Britannia Rules the Waves: How Seamanship and Gunnery Decided the Battle of Trafalgar

Katherine Pogue

History 301: Historical Methods and Writing

12 April 2011

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INTRODUCTION

“England expects that every man will do his duty.” Vice-Admiral Nelson gave this

famous signal before the Battle of Trafalgar on the 21st of October 1805. Nelson commanded the

British fleet to victory in what is considered one of the greatest naval battles in history. The

Battle of Trafalgar established Britain’s supremacy over the world’s oceans and allowed the

British Empire to spread to one quarter of the world. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, the

sailing line of battle ship was the most complex piece of technology afloat, and it required an

incredible amount of skill to fully control such a machine. Sailors on all sides were required not

only to maneuver these vessels—quite a feat on its own—but also to keep up successive fire

while being pounded by enemy shot. Considering the complexities of sailing ship operations and

the difficulties of firing massive naval guns, the abilities of all sailors present at the battle are

astounding. The training in the Royal Navy in particular provided British officers and seamen

with the capability of remaining a step above their French and Spanish counterparts. Despite

being outnumbered in ships, men, and guns, the Royal Navy was able to triumph over the

combined French and Spanish fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar because of their superior skills in

seamanship and gunnery.

THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR

The Battle of Trafalgar took place ten years before the conclusion of the Napoleonic

Wars. Napoleon Bonaparte controlled most of the European continent and was putting together a

fleet to invade Britain, but Britain’s navy had three French squadrons blockaded in port.

Bonaparte’s plan was for the squadrons to break out of the blockades, rendezvous in the West

Indies, then overwhelm the British fleet in the English Channel and land an invasion force in

Britain. French Admiral Villeneuve’s squadron joined with a Spanish squadron to head for the

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West Indies, but turned back and made port in Cadiz, Spain where they were again blockaded by

the British fleet. Nelson’s fleet waited beyond the horizon for the French and Spanish to leave

Cadiz. Villeneuve received news that Bonaparte was planning on replacing him, and decided to

make sail before his replacement could arrive. By midday on the 21st of October 1805, the

British fleet of 27 ships-of-the-line under Admiral Nelson engaged the combined French and

Spanish fleet of 33 ships-of-the-line—including the largest ship in the world at the time, the 136-

gun Santissima Trinidad. A pell-mell battle ensued, and by 4:30pm the British had captured 18

enemy ships and lost none. Though British hero Admiral Nelson was killed in the battle, it was a

decisive victory, confirming the supremacy of the Royal Navy over the world’s oceans.1

It is one thing to say that a battle took place. It is another thing entirely to experience the

chaos and destruction of a naval engagement such as Trafalgar. While being battered by enemy

fire, men on both sides had to keep courage and do their duties as well as they could. It is

impossible to imagine what the British, French, and Spanish forces had to contend with during

the battle, but some first-hand accounts can give an idea of the carnage. British Marine

Lieutenant Lewis Rotely describes the scene from the middle gun deck of the Victory:

A man should witness a battle in a three decker from the middle deck, for it beggars all description, it bewilders the senses of sight and hearing. There was the fire from above, the fire from below, besides the fire from the deck I was upon, the guns recoiling with violence, reports [echoes] louder than thunder…. I fancied myself in the infernal regions where every man appeared a devil.2

On the other side, Captain Servaux of the French 74, Fougueux, receives a broadside from the

Royal Sovereign:

Then she gave us a broadside from five and fifty guns and carronades, hurtling forth a storm of cannonballs, big and small, and musket shot…. The storm of projectiles that hurled themselves against and through the hull on the port side made the ship heel to starboard. Most of the sails and rigging were cut to pieces, while the upper deck was swept clear of the great number of the seamen working there….3

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Having to contend with enemy shot, though probably the worst a sailor had to deal with in battle,

was not the only factor contributing to the chaos on deck. Once the firing begins, “…the lower

deck becomes so completely filled with smoke that no one can see two yards before him…”4 and

the concussion from the guns “had so completely made us deaf, that we were obliged to look

only to the [hand] motions that were made…”5 In addition to the smoke and noise, there are

rivers of blood flowing along the decks from the killed and wounded: “It was shocking to see the

many brave seamen mangled so, some with their heads half shot away, others with their entrails

mashed lying on the deck…”6 Every man on both sides of the engagement had to experience

these horrors, and not only that, but to remain unfazed and carry out his duties.

THE ROLE OF SEAMANSHIP

One of those duties was the handling of the ship. On British, French, and Spanish ships

the majority of the crew manned the guns during a battle, but enough had to be left to sail the

ship. A sailing man-of-war was an immensely complicated, but highly efficient machine. The

majority of the vessels that fought at Trafalgar were ship-rigged, meaning that they had three

masts and carried square sails on all three masts. A ship would carry about twenty sails, though

more could be set in lighter winds, and spare sails were often kept aboard. HMS Victory could

set a maximum of 37 sails and had a total sail area of 6,510 square yards, as well as 26 miles of

rigging.7 Rigging consists of standing rigging (which supports the masts of the ship), and running

rigging (which controls the sails). The amount of rigging on a ship can be bewildering to a

newcomer, but each and every line had a specific and necessary purpose, and each purpose had

to be intimately known in order to sail the ship. Sail handling was of immense importance

particularly before a battle as the ships approached one another. Wind direction and strength

were vital factors to maneuvering in battle. Speed and the number of sails a ship could set

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depended on the strength of the wind, and the direction affected where a ship could sail. There

were light winds on the day of the Battle of Trafalgar,8 which made it especially difficult to

maneuver, according to Chuck McGohey, a captain of the 100-ton topsail schooner,

Californian.9 Seamanship may seem like a learned skill (albeit, a complicated one), but it was

also an art form, and it took years of training to perfect this art. The training in seamanship that

men received in the British, French, and Spanish navies greatly differed, and this was a deciding

factor in the outcome of Trafalgar.

British Seamanship

British seamanship was superior to that of the French and Spanish because of the amount

of training they received. While officers in the British Army were able to purchase their

commission,10 Royal Navy officers were required to have a certain level of competence in their

trade to achieve the rank of lieutenant. Though it was possible for the average seaman to reach a

petty officer position—and on extremely rare occasions achieve a commission—there was a

class division between commissioned officers and the rest of the crew.11 Being an officer in the

navy was seen as a respectable profession in Britain, and well-to-do families would often send

their sons to sea as midshipmen.12 These boys, from about twelve years of age and older, were

officers in training. In addition to the experience gained from life aboard a sailing man-of-war,

they were also schooled in navigation, mathematics, astronomy, and even reading, writing, and

religion.13 The training midshipmen received prepared them for what was required in their future

roles as lieutenants, captains, and admirals.

The only way a “young gentleman” could advance his career in the navy was to pass his

lieutenants’ examination.14 This grueling questioning by an examining board of captains tested

the candidate’s abilities in seamanship and navigation, and could only be taken after acquiring

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six years of experience at sea.15 William Badcock, in 1805, relates his ordeal in taking the

examination:

I was desired to stand up, and consider myself on a quarterdeck of a man-of-war at Spithead – ‘unmoor’ – ‘get underway’ – ‘stand out to sea’ – ‘make and shorten sail’ – ‘reef’ – ‘return into port’ ‘unrig the foremast and bowsprit, and rig them again’….[T]hey passed me, and desired me to come again the next day to receive my passing certificate.16

The lieutenants’ examination was a detailed evaluation of a midshipman’s knowledge, this

knowledge only being acquired through years of service at sea. This ensured that all officers at

the rank of lieutenant and above had the required competency and experience to command a

vessel in the Royal Navy, a factor that contributed greatly to its success.

Officers in the Royal Navy made up the minority, however, and were immensely

outnumbered by the ordinary seamen who crowded the lower decks. British seamen, though not

being of high standing in society and often illiterate,17 were extremely competent at their jobs.

One reason for this is the simple fact that Britain is an island. As such, most Britons are, in some

way, connected with the sea. The British merchant marine was highly profitable, and—despite

having a smaller population—Britain’s merchant ships outnumbered those of France three to

one.18 Thus, in times of war, the Royal Navy had a large pool of capable sailors to bring into the

service. The Impressment Service was used to force experienced sailors into the navy.19 This

allowed Britain to have a skilled Navy from the very onset of war, while land-based nations from

continental Europe had to completely train new hands.

The regiment of training that took place aboard every British ship was another reason for

the Royal Navy’s expert sailors. Once a navy recruit stepped aboard a British man-of-war, he

was given a rating based upon his abilities. Landsmen had no experience at sea whatsoever;

ordinary seamen had some experience, but were not considered skilled; and able seamen were

highly skilled sailors.20 Each rating had daily jobs that corresponded to their skill-level, but all

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new recruits underwent training every day after breakfast.21 A decent amount of training,

however, would be provided through the experience of simply living aboard a sailing ship.

William Robinson, a landsman, volunteered in 1805 and said that through the daily routine

aboard ship, “…I soon began to pick up a knowledge of seamanship.”22 Even if some recruits

had difficulties with learning the skills of seamanship, they were still useful to the Navy.

Landsmen were usually employed cleaning the decks of the ship, or pumping water out of the

bilge. And there was always a need for men to man the guns. In this way, all hands aboard

British ships could be employed in important work, and each ship had at least a handful of able

seamen to sail the ship and to teach the landsmen. With the leadership of knowledgeable officers

and the experience of able seamen, British ships were handled exceptionally well compared to

their French and Spanish counterparts.

French Seamanship

While most British crews were made up primarily of experienced sailors, French crews

were lucky to have able seamen aboard. As opposed to the British method of pressing capable

sailors into the service, the French Navy used conscription to meet its quota, taking a certain

number of men from each region of France to fill its ships.23 Subsequently, many men in the

French Navy were landsmen with no experience at sea whatsoever. There were also many more

soldiers filling the decks of French ships than there were British, also with no seagoing

experience. Napoleon Bonaparte, though a brilliant tactician on land, was no sailor. He believed

in quantitative over qualitative forces,24 and his navy’s ships were packed with soldiers. Admiral

Villeneuve, of the French fleet at Trafalgar, said that “[t]he few sailors were lost among the

soldiers, who were seasick and could not remain in the batteries but encumbered the decks.”25

While British ships had an attachment of marines one-fifth the size of the crew26 and used to

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doing their jobs at sea, French ships were overcrowded with soldiers from the army who made

up nearly half of the ship’s company.27 With the other half being primarily conscripted, French

ships were crewed largely by men with no maritime background, and a very small chance of

acquiring the training they needed to sail a fighting ship.

In addition to having inexperienced men, the French Navy spent significantly less time at

sea than the Royal Navy did, resulting in a lapse in training and the inability to give those men

the experience they needed. Many French ships were blockaded in port by the British.28 This not

only provided British crews with further training to refine their skills, but also denied French

crews of much-needed time at sea. Peter Warwick, a committee member of The Society for

Nautical Research, says in Voices from the Battle of Trafalgar that “neither the French nor the

Spanish could match their [British seamen] record of action and sea service; they had spent too

much time bottled up in harbour.”29 Time at sea was essential to properly train a crew, and with

most of the fleet blockaded in port, the French Navy was unable to train their crews well enough

to stand up to the well-trained British.

Another reason the French weren’t able to spend as much time at sea as the British (and

also why the British were able to keep up such a successful blockade) was because they didn’t

institutionally implement the cure for scurvy in their navy. Scurvy is a deficiency in Vitamin C,

which causes those afflicted to suffer lethargy, joint and muscle pain, gum disease, hemorrhaging

of the skin, and eventually death after a few months.30 In 1805, it was mostly known that citrus

fruits would reverse the effects of the disease, and the Royal Navy had begun regularly issuing

lime juice to its sailors in 1795.31 However, the French Navy did not do this.32 French ships had

to return to port every few months for fresh supplies to combat the disease, while British crews

were able to stay at sea for much longer periods of time, allowing them to effectively blockade

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French ports. Because the French Navy did not institutionally implement the cure for scurvy, its

crews could not get the practical training they needed at sea, and thus were not able to achieve

the high level of efficiency that British crews were able to attain.

It wasn’t only the crews of French ships that didn’t have training or experience, but the

officers as well. Just as the British, French officers were traditionally drawn from the upper

classes.33 French naval officers had been required to spend a certain amount of time at sea and

pass an exam, much like British officers.34 During the French Revolution, however, the authority

of these officers was questioned, and more than half fled the country for fear of the guillotine.

Only those who believed in the Revolution remained, and of those, many did not agree with

Admiral Villeneuve’s tactics. 35 This caused a divide between the officers, which further led to

inept leadership for the men. Without experienced officers to lead their untrained crews, and

little possibility of attaining practical training at sea, seamanship in the French Navy suffered

considerably.

Spanish Seamanship

Unlike the French, Spanish officers were not affected by a revolution. The Spanish Navy

at least had capable officers to lead their men. One seaman said of Captain Don Cosmé

Churruca, “Our leader seemed to have infused his heroic spirit into the crew and soldiers, and the

ship was handled and her broadsides delivered with wonderful promptitude and accuracy.”36

Indeed, Spanish officers were competent sailors with a long maritime background. This would

not be enough, however, to turn the tide of Trafalgar.

Despite having knowledgeable officers, in terms of opportunity to train, the Spanish

Navy was in much the same situation as the French. They were also blockaded in port by the

British, and didn’t institutionalize the cure for scurvy. Also like the French, Spanish ships were

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greatly lacking in experienced seamen. The decks of Spanish ships were overcrowded even more

so than those of the French:

In sheer numbers, their crews were enormous—eleven hundred men in ships which the British or French would have manned with six or seven hundred. …[T]heir press-gangs had gathered in every convict and beggar from miles around, and army units had been drafted wholesale. It was said that not one man in ten was a seaman. Thousands of them had never been aboard a ship before.37

In this way, the Spanish Navy was even worse off than the French. With overcrowding came

disease. The Spanish had suffered terribly from a yellow fever epidemic,38 meaning more and

more landsmen and soldiers were brought aboard their ships to take place of the dead and dying.

With such high numbers of ill and inexperienced crews, and little opportunity to train them, the

Spanish, like the French, were at a severe disadvantage to the British in terms of seamanship.

THE ROLE OF GUNNERY

Though being able to sail and maneuver a ship is important in battle, being able to keep

up successive fire against the enemy is even more so. The ability to reload and fire naval guns

rapidly was essential to the outcome of the battle of Trafalgar. This was no easy task. Naval

artillery at this time consisted of smoothbore, muzzle-loading guns fired using a flintlock or slow

match. These guns were classified by their shot weight, that is, the weight of the ball that they

would fire. For instance, a 12-pounder would fire a round shot that weighed about twelve

pounds. On a third rate ship-of-the-line (The most common rating present at the battle. Ships

were rated depending on the number of guns they carried; third rates carried around 74 guns.39),

gun sizes ranged from 9- to 36-pounders, the heaviest guns being kept on the lower gun decks,

and the lighter higher up.40 Different types of shot were used for different purposes. Round shot

was used to smash through the hull of a ship, or to destroy masts. Chain shot (two pieces of

round shot connected with a length of chain) and bar shot (two halves of round shot connected

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with a bar) were used to destroy rigging and sails. And grape (multiple iron balls in a bag) and

canister shot (musket balls in tin canister) were used to kill men on deck.41 The maximum range

for most guns was around one mile,42 though guns were highly inaccurate at that distance and

were most effective at point-blank range.43

Guns were fired using black powder, approximately 1/3 the weight of the shot.44 In order

to fire a gun, it must first be cleaned with a worm (a corkscrew-shaped tool) to remove anything

remaining in the barrel, then with a wet sponge to extinguish any lingering embers from a

previous firing, and then with a dry sponge. The charge of powder is next rammed into the

barrel, with wadding of old rope next to further compress the powder. Next comes the shot, and

another wadding to keep it from falling out of the end of the barrel on the heaving sea. A piece of

wire is pricked down the vent hole into the bag of powder. Fine priming powder is poured down

the vent. The gun is heaved on its gun tackles so that the muzzle is sticking out of the gun port.

The gun is now ready to fire. Once it is fired it recoils backwards, being stopped by its gun

tackles, and the process is repeated.45 All of this must be done as fast as possible in the havoc of

a battle.

Gunnery on Both Sides

The different navies fighting at the battle utilized different tactics when it came to

gunnery. The British liked to have what was called the weather gage, meaning that they were

between the enemy and the direction of the wind, giving them control of the engagement. This

also meant that they were firing with the guns depressed with the heel of the ship. Thus, the

British tended to fire at their enemies’ hulls (though never below the waterline), having a large

target to fire at. French Lieutenant Pierre-Guillaume Gicquel des Touches said that “…the

English…fired horizontally and hit our wooden sides, letting fly splinters which were more

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murderous than the cannon ball itself.”46 In this way, the British could quickly decimate the

opposing gun crews with wooden shrapnel, and still be able to sail the captured ship home in

exchange for prize money.47 The French, on the other hand, preferred to fire on the upward roll

of the ship, damaging the rigging of the enemy and leaving the hull intact.48 Though this would

cause considerable damage and disable the enemy ship, it was also possible for the shot to miss

completely, and with ill-trained gun crews, missing the target completely wasn’t an uncommon

occurrence. In addition, to then take the ship, the French would have had to fight through a large

number of men, to whom striking their colors (surrendering) wasn’t an option.49 Though gunnery

tactics utilized by the French would be effective with a trained crew, the inadequately trained

French gun crews were no match for their British counterparts.

The British were better trained than the French and Spanish in gunnery for many of the

same reasons that they were better in seamanship. The Royal Navy extensively drilled at

gunnery, practicing with live ammunition every evening, as evidenced by the surgeon of the

Favourite, Francis Spilsbury:

Our men were regularly trained, as is customary, to the exercise of great guns and small arms. It is perhaps the great attention to this most useful regulation on board British ships of war, which gives us a decided superiority over our enemies. On the beat of a drum, the men immediately fly to their quarters; and their being so constant in that point of duty, increases their agility, gives them confidence in their own powers, and prevents much of that confusion, which with those less disciplined must necessarily ensue….50

Through this training, the best British gun crews could fire one round per minute.51 Because the

French and Spanish did not train as often as the British, their skills in gunnery, as with

seamanship, suffered. The French could barely fire at half the rate that the British could52 and

Spanish gun crews could take as long as five minutes.53 Through the training they received,

British gun crews were able to fire much more rapidly than their French and Spanish

counterparts.

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CONCLUSION

At the Battle of Trafalgar, the Royal Navy had 27 ships of the line, 17,000 officers and

men, and 2,148 guns. The combined French and Spanish fleet had 33 ships of the line, 30,000

officers and men, and 2,632 guns.54 What the French and Spanish didn’t have, however, was the

training needed to maneuver their ships and fire their guns. The French Navy’s officers were

decimated by the Revolution and its men had little experience at sea. Though the Spanish had

capable officers, its lower decks were infected with disease and overcrowded with soldiers. In

contrast, the Royal Navy had capable officers and thoroughly trained seamen. They were

regularly drilled for battle, and could fire at least twice as fast as the opposing fleet. Because of

the Royal Navy’s training and experience in seamanship and gunnery, the British were able to

decisively defeat a force that significantly outnumbered them without losing a single ship.

Though this battle didn’t conclude the Napoleonic Wars, it did ultimately establish the Royal

Navy’s supremacy over all competing navies, allowing British trade to flourish and its empire to

expand into the largest empire world has seen.

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NOTES

&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&1. Royal Navy, The Battle of Trafalgar, 1805,

http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/history/battles/battle-of-trafalgar/index.htm (accessed 12 April 2011).

2. Roy and Lesley Adkins, Jack Tar: The Extraordinary Lives of Ordinary Seamen in

Nelson’s Navy (London: Abacus, 2009), 274. 3. Peter Warwick, Voices from the Battle of Trafalgar (Cincinnati: David & Charles,

2006), 150. 4. Jack Tar, 273 5. Voices, 120. 6. Roy Adkins, Nelson’s Trafalgar: The Battle That Changed the World (New York:

Viking, 2005), 111. &

7. Royal Navy, “Facts & Figures,” HMS Victory, http://www.hms-victory.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=72&Itemid=105 (accessed 14 April 2011).

8. Nelson’s Trafalgar, 69. 9. Chuck McGohey, interview by author, Maritime Museum of San Diego, 19 March

2011. 10. The National Archives, “British Army: officers’ commissions,” 20 January 2011,

http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/records/research-guides/british-army-officers-commissions.htm (accessed 5 April 2011).

11. Jack Tar, 62. 12. Nelson’s Trafalgar, 51. 13. Jack Tar, 21. 14. N.A.M. Rodger, “Commissioned officers’ careers in the Royal Navy, 1690-1815,”

Jounral for Maritime Research (June 2001): paragraph 5, http://www.jmr.nmm.ac.uk/server/show/conJmrArticle.52/viewPage/2 (accessed 5 April 2011).

15. Ibid.

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&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&16. Adam Nicolson, Men Of Honour – Trafalgar And The Making Of The English Hero

(London: HarperCollins, 2005), 25. 17. Jack Tar, 345. 18. Charles D. Pringle and Mark J. Kroll, “Why Trafalgar Was Won before It Was

Fought: Lessons from Resourse-Based Theory,” The Academy of Management Executive (1993-2005) 11, no. 4 (Nov. 1997): 76. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4165428 (accessed 22 February 2011).

19. Nelson’s Trafalgar, 49. 20. Jack Tar, 13. 21. Ibid., 203. 22. Ibid., 17. 23. Gregory Fremont-Barnes, Trafalgar 1805 Nelson’s Crowning Victory, ed. Lee

Johnson (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 20. 24. Rémi Monaque, “The French and Spanish Perspective,” in The Trafalgar Companion,

ed. Alexander Stilwell (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 107. 25. David Howarth, Trafalgar: The Nelson Touch (New York: Antheneum, 1969), 85. 26. Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Royal Navy 1793-1815, ed. Duncan Anderson, Marcus

Cowper, and Nikolai Bogdanovic (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2007), 38. 27. “The French and Spanish Perspective,” 114. 28. Ibid., 107. 29. Voices, 44. 30. Jack Tar, 314 31. Ibid. 32. Stephen R. Brown, Scurvy: How a Surgeon, a Mariner, and a Gentleman Solved the

Greatest Medical Mystery of the Age of Sail (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2004), 202. 33. The Nelson Touch, 83. 34. Terry Crowdy, French Warship Crews (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 12.

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&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&& 35. The Nelson Touch, 83. 36. Barnes, Trafalgar 1805, 24. 37. The Nelson Touch, 94. 38. John D. Harbron, Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press,

1988), 96. 39. Gregory Fremont-Barnes, Victory vs Redoutable Ships of the line at Trafalgar 1805

(New York: Osprey Publishing, 2008), 21. 40. Ibid., 20. 41. The Royal Navy, 63. 42. Ibid., 61. 43. Victory vs Redoutable, 35. 44. Nelson’s Trafalgar, 105. 45. Victory vs Redoutable, 60. 46. Voices, 156. 47. Barnes, Trafalgar 1805, 20 48. Ibid., 21. 49. The Nelson Touch, 186. 50. Jack Tar, 271 51. Nicholas Tracy, “Naval Tactics in the Age of Sail,” in The Trafalgar Companion, ed.

Alexander Stilwell (New York: Osprey Publishing, 2005), 126. 52. Victory vs Redoutable, 49. 53. Trafalgar and the Spanish Navy, 96. 54. Barnes, Trafalgar 1805, 22-23.

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