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British attitudes to Jews during the Holocaust: June 1942-1945

DISS030916

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Contents

Introduction p.3

Attitudes to European Jews p.11

A home for the Jews? p.25

Attitudes to Jews living in Britain p.33

Conclusion p.56

Bibliography pp.51-55

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Introduction

In the 1960’s the Eichmann trial brought attention to the Holocaust as a separate

entity and called into question the British response to Hitler’s ‘Final Solution.’1

Historians have proven that from June 1942 the British government and public had

access to information about the systematic extermination of European Jews. The

majority of scholarship examines the British response in terms of government policy

formation. This thesis will explore in depth an aspect of the Holocaust’s impact which

has not received the attention that it deserves. This thesis is interested in British

attitudes towards Jews at a time when there was awareness of the ‘Final Solution’ and

increasingly forceful Zionist arguments. British attitudes towards European Jews and

Jews living in Britain from June 1942 to the end of 1945 will be compared.

Studies of the Holocaust from a British perspective mainly question the mythology

of the moral certainty of the British war effort and the assertion that only with

liberation was the Holocaust fully understood.2 Issues are dealt with by a political top-

down approach concentrating on how and when information was received and policy

created. Historians have explored the limited help given by the British government to

Hitler’s victims and the difficulties of comprehending the ‘Final Solution.’ Bernard

Wasserstein, Michael Marrus and Anthony Julius argued that a bureaucratic

indifference prevented an effective solution to the Jewish refugee problem. Other

historians defended the British response in terms of a British naivety. Walter Laqueur,

Andrew Sharf and Martin Gilbert asserted that information was not widely accepted

1 Tony Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A social and cultural history (Cornwall,

1994), p.261 2 Tony Kushner, ‘Britain, the United States and the Holocaust: In search of a Historiography’, in Dan

Stone (eds.), The historiography of the Holocaust (New York, 2004), p.58

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or understood due to psychological issues and the unprecedented nature of the

massacres. Sharf provides an interesting model by studying a wide range of

newspaper cuttings. Yet Sharf’s focus is on reactions to the ‘Final Solution’ in Britain

rather than focusing explicitly on how the Nazi extermination plan affected how

British people viewed Jews both inside and outside Britain.

Historians focusing on British anti-Semitism are in disagreement. In the 1970’s

interest in British anti-Semitism was stimulated by debate between Gisela Lebzetler

and Colin Holmes.3 Holmes argued that there was a tradition of anti-Semitism in

Britain whereas Lebzetler attributed the failure of fascist groups to the absence of

anti-Semitism in Britain.4 Tony Kushner rightly criticised both approaches because

the focus was on an organised, political form of anti-Semitism.5 It was not until the

1990’s that academics began to accept that a form of anti-Semitism existed in

Britain.6 Britain was seen by early twentieth century contemporaries and academics as

a tolerant, liberal society where anti-Semitism was ‘too preposterously contrary to the

British character.’7 From the 1980’s multiculturalism began to develop recognition in

Britain and there was a gradual departure from the view that a form of anti-Semitism

could not exist in a ‘liberal’ Britain.

The historical argument most related to the interests of this investigation is

Kushner’s liberal assimilationist theory. Kushner explored the British response to the

3 Tony Kushner, ‘The impact of British Anti-Semitism, 1918-1945’, in David Cesarani (eds.), The

Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry (Oxford, 1990), p.192 4 Ibid., 5 Ibid., 6 Ibid., p.190 7 Ibid., p.191

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Holocaust from a social and cultural perspective defining anti-Semitism usefully as

hostility to Jews as Jews.8 Liberal British anti-Semitism differed to expressions of

anti-Semitism abroad by not being an organised, political movement or including

violent and repressive actions against Jews. Kushner asserted that a cultural

framework of ‘Britishness’ determined reactions and responses.9 Todd Endelmen’s

analysis links to Kushner’s liberal assimilationist theory. He identified the religious

tolerance of Jews as a consequence of the sixteenth and seventeenth century fracturing

of Christian unity and diffusion of liberal political values in the eighteenth and

nineteenth centuries.10 Endelmen rightly separated religious tolerance of Jews from

toleration of the ethnic and cultural differences of Jews in Britain.11 Both Holmes and

Kushner identified a liberal compromise in Britain in which there was no room for

either anti-Semitism or a Jewish failure to assimilate into British society.12 A failure

to assimilate led to a ‘well-earned’ type of anti-Semitism.13 Kushner is mostly

concerned with the period before the holocaust. He argued that it was against liberal

values to stress Jewish difference between the years 1933 and 1939 yet the scale of

Jewish persecution during the war was unprecedented and produced ambivalence

amongst the British population.14 Kushner described a British dislike for Jews at

home but a sympathy for Jews abroad.15 According to Kushner the ambiguities of

8 Ibid., p.192 9 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.20 10 Todd Endelman, The Jews of Britain, 1656-2000 (London, 2002), p.260 11 Ibid., 12 Kushner, ‘The impact of British Anti-Semitism, 1918-1945’, p.202 13 Ibid., 14 Tony Kushner, ‘Beyond the Pale? British Reactions to Nazi Anti-Semitism, 1033-1939’, in Tony

Kushner and Kenneth Lunn (eds.), The Politics of Marginality: Race, the Radical Right and Minorities

in Twentieth Century Britain (Oxon, 2006), p.144 15 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.272

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liberalism led to people blaming Jews for their own misfortune and to a restrictive

refugee treatment.16

This investigation will test whether Kushner’s notion of a liberal and conservative

anti-Semitism existed alongside the horrific news of the ‘Final Solution.’ Studies lack

a focussed analysis on how certain newspapers and journals presented Jews during the

period when the ‘Final Solution’ was known in Britain. Public and private attitudes

towards Jews will be compared. Newspapers, journals, Mass Observation and

writings by George Orwell will be used to encompass a wide sample of British

society. Together these sources provide the views of the Anglican Church,

government officials, politicians, journalists, Anglo-Jewry, intellectuals and

‘ordinary’ members of the public. How evident is Kushner’s liberal, ambivalent form

of anti-Semitism in newspapers and Mass Observation? Did British citizens continue

to blame the Jews for provoking anti-Semitism due to their failure to assimilate once

the news of the extermination plan was revealed from June 1942? Was the British

population ambivalent towards Jews or was there a more polarised response in which

people were wholly sympathetic, tolerant and compassionate towards the Jews or

hostile and anti-Semitic? Was there a dominant response? Did the British

government’s response to the ‘Final Solution’ influence attitudes to Jews? In

answering these questions this study will avoid the urge to condemn responses to the

Holocaust and will place importance upon considering the cultural, social and

economic context of the 1940’s. It will not be forgotten that the Holocaust coincided

with a major global conflict.

16 Tony Kushner cited by David Cesarani in Bystanders’ to the Holocaust: a Re-evaluation, David

Cesarani and Paul Levine (eds.), (Southgate, 2002), p.29

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British attitudes towards European Jews suffering systematic extermination will be

studied mainly by press analysis. The newspapers and journals being used are The

Times, Picture Post, The Economist and The Spectator. The focus is on The Times, a

conservative ‘establishment’ paper which was respected and covered the news of the

‘Final Solution’ and its implications in detail. The Times is a useful source as it

enjoyed a reputation of fair and accurate reporting.17 The Times was read by 2.5% of

the adult population which is over half of a readership and Mass Observation shows

that national newspapers were read by those who had different political opinions to

the paper.18 In contrast The Economist had a smaller circulation and was aimed at

educated audiences.19 The editor during wartime stated that the anonymous, collective

voice of the paper kept the editor "not the master but the servant of something far

greater than himself’ and gave the paper ‘an astonishing momentum of thought and

principle."20 The extreme centre is the paper's historical position and it was committed

to the classical nineteenth century liberal ideas of its founder.21 The Economist will

provide insight into what educated members of society felt was important in debates

over how Jews should be regarded and treated. The Spectator also features intellectual

discussion but from a more conservative perspective.22 To gain a greater sense of

representativeness Picture Post will be examined. Picture Post, like Mass

Observation, has been described as a place where the government and others in

positions of power could be criticized and where reality could be

interrogated.23 These forms of media frequently reveal a working class resentment

17 Andrew Sharf, The British press and Jews under Nazi rule (London,1964), pp.79-80 18 Ibid., p.5 19 http://www.economist.com/help/about-us#About_Economistcom 20 Ibid., 21 Ibid., 22 http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/558807/The-Spectator 23 Stuart Hall cited by Ben Lander and Stephen Brooke in ‘Mass Observation: An Historical

Introduction’

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towards the inability of leaders to combat unemployment, fascism, and other social

problems.24 Throughout the war Picture Post was required reading in Britain and at

times its readership was reported at over eighty percent of the population.25 Picture

Post had a liberal, anti-Fascist, populist editorial stance and appealed to wide

audiences.26

How powerful was the press in shaping British attitudes and accurately reflecting

‘popular’ sentiment? Andrew Sharf argued that the press was not powerful in shaping

the responses of its readers and did not effectively represent readers.27 Sharf concedes

that many people did regard the views presented in the press as representative of

popular opinion.28 During the war demand for news increased and efforts to

understand the public improved as the government propaganda machine sought to

accurately gauge the state of public opinion to understand levels of morale.29

Newspapers increasingly emphasised the importance of knowing their readers and

employed more sophisticated means of investigating their tastes and values.30 The

press could dictate how public opinion was perceived. Newspapers are thus an

interesting way to examine how the Holocaust was publicly approached. The evidence

will be useful in showing how public opinion was perceived by British readers and

how individuals who communicated their views through the press felt the public

should respond. When compared to sentiments expressed in Mass Observation one

can consider whether the press had an impact upon private sentiments.

http://www.massobservation.amdigital.co.uk.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/essays/content/historicalintroduction.as

px#_ftn21 24 Ibid., 25 Sarah McDonald, ‘History of Picture Post’ (2004) at

http://corporate.gettyimages.com/masters2/conservation/articles/HAHistory.pdf 26 Ibid., 27 Ibid., 28 Ibid., 29 Kevin Williams, Read All About It!: A History of the British Newspaper (Oxon, 2010), p.174 30 Ibid.,

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Evidence from the press will be juxtaposed against the personal writings provided

by Mass Observation. Mass Observation evidence in the form of diaries, directive

replies, day surveys and file report summaries will be used alongside the perception of

the contemporary intellectual Orwell to gain an insight into private feelings towards

Jews living in Britain. The Mass Observation sample is complete as it provides the

full collection of diaries and directives between 1942 and 1945. Mass Observation is

valuable because its purpose was to monitor everyday behaviour to expose the gulf

between public opinion and what was often described as ‘popular’ opinion by the

Government and the Press.31 Mass Observation was part of a larger movement

towards social engagement and the study of modern life.32 During the war Mass

Observation began producing reports on morale for the Ministry of Information’s

Home Intelligence Unit and thus served as an arm of the government to understand

public opinion.33 Mass Observation enables one to judge which issues related to Jews

were considered important by the government at certain times during the war. Mass

Observation provides detailed, candid, personal reactions which could not be obtained

through interviews.’34 It is likely that respondents would have had the confidence to

express their views without worrying about the reactions of others. The limitations of

Mass Observation will be taken into account and the evidence will be used cautiously.

The representativeness of Mass Observation is a point of contention. Mass

Observation has been described as presenting the 'unexciting lives' of volunteers of

31 ‘Brief history’

http://www.massobservation.amdigital.co.uk.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/introduction/history.aspx 32 Ben Lander and Stephen Brooke, ‘Mass Observation: An Historical Introduction’

http://www.massobservation.amdigital.co.uk.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/essays/content/historicalintroduction.as

px#_ftn21 33 Ibid., 34 Tom Harrisson quoted by Penny Summerfield in ‘Mass-Observation: Social Research or Social

Movement?’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Jul., 1985), p.441

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the lower to middle-classes.35 People who volunteered to record their thoughts may

have been more perceptive, organised and less occupied. Yet the group of respondents

is not too specific to skew results and the respondents are fairly representative of the

population. Few had gone to university and typical occupations were clerk,

schoolteacher and housewife.36 Most read widely and few belonged to any political

party.37 The sample is useful to this study as “ordinary” individuals with

unexceptional lives and without extreme political views or a high level of education

were in a majority in the population. Together the newspaper and journal articles and

Mass Observation sources can tell one not only how the news of the ‘Final Solution’

affected attitudes towards Jews but can also provide an understanding of British

culture and identity during the Second World War.

35 Samuel Hynes cited by Summerfield in ‘Mass-Observation: Social Research or Social Movement?’,

Journal of Contemporary History, p.441 36 Summerfield, ‘Mass-Observation: Social Research or Social Movement?’, Journal of Contemporary

History, p.441 37 Ibid, pp.441-442

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Attitudes to European Jews

To understand responses towards the systematic extermination of European Jews

it is important to consider the context in which the ‘Final Solution’ occurred. The

Ministry of Information had been ordered to play down Jewish suffering and the

Foreign Office was concerned about undermining the immigration limits into

Palestine outlined in the White Paper.38 In 1941 the Ministry of Information had

declared that people may think that victims were a ‘pretty bad lot anyway’ and that

horror should be used ‘sparingly’ with ‘indisputably innocent people’ ‘and not with

Jews’ to make the danger credible.39 The British government was eager to prevent the

impression that the war was being fought on behalf of the Jews.40 This indicates that

government officials feared domestic anti-Semitism which suggests that Jews were

not popular in Britain. Were fears of provoking domestic anti-Semitism and causing

instability in Palestine also affecting how the press responded to the persecuted Jews

in Europe after June 1942? During the war it was crucial for Britain to remain united

in patriotism and to support the war effort by preventing division and instability. How

British values coexisted alongside the pleas for aid for Jews facing genocide will be

explored.

British national values shaped the public response to the ‘Final Solution.’

Identifying contemporary British values is problematic because a clear definition of

38 David Cesarani, ‘Great Britain’, in David Wyman (eds.), The World react to the Holocaust

(Baltimore, 1996), p.605 39 A memorandum of the Planning Committee of the Ministry of Information, 25 th July 1941 quoted by

Walter Laqueur in The Terrible secret: the first disturbing account of how the news of Hitler’s “Final

Solution” was suppressed and how it was eventually revealed (London, 1980), pp.91-92 40 Cesarani, ‘Great Britain’, The World react to the Holocaust, p.605

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‘Britishness’ did not exist.41 Britain’s reputation as a liberal country was a significant

aspect of national identity. Liberal values were defined as belief in tolerance, human

progress, political moderation and a loathing of injustice.42 As the British Empire

declined there was tension over the assumption that Britain continued to be a ‘great

power.’43 During both world wars this tension was addressed by the argument that

Britain’s greatness was founded on morality rather than military might.44 Britain’s

classes were united around a shared self-understanding of the constitutional

democracy of Britain and the country’s historical task of civilising ‘inferior races.’45

The Second World War deepened Britain’s sense of superiority and it came to see

itself a as a custodian of western values and a protector of ineffective European

neighbours.46 Melvin Shefftz criticised Kushner arguing that it was not against liberal

values to single out a persecuted group for help.47 Shefftz connected liberalism with

civil liberties and freedoms and argued that liberalism demanded sympathy for

victims.48 The form of liberalism in Britain was more complex. The implications of

saving and allowing foreign Jews were perceived as dangerous to the stability of

British society. Britain was liberal in the sense that the country tolerated other

religious groups and immigrants if they were willing to assimilate into society

effectively and adhere to British values. Kushner provided evidence that officials

expressed a liberal form of anti-Semitism, for example, the Home Secretary Herbert

Morrison feared that allowing Jewish refugees into Britain would cause problems

41 Jodi Burkett, Constructing Post-Imperial Britain: Britishness, ‘race’ and the radical left in the 1960s

(Basingstoke, 2013), p.4 42 Sharf, The British press and Jews under Nazi rule, p.209 43 Ibid., p.20 44 Ibid., 45 Bhikhu Parekh, ‘Being British’ in Andrew Gambler and Tony Wright (eds.), Britishness:

Perspectives on the British Question (Oxford, 2009), p.35 46 Ibid., 47 Melvin Shefftz, ‘The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A Social and Cultural History by Tony

Kushner Review’, Association of Jewish Studies Review,Vol.21, No.2 (1996), p.424 48 Ibid., p.425

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because anti-Semitism was under the surface in Britain.49 Public press statements

debating Britain’s response to the Holocaust will be used to understand how national

identity and values were invoked to deal with mass genocide.

The press initially presented the desire to save European Jews as compatible with

liberal values. Wasserstein identified irritation amongst government officials with the

persistence and ‘selfishness’ of Jewish pleas for help.50 Aaron Goldman argued that

the war made people callous of the suffering of Jews in other countries.51 Both these

arguments are far from evident in early press evidence. The shock of the Jewish

suffering appears to have initially outweighed fears of arousing domestic anti-

Semitism. Newspapers presented Britain as a country which had an example to set to

others. A contemporary intellectual Harold Nicolson criticised the lack of action to

save the Jews stating that the people of ‘Anglo-Saxon stock’ had reached a ‘high

degree of consciousness and conscience’ of the ‘basic principles of humanity.’52 Jews

in Britain also used Britain’s liberal values and reputation to persuade the government

to save Jews. One Rabbi was confident that the ‘humanity of Britain’ would overcome

problems in aid.53 Letters to editors and Mass Observation evidence indicates that

there was support for immigration of Jews into Britain and frustration at the lack of

immediate action. An army clerk, 22, wrote in early December 1942 that Britain

‘can’t do much under present circumstances’ but could give Jews ‘a welcome

49 Kushner, ‘The impact of British Anti-Semitism, 1918-1945’, The Making of Modern Anglo-Jewry,

pp.205-206 50 Bernard Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe: 1939-1945 (New York, 1979), p.351 51 Aaron Goldman, ‘The resurgence of Anti-Semitism in Britain during World War II’, Jewish social

studies, Vol.46, No.1, (Winter, 1984), p.50 52 The Spectator, 24 December 1942 53 The Times, 27 January 1943

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haven.’54 A teacher, 42, expressed a similar sentiment in early December 1942

writing, ‘I am glad there are protests being made. Can we do anymore?’55 A retired

nurse felt that Britain had never lost anything by admitting refugees.56 Yet these

respondents are alone in their completely positive displays of support for immediate

action to save the Jews and are not representative of the sample as a whole. Most

diarists focused on Jews in Britain and those who dealt with the European Jews either

followed the government by expressing anger and desiring retribution or failed to

believe ‘atrocity stories.’ One should not assume that a lack of private comment

expressing enthusiasm for saving the Jews meant that respondents were anti-Semitic

and against rescue plans or cautious of increasing anti-Semitism. This is because there

was a lack of resistance and disproval of the campaign presented in the press to allow

Jewish immigration into Britain. Public statements diverged from the private opinions

presented in the Mass Observation evidence by providing a more unanimous

response. Typical articles in 1942 dealing with Jewish persecution condemned

inaction and pressed for action. On the 14th of December The Times reported that

‘shame covered all as Jews, as Englishmen, as human beings’ were not ensured action

to save the persecuted Jews of Europe.57 The Times condemned the ‘indifference’

displayed and stated that ‘public opinion must be roused to the ‘satanic’ and ‘most

appalling massacre in history.’58 This disgust is echoed in The Spectator which stated

that inactive nations participated in the crime59 and that all men were equal.60 The

immense pressure for action that built up in the press infers that the government was

not prioritising aid for persecuted Jews and did not expect the public to desire a

54 Mass Observation Archive: Diary 5177 December 1942 55 M-O A: D 5376 56 M-O A: File Report 1660 57 The Times, 14 December 1942 58 Ibid., 59 The Spectator, 10 December 1942 60 Ibid., 2 September 1943

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diversion from the war effort. Yet the attempt by the press to rouse public opinion

suggests that ordinary British citizens were not concerned enough to pressure the

government. This concurs with the lack of forceful arguments for a scheme to aid the

Jews in Mass Observation. The forceful articles and letters in the press urging aid for

European Jews was, therefore, likely to have arisen from a lack of popular initiative to

call for practical immediate action.

The eventual government response, the Allied Declaration, condemning the

systematic extermination of European Jews and promising retribution to perpetrators,

should be viewed as an attempt to satisfy ‘the public.’ Kushner’s identification of a

need by Britain to at least appear to be responding in a liberal manner is credible.

Britain and the United States were in competition over who had the best liberal

credentials and reference to Britain’s moral superiority is a reoccurring theme in the

press.61 Liberal values were invoked verbally to create a favourable perception of

Britain rather than directly influencing policy formation. Political calculation was

more prominent in official thinking than liberal principles because the reluctance to

single out Jews reflected a need to avoid German racialism and German propaganda

themes stressing a ‘Jewish war.’62 Meredith Hindley argued that claims of anti-

Semitism at a bureaucratic level are overstated and instead the Allies had established

a pattern of placing political gains above moral considerations.63 Intervening on

behalf of holocaust victims brought few political and strategic benefits due to the

61 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, pp.146-151 62 Bernard, Wasserstein, Britain and the Jews of Europe: 1939-1945, pp.163-164 63 Meredith Hindley, ‘Constructing Allied Humanitarian Policy’, in David Cesarani and Paul Levine

(eds.), Bystanders’ to the Holocaust: a Re-evaluation, pp.98-99

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disenfranchised status of European Jews.64 When the Archbishop of Canterbury asked

for refuge for Jews in the Empire Morrison responded negatively because it would

stimulate anti-Semitism which was ‘always under the pavement.’65 The Times initially

praised the government’s declaration. The Times drew attention to Britain’s record of

offering ‘traditional hospitality’ and admitting over ‘125,000 civilian refugees’ and

the devotion of ten million pounds to refugees since 1933.66 The Times stated that the

speech was ‘more than a political pledge’ as it bound the conscience of people who

hated cruelty.67

After the Allied Declaration the press presented British people as being expectant

of practical measures of rescue to support the liberal, moral statements being made.

The Allied Declaration appears to have encouraged those pressing for Jewish rescue

and made others feel that the appropriate response to the Holocaust was to ‘follow the

government’ by demanding immediate action. A reader who criticised the declaration

as ‘pitifully tame’ and claimed that it would ‘not save one single life’ represents most

of the views in letters to press editors once immediate action did not follow the

declaration in early 1943. A letter representing students and Christians in Scotland

urged immediate action.68 An article in The Spectator is of particular interest as the

writer cited precedents of immigration and how assimilation caused no harm.69

Members of parliament believed that public opinion supported solving the Jewish

problem and referred to the ‘British conscience’ as being ‘deeply stirred’ and called

64 Ibid., p.97 65 Goldman, ‘The resurgence of Anti-Semitism in Britain during World War II’, Jewish social studies,

p.45 66 The Times, 18 December 1942 67 Ibid., 68 Picture Post, 29 May 1943 69 The Spectator, 15 April 1943

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for any sacrifice which would not delay victory.’70 The pressure by ‘the people’

appears to have had an impact upon the Church of England. On the 31st of December

1942 the Archbishop of Canterbury stated that there is little that can be done.71 By the

end of January 1943 the Archbishop of Canterbury, Anglo-Jewry, the Free Church

and other church members united in pressuring the government for ‘immediate

rescue.’72 The shock of the Nazi genocide plans, the Allied Declaration and support

for immediate action in the press worked together to convince people that saving the

Jews was feasible and necessary. Letters by readers frequently offered solutions

demonstrating the sincerity of protests for aiding Jews. A reader stated that all

countries suffered from a shortage of labour and asked whether room could be found

in the military or ‘at worst’ Jews could be taken into reception camps.73 Another

reader referred to the British response to Kristallnacht and asked why a

correspondingly greater action in response had not occurred. This reader suggested

approaching the enemy government and neutral governments to allow Jews to leave

occupied areas.74

In mid-1943 articles in newspapers protesting for action to save and aid Jews

suddenly declined. By March 1943 The Times conceded the realities of rescue

missions.75 The article criticised the Archbishop of Canterbury and labour and liberal

MPs stating that the difficulties of rescue had not been appreciated and that the

government had been criticised wrongly.76 The Times had positivity towards the

70 The Times, 23 March 1943 71 Ibid.,, 31 December 1942 72 Ibid., 25 January 1943 73 Ibid., 22 December 1942 74 Ibid., 28 December 1942 75 Ibid., 24 March 1943 76 Ibid.,

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government plans for an international approach. The Times supported the upcoming

Bermuda Conference to solve the Jewish refugee problem and failed to radically

criticise the conference’s failure to implement any wide scale immigration plans.77

Continued discontent over government policy is largely limited to Nicolson in his

articles in The Spectator. A rationalisation of opinion may have occurred as issues

such as transporting and shipping millions were highly problematic.

A convincing explanation for the short-lived protests to aid Jews can be achieved

by applying Elizabeth Noelle-Neumann’s Spiral of Silence theory to the situation in

late 1942 and early 1943. Noelle-Neumann argued that when individuals are

immersed in a limited “climate of opinion” they are misled about the real state of

public opinion and are prompted by a “fear of isolation” to conceal their viewpoints

because they believe their opinions are in the minority.78 The immense moral

dilemma that the Holocaust presented meant that it would have been against British

liberal values to reject arguments to save persecuted Jews. There was not a precedent

on how to respond to this form of human tragedy and by giving attention to those

favouring action the press acted in line with British identity by appearing to outwardly

present Britain as a tolerant moral country. The constant stream of letters and articles

pressing for Jewish aid alongside the Allied Declaration was likely to have made

readers believe that aid for the Jews was the popular opinion of the country.

Headline’s such as ‘The people say: “Rescue the Jews!”’ would have been likely to

have made those indifferent or against saving Jews reluctant to voice their opinions.79

77 Ibid., 78 Noelle-Neumann cited by Kurt Neuwirth, Edward Frederick and Charles Mayo in ‘The Spiral of

Silence and Fear of Isolation’, Journal of Communication, Volume 57, Issue 3, September 2007, p.450 79 Picture Post, 27 February 1943

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There is little detail about those who wrote to the press and it is plausible to argue that

a certain type of person is likely to write letters to newspapers. Moreover, one cannot

know how the majority of readers responded to articles and letters demanding greater

action. It is, therefore, sensible to argue that the weight and frequency given to those

demanding a practical response to the ‘Final Solution’ by the press made readers

believe that this was the common, popular response making it intimidating,

unpatriotic and immoral to disagree. Thus there was a more complex attitude to Jews

than sympathy for Jews abroad and antipathy for Jews at home as Kushner suggested.

Kushner argued that the government’s refusal to connect the plight of the Jews to

the war effort caused people to become hardened to and bored with atrocity stories by

1944.80 Kushner argued that the British press followed the government by giving less

coverage to European Jews and presenting the evidence of atrocities against Jews in a

piecemeal manner without attempts to identify with Jews on a human level.81 It is true

that the frequency of articles on Jewish persecution did decline yet Kushner’s

statement needs to be qualified by considering the context of the development of the

war. From the end of 1943 the Russians were advancing from the East and the

German armies were forced from the Soviet Union, the Balkans and Italy. In the first

half of 1944 the D-Day landings occurred and German forces began to switch sides.

Attention would have been focussed on the likely imminent Allied victory and

throughout the war the British government believed that winning the war was the best

way to save the Jews. In response to these military setbacks the Nazis began closing

the death camps and hiding evidence of their existence in 1944. Moreover, in 1944 the

80 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.141, p.186 81 Kushner, ‘Different worlds’, p.258

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scale of killing declined as most European Jews had been exterminated. On the 5th of

May 1944 Himmler declared that ‘the Jewish question has in general been solved in

Germany and in the countries occupied by Germany.’82

Instead of becoming bored with the predicament of the European Jews the press

was devoted to informing the public about the suffering of European Jews. The press

found new but less shocking concerns related to European Jews which demonstrates a

high level of interest and empathy towards them. Anti-Semitism in the Polish army in

England led to two hundred and twenty four desertions to the British army and this

certainly received attention.83 Twenty four of these deserters were court martialled

which led to protests that that there was overt anti-Semitism in the Polish army.84

Nicolson praised Driberg’s decision to raise this issue of anti-Semitism in the Polish

army in parliament and stated that parliament was left embarrassed.85 Nicolson

criticised an MP who commented that the Polish Jews were ‘not nice Jews but nasty

Jews.’ Although parliament was worried that they would encourage further desertion

to the British army Nicolson stated that politicians felt that it was the ‘duty of

parliament’ to ‘give public expression’ to Jewish grievances.86 Comment on Polish

Jews was not limited to Nicolson. The Economist referred to the Polish army attitudes

to Jews as an instance of ‘moral and political perversity’ and that anti-Semitism

should be cured by setting a good example as well as educational work.87 The British

reaction shows the continued desire to publicly discuss Jewish suffering and assert the

82 Peter Longerich, Heinrich Himmler: A Life (Oxford, 2012), p.695 83 Goldman, ‘The resurgence of Anti-Semitism in Britain during World War II’, Jewish social studies,

p.42 84 Ibid., 85 The Spectator, 13 April 1944 86 Ibid., 87 The Economist, 6 May 1944

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superiority of British morals. The Economist defended the actions of the Jews by

stating that ‘the majority of Jews saw plainly their place in the ranks of the Polish

army’ despite the propaganda for a Jewish army made by Jewish nationalists.88 The

Economist justified the desertions of some Polish Jews by claiming that Jews felt

separated from Poland due to the annihilation of the Jewish community in Poland and

the Polish army’s presence in Britain.89 It could be argued that the reluctance to

encourage Jewish transferals to the British army was due to a fear of moving the anti-

Semitism from the Polish army to the British army. An article in The Spectator

admitted that the Jews did face anti-Semitism in the Polish army but condemned their

actions as a desertion and declared that the Polish army needed to stamp out open

anti-Semitism.90 This supports the view that Britain viewed Jews as being absorbed

into the country that they were born in as opposed to a national group showing that

immigrant Jews were regarded as different to British Jews.

Kushner’s statement that there was next to no public concern about Hungarian

Jews is misleading.91 It is significant that on the day of the Hungarian occupation

none of the newspapers studied in this investigation mentioned the danger that the

Hungarian Jews, the largest single Jewish community left, was facing.92 A few days

later there was a brief hint at the possible danger that the Hungarian Jews were facing

in The Times.93 The predicament of the Hungarian Jews was placed under unrelated

headlines such as ‘Food for the Reich’ at the end of March 1944. 94 This shows that

the danger to Hungarian Jews was not seen as urgent by the press. Hungarian Jews are

88 Ibid., 89 Ibid., 90 The Spectator, 4 May 1944 91 Kushner, ‘Different worlds’, pp.256-257 92 The Times, 21 March 1944 93 Ibid., 25 March 1944 94 Ibid., 27 March 1944

22

not mentioned again until July when the government acknowledged their plight. It is

evident that the press waited for a lead from the government. Antony Eden’s

parliament speech on the 5th of July was reported by The Times. The Times quoted

Eden’s comment that there was ‘no doubt that the Hungarian Jewish community is

marked for extermination’ and that ‘loathing’ has filled Britain.95 Yet in the

circumstances of 1944 the problems of winning the war and arranging the peace took

precedence and the military situation required the full deployment of Allied troops in

France and Italy.96 The Minister of Information stated that he could not ‘exaggerate

the brutality of the Germans in Hungary’, that the Jews played a ‘most splendid part

in our country and in all countries’ and that a ‘good Jew meant a good Briton, and

there was no incompatibility between being a good Jew and a good Briton such as

some stupid anti-Semites suggested.’97 The Minister of Information’s defensive

response suggests that there was a need to counter those with the opinion that Jews

were a separate national group unable to fit with the countries in which they lived.

Britain’s moral reputation is defended by drawing attention away from Britain’s

inaction and instead comparing the apparent liberal tolerance and harmony of British

Jews in Britain against the Nazi regime. The later ‘Blood for trucks’ deal looked like a

desperate attempt by the Nazi’s to threaten the British war effort by attempting to

‘blackmail, deceive and split the allies’ as the trucks and perishable goods offered in

return for Hungarian Jews were promised to be used only against the Soviets.98 The

Times appeared strongly on the side of the government agreeing fully with the

95 Ibid., 6 July 1944 96 J.S. Conway, “Between Apprehension and Indifference – Allied Attitudes to the Destruction of

Hungarian Jewry’ in K. G. Saur Verlag GmbH & Company and Michael Marrus (eds)., The End of the

Holocaust (Westport, 1989), p.61 97 The Times, 7 July 1944 98 Ibid., 20 July 1944

23

decision not to accept the offer.99 The article praised the British government’s

knowledge and response and agreed that the best option for the Jews was an allied

victory.100 In light of the desperate situation of the Nazi’s this response appears

consistent with the desire to aid the Jews through victory and maintain Britain’s moral

reputation and wartime unity. The later offer by Horthy to allow Jews to leave

Hungary was taken seriously by the government who ‘hoped that a scheme may

evolve.’101 The Times backed the British government’s rejection of the Hungarian

government’s decision to force Jewish immigration.102 This response demonstrates

Britain’s belief that Jews belonged in the country of their birth.

In approaching the European Jews the British press was fundamentally concerned

about how the reaction of Britain would be perceived. The ‘Final Solution’ provided

an opportunity for Britain to assert its moral superiority. Initially tension and debate

between ‘public opinion’ presented in the press and the government response arouse

because there were disagreements on how Britain’s liberal reputation could be

maintained and asserted. Writers in the press initially expected Britain to be obliged to

commit to a large-scale rescue plan. Once it was clear that the government would not

divert attention from winning the war attempts to criticise the moral implications of

the British government’s delay of immediate aid for the Jews were quickly

abandoned. Instead there were attempts to justify and explain Britain’s responses.

Britain’s moral superiority was then mainly expressed by condemnation of other

countries such as the conduct of Polish army and the Nazi’s treatment of Hungarian

99 Ibid., 100 Ibid., 101 Ibid., 29 July 1944 102 Ibid., 18 August 1944

24

Jews. Attitudes towards European Jews were publicly viewed in ways in which

sympathy could be expressed without threatening the unity and reputation of Britain

or the war effort.

25

A home for the Jews?

It has been established that the dominant reaction to the systematic extermination

of European Jews was to assert Britain’s morality to justify either action or inaction to

aid Jews and condemn anti-Semitic attitudes. After mid-1943 there were fewer

articles which referred to Nazi crimes against Jews. Interest and concern for European

Jews persisted in the form of discussion over whether Palestine should become a

national home for the Jews. The influence of concerns over Palestine upon public

opinion towards European Jews will be considered. The extermination of European

Jews sparked debates over the White Paper and the obligations that Britain took to

both the Jews and the Arabs in the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate.

The issue of finding a home for persecuted Jews became more problematic after the

expiry of the White Paper in March 1944 when entry depended on Arab consent and

subsequent outbursts of Palestinian Jewish terrorism. In April 1944 thirty thousand of

the seventy five thousand visas available to Jewish immigrants under the White Paper

had not been filled.103 British people were in debate over where Jewish survivors

should live and whether they were a national group. The problem was that neither the

Balfour Declaration nor the Mandate defined the type of ‘national home’ to be

established or specified how the rights of non-Jews were to be safeguarded.104 These

ambiguities occurred because the Balfour Declaration was not designed to be the basis

for British rule in Palestine and was instead a piece of wartime propaganda.105

103 James Renton, ‘Flawed Foundations: The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate’ in Rory

Miller (eds.), Britain, Palestine, and Empire: The Mandate Years (Farnham, 2010), p.11 104 Ibid., p.16 105 Ibid.,

26

The power and reputation of Britain was an important feature in government

attitudes towards discussions over whether European Jews should be allowed to live

in Palestine. Palestine was strategically vital to Britain’s position in the Middle East

and Arab relations were crucial due to oil rich Arab territory.106 The British

government looked at the Middle East problem logically from the point of view of the

war effort and expected all Jews to support Britain against Germany and not to

subordinate it to their desire for Palestine.107 The government was anxious about

another Arab rebellion occurring.108 In October 1944 Arab leaders issued the

Alexandria Protocol stating that the issue of European Jewish survivors ought not to

be connected to Zionism and that solving the problem of European Jewry should not

involve inflicting injustice on Palestinian Arabs. The soundness of relations between

Britain and the Arab States was the stabilising factor in the whole Middle-East

because all Arab communities were concerned with Palestine.109 The British

government feared that a mass influx of Jews to Palestine would antagonise Arabs

and drive them into German and Italian camps and threaten British rule in India by

outraging Muslims there.110 The Labour party who had supported Zionism made it

clear in the late summer of 1945 after their election victory that they intended to court

Arab favour to maintain British oil interests and contain the Soviet Union.111

Government officials such as Edward Grigg believed it was essential to get Arab

agreement to ensure British power in the Middle East.112 Grigg argued that even

partition of Palestine would endanger Britain’s position in the Middle East as it would

106 David Cesarani, ‘Great Britain’, in David Wyman (eds.), The World react to the Holocaust

(Baltimore, 1996), p.610 107 Nicholas Bethell, The Palestine Triangle: The Struggle between the British, the Jews and the Arabs

1935-1948 (London, 1979), p.97 108 Ibid., p.98 109 The Spectator, 12 October 1944 110 Endelmen, The Jews of Britain, 1656-2000, p.213 111 Ibid., p.233 112 Goldman, ‘The resurgence of anti-Semitism in Britain during World War II’, Jewish social studies,

p.44

27

raise Zionist aggression and Arab opposition leading Britain to be condemned to

further ‘embarrassment humiliation and wasteful expenditure.’113 There were fears by

the Foreign Office that recognition of a distinct Jewish nationality would be used by

Zionists in their campaign to achieve a Jewish sovereign state in Palestine.114 The

relationship of the British government with the Zionist cause may also have been

affected by the assassination of Lord Moyne by Palestinian Zionists in November

1944.

Did the British public view the issue of finding a home for the persecuted Jews of

Europe as a potential threat to British power and wealth? Press analysis will be used

to discover whether people followed the government and also viewed the prospect of

Palestine becoming a Jewish national home from a political, economic and military

perspective. There is evidence that the newspapers were also against Zionism. The

Spectator presented Zionist claims as a cause of anti-Semitism that Britain must save

world Jewry from.115 The Spectator protested that there was ‘no logical connection

between persecution in Europe and Zionism.’116 It could be inferred that The

Spectator was implicitly attacking Zionism due to fears of provoking Arab resistance

and a loss of British influence in the Middle East. Pressure from the United States to

allow Jewish immigration into Palestine led to an article expressing sympathy and

action needed on behalf of European Jews but that there was ‘no more reason why

they should be sent to add to the confusion in Palestine than why they should be sent

113 Ibid., pp.56-57 114 Ibid., p.44 115 The Spectator, 30 August 1945, 116 Ibid., 19 October 1945

28

to the United States.’117 There were strong articles against Zionist declarations that

there should be a Jewish state in Palestine. Yet these arguments were not clearly

linked to British military and economic interests. Violation of the Balfour Declaration

was invoked against Zionism. The argument that the Balfour Declaration promised to

try and create a Jewish national home in Palestine without prejudicing the civil and

religious rights of non-Jews was expressed in the press.118 The Spectator argued that

the Arabs who had lived in Palestine for a considerable amount of time did not want

to be governed by immigrants regardless of the benefits of Jewish capital and

ability.119 The Spectator asked why material prosperity would be the Arab’s chief

aspiration and that it was the Jews’ instead.120 A lack of support for Zionism was also

expressed in papers not aimed at educated audiences. A reader wrote to The Times

stating that the Zionist party did not represent Jewry as a whole. This reader felt that a

Jewish national home in Palestine would be at the expense of the Arabs and that the

sympathy expressed towards European Jews by Britain and the United States should

mean that Jews should immigrate to Britain and the United States.121

The majority of articles provide evidence to suggest that British people disagreed

with the idea that Jews were a national group. Zionists presented the idea of a Jewish

national home as a solution to the discrimination of assimilation and Jewish

inferiority.122 British Zionists argued that the logic of the liberal nation-state ran

117 Ibid., 4 October 1945 118 Ibid., 16 August 1945 119 Ibid., , 4 January 1945 120 Ibid., 16 August 1945 121 The Times, 1 August 1944 122 Selig Brodetsky quoted by Stephan Wendehorst in British Jewry, Zionism, and the Jewish State,

1936-1956 (Oxford, 2012), p.31

29

counter to Jewish collective continuity.123 Articles in the press countered this

approach by arguing that Jews belonged fully in the country in which they were born

in. An article confirmed that Jews found their “Jerusalem” in the countries in which

they resided in yet survivors needed refuge in Palestine or other countries.124 The

belief that large scale immigration of unassimilated European Jews would cause

instability is evident. Large scale immigration of Jews was seen as threatening and

dangerous to the countries receiving Jewish refugees. This compliments Kushner’s

assertion that Jews were seen by the British as resistant to assimilation. There was a

desire to limit the danger of mass immigration by solving the problem in

cooperation.125 A reader solved the problem by suggesting that Palestine should

become the centre of a Jewish Commonwealth whilst other countries allowed Jewish

immigration.126 The Spectator argued that Zionism gave ‘further colour to the

mistaken view held by the anti-Semite and the ignorant that the Jew is an alien in

every land except Palestine.’127 A Spectator article stated that the majority of Jews

had no intention of living in Palestine and that Palestine should be a cultural or

spiritual national home and a source of interest and pride to Jews ‘without

violence.’128 This article was reinforced by a letter by a British Jew who stated that all

Jews ‘deny that the Jews are a nation’, oppose a Jewish state in Palestine and view

themselves as a religious community.129 It was claimed that the number of Jews in

Palestine was over twice the number of ancient Hebrews in the ideal age of their

kingdom which was, therefore, enough to constitute a ‘national home.’130 A reader

123 Wendehorst, British Jewry, Zionism, and the Jewish State, 1936-1956, p.29 124 The Times, 26 October 1945 125 Ibid., 29 October 1945 126 The Economist, 20 October 1945 127 The Spectator, 2 November 1945 128 Ibid., 30 August 1945 129 Ibid., 2 November 1945 130 Ibid., 19 October 1945

30

asserted that the remarkable achievements of Palestinian Jews ‘revitalised the spirit of

Jewish nationality throughout the world’ and that ‘a National home in Palestine was

well established.’131 There was refusal by the government and the press to recognise

the European Jews as a national group requiring a country of their own.

The press response to the treatment of Palestine was related to Britain’s

reputation.132 A tension is evident because Britain desired to maintain its moral

reputation by honouring obligations whilst avoiding antagonising the Arabs. Desires

to appear moral may have been a reason why articles attacking Zionist claims did not

refer explicitly to British oil and military interests in the Middle East. Instead articles

pointed to the problems which would be imposed on the Arabs and the unfairness of

seeing Jews as not participants of their country of birth. Newspapers presented the

British administration as being in a difficult situation of trying to identify the precise

obligations and promises that the Balfour Declaration and Mandate entailed whilst

attempting to balance the situation.133 There was acceptance that the mandate obliged

Britain to bring about conditions which in time may make a Jewish national home

possible.134 British Jews pressured the government in many letters to The Times to

allow the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine. British Jews appealed to the ‘British

tradition and justice’ as a reason for the creation of a national home.135 Attitudes

expressed in response mainly centred around concerns of maintaining Britain’s

reputation by following obligations. British military and economic interests were

expressed more subtly. This is evident from an article which expressed that if

131 Ibid., 9 February 1945 132 Ibid., 30 August 1945 133 Ibid., 4 January 1945 134 Ibid., 135 The Times, 26 October 1945

31

Palestine was made a Jewish state it would ‘saddle the British government with a

permanent military commitment’ and that there was no legal or moral basis for it.136

This argument provoked a response by a reader who stated that the legal basis was the

Balfour Declaration whilst the moral basis was the Old Testament, tradition, the

‘Final Solution’ and the Palestinian Jews who fought for Britain.137 Press articles

defended the British approach to Palestine by emphasising Britain’s empathy and

desire to act legally and morally. Lord Cranborne was reported as stating that no other

nation had a finer record so far as the Jewish people were concerned.138 Lord

Cranborne referred to a letter to The Times to demonstrate that people in Britain were

sympathetic and caring about Palestinian Jews.139 The Lord Chancellor emphasised

British empathy with the Jews by arguing that the Jews were perceived to have an

important part to play in Europe and that all nations must help the Jews.140 An

eagerness to deflect attention away from the creation of a Jewish home in Palestine

and find more suitable alternatives is noticeable. An article claimed that the public felt

the sentimental and spiritual connection of Jewry with Palestine and the cultural link

to Palestine in terms of culture, society and science.141 The Economist stated that it

was impossible to ask Arabs to allow Jews into Palestine if Britain was refusing

immigration and that Britain should take the lead and in a gesture of humanity ask

Palestine to join.142 The Economist condemned Britain’s illiberal refugee policies of

the past and suggested that the United Nations outside of Europe allow Jewish

immigration and eventually there might be a chance of forming national home for

136 The Economist, 11 August 1945 137 Ibid., 25 August 1945 138 The Times, 11 December 1945 139 Ibid., 140 Ibid., 141 The Spectator, 30 August 1945 142 The Economist, 6 October 1945

32

Jewry in the Middle East.143 The Times supported the Royal Commission’s decision to

create a partition of Palestine and a letter to the editor viewed partition as ‘the only

hope of a solution’ and stressed that instead of bloodshed a partition would ensure

peace.144

British duty, the maintenance of law and order and acting in accordance with

British liberal values and obligations were important issues to the press in dealing

with the issue of whether Palestine should become a national home for European

Jews. The public engaged in finding explanations to justify British Palestine policy

and to find other options which would not antagonise the Arabs and hence severely

threaten British interests.

143 Ibid., 11 August 1945 144 The Times, 24 August 1945

33

Attitudes to Jews living in Britain

It will be interesting to juxtapose the public attitudes towards European Jews

presented in the press to the way in which Jews in Britain were privately regarded.

The national newspapers and journals studied rarely discussed domestic anti-

Semitism. Kushner’s view that conceptions of ‘Britishness’ were viewed as

incompatible with anti-Semitism is apparent.145 There was a reluctance to publicly

acknowledge and deal with expressions of support for anti-Semitism and Nazi

ideology. Picture Post presented British anti-Semitism as being supported by an

extremist minority who were linked to the Nazi’s in contrast to the Christian morality

of British people.146 The rejection of a Jewish nationality which featured in

discussions over Palestine was evident in public attitudes towards Jews in Britain.

Influential people attempted to contest the notion of Jewish difference. An article

dealt with proposals for a separate Jewish army by emphasising that the Jews were a

religious community and not a separate people. The article claimed that Jews did not

wish to be identified with Jewish nationalism and wanted to serve in Britain’s armed

forces.147 Press articles praise the creation of The Council of Christians and Jews

which was created to express the unity of morals between Christians and Jews and to

combat religious and racial intolerance.148 The council stated that anti-Semitism is

‘repugnant to the moral principles common to Christianity and Judaism.’149 In January

1944 the council expressed a belief in the progress of mankind and the importance of

145 Kushner, ‘The impact of British Anti-Semitism, 1918-1945’, p.202 146 Picture Post, 8 May 1943 147 The Economist, 15 August 1942 148 The Times, 1 October 1942 149 Ibid.,

34

human rights.150 Christian ethics were declared to have become part of the European

heritage which anti-Christian Fascism was attempting to destroy.151 The

incompatibility of Fascist anti-Semitism with Britain’s Christian values may be

explained by the pluralist values and attitudes in Britain which were established from

the Victorian era.152 Expressions of unity between Christianity and Judaism were not

limited to religious morals and included comprehension of cultural differences. The

council included in its aims fellowship between Christian and Jewish youth

organisations in educational and cultural activities.153 A “good” Jew was identified as

religiously observant as well as patriotic demonstrating that a mixture of Christian

moral values and national values were expected in Britain in order to prevent Fascist

style anti-Semitism gaining popularity.154 It will be questioned whether British people

privately believed that Jews could be both patriotic and have different cultural values

and habits.

Public discussion of anti-Semitism was a sensitive matter in Britain. The Times

reported disagreement in the House of Lords. Lord Wedgwood was condemned by

Viscount Cranborne for dangerously suggesting that there were anti-Semitics in

Britain and the Palestine administration.155 In response Lord Wedgwood was labelled

a ‘peculiar type of Englishman’ as he boasted of his patriotism yet also abused and

libelled his own country.156 Cranborne’s response exemplifies the public repulsion of

150 Picture Post, 8 January 1944 151 Ibid., 152 Susanne Terwey, ‘Britain (1870-1939)’, in Richard S.Levy (eds.), Antisemitism: A Historical

Encyclopedia of Prejudice and Persecution, Volume 1 (Santa Barbara, 2005), p.85 153 The Times, 9 October 1942 154 Terwey, ‘Britain (1870-1939)’, Antisemitism: A Historical Encyclopaedia of Prejudice and

Persecution, Volume 1, p.85 155 The Times, 10 June 1942 156 Ibid.,

35

links between Britain and intolerance towards Jews in Britain. Similarly an article in

the Spectator provoked a backlash from both Jewish and non-Jewish readers when it

claimed that black market offences of Jews were not isolated cases.157 A reader stated

that the article placed the Jewish aspects of the black market out of proportion citing

evidence showing that at the end of one week only six out of thirty-four black market

cases were Jewish.158 An separate article reviewing a book about Jews in Britain

condemned the author for falsely inferring that British Jews were devoted to material

success.159 These responses to anti-Semitic accusations demonstrates a willingness of

British people to collect and find evidence to disprove claims of Jewish exploitation

which suggests that some people saw anti-Semitism as against their interests and

views. Nicolson stated that parliament was alarmed by the thought of persecution

happening to British Jews that they knew and believed that the December Allied

Declaration would lead to condemnation of anti-Semitic feelings as ‘ungenerous and

uncivilised’ and to accepting more refugees.160 The measures taken to evade and

discredit claims of British anti-Semitism may suggest that there was an element of

anti-Semitism in Britain that British people were unwilling to admit to but willing to

battle. It is important to acknowledge that the type of people being portrayed in the

press were not representative of the British population. With the exception of the

factory workers and members of guilds attending the conference on anti-Semitism

described in Picture Post, those who publicly condemned anti-Semitism appear to be

church leaders or highly educated members of society, particularly politicians. This

shows the necessity of using Mass Observation to gain a more complete and accurate

insight into British attitudes towards Jews in Britain.

157 The Spectator, 1 April 1943 158 Ibid., 159 The Times Literary Supplement, 1 July 1944 160 The Spectator, 24 December 1942

36

Mass Observation will be used to test whether there was a genuine desire to combat

anti-Semitism and if a private, domestic anti-Semitic feeling was present which was

not mentioned in the newspapers and journals studied. Domestic anti-Semitism is

prominent Mass Observation. Fifty four percent of the sample expressed antipathy

towards Jews in Britain and the rest of the sample mostly presented mixed opinions

towards Jews. Entirely positive attitudes towards Jews featured only in ten percent of

samples. Julius’s assertion that anti-Semitism was contained by news of genocide and

increased after Lord Moyne’s assassination in November 1944 is not supported by

Mass Observation.161 An RAF corporal, 25, represents the typical expressions of

domestic anti-Semitism when he said he had ‘nothing but condemnation for the

persecution of Jews’ ‘yet many of their race has helped to bring this dislike and

persecution upon themselves by their sharp practise and doubtful business in trade.’162

A file report stated that pity for European Jews commonly existed alongside dislike

for British Jews.163 A striking feature of Mass Observation evidence is that between

June 1942 and 1945 the period with the most anti-Semitic comment was in March

1943 corresponding with the Bethnal Green stampede and interestingly a time when

demands for saving the Jews and allowing Jews refuge in Britain reached its peak.

There were frequent anti-Semitic comments between June 1942 and March 1943

before declining after. A Home Intelligence report in 1944 reported low levels of anti-

Semitism.164 Laqueur’s analysis of Home Intelligence weekly reports led to a similar

conclusion that towards the end of 1942 anti-Semitism was revived by the disclosures

161 Anthony Julius, Trials of the diaspora: A history of anti-Semitism in England (Oxford, 2010), p.327 162 M-O A D: 5210 July 1942 163 M-O A FR: 1660 April 1943 164 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.188

37

of Nazi massacres and people became more conscious of the Jews they disliked in

Britain.165

Caution should be used when explaining the continued anti-Semitic attitudes

towards Jews after June 1942 by stating that Hitler’s extermination plan was not

widely believed. Joanne Reilly’s view that during the war there was little

acknowledgment or credence given to reports on the ‘Final Solution’ is incorrect.166

There was not a strong link between those who expressed anti-Jewish sentiments and

claims that the news of the ‘Final Solution’ was false. ‘Atrocity stories’ of the First

World War which were reported by respected newspapers such as The Times would

have been remembered. There was an element of shock and disbelief amongst British

people which is understandable given the scale of brutalities and the wartime situation

of anxiety and rumour.167 Initial reluctance to believe the Nazi atrocities do not mean

that information was rejected. If British people did not believe that the Jews of Europe

were severely threated then why was there an absence of resistance against the

‘popular’ campaign to save Jews from late 1942 to mid-1943? Mass Observation does

not present strong evidence that there was a significant body of people who

disbelieved Nazi atrocities. There are hints from respondents that they encountered

people who disbelieved Nazi atrocities. Yet these respondents mainly report these

sentiments in other people and are confused as to how people could deny Nazi

atrocities in light of the evidence. A sixty-five year old nurse and a thirty-two year old

radio operator both pointed to the ‘overwhelming evidence’ for the Nazi atrocities in

165 Laqueur, The Terrible Secret, p.92 166 Joanne Reilly, Belsen: The Liberation of a Concentration Camp (London, 1998) p.63 167 Ibid., p.66

38

1944 after the pressure to save the Jews had declined.168 Respondents rarely singled

out atrocities against Jews during the period of liberation when Nazi crimes were

being fully revealed. When dealing with the validity of information concerning Nazi

brutality respondents referred generally to ‘prisoners’ in German camps. This

suggests that all Nazi atrocities were capable of producing an element of doubt and

uncertainty whether they were crimes against Jews or not. A file report in 1945

revealed that instead of finally making the population acknowledge ‘atrocity stories’

liberation provided images and eye witnesses which presented a different kind of

knowing and understanding.169 The file report discovered that in 1944 more people

partly believed or had no opinion on the atrocities than denied them.170 This may

represent a desire to believe that mankind was incapable of such atrocities and a

natural response to avoid mental distress rather than a reluctance to sympathise with

Jews or abandon anti-Jewish sentiments in Britain.

Mass Observation consistently reveals that traditional anti-Semitic themes of

Jewish power and difference were applied to the context of the war effort and

economy. This supports Endelmen’s argument that the notions of Jewish difference

were deeply embedded in Western culture.171 The common accusations against Jews

in Britain were black market profiteering, excesses of wealth, causing the war,

panicking, greediness, laziness and draft dodging. Jews were seen to evade war work

and make profit from black marketing leading many to view Jews as unpatriotic.172 A

typical attitude is expressed by a Commercial Traveller, 40, who stated that the Jews

168 M-O D:5233 January 1944, M-O D:5399 September 1944 169 M-O FR:2228 April 1945 170 Ibid., 171 Endelman, The Jews of Britain, 1656-2000, p.262 172 M-O A D:2930 March 1943

39

were ‘keeping foods in short supplies’ and not contributing to the war effort.173 The

belief that Jews were economically exploitative was the most common accusation

against Jews. An article referred to Jewish rationing offences stating that the ‘knavery

of the worst Jews’ did ‘more harm to the Jewish name’ than the bravery of the best

Jews.174 The economic focus of anti-Semitism in Britain is unsurprising considering

that the Jews had been stereotyped by economic charges for centuries.175 Interestingly

there is no sense of geographical concentration of anti-Semitism and expressions of

anti-Semitism do not appear to correspond to areas with large Jewish populations. The

average age of respondents was forty-three and the range of ages was narrow,

however, the anti-Jewish feeling in Mass Observation corroborates with Orwell’s

evidence of anti-Semitism which he encountered. 176 Respondents’ opinions of Jews

may have been conditioned by memories of the social movement of Jews during the

interwar period when the Jews entered the middle-class.177 The timing of this social

movement caused resentment as it occurred when there was an industrial depression,

labour unrest, poor housing conditions, unemployment, the Bolshevik revolution,

revolts in Palestine and the rise of Nazism. 178 All of these factors worked together to

heighten ‘Jewish consciousness’ in a population which was remarkably

homogeneous.179

173 M-O A D:5150 December 1942 174 The Spectator, 9 April 1943 175 Goldman, ‘The resurgence of Anti-Semitism in Britain during World War II’, Jewish social studies,

p.39 176 George Orwell, As I please: 1943-1945, Volume three essays, journalism and letters, in Sonia

Orwell and Ian Angus (eds.), (New Hampshire, 1968), p.333 177 Endelman, The Jews of Britain, 1656-2000, p.198 178 Ibid., 179 Ibid., p.260

40

The widespread belief that Jews were economically manipulative and unpatriotic

to the war effort inevitably meant that Jews were perceived as deliberately resisting

assimilating into British society and behaving differently to the British. Kushner’s

liberal anti-Semitism in which there was no room for ‘Jewishness’ in Britain requires

expansion. The surprising feature of Mass Observation is that it reveals that there

were conflicting attitudes towards Jews. Jews were publicly regarded in the press as

assimilated into British society and not a separate group in need of a country of their

own. This contrasts Mass Observation as some respondents viewed Jews as a different

‘race’ whilst others regarded Jews as part of British society. The majority of Mass

Observation diarists who presented negative opinions of Jews were concerned with

economic charges and do not directly link to Jewish religious practices or cultural

activities. Instead anti-Jewishness was based on irrational prejudices and general

references to Jewish ‘bad behaviour.’ A teacher, 61, believed that it was ‘a bit

difficult not to be anti-Semitic’ when Jews succeeded in areas such as food supplies

which did not allow the English to do the same.180 The claim that Jews caused anti-

Semitism is prominent in the samples as one respondent claimed that the Jews in

Britain do not act in a manner which will obtain them sympathy for their race.’181

After a Food Packing Manager, 35, encountered a Jew who was seeking a surplus of

paper he wrote ‘well there it is. I try not to be anti-Semitic, but the Jews do not make

it any easier for us.’182 Respondents commonly claimed that Jews cause Britain

‘trouble.’183 One person abhorred the Nazi persecution but believed that Jews only

identify themselves with the country of their adoption ‘for the furtherment of their

180 M-O A D:5402 February 1943 181 M-O A D:5150 December 1942 182 M-O A D:5004 June 1943 183 M-O A D:5210 July 1942

41

own interests.’184 The perception of Jews profiting from the war and being unpatriotic

is supported by evidence from leaflets which echoed Nazi broadcasts blaming Jews

for buying bombed out sites and controlling insurance companies.185 British people

complained about Jewish manners and a thirty-three year old journalist summed up

these poor manners stating that Jews were ‘noisy, aggressive, trying to draw attention

to themselves, loud, tactless, not taking a fair place in queues’ and ‘insensitive to

people’s feelings.’186 Jewish behaviour was viewed as in conflict to the values of

British society yet the ‘bad behaviour’ that Jews were accused had nothing to do with

Jewish religious or culture.

Conceptions of ‘Britishness’ and accusations that Jews were different and

unpatriotic made it hard for people to identify with Jews.187 Kushner is right to

identify an anti-Semitism which was caused the by the Jews’ supposed failure to

assimilate and a fear that allowing more Jews into the country would cause anti-

Semitism.188After 1918 ‘Englishness’ was constructed as an exclusive concept used to

support the idea of a homogenous, non-immigrant, Protestant nation.189 Kushner

believes that the liberal commitment to individualism required the Jews to cease to be

a collective body and Mass Observation does suggest that Jewish particularism caused

hostility.190 Instead of combating anti-Semitism through campaigns in organisations

such as the National Council of Civil Liberties most British anti-Semites believed that

184 M-O A FR: 1660 April 1943 185 Goldman, ‘The resurgence of Anti-Semitism in Britain during World War II’, Jewish social studies,

p.40 186 M-O A FR: 1660 187 Kushner, ‘Different worlds’, p.261 188 Tony Kushner, ‘’Pissing in the wind’? The search for nuance in the study of the holocaust’ in David

Cesarani and Paul Levine (eds.), ‘Bystanders’ to the Holocaust: a Re-evaluation, pp.66-69 189 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.273 190 Ibid., p.198

42

the solution relied on Jews changing their behaviour. One person wrote to the council

saying that a campaign would associate anti-Semitism with racism and generate

further anti-Semitism as a result.191 Orwell provided a convincing argument to support

the assertion that anti-Semitism was part of a problem of nationalism.192 Orwell

questioned how far economic factors caused anti-Semitism by asking why Jews rather

than other minorities were used as scapegoats and he pointed to the influx of refugees

since 1938.193 Although economic grievances were deeply rooted in British

consciousness and were more likely to drive anti-Semitic feeling amongst the working

classes, there is evidence from members of different classes that Jews were disliked

because they were viewed as a separate ‘race.’ Reasons for dislike of Jews amongst

the wealthy, educated or politically conscious may be explained by conceptions of

British national values. Orwell points to an irrational, deep rooted prejudice stating

that he also received anti-Semitism responses from those without economic

grievances.194 There is not a link between negative stereotypes of Jews as a ‘race’ and

the Nazi racial ideology. Racial attitudes towards Jews were used incorrectly and

irrationally. There was no clear criteria of what made Jews a ‘race.’ Large groups of

Jews were considered intimidating and foreign. An elderly man claimed that although

his friend was a Jew he did not like Jews as a ‘race’.195 A dentist admitted that once

he found out someone he liked was a Jew he could no longer like that person and

there was nothing he could do about it.196 The pressure for British Jews to assimilate

was more social and cultural than political in nature and less obvious.197 Being both a

‘good Jew’ and ‘good Briton’ was seen privately to be in conflict because Jewishness

191 M-O A D:5402 May 1943 192 Orwell, As I please, pp.340 193 Ibid., pp.90-91 194 Ibid., p.335 195 M-O A D:5446 February 1943 196 M-O A D:5445 March 1944 197 Endelman, The Jews of Britain 1656-2000,p.261

43

was seen as a barrier to effective assimilation into an ethnically and culturally

homogeneous society.198 Julius’s argument that during the war anti-Semitism was a

local phenomenon directed against individuals rather than Jewry as a whole is

unsupported.199 A significant amount of respondents viewed Jews as a different

‘race.’ A file report stated that many people liked individual Jews but disliked Jews as

a ‘race’ and could not explain their reasons for this.200 This irrational anti-Semitism is

evident from a respondent who attempted to explain their anti-Semitic feelings

writing ‘it is pure prejudice and I can see no logical reason for it.’201 These feelings

may be explained by the combination of anti-Jewish sentiments and xenophobia. In

1943 Mass Observation tested attitudes towards foreigners and only two people out of

sixty eight questioned why Jews were included in the survey.202 Jews were viewed as

a separate ‘race’ because they were somehow different to British people. A

respondent believed that Jews were ‘foreigners’ with different characteristics.203 A

forty-five year old writer claimed that her mother never used to be anti-Semitic before

the war and that she was particularly hostile towards European Jews and the

respondent sympathised with both her mother and the Jews.204 A twenty-three year

old shop assistant overheard people stating that ‘as long as they’re real English Jews

they’re alright. These Polish Jews, though are about the worst.’205 As British Jews

were seen as a foreign race it is unsurprising that there were comments aimed at

recent Jewish immigrants. Most of the respondents, however, did not distinguish

198 Kushner cited by David Cesarani in ‘Bystanders’ to the Holocaust: a Re-evaluation, p.18 199 Julius, Trials of the diaspora, p.326 200 M-O A FR:1660 April 1943 201 Ibid., 202 Kushner, ‘The impact of British Anti-Semitism, 1918-1945’, p.198 203 M-O A FR:1660 April 1943 204 M-O A D:5378 November 1944 205 M-O A D:5205 July 1943

44

between foreign and British Jews. The idea of a Jewish collective identity caused

resentment, suspicion and a belief that Jews were not part of British society.

Over time there was an increase in awareness of the irrational perception of Jews.

It is plausible to state that differences in antipathy towards Jews were based on levels

of education and intelligence. Diary entries, mostly by those lacking a university

education, contrasts a quantitative survey in which attitudes towards Jews of the same

group of intelligent people were compared in 1941 and in March 1943 and the results

showed that mixed feelings increased to include fifty percent of the sample whilst

unfavourable attitudes halved.206 The file report explained the decrease in

unfavourable attitudes towards Jews by stating that intellectual people had become

more aware of the dangers of anti-Semitism and less willing to admit prejudices and

that the ‘more thoughtful’ people felt ‘uncomfortable and ashamed.’207 Caution

should be taken as the file report itself acknowledges that quantitative data is more

favourable towards Jews than qualitative data.208 Government polls were not fully

developed during the war period and those taking surveys are likely to have thought

about the expectations that the government would have had and opinions that the

government would have favoured because they were conscious of providing an

opinion on certain issues. Diaries, on the other hand, provided a chance for issues

which preoccupied the population to be expressed naturally and for more personal

detail and description. Nevertheless, there is some evidence to suggest that more

educated people were likely to consider the implications of anti-Semitic sentiments.

Orwell came to the conclusion that above a certain level of intelligence people were

206 M-O A FR:1660 April 1943 207 Ibid., 208 M-O A FR:1660 April 1943

45

ashamed and emphasised that they disliked Jews rather than admitted that they were

anti-Semitic.209 Orwell accurately observed anti-Semitism as existing in the form of

feelings increasing in private and not as a racial or religious thought out doctrine.210

Reluctance to admit to intolerant behaviour amongst educated citizens features in

Mass Observation diaries. A student wrote that anti-Semitism was ‘the first sign of

Fascism’ yet disliked Jews and noted that it was ‘a private attitude’ that the student

kept hidden.211 Further evidence to suggest that anti-Semitic attitudes were not

communicated openly can be seen from comments such as ‘I have not noticed any

evidence of [anti-Semitism] in this district’212 and ‘most Englishmen have a sneaking

dislike for Jews.’213 Mass Observation’s anonymity presented an opportunity for

people to speak frankly and appears to have been used as an outlet to express

suppressed anger and envy and find a scapegoat for hardships during wartime. The

desire to keep anti-Jewish sentiment suppressed is likely to be explained by its

contrast to British values of tolerance and liberty. British characteristics have already

been shown to have been of importance during the war from analysis of articles in the

press.

Although educated people and people from the middle and upper classes may have

been less likely to express strongly anti-Semitic comments publicly and were more

likely to attempt to overcome or hide prejudices214 members of the lower middle and

working classes also defended Jews. In 1945 Orwell argued that the Holocaust

divided anti-Semitism, rather than diminishing or creating it, causing division

between the politically conscious who realised it was not the time to target Jews and

209 Orwell, As I please, p.334 210 Orwell, As I please, pp.335-337 211 M-O A FR:1669 April 1943 212 M-O A D:5205 April 1943 213 M-O A D:5004 April 1943 214 M-O A FR:1660 April 1943

46

the unconscious person whose native anti-Semitism was increased by the strains of

the war.215 Orwell provided an example of wide attendance at a service on behalf of

Jews in a synagogue in an area where anti-Semitism was strong.216 Someone Orwell

knew to be a supporter of Mosely turned up which demonstrates a desire to hide and

combat anti-Semitic tendencies.217 It is possible that instead of an abandonment of

anti-Semitic views this demonstrates a fear of the authorities clamping down on

supporters of Mosely. A considerable amount of diary respondents saw anti-Semitism

in others as an irrational blind hatred based on personal or financial factors.218 Mass

Observation reveals tensions amongst ‘ordinary’ members of the population as there

were some who intensified their belief in stereotypes of Jews whilst there was a body

of British people prepared to defend British Jews. The data which presents mixed

feelings about Jews occurs in the form of debates between people with contrasting

attitudes towards Jews. Debates between those who disliked Jews and those who were

sympathetic towards Jews occur in thirty five percent of the sample whereas

uncontested compassion and sympathy for Jews was only a feature of ten percent of

the sample. Instead of ambivalence, as Kushner argues, the respondents reported

disagreement and a polarisation of opinion over the Jews in Britain.

The solutions widely offered to the Jewish problem provide further evidence of the

contrasting and conflicting attitudes towards Jews in Britain. Solutions offered to the

issue of Jewish difference were that Jews needed to mix more with non-Jews219 or that

Jews should be removed from Britain. This demonstrates the polarisation of responses

215 Orwell, As I please, pp.338 216 Ibid., pp.335-336 217 Ibid., 218 M-O A D:5446 May 1943 219 Ibid.,

47

as some people expressed a liberal form of toleration of Jews whereas others were

anti-Semitic and saw Jews as a separate dangerous race. A forty year old working in

foreign shipping did not view Jews as a minority because they do not have common

language and common characteristics and cannot be placed in one country alone

without raising anti-Semitism.220 In contrast a shop assistant, 23, stated that the best

solution was to ignore the Jews and ‘admit them to the full rights and privileges of the

country in which they happen to be living and eventually they would be absorbed and

forgotten.’221 British people appear to have felt threatened and insulted by ‘close-knit

bands’ of Jews and limited attempts by Jews to ‘intermingle’ which led to a

misunderstanding of Jewish behaviour because British people saw this as an insult.222

If they mix, one person wrote, ‘they would make their point of view more generally

understood.’223 These views were supported by a diverse range of people such as an

estate agent, chemist, metal finisher, student and housewife.224 This type of British

attitude towards Jews seems to have been realised by British Jews. In a letter to The

Times, a Jew complained that the newspaper failed to stress that British Jews did not

want to be separated and want to ‘feel united in national loyalty’ and that Jewish

religious life could exist alongside recognition of ‘national life of Britain.’225 In

another letter a British Jew stated that there were ‘a very large number of Jews’ who

were ‘not in favour of the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth, and whose only

national cause is that of the country of which they are proud to be citizens.’226 A letter

in response stated that Jews could both be proud of Britain and also favour a Jewish

220 M-O A D:5390 June 1943 221 M-O A D:5205 16 March 1944 222 M-O A FR:1669 April 1943 223 Ibid., 224 M-O A FR:1660 225 The Times, 23 September 1944 226 Ibid., 21 February 1944

48

state and that German Jews were once patriotic until their country failed them.227 A

British Jew wrote in 1945 that British Jews owed their loyalty and service to Britain

and complained that many British people were unaware that the only difference

between Jews and British people was religious faith and observance and Jews were

instead still regarded as foreigners or a race.228 The writer complained that Zionism

enforced this racial view which added to the incorrect perceptions of Jews.229 As late

as June 1945 the Jewish Fellowship felt the need to combat the view that Jews were a

politico-national group instead of a religious group and make it clear that their

nationality was British.230 Issues of nationality and race were inextricably linked to

expressions of anti-Semitic feelings amongst people in Britain.

Mass Observation reveals a degree of support amongst those who expressed anti-

Jewish sentiments for the claim that Jews were a dangerous ‘race’. Kushner states

that British people never supported Nazi techniques.231 This statement is plausible as

there was support for Hitler’s aim to remove Jews but not for his methods of

genocide. One respondent commented that ‘Hitler did one good thing at least in

turning out the Jews, and now we will have to suffer for taking them in.’232 These

extreme views are reported mostly by people who heard other people express them. A

forty-four year old secretary wrote that ‘Scottie’ said that there was a ‘large minority’

of people ‘who wanted Hitler to come and take over’ and that the Jews caused the

war.233 A teacher overheard someone state that they preferred Germans to Jews.234

227 Ibid., 24 February 1944 228 The Spectator, 2 November 1945 229 Ibid., 230 The Times, 21 June 1945 231 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination, p.137 232 M-O FR: 1561 January 1943 233 M-O A D:5429 July 1943

49

One person felt that problems would never be solved until the Jewish race ceased to

exist.235 These statements should be considered carefully. Rumour and

misunderstanding is likely to have influenced these anti-Semitic comments.

Comments may have been said in a deliberately hyperbolic manner or taken out of

context and may not have been meant literally. Respondents may be reporting anti-

Semitism that they witnessed because they were shocked that it existed or because it

was rare to hear. Personal experience and circumstance influenced British attitudes to

Jews. The willingness for British people to link isolated, individual instances of

Jewish ‘bad behaviour’ to the whole Jewish ‘race’ is evident in the sample.

Respondents who expressed anti-Jewish sentiments commonly seem to believe that a

few bad Jews gave the ‘race’ a bad name.236 A fifty-seven year old housewife was

shocked by the diversity of people who thought that ‘Hitler was right by getting rid of

the Jews.’237 Yet this housewife in December 1942 wrote that the ‘greedy Jews

brought it on themselves’, ‘had a big hand’ in causing the war and as late as October

1945 believed that ‘the world would be a better place if there were no Jews.’238 This

respondent claimed that her ‘fair minded brother shouted sense when he declared that

Jews had done more harm in the world than Hitler.’239 This shows that anti-Semitic

attitudes were changeable and depended on feelings at certain times and situations.

British people had a habit of accusing Jews of economic manipulation and of

viewing Jews as ‘different’ and ‘foreign.’ There were differences in attitudes towards

Jews which were affected by personal experience, economic background, intellect,

234 M-O A D:5446 May 1943 235 M-O A FR:1669 April 1943 236 M-O A: FR 1481 November 1942 237 M-O A: D5296 August 1942 238 M-O A: D5296 December 1942, October 1945 239 M-O A: D5296 April 1943

50

rationality and political awareness. Defence of Jews in Britain may have arisen out of

sympathy in light of the mass murder of European Jews. Yet there was support of

Hitler’s aim to remove Jews which shows how the ‘Final Solution’ produced a

polarisation of attitudes towards Jews.

51

Conclusion

This thesis is important because it has found evidence to question the work of the

only historian who deals explicitly with British attitudes to Jews during the Second

World War. Kushner’s identification of a British ambivalence towards Jews during

the holocaust in the form of sympathy abroad and liberal anti-Semitism at home is too

simplistic. The complexities that knowledge of the Holocaust brought to opinions of

Jews means that the period between 1942 and 1945 deserves to be treated separately

from the wartime period as a whole. It is not surprising that there was sympathy in

light of the mass genocide yet the way that sympathy was presented in the papers is

striking and shows the power of the press in influencing public opinion in the 1940’s.

After news of the ‘Final Solution’ reached Britain the press presented British people

as being in a popular campaign for action to aid European Jews. Both the government

and British population believed that this was the popular opinion of the population.

This is evident from the Allied Declaration which attempted to deal with ‘public

opinion’ yet it had the effect of making the public temporarily believe that the

government supported the view that moral considerations should override practical

and military considerations. After mid-1943 there was greater unity between the press

and the government. The threat of extermination of the Hungarian Jews was not

emphasised until the government gave it attention. Considerations of priorities of

winning the war and a desire not to threaten British interest in the Middle-East were

also factors which subtly influenced how Jews were perceived publicly. The

newspapers supported the government’s decision to avoid large scale immigration to

Palestine by using arguments which were more publically acceptable than the issue of

52

British oil and military interests. These arguments centred on morality and a rejection

of the notion that Jews were a separate nationality.

There was a more complex relationship between British citizens and Jews who

lived in Britain. Individually most British citizens had strong opinions on the Jews

and were either defensive or resentful of Jews. Anti-Jewishness was more prominent

in the Mass Observation evidence although a considerable proportion of respondents

recorded instances of when they defended Jews in debates with other people. There

was a polarisation of opinions despite the seemingly unanimous view in the press that

anti-Semitism was an illiberal and anti-British sentiment. The accusations against

Jews did not identify which parts of Jewish cultural activities were offensive. These

polarised opinions were influenced heavily by traditional economic prejudices which

had been applied to Jews and were easily heightened during the strained conditions of

wartime Britain. Jews in Britain were thus seen as unpatriotic which accelerated anti-

Jewishness in Britain. This reveals the rapidness of British people to find an outlet for

frustrations and to blame Jews for the presence of British anti-Semitism in a ‘moral’

country. The polarisation of opinions towards Jews in Britain is evident from the

contradicting solutions to British anti-Semitism. Some people believed that Jews were

part of British society and capable of effective assimilation whilst others believed

Jews should be removed from Britain. Kushner’s ambivalence that he identifies is

best exemplified only by the attitudes of a particular group of people, mostly

intellectuals, who over time identified the irrationality and immorality of their anti-

Semitic outlooks and attempted to deny or suppress it.

53

This thesis has demonstrated how crucial it is that newspapers and Mass

Observation evidence are used together to understand differences in public and

private attitudes towards Jews and between European Jews and Jews living in Britain.

Mass Observation shows that government officials and others who feared domestic

anti-Semitism were right to be worried about British anti-Semitism. The public denial

and condemnation of anti-Semitism in the press would have been part of the reason

why anti-Semitism was viewed as unacceptable to publicly express. The comments of

national pride, values and morality mentioned in the press and in official government

statements may have influenced British people by creating shame and fear in

expressing openly irrational prejudices against Jews and produced a desire to fight or

conceal them. This supports Sharf’s assertion that the press was seen as providing the

majority view and that in reality public opinion was not reflected by the press. This

study has proven that public, outward statements need to be used with caution and

compared against other sources of evidence.

Kushner is right to stress the importance of conceptions of ‘Britishness’ in

influencing British attitudes towards Jews and argue that the British government

feared being seen as illiberal.240 Britain’s image was an important concern in reactions

towards Jews during the Holocaust. The press consistently used language to convey

Britain’s tolerance, morality and empathy in issues related to the massacre of

European Jews to justify agreement or disagreement with British policies. The

influence of liberal values on public attitudes towards Jews was not the only factor

driving public attitudes. The frequency of articles in 1942 and 1943 detailing the

appalling Jewish massacres would have had made British people less likely to express

240 Kushner, The Holocaust and the Liberal Imagination: A social and cultural history, p.199

54

anti-Semitic sentiments openly and to be linked to Nazi fascist ideology. Mass

Observation respondents were more concerned about domestic anti-Semitism than

whether Britain was acting morally in response to the genocide of European Jews.

More Mass Observation respondents believed that the issue of the massacres of

Europeans should be dealt with after the war than by practical action to save Jews.

Attempts to deal with anti-Semitism served to maintain Britain’s liberal reputation

and Britain’s stability. Yet the fear and paranoia that Jews were not behaving in line

with British values despite the toleration offered to them also amplified private

resentments towards Jews.

Opinions and attitudes presented in the press also diverge from Mass Observation

evidence in terms of whether Jews were a separate ‘race’ or nationality. The

government rejected the idea that Jews were a separate nationality to combat Zionism

and newspaper articles also suggested that national identity was viewed as

conditioned by place of birth as individuals were absorbed into the culture and

adopted national traits. There was a continued belief that Jews did not require or

qualify for a country of their own. The deserting Jews in the Polish army in England

were viewed as Polish, the deported Hungarian Jews were Hungarian and the

immigration of unassimilated Jews in Palestine was viewed as a threat to Palestinians.

Privately British Jews were commonly regarded as an offensive ‘race’ or as foreigners

because of perceived differences of Jewish behaviour to the rest of British society.

These differences were not explicitly outlined or related to Jewish culture and

religious activities which demonstrates the imprecise, irrational nature of anti-

Jewishness during the Holocaust. This anti-Jewishness was instead enflamed by

economic wartime hardships and based on previous anti-Semitic accusations and

55

stereotypes. Being part of British society entailed following set traditions and

behaviours which British people of all classes feared that the Jews were isolating

themselves from and rejecting. This study is incredibly valuable and worthwhile

because it has proven that privately patriotism and Jewishness were viewed as

incompatible even though newspaper articles attempted to battle this perception.

Furthermore, examining attitudes towards ‘British Jews’ allows a greater

understanding of attitudes towards European Jews. If Jews born in Britain were

thought as incapable of assimilating into British society and were viewed as

foreigners it is unsurprising that immigration of foreign, European Jews into Britain

did not occur. The lack of continued protest to save European Jews and allow

immigration into England suggests that British people viewed foreign Jews as

inevitably different and thus unlikely to be able to effectively assimilate which would

inflame the already present anti-Semitic tendencies in Britain.

56

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