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The authors

Editing:Lynn Benstead

Cover photo:KLA fighter in Kosovo, 13 January1999. An armed member of theKosovo Liberation Army (KLA) infront of the ruins of a house nearthe KLA’s headquarters inLikovac (Kosovo).dpa

Preface 4

Acknowledgments 5

ZusammenfassungGerman Summary 6

Introduction 8

What was the KLA? 10

Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo (FARK) 10

The Emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 11

Tipping the Balance from Politics to Violence 12

The KLA’s Arsenal 13

Financing the Struggle 13

Recruitment 14

Training and Structure of the KLA 14

Mixed Messages from US Diplomacy 15

The Ground War in 1998 15

The KLA and NATO 16

From Military to Political Power—the Kosovo Provisional Government 17

The Disarmament of the KLA 19

Disarmament 19

Deficiencies of Disarmament 20

Demobilization by Transformation—The Kosovo Protection Corps 22

Demobilization and Reintegration 25

Policing Kosovo—The Kosovo Police Service (KPS) 26

Behavioral Patterns of Former KLA Members 29

Turning Military into Political Power—KLA Successor Parties 32

Offspring of the KLA—Crime and Violence 34

Extremist Groups outside Kosovo 35

Southern Serbia—the UCPMB 35

Macedonia—the National Liberation Army (NLA) 36

Conclusions—Lessons of the KLA Demobilization 39

References 42

Interview Partners 45

AppendixI: Resolution 1244 (1999), Adopted by the UN Security Councilat its 4011th meeting, on 10 June 1999 46

II: Undertaking of demilitarization and transformation bythe UCK, Signed on 20 June 1999 50

Contents

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder isproject leader at BICC and adjunctprofessor for comparative politics atHumboldt University Berlin. Hismain fields of research are securitypolitics in Eastern Europe, post-Soviet politics, and comparativefederalism.

Wolf-Christian Paes works asproject leader at BICC. His mainfields of research include small armsissues, resource wars and civil-military relations. Regionally, hefocuses on Southeastern Europe,Africa and Southeast Asia.

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brief 20Wag the Dog:The Mobilization and Demobilization ofthe Kosovo Liberation Army

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder andWolf-Christian Paes

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The Friedrich Naumann Foundation,with its headquarter in Potsdam,Germany, supports democratictransformation processes in morethan sixty countries around the globe.Working with parliamentarians,academics and members of civilsociety, the foundation aims atbuilding liberal democracies byorganizing conferences and exchangeprograms on topics ranging fromhuman rights to economic freedom.Since 2000, the office in Skopje hasbeen coordinating project activities inAlbania, the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, Macedonia and Kosovo.

Friedrich Naumann FoundationNaum Naumovski Borce 581000 Skopje, MacedoniaPhone: +389 2 137 427

+389 2 133 019Fax: +389 2 296 340E-Mail: office22@skopje.fnst.org

The Friedrich Naumann Foundationis currently working in a number

of countries which have been througharmed struggles involving armies ofliberation. In all cases it has beenproved that peace and stability can onlycome about when all the military forcesin a country have been subordinated toa legitimate monopoly of power. InKosovo, it is widely assumed that someformer KLA structures have somehowremained intact and are not, or notcompletely, under UNMIK’s control.But instead of facts, one only hearsrumors—sometimes evenaccompanied by the advice: Better notto touch on that issue.

In order to obtain a more reliablepicture, the Friedrich NaumannFoundation’s office in Skopje, which isresponsible for the subregion thatincludes Kosovo, asked the BonnInternational Center for Conversion(BICC) to analyze the situation of theformer KLA in Kosovo. Only byknowing the reasons for these allegedparallel structures might it becomepossible to design additionalinstruments, i.e. incentives, trainingprograms for the civil (re-)integrationof former fighters etc., and tocontribute to the debate on changes inthe political framework of Kosovo. Itwas on this basis that a first projectentitled “What happened to thefighters” was formulated in December2000. As BICC carried out its fieldresearch in Kosovo in April/May 2001,the fighting in Macedonia, and beforethat in southern Serbia, made it veryobvious that what is happening—ornot happening—in Kosovo has animpact on neighboring countries in theregion.

The study entitled Mobilization andDemobilization of the Kosovo LiberationArmy clearly shows that the importantinsights which have been gained inKosovo should be taken into accountduring the planned disarmament of theAlbanian guerrilla army in Macedonia.The paper not only confirms theabove-mentioned universal truth aboutthe necessity of a state monopoly ofpower, it also teaches us that the taskof demobilizing guerrillas cannot becompleted by military (NATO) effortsalone. Without good reason to believethat the problems behind the fightingcan and will be solved peacefully,fighters will hardly be prepared to leavethe battlefield. And finally, carefullydesigned, planned and implementedcivil reintegration programs are neededfor those former fighters who havebeen granted amnesty. Charges must bebrought against the others.

Hope and trust in the civil society areof course essential—not only forformer fighters. If we take a look atMacedonia, we see a dramatic rise inpessimism: 88% of the populationview the general situation negatively,only 4% feel positively. Even worse,90.7% see the economy negatively, only2.6% positively. (the rest gave noreply). As a result more than half—53%—could imagine leaving thecountry. These are the findings of anopinion poll which was commissionedby our office (available atwww.fnst.org/ausland/regional/msoe.phtml). Together with BICC’sstudy on Kosovo, these findings willguide our next steps in thiscomplicated area.

PrefaceThanks to the Stability Pact, theFriedrich Naumann Foundation is ableto contribute towards democratictransformation in the Balkans. We areaware that joint efforts are needed inorder to achieve sustainable changes,and in presenting this material, wehope that it will be helpful and ofinterest to all those who are workingfor peace and progress.

Rainer WillertFriedrich Naumann Foundation,Head of ProjectSkopje, 20 August 2001

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acknowledgments

We should like to thank theFriedrich Naumann Foundation,

particularly its representative RainerWillert, for supporting our researchboth financially and logistically. Dr.Enver Hoxhai proved to be a veryreliable partner in conducting thestandardized interviews with formerKLA members. Driton Muhammedwas relentless in his efforts to locateinterview partners in Kosovo and actedas our interpreter. Our thanks also goto all our interview partners for thetime they spent answering ourquestions and providing additionalmaterial. Kees Kingma read the wholemanuscript—his critical comments areappreciated. Lynn Benstead andZachary Moss edited the finalmanuscript. The authors arenonetheless solely responsible for thecontent of this report, including anyremaining errors.

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder and Wolf-Christian PaesBonn International Center forConversion (BICC)

Acknowledgments

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Der vorliegende brief beschäftigtsich mit der Entstehung der

albanischen Kosovo Befreiungsarmee(UCK, engl.: KLA) in den neunzigerJahren des 20. Jahrhunderts sowie mitder „Auflösung“ der Guerillatruppenach der Errichtung eines Protektoratsunter der Schirmherrschaft derVereinten Nationen und der NATO imSommer 1999.

Mehr als zwei Jahre später ist diesesThema immer noch hochaktuell,obwohl oder vielleicht gerade weil sichmit dem Sturz des Milosevic-Regimesin Belgrad die strategischen Parameterauf dem Balkan verschoben haben.Galt der bewaffnete Kampf eines Teilsder albanischen Bevölkerung imKosovo noch vor zwei Jahren alsAusdruck eines legitimenSelbstbestimmungswillens, werdenheute vergleichbare Konflikte zwischenalbanischen Separatisten undOrdnungskräften im südserbischenPresevo-Tal und in Mazedonien alsBedrohung für die regionale Stabilitätbewertet.

Die Konflikte in diesen beiden an dasKosovo angrenzenden Regionenweisen deutliche Parallelen zumKosovokonflikt auf, und es gibtHinweise auf enge Verbindungenzwischen den Hintermännern der„alten UCK“ und den bewaffnetenAlbanergruppen in den Nachbarstaa-ten. Vor diesem aktuellen Hintergrundbeschäftigt sich der vorliegende Textmit der Entstehung der UCK und ihrerEntwaffnung und Demobilisierung seitSeptember 1999.

Die Entwaffnung der UCK durch dieinternationale Kosovo Protection Force(KFOR) hatte, im Gegensatz etwa zuden bescheideneren Ansprüchen derNATO in Mazedonien im September2001, die Einsammlung aller UCK-Waffen zum Ziel. Allerdings wurdennur etwa 10.000 Waffen sichergestellt,angesichts von 18.000 bis 20.000 UCK-Kämpfern eine recht niedrige Zahl.Substantielle Waffenfunde in denvergangenen zwei Jahren beweisen,dass die UCK – ebenso wie dieserbische Minderheit im Kosovo –immer noch über verdeckte Waffen-lager verfügt. Es ist anzunehmen, dassein Teil dieser Waffen seinen Weg überdie Grenzen in die Nachbarregionengefunden hat.

Von den etwa 20.000 ehemaligenKämpfern der UCK haben etwa 5.000eine Stellung im Kosovoschutzcorps (engl.:Kosovo Protection Corps – KPC) gefunden,einer paramilitärischen Einheit, derenoffizieller Auftrag im Katastrophen-schutz liegt, die sich jedoch selbst alsKern einer zukünftigen Kosovo Armeeversteht. Diese Truppe, deren Oberbe-fehl formal bei der KFOR liegt, trägtam deutlichsten die Züge der aufgelö-sten UCK, bis hin zu Details derUniformen und Organisationsstruktu-ren. Im Jahr 2001 wurden Mitgliederdieser Einheit mit gewaltsamenÜbergriffen auf Kosovo Serben, aberauch mit den bewaffneten Albaner-gruppen in den Nachbarstaaten inZusammenhang gebracht.

Auch der neugegründete KosovoPolizeidienst (engl.: Kosovo Police Service –KPS) besteht etwa zur Hälfte ausehemaligen Mitgliedern der UCK: einschwieriges Erbe für die multiethnischePolizeitruppe, die explizit mit dem Zielaufgebaut wurde, eine vertrauensbil-dende Funktion zwischen den unter-schiedlichen Bevölkerungsgruppenauszuüben.

Die politische Landschaft des Kosovoswird durch den Konflikt und durchdas Erbe der UCK geprägt. Diepolitischen Parteien zerfallen in zweiLager, einerseits die moderatenParteien um den „Schatten-präsidenten“ und Schriftsteller IbrahimRugova und andererseits die Nach-folgeparteien der UCK, die von denehemaligen Kommandanten Thaci undHaradinaj angeführt werden. DieNiederlage der UCK-Nachfolge-parteien im Rahmen der Kommunal-wahlen im Oktober 2000 scheint einenschleichenden Bedeutungsverlust derehemaligen UCK-Kommandeure inder Öffentlichkeit zu signalisieren.Trotzdem bestehen Kontakte zu denSeparatisten und zur organisiertenKriminalität inner- und außerhalb desKosovo fort.

Zusammenfassend kann man feststel-len, dass sich die UCK seit Anfang derneunziger Jahre von einer radikalenSplittergruppe zu einer populärenBefreiungsbewegung entwickelt hat,deren Kämpfer sich seit der Errich-tung des UN-Protektorates entwederin die zivile Gesellschaft des Kosovosintegrierten oder Positionen imentstehenden Sicherheitsapparat bzw.in der Politik des Territoriums anstre-ben. Dabei nutzte eine Reihe vonKämpfern die Umbruchphase imzweiten Halbjahr 1999 nicht nur zurpersönlichen Bereicherung, sondernauch zu gewaltsamen Racheakten. Seitder Etablierung der UN-Übergangs-verwaltung scheint sich der harte Kernder ehemaligen UCK gespalten zuhaben. Während ein Teil der Kämpferbereit scheint sich in die zivilenStrukturen zu integrieren, hängt eineradikale Minderheit „großalbanischen“Vorstellungen an.

Zusammen-fassung

German Summary

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Die ungelöste Frage der völkerrechtli-chen Zukunft des Kosovos dominiertdas politische Bewusstsein der Kosovo-Albaner und verhindert eine nachhalti-ge Befriedung der Region. Während dieinternationale Gemeinschaft an derResolution 1244 (1999) des UN-Sicherheitsrates festhält, der eineRückkehr der Provinz zur Bundesrepu-blik Jugoslawien vorsieht, wird dieseOption von nahezu allen Albanern imKosovo abgelehnt. Eine große Mehr-zahl der im Rahmen dieser Studiebefragten UCK-Kämpfer gab an, imFalle der Verwirklichung der Resoluti-on wieder zu den Waffen greifen zuwollen. Dies zeigt die Notwendigkeiteiner politischen Lösung für die„albanische Frage“, nicht zuletzt mitBlick auf die Unruhen in den Nachbar-staaten des Kosovo.

German summary

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Two years have passed since theKosovo Forces (KFOR) and the

United Nations Mission in Kosovo(UNMIK) took over governance ofKosovo (UN Security Council Resolu-tion 1244; Military Technical Agree-ment, 10 June 1999), establishing whatamounts to an internationalprotectorate with a dual military andcivilian leadership and limited politicalparticipation by the local population(Yannis, 2001; Wagner, 2000). It is nowtime to assess the demobilization ofthe Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA, orin Albanian, Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës(UCK)) as part of the overall securitymission. After the end of the war inJune 1999, one of the key tasks of theNATO-led Kosovo Forces consistedof demilitarizing the Kosovo-Albanianguerilla army, KLA, and transformingit into a civilian and KFOR-controlledsecurity force. The legitimatemonopoly of violence was to rest withthe protectorate, at least in theory. Itwas assumed that with the formerSerbian military and police presenceousted and a robust protectorate to beerected, ethnic violence would come torest.

On 20 June 1999, KFOR and the KLAsigned an ‘undertaking’ (see AppendixII) providing for the disarmament,transformation, and monitoring ofpersonnel under KLA-control as wellas the cessation of cross-borderactivities. On 20 September 1999, itwas additionally agreed between theKLA and KFOR to demilitarize theKLA and to transform it into auniformed, but unarmed, disaster relieforganization, the Kosovo ProtectionCorps (KPC). Demilitarizing the KLApresented two quandaries. Why shouldthe KLA, as a de facto ally of NATOand a victorious power of the war,agree to disarm before reaching its goalof full independence? And how couldthe KLA, lacking legitimate politicalcontrol and intermingled withorganized crime, turn into a reliablepartner for Kosovo’s security politics?

The demilitarization of the KLA wasinitially often described as anaccomplishment, until KLA splintergroups started to emerge in SouthernSerbia (Ushtria Çlirimtare Presheve,Medvegje e Bujanovac (UCPMB)) andMacedonia (the National LiberationArmy (NLA)). However, the projectedimage of UNMIK and KFOR keepingKosovo under tight control waspremature (Mintchev, 2000). Thedemilitarization of the KLA provedmore difficult than initially assumed bymost representatives of theinternational community. It is part of alarger unresolved problem—thesecurity situation in Kosovo and in itsborder areas, which in turn is closelyrelated to the ‘Albanian Question’(Reuter, 2000; Judah, 2001).Nonetheless, General Klaus Reinhardt,the German commander of KFORfrom October 1999 to March 2000,sees the demilitarization as a success.Among the main lessons whichReinhardt extracts from the KFORmission, not one refers to thetreatment of the KLA (Reinhardt,2001). NATO’s lessons from theKosovo seem to be confined to theimprovement of military performance(Naumann, 1999).

The Kosovo Liberation Army is alsoknown under its Albanian name UshtriaÇlirimtare e Kosovës (UCK). In order toavoid confusion with the Albanian-Macedonian insurgency group UshtriaÇlirimtare e Kombëtare (NationalLiberation Army), which uses the sameacronym, we shall refer in this text tothe original Kosovo Liberation Armyas KLA, while using the acronym NLAfor the Macedonian-based NationalLiberation Army.

The aim of this report is to drawlessons for demobilization andreintegration from the engagement ofKFOR, UNMIK and internationalorganizations, as well as from nascentlaw enforcement structures in Kosovo.It is not our intention to reconstructthe history of the Kosovo conflict, thewar, or post-war Kosovo politics.Neither do we intend to cover more

general questions pertaining to thegenesis and consequences of NATO’sintervention. We do not offer an all-encompassing menu of panaceas forKosovo’s post-war security situation.We specifically address a set ofquestions related to the post-wardemobilization and demilitarization ofthe KLA. First, in order to understandthe tasks involved in demobilizing theKLA, we have to understand its nature.What were the KLA’s internalstructure, recruitment basis, andmethod of conducting the war?Second, how effectively was the KLAdisarmed and its structures dissolvedafter June 1999? Third, howsuccessfully did KFOR and UNMIKdemilitarize the KLA? Fourth, what arethe major re-training and reintegrationsupport measures? Fifth, how doformer KLA combatants identify theirpolitical views and social role? Sixth,what role do the political parties, whichemanated from the KLA, play in post-war politics? Seventh, how are theextremist Albanian groups in Serbiaand Macedonia linked to the KLA?And finally, what are the major lessonsto be learned by intervening internatio-nal organizations? The report is basedon interviews conducted by theauthors in Kosovo in April/May 2001with representatives of the formerKLA, the Kosovo Protection Corps,the Kosovo Police Service, UNMIK,OSCE, KFOR, the InternationalOrganisation for Migration, andKosovo political parties (a full list ofthe interviewees is included below).

Demilitarization is not confined to thetransformation of the KLA into theKosovo Protection Corps (KPC) or theKosovo Police Service (KPS). Kosovois a heavily militarized society: thepossession of weapons is part ofKosovo’s everyday culture (Saferworld,2001). This ‘weapons culture’ seemsgrounded in the history of theAlbanian people, who were ruled byforeign powers for most of their recenthistory, as well as in the perceivedsecurity needs of a population living asemi-sedentary life in remote and

Introduction

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introduction

inaccessible territory. Until recently,social relations were governed by amedieval set of rules, the Kanun, whichhas contributed to the image ofAlbanians as ‘savage’ and ‘backward’.Weapons still play an important role insocial relations. Weddings, for example,are celebrated by firing guns into theair. Most Albanian households arethought to have at least one ‘familygun’—until 1997 most likely a huntingrifle or World War II-vintage bolt-action rifle. As a result of the conflictand the improved supply of modernweaponry, these old-fashioned gunshave most likely been replaced withmodern automatic weapons(Saferworld, 2001).

Weapons originally acquired andcontrolled by the KLA remain a majorfoundation of ethnic violence inKosovo. The militarization ofKosovo’s society also pertains to non-Albanian groups in Kosovo. While theYugoslav armed forces and the policewithdrew from Kosovo, members ofthe remaining Serb population retainan unknown number of weapons(Saferworld, 2001, p. 42). Given thefears of Serbs living in Kosovo and thedistrust of KFOR and UNMIK’scapacity for law enforcement, Serbparamilitary self-defense remains anoption to be reckoned with. However,we do not intend to cover the securitysituation of Serbs in Kosovo in thisreport.

The demobilization and disarmamentof non-legal military formationsfollowing armed conflicts represents acrucial prerequisite for the formationof a law-based society and democraticstate-society relations. The emergenceof new violent secessionist movementsin Serbia and Macedonia demonstratesthat the demilitarization of the KLAhas to be seen in the wider context ofregional security. Ethnic violence inKosovo against non-Albanian, mainlySerbian and Roma, minorities, theviolent uprising in the Albanian-populated Presevo valley in Serbiaproper—along the Ground SecurityZone (GSZ)—and in Albanian-populated parts of Macedonia do notonly put a strain on NATO’s 40,000

KFOR troops, but amply illustrate thecontinuing urgency of post-wardemobilization and disarmamentmeasures. The reintegration of formercombatants into civilian life and thereestablishment of a state monopolyof violence are essential for preventinga relapse into the violent pursuit ofinterests. Given the record of post-warviolence emanating from formercombatants, it is of key importance totransform paramilitaries into legallybound and controlled securitystructures, or to dismantle theseorganizations and facilitate theirreintegration into civilian life—professional, economic, and social.

The principal problems involved in thedemobilization of paramilitary forcesare known from other post-war zones:disarming, retraining, job creation,housing, social reintegration, raisingfunds to restructure the economy, andthe long-term task of re-socializingpeople used to violent conflictbehavior (Kingma and Pauwels, 2000).Disarmament, demobilization, andreintegration are interlocking processes,involving legal, institutional, social, andeconomic spheres of post-warsocieties. The case of Kosovo bearssimilarities to other post-war areas,most notably to Bosnia following theDayton Accord.

Kosovo demonstrates thatdemobilization might be seen byinsurgents as a halfway compromise oras an unjust restraint prior to gainingfull state independence. On the onehand therefore, the rewards ofdemobilization must compensate forcompromising on the ultimate aim ofindependence. On the other hand,sanctions for not demobilizing must bea credible deterrent. Lessons learntfrom Kosovo may prove valuablebeyond its confines, because post-warKosovo belongs to a growing numberof entities stuck between secessionfrom the former ‘motherland’ and fullindependence.

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The status of Kosovo has beencontested between the Albanian

and the Serb population within itsborders for most of the last century.While the Serbs consider Kosovo to bethe heartland of the medievalKingdom of Serbia fromapproximately 1200 to the start of theOttoman rule in 1455, as well as thehome of many important religious sitesof the Serb Orthodox Church, theAlbanians argue that the majority ofthe Kosovo population has always beenethnic Albanian, regardless of theethnic background of their overlords(Reuter and Clewing, 2000; Malcolm,2000). While we will not revisit theethnographic and historical argument,it is important to remember that theconflict between the Albanian strugglefor self-rule and the role of Kosovo inthe Serb national consciousness loomslarge in the minds of most inhabitantsof the region.

The accession of Slobodan Milosevicto power in Serbia in 1987 led to a newescalation of the Kosovo conflict.Milosevic’s government implementedmeasures to change the status of theprovince, making Serbian the onlyofficial language and subsequentlypurging ethnic Albanians from stateinstitutions and publicly ownedenterprises. Kosovo’s Albanian elitereacted by forming a parallel system ofgovernment, the Republic of Kosovo,under the leadership of ‘President’Ibrahim Rugova. This system—financed largely from the Diaspora—functioned alongside the officialstructures. The parallel administrationoperated hospitals and schools, whilefollowing a policy of peacefulresistance against the Serb authorities.The number of Kosovo Albaniansliving in Western Europe (mainlySwitzerland, Germany, Scandinavia) isestimated to exceed 600,000, while

another 300,000 Kosovo Albanians livein North America. Funds sent homefrom the Diaspora form the backboneof the Kosovo economy, while labormigration serves as a ‘safety valve’ forthe explosive population growth ofethnic Albanians in Kosovo.

On 2 July 1990, 114 ethnic Albaniandelegates of the Kosovo Assembly metin secret and declared Kosovo an“independent and equal entity withinthe framework of the Yugoslavfederation and an equal subject with itscounterparts in Yugoslavia” (Troebst,1999a). Clearly, the majority of KosovoAlbanians were then in favor ofsecession from Serbia, but not fromYugoslavia. For most of the 1990s,Rugova’s government followed thismoderate line, only to find the ‘KosovoQuestion’ sidelined in internationalnegotiations. It was against thebackdrop of non-recognition of theRepublic of Kosovo and increasedrepression against ethnic Albaniansthat military units were formed inKosovo, ultimately leading to thefoundation of two competing militarywings—the FARK and the KLA.

Armed Forces of theRepublic of Kosovo(FARK)

The build-up of armed forces inKosovo goes back to the supposedlypacifist government under Rugova.From its onset, the Rugovagovernment expected a confrontationwith Serb forces and wanted to beprepared in case of major atrocities(Interview with Caim Berisha, 7 May2001). The illegal ‘Defense Ministry’under Rugova worked from 1990 to1993 on the build-up of a Kosovarterritorial defense system, though itsplan to achieve a mobilization capacityof 40,000 reservists never materialized.Hajzer Hajzeraj was Kosovo’s first‘Defense Minister’, appointed by BujarBukoshi, the Kosovar prime minister inexile. Hajzeraj’s main task consisted in

the build-up of Kosovar police andmilitary units—the Armed Forces ofKosovo (FARK). After his arrest in1993, Hajzeraj was replaced by AhmetKrasniqui, an ethnic Albanian who hadserved in the Yugoslav army. Theemerging FARK troops consistedmainly of former Albanian officers ofthe Yugoslavian army with only fewrank and file soldiers (Lipsius, 1999,p. 365). Apart from enrollingcombatants, the FARK faced hugedifficulties in acquiring weaponry.Some weapons came from a Serbammunitions plant in Kosovo(Skenderaj), others from the Albanianmilitary. Bulgaria and Montenegro werecontacted too, but it is not clearwhether weaponry was actuallydelivered.

The formation of a territorial defensesystem came to a sudden halt in 1993.Following the ‘physical interrogation’of a member of the ‘DefenseMinistry’, Serb forces were able toarrest almost all members of theFARK general staff. Remaining FARKassociates left for Albania, where theyregrouped and received militarytraining. After the downfall ofPresident Sali Berisha in 1997, theFARK’s situation also deteriorated inAlbania (Lani, 1999). During theautumn of 1998, several FARKmembers were arrested in Albania forinvolvement in the coup attempt stagedby supporters of the AlbanianDemocratic Party against thegovernment of Fatos Nano, who hadreplaced Sali Berisha. Bukoshirepeatedly denied involvement in theattempted coup. Nonetheless, FARK’srelations with Nano’s socialistgovernment of Albania were muchmore strained than those of the KLA(Frefel, 1999). The killing of AhmetKrasniqui, leader of the FARK, inTirana on 21 September 1998 has attimes been attributed to the KLA, butit could also have been related to thecoup attempt. After the killing ofKrasniqui in Tirana, Bukoshi namedthe former officer Halil Bicaj as acting‘Defense Minister’.

What was the KLA?

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what was the KLA?

Faced with the growing strength of therival KLA, the Bukoshi governmentdecided in late March/early April 1998to join the military actions in Kosovo(Interview with Ahmet Alishani, 9 May2001). At the end of June 1998, threeFARK brigades, consisting of some300 combatants, entered Kosovo,fighting two battles against Serb forcesin the Kosovo villages of Lodja andJunik. Some 3,000 fighters joined theFARK combatants in Kosovo. From1998 onwards, the FARK attempted toget all armed units under its control,but local KLA commanders refutedthis idea. The FARK units enteringKosovo asked local KLA commandersto submit to FARK command. Insteadof submitting, the KLA units arrestedand disarmed those FARK soldiersthey could get hold of.

In November 1998, another FARKbrigade entered Kosovo, joining theOperative Zone of Pashtri. The FARKand KLA cooperated more closelyafter this, with the KLA ensuring thatit controlled command positions(Interview with Ahmet Alishani, 9 May2001). It has been reported that, inNovember 1998, parts of the FARKunder its new ‘Defense Minister’, HalilBicaj, joined ranks with the KLA(Lipsius, 1999, p. 366). Although thisinformation could not be confirmed, itwas evident that the KLA was able toconsolidate its power as thepredominant military wing of theviolent movement. The FARK, forexample, dropped the use of itsoriginal name by calling itself part ofthe overall KLA (Katulis, 2000, p. 5;Lipsius, 1999, p. 367). Yet, even afterthis step, FARK members underBukoshi’s command were arrested andbeaten up by the KLA (Lipsius, 1999).The relationship between the KLA andthe ‘Defense Ministry’ of the Bukoshigovernment again came under seriousstrain during the air war.

The KLA never accepted thelegitimacy of the elected Rugovagovernment. Rugova’s desperate callsto the KLA, in June 1998, to submit topolitical control were simply ignored

(Schmidt-Häuer, 1998). The conflictbetween the FARK and the KLA wasnot only about political and militaryleadership by the Rugova/Bukoshigovernment, but about deliberatelyputting civilians at risk by embarkingon guerilla tactics. Whereas the FARKopted for a ‘regular’ type of armedresistance, KLA commanders choseguerilla tactics. The signal for the endof the FARK came when KFORtroops entered Kosovo and the KLA’s‘Political Directorate’ under HashimThaci took over the government inKosovo.

The Emergence of theKosovo LiberationArmy (KLA)

The KLA represented a guerillamovement whose aim was to achieve,by means of violence, Kosovo’ssecession from Serbia and the creationof either an independent state ofKosovo or a Greater Albania. Thebeginnings of the Kosovo LiberationArmy are obscure, but they have littleconnection with the FARK. Someauthors trace the KLA’s emergence toMacedonia in 1992, others hold that itis a product of the Popular Movementfor Kosovo (LPK). Kosovo Albaniansin Germany founded the LPK on17 February 1982 in the wake of theviolent clashes between Albanianprotesters and Serb policemen inPristina in March and April 1981(Lipsius, 1998, p. 75). The LPK, unlikeRugova’s more moderate LDK,advocated an armed struggle againstSerb forces from the outset. Duringthe 1980s, the LPK received somesupport from communist Albania, butremained a marginal, radical party withlittle support within Kosovo until themid-1990s (Reuter, 2000a, p. 171).According to some sources, the LPKbegan to combat Serb police after theabolition of Kosovo’s autonomy in1989 (Vaknin, 2000). Earliest mentionof Kosovar military training in Albania

was in 1991, though the numbers werereportedly symbolic and confined to afew regions (Zejnullahu, 2001, p. 21).Different military movements existedas of 1991, which resulted in theformation of the ‘Front’ (Albanian:Frontiti) (Hamzaj, 2000, p. 14).

The National Movement for theLiberation of Kosovo (LKCK),founded as a splinter group of theLDK in Pristina on 25 May 1993 andactive among exiles in Germany,formed a military wing of its own. Yet,specific LKCK guerilla forces neverbecame apparent and it is thereforedoubtful that the KLA emerged fromthe LKCK. The more radical LPK andLKCK appealed to a youngergeneration of Albanian ‘ethnicentrepreneurs’ both within Kosovo andin the Diaspora, while Rugova wassupported by members of the oldAlbanian political elite socialized in theYugoslavia of the 1960s and 1970s.The connections between the emergingKLA structures and political partiesand emigrant circles were keptclandestine. Even operational zonecommanders in the early KLA did notknow the full extent of these networks.It is therefore impossible at this time toestablish the degree of politicalguidance in the formation of the KLA(Zejnullahu, 2001, p. 37 ff.).

The core group of the KLAsupposedly consisted of formerMarxist-Leninist Enverists, who werealready active in the 1970s and 1980s.Chris Hedges, New York Times’Balkans bureau chief from 1995 to1998, identified two factions within theKLA—radical rightists with traditionsgoing back to World War II fascistmilitias, the Skanderbeg volunteer SSdivision, and the kacak rebels whofought Serbs during World War I, aswell as radical leftists displayingxenophobia and Stalinism à la EnverHoxha (Hedges, 1999b). SOner

Since the expected internationalbacking did not materialize in theperiod from 1992–95, KosovarAlbanians in the Diaspora, former

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Yugoslav officers, and other individualsand groups who had fought against theSerbs in Croatia and Bosnia, decided tojoin the KLA’s core Enverist group(Cohen, 2001). It is estimated that over5,000 ethnic Albanians fought togetherwith Croat and Muslim militaryformations against Yugoslavian orSerbian forces in the Croatian andBosnian wars—some of these joinedthe KLA. The bulk of KLA fighterswas allegedly drawn from ethnicAlbanians who had fought for theMuslim-Croat Federation against theSerbs in Bosnia (Hedges, 1999b, p. 34).

Evidently, several armed groups actedindependently of each other until1994. Ramush Haradinaj, former KLAcommander and current head of theAlliance for the Future of Kosovo(AAK), asserts that diverse illegal unitsjoined ranks in 1994 to form the KLA(Hamzaj, 2000, p. 22). CoordinatedKLA activities started in 1994,including systematic training andweapons acquisition across theAlbanian border. But regular trainingof KLA members by the Albanianmilitary evidently only began in 1996(Hamzaj, 2000, pp. 15, 26 ff.). TheKLA actions could count on growingsupport from the local populace; itsmilitary strength consisted in itsintermingling with the local populaceand the ensuing difficulties in locatingKLA forces precisely. The early KLAgroups did not for the most part attackYugoslav Army facilities, butconcentrated rather on ambushingpolice patrols and attacking Albanianswho collaborated with the Serbianauthorities. The strongholds of theearly KLA were the Drenica and theLlapi regions.

Whereas the ideology and earlystructure of the KLA remain to acertain extent obscure, its mainactivities are known to have consistedin attacking Serbian police forces. Ashift occurred when some 10,000refugee Serbs from the Krajina wereresettled in Kosovo. From spring 1998

onwards, the KLA increasinglyattacked Serb settlements in Klina,Decani, and Dakovica, as well as arefugee camp in Baboloc, thusunleashing a cycle of excessive Serbiancrackdowns on ethnic Albaniansblamed for belonging to the KLA orhosting KLA combatants (Vaknin,2000). In response to KLA attacks, theFRY government cracked downindiscriminately on ethnic Albanians.In January 1997, Serb forces arrestedmore than 60 suspected KLAmembers, declaring that terrorism hadbeen cut to its roots (Katulis, 2000).

Tipping the Balancefrom Politics toViolence

The first public appearance of theKLA in Drenica on 28 November1997 (at the funeral of a teacher killedby Serb forces) did not mark thebeginning of the KLA, but rathersignaled the initiation of a nationaluprising, not confined to a fewguerillas. It is often claimed that theposition of president Rugova began tobe undermined when the Kosovo issuewas left off the agenda at the DaytonPeace talks on Bosnia in November1995. Whatever the direct impact ofthe Dayton Accord might have been,Rugova clearly could no longermonopolize the political landscape inKosovo. Young, mostly unemployed,men from rural areas, students withaffinities to the ideas of the MaoistAlbanian president Enver Hoxha, orKosovo Albanian exiles in Albaniaproper, Switzerland or Germany joinedthe KLA. The emergence of the KLAmarked a generation shift and sea-change in Kosovo politics. The influxof rural Kosovars into the towns, oftenfollowing the shelling of their villagesby Serb forces, led to a radicalizationof the urban population, contributingto the decline of the LDK.

When the policy of non-violentresistance sponsored by Rugova’sDemocratic League of Kosovo failedto provide gains, disappointed youngerKosovars turned to a violent fight forsecession. The break-away of AdemDemaci, Sakharov Prize Winner andhead of the Council for the Defenseof Human Rights and Freedoms, fromthe Rugova-led LDK, and his subse-quent switch to the Parliamentary Partyof Kosova (PPK) in 1996 may havecontributed to the disenchantment ofyounger LDK members with Rugova’snon-confrontational course. Accordingto a report by the International CrisisGroup, the LDK’s influence on theKLA was further undermined by thefact that a significant number of KLAcommanders originated from Tetovo inMacedonia (ICG, 1999a).

From 1996, the KLA openly competedwith the non-violent LDK underRugova (Federation of AmericanScientists, www.fas.org/irp/world/para/kla.htm). The Serbiangovernment insisted that Rugova’sgovernment should drop its demandfor secession and denounce the KLAbefore negotiations could resume(Economist, 14 March 1998). In June1998, Jakup Krasniqui, former villageleader of Rugova’s LDK, whoeventually became a KLA spokesman,in return requested that Rugova shouldeither align himself with the KLA orstep aside (Economist, 20 June 1998).Despite the rapid growth of the KLAin 1998 and the criticism of hismoderate approach, Rugova ranunchallenged in the undergroundelection for the presidency of theRepublic of Kosovo on 22 March1998. Ten political parties hadparticipated in the election campaign.In democratic terms, the KLA couldnever credibly claim to represent themajority of Kosovo Albanians.

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The KLA’s Arsenal

A key element in the KLA’s ascendancewas the disintegration of Albania afterthe breakdown of its pyramid schemesin December 1996. Armories werelooted and about 600,000 small armsended up in the hands of civilians.Only a fraction of these guns wererecovered by the Albanian authoritiesand it is estimated that half a millionweapons remain at large (Small ArmsSurvey, 2001, pp. 176/177). A numberof these guns ended up on the regionalarms market, where the sudden surgein supply saw prices tumbling as low asDM 15 for an automatic gun, risinglater to DM 250 (Reuter, 2000a,p. 172). The KLA was therefore able toequip itself with Chinese and Russian-made small arms at a low price,considerably increasing its firepower.Estimates of the number of weaponsavailable vary widely. While Reuter(2000a, p. 172) puts the number at100,000 weapons, others argue that theKLA’s armament “remained poor andinsufficient” (Troebst, 1999, p. 167).The latter position is supported by theaccounts of former fighters and byGeneral Agim Ceku, the KLA’s chief-of-staff from May 1999 (Kusovac,1999). Besides small arms (mostly AK-47s), the KLA had a small arsenal ofrocket-propelled grenades, shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launchers,mortars and anti-aircraft guns (Troebst,1999, p. 167). Furthermore, the KLA’sequipment included weapons fromWorld War II, such as PPS-41automatic rifles and the MP-40,although the inventory of modernarms, ammunition, telecommunicationsequipment, and other supplies wasmuch larger. The KLA obtainedweapons used by the former YugoslavPeople’s Army, as well as weaponsproduced in China, Singapore, and theformer Soviet Union. Apart fromarmory from Albania and NATOcountries, weapons produced inBulgaria, Rumania, Hungary, and theCzech Republic have also been foundin the KLA’s arsenal (Thaci, Guardian,31 May 1999; Vaknin, 2000).

In summer 1998, the KLA still hadproblems in properly arming all itsvolunteers—some of the weaponrywas evidently bought from Serbs whotraded with Albanians (Zejnullahu,2001, p. 75). Most of the latterweapons came from an ill-conceivedplan of the Serb authorities to armpro-Belgrade Serb militias in Kosovowith 75,000 AK-47s (Ripley, 2000,p. 22). In early February 1999, theYugoslavian government stated thatthey had seized US $500,000 worth ofweapons, ammunition and uniformsintended for the KLA that had beensmuggled in from Croatia (Hedges,1999b, p. 39). The Croatiangovernment confirmed that several ofits generals took leave to “work” withthe KLA.

Financing theStruggle

Details of the KLA’s finances are notknown, but it certainly receiveddonations from exiles, and probablyfrom drug lords—and possibly fundsfrom trading weapons, too. As RrustemIbraj, president of the New York Citychapter of the Kosovo DemocraticLeague, reported, KLA representativesraised more than US $500,000 in a fewmonths among expatriate Albanians inthe United States (Katulis, 2000). It hasbeen firmly established that the KLAcollected significant sums amongemigrants in the US and WesternEurope, particularly Germany. A 3%‘War Tax’ was levied on Kosovarsworking abroad, channeled through theSwiss-based ‘Homeland Calls’ fund(Dohnanyi, 2001). At a later stage, theKLA also received funds fromBukoshi’s ‘Republic of Kosovo’government. The Islamic Communityof Kosovo additionally helped byproviding the KLA with materialsupport (Zejnullahu, 2001, pp. 75 ff.).

The exact nature of the KLA’s links toorganized crime abroad is not known,even though there are persistentrumors linking ethnic Albanian gangsin Western Europe to the war effort.Given the fact that Albanian mobsterscontrol the drug trade in key German

(Munich, Hanover) and CentralEuropean (Budapest) markets (Reuter,2000a, pp. 182/183), it would be naiveto assume that no ‘drug money’ wasspent on the Kosovo war. ChrisHedges writes with regard to the KLA:“Thaci controls, after a year as theleader of the rebel movement, a vastnetwork of weapons smugglers,contract killers, soldiers and formercriminals, which is closely related to theincompetent and notoriously corruptgovernment in Tirana” (Hedges,1999a). Schmidt-Eenboom (1999,p. 17), citing secret service reports,claims that the KLA received DM 500million from both the Diaspora andfrom criminal sources up to March1999. Serbian estimates are closer toDM 900 million.

Media outlets often conveyed thepicture of the KLA as a criminalorganization, reporting internal killingsof rivals, executions of ‘collaborators’,the financing of weapons acquisitionby drug smuggling and by prostitutionrings, and the expulsion of Kosovarswho did not intend to flee during thewar in March–May 1999(www.flakmag.com/politics/thaci.html;Malcolm, 2000, p. xxx; www.emperors-clothes.com/interviews/alban.htm;www.decani.yunet.com/kla3.html). Theimpression of a criminal KLAcommand was additionally fed by theRugova/Bukoshi government.Bukoshi, for example, went so far as tonote that “cadaver have never been anobstacle to Thaci’s career” (New YorkTimes, 25 June 1999). Westerngovernments, including the Germangovernment, usually declined toconfirm such allegations, as did authorssupportive of the KLA (Lange, 1999).The German government, for example,denied knowing ‘specifics’ about theKLA’s criminal connections(Bundestagsdrucksache 14/753).

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Recruitment

The KLA’s strength swelled from anestimated 500 active members at thebeginning of 1998 to a force of at leasttwenty thousand by June 1999. Thisincluded those who only temporarilysupported the KLA by providinglogistical assistance. It is estimated thatthe KLA’s full-time force consisted ofapproximately 8,000 to 12,000 fighters(Stavljanin, 1998, p. 64). ProspectiveKLA members underwent reliabilitychecks before being accepted. TheInternational Crisis Group reported11,000 recruits “from other countries”,but the figure seems to be hugelyexaggerated (ICG, 1999d). The KLAincluded several hundred foreignvolunteers and some mercenaries fromAlbania, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Afgha-nistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, andCroatia—mainly devout Moslemveterans of the wars in Afghanistan,Lebanon and Bosnia. A group ofabout 400 Albanian Americansvolunteered for the so-called ‘AtlanticBrigade’, and most of them returnedto the US after the war. Three of theAtlantic Brigade disappeared after theend of the NATO bombing; theirbodies were found two years later, inmid-July 2001, in a Serb mass grave(Smith and Finn, 2001).

In the summer of 1998, the KLAsupposedly consisted of 165 ‘brigades’,with a total strength of about 12,000fighters, most of whom had little or noprior military training or experience.However, these numbers are veryshaky as identification with the KLArose and fell in the course of the war.Many units fought without muchcontact with KLA headquarters orother units. Commanded by localwarlords, civilians joined the fight onlyat specific times. Numbers for thesecond armed group–—the FARK—are even less reliable and range from600 to 3,000. During the war, Bukoshieven claimed 4,000 FARK troopsunder arms (ICG, 1999g, p. 13), thoughmany FARK members fought under

KLA command. Numbers for theFARK are furthermore obscured bythe fact that this force shed its ownuniforms at some stage, preferring tooperate under the KLA label.However, the fact that in 2001 an‘Association of FARK Veterans’ claimsto represent 1,200 members providessome idea of troop numbers.

As far as the ‘real’ KLA is concerned, itis impossible to give a definite troopstrength at the end of the conflict inJune 1999. Most observers, includingAgim Ceku, estimated the number ofKLA fighters to have been about20,000. However, the InternationalOrganization for Migration (IOM)received 25,723 applications forreintegration assistance, when it startedto register KLA combatants later in1999. This gap has never been fullyexplained.

Training andStructure of the KLA

KLA training in Northern Albaniancamps was assisted by unofficial Britishand German military instructors. Afterthe war, some CIA officers admitted tohaving developed close ties with theKLA under the guise of the OSCEKosovo Verification Mission in fall1998 and spring 1999. The CIAofficers provided the KLA withAmerican military training manuals andfield advice on fighting the Yugoslavarmy and Serbian police. There are stillopen questions with respect to theextent of CIA/KLA cooperationbefore the air bombing (Walker andLaverty, 2000).

In preparation for the war, the KLAset up directorates, codes, procedures,radio and electronic communicationsystems, as well as a military general

staff, headed by Sulejman (‘Sultan’)Selimi from February 1999 and dividedinto seven operational zones (Vaknin2000; Interview with Azem Syla,general commander of the KLA,2000). The Political Directorate underHashim Thaci was not formed untilthe aftermath of the Rambouillet talksin February 1999, and its influence onthe military command of the KLAseems to have been quite limited(Zejnullahu, 2001, p. 99). Before theRambouillet talks, there existed nogeneral command structure in theKLA. ‘Sultan’ Sulejman became thefirst general commander at KLAheadquarters. He was replaced by AgimCeku on 1 May 2001. It was notpossible to establish whether thecreation of a general commandresulted from joint war preparationswith NATO.

The KLA was organized in small,compartmentalized cells rather than asa single large rebel movement. TheKLA’s strength was apparently dividedbetween a maneuverable strike nucleusof a few hundred trained commandos,and the much larger number of locallyorganized members (territorial militias)active throughout the region. The KLAtypically performed acts of violence insmaller groups, at times with as few asthree to five men. Permanent membersof KLA units had been professionallytrained in Albania since 1996. Oneparticular branch included formerYugoslav army soldiers. Some of itsleaders were former members of theYugoslavian Internal State SecurityService, the Yugoslavian army and thepolice. The KLA remained a looselycoordinated organization until theallied bombing began on 24 March1999, with independent regionalgroups competing for influence andoften not sharing information amongeach other. After the war, the disunityof rival KLA factions recurred (Inde-pendent International Commission onKosovo, 2000, p. 71).

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Mixed Messages fromUS Diplomacy

In February 1998, Robert Gelbard, theUS president’s special envoy to theBalkans in charge of the Daytonagreement, characterized the KLA asfollows:

“The great majority of this violence weattribute to the (Serbian) police, but weare tremendously disturbed and alsocondemn very strongly theunacceptable violence done by terroristgroups in Kosovo and particularly theUCK—the Kosovo Liberation Army.This is without any question a terroristgroup ... you strip away the rhetoricand just look at actions. And theactions of this group speak forthemselves” (www.state.gov/policy_remarks/1998/980223_gelbard_belgrade).

Regardless of these initial negativestatements, the US government foundthat the KLA was a factor to reckonwith since it controlled an estimated30 percent of the Kosovo province.The US initiated high-level contactswith the KLA in May 1998. On 24June 1998, Richard Holbrooke, thenUS special envoy for the Balkans, metwith KLA fighters in a Kosovo village.This was followed by a meetingbetween Gelbhard and KLA officials inGeneva (Katulis, 2000). The KLA was“a reality on the ground”, Gelbhardexplained before the House ofRepresentatives International RelationsCommittee on 23 July 1998.

There is no unequivocal rationale forthe shift in US policy. Was the USdiplomacy trying to convince the KLAto give up its fight for independence orwere the contacts with the KLAintended to pave the way for a jointmilitary effort against Milosevic’sSerbia? Actually, both conflictingoptions may have co-existed for sometime. The KLA had clearly reached amajor intermediate goal—recognitionas a legitimate party to the conflict by

the most important Western power.The turnabout in the US commitmentfrom supporting Rugova to fosteringthe KLA is probably best explained bya mix of general beliefs andperceptions such as: “No secondBosnia”; “Bombs paved the way to theDayton Accord”; and “Threateningwords have to be followed by deeds”.Circumstantial evidence hints at anever-growing verbal willingness on theUS side to use military interventionsince September 1998. Given NATO’sreluctance to commit its own groundtroops, the KLA provided just these.

The Ground War in1998

The dramatic growth of the KLA fromsummer 1998 onwards is usuallyattributed to Milosevic’s escalation ofattacks on Kosovar villages accused ofhosting KLA guerillas, leading,according to UN relief agencies, tosome 50,000 to 60,000 displacedKosovars in early June 1998. TheKosovo war on the ground, lastingfrom late February to mid-October1998, involved some 13,000 Serb policeforces, 6,500 Yugoslavian Army troops,and 400 Serb para-militaries (Tigrovi—Tigers) (Troebst, 1999a). By June 1998,the KLA had launched a majoroffensive, controlling one-third ofKosovo by early July 1998. The KLA’sown calculus seems to have been thatconflict escalation would raise thelikelihood of turning NATO’swarnings of military intervention intoreal action (Zejnullahu, 2001, p. 59).Yet, from August 1998 onwards, theKLA faced serious losses once theSerb forces succeeded in taking backmost of the territory the KLA hadseized in the previous months(Troebst, 1999b).

In September and October 1998,NATO increased its pressure on Serbiato compromise on Kosovo, threateningit with air strikes. On 13 October 1998,after negotiations with RichardHolbrooke, Milosevic agreed to reduceSerb troops in Kosovo and to observe

a ceasefire (Loquai, 2000, pp. 95–105).The OSCE Kosovo VerificationMission in charge of monitoring theimplementation of the Octoberagreement had no mandate forcontrolling KLA activities (Eiff, 1999,p. 327). The Holbrooke-Milosevicagreement had not included anyprovisions for disarming the KLA. Inthe meantime, the KLA used theceasefire to regroup and build-up itsstrength (Zejnullahu, 2001, p. 79). TheKLA had been asked by US Secretaryof State, Madelaine Albright, not totake advantage of the Serb pullback,but uninhibited by the OSCE mission,the KLA continued with its attacks onSerb forces (Perlez, 1998; Smith, 1998).

The local populace was asked tosupport the KLA’s war in no uncertainterms. Commander Remi recalls ameeting in the Podujea municipality inDecember 1998 where the local peoplewere told by KLA commanders: “Awar is ongoing, we are in war. You willnot be able to stop this war, but youwill also not be allowed to do it. Wewill eliminate all the hindrances on ourway” (Zejnullahu, 2001, p. 80).Commander Remi leaves no doubt thatit was a deliberate strategy of the KLAto launch, conduct, and win a war. Incontrast to the international media,which concentrated on the civilianvictims of the Serb-Kosovar escalation,the KLA’s main idea was not to protectKosovo’s populace against Serb attacks,but to fight a war for independence.The fragile ceasefire brokered byRichard Holbrooke in October 1998therefore lasted only a few weeks.

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The KLA and NATO

Stepping up its military operations, theKLA was actually able to ensure aleading position at the Rambouillettalks from 6–23 February 1999 andfrom 15–18 March 1999. At the behestof the United States, the KLA underHashim Thaci headed the Kosovarteam at the Rambouillet negotiations inFebruary 1999, sidelining the Rugovagovernment. The Kosovar delegationsigned the Rambouillet documentforeseeing the KLA’s disarmament,though obviously in anticipation thatMilosevic would not sign at all. Duringthe Rambouillet talks, Secretary ofState Madeleine Albright asked theAlbanian Foreign Minister, Pascal Milo,to exert his influence on the Kosovardelegation to accept the agreement.According to Milo, the US guaranteedNATO presence in Kosovo, direct aid,and also that the KLA would beassisted in its professionalization and inbecoming part of Kosovo’s newmilitary forces (Cohen, 2001, p. 266).In order to obtain the Kosovars’signature, Rambouillet’s official questfor the KLA’s disarmament hadobviously become negotiable.

Contrary to Rambouillet’s request forthe KLA’s disarmament, some USCongressmen (Senators JosephLieberman, Democrat, Connecticut;Mitch McConnell, Republican,Kentucky) advocated legislationallowing the KLA to be armed in thecourse of the NATO bombing. TheWhite House officially resisted the ideabecause it might have furtheredKosovo’s quest for independence(Daalder and O‘Hanlon, 2000, p. 135).Some KLA representatives suggestedthat the US had already secretly armedthe KLA before the start of the war,though there is only limitedinformation available about directmilitary support from NATO countriesbefore the war (Katulis, 2000). TheAlbanian government evidently playedan essential role in channeling NATO’smilitary support to the KLA. Thaci wasprobably right in saying in May 1999that “NATO has not supported uswith arms, but has not impeded theprocess of arming us” (Lani, 1999,p. 32). A private US firm, the Virginia-based Military Professional ResourcesIncorporated (MPRI)—a companyconsisting of former US marines,helicopter pilots, and special forces

teams—provided training for the KLAfrom 1998 onwards, as did someGerman private security firms. MPRIsub-contracted some of the KLAtraining program to two Britishsecurity companies, ensuring, asChristian Jennings writes, “thatbetween 1998 and June 1999, the KLAwas being armed, trained and assistedin Italy, Turkey, Kosovo and Germanyby the Americans, the German externalintelligence service and former andserving members of Britain’s 22 SASRegiment” (Jennings, 2001). Incontrast, US Defense Secretary WilliamCohen had emphasized before the warthat the US had no intention ofbecoming the KLA’s airforce—astatement probably intended to clarifylines of subordination.

During the war, NATO was constantlyin communication with KLA guerillasregarding Serb targets. NATO assistedin one of the KLA’s major offensivesof the war in May 1999 (Cohen, 2001,p. 290). The White House’s ‘official’rejection of KLA support was mainlyintended to keep up the semblance ofa neutral stance in the conflict.NATO’s collaboration with the KLAnonetheless grew in preparation for thewar. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E.O‘Hanlon write in their account of USKosovo policy that, in order to defeatSerbia, or at least Milosevic:

“…a reasonable degree of KLA/NATO coordination was only sensi-ble... Using intermediaries such as theAlbanian military, and possibly workingthrough the CIA rather than directmilitary channels, the alliance knewwhat the KLA’s general patterns ofoperations were by war’s end” (Daalderand O‘Hanlon, 2000, p. 152).

Jane’s Defense Weekly reported thatspecial units from Britain, the UnitedStates, France “and other NATOgroups” were working undercover inKosovo (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 20 April1999). Additionally, a unit of BritishSpecial Forces was reportedly runningtwo KLA training camps near Tirana,the Albanian capital (Sunday Telegraph,18 April 1999). The KLA units trained

KFOR Commander General Michael Jackson (left), Ramush Hajredinaj (center),local KLA commander in the Dukagjini region, and General Chief of theKosovo Liberation Army, Agim Ceku (right), inspect mortars during a visit to aKLA arms depot in Irzniq, 20 July 1999. Foto: dpa

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by the SAS were infiltrating Kosovo,using satellite and cellular telephones,and communication devices suppliedby NATO to help guide NATObombing missions. Given the KLA/NATO cooperation, calls to disarm theKLA before the war should not betaken all too seriously.

From Military toPolitical Power—theKosovo ProvisionalGovernment

During the war, the KLA’s news agencyKosovapress announced, on 2 April1999, that a provisional governmenthad been formed, with the Chief ofthe ‘Political Directory’ of the KLA,Hashim Thaci, as its ‘Prime Minister’(Lipsius, 1999). Immediately after thewar, Hashim Thaci became the head ofthe self-proclaimed KosovoProvisional Government. The riftbetween the Rugova-led LDK and theKLA reappeared immediately after thewar, particularly in connection withpositions in the Interim Government.While the KLA leadership had invitedthe LDK to join the ProvisionalGovernment, the four cabinet posts(plus the post of deputy primeminister) set aside for LDKrepresentatives remained vacantbecause the LDK under Bukoshi didnot recognize the KLA’s politicaldominance (Lipsius, 1999).

By recognizing the Thaci governmentas the legitimate one in place, NATOrewarded the KLA for its role duringthe war. The Albanian governmentfollowed the same line by ordering thedissolution of the eight FARK campsin Albania, the subordination of FARKofficers to the KLA ‘defense minister’,Azem Syla, the disarmament of theFARK, and its subsequent relocation toKosovo (Lipsius, 1999; Lani, 1999,pp. 34/35). With Albanian and NATO

assistance, Thaci could make sure thatneither the FARK, which wasoutnumbered by the KLA anyway, northe LDK could represent an immediatechallenge to his government.

As Serb forces withdrew from Kosovo,followed by most of the Serb admini-strative elite, UNMIK was, accordingto UN Security Council Resolution1244, supposed to organize Kosovo’scivil administration. However, the KLAtook over local administrations in 27of Kosovo’s 29 municipalities (thosewhere Albanians formed the majorityof the population) even beforeUNMIK could establish its presence.Disappointed over the peaceagreement’s provision of autonomyinside Yugoslavia, the KLA aimed atsecuring its exclusive hold on powerinstead of the LDK-dominated‘Government of the Republic ofKosovo’. As Kosovo’s self-proclaimedprovisional government, the KLA tookover the administration in many townsand municipalities, in parallel to oreven replacing the shadow governmentunder Rugova which officially stillexisted.

The Thaci government, which formallyincluded fifteen political parties, wasdominated by the KLA and thePopular Movement for Kosovo (LPK).The Thaci government evidentlyhoped to benefit exclusively from themoney collected by the Homeland Callfund—a sum estimated by some ataround DM 300–400 million, by othersat around DM 60–100 million (ICG,1999e). The KLA was supposed tocooperate closely with KFOR andUNMIK, the UN Mission in Kosovoheaded by Bernard Kouchner, butrelations remained strained. TheProvisional Government issued decreesover-stretching the UN mandate andinterfering in UNMIK competencies(ICG, 1999f). The KLA-appointedlocal administrators could barelycontrol public security. Moreover, itseems that some KLA commandersused the power vacuum to benefitmaterially, establishing effective

economic control over public andprivate businesses, most notably petrolstations (Kosova Petrol), restaurantsand retail outlets (Reuter, 2000a,p. 185). The initial confusion about theownership of property and businesses,aided by the absence of administrativerecords and UN guidelines oneconomic policy, allowed formerfighters to turn their military victoryinto economic gain (ICG, 2001).

From the moment of Serb withdrawaluntil the early months of 2000, threeadministrations co-existed in theAlbanian parts of Kosovo—the Thaciinterim government, the remnants ofthe LDK shadow structures, and thenascent UN administration. Unlike theKFOR troops, UNMIK was lessprepared to implement a civilianadministration, having neither thefunds nor the personnel to deployquickly. UNMIK was very slow indeploying the multi-national policeforce, forcing KFOR to assume limitedpolicing and judicial functions duringthe first months of the protectorate.To this day, law enforcement remains aweak point in the UN’s handling ofKosovo. This vacuum in the sphere oflaw and order was used by extremistswithin the KLA to crack down onperceived political enemies,collaborators and members of the Serband Roma minorities (Reuter, 2000a,p. 185; Jane’s Intelligence Review, June2000, p. 4). It is disputed whether therewas a coordinated strategy of ‘purging’Kosovo by the KLA leadership. Thaciand other KLA leaders have repeatedlypointed out that “anyone can get aKLA uniform” (ICG, 2000, p. 15).Nevertheless, incidents such as theburning of 300 houses in Prizren(ICG, 2000, p. 16), or the organizedinter-ethnic violence in Mitrovica(Reuter, 2000a, pp. 185/186) could nothave happened without the knowledgeof the local KLA leadership.

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The reign of terror against politicaladversaries certainly played a role inalienating moderate Kosovars from theKLA leadership. The KLA used itsown military police—the black-shirtedPolicia Ushtarake (PU)—as well as itswar-time intelligence service Zbulim-Kunderzbulim (ZKZ)—to enforce itsgrip on Kosovo’s institutions, at leastduring the first six to nine months ofthe protectorate (ICG, 2000, pp. 11–14). LDK politicians and independentjournalists were threatened andoccasionally killed by unidentifiedpeople, assumed to stem from theKLA. In one prominent incident,Baton Haxhiu, a journalist with theKoha Ditore newspaper, was attacked bythe Thaci-controlled Kosovapress agencyin a thinly-veiled death threat for

criticizing the interim government(Reuter, 2000a, p. 185; ICG, 2000, p. 5).In other instances, critical journalistswere called in for ‘information talks’ byrepresentatives of the ProvisionalGovernment.

In December 1999, Ibrahim Rugova(LDK), Rexhep Qosja (LBD), andHashim Thaci (UCK, PDK) ultimatelysigned an agreement with UNMIK onthe abolition of all parallel structuresof the Provisional Government andthe creation of a Kosovo TransitionalCouncil (KTC), as well as an InterimAdministrative Council (IAC) underthe auspices of UNMIK’s 20 maindepartments (Wittkowsky, 2000).Administrations headed by UNMIKMunicipal Administrators were togovern locally, although Thaci’sProvisional Government and the KLA,acting as Kosovo Protection Corps(KPC—more details below) could stillproceed to exercise local authority forseveral months.

With its military intervention, NATOhad turned into a de facto ally in theKLA’s quest for independence. Oncethe intervention had started, the returnto former autonomy was never anoption. A protectorate remained theonly viable alternative to independence.The war alliance made NATO partisanin the conflict, at the expense of itsoriginally stated intention of restoringautonomy as part of Serbia. The de factorecognition of the self-proclaimedProvisional Government in June 1999meant a power boost for the PoliticalDirectorate of the KLA. Theunderlying assumption that the KLAhad inherited the legitimacy ofRugova’s government was based on thewar effort rather than ondemocratically legitimized support.Most of the KLA combatants saw theKLA as a people’s army, not therepresentation of particular politicalgroupings.

It could be argued that KFOR andUNMIK bought the KLA leaders’agreement to disarm, compensatingthem with politico-economic influence.This calculus obviously backfired lateron. In an account of two years KFORand UNMIK administration, YlberHysa extracts a general conclusion:

“A policy of favoring one politicalelement rather than another for short-term interests has complicated thetransition process. ... the internationalcommunity in Kosovo has consideredit expedient to back individuals ratherthan institutions” (Hysa, 2001, p. 55).

KFOR and UNMIK’s autonomy indecision-making largely suffered fromthe early compromising over Thaci’sProvisional Government. Given theminor military role of the KLA in thevictory over Milosevic, KFOR couldhave embraced a less partisanapproach. Only after six months of itsmandate, did UNMIK adopt a power-sharing formula with a representativeset of local political forces. TheInterim Administrative Council (IAC)and the Kosova Transitional Council(KTC) were created as consultativebodies. The coexistence of the ThaciGovernment, which oversaw the make-up of the Kosovo Protection Corpsand controlled local administrations,and UNMIK’s slowly emergingadministration are largely responsiblefor the initial lack of administrativeaccountability, control, and security.

KLA fighters awaiting the withdrawalof the Yugoslavian/Serbian troops in asuburb of the provincial capitalPristina. Large numbers of KLAfighters entered the province behindthe KFOR troops. Contrary to UNresolutions, they also tried to gainpolitical control. Foto: dpa

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disarmament of the KLA

The demobilization anddisarmament of the KLA were

widely seen as fundamental elementsfor any future peace, autonomy orprotectorate agreement. After NATO-led KFOR troops entered Kosovo on12 June 1999, a key question forreinstalling public order concerned theKLA’s willingness to disband. As theKLA was not a disciplined army withclear cut command structures and aguiding political leadership, it could notbe taken for granted that it wouldactually disarm. While the majority offormer KLA combatants, especiallythose who had only been looselyattached to the KLA, were happy toreturn to civilian life, a number ofhard-liners stuck to the political aimsof the original KLA—politicalindependence for Kosovo—and triedto turn their military victory intopolitical clout.

NATO urged the KLA to disarmfollowing armed attacks by KLAfighters on retreating Serbs, theimprisonment, expulsion and beatingof Roma by KLA rebels, as well asattacks on suspected collaborators(ICG, 1999c). UN Security CouncilResolution 1244 obliged the internatio-nal presence in Kosovo to disarm theKLA. Even before a formal agreementwas reached, US Marines disarmedsome 200 KLA fighters under threatof force in the village of Vladovo. On21 June, Lieutenant General SirMichael Jackson, the commander ofKFOR, and Hashim Thaci signed the“Undertaking of Demilitarisation andTransformation” (see Appendix),committing the KLA to hand over all

weapons other than pistols and huntingrifles to the KFOR forces within 90days. The KLA agreed not to carryweapons of any type within a mile ofYugoslav security forces, on mainroads, or in areas outside the bordersof the Kosovo province. Furthermore,it was agreed to close all fightingpositions and checkpoints as well as tomark minefields and booby traps. Thecore of the KLA was to betransformed into the KosovoProtection Corps (KPC), a uniformedbut unarmed disaster relieforganization.

On 30 August 1999, the KLA’s militarycommander Agim Ceku assured USspecial envoy Richard Holbrooke thatthe former guerrillas would honor ademilitarization agreement with NATOand hand over their arms by 19 Sep-tember 1999. In contrast, Ceku alsosaid the KLA would become a“Kosovo army”—an entity notprovided for in the Junedemilitarization agreement. The KLAwould transform in several directions,not just into a military guard, Cekudeclared. “One part will become partof the police, one part will becomecivil administration, one part willbecome the Army of Kosovo, as adefense force. And another part willform a political party” (Eddy, 1999).

Disarmament

By September 1999, the KLA hadhanded over to KFOR some 9,000small arms, 800 machine guns, 300anti-tank mines, 178 mortars, 27,000hand grenades, 1,200 mines, 1,000 kgof explosives and over five millionrounds of ammunition (Ripley, 2000,p. 23). This number, which seemsimpressive at a first glance, issurprisingly low when compared withthe strength of the KLA, estimated tobe roughly 20,000 fighters at the endof the war. KLA commander Cekuexplains that:

“At the end of the bombing campaign,we had 20,000 soldiers, but many ofthose, maybe even 50%, were draftedand had no arms. They had to shareone weapon. We were never short offighters, but had the problem ofweapons—both in quantity and inquality” (Kusovac, 1999).

This statement is in marked contrast toreports that the KLA had been on anarms shopping spree since mid-1998,using the funds collected in theDiaspora to buy weapons in EasternEurope and as far afield as Iran (Ripley,2000, p. 22). These weapons weresmuggled via Croatia to Albania, andthen carried on mule trails intoKosovo. Weapon caches had beenestablished both in Kosovo, as well asin neighboring Albania and Macedonia.Ripley argues that the end of theconflict in June 1999 caught the KLAby surprise. The rapid occupation ofKosovo by KFOR troops meant thatmuch of the newly acquired arsenalcould not be transported into theprovince. As a result, most of theweapons collected by KFOR duringthe initial disarmament came fromKLA units “that had been isolatedbehind Serb lines inside Kosovo duringthe war, rather than the new weaponsbought during the war and stockpiledin Albania” (Ripley, 2000, p. 23).

The 10,000 weapons surrendered bythe KLA in the summer of 1999allowed both KFOR and the KLAleadership to save face, but it wasprobably more a gesture of goodwill,rather than the effective disarmamentof the KLA. KFOR officersadmitted—in an interview with one ofauthors—that the completedisarmament of KLA combatants wasnot seen as a priority during the firstyear of the protectorate, as “the KLAwas not considered to be a problem” atthat time.

The Disarmamentof the KLA

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brief 20

Weapon caches continue to be foundby KFOR patrols, the largest consistingof 60 tons of arms and ammunitionfound in the Drenica Valley in June2000. KFOR estimated that this cachealone was sufficient “to fully outfit twoheavy-infantry companies, eliminatethe entire population of Pristina anddestroy 900–1,000 tanks” (Ripley, 2000,p. 22). However, this is probably just afraction of the armory available to theKLA leadership in times of need. Inthe six months leading to September2000, KFOR troops seized an additio-nal 4,000 assault rifles at vehiclecheckpoints and during house searches(Ripley, 2000, p. 22). A number ofthese ‘hidden’ weapons, originally fromKLA sources, have found their way tothe insurgents in Southern Serbia andMacedonia, or are being used byAlbanian militants for political andother crimes.

In addition to the weapon stocks stillhidden in various locations in theregion, as well as the alleged illegalweapon holdings under KPC control,individual combatants are also likely tohave retained some personal weaponry.As there was no organizeddisarmament of KLA units by KFOR,the business of ensuring disarmamentwas left to individual KLAcommanders. Given the tradition ofprivate gun ownership in Kosovo, itseems likely that some fighters simplyleft their unit, taking their personalarms with them. While most of theseweapons are probably still in privatepossession, it can be assumed thatsome have ended up in the hands ofcriminals or radical political elementsabroad.

The 10,000 weapons handed over in1999 were ‘decommissioned’ ratherthan destroyed. KFOR is keeping theweapons in storage, pending a finaldecision on their fate. 2,000 of theweapons are being “held in trust” byKFOR for the KPC, while the KPC isonly allowed to keep 200 weapons forguarding installations and providingsecurity for its units. The additional1,800 weapons held on behalf of theKPC are stored in secure weaponsfacilities, jointly controlled by KFORand authorized KPC members (TheKosovo Protection Corps Commander,Kosovo Force’s Statement ofPrinciples, 1999, http://www.kforonline.com/resources/kpc/stmt_principles.htm). Even if the‘decommissioned’ weapons seem to bestored securely, only a weaponsdestruction program can prevent futureuse of weapons caches, be they‘decommissioned’ or newly foundones.

The lack of an all-encompassingweapons destruction program allowed,for example, some German soldiersstationed in Kosovo to steal andillegally transport to Germany an armsarsenal seized at the Yugoslav army’sabandoned barracks in Prizren.Truckloads of guns, mortar shells,hand grenades, mines and otherexplosives were allegedly smuggled intoGermany, some of which could havefound their way to terrorists andcriminal gangs (Karacs, 2001).

Deficiencies ofDisarmament

Regardless of the KLA’s officialcommitment to hand over heavyweapons, throughout the first year ofits Kosovo presence, KFOR foundweapons caches which the KLAformally denied ever owning. Despiteclaims to the contrary, the KLA stillmaintains clandestine arms depots andits command structure might still befunctional (Vaknin, 2000). KFOR

troops found numerous weaponscaches after September 1999. FormerKLA commanders denied that thesehad been withheld (Interview withRrustem Mustafa, Pristina, 6 May2001).

KFOR officials did not know what thepenalty for hoarding arsenals might be,but Serbs violating weapons laws on amuch lesser scale have spent one yearin jail. Later in the year, in earlyNovember 2000, a group of Ukrainianand Polish KFOR troops discoveredone of the biggest illegal weaponscaches with 43 mortar rounds, 38 D40rockets, 2 rocket-propelled grenadelaunchers, 38 grenades, 25 mines, nineboxes of machine gun ammunition,170 blocks of dynamite and a few guns(European Stars and Stripes, 9 November2000).

The bulk of the KLA’s arsenal isbelieved to be still stored in Albania. InDecember 2000, American and BritishKFOR soldiers patrolling the border toSerbia arrested 13 people and seized acache of weapons, including machineguns, rocket-propelled grenades, handgrenades as well as military uniformsand maps (NATO Peacekeepers Detain13 Kosovars Transporting Arms,Associated Press, 21 December 2000).The group was about to enter theGround Security Zone (GSZ) inSerbia, originally established as a five-kilometer buffer zone along theYugoslavian border in order to preventSerb forces threatening KFOR.

Despite the efforts of the internationalcommunity to disarm the citizens ofKosovo, a number of factors conspireagainst their success. Most notably,there is a feeling of insecurity amongboth Kosovo Albanians and Serbs alikewith regard to the future of theterritory. As long as the final statusissue has not been resolved, there islittle incentive to hand-in substantial

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disarmament of the KLA

numbers of weapons. It seems plausi-ble, that parts of the KLA’s armory arebeing kept in preparation for a worstcase scenario, which would include anyform of reunification with the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia. Secondly, theKLA weapons were ‘privatized’immediately after the conflict. Whilethe majority of these weapons areprobably still privately held, othershave certainly found their way tocriminal groups. Thirdly, a strong ‘gunculture’ exists in Kosovo, which—together with the distrust of foreign

authorities—makes comprehensivedisarmament difficult. Fourthly, untilearly 2001, the old Yugoslav gun lawwas in force in Kosovo, offering verylimited legal means to combat theproliferation of guns in the territory.This has changed with the adoption ofa UNMIK regulation (UNMIKRegulation 17/2001), which punishesillegal gun ownership with jail terms ofup to three years and a fine of up toDM 10,000. Under the new legislation,weapon permits will only be issued tomembers of the KPC, the judiciary, aswell as to selected journalists andpoliticians considered under threat.While the legal situation has beenrectified, it remains to be seen whether

the embattled Kosovo law enforcementauthorities are able to implement it onthe street.

The difficult geography of Kosovo,bordering both the trouble spots ofSouthern Serbia and Macedonia, aswell as the smuggling centers ofAlbania and Montenegro, posesadditional problems for theenforcement of a strict gun controlpolicy. In the past, cooperationbetween KFOR and UNMIK on thisissue has been less than satisfactory.

A KLA soldier hands his AK-47 weapon over to a unidentified Italian KFOR soldier at the Italian base in Djakovica, 21June 1999. Foto: dpa

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Instead of complete demobilization,the KLA was amenable to a

transformation into the KosovoProtection Corps, modeled on theFrench sécurité civile. In the eyes of theWestern powers, the KPC represents ahumanitarian organization, whereas forthe Kosovars it is the “nucleus of afuture Kosovo army”. The formationof the KPC signifies a compromiseagreed between KFOR and the KLAleadership—a reward in exchange fordisbanding the KLA as a fighting force.

Immediately after the war, acommission for transforming the KLAwas set up, including representatives ofKFOR, UNMIK, the KLA, and theFARK. The commission metapproximately 40 times in order todetermine the details of transformingthe KLA. Three variants werediscussed: the transformation of theKLA a) into a National Guard with14,000 men; b) into a territorial defensewith an active reserve, modeled on theold Yugoslavian pattern; and c) acombination of a) and b). KFOR andUNMIK rejected the Kosovar ideassince it was feared they could be aprecedent for independence. As aresult, the KPC model was actuallydictated by the protectorate powers.The ambiguity with regard to thefuture role of the KPC was acceptedby both sides. It is no coincidence thatthe Albanian name of theorganization—Trupat Mbrojtese te Kosoves(TMK)—can also be translated asKosovo Defense Corps. The questionof why KFOR accepted the creation

of a thinly veiled KLA successororganization remains open. Somepossible answers include the emotionalattachment NATO officers felt for theprofessionalism of their KLAcounterparts (German GeneralReinhardt has, on occasion, noted thatKLA commander Hashim Thaci was“like a son” to him). The hope that theKPC might play a useful ‘proxy’ role incombating violent acts by Yugoslav orKosovo Serb forces may have played arole too. According to a statementrepeatedly heard by the authors inKosovo in early 2001, KFOR wassimply interested in retaining somedegree of control over the more radicalfirebrands within the KLAstructures—“better in the KPC andunder control, than in the hills and onthe loose”.

KLA leaders, particularly Agim Ceku,KPC commander and former chief-of-staff of the KLA, continue to stressthe paramilitary role of the KPC. In aninterview in October 1999, Ceku isquoted as saying:

“The main concern of the internatio-nal community was how to demilitarizethe KLA, while our main goal was totransform it. We played our part anddemilitarized, but we asked the interna-tional community to accept ourargument that Kosovo needs a defensi-ve structure, which in the end they did.The transformation is proof that theinternational community realized theKLA was not a problem, but anorganization they could co-operatewith” (Kusovac, 1999).

The view that the KPC is really aKosovo ‘army in-waiting’ is shared bymost international observers inKosovo and by the vast majority ofKosovo Albanians. Despite theWestern rhetoric about a purely civilianmandate, KPC commander Ceku hasalways been frank about his ultimateaims: “We see the KPC as a bridgetowards the future, from the KLA as awartime organization towards a regular,modern army of Kosovo” (Kusovac,1999). Ceku echoed this view in aninterview with one of the authors inDecember 2000. The continuity ofKLA traditions can be seen in bothuniforms and badges—which closelyresemble KLA ones—as well as, moreimportantly, in the organizationalstructures. In addition to Ceku, thecore of the KPC is made up of 56officers taken straight into the KPC—without any screening or applicationprocedure. At the operational level, thecontinuity of old KLA commandstructures in the KPC is striking, withformer zone commanders now servingas Regional Task Group (RTG)commanders (ICG, 2000, p. 7):

RTG 1: Drenica (Srbica)—SamiLushtaku;

RTG 2: Pashtrik (Prizren)—SaliVeseli:

RTG 3: Dukagjin (Pec)—GezimOstremi;

RTG 4: Shala (KosovskaMitrovica)—Rrahman Rama;

RTG 5: Llap (Pristina)—RrustemMustafa (Remi);

RTG 6: Karadak (Gnijlane)—Shaban Shala.

The one notable exception is RamushHaradinaj, the former commander ofthe KLA’s 3rd operational zone(Dukagjin), who left the KPC andformed his own political party, theAlliance for the Future of Kosovo(AAK), in April 2000.

Demobilization byTransformation—

The KosovoProtection Corps

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Kosovo Protection Corps

The task of screening applications forrank and file membership of the KPCwas awarded to the InternationalOrganization for Migration (IOM),which was also responsible for thereintegration of former fighters intocivilian life. The number of postswithin the KPC is limited to about5,000—of which some 2,000 are to bereservists. The general requirementsfor service with the KPC included agebetween 18 and 55, physical fitness,and a minimum of three yearssecondary education (Reuter, 2000a,p. 184). Access to the KPC wasbasically open to all citizens ofKosovo, not only former KLA fighters.Ten percent of all posts were set asidefor minority candidates.

Altogether some 18,000 people appliedfor KPC service, 17,348 of whom wereformer KLA combatants and 2,923civilians. 11,908 applicants wereactually tested for KPC purposes bythe IOM, which also managed theapplication process. The testing wasdone in cooperation with KFOR(IOM, 2001, p. 1). The final selectionof a candidate into the ranks of theKPC followed a “bargaining process”between KFOR and the KPCleadership (Interview with Carl Jenkins,IOM, 14 April 2001).

The demobilization and integration ofFARK members into the KPC becameat times a tense issue becauserecruitment for the KPC gavepreference to KLA members at theexpense of those coming from theFARK. Some 200 FARK memberswere recruited for the KPC, but higherranking FARK officers weresuccessfully kept at bay by the KPCleadership (Interview Caim Berisha inPristina, 7 May 2001).

The training of the KPC is organizedby the IOM in conjunction withKFOR. Some training courses wereoffered at the ‘School for CivilProtection’ established at PristinaUniversity. Training courses are limitedto the ‘official’ mandate of the KPC—disaster relief, fire-fighting, first aid,

etc. During the establishment of theKPC, Ceku repeatedly said that his aimwas to train more than 5,000 cadetsallocated to the KPC by UNMIK andKFOR. However, his plan to use theKPC as a military school for largernumbers of reservists has not yetmaterialized. Only a small number ofcadets resign after successful training inorder to make room for new cadets.

Funding for the KPC comes from theconsolidated Kosovo budget, whichallocates some DM 20 million to theforce, as well as from bilateraldonations from Western governments.The bulk of the KPC’s finances arespent on the maintenance ofinfrastructure and on constructionwork. The KPC is constantlycomplaining about lack of financialresources, pointing out that its limitedfunding would not allow efficientdeployment in the case of anemergency. Vehicles, for example, arevery scarce (Interview with Agim Ceku,KPC, 23 December 2000). Additionalfunds come from private sources, suchas the Kosovo-based “Friends of theKPC” and from the Diaspora. As faras the former are concerned, voluntarycontributions are said to be the sourceof the money. However, some interna-tional experts working in Kosovo andinterviewed for this report claim thatcoercion might be a tool in fundraising.As far as donations from the KosovoDiaspora are concerned, KPCcommander Rrustem Mustafa claimedthey were in fact miserable (Interviewwith Rrustem Mustafa, 6 May 2001).The total amount of private, i.e. extra-budgetary, KPC funding is unknown.

As a result of both its unclear mandateand lack of funding, KPC personnelseem to remain in their barracks mostof the time, with the exception ofpublic relations events such as so-called‘waste clearing’ and ‘environmentalawareness’ days. Low salaries areanother problem for the KPCleadership. KPC salaries range fromDM 170 to DM 670, barely enough to

sustain a family in an urban area. Thisis cause for concern, as both criminalactivity and—since the outbreak of theMacedonia conflict—fighting for theAlbanian cause abroad provide bettereconomic opportunities. Fighters in theMacedonian NLA are reportedly beingpaid DM 1,000 per month. The KPC’sadherence to democratic principles andits confinement to civil duties thereforedepends to a significant extent on theproper funding of salaries; otherwisethe incentive to misuse power forillegal purposes, or to join paramilitarygroups such as the Macedonian NLAremains high (Dorschner, 2000). InApril 2001, KFOR reacted to themovement of KPC members to theUCPMB and the NLA by introducing a‘roll-call’ system and ID checks tocontrol the presence of KPC membersin the barracks.

Whereas relations between the KPCand KFOR/UNMIK remained cordialduring the first year of theprotectorate, they have deterioratedconsiderably since the summer of2000. In theory, the KPC answers tothe KFOR commander, who isrepresented by liaison officers in eachRTG and at KPC headquarters.However, the International CrisisGroup reports that the chain ofcommand has been blurred in the past,quoting an unnamed liaison officer atKPC headquarters with the words: “Iam employed by [KFOR CommanderGeneral] Reinhardt, but Ceku is myboss” (ICG, 2000, p. 7).

Rumors persist that KPC officers haveused their position to gain political ormaterial benefits, with allegationsranging from smuggling and extortion,to violent acts against Kosovo Serbsand the support of radical Albanianmovements in neighboring countries. Amember of the KPC was arrested, forexample, in connection with the Nísexpress bombing, which killed elevenand wounded 35 Kosovo Serbs in mid-February 2001, but managed to escapeunder unclear circumstances(www.un.org/peace/kosovo/briefing/pressbrief14may01.html).

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Some well-known KPC commanderswere accused of participating in killingrival leaders. In early May 2001, threehigh-ranking KPC members werearrested by UNMIK for theirinvolvement in killing the former KLAcommander Ekrem Rexha(‘Commandant Drini’), who was seenas “too independent from the KLA’sgeneral staff ” (Jane’s Intelligence Review,June 2000) and a potential threat tosome in Kosovo politics. On 6 July2001, UNMIK suspended another fiveKPC commanders from service on thegrounds of threatening internationalstability and under suspicion of havingcommitted war crimes. The five KPCleaders belonged to a group of 20Kosovar leaders, denied immigration tothe US on the grounds of extremistactivities (Berliner Zeitung, 7/8 July2001). For almost two years KFORand UNMIK had turned a blind eye tothe suspicious past and current crimerecord of some leading KPC leaders.

Even Agim Ceku, the commander ofthe KPC, and acclaimed for hisprofessionalism by Westerncounterparts, has come under closerscrutiny. Ceku, who had joined theCroat Army during the Balkan wars ofthe 1990s, was long on the records forhis participation in ethnic cleansing inthe Krajina region of Croatia. TheInternational War Tribunal in TheHague collected evidence on atrocitiesagainst Serbs in the Krajina. Ceku wasreportedly one of the key planners ofthe Croatian Army’s ‘Operation Storm’against Serbs in 1995 (Jane’s DefenceWeekly, 10 June 1999). According to theCroatian Helsinki Committee, at least410 Serbs were killed during the‘Operation Storm’ massacres. Aninternal report of the Hague Tribunalin March 1999 did not explicitlymention Agim Ceku’s involvement anda formal prosecution has never beenlaunched (New York Times, 21 March1999). Asked about possibleinvolvement of their KPCcounterparts in ethnic cleansing, ahigh-ranking officer at KFORheadquarters dealing with the KPC

replied: “We do not look into the pastof the KPC commanders” (Interviewat NATO-HQ in Pristina, May 2001).Former KLA and KPC involvement inorganized violence and crime has longbeen treated as somehow regrettableand attributed to isolated rogueelements. It needed the escalating crisisin Macedonia for UNMIK to take lawenforcement vis-à-vis the KPCseriously.

Demilitarizing the KLA touches upona larger issue which is typical for post-conflict politics—immunity for pastcriminal offenses. Post-war amnestyinvolves complex legal issues wecannot conclusively resolve in thisreport (Burke-White, 2000). Given theurgency of the amnesty issue inKosovo and with respect to the NLAin Macedonia, we will nonethelessattempt to formulate some generalguiding principles. In post-warsituations, two policy goals are typicallyin conflict: reintegration and justice.Reintegration prioritizes the dangers ofresumed violence whereas the justiceargument holds that a democratic andlegally bound state cannot be erectedon the basis of forgiving violations ofvictims’ rights.

The argument for a blanket amnestyhas usually been made by outgoingdictatorships with respect to crimescommitted by servants of theseregimes. It has been additionally arguedfrom a ‘democratic consolidation’perspective that post-conflictreconciliation and assimilation ofmilitary and police servants as well asparamilitaries may warrant theimmunity of agents of the state forcrimes they have committed duringauthoritarian rule (Huntington, 1991/92). Granting post-authoritarianimmunity nonetheless varies accordingto the scope of the anti-humanitarianacts involved and the degree ofdomestic and international legitimacy.Blanket amnesties represent the mostinclusive and usually the least legitimateform of immunity—to put it concisely,perpetrators can get away with murder.In recent years, international law hasincreasingly restricted general immunityby exempting serious and systematiccrimes against human life, such as

genocide, torture, terrorism, systematicrape and other crimes againsthumanity, from impunity.

Post-war amnesty for insurgents suchas the KLA represents a different, butnonetheless quite common case—consider, for example, the IRA inNorthern Ireland or the PLO inPalestine. First, their actions were notcommitted under a state authority, butself-authorized. Who, apart fromindividuals, can be held responsible?Second, there is usually nodemocratically elected parliamentwhich could legitimately grantimmunity. Who is then entitled to grantimmunity? Third, in the absence ofdomestic legislation on an amnesty,which law should apply? Fourth,international treaties oblige states toprosecute serious and systematiccrimes against human life. In the caseof absent statehood, it is not evidentwhich bearer of sovereignty isresponsible for complying withinternational treaties.

Without any discernable deliberationon these four accounts, KFOR andUNMIK swapped an amnesty for theKLA for post-war reintegration. Actsof violence by KLA insurgents weretreated as acts committed in thefurtherance of legitimate politicalobjectives. By implication, the KLAwas treated as a legitimate war partyand their military actions as legitimizedby the joint war effort. Given theframing of the KLA as a war party, theonly likely accountability would havebeen for war crimes. By treating theKLA as a legitimate national liberationforce against Serb oppression, KFORand UNMIK did not even raise thequestion of crimes and human rightsabuses that may have been committedby KLA members in the course of thewar. After the war, KFOR andUNMIK’s only concern was controlover and transformation of the KLA,without addressing the issue of legalaccountability for acts of violence.

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demobilization

The job of demobilizing KLAfighters and preparing them for

reintegration into civilian society wasassigned by KFOR and UNMIK to theInternational Organization for Migrati-on (IOM), which at the same timehandled selection and training for thenewly created KPC. For this purpose,the IOM set up two separate programs,the Information Counseling andReferral Service (ICRS) and theKosovo Protection Corps Training(KPCT) program. Both programsoperated at the same time, puttingsome strain on the limited resources ofthe IOM in Kosovo.

The first step of the demobilizationprogram started immediately after theoccupation of Kosovo by KFORtroops and lasted from 23 July to30 November, 1999. During thisperiod, IOM officials registered theformer KLA combatants, initially in 49designated KLA Assembly Areas, laterin seven IOM sub-offices (IOM, 2001,p. 1). A database of KLA fighters wascreated, which offers a rare glimpseinto the socio-demographics of aguerilla force. The biggest surpriseduring this period, however, was thetotal number of KLA fightersregistering with the IOM. Instead ofthe roughly 20,000 combatantsexpected, 25,723 persons registered,raising doubts about whether all thesepeople were really with the KLA.

IOM officials concede that a numberof their demobilization cases wereprobably not combatants. However,during the chaotic early days of theUN-administered Kosovo, IOMresources did not allow a thoroughbackground check of all applicants. Onthe other hand, it is well known that anumber of former KLA fighterspreferred—for one reason oranother—not to register with the IOM(Interview with Carl Jenkins, IOM,14 April 2001).

The vast majority of KLA combatantswere male (96.7%), 857 combatantswere female, and 88.06% of theregistered combatants were youngerthan 39 years of age. The IOM notesthat “in addition to being young, themajority of former KLA combatantsare highly educated, with only one-fourth (24.52%) having less than highschool education. Of the remaininggroups, 34.18% are high schoolgraduates, 18.53% are trade schoolgraduates, 11.81% have not finisheduniversity studies, and 5.96% areuniversity graduates.” (IOM, 2000, p.3).

About a third (32.09%) of therespondents stated a career in thesecurity sector (armed forces andpolice) as their first choice for post-KLA employment—a number that issignificantly lower than the number ofapplications for KPC service from thedatabase (17,348). This might implythat KPC membership was seen as amore secure form of employment,given the volatile Kosovo job market.Before joining the KLA, 26.9% offormer combatants had beenunemployed.

The IOM database provides someinsight into another disputed aspect ofthe KLA’s history—force strengthduring the various phases of the war.Only 2% of the combatants wereassociated with the KLA before 1998,while the bulk of respondents joined inthe first and second half of 1998 (36%and 21% respectively). Accordingly, theremainder of some 40% only joinedthe KLA in 1999. Looking at thesenumbers, it is quite clear that only asmall minority belonged to the radicalpre-1998 KLA, while the vast majorityjoined during the time of the popularuprising and intensified Serb repressionin 1998 and 1999.

It is remarkable that there was nomechanism providing cash pay-outs toformer combatants after the end of theKosovo conflict, even though KLAcombatants were supporting a littleover 200,000 dependants, according toIOM statistics (IOM, 2000, p. 14). Asthe reintegration assistance was stalledfor several months in 1999, due to thescreening process simultaneouslyundertaken for the KPC, formerfighters were largely left to their owndevices until the beginning of the year2000. The majority of former fightersfound work on their own during thisperiod or were supported by theirfamilies—in the absence of a publicsocial security network. The mixedeconomy of Kosovo, which is basedon small-scale agriculture, retail tradeand Diaspora money (ICG, 2001), thestrength of traditional familystructures, as well as the comparativelyshort service time with the KLAhelped to ease the reintegration ofKLA fighters.

The IOM’s reintegration programs aredriven by the need to create income forformer fighters by offering assistancein the areas of skill training and thedevelopment of micro-enterprises.IOM offers vocational training in co-operation with 11 training centersthroughout Kosovo, teaching thefollowing skills:

Arc & Gas Welding

Auto-Electrician

Auto-Mechanic

Carpentry

Computers

Civil Construction

Electrical Installation

Hairdressing

Locksmith

Machinist

Demobilizationand Reintegration

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Plumbing

Post Mounting & TelephoneConnections

Rewinding

Servicing of Home Appliances

Sheet Metal Work & Painting

Tailoring

TV & Video Repair

Vulcanizing (IOM, 2000, p. 4).

These skills are taught within theframework of three month courses,followed by a one-week workshop ineither career development or businessplanning, depending on whether self-employment or salaried employment isbeing sought. During the trainingcourses, the IOM provides thebeneficiaries with both the necessaryequipment as well as with a stipend tocover living expenses.

While the IOM makes use of existingfacilities from pre-war times as well asof local staff, there is comparativelylittle information on whether the skillstaught are in demand on the Kosovojob market. While one would assumethat construction and basic technicalskills are sought after in any post-warsociety, no ‘market research’ isundertaken by or on behalf of theIOM. Information on the nature ofthe Kosovo job market is lacking as aresult of the secretive nature of thecurrent Kosovo society and becausereliable economic data for Kosovodoes not exist. Another problem withthe vocational training program is thenumber of places available, currentlylimited to 1,654, of which 20% havebeen set aside for the retraining ofKPC reservists, a program that startedin the second quarter of 2001. Thereservist component of the KPC iseligible for retraining in civilian skillsafter demobilization from active KPCservice, and the first group of KPCreservists was discharged in May 2001.

Another IOM program offersagricultural vocational training, takinginto account the continuingimportance of agriculture in theKosovo economy. This program offers450 places in three locations (IOM,2001, p. 10). Yet another IOM programoffers ‘on-the-job-training’ in existingenterprises, this training lasts three tosix months and is tailor-made to suitthe needs of the former combatant.The IOM provides financial incentivesto businesses offering full-timeemployment to beneficiaries, as well asan individual tool kit to the formercombatant, when he is offeredemployment.

Facing the realities of the Kosovo jobmarket, where employment in theformal sector probably accounts foronly 20–30% of all jobs, the focus ofthe IOM has shifted from job referralto self-employment. Combatants whohave completed one of the courses areassisted in setting up their ownbusinesses. However, access to credit isdifficult in Kosovo and IOM officialsadmit that their own experience in themanagement of micro-enterprises islimited. Furthermore, the lack ofinformation on the Kosovo economymakes the drafting of a business planvery difficult. As one IOM official putit: “Kosovars made bad experienceswith authorities in the past. Walkinginto his shop and asking him about hisbusiness leads nowhere in this society.”

Specialized IOM programs are offeredto particular groups of formercombatants. One of these—a programsupporting 44 cases as of March 2001–offers psycho-social assistance totraumatized veterans. Another programsupports fighters who have resumedtheir university studies, while a specialprogram assists female ex-combatants.So far the latter program has providedassistance to 214 women, about 25%of the total female caseload.

By the end of March 2001, the IOMhad provided support of one kind orthe other to 11,279 former fighters,44% of the registered caseload. Themajority (58%) had benefited fromtraining programs, while 42% receivedsupport for self-employment. 14,444former combatants had received noassistance. Expenditure per beneficiaryaveraged US $1,157 (DM 2,083), withtotal funds pledged standing at US$14,210,555. Funds are coming fromdonations to the IOM by memberstates. Among the largest donors arethe USA, Japan, the United Kingdom,and the Netherlands.

Policing Kosovo—TheKosovo Police Service(KPS)

The creation of an indigenous policeforce in Kosovo—separate from theYugoslav authorities and responsible tothe local authorities—has long beenseen as a key element in the restorationof law and order. Whereas the oldregime had purged most Albaniansfrom the police force during the 1990s,the new force was meant to beinclusive and multi-ethnic. Since thesummer of 1999, the responsibility forlaw enforcement had rested with theUnited Nations. A multi-national corpsof about 4,000 policemen had the taskof policing Kosovo. However, theUNMIK police was rife with problems.Unlike KFOR, the UNMIK policewere deployed slowly, creating avacuum during the first months of theprotectorate which was used forcriminal and political violence.Furthermore, UN member states wereunwilling to commit funds andpolicemen to the force, UNMIK neverreached its full strength. On theground, cooperation betweenpolicemen from different countries(and cultures of policing) proveddifficult and there were no establishedprocedures for multi-national policework. It could be argued that the fact

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that KFOR has been comparativelymore successful than the UNMIKpolice is due to (a) KFOR operates innational units; and (b) there areestablished procedures for internatio-nal cooperation within NATO andPartnership for Peace countries. Lastbut not least, the secretive nature ofthe Kosovo society—aided by distrustof any kind of foreign authority—makes police work in Kosovo verydifficult.

With these factors in mind, thecreation of the KPS was seen as animportant step forward. KPS operatesunder the control of UNMIK, withmost of the training undertaken by theOSCE pillar. The basic requirementsfor admission to the KPS are similar tothe KPC criteria—a secondaryeducation, physical fitness, and agebetween 21 and 55. Given the statedpreference of KLA combatants for acareer in law enforcement, it shouldcome as no surprise that a number offormer fighters applied for a job withthe newly created Kosovo PoliceService (KPS).

While the KPS—unlike the KPC—wasnot meant to be a KLA successororganization, a set of quotas wasnegotiated to ease the access of formerKLA fighters into the new police force.According to international policeofficers involved in the selectionprocess, 50% of training places wereset aside for KLA veterans, another20% for former Yugoslav policemen,of which 20% were allotted tominorities and 20% to women. It iswidely assumed that the quota forKLA members was accepted by KFORand UNMIK to get Thaci’s consent tothe demobilization of the KLA.

Nevertheless, the quota system poses anumber of challenges for the interna-tional community, both professionallyand politically. As a result of the quotasfor KLA veterans and former Yugoslavpolicemen, there is virtually no spacefor ‘ordinary Albanian males’. Theaverage entry age currently stands at 32years—at least seven years older thanin ‘normal’ countries.

More than 29,000 people applied forthe 4,000 positions in the KPS. TheKosovo Police Service School (KPSS)established a procedure for screeningand testing applicants that involvesbackground checks to avoid the

recruitment of criminals (KPSS, 2001).Basic training lasting eight weeks andcovering subjects ranging frominvestigations to firearms operationsand criminal law is undertaken at theKPSS, which is located in Vushtri. Aspecial emphasis is placed on‘democratic policing’. Members of theKPSS teaching staff repeatedlymentioned the need to change theculture of policing in Kosovo.

The basic training course is followedby 19 weeks of on-the-job trainingsupervised by UNMIK police. In April2001, the KPS had just about reachedthe mandated strength of 4,000officers. According to the OSCE, theethnic makeup of the KPS is 83%Albanian, 9% Serb and 8% “others”,whereby the latter category includesRoma, Turks, Gorans, Bosniaks andMuslim Slavs. Ethnic relations remainan issue for the KPS—as for Kosovoas a whole. While training isundertaken jointly, Serb KPS officersare currently deployed exclusively inSerb-dominated areas of Kosovo.Even the graduation ceremony is heldseparately—as witnessed by theauthors—for Serb KPS officers inVushtri, while the majority of KPSmembers graduate in Pristina. Thereason given for this is the fact thateven the KPS cannot guarantee thesecurity of Serb officers in Albanian-dominated areas. The gender makeupis 81% male and 19% female (OSCE,2001). The precise number of KLAmembers within the KPS is not known,but sources within KPSS confirm thattheir number is close to 50% of thetotal number of cadets. While there isno continuity of KLA hierarchies inthe KPS—as is the case in the KPC—the heavy presence of ex-KLAcombatants in the KPS is neverthelessproblematic because former KLAmembership is often perceived asethnic and political partisanship.

The International Crisis Group (ICG,2000, pp. 11/12) reports rivalriesbetween KLA cadets and formerYugoslav police officers, who joined

Kosovo Police Service School student practices markmanship at the firing range.October 1999. Foto: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe(OSCE)

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the force under a different quota.Former Yugoslav officers represent thelargest non-KLA group within theKPS. According to the ICG report,KLA veterans regard the formerYugoslav policemen as “collaborators”,“ex-communists”, and “old-LDK”sympathizers. Apart from this report,there is comparatively little informationavailable on conflicts within the policeforce. KPSS sources confirm thatformer KLA members are in no waydifferent from other members of theforce. There are no reports ofdisciplinary problems related to KLAveterans.

The lasting influence of KLAstructures causes concern, though itsextent is difficult for outsiders tomeasure. KPSS instructors are worriedthat a dual loyalty to both the old KLAleadership and to the UNadministration could develop withinthe ranks of cadets coming from theKLA. It is striking that 2/3 of the‘course commanders’ elected by KPSrecruits as class representatives camefrom the ranks of the KLA, indicatingeither the greater leadership potentialof the former guerillas or a continuityof power structures unknown to theinternational instructors. The practiceof electing ‘course commanders’—anoffice which was considered by someas a fast-track to promotion—has beenrecently stopped, precisely becauseKPSS personnel were afraid ofcreating the impression that these classrepresentatives enjoyed a higher statusthan their classmates.

The KPS reached its strength of 4,000policemen in the summer of 2001.From now on the KPSS will focus onoffering specialized training. Theinternational community seems

determined to abandon the quotasystem with regard to futurerecruitment and internal promotion,thereby diluting the influence of KLAstructures within the force.

Another problem for the KPS is thelack of funding. Salaries are very low—at about DM 350 per month, and thereare no benefits packages. In the two-tier economy of Kosovo, where an UNdriver easily earns three times as much,the low salaries of law enforcementpersonnel might serve as an incentivefor corruption. Equally difficult is theequipment situation of the KPS. Thetotal budget for the Kosovo policestands at DM 28 million for the year

2001, barely enough to maintain theexisting infrastructure and pay salaries.There are only 150 vehicles at thedisposal of the KPS, a very lownumber compared with a troopstrength of 4,000 (and the abundanceof seemingly unused UN vehicles).The international community shouldclearly invest more money in thewelfare and equipment of the KPS,given the crucial role the force plays inguaranteeing law and order.

Despite the problems mentionedabove, the creation of the KPS iswidely seen as a success story. Therecruits are motivated and the existenceof indigenous policemen—with theirgreater understanding of local cultureand terrain—has improved policing.Furthermore, unlike the KPC, KPSofficers have not been implicated incrimes or political violence.

A friend congratulates a Kosovo Police Service School graduate upon completionof the training course, 2 May 2000. Foto: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)

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Post-war society in Kosovo isdivided between active participants

in the military campaign and non-combatants. Former members of theKLA strive for public recognition aswar heroes. War memorials and masspublications celebrate the heroism ofKLA commanders, individual fighters,and ‘martyrs’. Former membership ofthe KLA is thus a source of socialprestige, particularly if the personserved in a leading position.Reintegration into the post-war societyis certainly different from the collectiveself-doubt of veterans returning from alost war—take for example GermanWorld War II soldiers returning fromprotracted periods in prisoner of warcamps.

Thirty standardized interviews withformer KLA combatants wereconducted in Kosovo in April 2001.The aim of these interviews consistedmainly in identifying post-warreintegration patterns and politicaloutlooks. The sample was too small toallow a statistically significant analysis.

The overwhelming majority of the 30former KLA members we interviewedin late April 2001 had joined the KLAbetween March and October 1998,with June to September 1998 being thepeak time for enrollment. One KLAcommander—now director of staff inthe KPC—claimed to have alreadyjoined the KLA in September 1992.One member of the KLA’s generalstaff reported to have joined in 1994,

another member of the KLA’s generalstaff declared that he had joined in1996. All the others interviewed hadjoined the KLA in 1998. In terms ofage, the combatants interviewed were20 to 40 years old. Seven out of 30were former commanders or officersof the KLA, the rest had been regularprivates. A little more than one thirdwere at least temporarily unemployedafter the end of the war. The youngerex-combatants in particular oftenclaimed to be students at Pristinauniversity. With few exceptions, theregular KLA members had notundergone military training beforejoining the KLA. Regulars joined theKLA for a limited period, not as along-term professional occupation. Incontrast, the KLA officers andcommanders had either served in theYugoslavian army or had receivedtraining in military camps in Albania.

Asked whether certain qualificationsacquired as a KLA member werebeneficial or disadvantageous for post-war reintegration, the intervieweesmentioned responsibility,communication skills, problem-solvingabilities, organizational capabilities,strategic and tactical thinking, andcontrol of stress as positiveexperiences and as advantageous. Awriter among the former KLAmembers felt that the war providedmaterial for new novels. Few explicitlymentioned war experiences that hadproved disadvantageous in civil life,such as solving problems by means ofviolence, intolerance, and hatredagainst people holding different views.A minority report that they are hauntedby memories of war cruelties or feel

nervous. The most frequently relateddifficulties after war pertain to financialshortcomings and housing problems,often resulting from destruction duringthe war. No regular reported to havebenefited materially from belonging tothe KLA. Based on these interviews, itseems that the reported economicadvantages enjoyed by former KLAmembers under the Thaci provisionaladministration were confined to certaincommanders and did not extend toregular soldiers.

Of the regular privates interviewed,not a single one applied for servicewith the KPC or KPS; only formerofficers or policemen applied. If thisfinding stands for the larger picture, itwas primarily former KLA officers andcommanders who became members ofthe KPC and KPS. Those who joinedthe KPC or KPS received training byKFOR, the IOM or the KPSS, othersusually did not undergo any vocationaltraining, with a few language coursesmarking the exception. Students wereat times supported by internationalstipends. International assistance fromNGOs proved crucial in rebuildinghouses destroyed during the war, yetthe overwhelming majority of thoseinterviewed had not received anyinternational assistance at all.According to our interviews, belongingto the KLA did not represent a specificadvantage on the post-war job market,jobs in the KPC or the KPS being theexceptions.

All the interviewees take pride inhaving belonged to the KLA. It is seenas a national liberation army of theKosovar people as a whole. The KLAis not just viewed as a reactive self-defense organization, but as an activeliberation army which deliberatelystarted a war against Serbian militarypresence. Former KLA membershipgenerates respect and prestige in thepost-war society, particularly comparedwith non-combatants. In contrast toofficers and commanders, very few

BehavioralPatterns of

Former KLAMembers

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privates could make use of theirmilitary experience in post-wareconomic or political positions or toimprove their social status. The imageof the KLA is better than the image ofthe KPC or KPS, even if fewrespondents criticize the latter. Afterall, in the eyes of the interviewees, theKLA represented not just aninstitution, but a people’s army. TheKLA is perceived as the army of theKosovar people, not of a particulargrouping. Few are critical of theinfluence of political parties on KLAcommanders during the war.Confirming this line of reasoning,most think that no single political partycan claim to be the inheritor of theKLA. Among the parties, the PDK andAAK are mentioned, but not theLKCK or LDK. Given the variety ofanswers on political inheritors to theKLA, we tend to conclude that formerKLA membership did not result in acoherent post-war political stand.Former KLA members do notrepresent a politically homogenousgroup, they seem rather to reflect thedivisions existing in society at large.

Slightly more than half of thoseinterviewed are optimistic about thefuture and expect life to be better infive years time, the rest keep hoping orremain undecided. The overall absenceof pessimism—not to speak ofnostalgic sentiments—may provide atemporary source of forward-lookinglegitimacy for the UNMIK and KFORprotectorate. Yet, the positiveassessment of the present and future,compared to the past, may wear offover time. Positive evaluations of thecurrent situation are only based onretrospect. There is only limitedconcrete support for the currentregime. The assessment of KFOR isgenerally more positive because itprovides external security, which theKosovars could not guarantee on theirown.

According to the interviews, formerKLA members maintain regularcontact to former combatants on anindividual basis, but not in anorganized fashion. The majority ofregular KLA members interviewedwere indeed demilitarized. Asked abouttheir views of UNMIK and KFOR, anoverall positive view of KFORcontrasts with frequent complaintsabout the slow, bureaucratic,unprofessional performance ofUNMIK. UNMIK, it was said, did notcount on local experience and lacked along-term strategy. Former combatantsare almost evenly divided with respectto the dissolution of the KLA after thewar. Whereas half of those interviewedthink it was a mistake to dissolve theKLA, the other half holds that it was anecessary compromise in 1999. Manyin the latter group add that the KPCshould become the future army ofKosovo.

There has been criticism of the KLAfollowing the war, particularly by someof the Kosovar media. Asked whethercriticism of the KLA was justified,three quarters agree in general, withcertain qualifications added at times(e.g. if facts confirm the criticism).Approximately one quarter think thatthe KLA should not be criticized at all.Asked whether KLA officers shouldplay a leading role in politics, less thana quarter think that KLA officers arebetter suited than civilian politicians.The overwhelming majority of thoseinterviewed think political roles shoulddepend on personality or qualificationsrather than on KLA commandexperiences. Some outrightly dismissthe idea of a special qualification forpolitics on the grounds of a KLAbackground.

Given these findings, theoverwhelming majority of thoseinterviewed do not question civilianand democratic prerogatives in Kosovopolitics. Asked about the future ofKosovo, all those interviewed opt forfuture independence for Kosovo. Only

two out of the 30 interviewed want tosee Kosovo as part of a larger Albania.Asked whether Albanians residingoutside Kosovo and Albania shouldlive in one state or have the right tosecede and join Kosovo, or enjoyautonomy in the given state, two thirdsthink that autonomy in a given state(for example, in Macedonia) would befine. The rest favor a right to secedeand to join Kosovo. We can thusconclude that any ideas of a ‘GreaterAlbania’ or strivings for unification ofall ethnic Albanians are only shared bya minority of former KLA members.The individual’s former rank in theKLA—regular or commander—doesnot make a difference on this account.The overwhelming majority hold thatSerbs in Kosovo should have the samerights as Kosovars. Only two of theinterviewed opted for a “return” ofSerbs to Serbia proper.

Most think that a new war of liberationwould be necessary if Kosovo were re-included in Serbia or Yugoslavia. Theindependence of Kosovo is theultimate aim, and most are prepared totake up arms again, if necessary. Askedabout the lessons learnt from the war,most claim that only the willingness tofight resulted in freedom and attractedthe international community’s attentionto their fate. The former KLAmembers are a highly homogenousgroup in this respect. There is noretrospective skepticism voiced withregard to launching a war of liberation.Few recall the horrors of war, mostmention their pride in military success.

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Some suggestions concerningreintegration policy seem appropriateon the basis of the results of theinterviews. Some of the former KLAcombatants would benefit frompsychological assistance in coping withthe war experience and behavioralpatterns learned in the course of thefighting. A significant segment of thoseinterviewed resumed their pre-waroccupations, particularly universitystudies. Given that employmentprospects for graduates are bleak,professional reintegration is currentlybeing delayed. Tensions may grow inthe same way as the unrest amongunemployed Kosovar graduates in theearly 1990s—this time targeting theUNMIK administration.

Former KLA members do not under-stand the long-term intentions of theUNMIK protectorate and are thereforehighly critical of its inadequateperformance. UNMIK is obviously notcapable of conveying its policy toformer KLA members.Communication between thegovernors and the governed has beendisturbed or even disrupted. UNMIKis mostly perceived as an alien, non-transparent, non-accountable form ofgovernance, and this may causeproblems for law obedience. Thedissolution of the KLA is onlyaccepted as far as the KPC turns into afuture army of Kosovo. Delays indetermining the final status of theKPC may thus contribute to furtherfrustration. The option of resumingviolent action in order to gain fullindependence is being kept open. Toprevent such a scenario, political clarityover the terms of Kosovar self-rulewould greatly help in foreclosing thewar-prone option of a return toSerbian or Yugoslavian rule.

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At the end of the hostilities, itbecame clear that influential KLA

leaders, most notably Hashim Thaci,were interested in a continuing politicalrole in Kosovo. After the end of hisinterim provisional government inDecember 1999, Thaci and other KLAleaders turned to party politics withinthe framework of the UN’s plan oflimited power-sharing. In this sphere,the KLA successor parties continue tocompete with Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK,which experienced a remarkablecomeback after the war.

The most important party claiming theKLA’s heritage is Thaci’s Party for theDemocratic Progress of Kosovo(PPDK), later renamed the DemocraticParty of Kosovo (PDK). This partytraces its political origins back to thePopular Movement for Kosovo (LPK),which played an important role in theset-up of the KLA in the early 1990s.While the LDK was dissolved on27 June 1999—a decision which wasnot accepted by parts of itsmembership in the Diaspora—most ofits members in Kosovo joined BardhylMahmuti’s Party of the DemocraticUnion (PBD). On 10 October 1999,the PBD and Hashim Thaci’s ‘PoliticalDirectorate of the KLA’ formed thePPDK (Lipsius, 2001, p. 5). The LPKheritage within the new party remainsstrong, fourteen out of 21 members ofthe PDK’s Presidency come directlyfrom the LDK (ICG, 2000, p. 4).

The PDK is widely seen as a vehiclefor Thaci’s personal political ambitionsand represents a substantial part of the‘inner circle’ of the KLA’s political andmilitary leadership. Jane’s IntelligenceReview writes:

“The PPDK failed to present itself as agenuine political party, being seenrather as a facade for the powerful andinfluential ‘Drenica group’. [...]Traditionally scorned by Kosovars as‘hillbillies’, the Drenica Albaniansavenged themselves and earned a newreputation after UCK actions in thewinter of 1997/98 brought theproblem to the attention of theinternational community” (Jane’sIntelligence Review, June 2000).

Information on the political aims ofthe PDK remains sketchy—a factwhich is true for most other parties inKosovo as well—its membershiprepresenting the ideological mix of theKLA, encompassing both radical rightand left wing ideas. However, it couldbe argued that politics take thebackseat compared with the desire forpolitical power. The PDK hasestablished a reputation for “politicaland economic heavy-handedness” indealing with competing politicians andthe independent media (ICG, 2000,p. 5). Without doubt, the party has lostthe support of ordinary Kosovars as aresult of this.

The other significant political partyclaiming KLA heritage is the Alliancefor the Future of Kosovo (AAK) ledby Ramush Haradinaj, the formercommander of the KLA’s thirdoperational zone. This party wasfounded on 25 April 2000 as analliance of six smaller political parties,among them the National Movementfor the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK),a radical nationalist group that brokeaway from the LPK in the early 1990s.The LKCK left the AAK on 1 January,2001, after the municipal elections andfollowing a dispute between Haradinajand the party.

Haradinaj, who had been one of thedeputies of Agim Ceku in the KPC,left the paramilitary force toconcentrate on politics. In contrast toCeku, the charismatic Haradinaj is seenas a moderate in international circlesand his personal integrity has not beenattacked. Lipsius (2001, p. 8) finds“communitarian” tendencies inHaradinaj’s political platform, as well asa focus on individual freedom andresponsibility. During the electioncampaign, the AAK suffered from alack of funding—seemingly not anissue for the PDK. However, Haradinajdealt himself a critical blow. On16 October 2000, a few days before theelections, he spoke highly of his rivalIbrahim Rugova in an interview withBota Sot newspaper. It is widelyassumed that this interview cost theparty substantial support and strainedHaradinaj’s relationship with the AAK-member party LKCK.

The municipal election on 28 October2000, was the first test of politicalstanding for the political parties ofKosovo since the end of the conflict.As a result, the poll was seen not as alocal election but rather as a nationalcontest. Ibrahim Rugova’s LDK won58% of the votes and 504 seats,

Turning Militaryinto PoliticalPower—KLA

Successor Parties

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winning the majority in 21 out of 30municipalities. Thaci’s PDK scored27.3% and 267 seats, winning in sixmunicipalities. Haradinaj’s AAKreceived 7.7% and 71 seats. Among thesmaller parties that gained someparliamentary representation were theAlbanian Christian Democratic Party(PSHDK) with 1.2% (8 seats) and theLiberal Center Party of Kosovo(PQLK) formed by former KLAcommander Naim Maloku with 0.8%(3 seats) (election results underwww.osce.org/kosovo/elections/results_parties.php3).

The victory of the LDK over the KLAsuccessor parties came as a shock—especially for the PDK, which hadtouted itself as the dominant politicalforce in Kosovo. While PDK membersblamed manipulation of the polls bysinister forces for the result, theelection results were celebrated by theinternational community as proof ofthe maturity of Kosovars, preferringmoderation to extreme positions.Widespread violence—anticipated bysome in the case of a LDK victory—did not occur.

Polling Station in Kosovo during the municipal elections, October2000. Foto: Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

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Criminal activities, smuggling, andattacks on non-Albanians in

Kosovo have continued since summer1999. Some former KLA membersretained their light weapons and joinedthe urban crime scene, especially inPristina (Sedlarevic, 1999). Linksbetween the KLA and Albanian drug-trafficking networks certainly did existduring the conflict (Schmidt-Eenboom,1999, p. 17). Whether these links arestill in place remains anybody’s guess asthere is very little solid evidence on thiscomplex in the public domain. Interna-tional agencies fighting the drug tradestate that Kosovo in general became asmugglers’ paradise supplying up to40% of the heroin sold in Europe andNorth America (O’Kane, 2000).According to some authors, Kosovo isabout to become Europe’s Colombia, asociety where narco-traffic, politics andviolence are closely related to eachother.

The recent history of Kosovo isanother factor influencing the outlookof Kosovars in relation to (foreign)authorities. Having witnessed Serbrepression, Kosovars have beensocialized not to trust the authorities,but rather to regulate conflicts amongthemselves. Talking to the police—whowere previously an instrument ofoppression—does not come easily. Atthe same time, the informal economyon which most Kosovars rely has led toa blurred distinction between legal andillegal business.

The control of local administrations bythe provisional Thaci government inthe second half of 1999 allowed some

KLA commanders to extractsubstantial economic benefits. KLAveterans were quick in establishingtheir niche after the end of the war, asubstantial number of them joined‘security companies’ in the cities, whichprovide ‘security services’ to localbusinesses. The line between legitimateservices and extortion is reportedlythin at times. Only recently hasUNMIK begun to crack down on thesecompanies by denying theirapplications for weapon licenses.

Since the middle of 2000, a number ofmonuments to the KLA have beenerected—financed by ‘donations’ frombusinessmen and shopkeepers inKosovo, who are ‘asked’ to donatesums of between DM 300 andDM 3,000 per month by organizationslinked to the old KLA, such as the‘Friends of the KPC’ (ICG, 2001, p.16/17). It seems reasonable to assumethat a part of these funds goes tothe—notoriously cash-strapped—KPCand possibly to underground structuresas well.

Likewise, some observers have linked astring of break-ins, targeted at interna-tional organizations in the monthsleading up to the municipal elections,to the need of some political parties torefill their campaign coffers. Theinternational community could notdefinitively establish whetherharassment, arson, expulsions, andkillings of minorities were random orpart of a KLA strategy of ethnic

cleansing (ICG, 2000). Kosovo Serbleaders commonly attribute post-warviolence against non-Albanianminorities to the former KLA. Inprotest over the formation of theKPC, Kosovo Serb leaders cancelledtheir cooperation with the TransitionalCouncil under UNMIK auspices (ICG,1999g).

The US-based Human Rights Watchreleased a report in August 1999documenting an apparentlycoordinated campaign of abductions,beatings, house burning, and murdersof Serbs and Roma by the KLA(www.hrw.org/reports/1999/kosov2/).A report by the United Nations HighCommissioner for Refugees, writtenfor Kofi Annan, charged the KPC withcriminal activities, killings, ill-treatmentand torture, illegal policing, abuse ofauthority, intimidation, breaches ofpolitical neutrality, and hate-speeches(UNHCR’s Background Note, 2000).The report claims that KPC membershave been running protection racketsacross Kosovo, particularly in Pristina,Suva Reka, Dragash, Istok and Prizren,possibly engaging in prostitution aswell (Sweeney and Holsoe, 2000;Smith, 2000).

KPC members performed arbitrarypolicing, using torture, mostly directedagainst presumed ‘collaborators’ andethnic minorities such as Serbs, Goraniand Roma. According to its statute, theKPC never had a role in lawenforcement or the maintenance oflaw and order. When the liberalpublisher of the daily Kosovar KohaDitore, Veton Surroi, wrote acommentary in August 1999, labelingthe intimidation of Serbs as fascist, theKLA-funded Kosovapress launched athinly-veiled death threat againstSurroi, claiming that “such criminalsand enslaved minds (meaning: Surroi—AHG/WCP) should not have a placein the free Kosovo” (ICG, 1999g).

Offspring of theKLA—Crime and

Violence

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The murder of the former commanderof the KLA’s 5th operational zone,Ekrem Rexha, a.k.a. ‘CommandantDrini’, who was gunned down in frontof his house in Prizren on 8 May 2000,has been linked to rivalries amongformer KLA commanders, as have thedeaths of other political opponents(Jane’s Intelligence Review, June 2000).Given that an increasing number ofAlbanians have become targets ofviolence, it has been surmised that, insome cases at least, criminalspenetrating Kosovo from Albaniamight be responsible. It cannot beexcluded that some former KLAcommanders retain relations withAlbanian organized crime resultingfrom the arms deals conducted duringthe war. Trying to distance himselffrom attacks on Serbs, Agim Cekuclaimed that former KLA commandersand the KPC cannot control the use ofKLA uniforms and insignia. Indeed,they are widely available on the openmarket.

Due to its dependent position, theKPC leadership is not interested inbeing linked to attacks on Serbs orother minorities (ICG, 1999g). Yet, itcannot be excluded that former KLAleaders are only paying lip service to amulti-ethnic Kosovo. Hashim Thaci,for example, strongly condemnedviolence against minorities in Kosovo(Dokumentation, Südosteuropa, 1/2,2000, pp. 105–114). No doubt, anumber of KLA combatants tookrevenge on Serbs, and some KLAfighters retained their arms and turnedto crime. It is noteworthy that the KLAabsorbed criminals during the war whowere never ‘re-socialized’. Against thebackdrop of our own interviews, it isnonetheless questionable whether thereis a coherent strategy on the part ofthe former KLA to ethnically ‘cleanse’Kosovo.

Extremist AlbanianGroups outsideKosovo

While the Southern Balkans regionseemed to be peaceful after the end ofthe bombing raids against Serbia andthe establishment of the Kosovoprotectorate, events since October2000 suggest that this is no longer thecase. The ‘liberation’ of Kosovo hastriggered a dangerous revival of ethnicAlbanian nationalism both in Serbiaand Macedonia, and even in Greece. Itseems that the success of the KLA hasopened a Pandora’s Box, bringing the‘Albanian Question’ back into thelimelight.

Southern Serbia—theUCPMB

The emergence of a ‘Liberation Armyof Presevo, Medvedija, and Bujanovac-UCPMB’ (three cities in the Albanian-dominated Presevo Valley of SouthernSerbia) in 2000 with the red, black andyellow KLA colors is seen by someobservers as proof that the formermilitary infrastructure continues toexist. The Presevo Valley—astrategically important corridor leadingfrom Serbia to Macedonia, straddlingKosovo—has long been a bone ofcontention between Serbs andAlbanians. A veritable ‘mini-Kosovo’ inethnic makeup, Kosovars refer to theregion as ‘Eastern Kosovo’. Comparedto Kosovo, inter-ethnic relations havebeen comparatively cordial—evenduring the reign of Milosevic—withAlbanian politicians participating inSerb politics and controlling themunicipal governments of the region.

The UCPMB first appeared in publicon 26 January 2000 at the burial inDubrosin of two Albanians killed bythe Serb police. Uniformed men vowedto fight until the Albanians of thePresevo valley were free. According toSerbian and Albanian sources around1,500 to 1,700 members of theUCPMB were active in thedemilitarized Ground Security Zone in

Serbia. Whereas KFOR verified thewithdrawal of Yugoslavian forces fromthe GSZ, in accordance with theKumanovo Agreement of 9 June 1999,it noticeably failed in enforcing anotherobligation of the same agreement—securing the border with Kosovo.

The relative security of the GSZ wasabused by the UCPMB who fought thelightly-armed Serb police forces, withKosovo being both supply base andsafe haven. The political aim of themovement—supported by radicalpolitical parties in Kosovo—is thesecession of the area from Serbia andits unification with Kosovo. To achievethat goal, the UCPMB used the sametactics previously employed by theKLA. It aimed at provoking a harshreaction from the Serb side—violatingthe GSZ—and obviously counted onthe international community forsupport. It comes as no surprise thatthe UCPMB’s first public appearancecoincided closely with the end of theMilosevic regime in Belgrade,indicating that radical political groupswere bent on a new escalation in orderto use a rapidly closing window ofopportunity.

The relationship between the UCPMBand the old KLA remains unclear—combatants were mainly recruited inthe south-eastern part of Kosovo (thetown of Vitina). Albanian sources inKosovo reported in February 2001 thata large number of towns in Kosovowere plastered with posters in whichthe purportedly disbanded KLAordered all Albanians between 18 and48 years of age to join theircompatriots in the UCPMB, whilethreatening draft dodgers with reprisals(“Increasing Strain among AlbanianExtremists in South Serbia”, FBIS-EEU-2001-0222). The Yugoslav Armyasserted in February 2001 that some 60members of the Kosovo ProtectionCorps crossed the border into the

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Ground Security Zone, harassingcivilians in a south Serbian village(Tanjug, 9 February 2001). Officially,Thaci claimed to be opposed to allarmed confrontation. It is thereforenot clear to what extent the formerKLA and the KPC deliberatelyparticipated in forming the UCPMB.

Against the backdrop of theemergence of the UCPMB, there havebeen several reports about CIA-training for the KLA under theoutgoing Clinton administration inorder to conduct sabotage acts inMilosevic’s Serbia (Beaumont et al,2001). Highly placed sources in Pristinaconfirmed that the US KFOR troopswere at least well informed about theUCPMB activities in the Presevo valley.Christopher Dell, US Chief of Missionin Kosovo, denied any US support ofthe UCPMB—they would “deceivethemselves”, believing that the USA insome way supports what they aredoing. “They say that: ‘Since AmericanForces are located at the border and donot get in our way, it means that theysupport us’” (Koha Ditore, 8 December2000).

The UCPMB was confronted withsurveillance by KFOR, but notseriously inhibited. The guerilla armycontinued to transfer weapons fromand to Kosovo, at times using theMacedonian-Kosovo border for transit(Free B92 News, 15 December 2000).Most members of the KLA splintergroups acting in Serbia while usingKosovo for logistics were usuallyreleased after a few hours ofinterrogation. The same holds true forKPC members bearing non-licensedarms found by KFOR or UNMIKpolice. KFOR spokesmen initiallyplayed down incidents of illegal bordercrossings by Albanian extremists. Morerobust action was only taken once the

Weapons seized from UCPMB combatants in the Presevo Valley, May 2001.Foto: Wolf-Christian Peas (BICC)

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offspring of the KLA

UCPMB insurgents began to shoot atAmerican and Russian border patrolsin January 2001. The British soldiersbrought in in early 2001 used tacticsadopted from their hunt of the IrishRepublican Army and were morewilling to risk their lives in fightingAlbanian guerillas than their UScounterparts in the Eastern sectoralong the border to Serbia.

In striving for the inclusion of theGSZ into Kosovo, the UCPMBreceived mixed messages from NATOwhich might have been interpreted asencouragement. Asked about possiblechanges in the status of the GSZ,NATO chief George Robertson said inmid-February 2001 that NATO was“prepared to consider such changes” tothe buffer zone, but only “if it will notcreate a vacuum or lead to newfighting. Premature changes ... carrythe risk of only making matters worse”(FBIS-EEU-2001-0215). Even withoutan extension of the KFOR mandate tothe southern Serbian Presevo valley,the UCPMB could hope to reach atleast one goal—recognition by NATOas a negotiating partner.

However, the gamble did not pay off—the new Serb government under ZoranDzindjic managed to restrain the armyfrom violating the GSZ, taking utmostcare not to hurt civilians in order toavoid an outcry from the internationalcommunity. The internationalcommunity at the same time changedits attitude towards Serbia—whilerelations with Serbia warmed,Albanians were seen increasingly as atrouble factor in the region.

KFOR agreed to allow Yugoslav forcesto re-enter the GSZ, forcing theUCPMB to retreat to its fortifiedstrongholds. Cut off from Kosovo andunder military pressure from Belgrade,

the anticipated end game did not takeplace. The UCPMB surrendered on20 May 2001, handing in their weaponsand retreating to Kosovo, where theirfighters were offered an amnesty. Aspart of the agreement, the Serb sideagreed to improve inter-ethnic relationsin the Presevo Valley by creating aspecial multi-ethnic police force,trained by the OSCE along the lines ofthe KPS in neighboring Kosovo. Animportant element in the resolution ofthe crisis was the role played by localAlbanian politicians, who acted aspeace-brokers in the negotiations. Inretrospect, it seems that the creation ofthe UCPMB was not so much anindigenous movement, but ratherimported violence from radical forcesin Kosovo. These were initiallytolerated by some Western powersinterested in destabilizing the Milosevicregime.

Macedonia—The Na-tional LiberationArmy (NLA)

The Former Yugoslav Republic ofMacedonia (FYROM) was remarkablypeaceful during the breakup of the oldYugoslavia. The only republic to breakaway peacefully from Belgrade, thecountry was seen as stable and as asecure supply base for KFOR troops inKosovo. However, Macedonia has itsown inter-ethnic crisis, simmeringbelow the surface, and largelyunnoticed by the internationalcommunity. According to the 1994census, 22.7% of the Macedonianpopulation are ethnic Albanians, livingmostly in the northwest of the country,bordering Kosovo and Albania, as wellas in the capital. These numbers aredisputed by Albanian politicians whoclaim that their ethnic group forms40% of the population. Internationalobservers tend to put the number atone-third (Judah, 2001, p. 12).

While Albanians play an important rolein politics—one of their two partieshas continuously been a member ofdifferent coalition governments in

Skopje (Troebst, 2000, pp. 234–238),the status of Albanians as an ethnicgroup has been contentious. Despitethe large number of Albanians in thecountry, the constitution relegatesthem in their own opinion to ‘second-class citizens’ (Dokumentation,Südosteuropa, 1/3, 2001 , pp. 134–149).Albanians are underrepresented in thepublic services, especially in the policeand in the military. Education in theAlbanian language has been an issueever since the dissolution of the oldYugoslavia, as Macedonian Albanianstraditionally went to Pristina Universityfor tertiary education, something thatbecame impossible from the early1990s onwards. In the meantime,Macedonian authorities have notrecognized the private AlbanianUniversity in Tetovo (Macedonia).

Relations between Slav and AlbanianMacedonians became increasinglystrained in 2000 after a small Albaniangroup, the Albanian National Army(Armata Kombetare Shqiptare—AKSh),started to attack police posts inMacedonia (Schindler, 2000). Fromhumble beginnings, the crisis inflatedto international dimensions in the earlymonths of 2001 when a small groupof AKSh occupied the village ofTanushec on the border with Kosovoand declared it a ‘liberated area’. Sincethen, the conflict has spread to otherregions of the country and hasdisplaced several thousands of civilianson both sides. The poorly-equippedMacedonian Army was not able tocontain the threat, giving the AKShtime to fortify their positions.

The spark that triggered the conflict iswidely seen in the border agreementbetween Macedonia and the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, signed inSkopje on 23 February 2001. Thistreaty—which also delineates theKosovo border with Macedonia—wasnegotiated without consulting Kosovo

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Albanians, an open provocation to theradical forces aiming for an indepen-dent Kosovo (Lipsius, 2001, p. 3). Intheir political statements, the AKSh,renamed National Liberation Army(NLA) in December 2000, demand thefederalization of Macedonia and animproved status for both Albaniansand the Albanian language. However,the ultimate goal of the NLA seems tobe the ‘internationalization’ of theconflict. Knowing full well that avictory against the Macedonian forcesis impossible, they put their hopes onthe international community forsecuring greater political rights. Havinglearnt from the experience in Kosovothat peaceful lobbying does not work,radicals turned to violence, hoping thata harsh reaction from the Macedonianauthorities would increase theirsupport in the Albanian populationand push the international communityinto action. So far, this strategy seemsto have worked.

The extent of the relations betweenKosovo-based remnants of the oldKLA and the Macedonian NLA isambiguous—both organizations areknown by the same Albanianacronym—UCK—and use similaruniforms and symbols. The politicalrepresentative of the NLA—AliAhmeti—has long been a factor inradical Albanian politics, having beenlinked to both the LPK and the KLA(Lipsius, 2001, p. 4). The NLA seems,at least partly, to be a spin-off of thelargely defunct UCPMB in the PresevoValley. Once Yugoslav forces wereallowed to enter the 5 kilometer wideGSZ, UCPMB combatants joined theNLA in large numbers. The NLA, withan estimated 800 fighters under armsin the spring of 2001, additionallyrecruited young Kosovars. Most ofthese freshly recruited NLA fightersare poorly trained, but have an intimateknowledge of the mountainous areaand know how to secure logisticalsupport, including food, shelter andintelligence, from the local ethnicAlbanian population on both sides of

the border. Despite denials by KPCleaders in Kosovo, the NLA has beensupplied with weapons from Kosovo.Jane’s Intelligence Review (May 2001, p. 21)reports that the NLA’s armory includesAK-47s, Draganov sniper rifles, mines,grenades, and Browning Light 50 long-range rifles. Support for the NLA fromKosovo was confirmed in April 2001by a Polish-Ukrainian KFOR patrolwhich found a vacated NLA trainingcamp inside Kosovo, near the villageof Krivenik. The patrol foundhundreds of small arms, rocketpropelled grenades as well as AT-3Sagger wire-guided anti-tank missiles.

KPC commander Rrustem Mustafadenied ‘official’ KPC relations with theUCPMB and the Macedonian NLA,though admitted ‘individual’ contacts.The KPC, Rrustem Mustafa claimed,could not directly assist the NLA(Interview with Rrustem Mustafa,Pristina, 6 May 2001). Gani Sheku,assistant to Agim Ceku in the KPC,asserted in early May 2001 that theKPC dismisses all KPC members whoare known to have joined theMacedonian NLA (Interview withGani Sheku, former KLA commander,Pristina, 8 May 2001). Given these—‘official’—statements by KPCcommanders, we are inclined toconclude that the KPC command isnot the mastermind behind the NLA’sactivities, though regular flows ofinformation can be assumed.

KFOR has come under criticism fromthe Macedonian government for itsperceived slowness in combating thecross-border movements of weaponsand fighters. Echoing earlier Serbsentiments, KFOR and the Westernpowers are seen as supporters ofAlbanian nationalists, intent on thedestabilization of Macedonia. KFORdid not prevent Kosovo becoming a‘safe haven’ for Albanian insurgents,operating in Macedonia and Serbia.Reacting to this criticism and alarmedby the escalation of the conflict inMacedonia, the US and Germanbrigades started to strengthen theirborder patrols in March 2001. A

special UK-Czech-Scandinavianbattalion was dispatched to theKacanik region, bordering Macedonia(Ripley, 2001, pp. 2/3). From May 2001onwards, unmanned aerial vehicleswere dispatched to control illegal cross-border movements, and some 1,000additional troops were ordered toguard the Kosovo-Macedonian borderin March 2001. KFOR arrested some150 NLA insurgents crossing theborder to Macedonia, but they wereusually released after 72 hoursdetention. As Tim Ripley from Jane’sIntelligence Review contends: “FrustratedNATO officers complain that nomatter how many suspects it detains,they are soon ‘back on the street’because UNMIK has no judges or jailsin which to hold them” (Ibid. p. 2).

Despite the efforts of internationalpeace-brokers, the Macedonian crisis isstill unresolved. The EU’s mediationefforts and NATO’s preparations forintervention are perceived, at least bythe Macedonian government, to berewarding and indirectly stimulating theviolent pursuit of ethnic interests.Offering an unqualified amnesty forinsurgents in advance, as was the casewith the KLA and the UCPMB, de factolegitimizes the NLA as an equal partyto the conflict. The conflict is strainingrelations between the Western powers,the Macedonian government, andAlbanians in both Kosovo andMacedonia. Conversely, theMacedonian war directly contributes toKosovo’s destabilization due itsmobilization as a hinterland and due tothe influx of refugees. In late July2001, it was estimated by UNHCR thatsome 62,000 Albanian refugees fromMacedonia had found refuge inKosovo.

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1) The majority of the fighters havebeen successfully reintegrated intocivilian life, with the IOM programbeing a success after all—even if itsvocational training sometimesseems to be far ahead of economicrecovery. There is evidently a needfor job creation programs,particularly the formation of smalland medium-sized enterpriseswhere the international communitycould play a more important role inmaking credit available toentrepreneurs. By the same token, aclear economic policy for Kosovohas just begun to emerge, beinghampered by conflicts among thedonors about the economic futureof the territory.

2) Of an estimated group of 20,000KLA combatants, roughly halfimmediately returned to their priorpositions. Some 5,000 ex-KLAfighters ended up in the KPC andsome 2,500 in the KPS. This leavesa group of roughly 2,500unaccounted for—the potentialrecruiting basis for UCPMB andNLA insurgents in Serbia andMacedonia. The operational basisof a KLA hardcore group ‘on theloose’ could be narrowed bycredibly sanctioning illegal weaponsand illegal border crossings, acentralized and coordinated poolof data on suspect persons, thebuild-up of detention centers, andcoordinated efforts on the part ofKFOR, UNMIK, the internationalpolice, KPC and KPS, and Kosovopolitical parties in fighting ethnicterrorism.

3) The funding of reintegrationprograms is an unresolved issue—the budgets of the IOM, KPC andKPS combined are a mere fractionof the cost of the UN’sadministration of Kosovo, costingless than a single day of bombwarfare against Yugoslavia. It seemsevident that more funds should beset aside for this purpose, as thesuccessful reintegration of formerfighters is a necessary prerequisiteto calm the region.

4) In terms of the reintegration of theformer KLA, one of the key issuesis job placement followingvocational training. Planning andassessment of retraining by theIOM could be improved bycooperation with potentialemployers, such as largeenterprises, local administrations,and the agricultural sector. UNMIKprovides legal frameworks, decidesupon locations of KPC garrisons,and provides finances, but it is farless engaged in training and placingformer KLA members inemployment. Regular cooperationbetween the IOM and the LaborDepartment of UNMIK couldincrease the efficiency of jobsearches and placement.

5) Whilst sharing the generalassumption that amnesty might bea necessary compromise in order tosuccessfully demilitarize andreintegrate, we think that amnestyhas to be more specifically defined.In view of the lack of amnestylegislation, the expectation of ablanket amnesty is very likely to

stimulate insurgents to relapse intoa violent or criminal pursuit ofinterests. The promise of amnestymay even make the protectoratepowers appear to be aiding andabetting. Blanket amnesties aspracticed with respect to the KLAdo not only cast a lasting doubt onthe democratic credentials ofparamilitaries transformed intosecurity agencies such as the KPCor KPS, but also inhibit theircontrol by the internationalprotectorate. Evaluation ofpersonnel for post-war securityagencies has therefore to cover allpotential candidates, includingcommanders. Flagrant violations ofhumanitarian law, includinggenocide, war crimes, torture,terrorism, rape, and hostage-taking,should be exempted from anyamnesty.

6) An international protectorate actsde facto as the legitimate sovereign,and is therefore bound by interna-tional humanitarian law. Byimplication, protectorates assumeinternal and external sovereignty inplace of a democratically definedpopular sovereign or the prior statesovereignty. Claiming lack ofdomestic democratic legitimacywould be equal to an evasion ofresponsibility. Wherever there aregrounds for suspicion, thejurisdiction of the InternationalCriminal Tribunal for the formerYugoslavia, namely “Genocide”,“Crimes Against Humanity”, and“Violations of the Laws andCustoms of War”, has to beapplied to the KLA, too (Statute ofthe International Criminal Tribunalfor the former Yugoslavia, 1993).The international protectoratecannot wait for an authority whichis legitimized to grant amnesty toemerge in the unknown future. Thescope of acts, time period, andgroup of perpetrators covered byimmunity, as well as the legal basisof amnesty have to be regulated asearly as possible.

Conclusions—Lessons

of the KLADemobilization

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7) Given the wide array of acts ofviolence committed by KLAmembers against civilians ofdifferent ethnic origin as well asKosovar Albanians, thereintegration and reassimilation ofthe KLA additionally warrants apro-active reconciliation policylaunched by the protectoratepowers. The credibility of theprotectorate powers would greatlybenefit from installing transparentand publicly accountable ‘Truthand Reconciliation Commissions’with a mandate to investigate anddocument all gross violations ofhuman rights, the identity of thoseinvolved in such violations, and toenforce judicial accountability forany such violation.

8) With regard to the KPC, the statusquestion needs to be resolvedquickly in order to avoid a furtherdeterioration of relations betweenKFOR, UNMIK and the KPC.Whereas most Kosovars areconvinced that the KPC will formthe nucleus of a future army,UNMIK cannot allow theestablishment of such a forceunder the terms of regulation 1244.

9) The KPS seems to be a success,contributing to a substantialimprovement in policing. However,the lasting influence of the oldKLA structures within the force isa cause of concern. Nevertheless,the KPS could serve as a model forthe creation of a new multi-ethnicpolice force in Macedonia.

10) Kosovo lacks an all-encompassingweapons collection programencouraging the turn-in of smallweapons. With respect to thedisarmament of the KLA, KFORnever seriously questioned thesymbolic nature of the hand-overof some 10,000 weapons in 1999.A weapon collection programlinking collection targets todevelopment aid, along the lines ofa similar UNDP project in Albania,could contribute to ridding Kosovoof surplus weapons.

11) KFOR could not rely on systematicintelligence gathering by itsmember states. The sharing ofinformation on illegal weapons andtrafficking is still of crucialimportance. KFOR has no specialunits for weapons collection; illegalweapons caches were mostly foundby chance and have fuelled theviolence in Southern Serbia and inMacedonia.

12) It seems that the KLA, whichstarted out as a violent secessionistmovement in the early 1990s andbroadened its base in the late 1990sby becoming a popular movement,has in part reverted to its roots in2001. While parts of the old KLAhave been integrated into the self-governing and paramilitarystructures of UN-administeredKosovo, the more radical forceshave taken the torch of revolt totheir Albanian brethren abroad.The impression, fuelled by thesimilarity in name, that Macedonia’sNLA is the old KLA is nonethelessmisguided. It seems rather that theNLA has adopted the Kosovomodel of escalation, foreignintervention and an internationally-brokered peace agreement, leadingto substantial autonomy. The NLAis trying to repeat the Kosovoscenario, with the importantqualification that Macedonia—unlike Milosevic’s Serbia—is notseen as an enemy of the West. Withregard to the demobilization of theKLA in Kosovo, there is no doubtthat some radical and criminalmembers of the old structures havesurvived the transformation intact.

13) The lack of law enforcement andunclear legal situations allowedKLA elites to create economic andpolitical niches during the first sixmonths of the protectorate. Whilethe situation has improved, bothpolicing and the judiciary remainweak spots in UNMIK’sadministration.

14) There is a need to unify civil andmilitary aspects of the protectorateadministration and to createaccountable and transparent chainsof an administrative division oflabor as well as subordination—alesson one could have learned frompost-Dayton experiences in Bosnia(ICG, 1999b, p. 23). KFOR’scontrol over the implementation ofthe Thaci-Jackson Agreementsuffered from lack of coordinationbetween the individual KFORzones (Jurekovic and Feichtinger,2000). At times the centralcommand chain of KFOR wasundermined by specific countryregulations. Furthermore, controlof the KPC as well as illegalactivities on the part of formerKLA members require policing andinvestigation skills largely missingamong militarily trained officers.

15) Regardless of statements to theopposite, KFOR failed incontrolling Kosovo’s borders withAlbania, Serbia, and Macedonia.Prevention of casualties amongKFOR troops was made thehighest priority, leading to theimpression that illegal bordercrossing, including weaponstransfers, can be committed withimpunity. Persons arrested forillegally crossing borders or holdingunlicensed weapons are usuallyreleased after hours. There is nocredible enforcement of theprovisions against the illegalpossession of weapons. NATO hasbecome the hostage of its ownphilosophy of running a risk-freemilitary intervention. Erecting aprotectorate means the assumptionof responsibility for public security,law enforcement, and bordercontrol, or, to put it concisely, thestate monopoly of violence.Intervention involves the takeoverof external and internalsovereignty, otherwise it meansirresponsible governance.

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conclusions

16) KFOR needs to be more resolutein enforcing laws, sanctioning thepossession of illegal weapons andprosecuting criminal undertakingsby former KLA members. Giventhe widely reported failings of theUN International Police, themilitary has to perform policework, especially in the borderregions. This requires training andspecialized military police units,particularly anti-terrorist units, aswell as the build-up of detentioncenters (ICG, 1999g, pp. 17 ff.).The KFOR mandate needs a morecredible interpretation in thisrespect.

17) In practical terms, the frequentturnover of KFOR and UNMIKpersonnel leads to a loss ofinstitutional knowledge. It seemsmore reasonable to rotatepersonnel in a way that securescontinuity. Furthermore, someKFOR sectors are understaffedwith respect to KPC control—inthe German sector, for example,only one person was assigned tothis task. This is of particularimportance if KPC units orindividual members do not complywith regulations.

18) The most important lesson learnedwith regard to future interventionsrelates to planning. NATO and itspolitical leaders had no idea what todo after the military defeat of theSerb forces. There was neither anentry strategy nor an exit strategy.Wars of intervention are alwayslikely to lead to unplanned,unexpected, and unintended results,but this cannot justify laxity. Someauthors have labeled the absence ofa discernable vision as“constructive ambiguity”. Butintervention is like pregnancy—it isunambiguous and you cannotescape full responsibility. Dayton-Bosnia had already demonstratedthat winning a war does not makesense if the political goal and the

terms of the post-war internationalgovernance are not spelled out.Bureaucratic sluggishness,competing national agendas,budgetary problems and an uncleardivision of labor between UNMIKand KFOR result, after all, frompolitical negligence.

19) Interventions aimed at endingethnic wars need to avoid theimpression that they favor onenationalism over the other, as wasclearly the case in Kosovo. This hasfuelled the hope of Albanianextremists in other countries ofrecreating a Kosovo-like scenario,thereby alienating Slav politicalleaders in Serbia and Macedonia.The UN—and NATO—should actas honest brokers, instead of usingone party—as was the case with theKLA in 1998/99—to foster theirown strategic aims.

20) The largest obstacle to a resolutionof the ongoing crisis in theSouthern Balkans region is theunresolved status of Kosovo. Whilethe UN and the Western powersmaintain the fiction that theeventual outcome will be dictatedby UN resolution 1244, i.e.substantial autonomy within theFederal Republic of Yugoslavia, itis clear that this will not beaccepted even by the mostmoderate Kosovo Albanians. Theopen status question prevents acomplete demobilization anddisarmament of Kosovo, as formercombatants retain their weapons incase resolution 1244 isimplemented—a scenario thatwould certainly lead to renewedfighting. Even ‘civilian’ institutionssuch as the KPC are preparing forsuch a scenario.

21) The unresolved status of Kosovohas sparked Albanian nationalismin the neighboring states. From asocio-economic point of view,foreign investment will not beattracted, thus preventing economicrecovery. The status of Kosovocannot be defined by KFOR orUNMIK; it requires political

guidance from the UN SecurityCouncil. It is highly recommendedthat measures should be taken todefinitely rule out at least theextreme options such as a return toYugoslavia, a Greater Albania, aninclusion into Kosovo of Albanian-populated parts of Serbia andMacedonia, as well as an indepen-dent Kosovo with full external andinternal sovereignty. This wouldforeclose the option of gainingindependence for Kosovo bybuilding an unfettered army.

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Frefel, Astrid. 1999. “UCK muss innertTagen raus aus Albanien.” Tagesan-zeiger, 19 June.

Hamzaj, Bardh. 2000. “A NarrativeAbout War and Freedom: Dialogwith Commander RamushHaradinaj.” Pristina: ZERI.

Hedges, Chris. 1999a. “Die Häutungder ‘Schlange’.” Die Woche, 16 July.

________. 1999b. “Kosovo’s NextMasters?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78,No. 3, pp. 24–42.

Huntington, Samuel. 1991/92. “HowCountries Democratize.” PoliticalScience Quarterly, Vol. 106, No. 4,pp. 579–616.

Hysa, Ylber. 2001. “UNMIK andKFOR in Kosovo.” In DimitriosTriantaphyllou, ed. The SouthernBalkans: Perspectives from the Region.Paris: Chaillot Papers, No. 46, p. 55.April.

ICG. See: International Crisis Group.

Independent InternationalCommission on Kosovo. 2000.Kosovo Report. Conflict. InternationalResponse. Lessons Learned. Oxford:Oxford University Press.

International Crisis Group. 1999a.“Unifying the Kosovar Factions:The Way Forward.” ICG BalkansReport, No. 58, Brussels/Tirana,12 March, p. 4.

________. 1999b. “Kosovo: Let’sLearn from Bosnia. Models andMethods of International Admini-stration.” ICG Balkans Report,No. 66, 17 May, p. 23.

________. 1999c. “Reprisals AgainstGypsies and Gorani.” Briefing,Tirana, 28 June.

________. 1999d. “Who Will Lead theKosovo Albanians Now?: MakingSense of Kosovo’s Feuding Fact-ions.” Group Briefing, Tirana,28 June.

________. 1999e. “Power Strugglebetween the KLA and the LDK.”Briefing, Tirana 28 June. Availableat: www.nyu.edu/globalbeat/balkan/ICG062899.html.

________. 1999f. “Waiting forUNMIK: Local Administrations inKosovo.” ICG Balkans Report,No. 79, 18 October.

________. 1999g. “Violence inKosovo: Who’s Killing Whom?”ICG Balkans Report, No. 78,Pristina, London, Washington,2 November.

________. 2000. “What Happened tothe KLA?” ICG Balkans Report,No. 88, Pristina/Washington/Brussels, 3 March.

________. 2001. “Kosovo’sEconomy—Shades of Grey”.Unpublished report, Pristina, April.

International Organization for Migrati-on. 2000. “Socio-Economic andDemographic Profiles of FormerKLA Combatants Registered byIOM.” Volume I, IOM Kosovo,21 January.

________. 2001. ICRS—7th QuarterReport (January–March 2001),Pristina.

IOM. See: International Organizationfor Migration.

Jennings, Christian. 2001. “Private USFirm Training Both Sides inBalkans.” Scotsman, 3 March.

Judah, Tim. 2001. “Greater Albania?”Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2 (Summer),pp. 7–18.

References

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Jurekovic, Predrag and WalterFeichtinger. 2000. “Zur Neuord-nung des südslawischen Raumes.”Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift.No. 3, pp. 334–340.

Karacs, Imre. 2001. “German TroopsAccused of Smuggling Guns FromKosovo.” Independent, 5 February.

Katulis, Brian. 2000. “US Diplomacytoward Kosovo: 1989–99.”Woodrow Wilson Case Study, No. 2.Princeton University, WoodrowWilson School of Public andInternational Affairs.

Kingma, Kees and Natalie Pauwels.2000. “Demobilization andReintegration in the ‘DownsizingDecade’.” In Natalie Pauwels, ed.War Force to Work Force: GlobalPerspectives on Demobilization andReintegration. Baden-Baden,Germany: Nomos Verlags-gesellschaft, pp. 9–19.

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Kusovac, Zoran. 1999. “Interview withGeneral Agim Ceku.” Jane’s DefenceWeekly, 20 October.

Lange, Klaus. 1999. “Die UCK—Anmerkungen zu Geschichte,Struktur und Zielen.” Aus Politik undZeitgeschichte, B 26, pp. 33–39.

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Lipsius, Stephan. 1998. “Untergrund-organisationen im Kosovo—EinÜberblick.” Südosteuropa, Vol. 47,No. 1/2, pp. 75–82.

________. 1999. “Kosovo: PolitischeFührung zerstritten.” Südosteuropa,No. 7/8, pp. 359–372.

________. 2001. “Die neue UCK inMakedonien.” Südosteuropa, Vol. 50,No. 1/3, pp. 1–16.

Loquai, Heinz. 2000. “Der Kosovo-Konflikt—Wege in einen vermeid-baren Krieg: Die Zeit von Novem-ber 1997 bis März 1999.” Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlags-gesellschaft.

Malcolm, Noel. 2000. Kosovo: A ShortHistory. London: Papermac.

Mintchev, Emil. 2000. “Europa und dieProbleme des Balkans: Ein JahrStabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa.”Internationale Politik, No. 8, pp. 53–58, esp. p. 54.

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Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. 2001. “Missionin Kosovo—Kosovo Police ServiceSchool.” Pristina.

OSCE. See: Organization for Securityand Co-operation in Europe.

Perlez, Jane. 1998. “Guerillas inKosovo Rebound, ProvokingConcern.” New York Times,11 November.

Reinhardt, Klaus. 2000. Speech beforethe Transatlantic Society. Bonn,19 October.

________. 2001. “Lehren aus Kosovo:Militärische und politische Heraus-forderungen.” Internationale Politik,No. 3, pp. 32–36.

Reuter, Jens. 2000a. “Zur Geschichteder UÇK.” In Jens Reuter andKonrad Clewing, pp. 171–186.

________. 2000b. “Albaniens nationaleFrage.” In Jens Reuter and KonradClewing, pp. 157–169.

Reuter, Jens and Konrad Clewing, eds.2000. Der Kosovo Konflikt—Ursachen,Verlauf, Perspektiven. Klagenfurt,Austria: Wieser Verlag.

Ripley, Tim. 2000. “The UCK’sArsenal.” Jane’s Intelligence Review,November, pp. 22/23.

________. 2001. “KFOR Tested byAlbanian Insurgents.” Jane’sIntelligence Review, May, pp. 2/3.

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Schmidt-Häuer, Christian. 1998. “Diegeheime Armee des Kosovo.” DieZeit, Nr. 27, 25 June, p. 6.

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Sedlarevic, Tarik. 1999. Violence inKosovo: Who’s Killing Whom? Report.Available at www.bosnet.org/archive/bosnet.w3archive/9911/msg00016.html.

Small Arms Survey. 2001. Small ArmsSurvey—Profiling the Problem. Oxford:Oxford University Press.

Smith, R. Jeffrey. 1998. “A Turnaroundin Kosovo.” Washington Post,18 November.

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Smith, Jeffrey and Peter Finn. 2001.“US Presses Belgrade to ExplainExecution of 3 Americans.”International Herald Tribune, 16 July.

Stavljanin, Dejan. 1998. “KosovoCrosses the Brink.” Transitions,Vol. 5, July.

Sweeney, John and Jens Holsoe. 2000.“UN Backed KPC’s Reign ofTerror.” Observer, 12 March.

Troebst, Stefan. 1999a. “The KosovoWar, Round One: 1998.” Südosteuro-pa, Vol. 48, No. 3/4, pp. 156–190.

________. 1999b. “Chronologie einergescheiterten Prävention: VomKonflikt zum Krieg im Kosovo,1989–1999.” Osteuropa, Vol. 8,pp. 777–795.

________. 2000. “Feuertaufe—DerKosovo-Krieg und die RepublikMakedonien.” In Jens Reuter andKonrad Clewing, pp. 227–245.

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Vaknin, Sam. 2000. “KLA: The Armyof Liberation.” Central EuropeReview, 7 June. Also available atwww.geocities.com/Athens/Forum/6297/pp56.html.

Wagner, Markus. 2000. “Das erste Jahrder UNMIK—Die Organisation derZivilverwaltung im Kosovo.”Vereinte Nationen, No. 4, pp. 132–138.

Walker, Tom and Aidan Laverty. 2000.“CIA Aided Kosovo GuerillaArmy.” Sunday Times, 12 March.

Wittkowsky, Andreas. 2000. “Give Wara Chance? Optionen zur Konsoli-dierung des Kosovo.” InternationalePolitik und Gesellschaft, No. 4,pp. 347–360.

Yannis, Alexandro. 2001. “KosovoUnder International Administrati-on.” Survival, Vol. 43, No. 2(Summer), pp. 31–48.

Zejnullahu, Safet. 2001. War for Kosova:Commander Remi Speaks. Pristina.

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interview partners

Alishani, Ahmet, former officer of theYugoslavian army, member of theFARK, Pristina.

Bennett, Steve, Director of PoliceSchool, OSCE Mission in Kosovo,Vushtri.

Berisha, Caim, member of the GeneralStaff of ‘Defense Minister’ HaizerHaizeri under the Bukoshigovernment, Pristina.

Bilandzic, Vladimir, Special AdvisorCSBM, OSCE Mission to the FRY,Belgrade.

Boskovic, Zoran, Senior Counsellor inthe Office of the Minister, FRYMinistry of Defence, Belgrade.

Ceku, Agim, former KLA Chief ofStaff, head of the KPC, Pristina.

Churcher, Bob, Director Kosovo,International Crisis Group (ICG),Pristina.

Connuck, Bruce, Deputy Head ofMission, OSCE Mission to the FRY,Belgrade.

Curis, Robert, Senior Analyst,International Crisis Group (ICG),Pristina.

Hoxhai, Enver, historian, University ofPristina.

Fatash, Parviz, Deputy ResidentRepresentative, UNDP, Tirana.

Goracci, Monica, ProgrammeDevelopment Officer, IOM,Pristina.

Hacker, Thom, Deputy PoliceCommissioner Planning andDevelopment, UNMIK Police,Pristina.

Hutsch, Franz-Josef, journalist,Hamburg.

Hyde, Andrew, expert, Stability Pact forSouth Eastern Europe, Brussels.

Interview Partners

Ibishi, Nuredin, KLA commander“Leka”, Kosovo Police Service,Pristina.

Jenkins, Carl, ICRS ProgrammeManager, IOM, Pristina.

Klinaku, Shukri, Vice President LKCK,Pristina.

Le Mesurier, James, Advisory Unit onSecurity and Justice, UNMIK,Pristina.

Lindeman, Ole Andreas, SpecialPolitical Advisor to CommanderKFOR, Pristina.

Lindholm, Sven, Press Officer, OSCEMission in Kosovo, Pristina.

Loquai, Heinz, OSCE Mission onKosovo in Vienna, retired generalof the German Bundeswehr.

McNeill, Ian, UNMIK Headquarters,responsible for KPC control,Pristina.

Muhamed, Driton, law student,University of Pristina.

Mustafa, Rrustem, KPC commander,Pristina

Osmani, Naim, National LegalAdvisor, Kosovo Law Centre,Pristina.

Ringard, KFOR Lieutenant-Colonel(Norway), KFOR-HQ, Pristina

Sands-Pingot, Guy, Colonel, KFORHQ, Pristina.

Sheku, Gani, former KLA commander,KPC administration, Pristina.

Turner, Paul, Head of Office, Depart-ment for InternationalDevelopment (DFID), Pristina.

Wittkowski, Andreas, Economic PolicyAdvisor, UNMIK, Pristina.

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Appendix

I. Resolution 1244 (1999), Adopted by the Security Council at its 4011th meeting, on 10 June1999

The Security Council

Bearing in mind the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and the primary responsibility of theSecurity Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, Recalling its resolutions 1160 (1998) of 31 March1998, 1199 (1998) of 23 September 1998, 1203 (1998) of 24 October 1998 and 1239 (1999) of 14 May 1999,

Regretting that there has not been full compliance with the requirements of these resolutions,

Determined to resolve the grave humanitarian situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and to provide for thesafe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes,

Condemning all acts of violence against the Kosovo population as well as all terrorist acts by any party,

Recalling the statement made by the Secretary-General on 9 April 1999, expressing concern at the humanitarian tragedytaking place in Kosovo,

Reaffirming the right of all refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in safety,

Recalling the jurisdiction and the mandate of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,

Welcoming the general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo crisis adopted on 6 May 1999 (S/1999/516, annex 1to this resolution) and welcoming also the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles set forth inpoints 1 to 9 of the paper presented in Belgrade on 2 June 1999 (S/1999/649, annex 2 to this resolution), and the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia’s agreement to that paper,

Reaffirming the commitment of all Member States to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia and the other States of the region, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act and annex 2,

Reaffirming the call in previous resolutions for substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration for Kosovo,

Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security,

Determined to ensure the safety and security of international personnel and the implementation by all concerned of theirresponsibilities under the present resolution, and acting for these purposes under Chapter VII of the Charter of the UnitedNations,

1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general principles in annex 1 and as furtherelaborated in the principles and other required elements in annex 2;

2. Welcomes the acceptance by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia of the principles and other required elements referred toin paragraph 1 above, and demands the full cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in their rapidimplementation;

3. Demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and verifiable end to violence andrepression in Kosovo, and begin and complete verifiable phased withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police andparamilitary forces according to a rapid timetable, with which the deployment of the international security presence inKosovo will be synchronized;

4. Confirms that after the withdrawal an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serb military and police personnel will bepermitted to return to Kosovo to perform the functions in accordance with annex 2;

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5. Decides on the deployment in Kosovo, under United Nations auspices, of international civil and security presences, withappropriate equipment and personnel as required, and welcomes the agreement of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia tosuch presences;

6. Requests the Secretary-General to appoint, in consultation with the Security Council, a Special Representative to controlthe implementation of the international civil presence, and further requests the Secretary-General to instruct his SpecialRepresentative to coordinate closely with the international security presence to ensure that both presences operatetowards the same goals and in a mutually supportive manner;

7. Authorizes Member States and relevant international organizations to establish the international security presence inKosovo as set out in point 4 of annex 2 with all necessary means to fulfil its responsibilities under paragraph 9 below;

8. Affirms the need for the rapid early deployment of effective international civil and security presences to Kosovo, anddemands that the parties cooperate fully in their deployment;

9. Decides that the responsibilities of the international security presence to be deployed and acting in Kosovo will include:

a. Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal andpreventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces, except as provided inpoint 6 of annex 2;

b. Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups as required in paragraph15 below;

c. Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the internationalcivil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;

d. Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;

e. Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;

f. Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;

g. Conducting border monitoring duties as required;

h. Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other internationalorganizations;

10. Authorizes the Secretary-General, with the assistance of relevant international organizations, to establish an internationalcivil presence in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovocan enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitionaladministration while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutionsto ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo;

11. Decides that the main responsibilities of the international civil presence will include:

a. Promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of substantial autonomy and self-government in Kosovo, takingfull account of annex 2 and of the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648);

b. Performing basic civilian administrative functions where and as long as required;

c. Organizing and overseeing the development of provisional institutions for democratic and autonomous self-governmentpending a political settlement, including the holding of elections;

d. Transferring, as these institutions are established, its administrative responsibilities while overseeing and supporting theconsolidation of Kosovo’s local provisional institutions and other peace-building activities;

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e. Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords(S/1999/648);

f. In a final stage, overseeing the transfer of authority from Kosovo’s provisional institutions to institutions establishedunder a political settlement;

g. Supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructure and other economic reconstruction;

h. Supporting, in coordination with international humanitarian organizations, humanitarian and disaster relief aid;

i. Maintaining civil law and order, including establishing local police forces and meanwhile through the deployment ofinternational police personnel to serve in Kosovo;

j. Protecting and promoting human rights;

k. Assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo;

12. Emphasizes the need for coordinated humanitarian relief operations, and for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia toallow unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations and to cooperate with such organizations so as toensure the fast and effective delivery of international aid;

13. Encourages all Member States and international organizations to contribute to economic and social reconstruction aswell as to the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and emphasizes in this context the importance of conveningan international donors’ conference, particularly for the purposes set out in paragraph 11 (g) above, at the earliestpossible date;

14. Demands full cooperation by all concerned, including the international security presence, with the International Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia;

15. Demands that the KLA and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups end immediately all offensive actions and complywith the requirements for demilitarization as laid down by the head of the international security presence in consultationwith the Special Representative of the Secretary-General;

16. Decides that the prohibitions imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1160 (1998) shall not apply to arms and relatedmatériel for the use of the international civil and security presences;

17. Welcomes the work in hand in the European Union and other international organizations to develop a comprehensiveapproach to the economic development and stabilization of the region affected by the Kosovo crisis, including theimplementation of a Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to furtherthe promotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation;

18. Demands that all States in the region cooperate fully in the implementation of all aspects of this resolution;

19. Decides that the international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of 12 months, to continuethereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise;

20. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of this resolution,including reports from the leaderships of the international civil and security presences, the first reports to be submittedwithin 30 days of the adoption of this resolution;

21. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.

Annex 1

Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on6 May 1999. The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political solution to the Kosovocrisis:

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Immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo; Withdrawal from Kosovo of military, police andparamilitary forces; Deployment in Kosovo of effective international civil and security presences, endorsed and adopted bythe United Nations, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of the common objectives; Establishment of an interimadministration for Kosovo to be decided by the Security Council of the United Nations to ensure conditions for a peacefuland normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo; The safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons and unimpededaccess to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations; A political process towards the establishment of an interim politicalframework agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouilletaccords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the othercountries of the region, and the demilitarization of the KLA; Comprehensive approach to the economic development andstabilization of the crisis region.

Annex 2

Agreement should be reached on the following principles to move towards a resolution of the Kosovo crisis:

1. An immediate and verifiable end of violence and repression in Kosovo.

2. Verifiable withdrawal from Kosovo of all military, police and paramilitary forces according to a rapid timetable.

3. Deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices of effective international civil and security presences, acting asmay be decided under Chapter VII of the Charter, capable of guaranteeing the achievement of common objectives.

4. The international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation must be deployedunder unified command and control and authorized to establish a safe environment for all people in Kosovo and tofacilitate the safe return to their homes of all displaced persons and refugees.

5. Establishment of an interim administration for Kosovo as a part of the international civil presence under which thepeople of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to be decided by theSecurity Council of the United Nations. The interim administration to provide transitional administration whileestablishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditionsfor a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo.

6. After withdrawal, an agreed number of Yugoslav and Serbian personnel will be permitted to return to perform thefollowing functions: Liaison with the international civil mission and the international security presence; Marking/clearingminefields; Maintaining a presence at Serb patrimonial sites; Maintaining a presence at key border crossings.

7. Safe and free return of all refugees and displaced persons under the supervision of the Office of the United NationsHigh Commissioner for Refugees and unimpeded access to Kosovo by humanitarian aid organizations.

8. A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework agreement providing for substantial elf-government for Kosovo, taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorialintegrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the demilitarization of UCK.Negotiations between the parties for a settlement should not delay or disrupt the establishment of democratic self-governing institutions.

9. A comprehensive approach to the economic development and stabilization of the crisis region. This will include theimplementation of a stability pact for South-Eastern Europe with broad international participation in order to furtherpromotion of democracy, economic prosperity, stability and regional cooperation.

10. Suspension of military activity will require acceptance of the principles set forth above in addition to agreement to the,previously identified, required elements, which are specified in the footnote below. (1) A military-technical agreement willthen be rapidly concluded that would, among other things, specify additional modalities, including the roles and functionsof Yugoslav/Serb personnel in Kosovo: Withdrawal Procedures for withdrawals, including the phased, detailed scheduleand delineation of a buffer area in Serbia beyond which forces will be withdrawn; Returning Personnel Equipmentassociated with returning personnel; Terms of reference for their functional responsibilities; Timetable for their return;Delineation of their geographical areas of operation; Rules governing their relationship to the international securitypresence and the international civil mission.

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Notes

1. Other required elements: A rapid and precise timetable for withdrawals, meaning, e.g., seven days to complete withdrawaland air defence weapons withdrawn outside a 25 kilometre mutual safety zone within 48 hours; Return of personnel forthe four functions specified above will be under the supervision of the international security presence and will be limitedto a small agreed number (hundreds, not thousands); Suspension of military activity will occur after the beginning ofverifiable withdrawals; The discussion and achievement of a military-technical agreement shall not extend the previouslydetermined time for completion of withdrawals.

II. Undertaking of demilitarisation and transformation by the UCK, Signed on 20 June 1999

1. This Undertaking provides for a ceasefire by the UCK, their disengagement from the zones of conflict, subsequentdemilitarisation and reintegration into civil society. In accordance with the terms of UNSCR 1244 and taking account ofthe obligations agreed to at Rambouillet and the public commitments made by the Kosovar Albanian Rambouilletdelegation.

2. The UCK undertake to renounce the use of force to comply with the directions of the Commander of the internationalsecurity force in Kosovo (COMKFOR), and where applicable the head of the interim civil administration for Kosovo,and to resolve peacefully any questions relating to the implementation of this undertaking.

3. The UCK agree that the International Security Presence (KFOR) and the international civil presence will continue todeploy and operate without hindrance within Kosovo and that KFOR has the authority to take all necessary action toestablish and maintain a secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo and otherwise carry out its mission.

4. The UCK agrees to comply with all of the obligations of this Undertaking and to ensure that with immediate effect allUCK forces in Kosovo and in neighbouring countries will observe the provisions of this Undertaking, will refrain fromall hostile or provocative acts, hostile intent and freeze military movement in either direction across International bordersor the boundary between Kosovo and other parts of the FRY, or any other actions inconsistent with the spirit ofUNSCR 1244. The UCK in Kosovo agree to commit themselves publicly to demilitarise in accordance with paragraphs22 and 23, refrain from activities which jeopardise the safety of international governmental and non-governmentalpersonnel including KFOR, and to facilitate the deployment and operation of KFOR.

5. For purposes of this Undertaking, the following expressions shall have the meanings as described below: a. The UCKincludes all personnel and organisations within Kosovo, currently under UCK control, with a military or paramilitarycapability and any other groups or individuals so designated by Commander KFOR (COMKFOR) b. «FRY Forces»includes all of the FRY and Republic of Serbia personnel and organisations with a military capability. This includesregular army and naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, borderpolice, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, Ministry of Internal Affairs, local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by Commander KFOR (COMKFOR). c. The GroundSafety Zone (GSZ) is defined as a 5-kilometre zone that extends beyond the Kosovo province border into the rest ofFRY territory. It includes the terrain within that 5-kilometre zone. d. Prohibited weapons are any weapon 12.7mm orlarger, any anti-tank or anti-aircraft weapons, grenades, mines or explosives, automatic and long barreled weapons.

6. The purpose of this Undertaking are as follows: a. To establish a durable cessation of hostilities. b. To provide for thesupport and authorisation of the KFOR and in particular to authorise the KFOR to take such actions as are required,including the use of necessary force in accordance with KFOR’s rules of engagement, to ensure compliance with thisUndertaking and protection of the KFOR, and to contribute to a secure environment for the international civilimplementation presence, and other international organisations, agencies, and non-governmental organisations and thecivil populace.

7. The actions of the UCK shall be in accordance with this Undertaking. «The KFOR» commander in consultation, whereappropriate, with the interim civil administrator will be the final authority regarding the interpretation of thisUndertaking and the security aspects of the peace settlement it supports. His determinations will be binding on all partiesand persons.

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Cessation of Hostilities

8. With immediate effect on signature the UCK agrees to comply with this Undertaking and with the directions ofCOMKFOR. Any forces which fail to comply with this Undertaking or with the directions of COMKFOR will be liableto military action as deemed appropriate by COMKFOR.

9. With immediate effect on signature of this Undertaking all hostile acts by the UCK will cease. The UCK Chief ofGeneral Staff undertakes to issue clear and precise instructions to all units and personnel under his command, to ensurecontact with the FRY force is avoided and to comply fully with the arrangements for bringing this Undertaking intoeffect. He will make announcements immediately following final signature of this Undertaking, which will be broadcastregularly through all appropriate channels to assist in ensuring that instructions to maintain this Undertaking reach all theforces under his command and are understood by the public in general.

10. The UCK undertakes and agrees in particular: a. To cease the firing of all weapons and use of explosive devices. b. Notto place any mines, barriers or checkpoints, nor maintain any observation posts or protective obstacles. c. Thedestruction of buildings, facilities or structures is not permitted. It shall not engage in any military, security, or trainingrelated activities, including ground or air defence operations, in or over Kosovo or GSZ, without the prior expressapproval of COMKFOR. d. Not to attack, detain or intimidate any civilians in Kosovo, nor shall they attack, confiscateor violate the property of civilians in Kosovo.

11. The UCK agrees not to conduct any reprisals, counter-attacks, or any unilateral actions in response to violations of theUNSCR 1244 and other extant agreements relating to Kosovo. This in no way denies the right of self-defence.

12. The UCK agrees not to interfere with those FRY personnel that return to Kosovo to conduct specific tasks asauthorised and directed by COMKFOR.

13. Except as approved by COMKFOR, the UCK agrees that its personnel in Kosovo will not carry weapons of any type: a.Within 2 kilometres of VJ and MUP assembly areas; b. Within 2 kilometres of the main roads and the towns upon themlisted at Appendix A; c. Within 2 kilometres of external borders of Kosovo; d. In any other areas designated byCOMKFOR

14. Within 4 days of signature of this Undertaking: a. The UCK will close all fighting positions, entrenchments, andcheckpoints on roads, and mark their minefields and booby traps. b. The UCK Chief of General Staff shall report inwriting completion of the above requirement to COMKFOR and continue to provide weekly detailed written statusreports until demilitarisation, as detailed in the following paragraphs, is complete.

Cross-Border Activity

15. With immediate effect the UCK will cease the movement of armed bodies into neighbouring countries. All movementof armed bodies into Kosovo will be subject to the prior approval of COMKFOR.

Monitoring the Cessation of Hostilities

16. The authority for dealing with breaches of this Undertaking rests with COMKFOR. He will monitor and maintain andif necessary enforce the cessation of hostilities.

17. The UCK agrees to co-operate fully with KFOR and the interim civil administration for Kosovo. The chief of theGeneral Staff of the UCK will ensure that prompt and appropriate action is taken to deal with any breaches of thisUndertaking by his forces as directed by COMKFOR.

18. Elements of KFOR will be assigned to maintain contact with the UCK and will be deployed to its command structureand bases.

19. KFOR will establish appropriate control at designated crossing points into Albania and the FYROM.

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Joint Implementation Commission (JIC)

20. A JIC will be established in Pristina within 4 days of the signature of this Undertaking. The JIC will be chaired byCOMKFOR and will comprise the senior commanders of KFOR and the UCK, and a representative from the interimcivil administration for Kosovo.

21. The JIC will meet as often as required by COMKFOR throughout the implementation of this Undertaking. It may becalled without prior notice and representation by the UCK is expected at a level appropriate with the rank of the KFORchairman. Its functions will include: a. Ensuring compliance with agreed arrangements for the security and activities ofall forces; b. The investigation of actual or threatened breaches of his Undertaking; c. Such other tasks as may beassigned to it by COMKFOR in the interests of maintaining the cessation of hostilities.

Demilitarisation and Transformation

22. The UCK will follow the procedures established by COMKFOR for the phased demilitarisation, transformation andmonitoring of UCK forces in Kosovo and for further regulation of their activities. They will not train or organiseparades without the authority of COMKFOR.

23. The UCK agrees to the following timetable which will commence from the signature of this Undertaking: a. Within 7days, the UCK shall establish secure weapons storage sites, which shall be registered with and verified by the KFOR; b.Within 7 days the UCK will clear their minefields and booby traps, vacate their fighting positions and transfer toassembly areas as agreed with COMKFOR at the JIC. Thereafter only personnel authorised by COMKFOR and seniorOfficers of the UCK with their close protection personnel not exceeding 3, carrying side arms only, will be allowedoutside the assembly areas. c. After 7 days automatic small arms weapons not stored in the registered weapons storagesites can only be held inside the authorised assembly areas. d. After 29 days, the retention of any non-automatic longbarreled weapons shall be subject to authorisation by COMKFOR. e. Within 30 days, subject to arrangements byCOMKFOR, if necessary, all UCK personnel, who are not of local origin, whether or not they are legally withinKosovo, including individual advisors, freedom fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighbouring and otherStates, shall be withdrawn from Kosovo. f. Arrangements for control of weapons are as follows: i. Within 30 days theUCK shall store in the registered weapons storage sites all prohibited weapons with the exception of automatic smallarms. 30 per cent of their total holdings of automatic small arms weapons will also be stored in these sites at this stage.Ammunition for the remaining weapons should be withdrawn and stored at an approved site authorised by COMKFORseparate from the assembly areas at the same time. ii. At 30 days it shall be illegal for UCK personnel to possessprohibited weapons, with the exception of automatic small arms within assembly areas, and unauthorised long barreledweapons. Such weapons shall be subject to confiscation by the KFOR. iii. Within 60 days a further 30 per cent ofautomatic small arms, giving a total of 60 per cent of the UCK holdings, will be stored in the registered weapons storagesites. iv. Within 90 days all automatic small arms weapons will be stored in the registered weapons storage sites.Thereafter their possession by UCK personnel will be prohibited and such weapons will be subject to confiscation byKFOR. g. From 30 days until 90 days the weapons storage sites will be under joint control of the UCK and KFORunder procedures approved by COMKFOR at the JIC. After 90 days KFOR will assume full control of these sites. h.Within 90 days all UCK forces will have completed the processes for their demilitarisation and are to cease wearingeither military uniforms or insignia of the UCK. i. Within 90 days the Chief of General Staff UCK shall confirmcompliance with the above restrictions in writing to COMKFOR.

24. The provisions of this Undertaking enter into force with immediate effect of its signature by the Kosovar Albanianrepresentative(s).

25. The UCK intends to comply with the terms of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, and in this contextthat the international community should take due and full account of the contribution of the UCK during the Kosovocrisis and accordingly give due consideration to: a. Recognition that, while the UCK and its structures are in the processof transformation, it is committed to propose individual current members to participate in the administration and policeforces of Kosovo, enjoying special consideration in view of the expertise they have developed. b. The formation of anArmy in Kosovo on the lines of the US National Guard in due course as part of a political process designed todetermine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet Accord.

26. This Undertaking is provided in English and Albanian and if there is any doubt as to the meaning of the text theEnglish version has precedence.

The Bonn InternationalCenter for Conversion (BICC)

an independent non-profit organizationdedicated to promoting the transfer

of former military resources and assetsto alternative civilian purposes

Published by© BICC, Bonn 2001Bonn International Center for ConversionDirector: Dr. Herbert WulfPublishing Management, Layout: Svenja BendsAn der Elisabethkirche 25D-53113 BonnGermanyPhone +49-228-911960Fax +49-228-241215E-mail: bicc@bicc.deInternet: www.bicc.de

ISSN 0947-7322

Printed in GermanyAll rights reserved

he transfer of resources from the militaryto the civilian sector represents both a

social and an economic challenge, as well asoffering an opportunity for the statesconcerned. The sustained process ofdisarmament during the decade following theend of the Cold War has made defense conver-sion an important issue in many countriestoday. This process has now slowed downconsiderably, but the problems faced by thoseaffected are far from solved. BICC’s mainobjective is to make use of the chances offeredby disarmament, whilst at the same timehelping to avoid—or lessen—the negativeeffects.

This issue concerns a number of areas: Whatcan scientists and engineers who were formerlyemployed in weapons labs do today? What isthe fate of the roughly eight million employeeswho lost their jobs in the defense factories?Why are so many defense companies faringbetter today than they did ten years ago? Willall demobilized soldiers or former combatantsfind a future in civilian society? What actionmust communities take when suddenly facedwith the closure of a huge military base? Howdoes one solve the problem of the readyavailability of small arms and light weapons?

It is BICC’s task to tackle these questions, toanalyze them on the basis of scientificresearch, to convey the necessary information,and to give advice to those involved—in short,to manage disarmament.

nternational think tank. BICC conductsresearch and makes policy

recommendations. In-house and externalexperts contribute comparative analyses andbackground studies

roject management and consultingservices. BICC provides practical

support to public and private organizations.For instance, BICC staff advise localgovernments confronted with the difficult taskof redeveloping former military installations.BICC also combines development assistancewith practical conversion work by helping inthe fields of demobilization, reintegration andpeace-building.

learinghouse. In its capacity as anindependent organization, BICC supports

and assists international organizations,government agencies, nongovernmentalorganizations, companies and the media, aswell as private individuals. It hereby mediatesand facilitates the conversion process at alllevels—local, national and global. BICCcollects and disseminates data and informationon conversion to practitioners in a wide rangeof fields and institutions. BICC strives to reachresearchers and practitioners as well asparliamentarians, the media, and the generalpublic by means of a variety of tools includingits library, its extensive on-line documentationservices and its internet service (www.bicc.de).Furthermore, the Center documents the courseof disarmament and conversion in its annualconversion surveys and produces a variety ofpublications.

The Bonn International Center for Conversionwas established in 1994 with generous supportfrom the State of North Rhine-Westphalia(NRW). The Center’s Trustees include the twoGerman states of North Rhine-Westphalia andBrandenburg as well as the Westdeutsche Lan-desbank–Girozentrale (WestLB), Düsseldorf/Münster and the Landesentwicklungsgesell-schaft NRW (LEG).

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