briefing on the colombian conflict by professor michael ... · 1 briefing on the colombian conflict...

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Briefing on the Colombian Conflict By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC

GENERAL FRAMEWORK • The Colombian conflict can be roughly characterized as a three-sided one involving

left-wing guerrillas, government forces and illegal right-wing paramilitaries.

• There has been a rough equilibrium over the years; paramilitary activity has been high

during periods when the government has done a poor job of containing the guerrillas

and vice versa.

• Existence of the paramilitaries reflects a failure of the state to contain the guerrillas,

although the paramilitaries now have a life of there own and will continue to exist with

or without the guerrillas.

MAIN ILLEGAL GROUPS

GUERRILLAS – FARC AND ELN • Check point/road block actions (without robbery), infrastructure attacks and attacks

on means of transport account for roughly half of all guerrilla events in our dataset.

• Then come bombings, incursions, ambushes, mine explosions and massacres

(kidnappings are not included in our data at present but are a big activity)

BRIEFING ON THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT

By Professor Michael Spagat, Royal Holloway, University of London and CERAC

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Portfolio of attacks by guerrilla groups

Massacre2% Incursion

8%

Check point20%

Mass kidnapping1%

Infrastructure15%

Means of transport12%

Bombing9%

Ambush8%

Mine explosion3%

Other22%

• The ELN stresses infrastructure attacks more and bombings less than the FARC.

• Are the Guerrillas narco-terrorists? Yes, but the term is too narrow. The guerrillas do

lots of things (e.g., infrastructure attacks) not normally associated with terrorism and

lots of things inconsistent with a desire for a quiet life dealing drugs.

Guerrillas – FARC and ELN

Source: CERAC

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• The ultimate goal of the guerrillas is to take power, not to get rich off drug-dealing. A

more medium-term and realistic goal is to maintain and extend local power.

• Guerrilla revenue comes not just from drugs but also from kidnapping, extortion and

theft, notably of land and cattle.

• The guerrillas cause most injuries to civilians, these coming mostly in bombings.

Distribution of injured civilians in attacks by identified group attacking

78%

11%

11%

Injured civilians by guerrilla groups Injured civilians by paramilitary groups Injured civilians by government

Guerrillas – FARC and ELN

Source: CERAC

4


Mass kidnapping5% Check point and/or road

blockage9%

Incursion16%

Massacre70%

PARAMILITARIES

• Basic strategy has been to massacre civilians they suspect of helping the guerrillas.

Portfolio of attacks by paramilitaries

Paramilitaries

Source: CERAC

5


0

200

400

600

800

1.000

1.200

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Civilians killed in paramilitary massacres Paramilitary massacres

• Cause most killings of civilians, mostly through massacres.

Civilians killed in paramilitary massacres 1988-2004

Paramilitaries

Source: CERAC

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• The paramilitary Killing/Injury ratio is on the order of 10, compared to roughly 2 for the

guerrillas and 1 for the government. This is because they mostly kill people by shooting

them at short range in massacres.

Ratio of killings to injuries in attacks by group attacking 1988-2004

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

K/I by guerrillas K/I by paramilitaries K/I by government forces

Paramilitaries

Source: CERAC

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• Generally perform very badly in clashes with other armed groups, getting killed much

more than the opposing guerrillas and government forces.

Killings by group in (clashes with paramilitary participation)

paramilitary clashes 1988-2004

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

1989 1990 1991 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Guerrillas killed Paramilitaries killed Government forces killed

Paramilitaries

Source: CERAC

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• Very high levels of Government-Guerrilla clashes

Government guerrilla clashes 1988-2004

MAIN TRENDS UNDER URIBE

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Uribe's government

Main Trends under Uribe

Source: CERAC

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0

200

400

600

800

1.000

1.200

1.400

1.600

1.800

2.000

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 20040,0

0,5

1,0

1,5

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

4,5

Guerrillas killed Government forces killed Ratio Gue/Gov

Uribe's government

• Higher ratios of guerrillas killed to members of government forces killed

Number of government forces and guerrilla s killed 1988-2004


Source: CERAC

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• Government forces have increased both their initiative and responsiveness against

the guerrillas.

• Heavy activity in the so called ¨Operación JM¨zone in the deep south of the country;

but not just there, activity remains all over the place.

0

500

1.000

1.500

2.000

2.500

3.000

3.500

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Combatants killed Civilians killed

Uribe's government

• Many combatants killed, fewer civilians killed.

Combatants and civilians killed 1988-2004


Source: CERAC

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Map 1: Clashes between government forces and

guerrillas in 2004

• Notable problem areas are Southeastern

Antioquia and near the Venezuelan border

with the Ecuadorian border emerging as

an issue.


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Map 2: Attacks


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• Government-Paramilitary clashes rose from almost nothing to something, but then

disappeared.

• Fewer guerrilla attacks (one-sided events) although these have started to come back.

Number of guerrilla attacks

0

200

400

600

800

1.000

1.200

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Uribe's government


Source: CERAC

14


0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

ELN clashes ELN attacks

Uribe's government

• ELN is disappearing as an attacking force.

Number of ELN clashes and attacks


Source: CERAC

15


• Fewer paramilitary attacks (one-sided events)

Number of paramilitary attacks

0

50

100

150

200

250

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004

Uribe's government

• Since 2002 the paramilitaries have been on an official ceasefire. They have violated it

frequently but have, nevertheless reduced their activity, focusing less on the guerrillas

and more on land-grabbing, drug dealing and political infiltration


Source: CERAC

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• The paramilitaries are killing fewer civilians than before but the numbers are growing.

• Civilian killings are overwhelmingly in isolated rural areas, mainly from paramilitary

massacres.

Population density and civilians killed in paramilitary massacres

0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1,0

0-50

100-

150

200-

250

300-

350

400-

450

500-

550

650-

700

800-

850

900-

950

1050

-110

0

1650

-170

0

2350

-240

0

2750

-280

0

4100

-415

0

4500

-455

0

5650

-570

0

1610

0-16

150

People per square kilometre

Cu

mm

ula

tive

par

tici

pat

ion

Population2005 KCivMasPar


Source: CERAC

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0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1,0

0-50

50-1

00

100-

150

150-

200

200-

250

250-

300

300-

350

350-

400

400-

450

450-

500

500-

550

550-

600

650-

700

750-

800

800-

850

850-

900

900-

950

1000

-105

0

1050

-110

0

1100

-115

0

1650

-170

0

1700

-175

0

2350

-240

0

2650

-270

0

2750

-280

0

3650

-370

0

4100

-415

0

4350

-440

0

4500

-455

0

5600

-565

0

5650

-570

0

9350

-940

0

1610

0-16

150


Cu

mm

ula

tive

par

tici

pat

ion

Population2005 KCivMasGue

Population density and civilians killed in guerrilla massacres


• Civilian injury rates remain very high due to a sustained guerrilla bombing campaign.

• Civilian injuries tend to concentrate in biggest cities and the most isolated rural areas

but these effects are not as pronounced as for massacres.

Source: CERAC

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Population density and civilians injured in guerrilla bombings

0,0

0,1

0,2

0,3

0,4

0,5

0,6

0,7

0,8

0,9

1,0

0-50

100-

150

200-

250

300-

350

400-

450

500-

550

650-

700

800-

850

900-

950

1050

-110

0

1650

-170

0

2350

-240

0

2750

-280

0

4100

-415

0

4500

-455

0

5650

-570

0

1610

0-16

150


Cu

mm

ula

tive

par

tici

pat

ion

Population2005 ICivBomGue

• 2004 was not as good as 2003 and indications are that 2005 will show further

backsliding.


Source: CERAC

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• The government has made serious mistakes in the political side of counterinsurgency.

• It has not made a good case internationally, e.g., its bewildering campaign to deny that

Colombia has a conflict.

• There is weak international support for paramilitary demobilization, in part due to failure

of the government to build a wide coalition for its Peace and Justice Bill.

• Resources, including time but also money, are lacking for investigation of paramilitary

crimes. The government is doing a poor job of doing forensic tests on guns and

pairing them with demobilizing combatants.

• More importantly, resources are scarce for reparations. Building a good victims registry

is the key to this process but it will be expensive to get this right. The international

community should focus more on reparations for victims and less on punishments for

perpetrators.

• The UN needs to be brought into the demobilization process. Right now the OAS is

carrying this load almost by itself with little support and lots of criticism just for

monitoring the process.

• Potential security vacuum as paramilitaries demobilize. The government is addressing

this problem with a new division and 5,000 additional police but this is unlikely to be

enough.

BIGGER PICTURE

Bigger Picture

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• No sign that the guerrillas are really on a trajectory of defeat at this stage.

• Uribe remains remarkably popular but this has translated into only modest additional

financing for the conflict.

• Neighboring states, primarily Venezuela and Equator, must be pressured to cooperate.

These countries clearly have understandings, implicit or explicit, that illegal groups

can go there as long as they threaten only Colombian interests. Venezuela is just

now setting up a production line that will be able to produce ammunition usable by the

FARC for weapons they have been struggling to feed.

• There needs to be a broader, more integrated program of taking away territory, hol-

ding it and building institutions, including police, judges and prosecutors. There does

seem to be some desire to do this but the resources are lacking.

• In this context training for special forces, military, police, judges, prosecutors and

emergency medicine is very valuable.

• Controlling land is the most promising approach to cutting the supply of drugs in

the long run. It is vital for Colombia to do a comprehensive land survey. There is

too much ungoverned space for spraying to really work as the primary tactic in the

drug war.

Bigger Picture

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1988-2004 1998-2004

Ratio of killings in events with paramilitary participation to total number of killings 0,26 0,36Ratio of injuries in events with guerrilla participation to total number of injuries 0,82 0,79Ratio of killings to injuries in paramilitary attacks 11,23 11,21Ratio of killings to injuries in guerrilla attacks 0,96 0,92Ratio of killings to injuries in government attacks 2,64 2,43Civilian killngs 12771 7766

• Continued US funding seems assured but with an unfortunate single-minded focus on

spraying.

Some Ratios for the Colombian Conflict 1988-2004

Professor Michael Spagat is the Chairman of the Advisory Board of CERAC and Research Associate.

He is a professor of Economics at Royal Holloway-University of London and has an extensiverecord of research in political economy of conflicts, dictatorships and repressive regimes. He hasalso done research in comparative and monetary economics.

Professor Spagat holds a PhD in economics from Harvard University and is a member of the CEPRand the William Davidson Institute.

e-mail: [email protected] website: www.cerac.org.co

Bigger Picture

Source: CERAC

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