Brian Cooney: MARECHAL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT

MARECHAL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT

by

Brian COONEY

A thesis submi tted to

the Facu1ty of Graduate Studies and Research McGi11 University,

in partial fu1fi1ment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

.Department of Philosophy April 1969.

~ Brian Cooney 1969

_r , \

.Brian Cooney

.MARECHAL'S CRITIQUE OF KANT

Department of Philosophy

Master of Arts

SUMMARY

This thesis deals with two topics in Kant's theory of the object of

human knowledge: (1) the "thing in itself": Why does Kant assign to this

unknowable entity a crucial role in his system? 15 he entitled to do 50 on

his own premisses? (2) subjective activity: Kant seems to calI for this

activity in order to make possible objective unit y; but does he account for

the possibility of this activity itself?

Joseph Maréchal argues that the subjective activity of human intelligence

requires a teleological analysis; that such an analysis reveals that the

object of 'experience' must have a determinate relation to the Absolute in

order to be recognizable as an object; consequently, that metaphysical know­

ledge is necessarily implicit in every objective judgrnent. Thus, in pre­

senting what he considers an adequate deduction of the possibUity of that

intellectual spontaneity which is 50 prominent in Kant's theory, Marechal

seeks to overcome the latter's agnosticism concerning the "thing in itself".

This thesis is an effort to understand Marechal's 'critique' of Kant.

PREFACE

The occasion for writing this thesis is a persistent wonder at the

presence of two major ambiguities in Kant's famous Transcendental Deduction

of the possibility of human knowledge. Even from my initial reading of

the Critique of Pure Reason l had the impression that Kant seemed committed

to assigning a crucial role in his system to an unknowable "thing in it-

self". This seemed an anomalous procedure - to give explanatory value to

what is unknowable. l sought for sorne historical or doctrinal justification

not found explicitly in the Critique itself. Closely related to this first

problem is a second: the role of subjective activity in the genesis of the

object of experience. Granted the boundless spontaneity of the simple 'l',

or intellectual subjectivity, why did Kant retain the 'affection' of the

thing in itself as a requirement of human cognition? This question may be

put in another way: why did Kant deny that the theoretical object bore a

determinate relation to the fullness of intellectual subjectivity; why does

limitless intellectual spontaneity result in an essentially limited object?

And, most importantly, why did Kant not analyse the activity of the self

teleologically, after the fashion of Leibniz, to whom he owed so much of

his philosophical education?

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In the midst of these preoccupations 1 had the good fortune to read

Joseph Marechal's Le point de depart de la Metaphysique, in particular,

cahier V, Le Thomisme devant la Ph1losophie critique. Marechal's sympathetic

and scholarly criticism of Kant's metaphysical agnosticism addressed itself

in large measure to precisely those questions 1 have outlined above. This

accounts for the format of the present thesis: an exposition of relevant

arguments in Kant and Marechal for which the principle of selection was my

initial questions.

Finally,I wish to acknowledge the generous assistance afforded me in

the preparation of this thesis by Professor Cecil Currie of the McGill

University Philosophy Department.

l

l N T R 0 DUC T ION

1. Joseph Marechal

Joseph Marechal was born at Charleroi, Be1gium, Ju1y 1, 1878. 1 At the

age of seventeen he became a novice of the Society of Jesus and thereafter

fo11owed the usua1 course of studies of the Jesuit priest, which inc1uded

three years of phi1osophy. It was during this latter period that he,deve1-

oped what was to be a 1ife-1ong loya1ty to the thought of Thomas Aquinas.

In addition to his priest1y studies he earned a doctorate in natura1

sciences from the University of Louvain in 1905. During the years immedi-

ate1y preceding Wor1d War l, Marechal, now a priest, taught experimenta1

psycho1ogy at Louvain and began his research into the psycho1ogy of mysti-

cism which was to give rise to a series of essays and a major work: Studies

in the psycho1ogy of the mystics. 2

After being forced to f1ee for a brief time to Eng1and during the German

invasion of Be1gium in 1ate 1914, he returned to Louvain the fo11owing year,

1 cf. Andre Hayen, "Le Père Joseph Marechal (1878-1944)" in Melanges Joseph Marechal, Paris 1950, V.l, pp.3-21.

2 Translation by A1gar Thorold (Albany, N.Y.: 1964).

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where unti1 1935 he taught sporadica11y such subjects as psycho10gy,

theodicy, history of modern phi10sophy. The bu1k of this period was taken

up, however, with persona1 research.

In the years 1922-23 the first three volumes· of his greatest work, Le

point de depart de la Metaphysique, were published. Publication of the

~ifth volume was de1ayed unti1 1926, whi1e the fourth was pub1ished post-

humous1y, still incomp1ete. These de1ays were the resu1t of adverse and

often uncomprehending censure from his re1igious superiors and co11eagues

concerning the orthodoxy of his phi10sophica1 tenets. For Father Marechal

worked in a context where phi10sophy was c10se1y bound'to the theo10gica1

exposition of the dogmas of Roman Catho1icism. This intramura1 criticism

forced him to de1ay his work on the fourth volume concerning German idea1ism

in order ta pub1ïsh the fifth, Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique,

1aden with clarifications addressed to contemporary Thomists.

From 1935 unti1 his death in 1944 Father Marechal did no teaching.

Plagued throughout his adult 1ife with bad health, grieved by the thought

that he was misunderstood and ineffectual, he yet preserved a gentleness

and kindness which earned him the lasting affection of so many who knew

him.

In a conference3 he gave to his fellow Jesuits in 1906, Marechal out-

1ines the history of Thomistic scho1asticism. Though remaining unshaken

3 From an unpublished text cited by Andre Hayen, 5.J., in his article "Un interprète thomiste 'du Kantisme: le Père Joseph Marechal (1878-1945)", Revue internationale de Philosophie, 1954, No.30,pp.449-469.

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in his adherence to what he considered the authentic Thomist tradition,

Marechal reacted very strongly to the fossilized doctrines and 'straw-man'

adversaries which abounded in the scholastic manuals of his day. He

maintained that this same lack of contact with the intellectual life of

the age killed the scholastic movement at the dawn of the scientific

revolution in Europe.

Much of the repertoire of the Thomist tradition survived the 'refor-

mat ion , of philosophy introduced by Descartes: Leibniz's insistence on

the value of such concepts as act and potency, intrinsic finality, dyna-

mism, is seen by Marechal as a restatement of sorne of the best in scho-

lastic thought. According to this view, " ... le vrai continuateur de

Leibniz est - non pas le rationaliste-pedagogue Christian Wolff, - mais

Emmanuel Kant.,,4 (The cogency of this view should emerge in the course

of the present dissertation).

But the formaI adherents of Thomism withdrew more and more into theolo-

gical debates, while the scholastic"manuals of philosophy borrowed bits

and pieces from certain authors of the age in such a way as to alter

substantially what was distinctly Thomist in the tradition. Marechal's

/

view of these developments is very much that of a Catholic religious thinker

concerned with the adequacy of the systematic props required for an elabo-

4 From an unpublished text cited by Andre Hayen, 5.J., in his article "Un interprète thomiste du Kantisme: le Père Joseph Marechal (1878-1945)", Revue internationale de Philosophie, 1954,. No. 30, p.453.

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ration and defense of 'the Faith': "Restaurer la tradition scolastique

dans toute la sévérité et la pureté de ses lignes c'était rendre à la foi

catholique un service éminent

During the latter part of the nineteenth cent ury such a restoration

was atternpted. But it suffered from the very occasion of its efforts:

it desired to resurrect 'the essentia1s' of the historie Aquinas, ernp10ying

canons of selections found neither in Aquinas nor in a serious atternpt to -relate the Thomist tradition to contemporary inte11ectua1 1ife.

was infected with a certain arbitrariness:

Une philosophie n'est pas qu'un garde-fou: elle doit doit être en même temps un stimulant d'activité, une organisatrice de tendances, un reflet supérieur de la somme des expériences d'une époque. Et le thomisme fut tout cela au moyen-âge •.. L'est-il encore au­jourd 'hui? 6

Thus it

Le point de départ de la Métaphysique is Marécha1's great attempt, incom­

pIete at the time of his death, to present a living Thomism engaged in

dialogue with thinkers of the recent past and immediate present. It is

this desire to present a "higher ref1ection" of Kant's critica1 work which

pervades his sympathetic criticism of the argument of the Critique of

Pure Reason. It is this firm conviction that nothing of the bri11iance

and depth of Kant's critica1 insights can be a1ien to the 'authentic

5 From an unpublished text cited by André Hayen, 8.J., in his article "Un interprète thomiste du Kantisme: le Père Joseph Maréchal (1878-1945)", Revue internationale de Philosophie, 1954, No.30, p.455.

6 Ibid., p.458.

.J

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Thomist tradition' which separates him from the more dogmatic elements

of current Thomism. In regard to this it is instructive to mention a

criticism of Maréchal' s attitude and method. by E. Gilson, perhaps the

most outstanding exponentof·the more récalcitrant Thomism:

Parti de l'objet de connaissance, (Maréchal) ne pouvait aboutir qu'à un. objet de connaissance, mais ·la partie lui semblait valoir la peine d'être jouée, parce qu' elle se termine sur· cette constatation que l' obj et de connaissance dont la position est logiquemelltnécessaire . pour la critique transcendentalecoincide avec l'objet absolu dont l'existence réelle est af­firméepar.la critique nié"taphysique .. 7

This complaiilt (Gilson' 5 criticism is more like a complaint), if it

is not self-defeating, if it is notcalling for knowledge to treat of

what is nevertheless not an object ofknowledge, must be relying on a

super- or infra-knowledge to provide the existential anchor for concepts.

This 'extra-knowledge' would then present the obj ect "dont l'existence

réelle est affirmé par la critique métaphysique" while the critical enter-

prise in the rea1m of mere concepts would reveal the logical necessity of

a determinate representation of the thing in itself which still faces the

crucial task of conforming itself to, or 'coinciding' with the thing in

itself, in itself.

The above position, shriven of its uncritical presupposition that the

meta-conceptual consciousness reveals a determinate thing in itself, would

then coincide with Kant's in maintaining a thing which is outside knowledge

7 E. Gilson, Réalisme thomiste et critique de la Connaissance, Paris 1939, p.147.

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but which somehow is the ground of knowledge ... For both, the abyss yawns

between thought as thought and thing as thing, and consequently, between

their respective conditions. Hence, for Gilson, the critical and realist

starting-points le ad to essentially divergent results:

... il n'est pas plus possible à un realiste de se poser le problème critique de la connaissance, qu'il n'est possible à un criticiste de rejoindre les con­clusions du realisme. 8

Marechal's critique of Kant, his transcendental deduction of the

possibility of a thomistic metaphysics, denies that the agnostic conclu-

sions of Kant are predetermined by the critical method. Marechal's

count~r-critique is the principal topic of this dissertation.

2. The Problern of Subjective Activity

There is a passage toward the end of Marechal's cinquième cahier

which indicates clearly his principal criticism of Kant's transcendental

idealism:

En formulant les conclusions agnostiques de la Critique de la Raison pure, (Kant) se rabat sur les seules relations formelles et statiques de la connaissance. L'affirmation de la 'chose en soi' reste un episode inexploite. 9

Briefly, Marechal is saying here that; for the most part, Kant was content

to reveal the different levels of unit y requisite for an object of expe-

8 E. Gilson, Realisme thomiste et critique de la Connaissance, Paris 1939, p.136.

9 J. Marechal, Le point de depart de la Metaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.592.

- 10 -

rience. Of course, Kant realized that because of the dependence of the

intellect upon a sensibility, objective unit y required as a condition of ~ its possibility what he called 'synthesis' or 'combination', both o'f

which terms denote the result of activity. Thus it might seem unfair of

Marechal to accuse. Kant of concentrating solely on the static aspects of

cognition. Yet Kant himself reveals his preoccupatîon with unit y throughout

the 'Transèendental Deduction', where the pivotaI phrase in his argument

is 'necessary synthetic unit y , , and in his definition of the term by which

he refers to the various modes of synthetic activity: "By 'function' l

mean the unit y of the act of bringing variaus representations under one

common representation. IIlO

Marechal claims that Kant, though aware ta sorne degree of the role of

activity and movement in the genesis of the object, failed to develop the

implications, even in a purely critical way, of the recipracal determina-

tion or actuation of sensible 'matter' and the'forms' of the transcendental

subject. He further maintains that it is this oversight af Kant which

leads to the agnastic conclusions of the first Critique concerning the

possibility of traditional metaphysics, that in failing ta gr~ the teleo-

logy of the act ('affirmation') whereby appearances became objective

realities he was led to deny to human cognition knowledge of the thing in

itself .

10 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reasan, transe N. Kemp Smith, London 1964, p.lOS. (AlI references ta Kant in this thesis will be drawn from the above translation).

- 11 -

3. The Prob1em of the Thing in Itse1f

In whatever manner and by whateve~ means a mode of know1edge may relate to objects, intuition is that through which it is in immediate relation to them, and to which a11 thought as ameans is directed. But intuition takes place on1y in 50 far as the object is given to us. This' again is on1y possible, to man at 1east, in 50 far as the mind is affected in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) for receiving representation through the mode in which we are affected by objects, is entit1ed sensibi1ity. 11

Our minds are not productive of intuitions of objects. There is a

moment of passivity in a11 know1edge, a11 experience; on1y thus can the

existent become present to us .. Yet the above passage contains a difficu1ty

which is never reso1ved in the Critique of Pure Reason: what is this

'object' .which affects us? The same question can bé posed regarding a

1ater passage where Kant contrasts a sensible or 'derivative' intuition

with one which through its own act wou1d create its object:

Our mode of intuition is dependent upon the ëXistence of the object, and is therefore possible on1y if the subject's facu1ty of representation is affected by that object. 12 (Italics mine)

The 'object' of which Kant here speaks can be none other than the 'thing

in its'e1f', that which is abso1ute1y, irrespective of any relation it may

assume to our sensibi1ity; for the finite human self is dependent upon the

being of something rather than nothing.

11 Immanue1 Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.65.

12 Ibid., p.90.

. "

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This 'object' or 'thing in itself' remains an unknowable entity in

the Kantian system. Yet its role in the genesis of the object of human

experience is crucial; not merely because the latter depends upon the

existence of the 'thing', but also because the forms of the transcenden-

tal subject, and the pure intuitions and concepts which the latter make

possible, are in themselves indeterminate:

... for knowledge of an object distinct from me l require, besides the thought of an object in gene­raI (in the category), an intuition by which l determine that general concept ... (Italics mine) 13

Though Kant will later wish to say that sensible appearances," as

mere representations, ... are subject to no laws of connection save

that which the connecting faculty prescribes .•. ,,14 the nature of the

knowing subject which he describes requires that the thing in itself

dictate such matters as that grass is green and that A be apprehended

as a process while B is conceived as a coexistent manifold. Despite

Kant's attempt to locate aIl necessity in the apprehension of the mani-

fold in the subject itself, there is at least sorne necessitating in­

fluence over the content and synthesis of perceptions contributed by

the thing in itself. How else are we to understand the phrase above,

"by which l determine that general concept"?

Thus upon even such a cursory analysis as has just been presented,

it is possible to see a crucial difficulty and tension within the Kantian

13 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p;169.

14 Ibid., p.173.

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system. What role is to be assigned to the sense of metaphysical depen-

dence built into the notion of 'sensibility'? Is it tolerable to maintain

the duality of the intelligible indeterminate a priori in the subject and

the unknowable determining influence of the thing in itself?

The above question has been posed at this sta~~ not,merelyas a prepa­

ration for later chapt ers , but alsoto inci:Î.cat:ë that, , Kant's starting-point

inay not lead necessarily to a denial"()fkn~wledge'of :the thing '":in itself.

For at the very outset a nietaphysicatrealis,t could weIl ask:., should we . . .. ,'.: :" . '. . .. ," . ,"

not take into account the :,i~tralts1g(ù).ce"ofth~ thing in it~elf lJothwith ' .' ,'.... . .. '",

, ,

respect to being and the here': and.now empiricaldetermination of a priori

subjective forms, so ast()'inchld,e,this,traÎlscendent fac,tor within the body '.. . ",:" "

of a priori knowledge of then:ecessarY":cond~t.iOIis ,Qf anobject of cognition?

A realist could ask:how 'are weto tinderstanci that the sensible mani­

fold here and now demands subsumption up4erthe category of causality of

the flowing river? Surely i,t must be" that ,the existent (the 'thing in if­

self, upon the existence,of which:our intuit'ion dep~nds), present to the

, sensibility, is in itseifsusc~p:tible to su~ a subsumption, 'and in fact

necessitates it. It would' sè.t~mthat suchanobj ect ion could be obviated

only by attempt_Ï?g to deduce b~ththe 'forro and, the, content of experience

from the nature of the subject,and by identifying the thing in itself with

the transcendental subject, concluding to the absolute ideality of being.

Marechal will develop his criticism from the point of view of Thomistic

realism:

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... la vie de Pesprit, chez l'homme" n'est pas une ,vie de ,possession naturelle "et deplén~tude débor­',' ~ante, mais avant"tout'.'uI'lé'"v-ie d'acquisltion..:e1=, "

d'assimilation actives: " , Intel1ectus, 'humarius ", ttiiri ' mensurans res, tum a' rebus mensuratus.. 15. .; "

': 4. The Scope, 'of, the Present Thesis

: ... :' ......... :.", .... -.,.', .'

............

A mere survey of the tit1es of the five cahiers of Father Mar€~hâi:'~'

Le point, de départ de la Métaphysique suffices to show how little of, t'his

1earned priest' s work is reflected in the present essay. Lepoint:,de::dé...,

part is a historica1 argument intended to revea1 the perennialva:1ue,,"oi',:,' j.: .

thephi10sophy of Thomas Aquinas. This intended conclusion, eXplicit. :,',-:

,fI.-'0m ,thebeginning in Maréchal 's work, far from prejudicingthe: value 'of,

his workas history, enhances it with a co~pe11ing unit Y of iill:erp:r;e~:a:,1:ion , ,

remarkable" in 'so vast aS,ubject-matter~' ,Thepreseilt essay refersa'tmost

e~clùsive1y tocahiér V,LeThomi~me"devant la, Philosophie critique, " .,,'

, ,

.. Livre III, La Critique thomiste de laConnaissance"transposée sur le mode

tran!;cen,demtaL 'l3ven within'thisspeci,a,iarèa~, m~cha haS be:e~ omitted from . :" . ,'. .".

"the' ,'coJ;1~ideraticiiÏ'9f:this, <thesis'),:pç.rticula.r.1yMarécha1' s doctrine of . . .' . . . . .' . .' . . . '" "

sensatlon,'~,':,his~:re:;i.i~~~~: bi 't~e" :Supernàt~:tal, the order of Grace which he .:,' '. :',.

felt was invç1ved' in the 'teleo10gy of human intelligence, and' of the systems

of Abso1ute Idea1ism which fo110wed in the,wake of Kant and capita1ized

upon the same instabi1ities in the Kantian system as those signa11ed by

Maréchal.

15 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris, 1949, p. 596.

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Moreover, even in areas where 1 have most exp1icit1y re1ied upon

Marécha1's thought, 1 have perhaps done so in ways that serve my own

purposes rather than ref1ect his. Because 1 was basica11y in agreement

with Marécha1's criticism of Kant, the 1ine between his thought and mine

no doubt frequent1y b1urred for me.

1

II

KANT'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT

1. The Subject-Object Relation in the Transcendenta1 Deduction

In the Transcendenta1 Aesthetic Kant argues very convincing1y that space

and time are representations of a subjective condition without which no

intuition is possible for us; that space and time are, in other words, the

forms of our sensibi1ity. From this he concludes (perhaps not so 1egiti-

mate1y, as we have seen in the previous section) that a11 the content of

our i~tuitions, being mere appearances,

... cannot exist in themse1ves, but on1y in us ... What objects may be in themse1ves, and apart from a11 this receptivity of our sensibi1ity, remains comp1ete1y unknown to us. We know nothing but our mode of perceiving them ... 16

If this conclusion is granted then a11 our intuition has to do with

objects whose being is relative, for its spatio-tempora1 mode is imposed

upon it by the subject. A11 our know1edge, both of other things and of

ourse1ves is subject to this sensible condition of space-time. Though we

have concepts such as 'cause' or 'rea1ity' which have an indefinite ex-

tension to a11 possible intuition, yet our intuitions, as human, are 1imited

16 Immanue1 Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.82.

- 17 -

to space-time (which we represent to ourselves as a single, potentially

infinite, given whole). That is, the unit y of the representations of

space and time is itself a representation of a limit upon the scope of

thought. 17 For the latter reaches beyond space and time" however vainly,

since it cannot then be given any objectwhere no intuition is possible.

Since aH our reasoning, in order to have an object, must confine itself

to what can be given within space and time, we cannot in principle come

to know the causes or conditions which, would enable us to relate the

spatio-tempora1to an absolute reality or thing in itself. What l am,

as a subject in itself,18 what a thing in itself is, these must remain

unanswerable questions; for l can know only phenomena, whose being is

entirely relative to my mode of perception.

The forms of sensibility, space and time, in themselves and apart

from their relation to the understanding, bestow upon the manifold of

impressions affecting sensibility the characteristics of externality and

successiveness respectively. The latter terms are employed here deliber-

ately in order to convey something essential to the transcendental de-

duction of the categories. When we speak of 'extension' or 'space' we

are thinking not only of the mutual exclusion of parts but also of the

unit y or wholeness of their manifold. Similarly with time. But Kant's

deduction requires that aIl unit y of representation derive from a faculty

cf. 17 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.170 n.a.

cf. 18 Ibid., pp.165-l66.

- 18 -

distinguished from sensibility ab ove aIl by its spontaneity: the under-

standing.

Before taking up the argument proper of the 'transcendental deduction',

it is important for the purpose of this essay to note the shift in thought

which takes place in Kant's revised, '~' edition of this deduction. It was

mentioned briefly in the previous section of this essay how the role of the

thing in itself is very problematic in the first Critique. The difficulty

there hinted at was due principally to the ill-defined phrase 'dependent on

the existence of the object' and the anticipated difficulty of understanding

. how sensation, as the 'matter' of intuition, could exert a determining

influence upon pure concepts of a possible experience. In the A edition

Kant wrestles with at least part of this difficulty, trying to contain it

with the concept of a 'transcendental object ; x'. In the B edition this

attempt is forsaken. The result is a smQother, more coherent exposition

which, as· will later be argued by this writer, is far less true to the

nature of human cognition.

Whatever the origin of our representations, whether they are due to the influence of outer things, or are produced through inner causes, whether they arise a priori, or being appearances have an empir­rical origin, they must aIl, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense. AU our knowledge is thus finally subject to time. In it they must aIl be ordered, connected and brought into relation. This ..• must be born in mind as being quite funda­mental. 19

We have here, at the level of sensibility, the universal condition to which

19 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.13l.

- 19 -

aIl possible intuition is subject. Whatever :~e are;:t:~' intriitmust~bé::, . "'.: . . ".' .

invested with the characteristicof~uc~e-?sivenes,s" ,of ,a "flowing away' . ;', "

Over against this flux we must ;~'n",6td,~,r"Y?,:th,ink' an' obj ect, in order ; .... : .. '."

that something may be regarde~as& experience,.represent a single,

indivisible and un ch ang ing, ~elf-c'on~ci()us~ess:'withi~ which the sheer

diversity, externality 'andsuécessivenE:'lss,Of' the sensible manifold is

'gathered up', aS,ltWere. '~itho:ut:thtsrépresentation it would be

impossible to understand tinie asthe,~iversal condition of intuition. " ' , ---' ", --.' --.---:--

", .',

Without it there ,would 'not"he orie space 'and: ~ time:

In order that unit y of intu.i;t,ion may arise out of this manifold, (as is', required in' ,the represeJltation of space) ,it must. firstbe run through, and held together. 'This. act 'Iname:t:he synthesis of appre­hensiOIi ; .. ' 20

The passivity of sensibilit~y, and' the sheer multiplicity of its

content, requirè, the intervent;ion ';of'ail indivisible self which actively ". "0 '. .'. •• . ' .

unifies the sensible manifold. 'Ill order 'that something may be thought,

it must be for me,that is, éVéry'"pos~ible object bears a necessary re1a-. . . .

tion to the uncha~ging '1 thi~k'. 'Thu~spaceand time, because they a!"e

representations of the tot,al: field· of possible experience, are constituted

in their unit y , by a ne'c,essapy:r'e~a:ÙoIi to the' l' .

The product ()f the synt4e~is ,0:1; ,apprehens iOh, the image, cannot be long ....

to sensibility ,for the 'forms 'o~ the' ,l,atter exclude the stable unit Y of a ' .. "

single 'representation., :An~tii~ production of the image cannot be the work

20 Immanue 1 Kant' sCritique' of Pure Réason, London 1964, P .131.

"·t· •••..• :,

r "',.: " ;. 0'

.", .:' .. ".:.' ',: "',,",:"

•• ',:,,', .••• ",r"

. , ..... '.- ~!: .. . ":','.,'" ;.... " ... .

",' "

... ,"

:. '", .. ',." , ..

. ..... : .

. ~ ': .:

· " '. - 20 ~

of a purely passive sensibility. Clearly, another fabtÙ~i, h' rèqui,r~,d;;

one which partakes of the nature of sensibility because ,oflts,cOI1:tent, :,.'

and of the indivisible self because of its activity. This i5 'imagination ',;' .....

clearly distinct from the 'l', for it ls subject to the condition of space.

and time, whereas the '1 think' can have representations which aredevoid

of any spatio-temporal reference.

Because aH obj ects bear a necessary re lat ion to the unchanging 'l'.,

the image which is intuited must also bear this relation. Therefore the

unit y in the synthesis of the image, that is, the unit Y of the act and

the product of imagination, is a necessary unity.

The 'l', insofar as it is that which must accompany any and aH repre-

sentations, is thereby independent of experience and is entitled 'pure

apperception'j because it is the a priori condition for any object of

thought, it is called 'transcendental apperception'. In both these ways

it contrasts with the empirical 'l'or apperception, which is the concomitant

of this or that perception. The unit y which belongs to any possible intu-

ition through its necessary relation to transcendental apperception is

entitled 'necessary synthetic unit y , ..

In this way Kant's deduction of the categories is in principle achieved;.

for the categories are concepts of the relations which aH perceptiOI{must . '

·have to each other in order that somethiIl:g may be' thot;tght to existin .a': '

single, ,spat·io-temp9ral ,.world· and in 'relatio~ to an., id~ntical seif;con~cious-" ~ .' 4":> ~~ • • •

ness. The categories, 'in themselves, ar~ simply repre,sentat~ons of<the'

unit y of the acts of the imagi11ation in the synthesis ofiiltuitions. In this

way they relate a priori to aIl possible objects of experience.

21 -

But .:the Trariscendént~l·Deduction.; is ·botb·' a ,proof ofthë'legitimacy' of

t~e::.~:'priori>~nQ~,.['~eq.g~ 'impÜed in pure . concepts of the understanding, and an . • r' '.

accountof the 'necessary 'conditions of an obj ect of human cognition. The

foregoing summary of this deduction presents its argument in a way that is

common to both the A and B editions:

.•. since a mere modification of our sensibility can never be met w.ith outside us, the objects, as appearances, cons­titute an object which is merely in us. Now to assert in this manner, that aIl these appearances, and consequently aIl objects with which we can occupy ourselves, are one and aIl in me, that is, are determinations ,of my identical self, is only another way of saying that there must bea complete unit y of them in one and the same apperception. But this unit y of possible consciousness also constitutes the form of aIl knowlëdge of objects; through it the mani­fold is thought as belonging to a single object. 21

In other words, the transition from an appearance, indistinguishable

from ~ consciousness of it ('It feels like it's raining') to an object

distinct from this consciousness and against which l can measure my sub-

jective state in the name of truth ('It is raining') is made possible by

the transcendental act which achieves synthetic unit Y of the manifold of

intuition, and is effected through the experiential recognition of the '"

necessity in the unit y of the same intuition.

To make clearer the transition referred to above (which Maréchal calls

'objectivation'), it is necessary to explain somewhat the difference between

the transcendental and the empirical functions of the human subject. First,

we are not dealing here with reflective self-consciousness, the act which

2'V .Immanuel Kant' s Critique of Pure Reason.,t London 1964 J pp. 149-.5.0.

-' ... , ,"

- 22 -

has for its object a pripr act of cognition. Any such reflection would be

impossible without a self-consciousnessaccompanying the prior act. This

self-consciousness might be called 'concomitant'; it is not an experience

,(in the Kantian sense) of th~ self, but a consciousness of myself as ex-

periencing something. There is a dual aspect to concomitant self-conscious-

ness (when~ ±n its most general aspect, it becomes an object for reflection):

1 happen to be aware of something, and this awareness qualifies my subjective

state here and now, how l feel, 'related images summoned up, etc. Yet 1 know

that what makes possible this entirely singular aggregate of perceptions, in

the context of which l'm aware of myself, is a self to which not only this

particular 'bundle of perceptions', but any perception or thought whatsoever

must relate. The ropresentation of this 'pure' self is devoid of any definite

content~ as it must be, for it is the presupposition of aIl possible content

of awareness; Thus the contrast between the empirical and transcendental

ego.

The empirical ego is subject to constant change, to a succession of states,

qualified by the events (interna1 and external) which it registers. It is

divisible, subject to analysis. The transcendental ego is unchanging, indi-

visible, for without it no Iilultiplicity can be thought. Thus, while any

unit Y in the aggregate of empirical consciousness is merely what happens to

be the case (that l see this tree is just a fact, that' s aU), in order that

any empirical consciousness be considered possible, the unit y of the trans-

cendental ego must be considered necessary.

- 23 -

It is important to remember that the representation of an abiding

'1 think' discussed above is merely the abstraction of an element in

the experience of sorne object. That is, transcendental apperception is

essentially unchanging and indivisible. It is nevertheless sometimes

actual, sometimes ~erely potential, in the intellectual life of the

individual; for,

There can be no doubt that aIl our knowledge begins with experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be awakened into action did not objects affecting our senses partly of themselves produce representations, partly arouse the activity of the understanding to compare these representations, and, by combining or separating them, work up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that knowledge of objects which is entitled experience. 22

More prosaically, "awakened into action" may be written as 'actuated'.

As the ab ove passage indicates, it is the occurrence of sensation which

sets in motion or actuates Kant's transcendental subject with its various

faculties and a priori forms.

"The unit y of apperception in relation to the synthesis of imagination

is the understanding ... ,,23 Were the understanding to take up into itself

the contents of sensibility, the result would be a contradiction: the

indivisible self would become a synthesis of its own form and a matter which

is not its own. Then the self-identity of apperception would be fractured;

but

22 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.41.

23 Ibid., p.143.

- 24 -

... the understanding in us men is not itself a faculty of intuitions, and cannot, even if intuitions be given in sensibility, take them up into itself in such manner as to combine them as the manifo.1d of its own intuition. Its synthesis" therefore~ if the synthesis be viewed by itself alone, is nothing but the unit y of the act, of which, as an act, it is conscious to itself, without the aid of sensibility. 24

The actuality of apperception, within the concomitant self-conscious-

ness of a particular object, is contingent upon the occurrence of sensation;

b~t because, within this act, the transcendental ego is aware of itself,

however implicitly, as the single term of a relation which aIl possible

objects must bear, the contingency of its actuation is countered by aware-

ness of a necessity which legislates for aIl possible cognition; and which,

therefore, cannot be identified with the present subjective state of the

individual knower, since it includes within its scope aIl possible subjec-

tive states, and consequently aIl possible individual knowers. Were this

not so, it would always be possible to represent the unit y in appearances

as merely accidentaI, and this would make impossible the starting point

of any critical philosophy - self-consciousness with respect to an object

in general. This implicit awareness of the necessary unit y of apperception

is the transcendental employment of this faculty. It must be an element

of any empirical employment as the ground of its possibility.

24 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.166.

- 25 -

2. Being and Unit y

This is what is intended by the copula 'is'. It is employed to distinguish the objective unit y of given representations from the subjective. It indicates their relation to original apperception and its ne­cessary unity*. It holds good even if the judgment is empirical, and therefore contingent, as, for examp le, in the j udgment. . 'Bodies are heavy'. l donot here assert that these representations ne­cessarily belong to one another in the empirical in­tuition, but that they belong to one another in vir­tue of the necessary unit Y of apperception •.. accor­ding to princip les of the objective determination of aIl representations ... principles which are aIl de­rived from the fundamental principle of the trans­~endental unit y of apperception. (* Italics mine) 25

This p;':lssage embodies the Kantian formulation of the venerable scho-

lastic dictum: ens et unum convertuntur. 'Necessary synthetic unit y ,

refers to the application of the supreme principle of thought in general

to a possible experience: 'a is a, and cannot both be and not be a'.

That the manifold in the representation of a tree is actually given to me

in experience (i.e. that there is a tree) is perfectly contingent; but if

there is a tree, if it is to be an object for me, then the combination of

its manifold must be recognizable as the only possible combinat ion for a

consciousness in general, and this is the function of transcendental apper-

ception. What is most significant for the purpose of the present essay is

that Kant is content to ground the necessity ruling aU thought and expe-

rience in the purely formaI unit y of apperception:

25 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.159.

- 26 -

. .• our knowledge has to deal sole Ir. with appea.rances:" .'. " the possibility of which lies in ourselves, an9. .the·: . connection and unit y of which (in the representation of an object) are to be met with only in ourselv~·s.: . Such connection and unit y must therefore precede aIl'· experience, and are required for the very possipi1ity of it in its formaI aspect. From this point of'view, the only fe~sible one, our deduction of the categories has been developed. 26 . .

3. The 'Object'

.' ...

Against a long tradition of regarding consciousness as the 'place' or

medium in which obj ects are present in sorne way· or other antecedent ly to

the efforts of the mind to interpret and form judgments concerning them,

Kant asserted the spontaneity of the self in the very constitution of its

objects. 'Judgment' is the final stage in this constitutiveactivity of

the self.

In a transcendentalanalysis of the c~ject of cognition we must remember

that language is most suited to the objects of direct experience; 50 that

the vocabulary employed by someone reflecting upon the possibility of the

experience which language presupposes will deviate somewhat from standard

usage. This is certainly the case with Kant's use of the word 'ju4~ent'.

Perhaps we think of 'judgment' as the mental act expressed by 'propositions'

such as logic studies. Prior to judging we think about something which is

'in our mind'. It is the business of transcendental philosophy to inquire

as to what makes possible the 'something' whose intelligible formula is

contained in judgment.

26 Immanue 1 Kant' s Crit ique of Pure Reason,. London 1964; p ~ 150.

- 27 -

We have alreadyseen27 that the self-consciousness which must

accompany my awareness of an object is made possible in the exercise

of an act which thereby becomes present to itself as necessarily

identical in aIl possible representations. This necessary self-conscious-

ness, which Kant calls 'transcendental apperception', is therefore the

formaI effect of an act of synthesis.

To understand fully Kant's account of how we come to know an object

it is perhaps helpful to distinguish two phases in the operation of the

self: 1) the pre-conscious activity by means of which an object is so

constituted that it can be given to us. in sensibility, 28 and 2) the

conscious activity by mèans of which we understand the object given.

Perhaps it may be asked: how can we ded~ce the necessary conditions

which are antecedent to our awareness of anything? To answer this it is

only'necessary to recall that even immediate sensible awareness of what

we have not yet understood belongs to the same unchanging self which

makes possible aIl further thought about the content of this awareness.

This content Kant terms 'appearance', and the immediate awareness of

appearance is '(empirical) intuition'. AlI appearances, in order that

we may become aware of them, bear a necessary relation to the unit Y of

apperception. It is from this premiss that Kantdeduces the pre-conscious

synthesis of apprehension.

27 Cf. pp.2l ff. of this essay.

28 " ... by synthesis of apprehension l understand that combination of the . manifold in an empirical intuition, whereby perception, that is, empi­rical consciousness of the intuition (as appearance) is possible." Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.170.

- 28 -

We are never consciously affected by the thing in itself in isolation.

The 'affection' or modification of which we become conscious is partly

the influence of the thing in itself, partly the influence of the imagi­

nation, whose activity is aroused by the occurrence of impressions pre­

consciously. !hat is why sensation, the element in appearance which is

directly attributable to the thing in it'self, becomes the 'matte.r' of

appearance. 29 It has been characterized by successiveness and externality,

and unified in such a way that it can relate to an identical consciousness

in intuition.

Consciousness of appearance is no more than an unresolved awareness of

itself and the appearance before which itis passive. The self, in conjunc­

tion with the thing in~tself is affecting itself; but this self-affection

is not a part of the intuition; it is only deducible as a condition of

appearances. Thus the consciousness induced by self-affection is passive;

not wholly passive, of course, for the understanding " ..• is conscious ta

itself,'even without the aid of sensibility.II30 For actual apperception

ls the formaI effect of the exercise of pre-conscious synthesis. By means

of the latter synthesis l become sensible of the manifold of a tree

(intuition) and also (independently of sensibility) of the unit y in the

act of synthesis of the tree. Thus, in this state of empirical apperception

l have two immediate representations: the appearance, based on the recep­

tivity of sense, and a 'concept' of the tree:

29 Cf. Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.65.

30 Cf. p.24 of this essaye

- 29 -

Whereas aIl intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts rest on functions. By 'function' l mean the unit y of the act ofbringing various representations under one conunon representation°. Concepts are based on the spontaneity of thought, sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions. 31

At this point one could say that the self is in possession of the

terms of a judgment that is objectively valid: a concept oand its corres-

ponding intuition (or instantiation). But because transcendental apper-

ception has not yet come intoplay (cf. pp.23-24) any 'judgment' ~hich above

articulates the content of exclusively empirical apperception has only

subjective validity; e.g. '(1 think) l see a tree'. The latter judgment

asserts merely the (possibly) accidentaI conjunction of two inunediate

representations, the intuition and its corresponding consciousness of

unit y, the concept. Thus the unit Y in the manifold of empirical apper-

ception can be thought as haphazard or arbitrary. This possibility is

marked by the presence, in the example above, of a judgment of merely

subjective validity, of othe qualifier 'l, think'. For the latter describes

an actual state of consciousness, 0 but not a necessary one (in its formaI

or unitary aspect). Therefore, whereas empiric~l apperception results

from the self-affection of a pre-conscious· synthesis, transcendental

apperception is impossible without a further, consciousact whereby the

contingency in the unit y of an appearance is overcome, giving way to

consciousness of a necessary unity.

31 lmmanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.lOS.

- 30 -

lAs we mentioned several times above, concepts and intuitions are in

themselves immediate representations, Le. 'proper to the understanding

and to sensibility respectively. Kant insists that aIl our knowlçdge of

objects is mediate, the representation (concept) of another representation

(concept or intuition) through their synthesis in 'judgment'. This re-

flects the conjoined operation of sensibility and understanding in the

constitution of the objecte Mediation first takes place when the synthesis

of imagination bridges the gulf between the subjective a priori forms and

the manifold of sen.sibility. This mediation is deduced from the necessity

that appearances must be 50 unified that they are sus.ceptible of concept­

ualization, i.e. capable of being thought within an identical self-cons­

ciousness. The ded~ction of the pre-conscious synthesis of apprehension

was based on the premiss that whatever is given to us in intuition must

be thinkable. This means that we must be able to recognize that the

unit y in the manifold of an appearance is the only possible unity.

Otherwise, ,o;hich is impossible, there could be thought not ruled by the

principle of non-contradiction.

The critical question for the possibility of knm'lledge is how the

manifold of intuition is united in the object. In empirical apperception

we are conscious of how it happens to be united in the subject. But the

synthesis of intuition and concept in judgments of merely subjective

validity lacks the necessity which we fee 1 belongs to knowledge; this

synthesis must be brought into relation with the object, that in which

the manifold of an intuition is necessarily united.

- 31"-

Now we find that our thought of the relation of aIl knowledge to its object carries with it an element of necessity; .the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in sorne fashion. 32

When reading the above passage one might be tempted to see in the re1a­

tivity of phenomena which it proclaims a relfection of earlier passages in

which the dependence of sensibility upon the existence of the thing in it­

self is briefly mentioned. 33 It·wou1d seem that the mind seeks from this

existent a necessitating influence of the kind suggested earlier in this

essay.34 But Kant, true to his standpoint of total immanence \'lithin cons-

ciousness, interprets this necessity solely in terms of the relation \'lhich

an appearance must have to a single se1f~consciousness within a thoroughly

interconnected experience:

"For in so far as they they must necessarily is, must possess that concept of an object.

are to relate to an object, agree with one another, that unit y \'lhich constitutes the

35

If l'le keep in mind the idealism of the Transcendental Aesthetic, the

following interpretation by Kant of the "unit Y \'lhich constitutes the

concept of an object" follO\'ls readi1y:

But it is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since the!.. (the object) which corresponds to

32 Immanue 1 Kant' s Crit ique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p. 134.

33 Cf. Chapter l, section 3, of this essay.

34 Cf. p.12 of this essay.

35 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.134-135.

o

- 32 -

them is nothing to us - being, as .it is, something that has to be distinct from al!' our representations - the unit y 'which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formaI unit y of consciousness in t·he synthesis of' the manifold of representation. 36

Becau?e of the unchanging and indivisible nature of pure self-conscious-

'ness,

The pure concept of this transcendenta1 object is a1ways one and 'the same, is what a10ne can confer upon aIl our ernpirica1 concepts in genera1 relation to an object, that is, objective rea1ity. 37

It is this concept of the unchanging transcendental object which must

be added to the synthesis of an intuition and its corresponding concept

(lIt feels 1ike it's raining') in order that the former synthesis have

objective va1idity ('It is raining ' ). The empirica1 concept is the re­

presentation of the unit y of a particu1ar synthesis: When it is discerned

that this unit y is an instance, so to speak, of the unit y in the concept

of the transcendental object, the synthesis of these two concepts produces

the particu1ar object, for this latter is understood to partake of the

necessity of the unchanging 1 l' '.

The subject-object relation has as its terms the (pure) self and the

non-self. If the self is to know an object, Le. if there is to be se1f-

consciousness with respect to an object, then it must represent to itself

this relation. To do so it must distinguish the terms of this relation and

re-unite them in a consciousness of their opposition. This must take place

36 Immanue1 Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.135.

37 Ibid., p.137.

33

within actual apperception, for we are dealing with the present appearance,

and cannot juxtapose the concept of something extraneous to the present

state of the self in or der to illumine its contents. The self must dis­

tinguish within its own se~f-presence that whichis necessary for all

possible representations from that which islimited and determined by its

relation to a present appeàrance. Since concepts represent the unit Y of

consciousness, the above-mentioned distinction is identically that between

the concept of the transcendental object and the empirical concept, the

one completely indeterminate and boundless in extent, the ot.her more de­

terminate but limited in its scope. The particular object or object of

experience is the synthetic product of a judgment in which the two concepts

are united in the relation of reciprocal determination of a limit upon the

spontaneity of the self in its infinite scope as the ground of aIl thought

in general C! edition) or a representation of a fragmentary aspect of the

unchanging object in relation to which allappearances can be given

objective unit y CA edition). Thus the opposition of subject and object

ip consciousness is that of unit y and the manifold. Insofar as the self

is pure spontaneity it is indivisibly one, so that the divisibility of

the manifold of experience marks a passivity which is somehow essential

to the exercise of that spontaneity.

Let us calI 'objective apperception' that act in which empirical and

transcendental apperception are combined in the repl'esentati.on of an

objecte In aIl objective apperception there is a moment of passivity.

Corresponding to the limitation of the unit y of apperception by the unit Y

- 34 -

of the particular ernpirical concept is a check upon the spontaneous

activity of the self such that it is restricted by the nature of its

'matter' to this synthesis and no more. In transcèndenta1 apperception

this activity becomes present to itse1f as 'more' than its rea1ization

in the present synthesis. And this 'more', Kant seems to be saying,

is that in relation to which appearances gain objective unity.

Before leaving this topic it would be weIl to reiterate the negative

conclusion of the transcendental deduction: since the light of apper-

ception is hidden behind the veil of a spatio-ternporal sensibility whose

texture and infinite extent is manifest in the pure intuitions of space

and time, the synthesis of the imagination can raise to the mind's eye

on1y phenomena:

... Our know1edge has to deal solély with appearances, the possibility of which lies in ourselves, and the connection and unit Y of which (in the representation of an object) are to be met with only in ourselves. Such connection and unit y must therefore precede aIl expe­rience, and are required for the very possibi1ity of it in its formaI aspect. From this point of view, the on1y feasib1e one, our deduction of the categorieshas been deve loped. 38

38 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.l50.

III

THE FOCUS OF MARECHAL'S CRITICISM

1. Existence and Unit y in Kant

This section is a preliminary exposition of the absence of a certain

transcendental condition in the Kantian system. It is felt by Maréchal

that Kant exploits only the formaI aspect of cognition, that while he

recognizes the role of activity in 'objectivation', he satisfies himself

in this respect merely by stating that it must take place, that it is a

necessary condition of the synthesis of form and matter in cognition.

Activity, movement, are necessary conditions, the 'how' of the unit y of

the sensible manifold, but how activity itself is possible is never in­

vestigated by Kant. The a priori possibility of subjective activity is

the absent transcendental condition which this essay will seek to present

under the guidance of Maréchal.

Marechal is willing to go part of the way with Kant's critical metho-

dology; but in the following statement of his intention an important

qualification is made:

Devant le problème de la connaissance, nous pouvons procéder, avec Kant, et pour des raisons de méthode, un peu comme le géomètre, qui transpose la réalité complexe en un jeu, aussi restreint que possible, et retrouve des "invariants" sous la variabilité même;

- 36 -

en critique, nous convenons de partir de l'aspect relatif de l'objet, aspect que personne ne contes­te et ne saurait contester: si nous retrouvions, sous la relativité même de cet objet, l'absolu métaphysique, notre conclusion, appuyée sur un moïndre nombre de présupposés, n'acquerrait-elle pas, sinon plus de valeur intrinsèque, du moins, plus de portée polémique? 39

Maréchal contends that the 'existential' need not be identified with

sheer variability, and therefore need not be negated for the sake of

a 'science of human reason ' ..

As Kant repeatedly emphasized in his introduction to the first

Critique, any science properly so called must consist of propositions

invested with strict universality and necessity. . Therefore these pro-

positions must ultimately derive from principles expressing the trans-

cendental conditions of the irrefutable.fact of 'experience'. This

derivation is the ambitious plan of which the Critique of Pure Reason

is merely the pro gram.

Kant seems to have finished with the 'existence' which our sensible

intuition depends upon by saying (implicitly): we live, we think,

impressions rain upon the sensibility, aIl this is a matter of fact

the life of the self, the material richness of sensation, movement,

manifoldness and contingency, this is the stuff upon which the theoretical

mind must exercise its penchant for unity. 'Unification', 'combination',

'synthesis' of the manifold: thus the speculative intellect brings about

39 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:590.

- 37 -

the closure of form upon the diversity and flux of natura materialiter

spectata. Upon the sheer 'givenness' of experience the edifice of know-

ledge is to be structured. 'Existence' is merely there (beyond the outer

perimeter of form, beyond space and'time) - an ultimate, irrational datum~

Since unit y is the characteristic product of mind, if aIl particular

unities can be exhibited hierarchically in .necessary relation to the

supreme unit y of apperception which makes aIl else possible, we have

then a system of knowledge, a science. If these various levels of unit y

can be discerned without there being a need (or indeed a possibility) of

c~aracterizing the thing or the subject in themselves, then the latter

must be excluded from the sphere of possible knowledge. \~ile such an

exclusion may causé grief in sorne academic circles, it nevertheless se-

cures the progress of science unhampered by sceptical doubts. In this

way 'existence' and the actual exercise of activity which, as it were,

manifests existence, are both consigned to the exterior darkness beyond

the light of apperception. The standpoint of total immanence is achieved.

Perhaps these considerations furnish sorne clue why Kant does not

provide a teleological explanation of the cognitive life. Any such mode

of explanation must reintroduce the 'existential' which he has excluded

in the name of unity. Such is his bias, and it is aptly described by

Maréchal:

un philosophe critique sera généralement sa1S1 d'une instinctive méfiance devant la notion dynami­que du mouvement, conçu, non comme une succession de formes, mais comme la morsùre progressive de l'acte sur la puissance; car il pressent bien qu'accepter la fonction dynamique du mouvement

- 38 -

c'est mettre le doigt dans l'engrenage de la Métaphysique. Et pourtant, en dehors des rap­ports généraux'd'acte et de puissance, comment concevoir la fonction synthétique de l'à priori, et la valeur universalisante du transcendental? Il faudrait réduire le sujet cognitif à un écha­faudage'inerte des formes, où l'on enfournerait le donné: mais de quel droit? •.. ,40

When Kant speaks of objects "affecting the senses" and thereby

"awakening into action" the cognitive faculty, he refers not only to

the passive reception of impression which "partly of themselves produce

representations" , but also to the spontaneous response of the under­

standing as they "arouse (its) activity". 41 \'/hile the 'receptivity of

sense seems to demand something like a production by the thing in itself,

the "Copernican revolution" in philosophy initiated by Kant has as its

first principle that theresponse of the self to the occurrence of

impressions is determined according to the nature of the knower and not

of the thing. Insofar as the self is active, it cannot be affected by

the thing; yet the activity of the self is "aroused" by the thing.

Therefore this influence cannot be understood by analogy with production;

it is rather like attraction, the impulse given to a tendency by the

presence of a value.

40 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:535.

41 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.4l; and pp.23 ff. of this essaye

- 39 -

2. Metaphysical Affirmation

"La question vraiment litigieuse" .

••• entre le Réalisme dans son ensemble et la Critique~ (voici) le vrai débat

Si l'on accèpte pour point de départ ce logogriphe initial: "l'objet de conscience comme object phénomé­nal", la question vraiment litigieuse se formule cor­rectement en ces termes: une représentation peut-elle prendre fonction d'objet, dans la conscience, en vertu d'une simple unité formelle de synthèse? ou, plus brièvement, un objet purement phénoménal est-il possi­ble (dans la pensée)? 42

According to Maréchal the question at issue is whether a purely phe-

nomenal object can be thought. An alleged 'object', which contains a

contradiction, ismerely a representation of the impossible attempt to

unite within ~he unit y of an object both its affirmation and denial,

being and non-being. The very least we must do in thinking of an object

in general is to think of it as possible (for our conscioùsness). Then

the lines of intelligibility inevitably reach beyond the object 'in

isolation', as it were, and necessary relations are discerned between

aspects of this object and what the subject must be in order that such

an object be possible. Kant calls the deduction of these necessary

conditions "transcendental". To think of an object as possible without

its transcendental conditions is therefore to think inconsistently. The

contradiction is not explicit, for, literally, it is not the same thing

42 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:593.

e

- 40 -

that is affirmed and denied; but it is an act ofa faculty which denies

the possibility of its own act·:

•.• lorsque la nécessité subjective est absolument primitive et universelle, lorsqu'elle s'étend à toute pensée objective, il devient impossible, pour la faculté intellectuelle, de ·nier cette nécessité

. ou d'en douter, sans l'affirmer néanmoins dans l'implicite logique de l'acte même du doute ou de la négation. 43

Maréchal maintains that to avoid a contradiction of this kind we must

admit that the thought of an 'object in general t implies an affirmation

of its relation to the Absolute.

But how do es this question of the possibility of a purely phenomenal

object relate to the absence in Kant's system of an explanation of the

becoming -of the active subject, as indicated in the previous section of

thiSchapter?The link between these two questions -is found in the first

formulation of Maréchal' s "ques~ion vraiment litigieuse" in the passage

quoted at the beginning of this section: is the formaI unit Y of synthesis

a sufficient explanation of objective unit y? "Porm", the unit y imparted

. to the manifold of sensibility, belongs to the self. The word t synthesis'

signifies the incorporation of an alien manifold within the act of the

subject. 'Form' is the unit y of this act of incorporation. If 'form'

is the sufficient explanation of 'objective reality', then, because form

is subj ective, the reality cf the obj ect is entirely relative to the

subject: it is a pure1yphenomenal object.

43 J.Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:49S.

- 41 -

But if 'form' is the unit y of a tendency toward an absent obj~ct,

it is th en the reality in itself of the absent object which, by the

attraction of its value for the self, moves the self to incorporate it.

The subjective form, far from grounding the reality of the object,

requires the thing in itse1f as the condition of its possibility.

Thus, even in 'critica1' philosophy, te1eology opens the way to

metaphysics: if the pure ego is in a state of active becoming, th en ,

since al! becoming44 implies the reality of something outside the be-

coming, the pure ego requires, for its possibi1ity, the reality of the

thing outside it, the thing in itse1f.

Here is the task which Maréchal sets himse1f:

Nous entreprenons, en effet, d'établir à priori, "par . concepts", que, pour toute intelligence non-intuitive, le moyen, et le seul moyen, de représenter, comme objets, les contenus de cons­cience, est l'affirmation strictement métaphysi­que de ceux-ci, c'est-à-dire leur rapport déter­miné, au moins implicite, à une Réalité transcen­dente: de telle façon que refuser cette affirma­tion revienne à nier la possibilité de la pensée objective. 45

3. 'Affirmation' in Kant.

Un contenu de conscience ne s'érige en objet, c'est-à-dire, n'exige l'attribut de vérité logique, qu'au sein du jugement, ou pour pré-

44 Cf. Chapter IV, section 4, of this essay.

45 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:318.

- 42 -

ciser davantage, dans l'affirmation judica­tive. En d'autres termes: l'aperception objective de l'objet est l'effet formel d'une affirmation. 46

With a sma11 amount of translation, the above passage para1lels the

treatment of Kant's notion of the 'object' in the second chapter of this

essay (cf. pp .33 ff.). "Affirmation (judicative)" is Marechal' s term

for a synthesis having objective va1idity. We have seen that the empi-

rica1 concept and its corresponding intuition, the two irnrnediate repre-

sentations ''t'hich are found in what Kant cal1s "empirica1 apperception"

cannot of themse1ves ~ together (in a judgrnent expressing the state of

consciousness of the subject) yie1d know1edge of an object. By stretching

Kant's language somewhat, we may say that in "affirmation" the state of

the subject, as represented in a judgment of mere1y subjective va1idity

such as '(1 think) l see a tree', becomes 'matter' for the form of trans-

cendenta1 apperception.

The scholastic formula for the relation of the knowing subject to its

object is 'esse aliud ut aliud'. Kant has provided us ''t'ith an interpre-

tation of this formula: 'to be the other as other' is the mode of knowing

proper to an intellect lacking intuition. The form of pure apperception

becomes actua1 (i.e. self-conscious) only in imparting itself to the mani-

fo1d of sensibility in "synthetic unit y". It does so by restricting its

47 spontaneity and unit y in the synthesis of appearances. Ens et unum

46 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:5l9.

47 Cf. pp.33-34 of this essay.

e

- 43a -

convertuntur: the empirical concept, as the unit y of synthesis of an

empirical intuition, is the 'other', since it is the form of a given

appearance; as the unit y of consciousness of this intuition, it is the

transcendental self as restricted. Thus, in empirical apperception,

the self is the 'other'. In objective apperception the self is the

other as other: the 'otherness' of the appearance is discerned in re-

lation to the concept of the 'transcendental object', whose unit y is

that of transcendental apperception. What Maréchal caUs "affirmation"

is the act of synthesis whereby the concept of a particular appearance

is joined to the concept of a 'transcendental object' (though he disagrees

radically with Kant's account of the latter concept). This completes

the translation procedure; we can now summarize both Kant and Maréchal

by saying that objective apperception is the "formaI effect" (the con-

comitant consciousness) of affirmation. In Maréchal's scholastic termi- .

nology,

L'objectivation de l'objet, c'est-à-dire la cons­cience d'un rapport de conformité entre la déter-· mination subj ective et la réalité extérieure,' exige, de la part du sujet, un acte spontané ('4affirmation") par lequel non seulement il se modè le effect ivement sur l' obj et C"empirical apperception"), mais se donne pour conforme à l'objet ("objective apperception"). Dès ce moment, le rapport de vérité - conformitas rei et intellec­tus - dont le terme subjectif etait déjà matériel­lement constitue dans les facultés du sujet ... est pose formellement, selon ses deux termes comme rapport de verite; et dans ce rapport, la détermi­nation subjective prend valeur d'objet. 48

48 J. Marechal, Le point de départ de la Metaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:T28.

- 43b -

4. Beyond transcendental apperception

" through the 'l', as simple representationnothing manifold is

given ... ,,49 \

This 'l' is an a priori representation of consciousness-in-general.

It is 'pure' not only in its independence from experience, but also in

its lack of any determinate relation to the possibility of experience.

It is thus a representation devoid of content, merely a consciousness

of the spontaneity of the self. To this representation no intuition,

pure or empirical, corresponds. It is the self-consciousness of an

intelligence devoid of intuition. This simple 'l', Kant would say,

cannot therefore be a principle of knowledge, lacking, as it does, any

relation to a possible intuition. Since aU our intuitions are sensible,

and consequently subject to time, the form of inner sense, and since that

unit y of self-consciousness which is the condition of a possible object

of knowledge is an a priori representation, the latter is necessarily

related to a temporal manifold, and is caUed 'transcendental apperception'.

Transcendental apperception, as the unit y of consciousness necessary for

an object of our intuition (in general) , is, identically, the simple 'It

conscious of its dependence upon and restriction to the total field of

spatio-temporal intuition.

Now the only possible relation which this original spontaneity of the

self can bear to the receptivity of inner sense is what Kant calls

49 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.lSS.

- 44 -

"synthetic". The representation of transcendental, or "original synthetic

unit y of apperception" is a synthesis of the pure manifold of sensibility

(externality and successiveness) and the pure spontaneity of the intellect.

The 'is' of a judgment in which an object is constituted within conscious­

ness asserts the necessary relation of the synthetic'unity of empirical

apperception to the original synthetic unit y described above, and not for

the unit y of the purely spontaneous 'l'. Therefore the latter, insofar as

it is 'more' than itself as restricted, will always lack an adequate object

in the theoretical sphere and be a surplus of subjectivity, rebuffed, as it

were, by its incarnation 'in a human being. This is why "pure reason", a

name for this surplus, requires a Critique: the human self must come to

know itself as a restricted nature. This self-knowledge is transcendental

philosophy, for it realizes in sorne way the classical notion of wisdom -

self-knowledge and an awareness of order in the world.

The above-mentioned "surplus" of subjectivity is different from the

"more" described on page 34 of this essay: "And this 'more', Kant seems

to be saying, is that in relation to which appearances gain objective

reality". There is a paralle l here, closer than at first appears, in the

moral life: just as, when someone says 'There must be more to life than

this', he may mean either more variety in the same kind of thing he values,

or that sorne values transcend others: so the potential of the transcenden­

tal ego in the synthesis of appearances exceeds infinitely its realization

in any particular experience or aggregate of experience, and yet the inex-

- 45 -

haustible field of 'experience' (in the technical, Kantian sense) is some-

~ how infinitely less than what reason, the impulse of the unrestricted 'l',

aspires to.

5. Ens principium numeri

The pure intuition of time can be understood as a representation of

the potentially infinite scope of inner sense, the faculty which makes

intuition possible. Corresponding to this 'time of the subject' is an

objective 'time of the world,.50 Whereas subjective time is the field

of possible intuitions, objectivetime is that in which the existence of

aIl objects of experience is to be determined. Bùt time, as subjective

or objective, is still representable only as a single, (potentially) in-

finite, given whole. But if the world is a single whole, then it should

be numerable, it should be thought as one of many worlds. However,

another world would be indiscernible, since both would comprise within

the same formaI unit y of time aIl possible sensible content, aIl possible

existence. Moreover, we are unable, because of the successiveness of

our mode of representing the world, to think it as actually infinite.

Therefore it is not really numerable. AlI this serves to indicate the

infra-intellectual nature of spatio-temporal being.

Every thing or event in the wor1d is also single, since it can only

be known through concepts. For the instance of a concept is

50 Cf. lmmanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, pp.208 ff.

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- 46 -

part of a potentially infinite series of instances of one and the same

synthesis. It is the identity of the synthesis which makes possible

the successive addition of homogeneous units in the imagination, by

means of which we understand the universality of the concept. Since

aIl concepts belong to a single consciousness, there is an identical

synthesis pel~ading the diversity not only of intuitions b~t also of

aIl empirical concepts. This is true also of the 'categories' ,.as

concepts. Ultimately, it is by means of the categories that the exis­

tence of an object is determined in time. Therefore aIl objects what­

soever are single, in virtue of an identical element in their synthesis.

Any object can be thought as a member of a potentially infinite series.

Since, as Kant says in another context, " ..• number ... (is) a repre­

sentation which comprises the successive addition of homogeneous units

••• 11,51 the unit Y of aIl possible objects, singly and in their totality,

is the infra~intellectual unit Y of number.

The 'identical element' in the synthesis of any object whatsoever

is the 'original synthetic unit y , of transcendental apperception. It

is to the latter that the identical element, the empirical concept, in

the synthesis of this or that intuition is referred in order that the

relation of an appearance to its object may be known. Thus the concept

of the object or being of experience differs from.e~pirical concepts

only in its absolute generality and consequent necessity. But·both re-

51 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, pp.183-184.

- 47 -

present something single. In this way, the being of experience, as ex-

plained by Kant~ corresponds~ in Maréchal's scholastic terminology~ to

ens principium numeri, being as the ground of number; and to ens univocum

(or, commune)~ for it is identical in aIl possible objects.

The synthesis of the form of apperception and the pure manifold of

inner sense is the absolute generalization of the particular synthesis of

the empirical concept and its corresponding intuition. This latter syn-

thesis is called by Maréchal 'concretion':

Il faut remarquer~ que le rapport de concrétion, considéré dans son type général, est précisément le rapport d'une forme spécificatrice quelconque à l'unité radicale et indéfinie du nombre, c'est­à-dire, en dernière analyse, le rapport d'une forme en général à cette subjectivité primitive et homogène ("primum subjectum"), que les Sco­lastiques appellent la "Matière" (première). 52

Kant would have it that the subsumption of a particular synthesis under

the concept of ens commune constitutes the relation of the former to its

object. The relativity of ens commune, spatio-temporal being, has already

been discussed at length (cf. pp.45 ff. of this essay).

\\Te have thus come again to the "question vraiment litigieuse". According

to Maréchal, Kant's explana~ion of 'affirmation1 solely in terms of original

synthetic unit Y (ens commune) is incorrect:

Mais la synthèse concrétive n'est pas - et ne peut pas être - l'unité suprême du jugement. L'affirma­tion rapporte le donné à une unité objective qui dé­passe infiniment en portée l'unité de nombre: la

52 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:523.

- 48 -

"synthèse concrétive" de la représentation, soudure de forme et de matière, se double d'une "synthèse obj ective" à l' être comme tel. 53

In other words, that unit y which is the principle of number cannot be

identified with objective unity.

6. Objective Unit y

Cette synthèse (objective), d'une nature toute particulière, est identique à l'affirmation. Elle s'exprime bien par le jugement élémentaire partout implicite: Cela est. 54

(N.B.: As we mentioned earlier in this chapter,55 affirmation is an act;

it makes possible the objective consciousness which is articulated in a

proposition. )

Kant would be the first to admit that an affirmation of the thing in

itself necessarily accompanies aIl judgments of objective validity. It is

this aspect of judgments which forms the starting-point of aIl metaphysical

inquiry. The original illusion, so to speak, of man's questioning mind is

that the (contingent) is given, in every object of experience. Reflection

upon this illusory proposition breeds a dissatisfaction with the homogeneity

and predictability of experience captured in mathematical formulae and

scientific generalizations; growing weary of what is mere1y 'here' or 'there',

53 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:523.

54 Ibid., p.524.

55 Cf. p.43 of this essaye

- 49 -

'now' or 'then', man seeks to break. the bubble of space and time. Tradi­

tionalmetaphysics is the scene of a succession of systematic elaborations

of this primary illusion ..

Here, in its most general form, is the reasoning to which this illusion

gives rise:

Tout conditionné exige l'existence de la totalité de ses conditions. Or un conditionné nous est donné (objectivement dans l'expérience). Donc la totalité de ses conditions nous est don­née avec lui. 56

If the thing in itself were given as a contingent being, then its absolute.

dependence would proclaim the actuality of the Unconditioned upon which it

depends. But since it is only appearance which is given, the dependence of

the latter can be grasped only in relation to a subjective a priori. While

the appearance is contingent with respect to a spatio-temporal sensibility

(it is given), the thing in itself, as the ground of this appearance, need

not be contingent. AlI such modal terms as cont ingency , possibility, ne-

cessity, etc. relate exclusively to our mode of knowing, and tell us nothing

of the thing in itself.

Still, it is a fact that reason, in its tendency toward the Absolute,

begins with the object of experience. The Critique of Pure Reason is very

much concerned with denying the legitimacy of this starting-point: the

transcendence of reason

56 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p~71.

- 50 -

... représente un besoin métempirique de l'esprit, une tendance subjective vers l'inconditionné trans­phénoménal: elle trouve satisfaction dans l'absolu problématique du noumène positif, mais ne saurait légitimement nous imposer la réalité objective de ce noumène. Réception du donné et exigence totali­sante se rapportent à des plans différents, sans communication dans l'objet. 57

Experience. ("réception du donné") and the illusory synthesis of pure reason

("exigence totalisante") operate on different planes. We have already seen58

that the unit Y of the simple 'l'or se1f-activity becomes objective, according

to Kant, on1y insofar as it is contracted by a necessary relation to the pure

manifold of inner sense. This restricted unit y is what Kant calls "original

synthetic". Subsequently it was shown59 that the object (in general) made

possible by transcendenta1 apperception is what the scholastics calI ens uni-

vocum principium numeri. Because the unrestricted 'l' is not, as such,

constitutive of an object, its affirmation of the object of experience adds

nothing to the synthetic unit y of apperception. The relation of an appearance

to the simple 'l', expressed in the lis' of a judgment, becomes determinate

only insofar as it is temporal. A concept is empty without sorne reference

to sensible intuition. But the way an appearance in innersense is concept-

ualized is in consciousness of the unit Y of the appearance. In other words,

for a concept to be tru1y of something given in intuition, it has to be the

57 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphlsigue, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critigue, 2nd ed. , Paris 1949, p -:572.

58 Cf. p.44 of this essay.

59 Cf. p.46 of this essay.

- 51 -

unit y of the content of inner sense. And, as we have seen, this unit y is

the unit y of number. If a so-called concept is ~ than this, it .is to

that extent .empty: "50 far as l could know, there wQuldbe nothing, and.

could be nothing, to which my thought could be applied. ,,60 The being

which is asserted by the simple 'l', Le. "pure reason", is therefore

merely ideal; it can be thought, but never known. "L'être comme tel",

ens ut sic, being as the representation of pure reason, though thought in

every judgment of experience, has no more content than ens principium numeri.

The complete indeterminacy of the thought of transcendent being reflects

the surplus of subjectivity due to the contraction of pure self-activity

in the synthetic unit Y of apperception.

Kant briefly mentions the illusory affirmation of metaphysical being .

in the A edition of his Transcendental Deduction, only to sub~it it to a

reductive analysis:

But it is clear that since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations, and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to us - being, as it is, something that has to be dis­tinct from aIl our representations - the unit y which the object makes necessary can be nothing else than the formaI unit y of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of representations (i.e. transcendental apperception). 61

Both the original unit y of apperception and the unit y of consciousness in

an empirical concept are forms intrinsically related to "matter", the pure

manifold of inner sense. The pure self-activity of the simple 'l' is yet

60 Immanue1 Kant's Critique of Pure Reason,London 1964, p.162.

61 Ibid., p.135; and cf. p. 31 of this essay.

- 52 -

operative within the self, its activity is free from the bonds of "matter",

and it is the origin of the dynamism which makes possible aIl synthetic

activity. For whatever there is ofspontaneity in the transcendental

functions described by Kant belongs to the simple 'l'. Kant seems cornrnitted

to sayin~ that pure self-activity does and does not make possible the object

of experience. But more of this later.

For now it is enough to have shown how Maréchal agrees with Kant in

such. fundamental tenets as the necessity of sensible content, the prirnacy

of judgrnent (synthesis) in the constitution of the object, and the synthesis

of "concretion" as a transcendental condition. This broad area of agreement

between Maréchal, a professed adherent of Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics,

and Kant, the 'revolutionary' in philosophical method, serves to highlight

both the presence in European philosophy of a continuous tradition, and the

"question vraiment litigieuse" between these two thinkers: the .significance

of the "rnetaphysical affirmation" present in aU objective apperception,

which Kant subrnits to a 'transcendental reduction', so to speak, and thereby

denies the possibility of metaphysics.

IV

EXISTENCE AND ACTIVITY

1. The Consciousness of absolute Existence

The '1 think' expresses the act of determining my existence. Existence is already given thereby, but the mode in which 1 am to determine this existence, that is, the manifold belonging to it, is.not there­by given. In order that it be given, self-intuition is required; and such intuition is conditioned by a given a priori form, namely time, which is sensible, and belongs to the receptivity of the determinable (in me). Now since 1 do not have another self­intuition which gives the determining in me (1 am conscious only of the spontaneity of it) prior to the act of determination, as time does in the case of the determinable, 1 cannot determine my existence as that of a self-active being; allthat 1 can do is to represent to myself the spontaneity of my thought, that is, of the determination; and my exis­tence is still only determinable sensibly, that is, as the existence of an appearance. But it is owing. to this spontaneity that 1 entitle myself an intel­ligence. 62

In the activity of my consciousness, my trans-phenomenal existence is

given. Corresponding to my self-presence as a pure spontaneity is an aware-

ness of my dependence upon the existence of things other than myself, a de-

pendence built into the notion of 'sensibility' in Kant.

62 Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, London 1964, p.169, n.a.

- 54 -

Kant restricts the realm of 'knowledge' to what can be conceptualized.

A concept is the unit y of consciousness in the synthesis of a given manifold,

pure or empirical. Nothing manifold is given in the representation of the

simple 'l' (cf. pp.43 ff. ofthis essay). AlI that is manifold is given in

inner sense, and is subject to time. This includes my own acts of conscious-

ness, which when viewed objectively can be represented only as a succession

of events. l have a pure intuition of time, in which I can understand time

as the formaI determinant of the matter of aIl appearances. But time, as I

intuit it, is the synthetic product of a pure manifold determined by my

self-activity (as.I come to. know through a transcendental deduction). But

I have no intuition of this determining activity of myself as purely active,

the product of which is the repres.entation of time. It is only in judgment

that we determine the objective reality of something; and judgment, according

to Kant, requires for its predicate a concept, a consciousness of the unit Y

of what is manifold. Since there is nothing manifold given in the .simple

'l', its existence cannot be known, Le. "determined".

The transphenomenal existence of pure consciousness, though it contrasts

with the 'existence' of an object or thing in itself because it is· a repre-

sentation of pure subj ectivity , yet shares with the 'existence' of the th,ing

in itself (upon which our derivative intuition depends) the absoluteness of

'something rather th an nothing'; it is the consciousness of the subject in

itself:

... ·cette "réflexion psychologique" qui nous révèle à nous-mêmes, et qui est - croyons-nous, avec beau­coup de Scolastiques - une véritable expérience mé­taphysique. En effet, l'aperception la plus primi-

- 55 -

tive que nous ayons de notre Moi, dans la réflexion immédiate sur nos contenus de conscience, nous le livre"en exercice", comme un Devenir actif (ou un Mouvement) se propageant à travers des détermina­tions sans cesse renouvelées ... 63

The situation of a pure spontaneity. 'incarnate' in a human being, intuiting

itself through the veil of a spatio-temporal sensibility is perhaps cap-

tured in sorne such phrase as "the root lessness of existence"; for the we 11-

springs of our action lie in the purely spontaneous self which is prior to

the constitution of this (phenomenal) world. To borrow a phrase from Jesuit

spirituality, we are "in the world, but not of it".

Corresponding to the absoluteness of existence present in the '1 think'

is the "metaphysical affirmation" of every object of experience (cf. ppa.S

ff. of this essay). The simple 'l', conscious of its dependence, in sen-

sibility, upon the existence of objects, and present to itself as a tendency

toward the Absolute, confers upon the object of experience an absoluteness

corresponding to that in the consciousness of its own existence, and invests

it with a dependence upon an actual Unconditioned such as would quiet its

incessant questioning. We have seen how, according to Kant, such an affir-

mation is illusory (cf. pp.49-5l of·this essay).

The representation.of the 'existence' of the objects upon which our

sensibility depends is made possible by the consciousness of my 'existence'

as spontaneity,·' as an empty self-presence, lacking everything ("nothing

manifold is given"). We have seen the impossibility of a conceptual repre-

63 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le . Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:5"36.

- 56 -

sentation of this 'existent' (cf. Chapter II). It is, in the system of

Kant, a formless datum, since 'forro', as.the principle of aIl knowledge

and science, is the unitary consciousness of a manifold; and this is

impossible with respect tothe subject in itself.

2. Action

In every act ·of the will l seek to communicate the absolute existence

of which l am conscious in myself to something else. l am always choosing,

l must choose; this is the human situation. My existence is a constant

confrontation with the world which demands the response. of a will to action

or inaction. In willing,'I bring myself as agent, as spontaneous, into

relation with something e.1se. Thus every act of the wil,l involvesthe

assertion of myself as existing absolutely in a world in which something

can come to be, absolutely, as a consequence of my willing. (This does not

mean 'creation' in the sense of a nihilo. This chapter, which l'm now

writing, will, absolutely> never be unless .!. persevere in the present effort).

Therefore, while it may be that we can expunge from aU the oret ical propo­

sitions any 'metaphysical affirmation', it is practically impossible to do

so in thQ!se propositions which express the content of an act of the will.

In the order of volition we seek to add to 'existence' as we are conscious

of it in our subjectivity. The same objects of experience from which

speculation (allegedly) can withhold any metaphysical affirmation, when

viewed as ends or means, regain their relation to the Absolute. For this

relation is constitutive of action.

- 57 -

However, the metaphysical affirmation which accompanies acts of the

will supervenes upon an already constituted world of objects. Ifthis

affirmation is to have not merely the subjective necessity of a self

which has to act,

Il faudrait que l'introduction de l'qbjet dans l'absolu des fins, au lieu dè se faire seule­ment par des vouloirs élicites, supposant l'objet déja constitué devant la conscience, s'effectuât dans la genèse même de 1 "obj et comme objet, dans la région de ce dynamisme implicite, encore.indifférencié, où.la spécu­lation et l'action ont également leur source. 64

Maréchal maintains that the postulates of practical reason are most

incontestable when deduced from the necessity of acting, in general, rather

than from the special case of moral action which Kant considers. We can

always refuse to recognize the moral imperative. Of course, such a refusaI

is ultimately contradictory, and this is the point of Kant's moral theory.

But the necessity of acting morally is grounded upon the necessity of acting

in general:

Car, se refuser à agir, c'est vouloir ne pas agir, et c'est donc agir encore; omettre d'agir, c'est bon gré mal gré vouloir omet­tre d'agir et donc, une fois de plus, prendre une attitude active. On n'échappe à l'action qu'en agissant: l'action nous tient, absolu-ment 65

64 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le . Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p:53l.

65 Ibid., p.530.

- 58 -

3. Further Remarks concerning intellectual Spontaneity

It is most important to notice, in the above exposition of propositions

which express acts of the will, that the absolute of being which a practical

judgment confers upon objects in the sphere of action is not an imposition

'ab extra' upon a reality which does not itself demand such affirmation.

Rather, because of the self-consciousness of the agent as spontaneous and

existing 'absolutely', the only way in which it can constitute for itself,

in judgment, an object for the exercise of its spontaneity, in in metaphy­

sical affirmation. From a 'Kantian viewpoint, this necessary affirmation

is still subjective, not because it is arbitrary, but because it is a re­

presentation of the relation between the "surplus" of subjectivity, described

on pages 43-44 of this essay, and objects whose reality is quite independent

of this subjectivity. Therefore, in order that this subjective a priori of

volition become a principle of a priori knowledge it must be shown that the

same relation of absolute dependence, which obtains between the purely

spontaneous self and the production ofwhat does not yet exist in relation

to it, also obtains in the very synthesis of objects of experience.

Let us once more resume the above argument: the Cogito is a represen­

tation of the spontaneity of the self in its consciousness of its own

existence. It is thus the representation of the common rootof the

synthetic activity of the understanding, the unceasing prosecution of

inferences by 'reason', and of volition (in which the spontaneous self

enters into a further relation with the products of its cognitive synthesis).

Kant would have it that despite the subjectively necessary metaphysical

- 59 -

affirmation which accompanies every object of experience as a theoretical

representation, or which (as we have contended) constitutes every object

of action, metaphysical being is unknowable. For Kant, the affirmation of

'pure reason' which accornpanies thesynthetic judgrnent of an object of ex­

perience does not constitute this object,and is therefore merely ideal.

The affirmation which constitutes the object of the will affirms a relation

of something to the Cogito or 'nournenal' self. But no such relation is

necessary in the representation of an object as object of cognition; there­

fore the affirmation has practical, nottheoretical validity.

We have once more focused upon "la question vraiment litigieuse":

for the doctrine presented above (as following from Kantian princip les)

depends upon the possibility of a purely phenomenal object; i.e. oit depends

upon whether, having taken as methodological point of departure the object

within consciousness, we can maintain this standpoint of total immanence

and yet adequately accountfor the possibility of affirming the object. We

have seen that the relation of the subject to an object of action could not

be represented immanently, for action relates to that which is not with

respect to the existence of which the self is conscious in its pure sponta­

neity; in other words, the object of volition is, simply, outside th~ self.

We have also seen that the metaphysical affirmation in volition is not an

imposition, by a conscious subject, of what is not intrinsic to "its produc­

tive act. For it is one and the same subject which, as spontaneity, gives

itself to the production of what does not yet exist, and which is present

to itself as the power or activity of production. We have here a recipro-

-60 -

city between intellect and will. For volition is impossible without the

constitution of its object by the affirmation of the intellect. But this

affirmation is itself necessitated by the nature of the spontaneous self

(as volitional).

4. An Analysis of active Becoming

What we are about to do here is to apply the principle of sufficient

reason to an activity which is real, 'existent' in the absolute sense in

which l am conscious of my existence independently of its determination

in time. Instead of giving in to the bias of regarding this 'existence'

as a modest but uninteresting complement of the essential structure of the

self, let us see whether it has any intelligibility in itself and whether

it requires a transcendental explanation which essential structure alone

does not calI for.

Let us forget that the subject, as existing in the metaphysical sense,

cannot, strictly speaking, be conceptualized; for, in transcendental phi­

losophy, the principle of sufficient reason is applied to the possibility

of concepts themselves, which can only mean that the act according to which

the possibility of concepts in general is rendered intelligible is itself

meta-conceptual. Moreover, reflective reason, in the first Critique, limits

knowledge to what can be conceptualized (in the technical, Kantian sense).

There are only two ways in which a limit can be discerned as such; either

that which limits and that which is limited can be known in one and the

same consciousness, or this discernment is the self-consciousness of a sur­

plus of subjectivity unable, in principle, to be exercised upon the kind of

- 61 -

object with which it dea1s when under a restriction (cf. pp .. 43 ff. of this

essay) . Because our intuition is a1ways sensible, no intuition is possible

of t'hat which, through its positive characteristics, mak.es the sphere of the

unification of the sensible manifold through concepts only a small portion

of something vaguely yet infinitely more. Therefore Kant would have to

adopt the second alternative in order to explain how the limiting of human

knowledge to what he calls "experience" is ïtself knowledge. That is, he

would have to admit that the possibility of transcendental knowledge, and

consequently the ultimate ground of j,ntelligibility in the knowing subject,

is the self-consciousness of the Cogito as'· an unlimited tendency which is

.submitted to a restriction. To be sure, we may loosely speak of aIl our

thoughts as 'concepts', especially when we are trying to understand some­

thing a priori, and wish to exclude merely empirical generalizations. But

what is to be noted here is that a1though the 'existence' of which l am

conscious in myself as spontaneity eludes the grasp of 'concepts' as these

are explained in the Critique, still, even on Kantian principles, it does

not follow that such 'existence' is unintelligible. For we are here applying

to it the same intellectual faculty which is at work throughout the Critique

of Pure Reason.

Let us calI the term or product of an activity its 'object'. Given any

activity, it is 'something rather than nothing', having 'existence' in the

absolute sense. Now the object of this activity, insofar as it has not

been brought into existence, is outside the activity in its antecedent

existence. Therefore the relation between such an activity and its object

- 62-

can be understood only in the absolute order of existence. We are speaking

here of an activity which is characterized by becoming, an activity which

progressively realizes its object,.which does not exist as what it conse-

quently becomes - an 'active becoming'. Activity, insofar as it is prior

to the realization of its obj ect, is potential; in realiz.ing its obj ect, it

is to that extent actual. Activity may be divided into two kinds, immanent

and transient. The latter has as its object the production of what is to

exist distinctly from the activity which brings it about (e.g. moving a

chair). But this essay is principally concerned with immanent act ivity , the

object of which is the exercise of activity. Because the object of immanent

activity is exercise, it does not follow, according to the reasoning of the

scholastics, that the object is exclusively immanent upon being realized.

For the term of immanent activity is an active relafing to some prior

existent, e.g. '1 now understand this situation which had baffled me. ,66

66 "Dès lors, quand l'intelligence cherche un jugement comme son bien, comme finis quo, en cherchant un jugement vrai, elle cherche une opé­ration qui la mettra en relation avec un en soi, un existant, indépen­dant de l'intellection qui l'atteindra. La relation à cet objet, l'union avec cet objet, c'est l'opération qui constitue le finis quo~ L'objet lui-même, indépendant de cette intellection, sera aussi un bien, une fin: car l'indépendance de cet objet, son caract~re d'en soi (par opposition à une fiction subjective, à un terme d'affirmation erronée)

. est essentiel à la verite du jugement, est essentiel donc à la bonté du jugement, à sa valeur de fin (finis quo) pour l'intelligence. Ex­primons cela en appelant cet objet un finis qui (intenditur) ou encore, comme dit le Père Marechal, une fin 'obj ect ive' . "

G. Isay~, in Les grands courants de la Pensee mondiale contemporaine, Ille partie, Portraits, V.2, p.IOI2.

The passage quoted above, an analysis of judgment as an immanent acti­vit y, is weIl worth remembering in connection with ~aréchal's 'trans­cendental deduction' of the 'fin objective' of human intelligence pre­sented in the following chapter.

- 63 -

Obviously something which is exclusively potential is what merely ~

be, 50 that if an activity (considered as a faculty or 'power') exists,

there must always be something of actuality about,it (what will later be

referred to as 'tendency'). In any case, what was said above of activity

in general is true of the immanent kind: the relation between activity

as potential and its object, actual activity ('exercise') is in the absolute

order of existence.

Every activity has a 'specifying form'. In speaking of ~ activity

which can pass from a potential to an actual state, we are thinking of

something whose nature remains identical in a potentially infinite series

of particular realizations. In other words, as we must, we are thinking

the activity through concepts. We are representing to ourselves the unit y

of the activity, that which distinguishes it from different kinds of acti-

vity. This unit y is the 'specifying form' of the activity. We cannot but

represent activity as exercised in accordance with its 'specifying form',

the law of its exercise. It is 'specified' by its form whether in its po-

tential or actual state or in transition from one to the other. Only in

this way could a faculty be said to "come into play" or a power be

"exercised".

Wecan think of the transition from a potential to an actual state in

one of two ways:67 1) as a series of states or qualities or forms in which

the movement of thought from one to the other provides the link according

67 Cf. J. Marechal, Le point de depart de la Metaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.363-.-

- 64 -

to which what we conceive is said to be one process. But this is merely

an ideal transition along members of a series each of which is, and remains,

what it is. There is no account, in such a transition, of the active be­

coming of the existent. Or 2) we can see a dual aspect to the specifying

form of this transition: insofar as there is a transition, from inception

to completion the actuality of the form is identically a potentiality for

further actuality. Is this a contradiction? No, for what has been said

above is that at any point in the transition, something actually iswhat

it has thus far become, and is not what it is yet to become. But if we

stop at this, Parmenides and Zeno have made their point: in an effort to

make becoming intelligible, we are compelled to say thata form both .is and

is not, for this form has to be both the unit y of what has been realized in

process and of what has not been realized. But the Parmenideari'objection

only serves to show the inadequacy of an explanation (such as Kant's; cf. p.37

of this essay) of activity solely in terms of its "formaI aspect". An -ex­

clusively formaI account of the transition from potentiality to actuality

invests becoming with a seeming paradox which can be countered only by

noticing the dynamical aspect of existence. Becoming, transition, is both

actual and potential: 'something is going on, but what it is can only be

seen in the result'. The identity of actuality and potentiality in 'be­

coming' is to be distinguished from their impossible identity in being.

While it is contradictory to say that at _, certain point in a given transition

the faculty is both actually and potentially what it has come to be, if one

keeps in mind the nature of 'becoming', there is no contradiction in saying

- 65 -

that the function is, actually, what it has come to be, and is, potentially,

what it is becoming. The identity of actualityand potentiality in the

specifying forni of a transition is dynamical: "Le mouvement ne serait pas

mouvement, si l'acte du moment présent n'y contenait virtuellement l'acte

du moment qui suivra.,,68 Just as the 'objects' of what Kant would caU

"transcendental knowlecige" (e.g. "forms') a:re objects only in relation to

the possibility of·empirical objects, so 'becoming' exists only insofar as

it relates to the actuaiity of beings whose existence unfolds progressively.

If, in the manner of Aristotle, we refer to form in its actuality as 'act',

then the'preceding discussion of active becoming càn be summarized in

Aquinas's rendition of Aristotle'sformula for the transition from potentiality

to actuality: "motus est actus existentis in potentia prout in potentia. ,,69

5. Active Becoming and Finality

Si agens non tenderet ad aliquem effectum determinatum, omnes effectus essent ei indifferentes; quod autem in­differenter se habet ad multa, non magis unum eorum operatur quam aliud. Unde, a contingente ad utrumque non sequitur aliquis effectus nisi per aliquid quod determinetur ad unum. Impossibile igitur esset quod ageret. Omne igitur agenstendit ad a1iquem determina­tum effectum, quod (qui) dicitur finis ejus. 70

In this section a pre1iminary ana1ysis of the relation between a faculty

or power of active becoming and its object will be presented.

68 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.364.

69 Ibid., p.363.

70 From Aquinas' Summa Contra Gentiles, quoted in Ibid., p.364.

- 66 -

To say that aIl transition in an agent is the act of that which is

potential insofar as it is potential is to understand this transition as

having direction. The transition is more than an impulse of a certain kind

which happens to terminate sorne way or other. Were it not more than this,

the transition would be indeterminate, i.e. -incapable of being thought.

This -is what Aquinas means in the passage quoted above where he says:

"Impossibile igitur esset quod ageret" - unless the object of active be-

comi~g is specified in the form of the tendency of a faculty, and in the

form of its transitional stage, there is no sufficient reason for the

exercise of activity. Of course, one can always be content with insuffi-

cient reason, i.e. with unintelligibility, with the reduction of sorne part

of reality to the status of a brute datum; but this is arbitrary, and aIl

arbitrariness must be banished from an inquiry into knowledge. The

'specifying form' of a faculty specifies what is lacking to the faculty;

what will augment the existence of the faculty is pre-contained in the form

of the facu1ty tendentially, as a demand. The 'direction' of a transition

is found in the dynamica1 identity of act and potentiality in the form of

the transition; for this potentiality is grounded in the very dynamism that

overcomes it. The object of a tendency, whether potential or in transition,

may be called its goal (this seems to be a better translation of the Latin

'finis' than the somewhat stilted term 'end'). Because there is more in

the exercise of activity than in the mere capacity for it, "Objectum opera-

t , 't . t et f' 't ' t t fl'nl's eJ'us.,,71 . lonlS ermlna per lCl lpsam, e es

71 Aquinas, l Sentent; quoted by J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Méta­physique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.364.

- 67 -

If we bear in mind that Kant explains consciousness as the self-presenc~

of the form of synthetic activity, th en , even in the Kan~ian system, conscious

tendency differs from what is presented in the above analysis of active be-

coming only in being present'to itself. Such is the view of Aquinas:

Haec autem determinatio sicut in rationalinatura fit per rationalem appetitum qui dicitur voluntas; ita in aliis fit per inclinationem naturalem quae dicitur appetitusnaturalis. 72 .

'Will' is simply the self-presence of a "natural appetite". The line of

attack against the notion of a purely phenomenal object becomes more apparent

now. Having analysed beèoming and finality in the exercise of activity, we

can now substitute for certain terms in a conclusion reached earlier in the

present analysis (cf. p.6l): we can now say that the relation between ten-

dency and goal can be understood only in the absolute order of existence.

Because' the will is a conscious tendency of this sort, those judgments which

are constitutive of its goals necessarily include metaphysical affirmation

(in which objects are placed in the absolute order). If the unit y in oppo-

sition of the subject-object relation in experience can be understood only

as the self-presence of a 'tendency', as analysed'in this chapter, then

metaphysical affirmation is constitutive also of the objects of speculation.

In the present chapter an analysis of active becoming has been presented.

It is still rather sparse, having as its main purpose to explain key notions

72 Aquinas, Summa Theologica; quoted by J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.365.

- 68 -

such as 'absoluteorder of existence', 'actuaiity and potent iality'; and

'tendency'.. The furth~r refinernents required to do justice to the topic

will, hopefully, ernerge in the course of the following chapter.

v

THE THEORETICAL NECESSITY OF

METAPHYSICAL AFFIRMATION

Introduction

In Chapter V, beginning with what is accepted in Kant's philqsophy -

the discursive nature of human intelligence, and the phenomenal object -

metaphysical affirmation will be deduced as the transcendental condition

of any object of knowledge whatsoever. This chapter will be confined to

an elucidation of the propositions of Maréchal's deduction enunciated in

Cahier V, Livre III, Section 3 of Le point de départ de la Métaphysique.

At the beginning of this section, Maréchal summarizes his argument in the

following polysyllogism:

L'objet immanent (comme objet phénoménologique) implique essentiellement: un contenu de représentation, - s'oppo­sant au sujet, - dans le sujet même, - sous de telles conditions que cette opposition dans l'immanence affecte, au moins implicitement, la conscience du sujet.

Or, dans un entendement non-intuitif (discursif), pa~ reil ensemble de caractères ne peut appartenir qu'aux phases successives d'un mouvement actif d'assimilation de données étrangères.

Mais ce mouvement actif d'assimilation réalise les con­ditions nécessaires et suffisantes d'une affimation onto­logique.

- 70 -

l'affirmation ontologique (avec' la totalité de ses pré­suppositions rationnels) est donc la condition intrin­sèque de possibilité de tout objet immanent d'un enten­dement discursif. 73

Proposition 1

L'intelligence humaine est discursive. En effet, la réflexion immédiate sur nous-mêmes, non moins que'l'a­nalyse structurelle du jugement révèlent, dans .notre activité cognitive, une progression dYnamique, un mou-vement de la puissance à l'acte. 74 .

Let us calI 'intelligence' the faculty of knowing objects asobjects.

In conformity with Maréchal's scholastic terminology the dynamic progression

referred to in the previous chapter as 'transition' will now be called

'movement'. By 'tendency' is meant the dynamism of a faculty or power of

'movement', in its p~tential state.

Maréchal agrees with Kant that our intelligence is in itself a radical

beginning, that its objects, one and aIl, are acquired through the exercise

of a spontaneous faculty upon a manifold which derives in part from a source

outside the subject. Human cognition is a combination of activity and passi-

vity. We have already discussed the presence in the Kantian system of a

reciprocal actuation (cf. Chapter l, section 3 of this essay). This fits

exactly what must be the case in an intellect which has to acquire matter

for the exercise of its proper activity. The forms of the subject, as laws

73 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.532.

74 Ibid., p.533.

of the synthesis according to which objects are constituted, have a certain

indeterminacy about them which must be overcome by the data to which they

are applied. Thus, in the very exercise of its activity, the intellect

submits to a determination:

. .. l'à priori fonctionnel· (le transcendental Kantien) n'est pas une pure absence de déterminations: c'est le lieu naturel, l'exigence formelle de détermination: c'est donc ce que les Scolastiques appellent une puis­sance passive, doublée d'une tendance (as defined on p. 63 of this essay). Et la détermination même, pour être subsumee sous l'à priori, doit dans cette mesure, et corrélativement, répondre à l'exigence qu'elle sa­ture; elle est donc, en regard de cette exigence, une acquisition positive, une actuation ultérieure. 75

In the reception of datawhich it unifies, according to its own laws,

the intellect 'moves' from potentiality to actuality. The forms of Kant's

transcendental subject are what was called in the previous chapter 'speci-

fying'. They are forms of a tendency.

In a passage at the begiiming of the previous chapter (cf. p.53 of this

essay) Kant tells us that· in our most primitive act of introspection we are

conscious of our existence as pure spontaneity. The 'purity' of this spon-

taneity denotes a radical necessity of going outside itself for an object

upon which it may be exercised. It signifies a passive self "doublée d'une

tendance". "Spontaneity", in itself, is an incessant .tendency toward some-

thing in general, an absalute exigency:

En effet, l'aperception la plus primitive que nous ayons de notre Moi, dans la réflexion immédiate sur nos contenus de conscience, nous le livre 'en

75 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.534.

- 72 -

exercice', comme un Devenir actif (ou en Mouvement) se propageant-à travers des déterminations sans cessé renouvelées. 76

Proposition II

Tout mouvement tend vers une Fin dernière, selon une loi, ou forme spécificatrice, qUl imprime à chaque étape du mouvement la marque dynamique de la Fin dernière. 77

The very notion-of a 'progressive realization' (i.e.'movement')

implies the presence of the goal ofa tendency throughout the process of

realization; this presence is oné of 'exigence'; it is the 'direction'

of the dynamical identity of act and potentiality (cf. pp. 66 ff. of this

essay). Therefore the unit y or form of a tendency is also the form of its

movement and of its goal. This is the only way in which the unit Y of a

movement from one state to another can be thpught. Paradoxically enough,

in th~ form of a tendency prior to exercise, the goal of this tendency is,

in the case of a passive-active faculty, present by its very absence. Such

a faculty is passive because it depends upon the existence of its goal (as

"matter") in order that the goal itself may become actually present to the

faculty and thus "arouse" it to movement. In order that such a faculty may

act it must add to itself) as it were, from what exists outside it. In its

state of pure tendency the faculty is not in 'contact' or communion with

76 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.536.

77 Ibid., p.538.

- 73 -

its material goal. Because the 'actual presence' ofa goal to suc~ a

faculty,is a particular, spa~io-temporal existence, it is always less

than the 'goàl' which is present in the form of the tendency. Neverthe-

less, the spatio-temporally present goal is an instance or concretion of

the fannal goal. Consequently, the relation between the concretely present

goal and the formaI goal may be thought as that between a 'partial and

ultimate goa'l ("'fin dernière"). The partial goal participates in the va-

lue of the ultimate (which of course is the ever-receding horizon of a

potentially infinite series like that of the inferiors of a concept; from

this one might develop the thesis that a tendency toward transcending its

spatio-temporal mode of being is built into every faculty having to do

with such a manifold). Since the form which 'specifies' is the form of

the tendency, the movement, and the ultimate goal, Proposition II is thereby

established.

Proposition III

La forme spécificatrice, qui oriente à priori notre dynamisme inte'llectuel ("l'objet formel adéquat", disent les Scolastiques) ne se peut concevoir que comme forme universelle et illimitée d'être. Cor­rélativement, la "fin dernière objective" ("finis cujus" de Saint Thomas), où s'épuiserait le mouve­ment de notre intelligence, ne souffre aucune dé­termination !imitatrice, et doit donc s', identifier avec l'être absolu, c'est-à-dire avec l"'illimitée" dans l'ordre de l'Acte. 78

78 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.540.

- 74 -

The above proposition is merely an application of the analysis of

active becoming to the pure spontaneity of the Cogito which Kant himself

regards as a datum. The'a priori orientation or 'specifying form' of the

Cog'ito contains no 'determination' (in the Kantian sense), Le. no ,intrinsic

limitation or relation to a certain kind of content ("manifold"). There-

fore the goal whose virtual presence is the specifying form of the tendency

of the Cogito (the simple 'l') is the Absolute, that which is free of aIl

limitation. Only the Absolute can saturate the 'purity' of the tendency

of the Cogito. This should be a mere corollary of Chapter III, but we can

here present a negative proof of the same thesis, that the specifying form

of the Cogito is the "forme universelle et illimitee de l'être" .79

Kant himself urges that in the representation of the pure 'l' nothing

manifold'is given, nothing which can be added to its sheer t~ndency by way

of objective determination or limitation. In other words, the form of the

Cogito must be limitless, for if it were intrinsically related to something

manifold, i.e. were it the form ofa kind of being and not being as such,

this relation would constitute an intellectual intuition after the pattern

of a 'pure intuition' of sensibility. Then the starting-point of the Cri-

tique of Pure Reason would be denied, and the consciousness iIivolved in the

primordial act of introspection 'which yields the representation of the Cogito

would be contradicted: there would be no pure spont~eity which must be con­

tracted into a relation with the pure manifold of time in the transcendental

Cf. 79 J. Maréchal, Le point de depart de la Metaphysique, cahier V: Le tho­

misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, pp.540-542.

- 75 -

synthesis of imagination; t.here wou1d be no "original synthetic unit y" ,

and'indeed no Critique. It was in order to be true to the nature of

intelligence as a pure spontaneity that Kant had to differentiate sharply

the Cogito in its simplicity from necessary synthetic unit y (the simple

'l' in relation to the pure temporal manifold). For a spontaneity 1imited

a priori to a certain kind of being in its cognitive activity cou1d on1y

be a facu1ty of sense conjoined with the activity of an imagination; it

would be a facu1ty which cou1d sense,·but not understand in anything, 1ike

the meaning of the latter verb in Kantian phi10sophy.

If we remember that the'word "act' signifies the actuality of a form,

then the goal of the tendency of· the Cogfto can be nothing less than the

objective assimilation of an un1imited Act; for, corresponding to the total

un1imitedness of the form of intelligence must be the maximum of rea1ity,

of being. And this serves as pro of for Proposit~on III.

Proposition IV

Une faculté connaissante discursive (non-intuitive), astreinte à poursuivre sa Fin par des passages suc­cessifs de la puissance à l'acte ,. ne les peut effec­tuer qu'en s'assimilant un "donné" étranger. Aussi l'exercice de notre intelligence réc1ame-t-i1 une sensibilité associée. 80

We have thoughts we never had before, come to know what was unknown, whi1e

the spontaneity or tendency of the simple 'l', as such, remains the same,

80 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.542.

- 76 -

as a necessary representation. Our intelligence isa passive-active

faculty, andthis'designation reflects aduality intrinsic to'its operation,

and its dependence upon another faculty. This dependence, however, is not

intrinsic, since the act of intelligence~ insofar as it isact, lacks any

temporal or quantitative determination. Intelligibility; as we mentioned

before (cf. p.61 of this 'essay) , is grounded in the limitlessness of in­

tellectual spontaneity. Unlike what Kant calls "transcendental appercep­

tion", what is here called the "act of' intelligence" is not constituted

or defined by the limitation of a spontaneity to the requirements of re­

ceptivity; it is the lack of any su ch intrinsic relation which enables

intelligence to be moved by the sensible datum to surpass the finite appa­

rition of its ultimate Goal. The act of intelligence, as we shall soon

see, is this 'surpassing' of the finite through reference of the appearance

to an Absolute in order to understand it. For this reason we can say that

the dependence of intelligence upon 'sensibility is extrinsic. It is here

that the cleavage between Maréchal and Kant is sharpest; for the super­

abundance of intellectual subjectivity is what leads Kant to deny theore­

tical validity to its alleged (metaphysical) objects;- whereas this same

superabundance is what Maréchal will calI the ground of the synthesis of

the object as object ("synthèse objective").

Since intelligence is by definition incapable of receptivity with respect

to an alien datum (it is a purely active tendency); it can operate only in

conjunction with a faculty which is receptive, i.e. sensibiiity. For the

limitless tendency of intelligence has its goal present only virtually or

• - 77 -

'by absence'. In order that its plfrely potential.state of limitless ten-

dency may be overcome by 'movement' toward some.determination or other,

the existent goal must in sorne waybecome . present to it. Here we have

arrived ded~ctively at'the meaning of Kànt's statement quoted on page II

of this essay:

Our mode of intùition is dependent upon the existence of the object, and is therefore possib.le only if the· subject's faculty of.representation is affected by that obj ect .

Proposition V

Notre opération intellectuelle étant un devenir actif, chaque assimilation qu'elle fait de déterminations nouvelles, grâce au concours de la sensibilité, doit présenter un double aspect:

1. l'aspect d'une acquisition: la détermination nou­velle est introduite sous la forme à priori du devenir intellectuel (en termes scolastiques: "sous l'objet formel de l'intelligence");

2 .. l'aspect d'un point de départ dynamique: la déter­mination n'est assimilée que selon son rapport dynami­que à la Fin dernière, c'est-à-dire comme fin prochaine éverituelle, comme moyen possible. 81

A brief note is in order at this stage of the present argument, concer-

ning the language of 'faculties'. The only way to avoid a latent cont~a-

diction in speaking of intelligence as 'acquiring' the data upon which to

exercise its spontaneity when, by definition, it isnon-receptive, would be

81 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.544.

- 78 -

to evolve from the previous proposition a tlleorysomething like the

Thomistic substantial union of body and soul in the personal existence

of a human being. This same difficulty besets Kant, for example, when

he refers to apperception as a "unitary consciousness" (cf. pp .133-134) .

of the synthesis which takes place through imagination. The relation

between the unit Y of imagination and the unit y of apperception is not

clarified very much merely by saying that they work in conjunction. The

relation between distinct operations or faculties must, therefore, be

grounded in a self which is a subject or substrate, andnot merelya

function. Kant sometimes uses the word 'mind' in just this way (cf. p.87

for instance). In order ta avoid any illusions due to faculty language,

it is essential to keep in mind that it is the person, the incarnate

spirit, and not the faculty, which is conscious and experiences something.

Kant's whole discussion of the dynamic interrelationship between the various

faculties of the mind implies a subordination of sense to intellect. The

very possibility of deducing the necessary conditions of a sensible intuition

that must be thinkable implies this subordination or covert teleology. 'Mind'

is a kind of metonymous designation of a person viewed under that aspect in

which aIl things work unto the synthesis of objects of cognition; it is a

des~gnation of 'man the thinker'.It is the 'mind' which receives, through

sensibility, that which its imagination synthetises in accordance with its

goal of knowledge. The consciousness which corresponds to the product of

the synthesis of concretion, of form and matter, can belong only to a subject

which is both spiritual and material. This is the only possible ground of

- 79.-

the dynamic subordination of sense, through imagination, to the goal of

inte lligence.

It is the 'mind', as one and the same passive-active being, characte­

rized by a limitless tendency, to which the existent material goal becomes

present through an "affection" of its sensibility, which is thus "aroused"

in the full scope of its su~jective tendency, which as imagination unifies

the data of sensibility, and which, as intelligence, becomes conscious of

. the unit Y of its imaginative synthesis .. The intellect as such is not

conscious of a passivity which belongs to it; rather, the mind, as ,intellect,

is conscious of its passivity as sense. Hopefully, the foregoing remarks

will obviate difficulties which ~he reader May have concerning the word

'acquisition' in reference to the intelligence.

What Maréchal calls the "assimilation of np.w determinations"by the

intelligence corresponds to the pre-conscious synthesis of apprehension

in Kant (cf. pp.27 ff. of this essay). We have just now been discussing

the ground of the relation between imaginative synthesis and intellectual

spontaneity in the continuity of dynamic subordination within this pre­

conscious assimilation. When we apply the analysis of active becoming in

the previous chapter and in Proposition II to this question, it can be seen

that the 'specifying form' of the intelligence is aiso the form of the

'movement' which takes place in pre-conscious assimilation of the impressions

of sensibility. For the 'specifying form' of int.ellectuai tendency is the

supreme form or unit y of the mind, in which is virtually present the Goal

of the mind as substrate of its distinct yet subordinated faculties.

- 80 -

The 'reciprocal actuation' of sensible datum and intellectual sponta­

neity has already been discussed in Proposition 1. Insofar as the datum

overcomes the indeterminacy of the form of intelligence, it is an acquisi­

tion of what is new, of what was lacking. Yet, however indeterminately,

the form of intellectual tendency specifies what is.lacking for the exer­

cise of its activity. Therefore every datum, as the presence of a nmterial

goal, can be assimilated ("apprehended") only insofar as it partakes of

the form or unit Y of the formaI Goal specified by the form of intellectual

tendency. (This conclusion is merely the application of Proposition II to

the form of intelligence). In other words, intuitions cannot be given unless

they participate in the unit y of·the Absolute. Thisis the contention of

the first part of Proposition V.

Only what is determinate can existe Only a goal which is fully deter­

minat~ as goal can present a sufficient reason for overcoming the mere

potentiality of intellectual tendency. Any finite goal of intellectual

tendency can be determined as such only in relation to the Absolute as ulti­

mate Goal of the intelligence. Therefore the relation between finite and

infinite in intellectual tendency is fully determinate, and this is a ne­

cessary condition of any intellectual act.

Because the 'speci~ication' of intellectual tendency is limit less, the

relation between finite and infinite is not the univocal relation of an

instance or inferior to an absolutely general conFept (cf. pp.45 ff. of

this essay). For the unit y of even the most general concept (in the technical,

Kantian sense of this term) is always the unit y of a temporal manifold. Con-

- 81 -

sequently this unit y is therepresentation of a genus or kind of being,

and represents a limitation upon the unlimited scope of intellectual

tendency. There is no further concept which can comprise both ens prin­

cipium numeri and the remainder of what is specified in the form of in­

telligence. Th.erefore the relation of 'more or less' .which obtains

between ens univocum and the Absolute cannot be understood in terms of an

increment or expanding series of identical acts of cognition. Each finite

being or genus thereof must.bear a unique relation to the Absolute, the

ultimate Goal of .. intelligence. Therefore these relations are only analo~

gically the same, since they relate to an identical term in absolutely

different ways. We now have another name for the being of things in their

relation to the Absolute: ens analogum.

The second part of Proposition V is quite obvious. The apprehension

of what is finite is always a partial goal, both because apprehension is

not yet objective synthesis, and because the finite can arouse the boundless

tendency of the intelligence.only insofar as the finite leads to the

achievement of the ultimate Goal, cognitive union with the Absolute.

Proposition VI

1. L'assimilation du donné, considérée statiquement, comme une acquisition subjective, ne contient pas encore, pour la conscience, les éléments d'une oppo­sition immanente d'objet à sujet.

2. Par contre, le rapport dynamique du donné à la Fin absolue de l'intelligence presente - implicite­ment - les éléments d'une pareille opposition, et

- 82 -

ainsi, du même coup, "constitue" l' obj et comme objet dans la conscience, et .1e rattache à l'or­dre ontologique. 82

When, in' the firstpart of Proposition VI, Maréchal bids us consider

"l'assimilation du donné •.. statiquement",' he means apar::. from, the ten-

dentia1 aspect of'inte11igence, when the mind ispassive before the pro-

duct of its synthesis of apprehension; in other words, in the state of

what Kant caUs "empirica~ apprehension", where the mind is presented

with the fait-accompli of pre-conscious synthesis. We have seen (cf.

pp.26 ff. of this essay) that the mind, in order to raise such an appea-

rance to the status of an object, must be able to distinguish self and

non-self within that awareness which Kant caUs "empirica1 apperception".

Can consciousness of the opposition of self and non-self be identified

with the passivity of sense " ... envahi par des déterminations étrangères,,?83

No, for the relation of subject and object as manifested in the hypothetica1

consciousness arising from a pure1y sensible (i.e. imaginative) synthesis

of the datum of the externa1 sense is manifest on1y in externa1ity of a

spatial sort within a single act of consciousness. The form of this cons-

ciousness, because it is exc1usive1y the unit y of a spatio-tempora1 manifold,

cannot have that se1f-identity by which it wou1d coincide with itse1f in the

'ref1ection' of se1f-consciousness. Though Kant does not take proper account

of the dynamism of the simple 'l', still it is the ground of se1f-consciousness

82 J. Marechal, Le point de départ de la Metaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.547.

83 Ibid., p.547.

- 83 -

in tra~scendental apperception. For transcendental apperception is the

simple 'l' ~ restricted to the pure spatio-temporal manifold. Were it

not for this surplus of subjectivity in transcendental apperceptiori, the.

latter would no longer be an inte11ectual faculty; it wou1d be a sensibi-

lit Y (cf. Proposition III). Thus even in Kant, it is the perfect self-

identity of the form or unit y of the simple 'l', insofar as it· is not the

unit y of a spatio-tempora1 manifold, that makes self-consciousness.possible~

There~ore a purèly sensible awareness of the irruption of alien determina-

tions,.because it could not become aware of its own passivity, cannot·be

identified with consciousness of the 9PPosition of self and non-self in

know1edge of an objecte

What we have said, in effect, in the above discussion, is that the

object as object is not given in intuition. But join to the intuitive

datum the apperception aroused in the spontaneous intellect by the occur-

rence of the intuition; you then have 'empirical apperception', the self­

consciousness of a passive mind. With this self-consciousness cornes the

power of inference:

... ne suffirait-il pas, pour expliquer le caractère objectif de l'appréhension, de supposer que l'intel­ligence, dans sa coordination immédiate à l'opération sensible, pût en discerner l'aspect passif, et ainsi, par une inférence implicite, conclure à une réalité limitante, objective? 84

The writings of the great phi1osophers of the seventeenthand eighteenth

centuries·testify to the wide currency of the above exp1anation of conscious-

84 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.S48.

- 84 -

ness of the non-self. There is, indeed, something cogent about it .. After

aH (in the words of Kant) " ... the objectis viewed as that which prevents

our modes of knowle~ge from being haph~zard or arbitrary" (p.l34). Any

reality-oriente~ person would seek to avoid \'lishful thinking, would hate

to be merely imagining what he bases his actions upon; he would, in other

words, never want to impose his subjective state upon reality and thereby

dist'ort it. His concern is always to. be open to the contradiction of his -

cherished opinions by experience, by facts. He wants to.let realityimpose

itself upon him. How very natural to look upon the passivity of sense as

the :tndex of the presence of what is independent ly of him, reality! .

Of course this theory of the object is liable to grave objections~ For

whatever may be the origin of th~ alien datum of sensibility, the content

of the representation which it engenders refers exclusively to what is imma-

nent to consciousness. What the thing in itself might be, what it could

mean, even, to say that this tlûng 'causes' our representations, still appears

unknowable. It would seem, after'all, that apperception of our sensible

passivity can give us no more than a feeling of dependence upon the existence

of objects.

The transcendental knowledge latent in the description, above, of the

'reality-oriented' person, is this: the presence in sensibility of a

partial goal (datum) of the limitless tendency of the intelligence calls

for a limitation of this tendency; consciousness of an object as object

requires that this limitation (which was referred ta, above, metaphorically

as "imposition") be represented as such. In other words, the boundless

- 85 -

spontaneity of the subject must become, aware, of itse1f as limited to this

or that synthesis and none other'. Since the self is unlimited tendency,

consciousness of the non~self, the object, can come on1y from a limitation

of this tendency.

There can be on1y twoways of,representing a limit as limit (and 'this

inc1udes representing the passivity of sense);

1. 'Bi1atera11y', in the know1edge of two objects'which mutua11y ex-

c1ude each other. Since the consciousness of limitation which we are now

considering is meant to exp1ain how an object is possible, this first a1ter-

native is c1osed. It is the' impossibility of bilatera1 representation of

what is immanent and of what is transcendent to consciousness within one

act of consciousness which is the undoing of the inferentia1 theory of

objectivity out1ined above.

2. Or e1se

..• intrinsèquement et unilatéralement, par exper1ence subjective de la limite, par conscience de la subir. Mais comment avoir conscience d'une limite subie, sinon dans la conscience d'une condition qui, virtuellement, la surmonte, c'est-à-dire, en définitive, dans la cons­cience d'une tendance active, à la fois spécifiée et bridée par l'objet limitant? En d'autres termes, la conscience d'une limitation immanente ne saurait être que la conscience de la limitation d'une actionimma­nente. (ita1ics mine) 85

What Maréchal is saying here app1ies equa11y to any particu1ar object

of experience and to the concept of an "object of experience in genera1" ,

85 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.548.

- 86 -

the unit Y of which is what Kant caUs "original synthetic". The only way

in which the representation of this transcendental subjective unit Y can

become objective, as a highly generalized representation of the non-self,

is in the consciousness of the self as limited to the phenomenal world re-

presented a priori, as surpassing this limitation tendentiaUy, as seizing

upon 'experience' as a partial goal and only insofar as it participates in

a fully determinate way in the objective union with the.Absolute.

We have now reached the climax of what might be called an ascending

and descending deduction. Proposition VI has demonstrated that only the

self-consciousness of an activity as limited can be the ground of the dis-- .

tinction implicit in aIl 'experience' between self and non-self, subject

and objecte Working back from a concept of the object of experience in

general, it is already obvious what the specifying form of the spontaneity

of the self must be in order that original synthetic unit y may be a gene­

ralized representation of the non-self. Clearly this highest specifying

form must be tendentially unlimited.

Secondly, as to the descending deduction: webegan in Proposition 1

with the notion of a pure intellectual spontaneity which is engaged in

active becoming. By Propositinn V it had become clear that aIl objects

assimilated by this spontaneity would have their form or unit Y only in a

determinate relatinn to the limitless Goal of intelligence, the Absolute.

With this as premiss it is on~y a short step to deduce the possibility of

just such a relation of self and non-self as does, in fact, hold in expe-

rience. The goal of intelligence with respect to any finite object is not

- 87·-

merely assimilation of the alien datum in order that appearances rnay arise

for what Kant calls "empirical apperception"; rather it tends to . 'be the

other as other', to represent to itself the relation of itself to the non-

self. Thé correctness of the teleological analysis of intelligence can

only be.ascertained if its makes possible the relation of subject and object

as it is undeniably found in experience, and if it is manifestly the only

possible analysis of intelligence that will ground this irrefutable facto

That a self-conscious limitless tendency towardcognitive union with the

Absolute should join the representatiort of the appearancé which ithas

already assimilated (apprehended) to the 'representation' of its own limit-

less tendency or selfhood follows, as we shall see, from its very nature.

Let us calI the representation of'the Absolute as specified in the form of

intelligence 'tendential'. Nothing more is meant by 'tendential' than a

contrast with 'conceptual'. The latter is always a representation of the

unit y of a given or pure manifold, in either case sensible. But the form

of intellectual tendency is not such a unit y, and therefore belongs only

to the surplus of subjectivity which surpassès unit Y that is merely conceptual,

and is purely tendential. As we have seen in the above. discussion of Pr'opo-

sition VI, the relation between the conceptual representation afappearance

and the tendential representation of the absolute Goal of intelligence sa-

tisfies the requirements of the subject-object relation as found in experience~

It is, in other words, what Marechal cal1s "objective synthesis".

Because the objective synthesis is the self-presence of the very tendency

which assimilates the alien datum in determinate relation to its ultimate

- 88 -

Goal, the relation of the appearance th us assimilated to the self as ten­

dentially represented is the very relation offinite and infinite, partial

and ultimate goal, which obtains in the pre-conscious synthesis ofappre­

hension. Therefore this relation is constitutive of the object of 'expe­

rience' •

Since Proposition VI has shown that· this relation is the only one.

possible in the undeniable fact of 'experience', the possibility and

necessity of the analysis of intelligence as an 'active becoming' has

been demonstrated, and we have shown that the analysis of'active becoming'

is a transcendental condition of human cognition missing from Kant's

Critique.

Let us once more view the transition from appearance t·c, object.

" ... the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge

from being haphazard or arbitrary" (p.134). Inother·words, we must be

able, in order to know an object, to represent the non-self as necessita­

ting that synthesis which deals with the already constituted appearance.

Now the self-presence of intellectual tendency in empirical apperception

belongs to a dynamism whose law is its specifying form. The latter form

is the unit y of the self as necessary for aIl possible representations,

thereby transcending the contingent state of the self "in empirical apper­

ception. Therefore, in empirical apperception the self is conscious of a

tendency to overcome the relativity and contingency of mere appearance, a

tendency which belongs to it not in virtue of its merely accidentaI unit Y

in empirical apperception, but in virtue of its unchanging nature as in-

- 89 -

telligence. Consciousness of this tendency corresponds to Kant's "trans-

cendental apperception". Thus, within ernpirical apperception,. the terms

of the relation of self and non-self' arise na:turally from the self-presence

of an intellectual tendency part-way toward the realization ofa particular

intellectual act, andcarried onward by the law of this act. For the sheer

relativity of the appearance proclaims that the self has not yet 'discovered'

in the appearance that trace of, or"relation to its Goal, the Absolute, which

is nevertheless there (due tothespécifying influence of the pre-conscious

assimilation or synthesis of apprehension). In the.on-going synthesis of

reproduction by.meansof which thè mind keeps before itself what is given

inapprehension, transcendental apperception, or the self-consciousness of

the intellectual tendency, asserts' itself as distinct from the merely sen-

sible tendency to integrate a certain content in the imagination. At ·this

point reproduction of the particular image can continue only insofar as

there is in the image something of the Goal, present by its very absence,

of intellectual tendency. That which governs the intellectual tendency to

continued reproduction of the image is thus the universal and necessary

condition of its acts, the law according to which it tends toward the

Absolute in every synthesis; and that which arouses this tendency does so

necessarily. In this way the relation of an appeara~ce t·o the self-presence

of the intellectual tendency is a necessitating influence, and so corresponds

to the notion of an object as presented in Kant's dictum at the beginning of

this paragraph.

-90 -

The conscious recognition of the Absolute in the appearance, to which

the law of intellectual reproduction of the image impels the self, is a

seeking for what is tendentiallypresent in what is 'representatively'

present (the image). In order thatthe Absolute may becomepresent partially

but determinately, through the image, the representation of the tendency of

intelligence, to the degree that it is actuated, must be joined to the 're-

presentation' of this tendency as still unsaturated, as 'surplus'. As we

have seen from the above discussions, the relation between these two repre-

sentations is one of limitation, determination, and necessity. And such is

the relation which obtains in the irrefutable datum of any critique.

The foregoing elucidation of Proposition VI can be summarized in a

passage from Maréchal: .

. .. lorsque, dans l "'implicite" de l'acte intellectuel, les données assimilées prennent, par rapport à la Fin dernière, la· valeur de moyens, ou de fins subordonnées; alors de l'intérieur même du sujet, et grâce à l'orien­tation dynamique de celui-ci, elles se projettent en a­vant de lui (in objective apperception) , comme des buts encore imparfaitement possédés: l'opposition immanente a surgi de la Finalité, parce que la signification spé­culative de toute finalité interne, soit productrice, soit assimilatrice, est nécessairement et immédiatement "objectivante". 86

86 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la, Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.549.

VI

MARECHAL'S CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE

Comparison of the Foregoing Deduction with Kant

Kant' 5 "original synthetic unit y of apperception" has a dual function:

" ... e11e est une fonction formelle d'unité, d'assimilation supérieure des

données au sujet conscient; elle est aussi unè fonction absolue d'objectiva­

tion".87 As anassimilating function it dictates that all appearances, in

order that they be thinkab1e, must be brought into a necessary relation with

the unit y of apperception, that un'l.tY of self which is also the a priori

representation of the field of possible experience. As an objectivating

function it dictates that the appearance must be subsumed under the objective

representation of the necessary unit y of apperception. The relation of the

appearance to this necessary represèntation is its relation to the object,

a relation which is 'guaranteed' in the synthesis of apprehension.

What is the 1ink between the assimi1ating and objectivating functions?

This 1ink is the fundamenta1 re1ativity of the appearance. In its state as

appearance its relation to the object is not manifest, 50 that its unit y or

87 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.550.

- 92 -

being is not yet invested (for consciousness) with the hypothetical necessity . .

of being the only possible way of apprehending such a datum if it is given.

We have called the act which gathers into a single consciousness the appearance

and the representation of the objective unit y of apperception (the 'trans­

cendental object') 'affirmation'; its formaI effect, the discernment of the

relation between these two representations, is knowledge of an object,

'objective apperception'.

One of the floating ambiguities in Kant, so often indicated in the present

essay, is the relation of the simple 'l' to the synthetic unit y of appercep-

tion. One thing is clear: the unit y of the simple 'l' is not itself objec-

tive. Yet an objec.tively valida priori representation has strict univers-

ality and necessity. These latter characters accrue to the original

synthetic unit y of apperception only because this unit y is a contraction of

that of the simple 'l'. For it is the necessity of consciousness which

grounds the necessity of ali other representations in the Kantian system.

Yet the objective unit y, or 'concept of the object' to which aIl appearances

must be referred is the original synthetic. Is there no objective correlate

of the unit y of the simple 'l' which is yet the ground of aIl else in the

subject?

According to Maréchal the answer to this lies in a-certain interpretation

of the reductive analysis to which Kant submits the concept of the object

(cf. p.'SI of this essay). Kant says that since we have to deal with nothing

but ~ representations, filtered by the forms of space and time, the concept

of the object, as something independent of our knowledge, remains wholly

- 93 -

indeterminate. Therefore the unit y of the object can be nothing else than

the synthetic unit y of apperception. This is the reductive analysis.

Unless our concept of the transcendentalobject is determinate, it cannot

ground the relation ofappearances to their object, for this relation would

then also be indeterrninate. But the most universal and determinate unit y

which we can represent to ourse Ives in an effort to overcome the re lat ivit y

of the phenomenon is the synthetic unit y of apperception. It is determinate,

for it is constituted by a determinate relation to the possibility of

intuition, whereas the unit y of the simple 'l' lacks such a determinate

relation. But Kant is not denying that there is ~ objective correlate

to the subjectivity of the simple 'l'. He is simply saying that this

correlate is indeterminable. But it is there, it is the unknowable thing

in itself. Before the limitless scope of the simple 'l' even the absolute

generality of the concept of the object of 'experience' as ens univocum is

relative; it is a representation of being which is relative to a kindof

consciousness (human) and not to consciousness in general. Though the self

is incapable of determining the objective correlate of consciousness in

general, and therefore unable to bring appearances into relation with it,

yet the law of its nature as a consciousness in general ('pure spontaneity')

requires that it think the thing in itself, however indeterrninately, as that

which limits even the original synthetic unit y of experience. The assertion,

under the impulse of the simple 'l'or Reason; of the relation of appearances

to the thing in itself, is the illusory metaphysical affirmation which

accompanies aIl judgrnents of experience and gives rise to the vanity of

metaphysics:

- 94 -

.•• subsumer le phénomène sous l'unité de la.cons­cience, ou le "penser", c'est penser, du même coup, quelque chose qui ne peut être relatif: un absolu indéterminé, limitant le phénomène comme tel, une "chose en soi".

S'il en est ainsi, l'objectivation, pour Kant., repose, en dernière analyse, sur l'exigence absolue, d'Unité de la raison, et conséquemment sur la cons­cience que nous prenons du phénomène sensible comme, relatif, c'est-à-dire comme limité par la "chose en soi". 88

Kant does not deny the metaphysical order to which belongs the sense of

dependence upon the thing in its(Ùf built into the notion of a sensibility.

He proclaims the metaphysical order against aIl those who would makea system

of metaphysics out of categories which pertain exclusively to phenomena.

But he proclaims it as unknowable. Bearing in mind what has been presented

so far in the six propositions of Màréchal, in particular in the sixth, we

are in a position to appreciate the substance of the latter's accusation

against Kant:

Pourquoi cèt arrêt à mi-chemin de la Métaphysique? Parce' que Kant, acceptant (par héritage wolfien?) l'exigence précatégoriale, ou métacatégoriale, d'absolu de notre entendement (exigence révélée, quant à sa forme, dans l'illimitation totale de l'unité pure aperceptive) , se contente de faire jouer en bloc cette clause de l'absolu, à l'égard de tout contenu quelconque de la sensibilité; il néglige de rechercher plus profondément (cf. Prop. VI) les conditions sous lesquelles le contenu sen­sible, phénoménal, trahit,à notre conscience, sa foncière relativité et connote ainsi des "choses en soi". 89

88 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris'1949, pp.550-551.

89 Ibid., p.552.

- 95 -

Yet, for aIl his reserve on the metaphysical order, Kant does tell us that

the. 'obj ect . of experience' or phenomenal obj ect ,does not,. inde~d cannot,

satisfy the requirements of the simple' 'l' even·with respect to a partial

realization of its Goal, not as form, for even its most general unit y is

still relative to sensibility; and not as existent, forwithout the comple-

ment of the unknowable thing in itself, the phen.ome:r:tal object cannot be

affirmed (such an affirmation is a subjective impossibility).

This subjectively necessary metaphysicàl aff~rmat!on of every object

of experience implies a consciousness of every such object as limited.

Because the Critique of Pure Reason sets out to limit human cognition, the

ground of the intelligibility of this critique must .be this same conscious-

ness of limitation, insofar as this consciousness cornes before the reflective

mind. To thisone can only apply once more Maréchal's objection (cf. pp.61

and 85 ff. ofthis essay):

Pour connaître une limite comme limite, disions-nous, il faut de toute nécessité, ou bien connaître objec­tivement les deux régions limitrophes, ou bien recon­naître la limite par un seul côté, dans une tendance à la franchir, dans l'exigence positive ou l'appétit d'un au-delà. Appliquons ceci au ph~nornène. 90

We have already seen, in connection with Proposition VI, that the objec­

tive recognition of what limits and what is limited cannot account for the

genesis of the object in consciousness. We are left with the second alter-

native in the above quoted passage, as an explanation of the possibility of

90 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed.·, Paris 1949, p. 552.

ft

- 96 -

both the subjectively necessar)" metaphysical affirmation and the cognitive

act which makes possible a critique.· The implications of the second alter-

native are those brought out in the various propositions of Maréchal's

counter-deduction. The act in which appearances are referred necessarily to

the unknowable thing in itse 1f is what Maréchal calls "~' Acte transcendental

obj ~ct ivant". What has been maintained so far in this essay is that only an

intellectual tendency whose Goal is the transphenomenal Absolute can account

for "l'Actetranscendental objectivant". Since the end of this essay is

now in sight, it is perhaps relevant to recall the passage froID Maréchal

with which it began, which was presented as notice of the complaint to be

brought against Kant, and which, hopefully, has acquired some substance

through the labour of these pages:

En formulant les conclusions agnostiques de la Critique de la Raison pure, il se rabat sur les seules relations formelles et statiques de la connaissance. L'affirma­tion de la "chose en soi" reste un épisode inexploité. 91

In what fol1ows, a refutation of Kant's metaphysical agnosticism will

be presented, based on the conclusions deduced from the teleo10gical ana1ysis

of intelligence in the first six propositions.

Proposition VII

L'assimilation intellectuelle des données, insépara­blement accompagnée de leur introduction dans l'ordre absolu de la finalité, n'est autre chose que l'affir-

91 J. Maréchal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.592; and P.9 of this essay.

-'97 -

mat ion , "acte transcendental" ou "forme objective" du jugement. L!affirmation a donc Wle valeur méta­physique. 92

This proposition does not add anything new; it is merely a summary represen-

tation of what has gone before.

Pre-conscious assimilation of the alien datum of sensibility takes place

as a result of the presence ("affection") of a partial goal of intellectual

tendency in sensibility. Application of the analysis of active becoming to

the 'movement' of intelligence from its purely tendential state to a parti-

cular synthesis of apprehension reveals the following: that the partial

goal or datum is such only insofar as it partakes of the form of the ultimate

Goal of intelligence. Therefore to say that the alien datum of sensibility

must be incorporated into-the intellectual activity in order that knowledge

may be possible is identically to say that every datum bears a necessary

relation (of participation) to the ultimate Goal of intelligence, and this

is the analogical relation of a finite being to the Infinite; the datum can

be assimilated onlyas ens analogum (cf. p.80. of this ·essay). The conscious,

intellectual act, whereby the image produced in the synthesis of apprehension,

is reproduced, is self-present as the same tendency, with the same Goal, as

that of the synthesis of apprehension. Therefore it necessarily seeks in

the image which it is reproducing that relation to the Infinite which was

the necessary condition of movement in the synthesis of apprehension, and

without which there would be no sufficient reason for its reproduction of

92 J. Marechal, Le point de départ de la Métaphysique, cahier V: Le Tho­misme devant la Philosophie critique, 2nd ed., Paris 1949, p.553.

.e - 98 -

the image. Its goal in this process is consciousness of the relation to the

Infinite, and therefore it requires the representationof both terms of the

relation. The representation of the image is conceptual, of the Infinite

tendential (cf. p.87 of this essay) .. As was shown in Proposition VI, .this

relation is constitutive of the object, the non-self in relation to the self.

The act whereby the conceptual.and tendential representations of the terms

of this relation are united in a single consciousness is "affirmation",

"l'Acte transcendental objectivant"; and the· unit y in opposition of a partial

goal and the tendency which is partly actuated but which surpasses, in its

boundless potentiality, this same actuation, is the "forme objective du ju­

gement" .

What is "metaphysical" is beyond or more than the "physical". The

"Physical", in the context of this essay, is phenomenal. being, ens uni-

vocum. Beyond the ph~sical is the thing in itself: for the being of

the physical is relative to ~mode of knowing, according to Kant. The

thing in itself, is absolutely outside the knower. Consciousness, without

knowledge, of the thing in itself, is conceded by Kant both with respect

to sensibility, which depends upon the existence of the object, and with

respect to the indeterminable thing in itself, the transphenomenal referent

affirmed by Reason for every object of experience. Strangely, paradoxi-

cally, this metaphysical affirmation is, for Kant, constitutive of the act

of synthesis of an object, but does not determine the object; for the

Cogito, as a boundless spontaneity, could not become conscious of the unit Y

of the object except by refer-l'ing it to the indeterminable thing in itself.

But, because of his dogmatism of concepts as the-sole vehicle of knowledge,

Kant was unable to .see how the unit Y of the simple 'l'or that of its objective

- 99 -

correlate, the thing in itself, could in any way be determined. If this

essay has accomplished anything, it is this: once the analysis of active

becoming is seen to be the transcendental explanation of the possibility

of affirming an object, the objective correlate of the limitless tendency

of intelligence is understood. as necessarily dete·rminate, for otherwise

there would be no sufficient reasonfor the exercise of the intellectual

activity which culminates in affirmation.·

Kant looked upon the existent simply as a brute datum to be inserted

int.p a system of forms which for sorne unexplained reason was thereby

aroused into activity. But existence isnot mere 'givenness'; it is

movement, growth, tendency. Seen this way, it becomes intelligible; its

leaps from the point represented by one concept to that represented by

another do not take·place in the vacuum of sheer variability; they follow

laws, and the discernment of these laws is teleology . •.

When the teleological analysis of active becoming is applied to intel-

ligence, mere 'givenness' of existence is sweptaway by the a priori ne-

cessity that aIl data. bear a necessary relation to the Absolute, and by

the realization that the existence of this Absolute is a necessary condition

of intellectual tendency itself.

The relation and relata represented by the self in its objective synthesis

are in the absolute order of existence; for, consciousness of a goal,

actually or virtually p:r:esent, partial· or ultimate, is a consciousness of

what is outside the self, of what exists, in other words, in itself. As

we have seen, consciousness of a partial goal in its relation to the Ultimate

- 100 -

Goal of intelligence is constitutive of the subject-object relation, or

at least of the act whereby it is represented: for the primary i.ssue, "la -- . -question vraiment litigieuse" in this prolonged dialogue with Kant is

whether this relation determines anything or is simply thought but not

known. In answer to thi~ it is only necessary to recallthat it is a

denial of the principle of sufficient reason to assert that something

indeterminate explains how something equally indeterminate (thesirnple

'l') is aroused to a determinate activity; for· the existent cannot be

thought as indeterminate. That which allows of no determination in our

thought is simply nothing; if, as with Kant, we yet insist theoretically

that it must·be something, then there is an error.somewhere in the system

which calls for such a paradoxical proposition. The only way in which we

can understand pre-conscious and conscious exercise of intellectual tendency

is in terms of a fully determinate relation between a partial and ultimate

goal,. which relation, as consciously represented, is constitutive of the

objecte

The foregoing serves as proof of the final sentence in Proposition VII:

"L'affirmation a donc une valeur métaphysique." For.the teleological ana­

lysis of intelligence has lead to the conclusion that the thing in itself,

the "conditioned" (or, finite, in the absolute sense) is given. Kant,

because of his reduction of the content of the subjectively necessary meta-

physical affirmation (which he concedes) to the unit y of ens univocum was

ready to allow no more than an intimation of the thing in itself; whereas

the determinate relation of appearances to the Absolute, which has been

- 101 -

shown to follow from the application of the analysis of active becoming

to intelligence, satisfies the requirements of a knowledge.of the thing

in itself. The means for overcoming the chief obstacle to such a conclusion,

namely Kant's dogmatism of the concept, was aIl along implicit in the very

notion of a critique of knowledge: for the latter is patently the worR of

a meta-conceptual act the proper effect of which is intelligibility. What

·would have to be, for Kant, the original illusion of the theoretical intellect,

that the conditioned is given, emerges from this essay under the tutelage of

Maréchal, as the transcendental condition of any object whatsoever of a

discursive intelligence. It is now possible to return to the pale of légi-

timate inquiry the full statement of Reason's aspiration, as recorded by

Kant: " ... if the conditioned is given, the entire sum of conditions, and

consequently the absolutely unconditioned (through which alone the conditioned

has been possible) is also given" (p.386). For knowledge of the "entire sum

of conditions" belongs to metaphysics, and stands or falls with the theore­

tical validity of the subjectively necessary metaphysical affirmation of

the object9f experience (Le. that it is given as conditioned, absolutely,

by a relation to the unconditioned).

VII

CONCLUDING REMARKS ON

THE PROBLEM OF THE THING IN ITSELF

At the geginning of this essay (cf. Chapter I, section 3) mention was

made of the paradoxical stand which Kant was driven to in maintainirig that

appearances are subject to no law of connection other than that prescribed

.by the nature of the knowing subject. Despite this insistence on the role

of the subject, Kant was forced to admit that the a priori forms of the

subject not only determine the object, but themselves require a determina­

tion from the side of the alien datum of sensibility.

Thus the viability of Kant's system of Pure Reason hinges upon an un­

knowable determining influence. The tension which su ch a factor might

create in a philosophy which aims at an integral account of human existence

is heightened when Kant (cf. p~41) speaks of the necessity of an unknowable

something outside the self "arousing" the faculty of knowledge to its

spontaneous activity. Again Kant is placing the human knower in dependence

upon what is unknowable. Kant cannot avoid speakingof the unknowable as

"affecting" our minds and "producing" representations. This is not to be

ascribed merely to a debility of language which cannot be refined to' criti­

cal precision: it is quite simply the only way in which initial 'contact'

- 103 -

or "community' with the datum called for by the bare spontaneity of the

self can be thought. Yet, in order to think this affection we are driven

to the notion of a 'medium' in which the thing in itself can be thought

to act upon a sens ibi lit Y , and this leads to the ascription of space and

time to the thing in itself. Again, one is ternpted to ask whether the

determining influence of the thing in itself doesn't inevitably imply that

the thing is, in itself, susceptible of whatever categorization it calls

for.

Faced with such objectionsas theones listed above, the suspicion

arises that Kànt is perhaps attempting an untenable via media between

realismand idealism. Either what overcomes the indeterminacy of the

pure manifold of space-time (the product of the "transcendent al synthesis

of imagination"), giving rise to this or that appearance, "is the form of

the thing in itself necessitatiùg subsumption under (for instance) the

category of causaiity rather than substance, or it is the ego itself which

necessit~tes the subsumption. No plea can be entered concerning the in­

sufficiency of the hurnan mind, in orderto evade this dilemma; for the

very possibility of the intellectual act of assigning limits to this mind

is grounded in the meta-categorical faculty of intelligence. Therefore a

judgment must be made between these two alternatives, even though they deal

with the transphenomenal.

One of the most prominent features of the method of transcendental

deduction is that it moves from a fact, awareness of an object, to the

possibility of this fact, in accordance with the general maxim that what

- 104 -

is possible depends ultimately upon what exists. The concept of an object

of experience ingeneral is therefore dependent uponthe·objective reality

of some particular object within consciousness; it is the concept of a

possible object which can come into being only under the determining in­

fluence responsible for this or that particùlar appearance. With this in

mind 2 Kant's "Copernican revolution", his insistence upon the legislative

function of the knowing subject with respect ~o the object, appears as a

complete reversaI of the relation between possibility and existence. The·.

dependence of possibility upon existence is overthrown semantically in Kant

by such words as "law of nature" (grounded in the sùbject), "synthesis",

and the value-laden.term "pure". It is so easy to forget that the a priori

forms of the subject represent no more than the possibility of something,

that their 'purity' is indigence, not sovere~gnty.

Everything hinges upon how we understand· the 'impress ions' which "part ly

of themselves produce representations, partly arouse theactivity of the

understanding" (pAl). Insofar as these impressions themselves produce

representations, they do so in giving rise to the "matter" of appearances,

that which differentiates one appearance from another. This "matter" marks

the presence of, or contact with the existent upon which our sensibility

depends. And it is this matter which necessitates subsumption under one or

another category. The mind· is dependent upon the 'existence' of this matter ..

Therefore it cannot be thought that the categorial synthesis of this matter

is a mere superposition or extrinsic pattern. Either the mind is dependent

or note If it is, then how else can this be understood but as the lack of

- 105 -

something real to which its forms can apply? But here the problem becomes

knottier: if this "real matter" already has· the form which is .in the subj ect,

then how are we to understand the synthesis of the matter accordin.g to a

subjective form? Aren't we back to a "window" theory of knowledge, in which

the immanence of the object is never explained?

In answer to this objection it is weIl to remember the distinction

between the form of the object or non-self and the form of the self. It is

a distinction which is implied in the Critique. There, the image, ·as product

of the synthetic a~t, has a necessary unit y which is also the unit y of the

activity of the mind with respect to this image. These two forms~(unities)

differ in that the·form of the subjective act is the subject as actuated,

and the subject, because of its intrinsic freedom from spatio-temporal

manifoldness, becomes present to itself as having the unit y in the image.

This is what Kant ca11s "empirical apperception". The subjective form, in

its actual state (actuated by the impressions) is ~he subject and the image

both; for unit y or form is being. Thus we can say that the matter does have,

in itself, the unit y which becomes the unit y of the subject when it (the

matter) is "run through" and "held together" in apprehension and reproduction.

In this way we can understand how an appearance can be the synthesis of an

indeterminate subjective form with an already unified or linformed' pre-

existent matter. What occurs is a reciprocal actuation: the concretely de-

termined matter imparts its determination to the subjective form, whereas

the activity of the subject raises the form of the matter to the level of

intentional being, where it is the form both of the self and the non-self,

- 106 -

in the identity of a single act. The subjective form 'determines' the

object, for the pre-existent matter is rendered immanent on1y insofar

as it has that unit y which can be so run through as .to become the act

(actual form)of the subject. (This· determining function is what has

been called in this essay "specifying"). But the "matter" determines

the self; for the 1atter,though it is infinite1y more than the matter

insofar as it is a tendency, still can receive something rea1 from the

matter because it is nothing actua11y. o'

The above is an outline of the rea1ist alternative referred to above

(cf. p.13) •. With this exp1anation in mind it is possible to grasp more

c1ear1y how things affecting sensibi1ity thereby make present to the mind .

partial, materia1 goals. For the matter which is made present to the mind

as impression coù1d not be a sufficient reason for the movement of inte11ec-

tua1 spontaneity, cou1d not "arouse" the facu1ty of synthesis, un1ess it

a1ready participated in the nature of the Abso1ute, un1ess this partici-

pat ion were a determinate relation to the Abso1ute. This is possible on1y

if the "matter" a1ready, in itse1f, has the form which is to become the

form of the subject in the synthesis of apprehension or assimilation.

B l B LlO G R A P H Y

1. Gilson, Etienne, Réalisme thomiste et critique de la connaissance-, Paris 1939.

2. Hayen, André, S.J., "Un interprète thomiste du Kantisme, Joseph Maréchal", Revue internationale philosophique, No.30, Kant (1954), pp.449-469.

Hayen, André, S.J., "Le Père Joseph' -Maréchal (1878-1944)", in Mélanges Joseph Maréchai, V.l, Paris 1950, pp.3-2l.

3. Isaye, G., S.J., "La finalité de l'intelligence et l'objectivation kantienne", Revue philosophique de Louvain, Tome LI (1953), p.42-l00. A summary of Maréchal'sCahier V.

Isaye, G., S.J., "Joseph Maréchal",' in Les grands courants de la Pensée mondiale contemporaine, ed. M.F. Sêiacca, Ille partie: Portraits,' Vol. 2, Milan 1964, pp.99l-l033.

4. Kant, Immanuel, Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp, Smith, London 1964.

5. Maréchal, Joseph, S.J., Studies in the Psychology of the Mystics, trans. Algar Thorold, Albany 1964.

Maréchal, Joseph, S.J., Le point de départ de la Métaphysique. Leçons sur le développement historique et théorique du probl~me de la con­naissance:

Cahier 1: De l'Antiquité à la fin du Moyen Age: La Critique ancienne de la Connaissance, 4e édition, Paris 1964.

Cahier II: Le conflit du ,Rationalisme et de l'Empirisme dans la Philo­sophie moderne avant Kant, 4e édition, Paris 1965.

Cahier III: Kant, 4e édition, Paris 1964.

Cahier IV: Le système idéaliste chez Kant et les postkantiens, Paris 1947.

Cahier V: Le Thomisme devant la Philosophie critique, 2e édition, Paris 1949.

CONTENTS

PREFACE . ........ . ................................................... '. '.'

1·· INTRODUCTION . ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .' ..

II

1. Joseph Maréchal . . -, .. '. -... ' ......... -... ' ..... p . 4

2. The Prob1em of Subjective Activity . . . . . . . . p . 9

3. The Prob1em of the Thing in Itse1f . . . . . . . p . 11

4. The Scope of the Present Thesis . . . . . . . . . . p • 14

. . KANT'S THEORY OF THE OBJECT .......................... 1. The Subject-Object Relation in the Trans.-

cendental Deduction ................. . '. _, .. ' .

2. Being and Unit y .................. '.' ... , •... ' ..

3. The Object . . . - . . . . . . . . . -, ...................... .

p. 16

p. 25

p. 26

III THE FOCUS OF MARECHAL'S CRITICISM . . .................... 1. Existence and Unit y in Kant .............. .

2. Metaphysica1 Affirmation

3. 'Affirmation' in Kant . . .................... 4. Beyond transcendenta1 Apperception

5. Ens Principiurn Numeri ..................... .

6. Objective Unit Y .............. -, ....... -.. .

p. 35

p. 39

p. 41

p. 43b

p. 45

p. 48

IV EXISTENCE AND ACTIVITY . . . . -' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. The Consciousness of Abso1ute Existence

2. Action

p. 53

p. 56

p. 2

p . 4

p. 16

p. 35·

p. 53

v

VI

- 109 -

3. Further Remarks concerning inte 11ectua1 Spontaneity . . . . . ... . , .. ' .... ' ............... ' ...... p • 58

4. An Ana1ysis of .active Becoming . . . . . . .. . . . . . p . 60

5. Active Becoming and Finality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p . 65

THE THEORETICAL NECESSITY OF METAPHYSICAL AFFIRMATION.

Introduction · .. " ......... " .... " .... ' ......... ' .... . p. 69

Proposition l . . .. . · ....................... -....... . p. 70

Proposition II ...... , .... , ..................... ; ... . p . 72

Proposition III . -...................... ' ........... . p . 73

Propositiori IV .... -........ ' ........................ . p. :75

Proposition V '. . . . , . . . · ........... -, ............... -... . p. 77

Proposition VI . . . . . . . . . . . " ........ ' .... ' .... ' . -.. . p . 81

MARECHAL 'S. CRITIQUE OF THE CRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -...... . Comparison of the Foregoing Deduction with Kant

Proposition VII . . .............................. p. 90

p. 96

VII CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE PROBLEM OF THE THING IN ITSELF

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . •••• , ••••••••••••••••••••••• a •••••••••••••••• _ .••

p. 69

p. 90

p. 102

p. 107