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  • 8/7/2019 British Policy in the Far East 1933-1936 Treasury and Foreign Office

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    British Policy in the Far East 1933-1936: Treasury and Foreign OfficeAuthor(s): Gill BennettSource: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Jul., 1992), pp. 545-568Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/312553 .

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    ModernAsianStudies,26, 3 (1992), pp. 545-568. Printed in Great Britain.ModernAsianStudies,26, 3 (1992), pp. 545-568. Printed in Great Britain.ModernAsianStudies,26, 3 (1992), pp. 545-568. Printed in Great Britain.ModernAsianStudies,26, 3 (1992), pp. 545-568. Printed in Great Britain.ModernAsianStudies,26, 3 (1992), pp. 545-568. Printed in Great Britain.

    BritishPolicyin theFar East 1933-1936:TreasuryandForeignOffice'GILL BENNETT

    The nature of British interests in the Far East in the 1930smeant thatboth the Treasury and the Board of Trade were necessarily closelyinvolved with the making of foreign policy. While Foreign Officeofficials resented this intrusion into their domain, they were them-selves disdainful of so-called 'technical' considerations connected withtariffs or currency reform, and were willing to leave them to thespecialists. Under the dynamic impetus of the Chancellor of theExchequer, Neville Chamberlain, and the Permanent Secretaryto theTreasury, Sir Warren Fisher, the Treasury, encouraged by theapparent abnegation of the Foreign Office, made a bold and aggress-ive foray between I933 and 1936 into realms of foreignpolicy-makinghitherto regarded as the exclusive sphere of the professional diplomat.Following the Tangku truce in May 1933, the Foreign Office under-took a critical appraisal of British policy in the Far East. A pressingissue was clearly the state of Anglo-Japanese relations, which haddeterioratedfollowing the breakingof the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in1921 and the signature with the United States of the Washingtonnaval limitation treaties, and had not been eased by British participa-tion in the League of Nations' condemnation of Japanese aggressionin Manchuria. It was necessary to mend fences: the increasinglythreatening European situation underlined the impossibility ofBritain's capacity to face a conflict in two theatres; the events inShanghai in 1932 had revealed some terrible truths about the Britishdefence position in the Far East. More pressing in the eyes of Britishbusinessmen was the need to moderateJapanese trade competition,

    1 This article is based on a paper given to the seminar group on the History ofSouth-East Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.I would like to thank Professor R. B. Smith, Professor of the International History ofAsia at SOAS, for his help.oo26-749X/92/$5.oo + .oo ? I992 Cambridge University Press

    BritishPolicyin theFar East 1933-1936:TreasuryandForeignOffice'GILL BENNETT

    The nature of British interests in the Far East in the 1930smeant thatboth the Treasury and the Board of Trade were necessarily closelyinvolved with the making of foreign policy. While Foreign Officeofficials resented this intrusion into their domain, they were them-selves disdainful of so-called 'technical' considerations connected withtariffs or currency reform, and were willing to leave them to thespecialists. Under the dynamic impetus of the Chancellor of theExchequer, Neville Chamberlain, and the Permanent Secretaryto theTreasury, Sir Warren Fisher, the Treasury, encouraged by theapparent abnegation of the Foreign Office, made a bold and aggress-ive foray between I933 and 1936 into realms of foreignpolicy-makinghitherto regarded as the exclusive sphere of the professional diplomat.Following the Tangku truce in May 1933, the Foreign Office under-took a critical appraisal of British policy in the Far East. A pressingissue was clearly the state of Anglo-Japanese relations, which haddeterioratedfollowing the breakingof the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in1921 and the signature with the United States of the Washingtonnaval limitation treaties, and had not been eased by British participa-tion in the League of Nations' condemnation of Japanese aggressionin Manchuria. It was necessary to mend fences: the increasinglythreatening European situation underlined the impossibility ofBritain's capacity to face a conflict in two theatres; the events inShanghai in 1932 had revealed some terrible truths about the Britishdefence position in the Far East. More pressing in the eyes of Britishbusinessmen was the need to moderateJapanese trade competition,

    1 This article is based on a paper given to the seminar group on the History ofSouth-East Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.I would like to thank Professor R. B. Smith, Professor of the International History ofAsia at SOAS, for his help.oo26-749X/92/$5.oo + .oo ? I992 Cambridge University Press

    BritishPolicyin theFar East 1933-1936:TreasuryandForeignOffice'GILL BENNETT

    The nature of British interests in the Far East in the 1930smeant thatboth the Treasury and the Board of Trade were necessarily closelyinvolved with the making of foreign policy. While Foreign Officeofficials resented this intrusion into their domain, they were them-selves disdainful of so-called 'technical' considerations connected withtariffs or currency reform, and were willing to leave them to thespecialists. Under the dynamic impetus of the Chancellor of theExchequer, Neville Chamberlain, and the Permanent Secretaryto theTreasury, Sir Warren Fisher, the Treasury, encouraged by theapparent abnegation of the Foreign Office, made a bold and aggress-ive foray between I933 and 1936 into realms of foreignpolicy-makinghitherto regarded as the exclusive sphere of the professional diplomat.Following the Tangku truce in May 1933, the Foreign Office under-took a critical appraisal of British policy in the Far East. A pressingissue was clearly the state of Anglo-Japanese relations, which haddeterioratedfollowing the breakingof the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in1921 and the signature with the United States of the Washingtonnaval limitation treaties, and had not been eased by British participa-tion in the League of Nations' condemnation of Japanese aggressionin Manchuria. It was necessary to mend fences: the increasinglythreatening European situation underlined the impossibility ofBritain's capacity to face a conflict in two theatres; the events inShanghai in 1932 had revealed some terrible truths about the Britishdefence position in the Far East. More pressing in the eyes of Britishbusinessmen was the need to moderateJapanese trade competition,

    1 This article is based on a paper given to the seminar group on the History ofSouth-East Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.I would like to thank Professor R. B. Smith, Professor of the International History ofAsia at SOAS, for his help.oo26-749X/92/$5.oo + .oo ? I992 Cambridge University Press

    BritishPolicyin theFar East 1933-1936:TreasuryandForeignOffice'GILL BENNETT

    The nature of British interests in the Far East in the 1930smeant thatboth the Treasury and the Board of Trade were necessarily closelyinvolved with the making of foreign policy. While Foreign Officeofficials resented this intrusion into their domain, they were them-selves disdainful of so-called 'technical' considerations connected withtariffs or currency reform, and were willing to leave them to thespecialists. Under the dynamic impetus of the Chancellor of theExchequer, Neville Chamberlain, and the Permanent Secretaryto theTreasury, Sir Warren Fisher, the Treasury, encouraged by theapparent abnegation of the Foreign Office, made a bold and aggress-ive foray between I933 and 1936 into realms of foreignpolicy-makinghitherto regarded as the exclusive sphere of the professional diplomat.Following the Tangku truce in May 1933, the Foreign Office under-took a critical appraisal of British policy in the Far East. A pressingissue was clearly the state of Anglo-Japanese relations, which haddeterioratedfollowing the breakingof the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in1921 and the signature with the United States of the Washingtonnaval limitation treaties, and had not been eased by British participa-tion in the League of Nations' condemnation of Japanese aggressionin Manchuria. It was necessary to mend fences: the increasinglythreatening European situation underlined the impossibility ofBritain's capacity to face a conflict in two theatres; the events inShanghai in 1932 had revealed some terrible truths about the Britishdefence position in the Far East. More pressing in the eyes of Britishbusinessmen was the need to moderateJapanese trade competition,

    1 This article is based on a paper given to the seminar group on the History ofSouth-East Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.I would like to thank Professor R. B. Smith, Professor of the International History ofAsia at SOAS, for his help.oo26-749X/92/$5.oo + .oo ? I992 Cambridge University Press

    BritishPolicyin theFar East 1933-1936:TreasuryandForeignOffice'GILL BENNETT

    The nature of British interests in the Far East in the 1930smeant thatboth the Treasury and the Board of Trade were necessarily closelyinvolved with the making of foreign policy. While Foreign Officeofficials resented this intrusion into their domain, they were them-selves disdainful of so-called 'technical' considerations connected withtariffs or currency reform, and were willing to leave them to thespecialists. Under the dynamic impetus of the Chancellor of theExchequer, Neville Chamberlain, and the Permanent Secretaryto theTreasury, Sir Warren Fisher, the Treasury, encouraged by theapparent abnegation of the Foreign Office, made a bold and aggress-ive foray between I933 and 1936 into realms of foreignpolicy-makinghitherto regarded as the exclusive sphere of the professional diplomat.Following the Tangku truce in May 1933, the Foreign Office under-took a critical appraisal of British policy in the Far East. A pressingissue was clearly the state of Anglo-Japanese relations, which haddeterioratedfollowing the breakingof the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in1921 and the signature with the United States of the Washingtonnaval limitation treaties, and had not been eased by British participa-tion in the League of Nations' condemnation of Japanese aggressionin Manchuria. It was necessary to mend fences: the increasinglythreatening European situation underlined the impossibility ofBritain's capacity to face a conflict in two theatres; the events inShanghai in 1932 had revealed some terrible truths about the Britishdefence position in the Far East. More pressing in the eyes of Britishbusinessmen was the need to moderateJapanese trade competition,

    1 This article is based on a paper given to the seminar group on the History ofSouth-East Asia at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.I would like to thank Professor R. B. Smith, Professor of the International History ofAsia at SOAS, for his help.oo26-749X/92/$5.oo + .oo ? I992 Cambridge University Press

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    much increased in both home and Empire markets since the imposi-tion of the Chinese boycott onJapanese goods in 193I. The aggressiveand proprietorial Japanese attitude towards China was also arecognized problem:British commercial interests in China, while lesssubstantial than suggested by the vociferous British businessmen whomade up the China Lobby, were nevertheless both traditional andextensive, and the maintenance of prestige in the Far East a vitalconsideration. The situation has been succinctly summarized byAlbert Feuerwerker:'China was too big for any one power to swallow,and seemed too dazzling a prize for a satisfactorydivision of shares tobe worked out.'2 Competing for shares in China was the UnitedStates, blamed by some for the deterioration in Anglo-Japanese rela-tions, anxious to preserve the 'open door' but unwilling to embroilherself in any action against Japan. British interests lay in a pros-perous, peaceful and independent China:Japan was a threat to thoseinterests, but since it was impossible to fight her for them, it washoped that some arrangementmight be arrived at for a division of thespoils. Finally, but not least important, negotiations were proceedingon the subject of naval disarmament in preparationfor the conferenceof I935 the success of which appeared to carry the most seriousimplications for the British defence position as a whole.3It was necessary, as Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin of the EconomicRelations Section of the League of Nations and Western Departmentof the Foreign Office put it in the memorandum of 3 August I933which he prepared at the request of the Permanent Under Secretary,Sir Robert Vansittart, to 'take stock of the position in the Far East,and of the aims of British policy'.4 He realized, however, that otherdepartments would be involved, and suggested the formation of aninterdepartmental committee to examine the issues. The presidingDeputy Under Secretary, Sir Victor Wellesley, however, thought thistoo risky unless a thorough-going collection of memoranda was firstpreparedwithin the Office. He pointed out on o August that 'nothingcould be more fatal to the object we have in view than for this Office tohave to meet the concrete proposals of other Government Depart-ments expressed in forcible terms and backed by cogent reasons with

    2 Albert Feuerwerker, 'The Foreign Presence in China', in CambridgeHistoryofChina, vol. 12, part i (Cambridge, I983).3 For the London Naval Conference,December I935-March 1936,see DocumentsonBritish ForeignPolicy gi99-i939 (hereafter DBFP), 2nd Series, vol. XIII (HMSO,I973).4 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XX (HMSO, I984), no. 23.

    much increased in both home and Empire markets since the imposi-tion of the Chinese boycott onJapanese goods in 193I. The aggressiveand proprietorial Japanese attitude towards China was also arecognized problem:British commercial interests in China, while lesssubstantial than suggested by the vociferous British businessmen whomade up the China Lobby, were nevertheless both traditional andextensive, and the maintenance of prestige in the Far East a vitalconsideration. The situation has been succinctly summarized byAlbert Feuerwerker:'China was too big for any one power to swallow,and seemed too dazzling a prize for a satisfactorydivision of shares tobe worked out.'2 Competing for shares in China was the UnitedStates, blamed by some for the deterioration in Anglo-Japanese rela-tions, anxious to preserve the 'open door' but unwilling to embroilherself in any action against Japan. British interests lay in a pros-perous, peaceful and independent China:Japan was a threat to thoseinterests, but since it was impossible to fight her for them, it washoped that some arrangementmight be arrived at for a division of thespoils. Finally, but not least important, negotiations were proceedingon the subject of naval disarmament in preparationfor the conferenceof I935 the success of which appeared to carry the most seriousimplications for the British defence position as a whole.3It was necessary, as Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin of the EconomicRelations Section of the League of Nations and Western Departmentof the Foreign Office put it in the memorandum of 3 August I933which he prepared at the request of the Permanent Under Secretary,Sir Robert Vansittart, to 'take stock of the position in the Far East,and of the aims of British policy'.4 He realized, however, that otherdepartments would be involved, and suggested the formation of aninterdepartmental committee to examine the issues. The presidingDeputy Under Secretary, Sir Victor Wellesley, however, thought thistoo risky unless a thorough-going collection of memoranda was firstpreparedwithin the Office. He pointed out on o August that 'nothingcould be more fatal to the object we have in view than for this Office tohave to meet the concrete proposals of other Government Depart-ments expressed in forcible terms and backed by cogent reasons with

    2 Albert Feuerwerker, 'The Foreign Presence in China', in CambridgeHistoryofChina, vol. 12, part i (Cambridge, I983).3 For the London Naval Conference,December I935-March 1936,see DocumentsonBritish ForeignPolicy gi99-i939 (hereafter DBFP), 2nd Series, vol. XIII (HMSO,I973).4 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XX (HMSO, I984), no. 23.

    much increased in both home and Empire markets since the imposi-tion of the Chinese boycott onJapanese goods in 193I. The aggressiveand proprietorial Japanese attitude towards China was also arecognized problem:British commercial interests in China, while lesssubstantial than suggested by the vociferous British businessmen whomade up the China Lobby, were nevertheless both traditional andextensive, and the maintenance of prestige in the Far East a vitalconsideration. The situation has been succinctly summarized byAlbert Feuerwerker:'China was too big for any one power to swallow,and seemed too dazzling a prize for a satisfactorydivision of shares tobe worked out.'2 Competing for shares in China was the UnitedStates, blamed by some for the deterioration in Anglo-Japanese rela-tions, anxious to preserve the 'open door' but unwilling to embroilherself in any action against Japan. British interests lay in a pros-perous, peaceful and independent China:Japan was a threat to thoseinterests, but since it was impossible to fight her for them, it washoped that some arrangementmight be arrived at for a division of thespoils. Finally, but not least important, negotiations were proceedingon the subject of naval disarmament in preparationfor the conferenceof I935 the success of which appeared to carry the most seriousimplications for the British defence position as a whole.3It was necessary, as Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin of the EconomicRelations Section of the League of Nations and Western Departmentof the Foreign Office put it in the memorandum of 3 August I933which he prepared at the request of the Permanent Under Secretary,Sir Robert Vansittart, to 'take stock of the position in the Far East,and of the aims of British policy'.4 He realized, however, that otherdepartments would be involved, and suggested the formation of aninterdepartmental committee to examine the issues. The presidingDeputy Under Secretary, Sir Victor Wellesley, however, thought thistoo risky unless a thorough-going collection of memoranda was firstpreparedwithin the Office. He pointed out on o August that 'nothingcould be more fatal to the object we have in view than for this Office tohave to meet the concrete proposals of other Government Depart-ments expressed in forcible terms and backed by cogent reasons with

    2 Albert Feuerwerker, 'The Foreign Presence in China', in CambridgeHistoryofChina, vol. 12, part i (Cambridge, I983).3 For the London Naval Conference,December I935-March 1936,see DocumentsonBritish ForeignPolicy gi99-i939 (hereafter DBFP), 2nd Series, vol. XIII (HMSO,I973).4 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XX (HMSO, I984), no. 23.

    much increased in both home and Empire markets since the imposi-tion of the Chinese boycott onJapanese goods in 193I. The aggressiveand proprietorial Japanese attitude towards China was also arecognized problem:British commercial interests in China, while lesssubstantial than suggested by the vociferous British businessmen whomade up the China Lobby, were nevertheless both traditional andextensive, and the maintenance of prestige in the Far East a vitalconsideration. The situation has been succinctly summarized byAlbert Feuerwerker:'China was too big for any one power to swallow,and seemed too dazzling a prize for a satisfactorydivision of shares tobe worked out.'2 Competing for shares in China was the UnitedStates, blamed by some for the deterioration in Anglo-Japanese rela-tions, anxious to preserve the 'open door' but unwilling to embroilherself in any action against Japan. British interests lay in a pros-perous, peaceful and independent China:Japan was a threat to thoseinterests, but since it was impossible to fight her for them, it washoped that some arrangementmight be arrived at for a division of thespoils. Finally, but not least important, negotiations were proceedingon the subject of naval disarmament in preparationfor the conferenceof I935 the success of which appeared to carry the most seriousimplications for the British defence position as a whole.3It was necessary, as Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin of the EconomicRelations Section of the League of Nations and Western Departmentof the Foreign Office put it in the memorandum of 3 August I933which he prepared at the request of the Permanent Under Secretary,Sir Robert Vansittart, to 'take stock of the position in the Far East,and of the aims of British policy'.4 He realized, however, that otherdepartments would be involved, and suggested the formation of aninterdepartmental committee to examine the issues. The presidingDeputy Under Secretary, Sir Victor Wellesley, however, thought thistoo risky unless a thorough-going collection of memoranda was firstpreparedwithin the Office. He pointed out on o August that 'nothingcould be more fatal to the object we have in view than for this Office tohave to meet the concrete proposals of other Government Depart-ments expressed in forcible terms and backed by cogent reasons with

    2 Albert Feuerwerker, 'The Foreign Presence in China', in CambridgeHistoryofChina, vol. 12, part i (Cambridge, I983).3 For the London Naval Conference,December I935-March 1936,see DocumentsonBritish ForeignPolicy gi99-i939 (hereafter DBFP), 2nd Series, vol. XIII (HMSO,I973).4 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XX (HMSO, I984), no. 23.

    much increased in both home and Empire markets since the imposi-tion of the Chinese boycott onJapanese goods in 193I. The aggressiveand proprietorial Japanese attitude towards China was also arecognized problem:British commercial interests in China, while lesssubstantial than suggested by the vociferous British businessmen whomade up the China Lobby, were nevertheless both traditional andextensive, and the maintenance of prestige in the Far East a vitalconsideration. The situation has been succinctly summarized byAlbert Feuerwerker:'China was too big for any one power to swallow,and seemed too dazzling a prize for a satisfactorydivision of shares tobe worked out.'2 Competing for shares in China was the UnitedStates, blamed by some for the deterioration in Anglo-Japanese rela-tions, anxious to preserve the 'open door' but unwilling to embroilherself in any action against Japan. British interests lay in a pros-perous, peaceful and independent China:Japan was a threat to thoseinterests, but since it was impossible to fight her for them, it washoped that some arrangementmight be arrived at for a division of thespoils. Finally, but not least important, negotiations were proceedingon the subject of naval disarmament in preparationfor the conferenceof I935 the success of which appeared to carry the most seriousimplications for the British defence position as a whole.3It was necessary, as Frank T. Ashton-Gwatkin of the EconomicRelations Section of the League of Nations and Western Departmentof the Foreign Office put it in the memorandum of 3 August I933which he prepared at the request of the Permanent Under Secretary,Sir Robert Vansittart, to 'take stock of the position in the Far East,and of the aims of British policy'.4 He realized, however, that otherdepartments would be involved, and suggested the formation of aninterdepartmental committee to examine the issues. The presidingDeputy Under Secretary, Sir Victor Wellesley, however, thought thistoo risky unless a thorough-going collection of memoranda was firstpreparedwithin the Office. He pointed out on o August that 'nothingcould be more fatal to the object we have in view than for this Office tohave to meet the concrete proposals of other Government Depart-ments expressed in forcible terms and backed by cogent reasons with

    2 Albert Feuerwerker, 'The Foreign Presence in China', in CambridgeHistoryofChina, vol. 12, part i (Cambridge, I983).3 For the London Naval Conference,December I935-March 1936,see DocumentsonBritish ForeignPolicy gi99-i939 (hereafter DBFP), 2nd Series, vol. XIII (HMSO,I973).4 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XX (HMSO, I984), no. 23.

    546546546546546 GILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTGILL BENNETT

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    BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36mere generalities which, however true and sound, will stand littlechance of acceptance if in conflictwith the well-reasoned argumentsofother Government Departments.'5Vansittart appreciated this pointonly too well and, while authorizing the preparation of thememoranda, warned that the task could hardly be completed by theend of I933, and that they could not ask 'other dep[artmen]ts, or theCabinet, to postpone decisions on urgent matters until the productionof an interdepartmentalreport at some unspecified future date'.6Other departments did not wait. By the time the thirteenmemoranda,wide ranging but unsurprisingin their indecisive conclu-sions, had been gathered togetherfor circulation to other departmentsin January I934, Neville Chamberlain had already decided whatBritish policy in the Far East should be, and taken steps to beginimplementing it. These words are used deliberately: his was theimpetus for Treasury involvement in the Far East; ambitious, con-fident, convinced that he could direct policy more effectively than theForeign Office, the Chancellor saw special reasons for interestinghimself in the Far East. For one thing, British interests in China wereprimarilycommercial, and he was constantly reminded of the need toprotect these interests and to develop existing trade links by the Boardof Trade, by the Export Credits Guarantee Department, and byinfluential businessmen. It was Japan, however, which occupied amore pressing place in the Chancellor's mind, as it did indeed in theminds of Foreign Office officials. Following the abandonment of the0o year rule in 1932, the fact that Britain was unable to face both aEuropean and an Oriental enemy at the same time had been statedand restated in Cabinet and defence committees. As Chancellor of the

    Exchequer, Chamberlain's responsibility was for the financing ofdefence, but, as he stated at a meeting of the Committee of ImperialDefence on 6 April 1933, 'although at the Treasury it was felt that therisks of the financial situation were perhaps more pressing than risksfromJapanese aggression he was greatly impressed by the case whichhad been put forward' for the need to defuse that aggression.7Theanswer, to his thinking, was clear: if the dual threat could not be metand overcome, and if the threat from Germany appeared greater thanthat fromJapan, the obvious answer was to get on good terms withthe latter. Having reached this conclusion, Chamberlainwanted to dosomething about it.

    5 Ibid., no. 25.6 Ibid., no. 25, note 2.7 CID 258th meeting, 6 April I933 (CAB 2/5).

    mere generalities which, however true and sound, will stand littlechance of acceptance if in conflictwith the well-reasoned argumentsofother Government Departments.'5Vansittart appreciated this pointonly too well and, while authorizing the preparation of thememoranda, warned that the task could hardly be completed by theend of I933, and that they could not ask 'other dep[artmen]ts, or theCabinet, to postpone decisions on urgent matters until the productionof an interdepartmentalreport at some unspecified future date'.6Other departments did not wait. By the time the thirteenmemoranda,wide ranging but unsurprisingin their indecisive conclu-sions, had been gathered togetherfor circulation to other departmentsin January I934, Neville Chamberlain had already decided whatBritish policy in the Far East should be, and taken steps to beginimplementing it. These words are used deliberately: his was theimpetus for Treasury involvement in the Far East; ambitious, con-fident, convinced that he could direct policy more effectively than theForeign Office, the Chancellor saw special reasons for interestinghimself in the Far East. For one thing, British interests in China wereprimarilycommercial, and he was constantly reminded of the need toprotect these interests and to develop existing trade links by the Boardof Trade, by the Export Credits Guarantee Department, and byinfluential businessmen. It was Japan, however, which occupied amore pressing place in the Chancellor's mind, as it did indeed in theminds of Foreign Office officials. Following the abandonment of the0o year rule in 1932, the fact that Britain was unable to face both aEuropean and an Oriental enemy at the same time had been statedand restated in Cabinet and defence committees. As Chancellor of the

    Exchequer, Chamberlain's responsibility was for the financing ofdefence, but, as he stated at a meeting of the Committee of ImperialDefence on 6 April 1933, 'although at the Treasury it was felt that therisks of the financial situation were perhaps more pressing than risksfromJapanese aggression he was greatly impressed by the case whichhad been put forward' for the need to defuse that aggression.7Theanswer, to his thinking, was clear: if the dual threat could not be metand overcome, and if the threat from Germany appeared greater thanthat fromJapan, the obvious answer was to get on good terms withthe latter. Having reached this conclusion, Chamberlainwanted to dosomething about it.

    5 Ibid., no. 25.6 Ibid., no. 25, note 2.7 CID 258th meeting, 6 April I933 (CAB 2/5).

    mere generalities which, however true and sound, will stand littlechance of acceptance if in conflictwith the well-reasoned argumentsofother Government Departments.'5Vansittart appreciated this pointonly too well and, while authorizing the preparation of thememoranda, warned that the task could hardly be completed by theend of I933, and that they could not ask 'other dep[artmen]ts, or theCabinet, to postpone decisions on urgent matters until the productionof an interdepartmentalreport at some unspecified future date'.6Other departments did not wait. By the time the thirteenmemoranda,wide ranging but unsurprisingin their indecisive conclu-sions, had been gathered togetherfor circulation to other departmentsin January I934, Neville Chamberlain had already decided whatBritish policy in the Far East should be, and taken steps to beginimplementing it. These words are used deliberately: his was theimpetus for Treasury involvement in the Far East; ambitious, con-fident, convinced that he could direct policy more effectively than theForeign Office, the Chancellor saw special reasons for interestinghimself in the Far East. For one thing, British interests in China wereprimarilycommercial, and he was constantly reminded of the need toprotect these interests and to develop existing trade links by the Boardof Trade, by the Export Credits Guarantee Department, and byinfluential businessmen. It was Japan, however, which occupied amore pressing place in the Chancellor's mind, as it did indeed in theminds of Foreign Office officials. Following the abandonment of the0o year rule in 1932, the fact that Britain was unable to face both aEuropean and an Oriental enemy at the same time had been statedand restated in Cabinet and defence committees. As Chancellor of the

    Exchequer, Chamberlain's responsibility was for the financing ofdefence, but, as he stated at a meeting of the Committee of ImperialDefence on 6 April 1933, 'although at the Treasury it was felt that therisks of the financial situation were perhaps more pressing than risksfromJapanese aggression he was greatly impressed by the case whichhad been put forward' for the need to defuse that aggression.7Theanswer, to his thinking, was clear: if the dual threat could not be metand overcome, and if the threat from Germany appeared greater thanthat fromJapan, the obvious answer was to get on good terms withthe latter. Having reached this conclusion, Chamberlainwanted to dosomething about it.

    5 Ibid., no. 25.6 Ibid., no. 25, note 2.7 CID 258th meeting, 6 April I933 (CAB 2/5).

    mere generalities which, however true and sound, will stand littlechance of acceptance if in conflictwith the well-reasoned argumentsofother Government Departments.'5Vansittart appreciated this pointonly too well and, while authorizing the preparation of thememoranda, warned that the task could hardly be completed by theend of I933, and that they could not ask 'other dep[artmen]ts, or theCabinet, to postpone decisions on urgent matters until the productionof an interdepartmentalreport at some unspecified future date'.6Other departments did not wait. By the time the thirteenmemoranda,wide ranging but unsurprisingin their indecisive conclu-sions, had been gathered togetherfor circulation to other departmentsin January I934, Neville Chamberlain had already decided whatBritish policy in the Far East should be, and taken steps to beginimplementing it. These words are used deliberately: his was theimpetus for Treasury involvement in the Far East; ambitious, con-fident, convinced that he could direct policy more effectively than theForeign Office, the Chancellor saw special reasons for interestinghimself in the Far East. For one thing, British interests in China wereprimarilycommercial, and he was constantly reminded of the need toprotect these interests and to develop existing trade links by the Boardof Trade, by the Export Credits Guarantee Department, and byinfluential businessmen. It was Japan, however, which occupied amore pressing place in the Chancellor's mind, as it did indeed in theminds of Foreign Office officials. Following the abandonment of the0o year rule in 1932, the fact that Britain was unable to face both aEuropean and an Oriental enemy at the same time had been statedand restated in Cabinet and defence committees. As Chancellor of the

    Exchequer, Chamberlain's responsibility was for the financing ofdefence, but, as he stated at a meeting of the Committee of ImperialDefence on 6 April 1933, 'although at the Treasury it was felt that therisks of the financial situation were perhaps more pressing than risksfromJapanese aggression he was greatly impressed by the case whichhad been put forward' for the need to defuse that aggression.7Theanswer, to his thinking, was clear: if the dual threat could not be metand overcome, and if the threat from Germany appeared greater thanthat fromJapan, the obvious answer was to get on good terms withthe latter. Having reached this conclusion, Chamberlainwanted to dosomething about it.

    5 Ibid., no. 25.6 Ibid., no. 25, note 2.7 CID 258th meeting, 6 April I933 (CAB 2/5).

    mere generalities which, however true and sound, will stand littlechance of acceptance if in conflictwith the well-reasoned argumentsofother Government Departments.'5Vansittart appreciated this pointonly too well and, while authorizing the preparation of thememoranda, warned that the task could hardly be completed by theend of I933, and that they could not ask 'other dep[artmen]ts, or theCabinet, to postpone decisions on urgent matters until the productionof an interdepartmentalreport at some unspecified future date'.6Other departments did not wait. By the time the thirteenmemoranda,wide ranging but unsurprisingin their indecisive conclu-sions, had been gathered togetherfor circulation to other departmentsin January I934, Neville Chamberlain had already decided whatBritish policy in the Far East should be, and taken steps to beginimplementing it. These words are used deliberately: his was theimpetus for Treasury involvement in the Far East; ambitious, con-fident, convinced that he could direct policy more effectively than theForeign Office, the Chancellor saw special reasons for interestinghimself in the Far East. For one thing, British interests in China wereprimarilycommercial, and he was constantly reminded of the need toprotect these interests and to develop existing trade links by the Boardof Trade, by the Export Credits Guarantee Department, and byinfluential businessmen. It was Japan, however, which occupied amore pressing place in the Chancellor's mind, as it did indeed in theminds of Foreign Office officials. Following the abandonment of the0o year rule in 1932, the fact that Britain was unable to face both aEuropean and an Oriental enemy at the same time had been statedand restated in Cabinet and defence committees. As Chancellor of the

    Exchequer, Chamberlain's responsibility was for the financing ofdefence, but, as he stated at a meeting of the Committee of ImperialDefence on 6 April 1933, 'although at the Treasury it was felt that therisks of the financial situation were perhaps more pressing than risksfromJapanese aggression he was greatly impressed by the case whichhad been put forward' for the need to defuse that aggression.7Theanswer, to his thinking, was clear: if the dual threat could not be metand overcome, and if the threat from Germany appeared greater thanthat fromJapan, the obvious answer was to get on good terms withthe latter. Having reached this conclusion, Chamberlainwanted to dosomething about it.

    5 Ibid., no. 25.6 Ibid., no. 25, note 2.7 CID 258th meeting, 6 April I933 (CAB 2/5).

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    GILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTIn Cabinet on 26 October I933 he expressed regret at the weaken-ing of Anglo-Japanese friendship which had resulted from thetermination of the Alliance: 'In the long run we had received noadequate compensation, and our position in the Far East had onlybeen rendered more precarious ... He asked the Secretaryof State forForeign Affairs to consider whether anything could be done toimprove relations with Japan'.8 Sir John Simon's response was topoint out that the question was 'a large one' and to promise that itwould receive consideration. Unsatisfied, the Chancellor returned tothe charge in the Committee of Imperial Defence on 9 November at ameeting called to consider the annual Chiefs of Staff review, a report

    which placed the defence of British possessions in the Far East at thehead of the list of defence priorities. Chamberlain pointed out that itseemed likely that the European situation would become more urgentthan that in the Far East, and repeated his regret at the abandonmentof the Anglo-Japanese alliance: Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretaryto theCabinet and to the CID, had, he said, explained to him why theAlliance had been dropped. Chamberlain still felt it was a mistake.9Chamberlain did not, it is true, have much patience with the subtleand cautious Foreign Secretary SirJohn Simon. Writing to his sisterHilda on i8 November, he said that he had been having a 'terribletime' with Simon, and felt that 'somehow or other there will have tobe a change at the FO before long'.10He did not have much patiencewith the Foreign Office as a whole, complaining again and again thatit was impossible to get a decision or action taken. This criticism wasunjust in the sense that the question of Anglo-Japanese relations wasby no means being put on the back burner in the way that theChancellor suspected. In fact, the possibility of some Anglo-Japaneserapprochementwas under close considerationin the Foreign Office atthe end of 1933, and a great deal of optimism was expressed byofficials as to the possibility of its attainment. When the JapaneseAmbassador in London, Tsune Matsudaira, proposed in November ajoint protest against the raising of the Chinese import tariff,R. H. S.Allen of Far EasternDepartment summed up the views of a number ofhis colleagues when he called it a 'golden opportunity' forjoint actionwhich should not be missed." His enthusiasm was dampened,

    8 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 35.9 Ibid., no. 39.10Private papers of Neville Chamberlain, University of Birmingham, quoted bykind permission of the Librarian: NC I8/ /85 (hereafterChamberlain papers)." DBFP, vol. XX, no. 45, note 6.

    In Cabinet on 26 October I933 he expressed regret at the weaken-ing of Anglo-Japanese friendship which had resulted from thetermination of the Alliance: 'In the long run we had received noadequate compensation, and our position in the Far East had onlybeen rendered more precarious ... He asked the Secretaryof State forForeign Affairs to consider whether anything could be done toimprove relations with Japan'.8 Sir John Simon's response was topoint out that the question was 'a large one' and to promise that itwould receive consideration. Unsatisfied, the Chancellor returned tothe charge in the Committee of Imperial Defence on 9 November at ameeting called to consider the annual Chiefs of Staff review, a reportwhich placed the defence of British possessions in the Far East at thehead of the list of defence priorities. Chamberlain pointed out that itseemed likely that the European situation would become more urgentthan that in the Far East, and repeated his regret at the abandonmentof the Anglo-Japanese alliance: Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretaryto theCabinet and to the CID, had, he said, explained to him why theAlliance had been dropped. Chamberlain still felt it was a mistake.9Chamberlain did not, it is true, have much patience with the subtleand cautious Foreign Secretary SirJohn Simon. Writing to his sisterHilda on i8 November, he said that he had been having a 'terribletime' with Simon, and felt that 'somehow or other there will have tobe a change at the FO before long'.10He did not have much patiencewith the Foreign Office as a whole, complaining again and again thatit was impossible to get a decision or action taken. This criticism wasunjust in the sense that the question of Anglo-Japanese relations wasby no means being put on the back burner in the way that theChancellor suspected. In fact, the possibility of some Anglo-Japaneserapprochementwas under close considerationin the Foreign Office atthe end of 1933, and a great deal of optimism was expressed byofficials as to the possibility of its attainment. When the JapaneseAmbassador in London, Tsune Matsudaira, proposed in November ajoint protest against the raising of the Chinese import tariff,R. H. S.Allen of Far EasternDepartment summed up the views of a number ofhis colleagues when he called it a 'golden opportunity' forjoint actionwhich should not be missed." His enthusiasm was dampened,

    8 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 35.9 Ibid., no. 39.10Private papers of Neville Chamberlain, University of Birmingham, quoted bykind permission of the Librarian: NC I8/ /85 (hereafterChamberlain papers)." DBFP, vol. XX, no. 45, note 6.

    In Cabinet on 26 October I933 he expressed regret at the weaken-ing of Anglo-Japanese friendship which had resulted from thetermination of the Alliance: 'In the long run we had received noadequate compensation, and our position in the Far East had onlybeen rendered more precarious ... He asked the Secretaryof State forForeign Affairs to consider whether anything could be done toimprove relations with Japan'.8 Sir John Simon's response was topoint out that the question was 'a large one' and to promise that itwould receive consideration. Unsatisfied, the Chancellor returned tothe charge in the Committee of Imperial Defence on 9 November at ameeting called to consider the annual Chiefs of Staff review, a reportwhich placed the defence of British possessions in the Far East at thehead of the list of defence priorities. Chamberlain pointed out that itseemed likely that the European situation would become more urgentthan that in the Far East, and repeated his regret at the abandonmentof the Anglo-Japanese alliance: Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretaryto theCabinet and to the CID, had, he said, explained to him why theAlliance had been dropped. Chamberlain still felt it was a mistake.9Chamberlain did not, it is true, have much patience with the subtleand cautious Foreign Secretary SirJohn Simon. Writing to his sisterHilda on i8 November, he said that he had been having a 'terribletime' with Simon, and felt that 'somehow or other there will have tobe a change at the FO before long'.10He did not have much patiencewith the Foreign Office as a whole, complaining again and again thatit was impossible to get a decision or action taken. This criticism wasunjust in the sense that the question of Anglo-Japanese relations wasby no means being put on the back burner in the way that theChancellor suspected. In fact, the possibility of some Anglo-Japaneserapprochementwas under close considerationin the Foreign Office atthe end of 1933, and a great deal of optimism was expressed byofficials as to the possibility of its attainment. When the JapaneseAmbassador in London, Tsune Matsudaira, proposed in November ajoint protest against the raising of the Chinese import tariff,R. H. S.Allen of Far EasternDepartment summed up the views of a number ofhis colleagues when he called it a 'golden opportunity' forjoint actionwhich should not be missed." His enthusiasm was dampened,

    8 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 35.9 Ibid., no. 39.10Private papers of Neville Chamberlain, University of Birmingham, quoted bykind permission of the Librarian: NC I8/ /85 (hereafterChamberlain papers)." DBFP, vol. XX, no. 45, note 6.

    In Cabinet on 26 October I933 he expressed regret at the weaken-ing of Anglo-Japanese friendship which had resulted from thetermination of the Alliance: 'In the long run we had received noadequate compensation, and our position in the Far East had onlybeen rendered more precarious ... He asked the Secretaryof State forForeign Affairs to consider whether anything could be done toimprove relations with Japan'.8 Sir John Simon's response was topoint out that the question was 'a large one' and to promise that itwould receive consideration. Unsatisfied, the Chancellor returned tothe charge in the Committee of Imperial Defence on 9 November at ameeting called to consider the annual Chiefs of Staff review, a reportwhich placed the defence of British possessions in the Far East at thehead of the list of defence priorities. Chamberlain pointed out that itseemed likely that the European situation would become more urgentthan that in the Far East, and repeated his regret at the abandonmentof the Anglo-Japanese alliance: Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretaryto theCabinet and to the CID, had, he said, explained to him why theAlliance had been dropped. Chamberlain still felt it was a mistake.9Chamberlain did not, it is true, have much patience with the subtleand cautious Foreign Secretary SirJohn Simon. Writing to his sisterHilda on i8 November, he said that he had been having a 'terribletime' with Simon, and felt that 'somehow or other there will have tobe a change at the FO before long'.10He did not have much patiencewith the Foreign Office as a whole, complaining again and again thatit was impossible to get a decision or action taken. This criticism wasunjust in the sense that the question of Anglo-Japanese relations wasby no means being put on the back burner in the way that theChancellor suspected. In fact, the possibility of some Anglo-Japaneserapprochementwas under close considerationin the Foreign Office atthe end of 1933, and a great deal of optimism was expressed byofficials as to the possibility of its attainment. When the JapaneseAmbassador in London, Tsune Matsudaira, proposed in November ajoint protest against the raising of the Chinese import tariff,R. H. S.Allen of Far EasternDepartment summed up the views of a number ofhis colleagues when he called it a 'golden opportunity' forjoint actionwhich should not be missed." His enthusiasm was dampened,

    8 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 35.9 Ibid., no. 39.10Private papers of Neville Chamberlain, University of Birmingham, quoted bykind permission of the Librarian: NC I8/ /85 (hereafterChamberlain papers)." DBFP, vol. XX, no. 45, note 6.

    In Cabinet on 26 October I933 he expressed regret at the weaken-ing of Anglo-Japanese friendship which had resulted from thetermination of the Alliance: 'In the long run we had received noadequate compensation, and our position in the Far East had onlybeen rendered more precarious ... He asked the Secretaryof State forForeign Affairs to consider whether anything could be done toimprove relations with Japan'.8 Sir John Simon's response was topoint out that the question was 'a large one' and to promise that itwould receive consideration. Unsatisfied, the Chancellor returned tothe charge in the Committee of Imperial Defence on 9 November at ameeting called to consider the annual Chiefs of Staff review, a reportwhich placed the defence of British possessions in the Far East at thehead of the list of defence priorities. Chamberlain pointed out that itseemed likely that the European situation would become more urgentthan that in the Far East, and repeated his regret at the abandonmentof the Anglo-Japanese alliance: Sir Maurice Hankey, Secretaryto theCabinet and to the CID, had, he said, explained to him why theAlliance had been dropped. Chamberlain still felt it was a mistake.9Chamberlain did not, it is true, have much patience with the subtleand cautious Foreign Secretary SirJohn Simon. Writing to his sisterHilda on i8 November, he said that he had been having a 'terribletime' with Simon, and felt that 'somehow or other there will have tobe a change at the FO before long'.10He did not have much patiencewith the Foreign Office as a whole, complaining again and again thatit was impossible to get a decision or action taken. This criticism wasunjust in the sense that the question of Anglo-Japanese relations wasby no means being put on the back burner in the way that theChancellor suspected. In fact, the possibility of some Anglo-Japaneserapprochementwas under close considerationin the Foreign Office atthe end of 1933, and a great deal of optimism was expressed byofficials as to the possibility of its attainment. When the JapaneseAmbassador in London, Tsune Matsudaira, proposed in November ajoint protest against the raising of the Chinese import tariff,R. H. S.Allen of Far EasternDepartment summed up the views of a number ofhis colleagues when he called it a 'golden opportunity' forjoint actionwhich should not be missed." His enthusiasm was dampened,

    8 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 35.9 Ibid., no. 39.10Private papers of Neville Chamberlain, University of Birmingham, quoted bykind permission of the Librarian: NC I8/ /85 (hereafterChamberlain papers)." DBFP, vol. XX, no. 45, note 6.

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    BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36however, by the British Minister in Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, whopointed out on 13 December that it would be very unwise to anta-gonize the Chinese for the sake of pleasingJapan: ' ... if I am correctthat our tradewith China only representssome 3 per cent of our worldtrade I should have most gravely doubted wisdom of forfeitingChina's general good-will on that account.'12 The Ambassador inTokyo, Sir Francis Lindley, was scarcely more encouraging, writingon 27 December that as the Americans had 'steadily and successfullyopposed any Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the Far East' ever sincethe Anglo-Japanese alliance had been allowed to lapse, he feared that'we must expect the same American opposition to any confidentialrelations withJapan in the future'.'3George Sansom, the long servingand respected Commercial Counsellor at Tokyo, had already givenhis verdict in June I933: 'The Japanese need very badly a goodhiding.'14The differencein the informationreceived by the Treasury and theForeign Office was one of the most important sources of mutualmisunderstanding over the next few years. The Foreign Office,naturally, paid attention to their representatives in the field, even ifthey were not always guided by them: most of the Chancellor's infor-mation came from London, filtered through from the Far East. Theviews of British firms in China were put by their influential butLondon-based directors: the views of theJapanese Government foundtheirway through the somewhat shady figureof A. H. F. Edwardes, adiscredited former Acting Inspector General of Chinese Customs,now employed in London as an adviser by the Manchukuo govern-ment, and a close contact of Sir Warren Fisher.'5 If more localizedinformation was required, the Treasury had to send someone to get it:hence the Federation of British Industries Mission of 1934, and theLeith-Ross Mission of 1935-36. The informationreceived by ForeignOffice and Treasury was thus of quite a different kind: the formerreceived more balanced and considereddata, but lacked the technicaladvice which would have enabled them to combat the Treasury ontheir own ground. Foreign Office officials were too ready to defer to

    2 Ibid., no. 63.13 Ibid., no. 68.14 Ibid., no. 4.'5 On the activities of A. H. F. Edwardes and the broader issues of British FarEastern policy see Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia (Cambridge, I975). I am gratefulto Dr Trotter for putting me on to papers concerning Edwardes held in the SOASLibrary.

    however, by the British Minister in Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, whopointed out on 13 December that it would be very unwise to anta-gonize the Chinese for the sake of pleasingJapan: ' ... if I am correctthat our tradewith China only representssome 3 per cent of our worldtrade I should have most gravely doubted wisdom of forfeitingChina's general good-will on that account.'12 The Ambassador inTokyo, Sir Francis Lindley, was scarcely more encouraging, writingon 27 December that as the Americans had 'steadily and successfullyopposed any Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the Far East' ever sincethe Anglo-Japanese alliance had been allowed to lapse, he feared that'we must expect the same American opposition to any confidentialrelations withJapan in the future'.'3George Sansom, the long servingand respected Commercial Counsellor at Tokyo, had already givenhis verdict in June I933: 'The Japanese need very badly a goodhiding.'14The differencein the informationreceived by the Treasury and theForeign Office was one of the most important sources of mutualmisunderstanding over the next few years. The Foreign Office,naturally, paid attention to their representatives in the field, even ifthey were not always guided by them: most of the Chancellor's infor-mation came from London, filtered through from the Far East. Theviews of British firms in China were put by their influential butLondon-based directors: the views of theJapanese Government foundtheirway through the somewhat shady figureof A. H. F. Edwardes, adiscredited former Acting Inspector General of Chinese Customs,now employed in London as an adviser by the Manchukuo govern-ment, and a close contact of Sir Warren Fisher.'5 If more localizedinformation was required, the Treasury had to send someone to get it:hence the Federation of British Industries Mission of 1934, and theLeith-Ross Mission of 1935-36. The informationreceived by ForeignOffice and Treasury was thus of quite a different kind: the formerreceived more balanced and considereddata, but lacked the technicaladvice which would have enabled them to combat the Treasury ontheir own ground. Foreign Office officials were too ready to defer to

    2 Ibid., no. 63.13 Ibid., no. 68.14 Ibid., no. 4.'5 On the activities of A. H. F. Edwardes and the broader issues of British FarEastern policy see Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia (Cambridge, I975). I am gratefulto Dr Trotter for putting me on to papers concerning Edwardes held in the SOASLibrary.

    however, by the British Minister in Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, whopointed out on 13 December that it would be very unwise to anta-gonize the Chinese for the sake of pleasingJapan: ' ... if I am correctthat our tradewith China only representssome 3 per cent of our worldtrade I should have most gravely doubted wisdom of forfeitingChina's general good-will on that account.'12 The Ambassador inTokyo, Sir Francis Lindley, was scarcely more encouraging, writingon 27 December that as the Americans had 'steadily and successfullyopposed any Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the Far East' ever sincethe Anglo-Japanese alliance had been allowed to lapse, he feared that'we must expect the same American opposition to any confidentialrelations withJapan in the future'.'3George Sansom, the long servingand respected Commercial Counsellor at Tokyo, had already givenhis verdict in June I933: 'The Japanese need very badly a goodhiding.'14The differencein the informationreceived by the Treasury and theForeign Office was one of the most important sources of mutualmisunderstanding over the next few years. The Foreign Office,naturally, paid attention to their representatives in the field, even ifthey were not always guided by them: most of the Chancellor's infor-mation came from London, filtered through from the Far East. Theviews of British firms in China were put by their influential butLondon-based directors: the views of theJapanese Government foundtheirway through the somewhat shady figureof A. H. F. Edwardes, adiscredited former Acting Inspector General of Chinese Customs,now employed in London as an adviser by the Manchukuo govern-ment, and a close contact of Sir Warren Fisher.'5 If more localizedinformation was required, the Treasury had to send someone to get it:hence the Federation of British Industries Mission of 1934, and theLeith-Ross Mission of 1935-36. The informationreceived by ForeignOffice and Treasury was thus of quite a different kind: the formerreceived more balanced and considereddata, but lacked the technicaladvice which would have enabled them to combat the Treasury ontheir own ground. Foreign Office officials were too ready to defer to

    2 Ibid., no. 63.13 Ibid., no. 68.14 Ibid., no. 4.'5 On the activities of A. H. F. Edwardes and the broader issues of British FarEastern policy see Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia (Cambridge, I975). I am gratefulto Dr Trotter for putting me on to papers concerning Edwardes held in the SOASLibrary.

    however, by the British Minister in Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, whopointed out on 13 December that it would be very unwise to anta-gonize the Chinese for the sake of pleasingJapan: ' ... if I am correctthat our tradewith China only representssome 3 per cent of our worldtrade I should have most gravely doubted wisdom of forfeitingChina's general good-will on that account.'12 The Ambassador inTokyo, Sir Francis Lindley, was scarcely more encouraging, writingon 27 December that as the Americans had 'steadily and successfullyopposed any Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the Far East' ever sincethe Anglo-Japanese alliance had been allowed to lapse, he feared that'we must expect the same American opposition to any confidentialrelations withJapan in the future'.'3George Sansom, the long servingand respected Commercial Counsellor at Tokyo, had already givenhis verdict in June I933: 'The Japanese need very badly a goodhiding.'14The differencein the informationreceived by the Treasury and theForeign Office was one of the most important sources of mutualmisunderstanding over the next few years. The Foreign Office,naturally, paid attention to their representatives in the field, even ifthey were not always guided by them: most of the Chancellor's infor-mation came from London, filtered through from the Far East. Theviews of British firms in China were put by their influential butLondon-based directors: the views of theJapanese Government foundtheirway through the somewhat shady figureof A. H. F. Edwardes, adiscredited former Acting Inspector General of Chinese Customs,now employed in London as an adviser by the Manchukuo govern-ment, and a close contact of Sir Warren Fisher.'5 If more localizedinformation was required, the Treasury had to send someone to get it:hence the Federation of British Industries Mission of 1934, and theLeith-Ross Mission of 1935-36. The informationreceived by ForeignOffice and Treasury was thus of quite a different kind: the formerreceived more balanced and considereddata, but lacked the technicaladvice which would have enabled them to combat the Treasury ontheir own ground. Foreign Office officials were too ready to defer to

    2 Ibid., no. 63.13 Ibid., no. 68.14 Ibid., no. 4.'5 On the activities of A. H. F. Edwardes and the broader issues of British FarEastern policy see Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia (Cambridge, I975). I am gratefulto Dr Trotter for putting me on to papers concerning Edwardes held in the SOASLibrary.

    however, by the British Minister in Peking, Sir Miles Lampson, whopointed out on 13 December that it would be very unwise to anta-gonize the Chinese for the sake of pleasingJapan: ' ... if I am correctthat our tradewith China only representssome 3 per cent of our worldtrade I should have most gravely doubted wisdom of forfeitingChina's general good-will on that account.'12 The Ambassador inTokyo, Sir Francis Lindley, was scarcely more encouraging, writingon 27 December that as the Americans had 'steadily and successfullyopposed any Anglo-Japanese co-operation in the Far East' ever sincethe Anglo-Japanese alliance had been allowed to lapse, he feared that'we must expect the same American opposition to any confidentialrelations withJapan in the future'.'3George Sansom, the long servingand respected Commercial Counsellor at Tokyo, had already givenhis verdict in June I933: 'The Japanese need very badly a goodhiding.'14The differencein the informationreceived by the Treasury and theForeign Office was one of the most important sources of mutualmisunderstanding over the next few years. The Foreign Office,naturally, paid attention to their representatives in the field, even ifthey were not always guided by them: most of the Chancellor's infor-mation came from London, filtered through from the Far East. Theviews of British firms in China were put by their influential butLondon-based directors: the views of theJapanese Government foundtheirway through the somewhat shady figureof A. H. F. Edwardes, adiscredited former Acting Inspector General of Chinese Customs,now employed in London as an adviser by the Manchukuo govern-ment, and a close contact of Sir Warren Fisher.'5 If more localizedinformation was required, the Treasury had to send someone to get it:hence the Federation of British Industries Mission of 1934, and theLeith-Ross Mission of 1935-36. The informationreceived by ForeignOffice and Treasury was thus of quite a different kind: the formerreceived more balanced and considereddata, but lacked the technicaladvice which would have enabled them to combat the Treasury ontheir own ground. Foreign Office officials were too ready to defer to

    2 Ibid., no. 63.13 Ibid., no. 68.14 Ibid., no. 4.'5 On the activities of A. H. F. Edwardes and the broader issues of British FarEastern policy see Ann Trotter, Britain and East Asia (Cambridge, I975). I am gratefulto Dr Trotter for putting me on to papers concerning Edwardes held in the SOASLibrary.

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    GILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTGILL BENNETTarguments which were presented as having 'financial' or 'economic'considerations as their basis.In fact, the views of Chamberlain and Simon were not far apart.When the Chancellor, for example, next broached the subject ofAnglo-Japanese relations in Cabinet on 14 March i934, during dis-cussion of the report of the Defence Requirements Committee, heproposed that 'we should decline to align ourselves with Washington'on the question of naval limitation, as this was guaranteed to anta-gonizeJapan. He suggested instead a non-aggressionpact withJapan,'which would enable us to concentrate on the serious situation thatwas developing nearer home'.16 Simon, who had recently written in amemorandum on Japan 'I would untie ourselves from U.S.A. policyat the earliest possible moment. We shall only be used as a catspawand be deserted if the situation became difficult','7did not disagreewith the Chancellor. He admitted that 'a non-aggression pact wouldbe of advantage to us. We never wished to attackJapan. Our desirewas that they should not attack us'.'8 He agreed that the proposalshould receive urgent consideration,and by 16March had produced amemorandum, of which he personally dictated the first draft, settingout the pros and cons of a non-aggression pact withJapan. Unlike theChancellor, who sought to improve Anglo-Japanese relationsprimarily as a means to an end, the Foreign Secretary alsoemphasized the necessity for receiving something in return. TheCabinet decided on 19 March that furtherconsideration should againbe given to the proposals. A memorandum of 23 March by Vansittartand Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, however, alarmed Chamberlain byseeming to suggest that the idea ofJapan as a military opponent wasnot ruled out, and he was forced to counter attack by circulating amemorandum of 23 April by Sir Warren Fisher on defence require-ments and naval strategy, on the theme that since 'the last thing in theworld that we can count on is American support, [we] not merelycannot afford further to alienate Japan, but it is an imperative andpressing need for us to effect a genuine and lasting reconciliation withher.'19

    Unfortunately for the Chancellor, however, his cogently expressedarguments in Cabinet were outweighed by the fact that in the firstmonths of I934 Anglo-Japanese relations were decidedly cool. Talksin London between representativesof the British andJapanese textileindustries soon revealed that the Japanese delegation were unwilling16 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 97. 17 Ibid.,no. 77, note 2.18 Ibid.,no. 97. '9 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XIII, Appendix I.

    arguments which were presented as having 'financial' or 'economic'considerations as their basis.In fact, the views of Chamberlain and Simon were not far apart.When the Chancellor, for example, next broached the subject ofAnglo-Japanese relations in Cabinet on 14 March i934, during dis-cussion of the report of the Defence Requirements Committee, heproposed that 'we should decline to align ourselves with Washington'on the question of naval limitation, as this was guaranteed to anta-gonizeJapan. He suggested instead a non-aggressionpact withJapan,'which would enable us to concentrate on the serious situation thatwas developing nearer home'.16 Simon, who had recently written in amemorandum on Japan 'I would untie ourselves from U.S.A. policyat the earliest possible moment. We shall only be used as a catspawand be deserted if the situation became difficult','7did not disagreewith the Chancellor. He admitted that 'a non-aggression pact wouldbe of advantage to us. We never wished to attackJapan. Our desirewas that they should not attack us'.'8 He agreed that the proposalshould receive urgent consideration,and by 16March had produced amemorandum, of which he personally dictated the first draft, settingout the pros and cons of a non-aggression pact withJapan. Unlike theChancellor, who sought to improve Anglo-Japanese relationsprimarily as a means to an end, the Foreign Secretary alsoemphasized the necessity for receiving something in return. TheCabinet decided on 19 March that furtherconsideration should againbe given to the proposals. A memorandum of 23 March by Vansittartand Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, however, alarmed Chamberlain byseeming to suggest that the idea ofJapan as a military opponent wasnot ruled out, and he was forced to counter attack by circulating amemorandum of 23 April by Sir Warren Fisher on defence require-ments and naval strategy, on the theme that since 'the last thing in theworld that we can count on is American support, [we] not merelycannot afford further to alienate Japan, but it is an imperative andpressing need for us to effect a genuine and lasting reconciliation withher.'19

    Unfortunately for the Chancellor, however, his cogently expressedarguments in Cabinet were outweighed by the fact that in the firstmonths of I934 Anglo-Japanese relations were decidedly cool. Talksin London between representativesof the British andJapanese textileindustries soon revealed that the Japanese delegation were unwilling16 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 97. 17 Ibid.,no. 77, note 2.18 Ibid.,no. 97. '9 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XIII, Appendix I.

    arguments which were presented as having 'financial' or 'economic'considerations as their basis.In fact, the views of Chamberlain and Simon were not far apart.When the Chancellor, for example, next broached the subject ofAnglo-Japanese relations in Cabinet on 14 March i934, during dis-cussion of the report of the Defence Requirements Committee, heproposed that 'we should decline to align ourselves with Washington'on the question of naval limitation, as this was guaranteed to anta-gonizeJapan. He suggested instead a non-aggressionpact withJapan,'which would enable us to concentrate on the serious situation thatwas developing nearer home'.16 Simon, who had recently written in amemorandum on Japan 'I would untie ourselves from U.S.A. policyat the earliest possible moment. We shall only be used as a catspawand be deserted if the situation became difficult','7did not disagreewith the Chancellor. He admitted that 'a non-aggression pact wouldbe of advantage to us. We never wished to attackJapan. Our desirewas that they should not attack us'.'8 He agreed that the proposalshould receive urgent consideration,and by 16March had produced amemorandum, of which he personally dictated the first draft, settingout the pros and cons of a non-aggression pact withJapan. Unlike theChancellor, who sought to improve Anglo-Japanese relationsprimarily as a means to an end, the Foreign Secretary alsoemphasized the necessity for receiving something in return. TheCabinet decided on 19 March that furtherconsideration should againbe given to the proposals. A memorandum of 23 March by Vansittartand Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, however, alarmed Chamberlain byseeming to suggest that the idea ofJapan as a military opponent wasnot ruled out, and he was forced to counter attack by circulating amemorandum of 23 April by Sir Warren Fisher on defence require-ments and naval strategy, on the theme that since 'the last thing in theworld that we can count on is American support, [we] not merelycannot afford further to alienate Japan, but it is an imperative andpressing need for us to effect a genuine and lasting reconciliation withher.'19

    Unfortunately for the Chancellor, however, his cogently expressedarguments in Cabinet were outweighed by the fact that in the firstmonths of I934 Anglo-Japanese relations were decidedly cool. Talksin London between representativesof the British andJapanese textileindustries soon revealed that the Japanese delegation were unwilling16 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 97. 17 Ibid.,no. 77, note 2.18 Ibid.,no. 97. '9 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XIII, Appendix I.

    arguments which were presented as having 'financial' or 'economic'considerations as their basis.In fact, the views of Chamberlain and Simon were not far apart.When the Chancellor, for example, next broached the subject ofAnglo-Japanese relations in Cabinet on 14 March i934, during dis-cussion of the report of the Defence Requirements Committee, heproposed that 'we should decline to align ourselves with Washington'on the question of naval limitation, as this was guaranteed to anta-gonizeJapan. He suggested instead a non-aggressionpact withJapan,'which would enable us to concentrate on the serious situation thatwas developing nearer home'.16 Simon, who had recently written in amemorandum on Japan 'I would untie ourselves from U.S.A. policyat the earliest possible moment. We shall only be used as a catspawand be deserted if the situation became difficult','7did not disagreewith the Chancellor. He admitted that 'a non-aggression pact wouldbe of advantage to us. We never wished to attackJapan. Our desirewas that they should not attack us'.'8 He agreed that the proposalshould receive urgent consideration,and by 16March had produced amemorandum, of which he personally dictated the first draft, settingout the pros and cons of a non-aggression pact withJapan. Unlike theChancellor, who sought to improve Anglo-Japanese relationsprimarily as a means to an end, the Foreign Secretary alsoemphasized the necessity for receiving something in return. TheCabinet decided on 19 March that furtherconsideration should againbe given to the proposals. A memorandum of 23 March by Vansittartand Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, however, alarmed Chamberlain byseeming to suggest that the idea ofJapan as a military opponent wasnot ruled out, and he was forced to counter attack by circulating amemorandum of 23 April by Sir Warren Fisher on defence require-ments and naval strategy, on the theme that since 'the last thing in theworld that we can count on is American support, [we] not merelycannot afford further to alienate Japan, but it is an imperative andpressing need for us to effect a genuine and lasting reconciliation withher.'19

    Unfortunately for the Chancellor, however, his cogently expressedarguments in Cabinet were outweighed by the fact that in the firstmonths of I934 Anglo-Japanese relations were decidedly cool. Talksin London between representativesof the British andJapanese textileindustries soon revealed that the Japanese delegation were unwilling16 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 97. 17 Ibid.,no. 77, note 2.18 Ibid.,no. 97. '9 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XIII, Appendix I.

    arguments which were presented as having 'financial' or 'economic'considerations as their basis.In fact, the views of Chamberlain and Simon were not far apart.When the Chancellor, for example, next broached the subject ofAnglo-Japanese relations in Cabinet on 14 March i934, during dis-cussion of the report of the Defence Requirements Committee, heproposed that 'we should decline to align ourselves with Washington'on the question of naval limitation, as this was guaranteed to anta-gonizeJapan. He suggested instead a non-aggressionpact withJapan,'which would enable us to concentrate on the serious situation thatwas developing nearer home'.16 Simon, who had recently written in amemorandum on Japan 'I would untie ourselves from U.S.A. policyat the earliest possible moment. We shall only be used as a catspawand be deserted if the situation became difficult','7did not disagreewith the Chancellor. He admitted that 'a non-aggression pact wouldbe of advantage to us. We never wished to attackJapan. Our desirewas that they should not attack us'.'8 He agreed that the proposalshould receive urgent consideration,and by 16March had produced amemorandum, of which he personally dictated the first draft, settingout the pros and cons of a non-aggression pact withJapan. Unlike theChancellor, who sought to improve Anglo-Japanese relationsprimarily as a means to an end, the Foreign Secretary alsoemphasized the necessity for receiving something in return. TheCabinet decided on 19 March that furtherconsideration should againbe given to the proposals. A memorandum of 23 March by Vansittartand Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, however, alarmed Chamberlain byseeming to suggest that the idea ofJapan as a military opponent wasnot ruled out, and he was forced to counter attack by circulating amemorandum of 23 April by Sir Warren Fisher on defence require-ments and naval strategy, on the theme that since 'the last thing in theworld that we can count on is American support, [we] not merelycannot afford further to alienate Japan, but it is an imperative andpressing need for us to effect a genuine and lasting reconciliation withher.'19

    Unfortunately for the Chancellor, however, his cogently expressedarguments in Cabinet were outweighed by the fact that in the firstmonths of I934 Anglo-Japanese relations were decidedly cool. Talksin London between representativesof the British andJapanese textileindustries soon revealed that the Japanese delegation were unwilling16 DBFP, vol. XX, no. 97. 17 Ibid.,no. 77, note 2.18 Ibid.,no. 97. '9 DBFP, 2nd Series, vol. XIII, Appendix I.

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  • 8/7/2019 British Policy in the Far East 1933-1936 Treasury and Foreign Office

    8/25

    BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36BRITISH POLICY IN THE FAR EAST I933-36to make any concessions, and on 19 March the President of the Boardof Trade asked his Cabinet colleagues to consider what would happenif the negotiations brokedown.2?The Cabinet Committee onJapaneseTrade Competition, set up to examine this question, concluded on 18April that in view of theJapanese attitude no useful purpose would beserved 'in making a proposal to theJapanese Government with a viewto seeking an agreed basis for subsequent negotiations': they recom-mended, therefore, that the Japanese should be told that HisMajesty's Government reluctantly resumed liberty of action, that is,the Board of Trade began to make arrangementsfor the institution ofa quota system in the colonial territories.21

    Combined with this, on 17 April 1934 the Japanese Foreign Officespokesman, Eiji Amau, stated publicly that Japan would brook noforeigninterferencein China except her own. This statement caused aminor flurry in London and Washington, but on the whole the For-eign Office took it calmly as merely the confirmation of an alreadyrecognized Japanese viewpoint. When J. L. Dodds, newly arrived asFirst Secretary in Tokyo, expressed the opinion in May 1934 that onshort acquaintance there seemed 'no argument of morality that couldbe used, no abstract standard to which reference could be made, noideal of international intercourse which could be invoked, in anattempt to dissuade the Japanese from any course marked out forthem by their conception of national and racial interest', thissomewhat desperateverdict met with unsurprised agreement from SirJohn Simon: 'We are far too prone to say that the Japanese are acivilized people and to think that they therefore have the same outlookas ourselves. They differ fromWestern nationsfundamentallyand everytime we forget that fact we shall find ourselves totally misunderstand-ing the Japanese outlook & utterly at sea as to their intentions.'22Neville Chamberlain did not subscribe to such dismissive assess-ments of the Oriental character. In Cabinet on 14 March I934 hestated that 'he did not believe that there were any difficulties whichfrankdiscussion [with the Japanese] might not solve'.23It was in factthe Japanese Government themselves who gave him the opportunityto revive the idea of an Anglo-Japaneseagreementafter the frictions ofthe early months of 1934 appeared to be lessening. The initialJapanese approach, however, was through the back door, andannoyed the Foreign Office. Following the breakdown of the tradeconversations, theJapanese Ambassador presentedto the Presidentof

    20 DBFP, vol. XX, no. Ioo. 21 Ibid., no. 105.22 Ibid., no. 133. 23 Ibid., no. 97.

    to make any concessions, and on 19 March the President of the Boardof Trade asked his Cabinet colleagues to consider what would happenif the negotiations brokedown.2?The Cabinet Committee onJapaneseTrade Competition, set up to examine this question, concluded on 18April that in view of theJapanese attitude no useful purpose would beserved 'in making a proposal to theJapanese Government with a viewto seeking an agreed basis for subsequent negotiations': they recom-mended, therefore, that the Japanese should be told that HisMajesty's Government reluctantly resumed liberty of action, that is,the Board of Trade began to make arrangementsfor the institution ofa quota system in the colonial territories.21Combined with this, on 17 April 1934 the Japanese Foreign Officespokesman, Eiji Amau, stated publicly that Japan would brook noforeigninterferencein China except her own. This statement caused aminor flurry in London and Washington, but on the whole the For-eign Office took it calmly as merely the confirmation of an alreadyrecognized Japanese viewpoint. When J. L. Dodds, newly arrived asFirst Secretary in Tokyo, expressed the opinion in May 1934 that onshort acquaintance there seemed 'no argument of morality that couldbe used, no abstract standard to which reference could be made, noideal of international intercourse which could be invoked, in anattempt to dissuade the Japanese from any course marked out forthem by their conception of national and racial interest', thissomewhat desperateverdict met with unsurprised agreement from SirJohn Simon: 'We are far too prone to say that the Japanese are acivilized people and to think that they therefore have the same outlookas ourselves. They differ fromWestern nationsfundamentallyand everytime we forget that fact we shall find ourselves totally misunderstand-

    ing the Japanese outlook & utterly at sea as to their intentions.'22Neville Chamberlain did not subscribe to such dismissive assess-ments of the Oriental character. In Cabinet on 14 March I934 hestated that 'he did not believe that there were any difficulties whichfrankdiscussion [with the Japanese] might not solve'.23It was in factthe Japanese Government themselves who gave him the opportunityto revive the idea of an Anglo-Japaneseagreementafter the frictions ofthe early months of 1934 appeared to be lessening. The initialJapanese approach, however, was through the back door, andannoyed the Foreign Office. Following the breakdown of the tradeconversations, theJapanese Ambassador presentedto the Presidentof20 DBFP, vol. XX, no. Ioo. 21 Ibid., no. 105.22 Ibid., no. 133. 23 Ibid., no. 97.

    to make any concessions, and on 19 March the President of the Boardof Trade asked his Cabinet colleagues to consider what would happenif the negotiations brokedown.2?The Cabinet Committee onJapaneseTrade Competition, set up to examine this question, concluded on 18April that in view of theJapanese attitude no useful purpose would beserved 'in making a proposal to theJapanese Government with a viewto seeking an agreed basis for subsequent negotiations': they recom-mended, therefore, that the Japanese should be told that HisMajesty's Government reluctantly resumed liberty of action, that is,the Board of Trade began to make arrangementsfor the institution ofa quota system in the colonial territories.21Combined with this, on 17 April 1934 the Japanese Foreign Officespokesman, Eiji Amau, stated publicly that Japan would brook noforeigninterferencein China except her own. This statement caused aminor flurry in London and Washington, but on the whole the For-eign Office took it calmly as merely the confirmation of an alreadyrecognized Japanese viewpoint. When J. L. Dodds, newly arrived asFirst Secretary in Tokyo, expressed the opinion in May 1934 that onshort acquaintance there seemed 'no argument of morality that couldbe used, no abstract standard to which reference could be made, noideal of international intercourse which could be invoked, in anattempt to dissuade the Japanese from any course marked out forthem by their conception of national and racial interest', thissomewhat desperateverdict met with unsurprised agreement from SirJohn Simon: 'We are far too prone to say that the Japanese are acivilized people and to think that they therefore have the same outlookas ourselves. They differ fromWestern nationsfundamentallyand everytime we forget that fact we shall find ourselves totally misunderstand-

    ing the Japanese outlook & utterly at sea as to their intentions.'22Neville Chamberlain did not subscribe to such dismissive assess-ments of the Oriental character. In Cabinet on 14 March I934 hestated that 'he did not believe that there were any difficulties whichfrankdiscussion [with the Japanese] might not solve'.23It was in factthe Japanese Government themselves who gave him the opportunityto revive the idea of an Anglo-Japaneseagreementafter the frictions ofthe early months of 1934 appeared to be lessening. The initialJapanese approach, however, was through the back door, andannoyed the Foreign Office. Following the breakdown of the tradeconversations, theJapanese Ambassador presentedto the Presidentof20 DBFP, vol. XX, no. Ioo. 21 Ibid., no. 105.22 Ibid., no. 133. 23 Ibid., no. 97.

    to make any concessions, and on 19 March the President of the Boardof Trade asked his Cabinet colleagues to consider what would happenif the negotiations brokedown.2?The Cabinet Committee onJapaneseTrade Competition, set up to examine this question, concluded on 18April that in view of theJapanese attitude no useful purpose would beserved 'in making a proposal to theJapanese Government with a viewto seeking an agreed basis for subsequent negotiations': they recom-mended, therefore, that the Japanese should be told that HisMajesty's Government reluctantly resumed liberty of action, that is,the Board of Trade began to make arrangementsfor the institution ofa quota system in the colonial territories.21Combined with this, on 17 April 1934 the Japanese Foreign Officespokesman, Eiji Amau, stated publicly that Japan would brook noforeigninterferencein China except her own. This statement caused aminor flurry in London and Washington, but on the whole the For-eign Office took it calmly as merely the confirmation of an alreadyrecognized Japanese viewpoint. When J. L. Dodds, newly arrived asFirst Secretary in Tokyo, expressed the opinion in May 1934 that onshort acquaintance there seemed 'no argument of morality that couldbe used, no abstract standard to which reference could be made, noideal of international intercourse which could be invoked, in anattempt to dissuade the Japanese from any course marked out forthem by their conception of national and racial interest', thissomewhat desperateverdict met with unsurprised agreement from SirJohn Simon: 'We are far too prone to say that the Japanese are acivilized people and to think that they therefore have the same outlookas ourselves. They differ fromWestern nationsfundamentallyand everytime we forget that fact we shall find ourselves totally misunderstand-

    ing the Japanese outlook & utterly at sea as to their intentions.'22Neville Chamberlain did not subscribe to such dismissive assess-ments of the Oriental character. In Cabinet on 14 March I934 hestated that 'he did not believe that there were any difficulties whichfrankdiscussion [with the Japanese] might not solve'.23It was in factthe Japanese Government themselves who gave him the opportunityto revive the idea of an Anglo-Japaneseagreementafter the frictions ofthe early months of 1934 appeared to be lessening. The initialJapanese approach, however, was through the back door, andannoyed the Foreign Office. Following the breakdown of the tradeconversations, theJapanese Ambassador presentedto the Presidentof20 DBFP, vol. XX, no. Ioo. 21 Ibid., no. 105.22 Ibid., no. 133. 23 Ibid., no. 97.

    to make any concessions, and on 19 March the President of the Boardof Trade asked his Cabinet colleagues to consider what would happenif the negotiations brokedown.2?The Cabinet Committee onJapaneseTrade Competition, set up to examine this question, concluded on