76

The 1832 Reform Actand the Maintenance ofAristocratic Power in

Britain

Paul Townsend

No King, no Lords, no inequalities in the social system; all will be leveled tothe plane of petty shopkeepers and farmers; this not perhaps withoutbloodshed, but certainly by confiscation and persecution.

-- Letter of John Croker to Sir Walter Scott, 1831

When the King called the Bill ‘an aristocratic measure’ the Tories laughedbitterly and accused Grey of playing upon his simplicity. Yet, in persuadingthe King that the Bill would save the throne and the aristocracy and preventbloodshed, Grey spoke his honest belief, which turned out to be correct.

-- George Macaulay Trevelyan Lord Grey ofthe Reform Bill

When Lord John Russell rose in the House of Commons on the evening ofMarch1, 1831 to bring forward, on behalf of the government, a Bill to Amend theRepresentation of the People of England and Wales, he was not proposing just

another law; rather he was opening one of the greatest constitutional debates in modemBritish history. What Lord John’s Bill proposed, the reform of the parliamentary electoralsystem, was the most fundamental change in the British Constitution since 1688, when theposition of Parliament in the governance of the realm had been enshrined following theevents of the Glorious Revolution.

The first Reform Act, as passed in 1832, had two fundamental effects: it broadenedthe electoral franchise and redistributed parliamentary representation, in the form ofelectoral constituencies throughout Britain. By setting the qualification for the franchise atthe ten pound householder in towns, the ten pound copyholders and long leaseholders, andthe fifty pound short leaseholders and tenants-at-will in the counties, the electorate wasincreased by nearly 80%. However, even with this large increase the total eligibleelectorate numbered about 650,000, a small fraction of the total adult male population. Theredistribution of parliamentary seats meant the elimination of fifty-six rotten boroughs and areduction by one seat each in thirty other constituencies. forty-three previouslyunrepresented boroughs, particularly the newly enlarged northern industrial cities, wereenfranchised while the counties received sixty-five additional seats. What did this reformsigfllfy for the governance ofBritain?

The quotations at the head of this paper, the former by a contemporary, anti-reformMember of Parliament (MP) John Croker, and the latter written by twentieth century Britishhistorian G. M. Trevelyan, indicate the great gulf in opinion about the intent of reform.

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Croker saw in reform the destruction of the piiiars of British society while the PrimeMinister, Lord Grey, is described as seeing in reform the means to saving the Crown andthe aristocracy. Historians of the liberal-whig school, the dominant school of opinion onthe meaning of the Reform Act of 1832, such as Trevelyan, Butler, and Gash, presentreform as a response by the ruling aristocratic elite to middle class pressure for a share inpolitical power, leading to the opening of Parliament to the middle class and effecting the

shift to representative democracy in Britain.However, the intention of the framers of the first Reform Bill was to instigate

electoral reform that would maintain the primary position of aristocratic influence in the

House in Commons and in His Majesty’s Government. They did not see their objective as

being incompatible with the limited extension of the political franchise to the emerging

middle class, but rather saw such a concession as necessary and justifiable under the

principles of the constitution, and believed that by offering such inclusion in power to the

middle class, they would strengthen the constitution and maintain the political role of the

aristocracy. This essay addresses the question of intent by analyzing the writings and

speeches of leading, mainstream reform advocates in reference to three constitutional

principles widely held in early nineteenth century Britain. These three principles,

constitutional checks and balances, the acceptance of property as the basis of political

power, and the variety of parliamentary representation, are each considered in turn. This

analysis is preceded by a section describing the political situation in Britain in the early

1830’s, and followed by a consideration of the efforts of the Ultra-Tories, the traditional

ardent defenders of aristocratic rights, for electoral reform.Since the intangible nature of intent makes it difficult to identify, except where it is

unequivocally stated, much attention will be placed upon the principles of political thought

that prevailed at that time within the mainstream of British politics. No attempt is made to

incorporate the democratic ideas of the Radicals, which, as the paper shows, were foreign to

the minds of the political elite. Rather, the focus is upon those ideas that prevailed within

the elite, as held by leading politicians and their intellectual influences.

The Political Landscape of 1830’s Britain

Before proceeding, some attention to the meaning of ‘aristocracy’ and ‘political elite’

is necessary. Aristocracy refers to the landed nobility and the gentry.1 Land was the basis of

nobility. Without it a peer’s claim to a title could be nullified. In Britain at the time of the

first Reform Act there were about 350 men who could claim to hold hereditary title of

nobility. The hereditary aristocracy was the core of the traditional British political elite.

The gentry was that group, one rank socially inferior to the nobility, who were untitled,

traditional large landowners. Together they are often termed the ‘landed interest’.

Numbering around 4,000 families, they constituted the traditional ruling elite of Britain.

Over the half century previous to the 1830’s there had been an increasing clamor for

parliamentary reform. The gross disparities between the size of constituencies, the easy

corruptibility of so many constituencies, the narrowness of the electoral base and the

Norman Gash, Aristocracy and People. Britain, 1815-1865 (Cambridge: Harvard University Pres, 1979),

17-19.

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vagaries of the franchise throughout the kingdom combined to undermine the authority ofParliament in the minds of the people. Aristocratic hegemony reigned in Parliament, whilein the nation at large the growing capitalist and middle classes felt excluded from power andinfluence.

The nature of government in early nineteenth century Britain was very differentfrom that of today. Parties, as we know them, with centralized organization and commonpolicies, did not exist. The greatest honor an MP would claim was that he was independent.While there were different wings in Parliament, there was no clear dividing line betweenthem, and hence the executive, the Cabinet, was to some degree a coalition of men of thePrime Minister’s wing and men of reasonably compatible views. The expectation was thatthe Government should embody the interests of the nation, rather than a sectional or partyinterest, and that it should be able to command majority loyalty in the House of Commonsso that it could fulfill the executive function of government.

When Lord Grey assumed the Prime Ministership from the Duke of Wellington in1830 the Whigs came to power for the first time in a quarter of a century. The Toryadministrations from Lord Liverpool until Wellington’s had brought about many neededlegal reforms, but they had not dealt with the vital issue of constitutional change whichelectoral reform entailed. The Whigs, whose politics tended to be more ‘liberal’ than that oftraditionalist Tories, were in a position to consider electoral reform and were inclined tobelieve that it was necessary for them to do so if they wished to stay in power.2

A series of letters from Grey to Lord Holland, in the years 1816 to 1820, shows howGrey’s thinking developed from generally favoring a “moderate and gradual Reform ofParliament”3 to unequivocally stating “I am convinced, as every rational man must be, thatour Administration, if we should form one... could not be acquired and certainly notretained, if we were to put aside the question of a Reform of Parliament.”4 Through time hewas drawn toward the conclusion that reform was necessary, and should be a preconditionto the formation of a Whig government. When Grey became Prime Minister ten years laterhe held true to his opinion and made it a prerequisite for government and a criterion forinclusion in his Cabinet.

What is noteworthy about Grey’s Cabinet is how similar it was in its aristocraticmake-up to previous cabinets. It had only four MP’s in it. All nine others sat in the Houseof Lords, and all but two members were substantial landowners. Grey is believed to haveproudly claimed that “its members owned jointly more acres than any previousadministration.”5 The idea that such a Cabinet would initiate electoral reform with thepurpose of diluting aristocratic power in Parliament seems incongruous. That anunreformed , aristocratically dominated Parliament could consider putting its own positionin jeopardy by means of reform seems equally unbelievable. The words of Lord Russell, ina reply to Parliament in 1837, justif’ing the reforms of 1832, should help us understandhow reform was viewed by the Grey Government:

2 From a letter of Lord Grey to Lord Holland, Dec. 20, 1820, quoted in George Trevelyan, Lord Grey oftheReform Bill (London: Longman, Green & Company, 1952), 373.Dec. 8, 1816, quoted in Trevelyan, 371.

‘ Dec. 20, 1820, quoted in Trevelyan, 373.W.L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1963), 35-36.

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At the time the Reform Act was passed, I stated the belief that it must necessarily

give preponderance to the landed interest; and, although it may be deemed that such

a preponderance has been somewhat unduly given, I still think that a preponderance

in favour of that interest tends to the stability of the general institutions of the

country... to frame a plan of reform which should give weight only to the large

towns, to the exclusion of the great body of the landed interest.., would be to

introduce elements of general disorder.6

That such an arrangement of electoral representation could be seen as reform requires an

understanding of the currents of political thought at the time.The constitution of Britain is not a written document, but rather a set of commonly

accepted principles, determined by consensus and convention, and based in legal precedent,

that have developed over the centuries. While this makes it difficult for groups or

individuals to claim specific rights under the constitution, it also allows the constitution to

be reinterpreted in a contemporary context. With regard to the elective representation of the

people and the conditions of the electoral franchise, the three previously stated

constitutional principles, (the concept of constitutional checks and balances, the acceptance

of property as the basis of political power, and the variety of parliamentary representation)

were broadly accepted by the i-tiling elite of the early nineteenth century. With reference to

these political principles the intent of the framers of reform can be considered.

Constitutional Checks and Balances

The constitutional principle of checks and balances between monarchy, the House

of Lords, and the House of Commons, as established in 1689, could no longer be said to

pertain in the Britain of 1830. In the eighteenth century His Majesty’s Government had

become more independent of royal power, though by no means free of royal authority. The

House of Lords, as the upper chamber of Parliament, was fulfilling its functionas the

representative of the nobility. However, through the rules of parliamentary elections the

aristocracy, and its placemen, had also gained dominance of the lower chamber, theHouse

of Commons. These developments combined to concentrate dominant power inthe hands

of the aristocracy, who controlled Parliament and the Cabinet. With the reality of

Parliament’s dominance of government, new thinking arose on the proper role of

Parliament.Sir James Mackintosh (1765-1832), the historian and onetime MP who influen

ced

Grey and Russell, was a chief exponent on the new Whig thinking on the need for

parliamentary reform. While he wrote on the broader participation of allclasses in a

representative Parliament, he singled-out for particular attention the role of thearistocracy.

He wrote:

The capacity of the assembly to make good laws, evidently depends on the quality

6 Lord Russell quoted in D.C. Moore, The Politics ofDeference; A study ofthemid-Nineteenth Century

English Political System (Hassock, UK: Harvester Press, 1979), 188-189.

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of skill and information of every kind which it possesses. But it seems to beadvantageous that it should contain a large proportion of one body of a more neutraland inactive character - not indeed to propose much, but to mediate or arbitrate inthe differences between the more busy classes, from whom important propositionsare to be expected... the best chance for an approach to right decisions, lies in anappeal to the largest body ofwell educated men, large property, temperate character,and who are impartial on more subjects than any other class of men. Anascendancy, therefore, of landed proprietors must be considered, on the whole, as abeneficial circumstance in a representative body.7

He goes on to praise the virtues of the aristocracy:

What has preserved their character? ... Where all the ordinary incentives to actionare withdrawn, a free constitution excites it, by presenting Political Power as a newobject of pursuit. By rendering that power in a great degree dependent on popularfavour, it compels the highest to treat their fellow with decency and courtesy; anddispose the best of them to feel, that inferior in station may be superior in worth, asthey are equals in right.8

The words of Mackintosh may seem naive, and even romantic to us, but in its time theyreflected the main thrust of ‘respectabl& reformist thinking. Another excerpt fromMackintosh’s essay is highly revealing, “Popular representation... tends to make governmentgood, and to make good government secure.”9 Interestingly, he began his essay with thisshort sentence, “The object of Government, is security against wrong.” The specter ofreform that Croker feared, respecting “no inequalities in the social system” and leveling all“to the plane of petty shopkeepers and farmers,” was not the reform that Mackintosh hopedfor. Whig reform was a more subtle concept. It sought good, secure, and populargovernment. It recognized Parliament as the de facto dominant political institution, andrecommended reform as the means to make “good government secure”. Such reform was,however, no enemy of aristocracy, but rather saw aristocracy as a vital element in the properfunctioning of representative government. It realized that popular representation makes forgood government and sought to overhaul the existing system rather than destroy it. By sodoing the authority of Parliament would be fortified.

Property as the Rightful Basis of Political Representation

The second broadly accepted constitutional principle, that property was the rightfulfoundation of political power, was a matter of little contention between the parties as theyapproached the reform debate. The principle is well reflected in Sir J. Scarlett’s Letter toLord Viscount Milton, in which he writes, “I hold it a maxim that every Government which

‘ H.J. Hanham, The Nineteenth Century Constitution, ]815-1914: Documents and Commentary (Cambridge,UK: Cambridge University Press, 1969), 6-10.8 Ibid.9lbid.

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tends to separate property from constitutional power, must be liable to perpetual revolution;

for power will always seek property and find it.”The right to vote was not considered an individual right. Indeed, the idea of the vote

as a ‘right’ would have been an alien concept to an early nineteenth century British

gentleman. The idea would suggest revolutionary thinking, which was generally agreed to

be an evil thing, as the bloody revolution in France and the horror of dictatorship and

European wide war that arose from it, which was fresh in the memory of so many, had

attested. The franchise was seen as a ‘trust’, and as such it could only be vested in men of

property. It was believed that those without property had no stake in the maintenance of

order, and were most likely ignorant, irrational and careless of the general good of the

nation.The difference between reformers and anti-reformers was not over the merits of this

belief, but rather whether the middle class was in a position to have the trust of the

franchise. Cabinet member Lord Brougham described the middle class as “the genuine

depositories of sober, rational, intelligent and honest English feeling”0 while Grey claimed

that they had made “wonderful advances in both property and Lord

Macaulay, the leading Whig historian and intellectual, said in December, 1831, that “the

time has arrived when a great concession must be made to the democracy of England...

whether the change be in itself good or bad, has become the question of secondary

importance’ that good or bad, the thing must be done.”2 Macaulay expressed the reformist

Whig belief that the way to insure that the middle class would not ally themselveswith

radicalism, or even revolution, was to make concessions to them, and recognize them as the

proper ally of aristocracy.

Variety of Electoral Representation

The third constitutional principle, the principle of the variety of representation,

should not be confused with the democratic ideal such a concept brings to mind inthe late

twentieth century. The classic traditional exposition of the principle of variety of

representation would point out that the various forms of constituency types were the

guarantors of the variety of parliamentary representation. And constituencies were various

indeed. Some of the open boroughs (urban constituencies), due to their conditions of

electoral enfranchisement, had near universal male suffrage, if men of no propertywere

excluded from the reckoning, which they would automatically be. At the other extreme

were the close and rotten boroughs, where there might be no more than fifty electors with

the right to return two Members of Parliament. What made these boroughs ‘rotten’ was that

in reality the nomination of the candidates was in the control of an aristocratic magnate and

it would bode ill for any elector who dared vote against his nominee. As an elector’s vote

was not secret, but rather declared on the day of voting at a public assembly, thefreedom of

choice of electors was severely restricted. These are just two examples of the many

different forms of constituencies, and the resultant representations, that werepart of the

° J.R.M. Butler, The Passage ofthe Great Reform Bill (New York: A.M. Kelley, 1965), 247.Ibid

12

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unreformed electoral system.The justification of this system was that it would put in Parliament a range of

different men representing a wide variety of interests, and it was this variety that gaveParliament representative legitimacy. A particular argument was that it allowed men oftalent, who stood little chance of being elected in an openly contested election, the chanceto be returned for a ‘safe’ seat, and so bring their talents into Parliament. Over time, manyCabinet members had secured their position in Parliament through a particular form of closeborough, the Cabinet borough. To the majority of modem observers, and to a fewcontemporaries, this argument sounds like a self-justification of a corrupt and unequalrepresentation. But such a reaction overlooks a fundamental underlying concept ofrepresentative government still accepted in the early nineteenth century. Representationwas not based on the rights of individuals in society, but on the rights of social groups andcommunities. It was the sum of these groups, and not the sum of the adult male population,which defined political society. The reformist Whig thinkers, who included Lord JohnRussell and Sir James Gresham, both members of the Cabinet’s Committee of four thatdrafted the first Reform Bill, accepted the idea of group rights of representation.

Again it was Sir James Mackintosh who best represented the thinicing of thereformers in this regard. He looked at the changing social and economic composition ofBritain in the early nineteenth century and explained why parliamentary reform was neededto represent the new reality. He described two forms of government, the old and the new.The old form reflected the primacy of aristocracy in government, which gave it stability andvigor. He praised “the natural tendency derived from [landed] wealth, to settle andconsolidate into a sort of patriarchal chieftainship, which gains strength by descent andduration.” He continues:

Every county, and district, and parish, and village, has its settled heads and leaders,through whom, as their natural organ, their [the peoplesJ sentiments and wishes aremade known, and by whose influences they may be greatly impressed with thewishes and sentiments of others.’3

In the new Britain there had arisen to join the “aristocracy of rank and hereditary wealth” an“aristocracy of personal merit.” This new group were the leaders of the middle class; menof talent, education, culture and property. “In order to make any form of government secureand peaceful these two aristocracies must be united,” he concluded. In this union he sawthe foundation of new government.

Reform, once more, is not portrayed as a threat to the ‘aristocracy of rank’; rather itis the acceptance of the new reality and the modification of the constitution to incorporatethe new men who are of the new aristocracy. It is a concession to the middle classes, butnot a repudiation, nor a confiscation, of aristocratic power. Through concession, byamendment of the constitution, the preservation of aristocratic power, and the maintenanceof secure and peaceful government can be assured.

The Ultra-Tories and Electoral Reform

Moore, 195-96.

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The historian D.C. Moore contends that “the myth of the [Reform] Bill being a

Radical measure” is presented in history “as a means of defining the political character of

the Grey administration.”14 We have seen already that the influence on the framers of

reform was that of the mainstream reformers. Very little consideration seems evident in

their work for the ideas of the Radical reformers, who argued for universal male suffrage,

the secret ballot and democracy. But Moore is not referring to these mainstream liberal

thinkers. He is referring to the ultra-Tory faction in Parliament, staunch traditionalists and

advocates of the aristocracy and landed interests. Yet, they too embraced reform and their

thinking is reflected in the thinking of the framers of the first Reform Bill.

The reforming legislation that had been introduced by the Tory administrations from

the end of the Napoleonic War in 1815, up until the fall of the Wellington government in

1830, had not pleased the ultra-Tory wing of the Tories. The passage of the Catholic

Emancipation Act of 1829 “broke up the old Tory party of Pitt and Liverpool that had so

long dominated the political life of the country”’5 and helped lead to the fall of the

Wellington administration.3tackwoodc Edinburgh Magazine was the forum used by the ultra-Tories to make

their views known. In a series of three articles, published between August 1829 and

February 1831, Blackwood put forward their argument for electoral reform)6 In thelast of

these articles, their concerns with the inequality of electoral representation were presented:

The present system has long worked in the most baleful manner possible... For

several years the House of Commons has treated the sentiments and petitions of the

community with the utmost disregard.. .Thus it is proved by experience... [itJ neither

supplies proper security for public possessions, nor possesses the ability requiredfor

the discharge of its ordinary duties.This [electoral] system is so far from preventing change in the distribution of

election power, that it is hourly making it... it is constantly the Aristocracy to the

Democracy, and giving effect to the schemes of the Radicals... and... in various

counties it has placed Aristocracy and Agriculture in the minority.

The Aristocracy, as a whole, does not possess, and it draws little exclusive benefit

from them [close boroughs]. They belong to a few Peers and Commoners, who use

them for private gain, and the body of Peers have no boroughs... because the vicious

and imbecile few possess them, the great mass of virtuous and talented Peers areas

much excluded from office as an uninfluential commoner.17

The control of close boroughs, the ultra-Tories believed, had fallen underthe

influence of “aristocrats”, a small group of peers and commoners, wealthy men of trade and

manufacturing, who now owned those seats, who represented no local community or

Ibid, 205.R.W. Davies, “The Tories, the Whigs and Catholic Emancipation, 1827-1929,” En

glish Historical Review

97 (1982).6 Gilbert Cahill, The Great Reform Bill of1832: Liberal or Conservative? (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath &

Co., 1969), Introduction.Ibid, 48-52.

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interest but their own, who stood for no principle, and who were willing to sell their votes toany government that made it worthwhile for them. As the MPs from these boroughs couldnot be relied upon to uphold the interests of the aristocracy, then if needs be, these boroughsshould be abolished, and the seats, by right, redistributed in favor of “the most flourishingpart of English history,” the aristocracy. After much more haranguing of manufacturers,trade and the derisively termed ‘aristocrats’, the article concludes that:

From all this, our own most carefully formed and conscientious opinion is, that theLanded Interest and the Aristocracy have only one choice before them - Reform orruin.., the present system will soon virtually drive them out of the House ofCommons, and render them defenseless against the mighty enemies who seek toplunge them into destruction.’8

As empirically suspect and as self-serving as the assertions of the Btackwood’s article maybe, its appearance just weeks before the introduction of the first Reform Bill highlights theirbelief in the inevitable marginalization of the aristocracy and the need to seek redressthrough electoral reform.

In Lord Russell’s speech introducing the Reform Bill the House of Commons inMarch, 1831, he put great emphasis in the distinction between ‘legitimate influence’ andcorrupt, or more properly, ‘illegitimate influence’, upon the electoral system. His meaningin using such language would have been understood by many in the chamber that evening.In the late eighteenth century the historian Thomas Oldfleld had distinguished between twotypes of influence in his History of the Boroughs. For Oldfleld, legitimate influence “onlyderived from extensive property, eminent personal qualities or from good neighbourhoodand hospitality.”9 Those with legitimate influence were the aristocrats that Lord Russellreferred to in his speech, living on their estates, “receiving large incomes, performingimportant duties, relieving the poor by charity, and evincing private worth and publicvirtue... It is not human nature that they should not possess a great influence upon publicopinion, and have an equal weight in electing persons to serve their country in Parliament...I contend that they will have as much influence as they ought to have.”20 Illegitimateinfluence, Lord Russell claimed, was held by those who did not “live amongst the people...[knewJ nothing of the people... and... care[d] nothing for them” and “who seek honourswithout merit, places without duty, and pensions without service - for such an aristocracy Ihave no sympathy.” for Oldfield this influence was at work in “limited corporations andburgage tenures, and in what are termed rotten boroughs, with only ten or twelve houses ineach.”

The illegitimate influence referred to by Lord Russell and the ‘aristocrats’ as definedby the ultra-Tory article in 3lacIcwoods Edinburgh Review may be seen as one. Evident inthe thinking of Oldfield, Russell, and the ultra-Tories is an underlying acceptance of anatural hierarchy of virtue in society, with the aristocracy by right at the top of thehierarchy. The Grey government sought to protect legitimate influence by attacking the

‘ IbidMoore, 45, 233.

20 J.V. Beckett, The Aristocracy in Eng1ana 1660-1914 (Oxford: Basil Blackwood, 1986), 453.

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most blatant forms of corrupt, illegitimate influence. In doing so they intended to

strengthen the legitimate influence of the aristocracy.

Conclusion

The primary purpose of the first Reform Bill was to garner middle class support for

the continuation of aristocratic rule. As Grey wrote a friend, it would strengthen the

constitution by drawing the support of “the real and efficient mass of publicopinion...

without whom the power of gentry is nothing.”2’ It was a measure Lord Russell saw as

final, as he said in his speech to the House on March 1, 1831. The Bill intended “to satisfy

all reasonable demands, and remove at once, and for ever, all rational grounds for complaint

form the minds of the intelligent and independent portion of the community.”22Time was

to prove that it was not enough to satisfy all reformist demands. Considered withregard to

the other electoral reform measures that would come up in the following eighty years, it was

not very radical at all, as its opponents had claimed, but a conservative measure. But the

Bill’s detractors were so angered by it that they did not recognize how pro-aristocratic it

was.The verdict of John Bright, the Radical politician, that, “It was not a good Bill

but it

was a great Bill when it passed”23 shows a greater understanding of what was occurring.

But the Bill’s opponents in the House of Commons did reflect in their angry reaction to the

Bill the eventual importance of the Bill. That the introduction of the Bill wasa novel act,

and a precedent in the area of electoral reform, was perhaps its greatest importance. Once

the precedent was accepted, that Parliament had the right to alter the verynature of the

House of Commons by altering the electoral system, it could not be undone. It opened the

door for future reform, which could not be rejected on the basis that electoralreform was an

unconventional action and hence not allowed.The first Reform Act of 1832 set Britain on the road to being a modem democracy,

and hence put it on the constitutional path to that goal. It was as we might say, ‘the thin

edge of the wedge.’ But, it was not of itself intended to introduce a democratic electoral

system, in any sense that would be recognizable today, nor did it make any pretense to do

so. Lord Durham, one of the drafters of the legislation, claimed in the debates in the first

Reform Bill in the House ofLords, that with the Bill, “to property and good order we attach

numbers.” This was seen as a radical statement, and much political maneuvering was

required to undo its hann. His statement acknowledged some concession to the middle

class, but just those of ‘property and good order.’ It did not promise democracy and it did

not envisage the surrender of aristocratic power.What is worthy of consideration is the idea that by introducing the first Ref

orm Bill

the Grey government offered a palliative to those in the middle class and to Radicals that

satisfied the growing demand for reform before it could grow into a movement threatening

to the established order. Concessions forestalled radical change, won over the mass of

middle class allegiance to the aristocracy, eliminated a base of public opinion for ardent and

21 Gash, 147.22 Eugene Black, British Politics in the Nineteenth Centuiy 61-74.23 Gash, 152.

86

Radical reformers to build on, and so maintained the dominant role of aristocracy in thegovernance of Britain. The question that may be asked, but cannot be properly answered,because it would require a great deal of speculation, is, if electoral reform had not beeninstigated in 1831, with concessions made to the middle class, would the aristocraticdominance of political power that continued for so long after 1832 have survived if noreform had been offered then, and the tide of events allowed to run its course?Britain was exceptional in 1848 in that it did not explode into popular revolution asdid much of the rest of Europe. Lord Macaulay believed he knew why, and in a speech inEdinburgh in 1852, he explained his thoughts:

The madness of 1848 did not subvert the British throne. The reaction whichfollowed has not destroyed British liberty. And why is this? Why has our country,with all the plagues raging around her, been a land of Goshen? . . .We owe thissingular happiness, under the blessing of God, to a wise and noble constitution, thework ofmany generations of great men.

I answer, It is because in the year of revolutions we stood firmly by our Governmentin peril.., because we know that though our Government was not a perfectGovernment, it was a good Government, that its fault admitted of peaceful and legalremedies, that it had never inflexibly opposed just demands, that we have gainedconcessions of inestimable value, not by the beating of the drum, not by ringing ofthe tocsin, not by tearing up the pavement, not by running to the gunsmiths’ shop tosearch for arms, by the mere force of reason and public opinion.., preeminent amongthose pacific victories of reason and public opinion... I would place two greatreforms... the great commercial reform of 1846... and the great parliamentaryreform of 1832, the work of many eminent statesmen, among whom none was moreconspicuous than Lord John Russell.24

Contrasting the revolutionary birth of democracy on the Continent to its peacefulevolutionary development in Britain, Macaulay’s words are worth considering.

Paul Townsend earned an MA. in History at San Francisco State University in the spring of 1998, with afocus on modern European history. He earned a bachetor degree in business in 1987 from TrinityCollege Dublin, IrelancL

24 Hanham, 12-13.