nuclear powers not complying with the terms of the NPT and not undergoing the dismantlement of their nuclear arsenals: the US and Russia, with by far the largest nuclear arsenals, have done only timid efforts. In this sense, Brazil is part of the New                                                                                                                34 Differently, ‘traditional’ partners are the US, the EU and South America. 35 In terms of trade, China became Brazil’s first trading partner in 2009 (representing 17.3% of Brazilian exports and 14.49% for imports versus the US accounting for 10.1% of Brazilian exports and 15.01% of imports); Brazilian trade with the BRICS rose from US$1.3 billion in 1990 (compared to US$11.754 billion with the US) and US$4.316 billion in 2000 (compared to US$26.088 billion with the US) to US$96.133 billion in 2011 (compared to US$59.766 billion with the US) - in other words, it was multiplied by 22 over 2000-2011; in 2012, commercial exchanges with Africa equalled US$26.5 billion compared to US$5 billion in 2000, and Brazilian exports to the Arab world reached US$14.8 billion versus US$2.6 billion in 2002. 36 Vigevani & Cepaluni (2007) opposed ‘autonomy through diversification’ under Lula to ‘autonomy through participation’ under Cardoso. 37 Brazil ranks behind the US (49), China (48), France (46) and Russia (38). 38 Samuel Guimarães pointed out that ‘embassies are only opened where there is mutual and commercial interests’. 39 Manmohan Singh (India); Poutine/Medvedev (Russia); Hu Jintao (China).

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Agenda Coalition (NAC) and contributed, among other initiatives, to the ‘13 Steps’, i.e. a set of practical steps for the systematic and progressive effort to implement nuclear disarmament (Jesus 2012b, p.377). In 2007, as acknowledgement of Brazil’s contribution to the global disarmament issue, Ambassador Duarte was appointed as the High Representative for Disarmament Affairs at the Under-Secretary-General level. Considering the consequent ‘freeze (in) the international distribution of power’ (Araujo Castro 1971), Brazilians underline ‘the impossibility that a world structure can be maintained indefinitely on the basis of a handful of nations possessing nuclear arms, while it is forbidden to all others to acquire any. The alternative to a world without nuclear arms is the status quo. It is a world in which a great number of states will end up acquiring nuclear capacity’ (Howlett-Martin 2012, p.99). In fact, Brazil denounces the nuclear regime as ‘discriminatory’, only ratified the NPT in 1998, still refuses to sign to ‘Additional Protocol’40, and in 2004, denied IAEA inspectors full visual access to the Resende uranium enrichment facility (Jesus 2012b).

* Brazil has been willing to ‘work inside the system’, contrarily to other emerging powers that have been more reluctant to ‘integrate’ (LSE Ideas 2014). Defending the ‘universality of values’, differently from China or Russia among the BRICS41, Brazil’s democracy is in the process of consolidation following the military regime (1964-1985) and the 1989 democratic elections42, as part of the ‘Third Wave of Democratisation’. Though endemic curses, like corruption43, inequality44, discrimination45, impunity and violence46, still need to be eradicated, Brazil was called the ‘entrepreneurial and democratic BRIC’ (Armijo & Burges 2009). Considering Brazilians have rarely gone to the streets, the protests of 2013 and 2014 that denounced corruption, especially linked to money used to build infrastructure for the FIFA World Cup, and demanded the provision of better services, like health and education, illustrate growing political consciousness among the population, and are signs of a functioning democracy.

Brazil shows long-term presence as a member of international organisations (e.g. the UN, WTO47, IMF, World Bank, etc.), often since their creation. Differently, in the case of the WTO for example, China joined in 2001 after an expulsion from the GATT, and Russia joined in

                                                                                                               40 The Additional Protocol grants the IAEA complementary inspection authority to that provided by the safeguards agreements. A principal aim is to enable the IAEA inspectorate to provide assurance about both declared and possibly undeclared activities. Under the Protocol, the IAEA is granted expanded rights of access to information and sites. 41 Brazil ranked n°43 among the world’s democracies, ahead of the other BRICS - South Africa was n°66, India n°72, Russia n°88 and China n°99. 42 Although even lower in the past, support and satisfaction with democracy remain low in Brazil (respectively equalling 37% and 45% in 2011 versus 30% in 2001 and 18% in 2000). Only 29% of Brazilians think that democracy has improved. 43 Brazil ranks 69 (same as South Africa; China 80; India 94; Russia 133) on the ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’, and 58% of Brazilians believe that the reduction of corruption is necessary for the consolidation of democracy. 70% of Brazilians believe the police are corrupt, and only 28% trust the judiciary. 44 Brazil is still among the most unequal countries worldwide. Only 20% of Brazilians believe that democracy guarantees the just distribution of wealth, while 45% think that Brazil lacks to provide social justice. Brazil’s GINI index equalled 0.559 in 2011; the ‘wealthiest 10%’ of the population receives 39.5% of total income, while the ‘poorest 40%’ receives 14.2%. Yet, we must acknowledge that inequality has been significantly reduced in the last decade: Brazil’s GINI dropped from 0.639 in 2001 and 0.576 in 2009; in 2001, the ‘wealthiest 10%’ received 46.8% of total income, while the ‘poorest 40%’ only received 10.3%. Brazil’s middle class has reached 105.4 million people (over half of the population), compared to 65.9 million in 2003. 64% of Brazilians believe their economic situation will improve. 45 Respectively 34% and 46% of Brazilians describe themselves as part of a discriminated group and believe that this discrimination is due to race. The poorest people are 76.3% African-Brazilian and 23.7% white, while the wealthiest are 82.3% white and 17.7% African-Brazilians. In Brazil, in 2010, there were 33,264 blacks killed against 13,668 whites (71% against 29%), i.e. 37.6 blacks and 17.7 whites for every 100,000. 46 Homicides grew by more than 250%, from 13,910 in 1980 to 51,108 in 2012. Between 2004 and 2007, more people were assassinated in Brazil than in the twelve countries where major armed conflicts took place, and almost as much as in the 62 armed conflicts worldwide. The cost of violence is estimated in Brazil to US$56.5 billion. Only 24% of Brazilians think that democracy ensures the protection against crimes. 47 The League of Nations and GATT prior to those.

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2011 after 18-year accession negotiations. Brazil even sat in the Security Council ten times as non-permanent member since the creation of the UN. As per the findings of Vilela and Neiva (2011), ‘International Institutions’ are among the most cited themes by Cardoso and Lula, and associated by Lula with other themes like ‘Economy’, ‘Climate change’, ‘Social Inequality’, ‘International Cooperation’, or regions like ‘South America’. Actually, in South America, often referred to as a ‘priority’ (Malamud 2011), Brazil has aimed at integration and cooperation through regional institutions: MERCOSUR48, UNASUR, IIRSA (Initiative for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America)49 etc. Still, Valladão  (2006, p.10) argued that Brazil proved itself reluctant to accept a deeper integration in a regional bloc sharing institutions that would give other member countries some tools capable of influencing Brazilian policy.

As per Wang and French’s (2013, p.993) findings50, Brazil sees itself as the most active in the International System - least as a ‘bystander’ - in a group of ‘developed’ and ‘emerging’ countries selected by the authors. Besides, the country prefers ‘multilateral action’: for example, using it 26 times51, Brazil ranks fourth among the most active users of the WTO Disagreement Settlement Mechanism (DSM)52. Most of Brazil’s complaints were directed at developed countries - ten against the US, seven against the EU and three against Canada. Burges and Daudelin (2011, p.43) claimed that Brazil’s success in operating within the confines of the WTO’s institutional mechanisms to achieve important and enforceable trade victories against the US and the EU, helped establish the global trade body as something other than a simple instrument for perpetuating the existing global order. Also, as a peacekeeping contributor, Brazil has favoured participation in peace operations under the auspices of the UN or regional organisations. ‘Multilateralism encounters in the UN its legitimate expression. Its large degree of legitimacy is derived from its universal vocation and the representativeness of its composition to reflect the will of the international community; the UN is better equipped than whatever individual country to promote international peace and security’, explained Celso Amorim (Uziel 2010, pp.102-103).

*

Brazil conceives itself as a ‘regime deepener’. The country supports the ‘democratisation’ of the world order with more ‘representative’, strengthened and more legitimate institutions, without seeking to ‘revolutionise’53 the International System. Since it looks for ‘recognition’ - i.e. acknowledgement as full and equal member of the society of states, with distinct interests and needs - and ‘redistribution’ - in other words, ‘who gets what, when and how?’, Brazil is sometimes seen as ‘revisionist’ (Nel 2010; Scheweller 2011). Dilma Rousseff commented: ‘governance structures need to change accordingly, to reflect the world as it is today, in particular the UNSC, the IMF and the World Bank. Developing countries need to have their voices heard, and their concerns and contributions taken into account’ (The Economist 2012). As per Wang and French’s (2013, p.993) findings, Brazil is among those countries that most                                                                                                                48 78% of Brazilian diplomats judge that MERCOSUR is beneficial to Brazil and 54% that it is ‘extremely important’ to strengthen MERCOSUR (another 38% that it is ‘very important’). 49 70% of Brazilian diplomats believe it is ‘extremely important’ to integrate South American infrastructure. 50 Statements indicative of a bystander role included speakers asserting that Brazil needed to prioritise internal development before assisting with global governance, arguing that their country’s internal development constituted its primary contribution to global governance, referring to Brazil’s policy as independent or autonomous, emphasising sovereignty in opposition to global governance efforts or initiatives welcoming a development that their country was involved in, expressing hope that countries would make progress on a global governance issue, while not providing assistance or getting involved, or expressing current or past hesitancy to take on a major role in global or regional governance. 51 While the US used it 98 times, the EU 85, Canada 33 and India 21. 52 Stuenkel (2010) argued that it shows Brazil is not disposed to align with the main institutions of today. 53 Interview of Benoni Belli, Minister Counsellor - Brazilian Embassy in Washington; conducted in writing (June 16, 2014). Actually, a neo-Gramscian reading of international organisations sees them as a means of stabilising and perpetuating a particular order. Institutions reflect the power relations at the point of origin and tend, at least initially, to encourage the collective images consistent with these power relations (Cox 1981, p.136).

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refer to the reform of global governance structures within a list of ‘developed’ and ‘emerging’ countries54: ‘Brazil works in favour of the construction of a participative and inclusive global community. It strives in the promotion of a cooperative multi-polarity, expression that synthesises its perception of a multipolar structure consolidating in the world’ (Ministry of Defence 2012). Brazil wants decision-making bodies to be more inclusive and participatory or, in Celso Amorim’s terms, the country encourages ‘a certain reconfiguration of the world’s commercial and diplomatic geography’ (Brands 2010, p.31). In this perspective, Brazil called for the replacement of the G8 by the G20 with the integration of emerging countries (Brands 2010, p.32). Together with India, Germany and Japan, in the G4, Brazil claims for a seat in the UNSC55, the ‘veto power-exclusive club per se’, in order to make this body more democratic, representative and legitimate. While presenting its accession to a UNSC permanent seat as a ‘natural’ component of any meaningful reform (Hurrell 2010a, p.3), this Brazilian ‘obsession’ exemplifies, without doubt, Brazil’s effort to make itself more present on the global scene (Saraiva 2006, p.41).

Ultimately, planned to function in 2016, the BRICS Bank - ‘conceived by the BRICS Group, (to) do the same as the IMF or the World Bank, financing budget deficits in period of economic instability of the Bank’s participants, and the social and economic projects the IMF, the World Bank or other institutions refuse to finance’ (Voz da Rússia 2014) - illustrates that Brazil works, together with emerging powers, to propose substitute institutions, ‘analogous but more loyal to them’ (Voz da Rússia 2014).

* Nurturing the image of ‘primus inter pares’56, Brazil is seen, in the ‘Global South’, as ‘role model’ of economic prowess: ‘economy and products’ (26%) is the most cited element contributing to the country’s positive image (BBC 2012b). As Mead (2004) signalled, ‘economic power is sticky power; it seduces as much as it compels’. Considering its ‘inspiring success story’57 (MercoPress 2012), Brazil positions itself as a ‘South development partner’, familiar with the challenges faced by developing countries and a better understanding of recipient countries’ needs and sensitivities (Inoue & Costa Vaz 2012). In fact, Marco Farani, the former Director of Brazil’s Cooperation Agency (ABC), explained: ‘because of similarities in social and economic realities and challenges to be faced in many areas, partner countries can absorb knowledge resulting from exchanging experiences with Brazil, which are more easily adapted and applied to real cases if compared to traditional solutions offered by traditional partners. Affinities of historical and cultural, linguistic and economic nature - as well as shared heritage and aspirations - favour the expansion and realisation of South-South cooperation and contribute to its success’ (Cabral & Shankland 2013, p.5).

As a result, Brazil provides its expertise to developing countries and exports its nationally successful programmes: the term ‘social development’ was included in 81.6% of bilateral acts signed under Lula58 (Faria 2013, p.17). In Africa, the agricultural (31%) and health (27%) sectors were those receiving more Brazilian technical cooperation. Agricultural projects include a model cotton farm in Mali to increase the Cotton Four’s59 productivity and production

                                                                                                               54 Statements indicative of a reformist attitude involved the speaker advocating reform or substantial change, reorganisation or improvement of a global governance institution or other. 55 As a post-WWII creation, the UNSC evokes a strong military component: it has decision-making power over the use of force; its permanent members are NWS, strong military capable states, etc. 56 Though stressing its developing country profile is in contradiction with its manifest destiny as global-power-to-be. Interview of Ambassador Marcel Biato, former Ambassador of Brazil to Bolivia conducted in writing (June 25, 2014). 57 Labelled as such by Hillary Clinton. 58 In other words, 1,546 of the 1,896 bilateral acts signed during Lula’s government compared to 68.2% during Cardoso’s administration. 59 i.e. Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali. The experimental station that will function as a regional agricultural research pole was inaugurated in November 2013.

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quality, or an experimental rice farm in Senegal, training technicians from Senegal, Guinea Buissau and Mauritania in rice production and processing technologies. Concerning social programmes, African representatives 60 went to Brazil to learn from the Bolsa Familia experience and gain insights into its design, implementation and management, arranging tours and visits to the Ministry of Social Development and Hunger Alleviation61. As recognition of Brazil’s achievements in this field and acknowledgment of its contribution to global fight against hunger in 2011, José Graziano da Silva was elected FAO Director General. Lastly, in health, Brazil has worked on the construction of a generic antiretroviral drugs factory in Mozambique. It is the most ambitious and expensive South-South cooperation project ever launched in Brazil. The plant has been operating since mid-2012 and investment costs reached US$100 million. It aims at producing 21 medication types to fight HIV/AIDS, initially to meet the national demand only, before expanding to supply all sub-Saharan Africa. Brazil provides capacity-building measures to enable the generic drug production to be taken over by Mozambican technicians trained by Fiocruz62. ANVISA (Brazil’s Health Surveillance Agency) and the Ministry of Health support Mozambique in establishing a drug regulatory authority to control the safety, quality and price of these medicines (Stolte 2012).

Graph 4: Brazil South-South Development Cooperation (SSDC) official guiding principles and narratives

(Costa Leite et al. 2014, p.21) *

Brazil presents itself as a ‘good partner’. Brazil’s international actions and views are impacted by a series of principles: ‘non-intervention’ or ‘non interference’, ‘self-determination of the peoples’, an ‘absolutist’ idea of sovereignty (Kenkel 2012, p.6), ‘consent of the parties’ etc. Concerning development cooperation, the country favours ‘horizontal cooperation’ and ‘demand-driven action’ (Inoue & Costa Vaz 2012) (see Graph 4). In part due to a history of colonialism and interventionism in the region, those values are embedded in Brazil’s political and juridical cultures (Wojcikiewicz 2014, p.30); nevertheless, there has been some ‘loosening up’ with regards to those principles. Differently from Brazil’s initial rejection of RtoP as ‘droit

                                                                                                               60 Ghana, Guinea Buissau, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. 61 It is in charge of the programme. 62 It is responsible for the pharmaceutical production process of the plant.

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d’ingérence in new clothes’63 (Kenkel 2012, p.15), the country has engaged with the concept, especially through RwP. Within Brazil’s ‘diplomacy of solidarity’64, the notion of ‘non-intervention’ was complemented by the idea of ‘non-indifference’ - meaning that Brazil cannot be ‘indifferent’ and should intervene to protect those suffering from HR violations (Wojcikiewicz 2014, p.35) - to justify the country’s participation in a Chapter VII mission in Haiti65. As confirmed by Celso Amorim in 2009, ‘the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states simply directed the foreign policy of Brazil. But this principle has to be balanced by non-indifference; this is the readiness to collaborate, by legitimate means, with other countries that find themselves in particularly difficult situations’ (Mayer 2010).

* Some of those cases - Brazil’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs), engagement with RtoP, or its role in the Tehran declaration - illustrate that Brazil has proved to be a ‘responsible’ actor also in the area of ‘peace and security’, for long considered the ‘playground’ of UNSC permanent members66. Concerning Haiti, Celso Amorim commented: ‘our participation comes from the principle that peace has a price. This price is that of participation. To be absent or to avoid having an opinion or act in front of a situation of crisis can mean the exclusion from the decision-making process’ (Chatin 2013, p.12).

* A ‘pan Southern leader’ (Burges 2013, p.582), Brazil acts as a collective actor that defends the interests of the developing world, often relying on a ‘plethora’ (Burges & Daudelin 2011, p.38) of ‘Southern coalitions’: for example, BRICS, IBSA, G20 in the Doha Round of WTO, BASIC in climate change negotiations, etc. In this sense, it can be called a ‘networked power’, a state that is at the crossroads of various foreign policy networks67 (Flemes 2013). This can also be illustrated by Brazil’s participation in the Tehran declaration, together with Turkey, when Brazil defended the possibility for developing states to acquire nuclear technology for pacific means, like the production of energy, as allowed by the NPT: ‘Brazil is committed to the strictly peaceful use of nuclear energy. However, Brazil also asserts its strategic need to develop and master nuclear technology’ (Ministry of Defence 2008, p.12).

Since the WTO has been responsive to change compared to other institutions, emerging powers like Brazil were admitted in the inner circles of WTO decision-making, even bringing the relative marginalisation of Western middle powers (Efstathopoulos 2012, pp.283-284). Epitomising a process of Southern diversification, Brazil’s inclusion in negotiating groups, like the ‘Five Interested Parties’ (FIPs) and ‘New Quad’, was facilitated by taking the ‘route of representation’ (leading the G2068 or G110). In 2008, the Brazilian and Indian Foreign and Trade Ministers declared: ‘one thing that we can celebrate is that rules here are no longer made by rich countries’. They have to take us into account, and that will continue to be so’ (Narlikar et al. 2012, p.261). While development issues and interests of developing countries are at the core of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), Brazil defends topics such as agriculture or medicine patents in the Doha negotiations, and has refused the imposition of ‘pre-cooked deals’

                                                                                                               63 In Celso Amorim’s terms. 64 Already in his inaugural speech, Lula (apud Faria 2013) claimed: ‘in my government, Brazilian diplomatic action will be oriented by a humanistic perspective.’ 65 Paula Wojcikiewicz Almeida (2014) argued that ‘non-indifference’ reconciles contradictions between ‘non-intervention’ and Lula’s ambitious foreign policy objectives. 66 Celso Amorim, in the case of Tehran declaration, commented: ‘the fact that Brazil and Turkey ventured into a subject that would be typically handled by the P5+1 and, more importantly, were successful in doing so, disturbed the status quo’ (Chatin 2013, p.10). 67 Foreign policy networks are defined as ‘a collection of more than two state actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the time, lack a legitimate organisational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange’. 68 Walden Bello (2005) commented that the G20 operated ‘as the launching pad for India’s and Brazil’s integration into the WTO power structure’.

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by Western powers, like the ‘Singapore Package’ in 2003; in Celso Amorim’s (2003) words, developing countries ‘will not be reduced to the role of supporting actors in discussions that affect their development prospects’. Partly as recognition of Brazil’s ‘willingness to put its neck out’69, Roberto Azevêdo was elected as WTO Director General with large support for developing countries to his candidacy (including 49 votes from African countries) (Charlton 2013).

Concerning climate change negotiations, Brazil, which fights against increasing pressure by ‘Annex I’ countries for developing countries to accept binding emission reduction targets, advocates for the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibility’, according to which developing countries have room for manoeuvre in the conduct of their sustainable development policies. Considering Vilela and Neiva’s (2011) findings, ‘Environment’ is one theme closely linked to ‘Economy’: ‘environmental protection must be planned as a means to promote development and not as an obstacle to the rising expectations of the underdeveloped world’ (The Economist, 2011). Still, Brazil has shown some flexibility: prior to Copenhagen, Brazil was the first among the BASICs to propose voluntary GHG emission reduction targets70. Being referred to as an ‘environmental power’ (Ricupero 2012), the country has undertaken major achievements, including a fall of 70% in deforestation of the Brazilian Amazon during the past decade, from a ten-year average of 19,500 km2 per year in 2005 to 5,800 km2 in 2013. Since deforestation is largely responsible for GHG emissions, if clearances had continued at their 2005 rate, an extra 3.2 billion tonnes of CO2 - i.e. an amount equal to a year’s emissions from the EU - would have been put into the atmosphere71 (The Economist 2014).

* Thanks to our analysis of Brazil’s ‘soft’ potential in comparison to its military capacity we demonstrated that the country has proved to be an increasingly relevant, constructive and rather ‘soft’ power on the international scene.

*** This paper aimed to find out whether Brazil could contradict the realist conception of power, according to which military strength is an essential asset for a state as an ‘influential’ power in international relations. We evaluated Brazil’s ‘cordial’ power profile (Vidigal 2010) to determine whether the country could become a ‘relevant’ power, and live up to its historical ambition of ‘greatness’, based on its soft rather than hard power potential.

Consequently, we started by introducing role theory and its usefulness in international relations. We established the distinction between role conception, expectation and performance, respectively ‘how foreign policy makers envision their state’s function’, ‘how the state is predicted to operate’ and ‘how the state actually acts’. Then, we studied the notion of soft power, as conceived by Joseph Nye, compared to hard power, in order to propose ‘ideal type’ ‘soft’ - ‘peaceful-not war prone’, ‘mediator’, ‘bridge-builder’, ‘responsible actor’, ‘collective actor’, ‘institution user’, ‘regime deepener’, ‘role model’, ‘good partner’, etc. - and ‘hard’ roles - ‘holder of nuclear weapons’, ‘militaristic-military competent’, ‘aggressive-expansionist’, ‘interventionist’, ‘sanctions promoter’, ‘makes the rules of the game’, etc.

Lastly, we turned to an in-depth study of the case of Brazil, analysing both its limited military capacities and its foreign policy of the last mandates. Though Brazil has launched a modernisation program to ‘update’ its armed forces for ‘dissuasion’ purposes, the country is not a military power and asserts that it currently does aim to become one: as illustrations, Brazil is                                                                                                                69 Interview of Ambassador Marcel Biato, former Ambassador of Brazil to Bolivia conducted in writing (June 25, 2014). 70 By between 36% and 30% below ‘business as usual levels’ by 2020. 71 An area the size of Belgium was cut down every year in the 1990s. Other areas where Brazil has had an impact in the environment field include renewable energy, biodiversity, etc.

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not a NWS; its military spending is low and active armed forces are small compared to those of other ‘recognised’ or ‘emerging’ powers; its military equipment is obsolete.

Besides, ‘peace, openness, multilateralism, international cooperation, respect of international law, etc.’ 72 can summarise how Brazil conceives its global contribution. The country encourages the peaceful resolution of disputes through diplomatic means, in other words, mediation, dialogue and ‘bridge-building’ - as illustrated by its participation in the Tehran declaration, its offer to solve the Israel-Palestine conflicts and its attempt to promote stability in its region. Thus, the country stresses that force should only be used in last resort - as shown by its contribution in UN peacekeeping and its approach to RtoP. Brazil’s RwP proposal and the steps taken with regards to Internet governance prove that it acts as an ‘agenda-setter’. Strong advocate of multilateralism and long-lasting member of international organisations, Brazil prefers to ‘work inside the system’: for example, it is among the most active users of the WTO DSM, and it favours contributing troops to PKOs under the auspices of the UN or regional organisations. Also, Brazil works at strengthening and legitimising international institutions by calling for the ‘democratisation’ of the world order. Brazil advocates for the compliance to international law: with regards to climate change, Brazil stresses that ‘Annex I’ countries should comply with their GHG emission reduction targets as per the Kyoto Protocol; Brazil condemned the intervention in Iraq without UN authorisation; it accused NATO of surpassing the mission’s mandate in Libya and bringing about regime change; Brazil calls for nuclear dismantlement and compliance of NWS with the terms of the NPT. As a ‘Southern power’, Brazil acts as a ‘role model’, sharing its expertise (health, agriculture, etc.) through development cooperation. The country presents itself as a ‘good partner’, which favours principles like ‘non-intervention’, ‘preservation of national sovereignty’, ‘self-determination of the peoples’, etc. By working through coalitions, Brazil defends the interests of developing countries - for example, defending the right of developing countries to nuclear energy, as authorised by the NPT, through its participation in the Tehran declaration.

In this paper, we wanted to find out to what extent Brazil’s role performance matched the ‘ideal type’ ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ roles, on the one hand, and its own role conceptions, on the other hand. We thus argued that Brazil leans to a ‘soft-inclined’ profile. We attempted to provide new perspectives on the concept of power and the potential of ‘soft’ versus ‘hard’ power. Far from arguing that hard power, in the form of military might, is now ‘insignificant’ in international relations, we defended that the case of Brazil - n°7 in the BBC ‘Country Ratings Poll’, with 45% of interviewees having a positive image of the country’s influence in the world - presents the possibility for ‘softer’ options in order to be an influential actor on the international scene. Since it is now the 2014 World Cup, we end this paper on the following ‘topical’ words dating from the time of the announcement that Brazil would host the event. According to Lula, being granted to host the World Cup meant the recognition of Brazil’s international significance: ‘the world has recognised that the time has come for Brazil. Today, I’ve felt prouder of being Brazilian than on any other day. Today is the day that Brazil gained its international citizenship. Today we earned respect’ (Grix & Lee 2013, p.535).

                                                                                                               72 Interview of Ambassador Marcos Vinicius Pinta Gama, Permanent Representative of Brazil to International Organisations (June 13, 2014).

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