british tank production report

8/6/2019 British Tank Production Report

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Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1944.T h e c i rcu lat ion of th i s p a p e r h a s been s t r i c t ly l imi ted , i t i s i s suedfo r th e personal use of . . r r^^r r?^^ :^? 1 - - - -

T O P SEC RE T. Copy Mo.W.P. (44) 262.23rd May, 1944.

W A R C A B I N E T .

S E LE C T C O M M IT T EE ON N A T I O N A L E X P E N D I T U R E : R E P O R T O NT A N K P R O D U C T I O N .

N O T E B Y T H E S E C R E T A R Y O F T H E W A R C A B I N E T .BY direct ion of the Prime Minis ter I ci rculate herewith for the considerat ionof the W ar Cabine t

I . A R epo r t of the Selec t Commit tee on Na t ional Ex pen di tu re on TankPro duc t ion , ,dated the 9th Marc h, 1944.I I . A Memorandum by the Min i s te r o f Product ion da ted the 20 th May,1944, submit t ing to the Prime Minis ter the observat ions of theSecretary of State for War, Minis ter of Supply and himself on theSelect Commit tee ' s Report^ wi th enclosures .

I I I . A le t t e r from Si r John W ard law Mi lne to the Pr im e Minis te r, da tedthe 10th May, 1944, asking for early consideration of the Report .IV . A n inter im reply wh ich the P rim e M inis ter proposes to send toS i r J o h n Ward l aw Mi l n e .

(S ig n ed ) E . E . B R ID G E S .

Offices of the W ar Cabinet, S.W. 1."23rd May, 1944.


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I . MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON

NATIONAL EXPENDITURE TO THE PRIME MINISTER FORTHE CONSIDERATION OF THE WAR CAB INET .

TANK P R O D U C T I O N . *T A B L E OF C O N T E N T S .

I N T R O D U C T O R Y P a g e( 1 ) General , '.. 3( 2 ) Cons iderat ions affect ing the Occasi on and Me tho d of Repo rtin g . . . . . . 3( 3 ) Ev id en ce tak en . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

T H E R E S U L T S A C H I E V E D IN 1 9 4 3 ( 1 ) The General P ic ture ... 4(a) "P ro sp ec t " as forecast in 1 9 4 2 compared with " Performa nce " in 1 9 4 3 4

( 6 ) Res our ces inv est ed and " Operational Di vi den d '' in 1 9 4 3 . . . . . . 5(c) Th e De ve lo pm en t of the Pro gra mme ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

( 2 ) Spe cia l Ill ust rat ive Ca se s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7(a) The recent 3 , 0 0 0 Mile s Drivi ng Trials . . . - 7( 6 ) The Story of the 7 5 - m n i . M e d iu m V e lo c i t y Gu n 7

T H E S I G N I F I C A N T P O I N T S IN THE R E S U L T S OF 1 9 4 3 (a) Mit iga ting Consi derati ons, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . &(b) Th e Ine sca pabl e Fa ct s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

( 1 ) Out sta ndi ng Poi nts in the Gener al Picture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9( 2 ) Le ss on s from the Spec ial Case s exa min ed . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0(a) The 3 , 0 0 0 - M i l e Reliability Trial " .. . 1 0

(i) The signif i cance of Fa ul ty Wo rk ma ns hi p . . . . . . . . . . . . .10( ii) The Auth ori ty of Pare nt Fir ms . . . 1 0

(iii) The Im por tan ce of a Careful Selec t ion of Su bsidia ryMa nuf ac tur ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1

, ( iv) Fa ult y Mate rial . . . . . . . . . 1 1(v) The Impo rtan ce of Inspe ct ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1

(vi) In sp ec ti on by the I.F .V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1- (vii) Ins pec t io n by Mamrfacturers . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1

(b) The Case of the 7 5 - m m . Gu n " . . . 1 1( i) De la y in sett l ing Des ig n of Mou nti ng . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1

(ii) Ev id en ce on Te st s and Trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2( iii) Practica l Concl usion s from th e Fail ure . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 3

M A I N C O N C L U S I O N S ( 1 ) De fe ct s in Orga nisat i on . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 4( 2 ) The Dispersa l o f Responsib i l i ty . . . . . . . . . 1 4

(a) The Wa r Office and th e General Staff as repre sent ing the " Use rs " . . 15(b) The Ministry of Supply 1 6(c) Th e Ma nuf ac tur ers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6(d) F a u l t y Wo r k m a n s h ip . . . ... 1.7

( 3 ) La ck of Urg enc y abou t the Tan k Pro gr amm e . . . - . . . 1 7( 4 ) Ge ner al Obs erv atio ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -- . 1 7

R E C O M M E N D A T I O N S ( 1 ) Th e Im me di at e Em erg enc y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8( 2 ) Gene ral Re co mm end at io ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8


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S E L E C T C O M M I T T E E O N N A T I O N A L E X P E N D I T U R E .M E M O R A N D U M A D D R E S S E D TO T H E P R I M E M I N I S T E R F OR TH E C O NS ID E R AT IO N O F T H E

W A R C A B I N ET .- T A N K P R O D U C T I O N .

I n t r o d u c t o r y .( 1 ) G E N E R A L .

1. I n A u g u s t 1 9 4 2 the Committee of that Session completed an investigationof Tank Product ion and submit ted a Secre t Memorandum to the War Cabinet .The general conclusion was that there had been faults in organisat ion whichhad led to avoidable waste of t ime, money and ma ter ial resources. Ce rtainrecommenda tions were made , im por ta n t po in ts in wh ich w e r e

( i) That the responsibil i ty of the W ar Office an d the M ini str y of Sup plyshould be more closely " clam ped tog eth er. "( i i) That the executive responsibil i ty in the Ministry of Supply should beclearly placed on the shoulders of one man who should in effect be a" M ana gin g Direc tor for T an ks ," responsib le bo th for Prod uct io nand for Design and Development.

( i ii ) Th at the par ent firms of m an ufa ctu rer s ' group s should be broug ht moreintim ately into the pictu re and be consulted from the ear l iest stagesin the conception of a new requirement.2. After these investigations, changes were made in the organisat ion whichappeared substantial ly to sat isfy the Committee 's recommendations, and, on theassu ranc es received both from the W a r Office and th e M in ist ry of Sup ply , aReport* was presented to the House of Commons in November 1942 whichincluded a general account of what had taken place in regard to tanks andrecommended in effect that the new men and the new organisat ion should begiven a chance to make good.

( 2 ) C O N S I D E R A T I O N S A F F E C T I N G T H E O C C A SI O N A ND M E T H O D O F R E P O R T I N G .

3. In September 1943 we decided th at we ough t to resume our inves tigationso as to ascertain how far the new men and the new organisa t ion ha d i n fact" made good ." W e felt tha t such a step would, in view of the previous Re po rt,be expec ted by the H ouse of Com mons, and beyond th is we were influenced by theconsiderat ion that unfavourable comment was prevalent about tank production.4. We have mentioned the lat ter considerat ion because i t has a bearingon our choice of m etho d for repo rti ng . Th is indeed ha s prese nted us wit h atroublesome problem. On the one ha nd , as alre ady noted, we feel tha t a repor tis due to the Ho use of Commons. On the other hand , we cann ot disreg ard thepossible repercussions of a published report, or the great difficulties of makingone which would convey a true picture without revealing matters which, for ;secu rity reasons, m ust be ke pt secret. Th ere is, moreover, a spec ial difficulty ab ou tgiving a fair appreciat ion at the present moment when the Cromwell tank hasju st reached the stag e of being conside red read y for the test of battle. If itproves to be rel iable in batt le and to have substantial tact ical advantages overthe Sherm an, then u ndoubtedly the general pic ture which can be presented wil lchan ge. Bu t this, the only real test, still lies ahea d, and un til it is accomplishedwe have no solid ground on which to base a report except the actual anddis qu iet ing reco rd of the pas t. O ur difficulty is increased by the fact t h a t we

E i g h t e e n t h R e p o r t , H . C . 1 2 2 , 1 9 4 1 - 4 2 .


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have not been given full information on the programme that l ies ahead, so thatwe are wi thout a l l the data for judging how the present organisat ion is working.5. In these circumstances we have decided that our r ight course is in thefirs t place to submit a Secret Memorandum to the War Cabinet s tating ourimpress ions and recommendat ions . W e ha d contemplated th at we should then ,in the light of the reply received, decide in what sense we should report to the

Hou se of Commons. In the course of the final com pletion of thi s M em oran dum ,however, there occurred the discussion of the 2nd March in the House leading tothe pro spe ct of an early debat e on tan ks in secret session. In view of this , andof what has been s tated in the 18th Report of 1941-42, we must take into accountour responsibil i t ies in regard to reporting to the House at an early date.(3) E V I D E N C E T A K E N .

6. On the 28th September, 1943, we asked for cert ain fac tua l inform ationfrom the Mi nis try of Sup ply and later , in November, 1943, furth er inq uir ie s weresubm itted to the W ar Office. In response to these app roac hes a mem orandu mprepared jointly by the War Office and the Minis try of Supply was given to uslate in December 1943. Th is document, to wh ich we refer here after as the " W a rOffice Memorandum," has been supplemented at various t imes by furtherinformat ion prepared for the mos t par t jo in t ly by the two Depar tments .Apart from this body of written official evidence we have examined a numberof witnesses orally : on the Army side, representatives of the General Staff, theRoyal Armoured Corps and off icers from the Gunnery and Experimental Wingsat Lulworth; and on the Minis try of Supply s ide, departmental representatives , onthe Tank Board, off icers of the development section under D.T.D. at Lulworth,and the Director -G eneral of Ar t i l lery . In ad di t ion , we have had a subs tant ia lbody of evidence from manufacturers engaged in both assembly work and engineproduct ion .

The Results Achieved in 1943.(1) T H E G E N E R A L P I C T U R E .

7. On our review of the position, it is impossible to avoid the gen eralimpression that , measured in terms of production of tanks f i t for current batt lerequirem ents , the Brit is h m an ufa ctu rin g effort of 1943 has fallen fa r short ofrealis ing expectations or being fully effective, and has involved what appears tobe a wa stefu l use of na tio na l resources. W e cannot, from our evidence, "state theexac t s ignif icance of this in term s of cash ex pe nd itu re; but th at the am ountsinvolved are very large is shown by a s tatement, furnished by the Minis try ofSupp ly for another inqu iry , according to which expe ndi tu re on tanks represented18-79 per cent, of their total expenditure on War Stores for 1942-43.The picture, as i t has impressed i tself on us , is drawn broadly in two waysin the two succeeding p ara gra ph s : (a) " Prospect,'", as forecast in 1942, compared with "Performance " in 1943.

8/ In th e firs t place we have compared " prospect " w ith " perform ance "by setting the achievement up to the end of 1943 side by side with our impressionof the prospect as it was presented to us in the autumn of 1942.(NOTE .In the comparisons set out below

(a) We have, for the sake of simplification, left out any reference to theVa len tin e pro du ction . Fu ll cre dit should, of course, be given forthe continuity of this part of the programme.(b) W e have, on the ' ' prosp ect ' ' s ide, set out the gen eral impressionswhich we gained, directly and indirectly, from a wide body ofevidence.)


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Main points in the " Prospec t " aspresented in the autumn of 1942.(a) That the Crusader had p rovedunre l iable an d wa s to go out of product ion .(6 ) Th at the I n fa n t ry Mk. I V(Churchi l l ) , though jus t i f ied for i t soriginal home defence purpose, d idnot jus t i fy cont inuance for overseasf ight ing an d was to go out of pro duc t ionat the end of the current contract (earlysummer, 1943) and that the wholeV au xh al l G roup should then go over tocru i ser t anks .

(c) That the Cromwell , wi th a Meteoreng ine and car ry ing a 6-pdr. gun , wasgoing to be the best tank in the world,and an impor tan t fac to r a l ready in1943 fighting.

(d ) That the Centaur , wi th L iber tyengine, was going to be . a very closesecond-best to the Cromwell (in factident ical except at the highest speeds) .

(e) That the Centaur was to beadopted because, owing to the demandsof the M.A.P. Mer l in eng ine p rogramme, a sufficient production ofMeteor engines for the total cruiserprogramme could not be organised.(/) T ha t the whole B rit ish effortwould be conce ntrated on the C romw elltype of cruiser tank, and that the product ion of an infantry tank would ceaseto be pa r t o f the B r i t i s h p rogramm e.

Actual " performance " in 1943.(a) Crusaders s t i l l represented 26 percent , of the total tanks produced in1943.(b) The Churchi l l has , according tothe Mem orandum subm i t ted by the W arOffice, ' ' esta blish ed itself a s a re lia bleand efficient weapon, having stood thetes t of bat t le experience in Tunis ia andwon the confidence of the troops."

(But N.B.It has been al lowed to dropout of bat t le , s ince Tun is ia , ap par en t lyowing to the armament be ing judgedinsufficient.)(c) The Cromwell had, up to the end

of 1943, not pr ove d in quality to be avehicle of sufficiently reliable performance to be used in bat t le . I t s produc t ionin quantity fell far short of the programm e. As a resul t i t was considerednecessary to change the ' ' paren tage ' 'for Cromwell product ion in May 1943.Even if as armoured vehicles Cromwellshad been adequa tely rel iable, they wouldnot have been sent abroad because, bythe t ime they came into product ion, theGe nera l Staff h ad come to re ga rd acru i ser t ank equ ipped wi th a 6-pdr. gunas i n ad eq u a t e .

id) The Centaur , wi th i t s L iber tyengine, prov ed so unre liable wh enhandled by uni ts at home that , as agun -tank , i t ha s been condemned. TheLiberty engine is to go out of produetion, but, in order not to break upmanufac tu rers ' o rgan i sa t ions , p roduction will have to continue long aftercondemnat ion as a gun-tank engine.(e) I t has been found possible during1943 to organise the product ion ofMeteor engines on a scale which isclaimed to be ade qua te for the Avholecru i ser t ank p rogramme.(/) The General Staff have acceptedthe pol icy that an infantry tank of theChurchi l l type is an indispensable parto f the Br i t i sh p rogramme.

(b) Resources invested and "Operational Dividend" in 1943.9. A n al ter nat iv e method for get t in g a broad impress ion of the fac tua lresul ts i s to com pare the resources invested with the ' ' opera t ional divide ndreal ised. W e have accordingly enq uire d wh at prop ort ion of the tan ks prod ucedduring 1943 proved to be of value for the purposes for which they were planned,viz. , as gun -tank s to be used by arm oure d forma t ions . The resul ts are ind icated


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have not been given ful l information on the programme that l ies ahead, so thatwe are wi thout a l l the da ta for judging how the present organisa t ion i s working.5. In these circumstances we have decided that our r ight course is in thefirst place to subm it a Secret M em oran dum to the W a r Ca bin et s ta t in g ourimpress ions and recommendat ions . W e had contempla ted tha t we should then,in the light of the reply received, decide in what sense we should report to theHou se of Commons. In the course of the final complet ion of this M em orand um ,however, there occurred the discussion of the 2nd March in the House leading tothe pro spe ct of an early debate on ta nk s in secret session. I n view of thi s, andof what has been stated in the 18th Report of 1941-42, we must take into accountour responsibi l i t ies in regard to report ing to the House at an early date .

(3) E V I D E N C E T A K E N .6. On the 28th September, 1943, we asked for cer tain fac tua l info rm ationfrom the M ini str y of Su pply and later, in November, 1943, furth er inq uiri es weresubm it ted to the W ar Office. I n response to these appro aches a m em orand umprepared joint ly by the War Office and the Ministry of Supply was given to uslate in December 1943. Th is docum ent , to which we refer he reafter as the " W a rOffice M em ora nd um ," ha s been supplem ented a t various t ime s by fu rthe rinformat ion prepared for the most par t jo int ly by the two Depar tments .Apart from this body of wri t ten official evidence we have examined a numberof witnesses oral ly : on the Army side, representat ives of the General Staff, theRoyal Armoured Corps and off icers f rom the Gunnery and Exper imenta l Wingsa t Lu lwo rth; and on the M inis t ry of Su pply s ide , dep ar tm enta l representa t ives , onthe Tank Board, officers of the development sect ion under D.T.D. at Lulworth,and the Direc tor-G enera l of A rt i l l e ry . In addi t ion, we have had a subs tan t ia lbody of evidence from manufacturers engaged in both assembly work and engineproduc t ion .

The Resul t s Achieved in 1943 .(1) T H E G E N E R A L P I C T U R E .

7. On ou r review of the po sition , i t is impo ssible to avo id the g ene ralimpression that , measured in terms of product ion of tanks fi t for current bat t lerequ irem ents, the Br i t is h ma nu fac tur in g effort of 1943 has fal len far sho rt ofreal ising expectat ions or being ful ly effect ive, and has involved what appears tobe a wastefu l use of nat io nal resources. We cannot , from our evidence,"state theexa ct s ignificance of this in term s of cash ex pe nd itur e; but tha t the am oun tsinvolved are very large is shown by a statement , furnished by the Ministry ofSupply for another inqui ry, according to which expendi ture on tanks represented18 - 79 per cent , of their total exp en ditu re on W ar Stores for 19 42-43.The picture, as i t has impressed i tself on us, is drawn broadly in two waysin the two succeeding paragraphs :(a ) " Prospect ". as forecast in 1942, compared ivith "Performance" in 1943.

8. In the first place we hav e comp ared " prosp ect " w ith " perfo rm ance "by set t ing the achievement up to the end of 1943 side by side with our impressionof the prospect as i t was presented to us in the autumn of 1942.

(NOTE .In the comparisons set out below-(a ) We have, for the sake of simplification, left out any reference to theVa lent ine produ ct ion. Fu l l credi t should, of course, be given forthe cont inui ty of this part of the programme.(b ) We have, on the "prospect " s ide, set out the general impressionswhich we gained, direct ly and indirect ly, from a wide body ofeviden ce.) . .


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1 0 05Main points in the "Prospec t" aspresented in the autumn of 1942.

(a) T ha t the Crusade r had provedunreliable and was to go out of product ion.(b ) T h a t t h e In f an t ry Mk . IV(Churchil l) , though justified for i tsor ig inal home defence purpose, d idnot jus t i fy cont inuance for overseasfighting an d wa s to go out of prod uctio nat the end of the current contract (ear lysummer, 1943) and that the wholeV au xh al l Gr oup should then go over tocruiser tanks .

(c ) That the Cromwell , wi th a Meteoreng ine and car ry ing a 6-pdr. gun, wasgoing to be the best tank in the world,and an important factor al ready in1943 fighting.

(d) That the Cen taur , wi th L iber tyeng ine, w as going to b e . a v ery closesecond-best to the Cromwell (in factident ical except a t the h ighest speeds) .

(e ) That the Centaur was to beadopted because, owing to the demandsof the M.A.P . Mer l in eng ine p ro gram m e, a sufficient pro duc tion ofMeteor engines for the total cruiserprogramme could not be organised.(/) T ha t the whole B rit is h effortwould be con cen trated on the C romw elltype of cruiser tank, and that the product ion of an infantry tank would ceaseto be p ar t of the Br i t i sh prog ram m e.

Actual "performance" in 1943.(a ) Crusaders s t i l l represented 26 percent , of the to tal ta nk s produced in1943.(b) The Churchi l l has , according tothe Me morandum submi t t ed by the W arOffice, " estab lished itself as a relia bleand efficient weapon, having stood thetes t of bat t le experience in Tunis ia andwon the confidence of the troops."

(But N.B.It has been al lowed to dropout of bat t le , s ince Tun is ia , appa rent lyowing to the armament being judgedinsufficient.)(c) The Cromwell had, up to the end

of 1943, not proved in quality to be avehicle of sufficiently reliable performance to be used in ba tt le. It s prod uctionin quantity fell far short of the program me. As a resul t i t was consideredn ecess ary t o ch an ge t h e " p a r e n t a g e "for Cromwell production in May 1943.Even if as armoured vehicles Cromwellshad been adequately reliable, they wouldnot have been sent abroad because, bythe t ime they came into production, theG enera l Staff ha d come to reg ard acru i ser t ank equ ipped wi th a 6-pdr. gunas inadequate .

(d) The Centaur , wi th i t s Libertyengine, proved so unreliable whenhand led by uni ts a t home that , as agu n-ta nk , i t has been condemned. Th eLiberty engine is to go out of production, but, in or der n ot to break UDmanufac tu rers ' o rgan i sa t ions , p roduction will have to continue long aft ercondemnat ion as a gun-tank engine.(e ) It has been found possible during1943 to organise the production ofMeteor engines on a scale which isclaimed to be adequate for the wholecru i ser t ank p rogramme.(/) The General Staff have acceptedthe pol icy that an infantry tank of theChurchi l l type is an indispensable parto f the Br i t i sh p rogramme.

(b) Resources invested'and "Operational Dividend" in 1943.9 . An al ternat iv e metho d for get t in g a broad impression of the fac tua lresults is to com pare the resources invested with the ' ' op era tion al divide ndreal ised. W e have accordingly enquired wh at pro port io n of the tan ks prod ucedduring 1943 proved to be of value for the purposes for which they were planned,viz. , as gun -tank s to be used by armo ured form at ions . The resul ts are ind icate d


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in the fol lowing table compiled from information furnished by the Ministry ofS u p p l y : -P e r c e n t a g e of T o t a l N u m b e r O p e r a t i o n a l l y a d e q u a t eT y p e . o f T a n k s A c t u a l U t i l i s a t i o n .a s G u n - t a n k s .p r o d u c e d

d u r i n g 1 9 4 3 . C o v e n a n t e r . . . 0 - 5 N i l O b s o l e t e .C r u s a d e r 2 6 N i l T w o - t h i r d s b e i n g c o n v e r t e d a s g u n t o w e r s , A . A . t a n k s , & c. O n e - t h i r d

f o r t r a i n i n g .C a v a l i e r 5 N i l H a l f s t a t e d b y M i n i s t r y o f S u p p l y t ob e d e s t i n e d a s C P t a n k s . T h e W a r

O f f i ce e v i d e n c e t h r o w s d o u b t o n t h e i rv a l u e f o r t h i s p u r p o s e .

H a l f f o r t r a i n i n g .C e n t a u r 1 7 N i l T w o - t h i r d s f o r t r a i n i n g , o n e - t w e l f t ho p e r a t i o n a l l y w i t h 9 5 m m . O n e

q u a r t e r i n t e n d e d p r o b a b l y f o r t r a i n i n g .

C r o m w e l l 7 - 5 N i l M i n i s t r y o f S u p p l y s a y for operationalunits o r t r a i n i n g . B u t W a r O f f i cee v i d e n c e i s t h a t u p t o 1 s t J a n u a r y ,1 9 4 4 , n o p r o d u c t i o n m o d e l s w e r ea c c e p t e d a s a d e q u a t e f o r b a t t l e o v e r s e a s .

M a t i l d a . . : 2 A s m a l l n u m b e rF a r E a s t .

fo r M a i n l y f or m i n e - s w e e p i n g .

V a l e n t i n e 2 4 A l l o p e r a t i o n a l ;f o r R u s s i a .

m a i n l y

C h u r c h i l l 1 8 A l l o p e r a t i o n a l ;N . B . T h e y h a v eb e e n u e d i ns i n c e T u n i s i a .

b ab u tn o tt t l e

(c) The Development of the Programm e ahead.10 . P ar ag ra p h s 8 and 9 have dea l t wi th ac tua l resul t s . Bu t the achievement of 1943 cannot be fa i r ly judged wi thout taking into account how the

prog ramm e which l ies ahead has been se tt led and how i t now s tands . He re weare in an unavoidable diff iculty, s ince we have been precluded from enquir ing intode tai ls of pro ject ed dev elopm ents. W e hav e, how ever, in th e W a r Office Mem orandum, been given a general indicat ion of present policy, and this has beensupp lemen ted in cer tain respects by oral evidence. In ord er , therefore, to makeclear the understanding of the posi t ion on which our conclusions and recommendations are based, we set out shortly below such impressions as we have been ableto form.(i) Armament.

We und e r s t and tha t t he 6-pr., owing to its ineffective H.E. shell, has, sinceDecember 1942, been considered inadequate as a general form of tank-gun, butthat a small proport ion, to f ire a special type of A.P. ammunit ion, may st i l l berequi red to supplement the 75-mm. gun- tanks; tha t the 75-mm. M.V. (MediumVeloc i ty) gun i s regarded as a reasonably adequate dua l -purpose weapon wi th afair ly good H.E. shel l and with an A.P. performance equal to the 6-pr . whenboth are f ir ing normal A.P.C.B.C. shot; that the " 77-mm." wil l be worth havingas giving a be t te r A.P. per formance than the 75-mm. , though i t s exac t A.P.muzzle velocity and the content of i ts H.E. shel l are st i l l matters of uncer tainty;and, finally, that the 17-pr. is the only British gun about which we have been toldwhich, for tank v. tank purposes, can be regarded as being in the same class withthe German 75-mm. gun in the Panther (Pz Kw V) or the 88-mm. in the Tiger(Pz Kw VI ) . These impress ions have a bear ing on our judg me nt of the presentposi t ion.


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(ii) Cruiser tank programme.The Cromwell (as now coming off the product-ion line with the modificationsdecided upon after the recent driving test)* is considered for the first time tohave got through it s teething troubles and to be mechanically reliable. But theCromwell, even if it has thus attained mechanical reliability, is apparently tohave a limited production life. As from the middle of 1944 it is to be tailed offand replaced by a larger tank (A. 34) of the Cromwell type, taking the 77 -mm.gun. The A. 3 4 involves redesigning 6 0 per cent, of the Cromwell parts. I tmust, therefore, be regarded as more than a modification, and as involving a factorof uncertainty in that it is likely to have to go through' its own teething troublesbefore it will be accepted as a vehicle reliable for battle. The position as regardsarmament is even more uncertain. The 77 -mm. gun has not yet been producedand fired. The design for its H.E. ammunition is stil l under discussion. Evenif it proves to be a good weapon, it will remain for tank v. tank purposes definitelyless powerful than the best German tank armament.

(iii) Infantry tank programme.The production of the Churchill with developments is to continue as animportant element in the British programme. As from March 1944 , the heavierChurchill, Marks VII and VIII, will be in production equipped with the 75 -mm.

M.V. gun or the 95 -mm. gun-howitzer. But,- since the standard Churchill hashitherto continued in production with the 6 -p r . , emergency retrospective modifications will be necessarj'- if those already produced, including those with the troopsoverseas are to have what the General Staff now consider adequate armament.(iv) Other projects, S.P. motmtings, &c.

We have not been permitted to inquire into the very varied range of projectsin hand outside the main lines of cruiser and infantry tanks or into the long-rangeprogramme for these two types. We have been informed, however, that " projectsfor the mounting of still larger guns in tanks both of the Cromwell and Churchillseries are i n hand and have reached varying stages of development."(2) SPECIAL ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

1 1 . Paragraphs 8, 9 and 1 0 give the broad picture as it has impressed us.In order to make a closer check of current achievement we have taken evidencefrom manufacturers, and also examined, in some detail, two recent experiences,viz., the results brought to light in the recent 3,000 -miles driving trials, and thestory of the 75 -mm M.V. gun. Both cases illustrate important points.(a) The recent 3,000-Mile Driving Trials.

12. The points brought to light in the recent driving test indicate that,while the general design of the Cromwell is now considered likely to achievemechanical reliability, there is still a real risk nf failure owing to defects inmaterials and workmanship. The faults revealed in the test show the need formore rigid qualitative control of materials and for better systems of inspectionand works administration, not only in the main assembly firms, but among subcontractors and manufacturers of every kind of part or component. These matters,which indicate that there is still serious need for improvements in organisation,are more fully examined in a later passage. (See below paragraphs 2 2 to 29.)

(b) The Story of the 75-mm. Medium Velocity Gun.1 3 . Our investigations of what has occurred in the case of the 75-mm. gunhas brought to light several points which are most disturbing. We have beenchiefly impressed by the following matters :-(a) The delay which has occurred in getting this gun with a serviceablemounting fitted into Cromwell and Churchill tanks;(6 ) The fact that a design for a mounting, which has since proveddangerously inadequate, was approved for production;(c) The fact that tanks were issued to field formations with these defectivegun-mountings, with the result that it has been necessary to issue

* W e u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e e x p e r i e n c e in the 8 ,000-mile t r ia l led to d e c i s i o n s t o in t r o d u c ea n u m b e r o f im p o r t a n t m o d i f i c a t io n s w h ic h m e a n t h o ld in g u p t a n k s c o m in g off the l i n e ; b u tthat these modif icat ions have , s ince t h e m id d le of Febr uary , been incorporated i n p r o d u c t io n .


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urgent warning not ices to the formations concerned/a mostunfortunate resul t in view of the lack of confidence already prevai l ingin regard to Br i t i sh tanks ;id) The fact that officers going through the A.F.V. School have now forseveral mo nths ha d to ' receive instruc t ion on gea ring wh ich they k newto be defective, and which they knew would have to be replaced bybet ter gearing in the tanks to be issued for operat ions.

- ^ 14. The reasons for w ha t ha s hap pen ed an d the defects in orga nis at io nwhich they appear to ind icate are more fu l ly deal t wi th in la ter paragraphs(30-36) . The outs tand ing poin t re levant to th i s pa r t of our mem orandum is thedelay. In the War Office Memorandum i t is s tated that the possibi l i ty!of introducing the 75-mm. M.V. gun as a dual purpose weapon in place of the 6-pr. was"c on t inu ou s ly u nder r e v ie w " in 1942; th at " in December 1942, as a resu l t ofMiddle East experience, the General Staff asked that this gun should 'be adoptedas soon as pract ica ble as the main ar m am ent of the majo ri ty of B ri t i sh Ta nk s " ;and that " on the same date the General Staff were informed by the Minist ry ofSup ply th at an out l ine design had been pre pa red of the 75-mm. gu n to f it int o the6-pr. m ou ntin g in B ri t ish T anks.' '" Ye t this requirem ent , thoug h shown byfighting exp erienc e to be ur ge nt, though involving none of the complications ofproducing a new type of ammun ition, and though formulate ,d ;j and accepted inDecember 1942, had, up t i l l Fe bru ary 1944, rem ained u nsat isf ied in term s ofserviceable prod uct ion . W he the r rel iable mo unting s wil l , even now, be prod ucedon a larg e scale s t i l l rema ins to be proved in pract ice , bu t the extremelyun fo rtu na te re sul ts of the 14 m onth s ' delay which has already oc curred cann ot beescaped. T ha t this delay has not had more ope rat ion al s ignificance is because noBri t ish cruiser tanks, accepted as vehicles f i t for bat t le, were produced during1943itself a most un fo rtu na te resul t . B ut the Ch urch i l l tan ks have, al l thist ime, been avai lable as bat t le-worthy vehicles , and i t appears to us both inexpl icable and reg ret tab le th at these should have been cont inu ed in p rod uct io nthro ugh out 1943 wi th no bet ter arma men t than the 6-pr .

The Significant Points in the Results of 1943.(a ) Mitigating Considerations.

15. I t is from the broad picture as given in paragraphs 8 to 10, supplemented by our detai led examinat ion of the matters covered by paragraphs 12 to 14,tha t we have formed our v iews on the s i tuat ion . In jud gin g the present organ isat ion we wish to give ful l weight to al l the mit igat ing considerat ions that havebeen pu t before us . Of these the fol lowing seem the most im po rta nt : (a ) Owing to the lag in convert ing plans into product ion, the resul ts of 1943

do not necessari ly afford a basis for cri t icis ing the orga nisa t ion as i thas exis ted s ince we last reported, i.e., since the changes made in theautumn of 1942.(b) Accou nt mus t be taken of the han dica p under which the B r i t i sh tan kproduct ion has s t ruggled f rom the beginning of the war , resu l t ingfrom the fai l ure to cont inue on an ade qua te scale the org an isat io n fortank design which had been bui l t up in the last war.(c) Brit ish designers have had to cope with special problems such as thel imi ta t ions imposed by ra i lwa y t rans por t requi rem ents and the low: si lhouet te demanded by the General Staff.(df Difficul ties have been caused by the dispersal of Br i t is h m an ufa ctu rin gun i ts . (Th is po int is relevan t when com parisons ar e mad e wi th theAmerican organisa t ion , which has been ab le to take advantage of

the immense scale and concentrat ion in one convenient centre of theAmerican motor indus t ry . )(b) The Inescapable Facts,

16 . These consid erat ions cannot al l be accepted, w ithou t qual i f icat ion, an dthey prov ide in the m ain expla nat ion s of, ra the r than just i f icat ions for, p astshortcom ings. (For exam ple, i t app ears to us th at if there had been a more clearand determined purpose , the res t r ic t ions refer red to under (c) would not havebeen acquiesc ed in for so long.) Bu t, w hate ver the ir significance, the m ain facts. rem ain th at , ap ar t from th e V alen t ine in Ru ssia and the l imite d use of the


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Churchill in Tunisia, no British^ tanks during 1943 have been considered worthyof a place in the main battles; that British tanks issued to British troops havegained a bad reputation both for mechanical reliability and fighting arrangements; that British factory workers have seen very large quantities of completedtanks broken up, or parts "(finished and half-finished) piling up to be taken awayas scrap; and that these things have combined to create a psychological atmosphere about British tanks among al l concerned with handling them which musthave unfortunate effects and which in our view deserves the urgent attentionof the War Cabinet. The past record in fact puts the onus of proof very heavilyon those who claim that all is now well with the organisation for tank production.

(1) OUTSTANDING PO INT S IN THE GENERAL PICTURE.17. From the broad survey (paragraphs 8 to 10) certain points seem to usto stand out for special comment.18. The contrast between " Prospect " and " Performance " (paragraph 8)seems to indicate that wrong appreciations were made at the end of 1942, andthis inevitably affects our judgment of the expectations that are now put forwardfor 1944 and onwards. The point which we find most disquieting is that i tshould have been seriously contemplated at the end of 1942 that practically all" th e eg g s " as regards future tank production should be put into the "onebasket " of a type of cruiser tank which was still unproved as a mechanicalconstruction, and which was to rely for the major part of the programme on anengine which, on past performance, could only be regarded as inadequate andwhich has since proved to be so.19. The disappointing nature of the " dividend " for 1943 (paragraph 9)tells its own story. The alternative purposes recorded in column 4 of the tablein that paragraph are doubtless of value, and other uses may be found of which

we have not been informed ; but it was not for these purposes that the programmewas originally planned, and we cannot believe that these could not have beenattained far more economically if they had been the original objective. Werecognise, of course, that several of the unsatisfactory features in the " dividend'' resulted from decisions which were taken before the changes inorganisation, and which have since been reversed. Ju dg in g by these reversals,we conclude that the main causes of trouble were, first, the reliance on theLiberty engine, and, secondly, the original selection of the " parent " firm forthe Cromwell group. Due credit should be given to those filling the new appointments for facing up to these matters, but there still remain important questions,some of which we set out below :(a) Could not the decisions reversing earlier policy (e.g., as regards the

Meteor engine programme) have been taken earlier ?(&) Has it really been necessary, for the sake of avoiding dislocation inemployment, to continue the production of obsolete or condemned types,of vehicle and engine so long as has been done ?(c) When it was decided that certain tanks (Crusader, Cavalier, Centaur)must continue in production even though they would not be acceptedas gun-tanks, was the task of preparing all the modifications andappliances which would be necessary for their alternative uses undertaken with sufficient vigour and foresight ? We understand, forexample, that the production of Centaurs as gun-tanks has beencontinued much longer than was intended because the fittings andmodifications required for using them as A.A. tanks were not ready.Our evidence also suggests some confusion as regards the equipmentand uses of O.P. tanks.

id) Lastly, and most important, the question already referred to : why hasthere been so long a delay in replacing the 6-pr. with the 75 -mm. gun ?20. When we turn to our impressions on the present programme (paragraph. 10) , our comments, owing to our lack of full information, can, of course, be

* W e ful ly apprec iate that t h e s u p p l y of A me r ic an t anks m a y b e suff icient t o m e e t t h e .requ irement s of Brit i sh troops . B u t w e cannot regard this a s affording ground for not consider ingth e Br i t i sh pr oduc t ion pr ogr amme on i t s me r i t s , and on the assumpt i on t hat t he s e t anks ar eurgent ly required. Otherwise a substant ial port ion of Brit i sh resources must b e regarded as havingbe en employed without just i f icat ion.


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no mo re th an ten tativ e. W e confine ourselves, therefore , to sayin g tha t we findi t d i squie t ing (a ) that the Cromwell , even i f i t proves now to have a t ta inedmechanical reliability, is apparently under sentence of supersession after a fewmo nths of pro du ction life, (&) th at the positio n as regar ds th e A . 3 4 should beaffected by so many uncerta int ies , and (c ) that there should be no evidence ofproduct ion from projects on which we had evidence in our visi ts to factories inthe summer of 1942 .

( 2 ) L E S S O N S F R O M T H E S P E C IA L C A S E S E X A M I N E D .2 1 . It has seemed to us important to examine in some detai l the specialcases re fe rred to in par ag rap hs 1 2 to 1 4 since these not only i l lustra te the workingof the organisat ion, but a lso throw l ight on what is involved in the charge offaul ty workmanship which has figured somewhat prominently in our evidencefrom the General Staff.

(a) The 3,000-m ile Reliability Trial.2 2 . We have seen only a short prel iminary report from the Fight ing VehicleProv ing Es tabl ishment on th i s t r ia l . From th is i t app ears tha t the resul t sbrought out the fol lowing main points in the comparison between the Cromwelland the Sherm an. The Cromwel l has a subs tant ia l ly be t te r dr iv ing performancethan the Sherman ( 2 0 per cent, faster across country, 6 0 per cent, faster on theroad). The Sherman up to 2 , 0 0 0 miles is more re l iable ( though this resul t mayhave been affected by th e Sh erm an bein g dri ve n a t a lower speed ). Th e Cro mw ellhas a longer life (both engine and suspension).

(i) The significance of " faulty workmanship."2 3 . Th e repor t a l so s ta tes tha t the t r ia l s broug ht to l ight compara t ive ly few

serious design defects but " a lot of very serious manufacturing faul ts in Englishtan ks." Fu rt he r inv est igat ion seems to show th at the expression " seriousm anu fac tu r ing fa u l t s" i s somewh at loosely used. I l lu s t ra t ion s g iven of thesefaul ts were (a) faul ty radiators 1 ; (b) wrong fluid in the Lockheed system;(c) badly assembled gear boxes; (d) modifications not fit ted (e.g., final drive bolts);(e) fan belts. Of thi s l ist i t is wo rth no tin g th at, acc ord ing to our evidence, only(d)the failure to introduce the modifications of strengthened final drive bolts 1represen ted a s t ra igh t faul t in m anu factu re by the m ain assembly firms. Th eradiators , the Lockheed uni ts , gear boxes and fan bel ts , a l l represented bought-outpar t s . Fu r the r , in these cases , " faul ty m anu fac tu re " was only par t ia l ly thecause of t rouble . The ra dia tor s , for examp le, we un de rst an d were ma de bysub-contractors to a design set t led a t the Belper establ ishment of the Ministryof Supply, and the assembly fi rm cla ims that i t was a bad design and that theirown rad ia to r as made for th e ' " Centau r " proved adequa te . The fa i lure in thefan bel ts wa s essent ia lly due to fau l ty ma teri a l (bad rubber an d canvas). Fa ul t ymateria l (faul ty synthet ic rubber pistons) is a l leged also as one of the causes ofthe Lockheed system fai lures . In other cases fau l ty ma ter ia l and w ork m ansh ipboth played a part (e.g., tab-washers to lock the lock-nut in the gear-box madeof faul ty materia l and knocked on by a f i t ter in such a way as to damage thewash er). Th is analysis br ing s to l igh t a num ber of points .(ii) The authority of parent, firms.

2 4 . T he case of the final dri ve bolts i l lu str ate s a m at ter of consid erableimp ortance . Th e intro duc t ion of modificat ions in the assembly l ine a t the rig httime depe nds on ha vin g an efficient works system. Ev en if a pa re nt firm itselfhas a f i rs t -c lass system of ad m in ist ra t ion and inspect ion, faul ts ma y occur inmember firms of a group , and ap pa ren t ly th e pa re nt fi rm, a l tho ug h held responsibleby the Ministry of Supply for the products of the whole group, has no establ ishedauth ori ty to control the wo rki ng methods of i ts members. I t ap pe ars to us tha tonly a firm of pro ved first-class qu alific atio ns sho uld be selected as a par en t firm,an d th a t such a firm wh en selected sho uld be stre ng the ne d by official back ing. I tis , in fact , an essent ia l p ar t of our recom mend ations th at th e two or thre e firmswhich after four and a half years of war have emerged as worthy for se lect ionas pa ren t f irms, should be t re ate d as an inte gra l pa rt of the offic ia l org anis at ionwith a real share in the responsibi l i ty.


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(iii) The importance of careful selection of subsidiary man ufacturers.25. Another point which emerges is the importance of great care in theselection of fi rms a s sub-con tractors or ma kers of an y pa rt s or components re quiredfor tan ks . The re l iabi l i ty of a tan k depends on far more than th e work done bythe m ain assembly firms. A pp ar en t carelessness in thi s m at ter is br ou gh t out ina l a t e r p a r ag rap h .

(iv) Faulty material.26. Since faul ty mater ial has been an appreciable factor , we must emphasisethe urgency of ensuring that nothing but the bes t qual i ty of mater ial i s i ssuedfor v i ta l pa r ts in tan ks or thei r armam ent . F an bel ts have app are nt ly been acomm on source of trou ble. In th e case of such vita l accessories as these (or thesemi-automat ic cam referred to in a la ter paragraph) the quant i ty of mater ialsreq uir ed in rela t ion to to tal w ar produc t ion is negl ig ible . Selected qual i t ies ofrubber , canvas or o ther mater ials should be made avai lable for such vi tal par ts .(v ) The importance of inspection.

27. Last ly , th is case and many others which have come before us i l lus t ratethe vi tal importance of working up s tandards 1 of inspe ction. T his has to beconsidered under the two heads of Government inspect ion by the I .F .V. andinspec t ion by manufac tu rers .(vi) Inspection by the I.F.V.

28. We understand that the great difficulty has been to get rightly qualifiedpersonnel, and that , in default of this , i t has been necessary to rely on employinggreater numbers and on the ru le-of- thumb method of inspect ing according to al i s t . W e ar e inform ed tha t there has been a considerable improveme nt in theI .F .V . wo rk over the las t 12 mon ths , and th at the need for fur ther improvementis fully recognised.I t seems obvious th a t every possible op po rtu nit y should be taken for br ing ingin highly qual if ied ex per ts , and for t ra in in g those th at are not. W e suggest tha ti t m ig ht be valu able to tra nsf er selected R .E.M .E p ersonn el to* I.F .V .(vii) Inspection by manufacturers.

29. There are three main heads for considerat ion :(a) The sys tem of inspect ion by manufacturers wi thin thei r own works (ei therby the main assembly firms or by manufacturers of components).(b ) Inspection by the parent firm of the work done by other members of theirg ro u p .(c) Inspection by the main assembly firms of parts or sub-assemblies madeby other firms.Here again the essential difficulty in al l three cases is shortage of highly

qualified pers onn el re su lt in g from t he gre at exp ansio n of work for most of thepr inc ipa l m anu fac ture rs . I t seems clear tha t , i f m anu fac ture rs ' inspect ion couldbe m ad e more effective by ta kin g a cert ain n um ber of men off pro duc tion, i t w ouldbe w or th w hile to face some loss in q ua nt i ty for the sak e of secu ring a betterguaran tee as to qua l i ty .(b) The Case of the 75-mm. Gun.

30 . We have a l ready ment ioned (paragraph 13) the main d i s tu rb ing po in t sbro ugh t to l ight in th i s case, of which the most im por tan t f rom a prac t ical pointof v iew has been the delay in get t ing Bri t i sh tanks equipped wi th armamentwhich, in the v iew of the General Staff, was essent ial . V ario us factors appe arto have contr ibuted to th is delay.(i) Delay in settling design of mou nting.

31. We have been astonished to learn in evidence that al though the requirement was formulated as urgent and accepted as pract icable in December 1942,i t was not unti l the 3rd July, 1943, that the responsible officer under C.A.F.Vagreed wi th D.T .D. tha t the s t andard 6 -p r . mount ing would t ake the 75-mm.subject to defined modifications (a special S.A. cam, and a specially strengtheneddeflector brac ket) ; and, fur ther , t ha t i t wa s not unt i l the 10th Jul y tha t th e


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requi rements for the e leva t ing gear were ca tegor ica l ly s t ipula ted to the Minis t ryof Supply by the General Staff (i.e., the requirement for a geared elevation witha def ini te rat io and for equ ipm ent to enable ind irect f i r ing to be carr ied ou t) . W efind i t dif ficult to un de rsta nd w hy so ma ny mo nths were al lowed to elapse w ith ou tsuch points being set t led, or why the General Staff did not press the matter moreurgent ly . I t appe ars to us tha t severa l mon ths were wasted.32 . After this ini t ia l delay, matters seem to have been handled expedit iously, s ince we have been told that tanks equipped with 75-mm. guns began tobe issued to formations in thi s country in October .* Un for tun ate ly, however, th isdid not mean gett ing serviceable weapons into the hands of the troops, s ince themo untin gs as prod uced proved to be ser iously fautly w hen f ired. There ha stherefore been sub stan tial fur ther delay in overcoming these faults . On theevidence th at we have ob tained hi th er to, the posi t ion is som ewh at confusing, an dit is difficult to unravel the precise course of events or to understand how it cameabout tha t those responsible for des igning the mount ing did not ant ic ipa te thestrains to which i t would be put when f ir ing American ammunit ion in servicecondit ions.

(ii) Evidence on tests and trials.33. We may record the fol lowing statements f rom our evidence :(a ) That the trials on which reliance seems chiefly to have been placed were

(i) A " user ' s " t r ia l a t Lulw or th in March 1943 by the Ex per im enta lOfficer to D.E.A.C. working with the Officer in Charge of theD.T .D. ' s Development W ing. (This w as a t r ia l wi th 100round s . The amm uni t ion in th is case was hand-picked andabou t 30 per cent , of the rounds were rejected. I t was ca rr iedout with a 75-mm. gun in a Valentine tank, on a mild steelfabr ic ated mounting . The results were ent irely sat isfactory.)( i i ) A technical t r ia l by C.I .A. wi th 200 round s Am er ican amm unit ion. As in the case of ( i) , the amm un it ion wa s han d-pic ked ,60 rounds out of the 200 being rejectediand the results weresa t i s fac tory.

(b ) That is was on the results of the C.I .A. 's t r ia l that the mounting wentinto product ion.(c ) That the tes ts re fer red to under (a ) did not show up the weakness in themount ing because the ammuni t ion was hand-picked, whereas theordinary run of Amer ican ammuni t ion may put a much grea te r s t ra inon the mounting, since i t includes rounds which, while not soinaccurate as to fai l to go into the breech, are very hard to extract .(This explanation, however , was not accepted as proved by otherwitnesses-who alleged that it is impossible to create conditions bywhich it can be conclusively proved.)(d ) That signs of widespread trouble began to come in during October f rompractice f ir ing by units; but that pr ior to this there had been troublein var ious tes ts a t Lulwor th .(e ) That the trouble was ini t ia l ly the breaking of the S.A. cam, but that whenthe cams we re streng then ed (by redes ignin g the shape and en su ringbetter hea t t reatm en t) so th at they did not break, the st ra in was shif te don to the brac ket and caused dis tor t io n in this . Th is involvedredes igning and s t rengthening the bracke t .(/) Th at dis tor t ion of the brack et occurred in f ir ing t r ia ls (on the28th December , 1943) at Lulworth and went so far as to br ing thef ir ing gear into operat ion, thus causing a ser ious accident , whichinvolved the p erm an en t disab lem ent of the officer in ch arge of t h eDevelopment Wing.(g ) Th at the brack et in the tr i a l referred to in (/) was m ade of fabr ic atedmild s tee l , thus apparent ly represent ing an a t tempt a t s t rengtheningthe or igina l ly approved des ign, but an a t tempt which did not go fa renough.(h ) That, apar t f rom faults in design, there have been faults in manufactureand ma ter ia l . Th us i t has been s ta ted

(i) That a large number of broken cams showed clear ly that the heatt rea tment had been faul ty .* A c c o r d i n g t o t h e W a r O f f ic e M e m o r a n d u m , t h e first t a n k m o u n t i n g t h i s g u n w a s d e l i v e r e d

t o t h e S e r v i c e o n 1 1 t h O c t o b e r , 1 9 4 3 .

// /


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( i i ) That a contributory cause of trouble has been the difficulty ofgetting sufficient supplies of 3^ per cent, nickel steel, which' isrequired for these cams. ,i(iii) T h at some of th e bra ck ets wh ich showed deflection on firing we remade of faul ty mater ia l - in fac t , of what has been descr ibedto us as ' ' bedstead brass ' ' instea d of m anganese bronze asspecified.(iii) Practical conclusions from the failure.

34. To arrive at a sure and precise judgment on all the issues involved wouldreq uire an elabo rate enq uiry wi th expert assistance. Th is we have not at tem pted ,since, whatever the exact technical explanation of what has happened, i t seemsto us that cer tain pract ical points emerge which admit of no reasonable doubt .The fol lowing are the main points relevant to the present enquiry :F i r s t . - I t w as sought to accompl ish the task of car ryin g the 75-mm. gunin Bri t ish tanks with a mounting which was less robust than that used forthe equiva lent gu n in the Sherm an. If, as is now alleged, inaccu racies ofAmerican ammunit ion have been the main cause of the fai lure, that factoroug ht to have been provided aga inst f rom th e outset, s ince this inaccuracyis well known to every soldier who has used any kind of American ammunit ion in ope rat ion s or t ra in in g. To choose a less robust moun ting wa s, in anycase, to take a r isk which could only be guarded against by special care inthe design and m ate ria ls used. Th is care does not seem to have been taken. 'If a combination of fighting experience and technical knowledge had beenbrought to bear on the or iginal design, such a mistake ought to have beenavoided.Second.The tests and tr ia ls , on the stren gth of which the or igin aldesign was passed for production, seem to have been confused and haveproved by resu lts to have been inad equa te. I t ap pe ars tha t t r ia ls were takeninto account which were carr ied out in ar t i f ic ial condit ions and withmo un ting s of a desig n different from tha t first selected for pro du ctio n. Th ereseems to have been no decisive occasion when an attempt was made toreproduce service condit ions and deliberately to reveal weaknesses and breakbreak down the mo un ting. Th at such a f inal test , un der the combined supervision of technical experts and officers with practical knowledge of battlecondit ions, should be carr ied out before production contracts are placed seemsto us to be essential.Thi rd .The ar rangements for manufac ture seem to have been suchth at p ar ts of the mo unting s were, in a num ber of cases, ma de of faultyma teri al, im pro pe rly treat ed an d finished. It is extremely dis tu rb in g, first,that manufacturers capable of such work should have been selected formaking vi tal ly important par ts of war weapons, and secondly, that such

faults should not have been detected on inspection.35. These conclusions seem to us to show that there has been somethingser iously wrong ei ther with the organisat ion i tself or with the discharge of therespon sibi l i t ies wh ich exist und er i t . Ou r impression is th at there has beena comb ination of both . So far as concerns org an isati on , this is one of th e caseswhich ap pe ars to i l lustr ate the dan gers of the spl i t t in g of responsibi l i t ies. Inreg ard to guns, we un de rsta nd th at the responsibi l i ty of the D.G. of A. fordevelopment ( research, design and experimentat ion) and inspection is limitedto the gun i tself ( the tube and breech mechanism) an d i ts amm unit ion. H is' ' f rontier ' ' of respon sibi l i ty now stops there, thoug h formerly i t went fur th erso a s to inclu de the recoil system and the cradle. W e have been informed th at

this division has led to difficulties in the past, but that in recent monthscollaborat ion between the pa r t ies on both sides of the "f r o n t i e r " has beenconsiderably bet ter . W e hes i tate to express views on these extremely technica lm att er s, bu t we find it difficult to avoid the imp ressio n th at th is spli tti ng ofrespon sibi l i ty has contr ibuted to resu lts such as those now under cons iderat ion.36. The conclusions in paragraph 34 also reinforce what has already beensaid as to the need for careful selection of con tracto rs and for im pro vin gstan da rds of work man ship, mater ia ls and inspec t ion. We may add th a t wehave had other evidence of faulty wo rkma nship in the ma nu factu re of tan karm am en t. The experience of the Gu nne ry W in g at Lu lwo rth is th at the f inish


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of guns generally is poor, and tha t no less than one in three of the firingmechanisms of the 75 -mm. M.V. gun received at the Gunnery School has hadto be stripped and fitted by hand to make them interchangeable.

Main Conclusions.( 1 ) DEFECTS IN ORGANISATION.

37. Our conclusions from the foregoing review are that the new organisation has not fully "made good," and that the expectations recorded in theearlier Report (Eighteenth of 1 9 4 1 / 4 2 ) have not been fulfilled. We do notwish t O belittle the improvement which has taken place in the clarification ofresponsibility, in co-operation between the various branches, and in the leadingpersonalit ies; but, in our view, there is stil l urgent need for further improvement. It appears to us that since the appointment of Major-General Briggs,wi th his recent fighting experience, at the War Office,- and of Mr. Gibb at theMin ister of Supply, there have been definite signs of better working. We believe,indeed, tha t the course of events might , iu several respects, have been differentif these appointments have been made earlier; but we cannot, a second time, becontent to recommend wai ti ng to see what the ' ' new men ' ' can do, since, in ourview, it is now demonstrated beyond question that the organisation itself isseriously defective.

(2) THE D I S PERSAL OF RESPONS IB IL ITY .38. The chief cause of trouble remains the familiar one of the division ofresponsibility which exists between

The War Office (representing the users who want instruments of warfor certain purposes);The Ministry of Supply which has to interpret the wants of the usersin terms of instruments capable of manufacture and to place the orders for'their manufacture; andThe Manufacturers who have to carry out the orders.

The essential needs are(A) A clear conception by the General Staff of their requirements, i.e., ofwhat type of tank they will require at the time when that tank tvillbe available in production (which means, if it is a new type, abouttwo years ahead).(B) A linking up of the responsibilities for achieving results approachingas nearly as is practicable to the requirements as defined under (A).This means responsibilities for

(i) The assessment of what is practicable, in design and production;(ii) The formulation of programmes of design, development andproduction, on the basis of (i);(iii) The execution of such programmes (including inspection andtesting of what is produced).

39. As is shown by our recommendation in paragraph 5 3 we consider thatthe right arrangement in principle is that there should be a single overridingresponsibility, and that this should rest with the War Office as the authoritythai, has to stand or fall by the result.

40. So long, however, as the responsibilities and functions are keptseparated, then at least everything should be done to reduce the effects of thisseparation to a minimum and to ensure that the three main agents work togetherin the closest partnership in such a way that each feels responsible for the wholecombined operation of the par tnersh ip. The three par tners should, in fact, bejointly and severally responsible for the results.We cannot believe that many of the things which have happened in thepast could have happened if this joint and several responsibility for results hadbeen a reality.


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4 1 . In spite of all that has been done to improve the position in the last twelvemonths, our evidence shows only too clearly the dangers of divided responsibil i tybetween three agentswith each of the three able to shift on to one of the others theresp ons ibilit y for any fai lu re in the joi nt result. Moreover, this disp ersa l or confusion of responsibility seems to exist, not only as between the three main agencies,but also w ith in the orga nisatio ns in the W a r Office and th e M inis tr y of Sup ply.Our impression of the present se t -up is indeed that " a l i b i s " for fa i lures inresu lts can far too easily be prod uced by everyone concerned. W e ha ve trie d toform a fair judgment on the past record, and our conclusion is that a certainmeasure of blame attaches to each of the three main agencies .

(a ) The War Office and the General Staff as Representing the Users.42. One great dang er ar is in g from divis ion between the ' ' user ' ' and" pr od uc er " respo nsibil i t ies , is th at the " user " may not take full account ofhow long it takes to introduce new types or modifications or of the dirsuptiveeffect which these have on production in the case of a complicated constructionsuch as a ta nk . H e tends, therefore, not to mak e up his min d early enough and

to be too ready to change his requirements according to changing experience onthe fighting fronts. Th is tendency ha s ce rtai nly revealed itself in th e actu alcourse of events , and there is a substantial element of truth in the cri t icism madeby one ind us tri al w itnes s th at " developm ent has proceeded in a series of shortnervous little steps, each of which has been sufficient to disrupt production; butno one so far has had sufficient courage, or been able, to assess the battle requirements sufficiently far ahe ad to make a technical jum p t ha t is going to pu t usahead of the Germans ."43. It seems, further, that the General Staff have not been sufficientlydecisive in s tatin g their req uirem ents or in choosing between the variousprac ticable alterna tives ,^ and facing th e consequences. They also ap pe ar to havebeen too ready to take the att i tude vis-a-vis the Minis try of Supply, " We saywh at we wa nt an d they say wh at they can do and then they get on w ith i t , andafter th at our responsibil i ty en ds ." In dealing wit h new ideas for tan ks thisimplies a dangerous over-simplification both of the problem and of the soldiers 'responsibil i ty. Pa st records show th at in converting tank requirem ents in topro du ctio n the re is never a clear ru n. A ll sorts of unex pecte d difficulties cropup an d fresh decis ions have continuously to be take n. Th e Arm y side mustconstantly watch how things are going during the course of converting ideasinto pro du ctio n,, and it i s for them , above all, to im p ar t a sense of urg en cy tothe whole process.In recording the above remarks we have had in mind the general course ofaffairs over the past two yea rs . .One po int in pa rti cu lar ap pe ars to be i l lu stra ted bywha t hap pen ed in connection wi th the A. 34. On this matter there ha s been

some conflict of evidence, but what chiefly impressed us was a statement fromthe Ge nera l Staff side tha t it came as a shock to them whe n, some m on ths aft erthe idea had been mooted, they were informed that the improvement on the75-mm. M.V. gun which they required (for which the " 77-mm." was eventuallyadopted) would involve en lar gi ng the Cromwell tu rre t and, consequently, ch ang ingthe hull to such an extent as to mean putt ing a new tank into production.44. In s t ress ing (paragraph 42) the impor tance of making p lans far aheadand the n ad he ring to them, we do not imply th at s hort-ra nge m odifications andimp rovisa tions should not be mad e, s ince i t is vital ly im po rta nt th at the o rgan isation should be tuned up to respond quickly, within the limits of what is possible,with out dis rup tin g the m ain flow of prod uction . The need for replacing the6-pr. with a better gun is a clear example of a short-range alteration which,as we have alrea dy s trongly emphasised, oug ht to have been made m uch morequickly, t The need for know ing wha t is prac ticab le in the way of improvisation,and imparting a sense of urgency to its accomplishment, is one of the stronggrou nds for es tablishing dir ect contact between the W ar Office and m anu factu rersand for giving the War Office the leading responsibility.45. Finally, no arrangement for unifying responsibil i ty, especially if thattakes the form of placing the single responsibility on the War Office, can work

* I n t h e p e r e n n i a l d i s p u t e b e t w e e n a r m a m e n t , a r m o u r , p o w e r - w e i g h t r a t i o, s u s p e n s i o n ,e l e c t r i c a l f it ti ng s, a n d s i m p l i c i t y f o r p r o d u c t i o n , t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r s e t t l i n g t h e f i n a l b a l a n c e o fc h o i c e m u s t r e s t w i t h t h e G e n e r a l Staff.

t I n c i d e n t a l l y , t h i s c a s e a l s o i l l u s t r a t e s t h e l a c k o f f o r w a r d p l a n n i n g , s i n c e t h e 6 - p r . w a sp r a c t i c a l l y o b s o l e t e a s a t a n k g u n b y t h e t i m e i t r e a c h e d t h e f i g h t i n g f o r m a t i o n s i n s u b s t a n t i a ln u m b e r s .


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properly if the responsibil i ty on the War Office side is i tself confused or divided.Our impress ion is that at present there is a need for a closer l inking-up betweenplann ing , t ra in ing and opera t ional respons ib i l i t i es in connect ion wi th A . F . V .Sand S .P . mount ings .(b) The Ministry of Supply.

46. In the case of the Min is t ry of Supply, one dan ger of the e xis t in gdivis ion of responsibi l i ty , involving their in terposi t ion as an intermediarybetween the user and produc er , i s th at they may in ter pre t th e General Staffdemands in a way which does not really meet the fighting soldiers ' requirements.We have, however, in this inquiry been chiefly concerned with the results of thedivis ion of responsibi l i ty between the M inis t ry and the m anu fac ture rs . Th epoint made by the lat ter i s that a tank cannot be designed in a detached drawingoffice, but that at every step the designers must be in close touch with those whowil l hav e to execute the prod uct ion . In the earl ier Mem orand um th e Co mm it teecommented on the months which had been wasted in certain cases because modifications for meeting army requirements had been designed by the staff of theD.T.D., and then, when submit ted to manufacturers , had proved to be qui teim prac t icable as prod uct ion jobs . They s t rongly recommended t ha tm an uf ac tur ers should be consul ted from the outset and cont inuously . W e havebeen glad to note that recent ly there appears to have been a marked improvementin this m at te r . In the case of the A. 34, for examp le, f rom the mom ent wh en theproject was f inal ly decided upon, the work of design was entrusted to the LeylandCompany, and the D.T.D. ' s branch, which has undoubtedly accumulated valuableknowledge, gave ass is tance by lending s taff to work with Leyland 's designers .Th is seems to us to be the r ig ht m ethod, but even in this case our imp ressio n isth at i t would have been bet te r from every point of view i f the Leylan d rep resentat ives had been brought in to the discussions when the idea was f i rs t mootedin Ja nu ar y 1943. We have, fur ther , received evidence which indicates th atcases s t i l l occur when t ime is wasted by design work being undertaken by D.T.D.with out consul t ing m anu fac ture rs . W e have been told, for examp le, tha t ther ehas been a recent urgent demand for an all-round-vision cupola to be fi t ted on toa ll t an ks ; th a t D.T .D. p rep ared a des ign ; and tha t the m anufa c tu rers found i thad been done in such a way as to involve processes of production which, even ifpract icable, would have involved immense delay and unnecessary expendi ture.^

As indicated in our recommendat ions , we adhere to the view expressed in theCom mit tee ' s fo rmer Re por t tha t the l ead ing ma nufa c tu re rs should be b roug htinto s t i l l c loser par tne rsh ip in the respo nsibi l i ty not merely for- design, but alsofor suggest ing new ideas .(c) The Manufacturers.

47. In the case of the manufacturers , the danger of divis ion ofresponsibil i ty is that they may not feel responsible for results. T h e p re s en tposit ion is in effect that they are told to do a job according to a certain designand that i t is not their business to express their ideas as to whether i t is l ikelyto be sui ta ble for the task requ ired. I f i t fai ls in th is , they ca n wa sh their ha nd sof respon sibi l i ty . We cann ot help com par ing this posi t ion with th at of theairc raf t ind ustry . W hen a La nca ster bomber goes into the ai r , the repu tat ionof A. V. Roe and Company and, indeed, of the whole Hawker-Siddeley Groupgoes w i th i t . Th ere is no ful l paral lel in the case of tank s . Possibly the Va ux ha l lCompany and Vickers have had something of th is feel ing in the case of theChurGhill and the Valentine respectively, and i t is significant that these havebeen th e mo st successful Br it i sh tan ks. B ut in the case of cruis er ta nk s the rehas never been a clear ident i f icat ion of a part icular type wi th a part icular f i rm,pro ud of i ts rep uta tion , an d i t would be extre m ely difficult, to m ake an affil iationorder for the Cromwell or any of i ts relatives.W e bel ieve tha t th is considerat ion is of real im portan ce and tha t i t hassomething to do with the share in the blame for bad resul ts which is at t r ibutedto fau l ty workmansh ip by manufac tu rers .

* E v i d e n c e f r o m m a n u f a c t u r e r s i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t s a b o u t i d e a s b e i n g d e v e l o p e d i nd e t a c h m e n t f r o m t h e p r a c t i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e m a i n t a n k p r o d u c e r s a p p l y n o t o n l y t o t h e w o r kd o n e u n d e r t h e D . T . D . , b u t a l s o t o t h e M i n i s t r y o f S u p p l y e s t a b l i s h m e n t a t B e l p e r . T h i s , i t i sa l l e g e d , h a s b e e n a n o t h e r i l l u s t r a t i o n o f a d i s p e r s a l o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r d e s i g n a n d o f t h ei n t r o d u c t i o n o f c o n f u s i n g i n f l u e n c e s . W e u n d e r s t a n d t h a t a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h h a v e r e c e n t l yb e e n m a d e , a n d e s p e c i a l ly t h e a p p o i n t m e n t o f M r . G ib b a s D i r e c t o r - G e n e r a l o f A r m o u r e d E i g h t i n gV e h i c l e s , . a r e l i k e l y t o c l e ar u p t h e s e c o n f u s i o n s . A c c o r d i n g l y ; w e h a v e n o t e n q u i r e d i n d e t a i li n t o t h e s e a s p e c t s o f t h e p o s i t i o n . ! 1 .


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(d) Faulty Workmanship).48 . Fa ul ty wo rkm ans hip , however, , wh ich mu st be considered tog ether w ithfaulty mater ials and inadequate inspection, represents a t rouble involving anum ber of dif ferent causes an d respon sibi l i t ies. Th is has already been ma de clearby the i l lus t ra t ion considered in pa rag rap hs 23-29. I t should a lso be noted t ha tthis matter is c losely connected with design, and that i f a designer is set taskswhich requi re s tandards of accuracy and qua l i ty in workmanship which cannotreasonably be expe cted from m an ufa ctu rers w orkin g w ith di lute d staffs in wa rcondit ions, i t is not fair to p ut al l the blame on the lat ter . The story of B ri t is hcruiser tanks and their armament seems to just ify the comment that , beforeblaming the Bri t ish workmanship, designers should devote more thought to thetas k of ,evolving simple and robu st designs. The rel iab il i ty of the Ch urchil l asnow evolved, as well as of the Valentine, seems to show that it can be done.49 . For the reasons given in the preceding paragraph we cannot acceptwithout qualif icat ion the statement made to us in evidence by the General Staffthat poor quali ty in the actual processes of manufacture has been a greater cause

of t rouble th an any faults of design or vacil la t ions in the prog ramm e. Sucha statem ent is an over-simplification in the app ort io nm ent of blame. Nevertheless, we are sat isf ied that faulty workmanship, par t icular ly in the products ofcer tain f irms, has been a substantial factor in the past , and we at tach greatimportance to the conclusions on this matter which we have stated inpa ra gr ap hs 22 to 36. W e wis h to emph asise most strong ly our view th at there iss t i l l an urgent need for improvement in s tandards of mater ia l , workmanship andinspection. W e consider th at dr as t ic act ion should be taken in special ly badoases of carelessness in manufacture, and we trust that special a t tention wil l begiven to our recommendations covering these matters.

(3) Lack of Urgency about the Tank Programm e.50 . There is one fur ther general considerat ion to which we feel bound tocall a t ten tion . W e cannot avoid the impression that , ow ing to the av ailabil i tyof large supplies of American tanks, which were regarded by the General Staffan d the fighting troo ps as sati sfac tory , th ere has , as a m att er of gene ral policy,been some we ak eni ng of urg enc y an d d r ive behind the whole of the B ri t is hprog ram me . Th is is not easi ly demonstrab le by specific examp les, bu t is ratheran impression of general a tmosphere which appears to have been fel t throughoutth e ind ustr y. A s one specific i l lustra t ion , we have ha d evidence th at in the ma tterof pr ior i t ies as regards labourpar t icular ly in the case of sub-cont rac torsthose responsible for the Meteor engine programme have at t imes sufferedappreciable delays.(4) General Observations.

51. At the beginning of this Memorandum we referred to the prevalence ofunfavo urable comment upon B r i t i sh tanks . Al thou gh this i s not a mat te r ofexpenditure, we cannot close without expressing our ser ious concern about thisaspect of the pos ition . I t is not too mu ch to say th at the re is a w ide sp rea d feelingof depression about the si tu at io n. Th is is not an examp le of norm al Bri t ishgrumbling or of complaints confined to the type of men who are natural ly incl inedto discon tent an d defeat ism. I t is impossible to probe anyw here, even amongtroo ps of th e hi gh es t mo rale an d fighting qu ality, w ith ou t finding it . In ourview, this is a very ser ious m att er an d urg en t con siderat ion should be given todevising means for deal ing with i t . I t is not easy to make posi t ive recomm endation s as to w h at sho uld be done. Th e only really effective remedy would be theactual production of a Bri t ish tank which proves i ts rel iabil i ty and f ighting valuein action, and much will depend on the qualities shown by the first batches of the1944 Cromw ell tan ks . B ut there are many things which clear ly should no t bedone. Some of these are ap pa re nt f rom wh at has alread y been said. In t hisconnec t ion a par t icular ly impor tant fac tor i s the t ra ining a t the A.F.V. Schoolat Lulworth, s ince a great many off icers and other ranks pass through courses here.We have already commented on the bad effect of training pupils at the School onequ ipm ent which they know to be faulty or incomplete . W e consider th at thesem atte rs req uire special a t tention .


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Recommendations.(1 ) TH E IMMEDI ATE EMERGENCY.

5 2 . As a preliminary to our general recommendations, we wish to representone mat ter of immediate urgency. At this critical moment when Brit ish troopsare about to be sent into action for the first time with Cromwell tanks thereshould be a concentration of every available resource so as to ensure that, so faras concerns quality of material and workmanship, nothing is left to chance.Requirements in respect of these first issues of Cromwell tanks should havesuper-priori ty and be subjected to specially rigid inspection. I t seems to us tobe of supreme importance that when the Cromwell tanks are first tested in battlethey should not fail in reliability. If they do fail, then, after the unfor tuna teexperiences of the past , it must be very doubtful wdiether the Bri tish cruiser tankwill ever be able to regain the confidence of the troops.

(2) GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS.5 3 . We put forward the following general recommendations :

Organisation and Responsibility.(A) The responsibility for obtaining production of technical instruments ofwar , such as tanks, should rest with the Wa r Office. The transfer of responsibili tyto the enormous organisation of the Ministry of Supply has revealed most seriousdisadvantages. These disadvantages have not been confined to tanks, but havebeen evident throughout the whole field of technical stores.(B) Pending the full implementation of the change recommended in (A),every possible step should be taken to create a close partnership in responsibilitybetween the three main agenciesthe War Office, the Ministry of Supply and themanufacturers, and to give the dominating position in this partnership to theWar Office, seeing that it is they who are chiefly concerned with the practicalresults and who ought to be directly conscious of thei r urgency. I t is not easy todevise the best method for achieving this purpose, but we put forward the following suggestions as indicating the kind of changes which in our view arenecessary :(i) The Tank Board should be made a more effective executive instrumentand should be so constituted as to recognise that i t is for the Wa r Office

' ' to call the tune.''At present the Board appears to have drifted into the position ofa body for recording decisions reached by discussions at lower levels.There are too many separate pockets of responsibility in regard totanks, their guns, their other equipment, and the whole range of S.P .mountings. The Tank Board should be made more effective in pull ingthese things together.The Tank Board should be as small in numbers as possible.The Chairman of the Tank Board should be a War Office representative, and on the War Office side there must always be adequaterepresentation of recent tank-fighting experience.On the Ministry of Supply side, the C.A.F.V., or the D .G .A .F .V . ,as " managing director," for organising the production of tanks andtheir equipment, should be given full responsibility for taking the stepsnecessary to give effect in terms of production to the decisions of theTank Board.We still consider that, as formerly recommended, there would beadvantages in having the D .G . of A. as a member of the Tank Board.(ii) The representatives of a few selected industrial firms should be broughtin to all discussions from the very first moment when a new idea ismooted. The manufacturing responsibi lity has now, after four and ahalf years' war experience, been sorted out, and according to ourreading of the position, it would be sufficient for the purposes of thisrecommendation to include representatives of three firmsVauxhall,Leylands and Vickers. Thei r representatives need not be members ofthe Tank Board, but they should normally attend all its meetings. Nodesign work should be entrusted to D.T.D. without simultaneousconsultation with the industrial representatives.


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( i i i ) When it is decided that a new type of tank is to be developed and putinto prod uction , the respon sibi l i ty for paren tage ( inclu ding d esign,co-ordination of production and future development) should f rom theoutset be given to a manufacturing organisation of proved efficiencywith an ade qu ate team of engine ers. The functions of the C.A.F.V .( through D.T.D. or otherwise) should thereaf ter be to assist thep a r e n t 5 s des igning staff, ra ther than to work independent ly on anyfea ture .(C) The organisation on the War Office side requires in any case to be madem ore effective. Th e m ain objectives sho uld be

(i) To brin g abou t, in the case of A.F .V .S and S.P. mountings, a closer unityof the responsibilities forthe formula t ion of requi rements ;the conduct of tests and tr ia ls before designs are approved forp r o d u c t i o n ;the subsequent supervis ion of product ion programmes;al l matters concerning the handling of A.F.Vs. and S.P.

mount ings a f te r i ssue to uni t s , inc luding t ra ining.(ii) To ensu re th at officers wi th recen t op era tio na l exp erien ce are in contactwith al l s tages.We deliberately leave this recommendation in general terms; but , as oneins t rument towards a t ta ining the foregoing objec t ives , we have been impressedwith the value of suggest ions that have been put before us by var ious witnessesfor the formation of a comprehensive Ta nk Cen tre . Such a Ce ntre would beorg anis ed so as to ens ure adeq ua te faci l i t ies for comprehensive tests , cover inggunn ery, dr iving, main tenance , wire less equipm ent , &c. W e are s t ronglyimpressed wi th the disadvantages under the present sys tem ar is ing f rom thesp li t t in g up and duplic at ion of var io us tests . The reg ula r provision of an

adequte supply of prototypes and of the latest production models to the CentralTank School would be an important feature in any such arrangements (seep a r a g r a p h 5 1 ) .Workmanship and Inspection.

(D).-(i) Every possible step on the lines indicated in paragraphs 23-29should be taken to ensu re f irst-class st an da rd s in ma ter ials , wo rkm ans hip andinspe ction (both by I .F .V . an d by m an uf act ur ers themselves) in ta nk produ ction.The inspecting staff a t I .F.V. should be drast ical ly overhauled, and members ofthe staff with insufficient experience should be replaced by men with the necessaryexperience who are at present ei ther in industry or in the armed forces.( i i ) I f manufacturers ' inspection standards can be improved by baking menoff prod ucti on , then th is should be done, It w ill be justifiable to face somesacrifice in qu an tity , if th at is necessary , in ord er to en su re first-class qua lity.(This applies to manufacturers of components as well as to the main assemblyfirms.)Priorities.(E) The re should be no doubt abou t adeq uate p r ior i ty for every thing th at isinvolved in the agreed tan k prog ram me. Th is applies pa r t i cu la r ly to requirements for the Meteor engine programme which is the key to the whole Bri t ishcruiser hank programme.Links with Fighting Experience.

(F) Co nstan t at te nti on should be given to imp rovin g and simplifying theproc edu re for intro du cin g minor modif icat ions proved necessary by f ightingexper ience .54. The foregoing recomm endations are not intende d to be exh aust iv e; bu tas to the urgent importance of the object ives to which al l of them are directedwe are in no doubt . Unles s determ ined step s are now taken for impro ving theorg an isat ion for Tan k Development and Pro du ctio n, results l ike those of the pa stmust be expected to recur with the consequence that money and war resourceswil l con tinue to be was ted. Beyond this there is the serious dan ger th at thecoun try wil l , a t the end of the war , f ind i tself w ithou t a pro perly func tionin g


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6. The Committee give great prominence to the delays which occurred inpro du cing the 75 mm. M.V . gun and p ar t ic ula r ly i ts m ou ntin g up to a state ofop era tio na l efficiency. It is tru e th at there were difficulties and dis ap po int m en ts.The normal precautions and tests were applied, but this is one of the oases whereweaknesses were revealed in Service use which did not show themselves duringacceptance tr ia ls . Th e gu n was app roved as a general staff requ irem ent inJa n u a ry 1943, i t began i ts tests in M arch a nd w as issued to the troops in October.The fau lts w hich thereaf te r became evident w ere corrected by Feb ruary 1944 andthe improved model is now in regular production.

F A U L T Y W O R K M A N S H I P A N D M A T E R I A L S .7. The Committee give a number of cases of faulty workmanship andmater ials and seem to have formed the impression that such faults are r ife .Whilst it could not be claimed that tanks are or could ever be entirely free fromthis source of t rouble, energetic steps have been taken by the Ministry of Supplyand by f irms progressively to t ighten up inspection arrangements so as to reducethese cases to a minimum.

O R G

british tank production report

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