british views in turkish national movement 1919-22
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British Views of the Turkish National Movement in Anatolia, 1919-22Author(s): A. L. MacFie
Source: Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Jul., 2002), pp. 27-46Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4284241Accessed: 16-03-2015 16:36 UTC
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British Views of the Turkish
National
Movement
in
Anatolia,
1919-22
A.L. MACFIE
British views of the
Turkish national
movement in Anatolia
differed
according
to the
point
of view
adopted.
Whereas British officials
on
the
spot, in Constantinople(Istanbul, occupied by the EntentePowers, Britain,
France
and
Italy,
following
the defeat
of the
Ottoman
Empire
in the First
WorldWar)and
Anatolia tended to view the movement as the
product
of a
conspiracy, organized by elements
within the
Ottoman
government,
in
particular
the
Ministry
of
War,
the
intelligence services, particularly
hose
operating
in
Europe,
Central Asia and the Middle
East,
tended to view
it
as
pa
t
of
an
international
conspiracy, organized by
outside forces
(CUP
in
exile,
German
right wing,
Bolshevik),
centred in Berlin
and
Moscow. This
discrepancywas never fully resolved, but as events developed in Anatolia,
in the period of Turkishnational
struggle,
the
view put
forward
by
the men
on the
spot gained
increasing acceptance.
The view expressed
by
most of
the British officials serving
in
Constantinople
and Anatolia
(General Milne,
Commander
of the
Army
of
the Black Sea, Admiral
Calthorpe,
British
High Commissioner
in
Constantinople,
Admiral de
Robeck,
also a British
High Commissioner,
Commander
Heathcote-Smith, RNVR, Captain Hurst,
an officer
in
the
LevantConsular Service, Captain Perring, a relief officer, and many others)
found its
clearest expression
in
a
History
of the
National Movement, printed
by
the
War Office in
the
autumn of
1919. Until the end of May, the History
of the National
Movement
noted,
all the Turkish
corps commanders
continued
to
dispatch
armaments to
Constantinople,
as
they
were
required
to do
by
the Armistice of Mudros
(30
October
1918).
But the
occupation
of
south-western Anatolia
by
the
Italians,
in
March
1919,
and the
occupation
of
Smyrna (Izmir) by
the Greeks
in
May entirely changed
the
situation. By
the end of May the countrywas flooded with accounts of what had occurred.
These accounts, which
'naturally'were exaggerated, came as a great shock
to the
Turks,
and
had a
unifying
effect on the various
factions into which the
country
at that time was
divided.
Middle
Eastern
Studies, Vol.38,
No.3, July 2002, pp.27-46
PUBLISHED
BY
FRANK
CASS, LONDON
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28
MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
About that
time
-
so the
History
continues
-
the surrender
of
armaments
from
central and eastern Anatolia ceased.
During
June
the
creation of two
different
organizations
was
reported:
a) The first was an unofficial
organization,kept
very secret,
and headed
by
Raouf Bey, a
sailor,
lately
Minister of Marine. This
organization
was
engaged
in
sending
men and
money
into the area near
Smyrna.
b)
The second
organization
was
the creation of General Shevket
Turgut
Pasha,Ministerof War, n
consultation
with
the Minister of the Interior.
He
mapped
out Asia
Minor into
Northern and
Southern
Inspectorates,
and
allotted to
each
a
distinguished
General Staff. The first two
appointmentswere General MustafaKemal to the NorthernInspectorate
and General 'Kutchuk'
Djemal
to the Southern
Inspectorate.
So far as
one can ascertainthis official
organization
at its
inception
seems to have
been
intended
to
ensure
the
peace
of TurkishAnatolia
during
a
period
of
intense strain.
Unfortunately
the method
adopted by Mustafa Kemal had the
opposite
effect. He
and
his
officers did
everything
in their
power
to stir
up
the
people,
by condemning the action of the Allies with regardto the events occurring
in
the
Smyrna
district. This
agitation
became
so serious that it
was
necessary
to
order the return of Mustafa
Kemal to
Constantinople,but he
refused
to
obey. Instead,
early
in
July
he
went to
Erzerum,
and about
the
same
time was
joined
there
by
Raouf
Bey
from
Aydin.
The first
step taken
was
the
summoning
of the
Congress of
Erzerum,with
delegates
from
what
were known
as the six
eastern provinces. This
was the
first important
meeting
at
which
the
nationalist programme
was
discussed. There
appeared
to
have been a
good deal of
disagreement at the
congress, but in
the end
a
declarationwas agreedon. The underlying principle of the declarationwas
the 'defence of
national
rights'.
As
a
result
of
the
defeat of the Ottoman
army
by
the
British
forces the
leaders
of
the
movement were
preparedto
accept
the
loss of
Mesopotamia, Arabia,Palestine and
Syria,
but they were
determined
to
defend,
if
need be
by force,
the
remainderof
Turkey, which
'representedthe home of the
race'. On
no account
would they accept
the
division
of
parts
of
Anatolia
between the
Greeks and
Armenians.Nor would
they accept
the
granting
of
any
form of
mandate,which would
'result in
the
Ottoman Empire losing its independence to the Powers'. The 'real'
programme
of
the
nationalists
was,
therefore, the report
concluded:
a)
To
organize
the
villages
as
best
they could
without taking
men from
their
homes;
b)
To
maintain
complete order in
Anatolia, and to
refrain from
any
aggression across the
pre-war
frontier;
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BRITISH
VIEWS
OF
TURKISH
NATIONAL
MOVEMENT
29
c)
To
get
rid of the
government
of
Ferid
Pasha,
and
to
substitute
a
government which
would
furnish
a
delegation
to the Peace
Conference
capable
of
making
a
dignified
protest upon
the basis of
President
Woodrow Wilson's 14
Points;
d)
To avoid
any
immediate clash with the
Allies,
and
reserve
to their
party
such powers of
compromise,
as
would put them
in
a
position
of
being
at
once the saviour of
their
country,
and able to come
to
a
settlement with
the Entente.
Following this
programme,Mustafa Kemal and
his
associates
continued
to
organize
the
country.
As a
preliminarystep
to
the overthrow
of
Damad
Ferid
Pasha, they summoned a congress at Sivas. The Sivas Congress differed
from the Erzerum
Congress
in
that its
delegates
came from
the whole of
Turkey. It was at the
Sivas
Congress
that the
delegates decided on the
seizure
of
the
telegraph offices in
Anatolia,
therebysecuringthe isolation of
the
government
in
Constantinople.
A
second
account, dispatched on 30
June 1919, from
General Milne,
Commanderof the
Army
of
the Black
Sea,
to
Admiral
Calthorpe,
he British
High
Commissioner, may also
be taken
as representative of
the views
frequently expressed at the time by the men on the spot. In his account,
Milne
informed
Calthorpethathe hadjust
received a series of
reportsfrom
the
interior
suggesting that a 'serious
movement' was
developing
in the
districts of Sivas
and
Konia,
and that armed bands
were
being
assembled
there. This
movement,
which
had,
it was
reported,
been set
up by Mustafa
Kemal
Pasha at
Sivas, and
Djemal Pasha at
Konia, aimed at
'action
independent
of the Ottoman
Government'.
A
third
account, entitled
History of
the Movement,
composed by
CommanderHeathcote-Smith, and dispatched to London on or about 24
July
1919, may
also be
taken as
typical.
In
his
reportHeathcote-Smith races
the
events
leading
up
to
the
declarations, ssued on 8
July
1919
by
Mustafa
Kemal
(on
the occasion of
his resignationfrom
the
army), and on 9 July by
Raouf
Bey, ex-Minister
of
Marine. In
recent months,
Heathcote-Smith
reports, members
of the CUP,
left at liberty in
Anatolia, had
made much
propaganda, promoting
the
idea that
President
Wilson's
14
Points
guaranteed
the
territorial
integrity
of
Turkey.
But
hampered
by their
'inveterateinstinct for intrigue' they had made little headway. Then came
the Greek
occupation
of
Smyrna
(15 May
1919)
and
the 'Greek
bungling'
that
accompanied
it. From
that
date
the
resistance movement
began
to
thrive,
and
the national
defence
organization,
set
up by
Mustafa Kemal
and
his
colleagues, became
'practically Turkey'. The
organization,
Heathcote-
Smith
was
informed,
was backed
by
the
Ottoman
government,
or at
least
elements within
it.
Members of a
congress, shortly to be
assembled
in
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30 MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
Erzerum,
would act as
political
advisors to the movement. Methods to
be
employed
would include the threat of
massacre.'
The view frequently expressed
by
the
various
intelligence agencies,
on
the
other
hand,
found its clearest
expression
in three
reports
on the Causes
of Unrest
in
Mesopotamia,
drawn
up by
the India Office and the War
Office
in
the
autumn
of
1920.2
According
to
Major
N.N.E.
Bray,
a
special
intelligence officer,
attached to the Political
Department,
India
Office,
and
author of two of the
reports,
the Turkish national
movement,
like
other
national movements
active
in
the area
(Arab, Syrian, Mesopotamian)
was
merely a 'compliment
of a far
wider
conspiracy', organized
in Berlin
and
Moscow.
The aims of that
conspiracy
were:
a) By every possible
means to discredit the
Entente;
b)
To
organize
national forces
in Anatolia and
Thrace,
if
possible
with the
assistance of men and
money
from the Bolsheviks
and
Berlin;
c)
To
prepare
rebellion on a
large
scale in
Syria
and
Mesopotamia;
d)
To
organize
all
the
parties
concerned so as to
produce
a simultaneous
action.
These plans could not be carried out until arrangementshad been made for
the
organization
of the national
elements
in
Turkey,Syria and
Mesopotamia,
the alliance of the
pan-Arab movement with the Turkish
national
movement,
the
co-operation of the tribes and the unification of the
whole on
a
pan-Islamist
basis.
When unification was
completed and all the plans were
ready,
a
signal would be given and a simultaneous action
undertaken.This
action
would,
it was
hoped,
be of so widespread a nature as to force the
withdrawalof the Entente
Powers from the Middle East, and possibly
even
from Asia.
Much
evidence was adduced by the British intelligence
services in
support
of
the contention
that the Turkishnational movement was
part of a
wide-ranging conspiracy,aimed at the expulsion of the British and
French
from
the Middle
East.
In
November 1919,
so
it was reported, a
'very
important' meeting was held at Montreux, presided over by Talaat
Pasha,
the
Committee of
Union and
Progress (CUP) leader and former
Ottoman
Grand Vizier.
At this
meeting, which was also attended by Amir Shakib
Arslan, a 'delegate of the Damascus extremists' and representative of
Feisal,
the
leader of the
Arab national forces in Syria, proposals were
discussed for the
formation of
a defensive alliance between the
Syrian
nationalists, the Turkish
nationalists and the Arab sheikhs of
Arabia. The
Arab
sheikhs,
in
particular,might be united under the leadership of
Emir
Husein, Feisal's father, the
so-called 'King of the Hedjaz'. In
December, at
a
similar
meeting,
held
at St Moritz, again attendedby Amir Shakib
Arslan
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BRITISH
VIEWS OF
TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT 31
(who had
it seems in
the meantimebeen instructed
by
Feisal
to agree to the
proposals
put forward by Talaat
at
Montreux),
a
proposal
-
so
it was
reported
-
was
discussed
for the
formation
of an
alliance between Enver
Pasha, the exiled CUP
leader
and
Ottoman Minister of War
in
the First
World
War, Mustafa Kemal,
the Arab
sheikhs and the Bolsheviks. At the
meeting,
Amir
Shakib Arslan was instructed to
go
to
Moscow,
to make
contact
with the
Soviet
government;
but
in the
event
it
seems
he
did not do
so.
Rather he sent a letter to
Litvinoff,
the
Soviet
representative
in
Copenhagen, asking
him to inform
Moscow
of
the conference
proposal.
In
the
meantime
letters
and
telegrams,dispatched
by
the
Ottoman Minister of
War and
other officials
in
Constantinople,
to Ottoman
army
commanders n
Anatolia, intercepted by British intelligence or otherwise obtained,
indicated that the Turkish nationalist
army
commanders
concerned,
in
particular he commander of the XIII
Army
Corps,
stationed at
Diarbekir,
were
being
instructed to make
contact with
leading
sheikhs
in
Syria
and
Mesopotamia,
and
where
possible promote
resistance to the
forces of the
Entente Powers
stationed there. Thus on 8 December
1919 it was
reported
that
the
Under-Secretary
of
War,
Constantinople,
had instructed the GOC
XIII
Army Corps, Diarbekir,
to
maintain contact with
the Arab sheikhs
in
Mesopotamia; and on 29 December that he had instructed the GOC XV
Army
Corps to instruct one
Ajaimi,
the
'Chief Sheikh of
Iraq', to keep
in
touch and
patiently await events. On 31
December
it
was
reported
that
Djevad,
Chief
of
the Ottoman General
Staff,
and
Djemal,
Minister of
War,
had
orderedthat contact be
maintainedwith Ibn
Saud,
the ruler of
Nejd,
and
Sheikh
Rashid, the ruler of
Ha'il;
and
on 21
February
1920 that various
Arab tribes had made it clear
that
they
were
ready
to take
action as soon as
they
received orders.
Otherreportsreceived about this time appeared o confirmthe existence
of
a
wide-ranging conspiracy. In
November
1919
MI
ic
reported that
the
Turkish
nationalists
intended to
convene a
pan-Islamicconference at
Sivas,
and
that
delegations were
expected
to
attend from
Azerbaijan,
Kurdistan,
Arabia, Persia and
Afghanistan. Efforts
were
also being made to
make
contact
with
pan-Islamic
elements
in
the
neighbourhood
of
Kashgar.3
n
December the
Director of
Military
Intelligence,
Constantinople,dispatched
a
copy
of a
report,
drawn
up by
Major Hay,
on
Possible Relations between
the Nationalist Leaders in Anatolia and Agents of the Soviet Government,
based
in
the Ottoman
capital.
Soviet
agents based
in
the
Ottoman
capital
had,
it was
believed, made
contact with
the Turkish
nationalists in
September;
and in
October
they
had
dispatched an
emissary (actually
a
British
agent),
supposedly
a
member of the 'Council of the
Representatives
of
the Russian
Socialist
Federative
Soviet Republic in
Constantinople', to
the
interior.4
n
January
1920
it
was
reported
hat a
pan-Islamic organization
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32
MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
in Constantinople had received
funds from
Germany
and
Switzerland; and
that
the Ottoman
Minister
of
War was
engaged
in
the
direction
of
pan-
Islamic intrigue
in
India,
Afghanistan,
Azerbaijan
and Arabia.'
In
July
1920
it was reported that Bolshevik influence was
becoming
increasingly
apparent
in
nationalist
circles;6
and in
August
that
Mustafa Kemal
had
arrived
at
an understanding
with Feisal.7
Particularattention was
paid
by
the British
intelligence
services to
the
activities of
secret societies
operating
in
the
Near
and Middle
East,
in
particular
al-Nadi-al-Arabi,
an
extreme
pan-Islamic
society
set
up
in
Damascus,
al-Ahd,
a secret
society,
set
up by
ex-Ottoman
Army
Arab
officers and
others,
in
Mesopotamia,
and
Mouvahiddin,
a
pan-Islamic
society, set up in Sivas in November 1919.8 These secret societies, British
intelligence
concluded, were directly linked with
Constantinople
and
Switzerland,
and
from
there
with
the
German
Foreign
Office
in
Berlin.
They
were, it was
believed, generally formed for some
specific
political purpose,
to tap
a
'new source of
activity' (Islam)
in
the
struggle
with
the
Western
imperialpowers.9
Mouvahiddin,
in
particular,
had been
set
up
by
the CUP
and Turkish
nationalists, with
the
object
of
'enlisting
the
support
and
co-
ordinating
the efforts of all
anti-foreign
and disaffected
elements
in
Islamic
countries'.'?Acting in conjunctionwith the Bolsheviks, they were capable
of
causing
much
trouble,
more
particularly f,
as
appeared
ikely, they
were
'able
to
dispose
of
the
large
funds
in
the
possession
of
the CUP'.
In the
second
of the three reports on
the
Causes
of
Unrest in
Mesopotamia, Bray
described
in
some detail
the
part played
in
the anti-
imperialist movement
by
Moscow and Berlin. Soviet
efforts to
create world
unrest,
Bray
declared,
were 'ceaseless and
effective'
l
Opportunism as
regards means was
absolute,
and it
did not
exclude an 'alliance
with
opposites'.'3Lenin andhis Commissariatof Military Affairs were aiming to
'bring
the whole
world
under
the
communist
system',
and
secure the
downfall of the
British
Empire
in
Asia.'4
Their main
centre
of
endeavour
was the
Middle East where
they
were
busy
undermining
stable
government,
organizing secret societies
and
spreading
revolutionary
propaganda. In
Anatolia,
in
particular, hey
were
hoping
to
have
Mustafa
Kemal replaced
by
Enver,
and
a
Soviet
regime established.
German
reactionaries were
similarly seeking
to
create
unrest and
revolution in the Middle East. To this end they were 'undoubtedly'
providing Enver,
and
possibly
also
Mustafa Kemal,
with capable German
officers. In
December 1919
Enver, it
was
reported, had been in Berlin,
working
hard to establish
an
alliance
between
the Germans and the
Bolsheviks,
and
unify
the
Arab, TurkishandEgyptian
national
movements.
About the
same time a
number of
CUP,
nationalistand
pan-Arab leaders
(Talaat,
Shakib
Arslan,
Fuad
Selim, Nedjmeddin
Molla) had
come together
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BRITISH VIEWS
OF TURKISH
NATIONAL MOVEMENT 33
to
discuss the possibility; and
shortly
thereafter
Enver,
with German
and
Bolshevik support,
had formed an Asiatic Islamic
Federation hroughwhose
medium all the various movements and
societies would
be
co-ordinated.
Enver and Talaatwould provide substantial unds, fromCUP accounts held
in Berlin.
Large scale
operations,
from
Mesopotamia
to
India, might
be
expected
to
begin
in the autumnof
1920.'5
Not that the Turkish nationalists
in
Anatolia
were
necessarily
entirely
committed to
the Bolshevik
cause.
Opinion
in
Anatolia, according
to
various accounts,
was divided on the
issue.
A
numberof armycommanders
were sceptical. But
Bolshevik propaganda
was
rampant,
and
several
towns
had
highly
organized revolutionary organizations.
In
the Grand
National
Assembly 105 members were committed to the Bolshevik programmeand
direct
contact
had been made
with
the Bolsheviks
by way
of
Nakhichevan.'6
Further
supportfor the
view
that the Turkishnational
movement should
be
seen as part of
a
world-wide
conspiracy,
aimed at the
destruction of the
British
Empire
in
Asia,
was
provided
by
Commander
Luke,
a
political
officer,
attachedto the Commander-in-Chiefof the British
fleet,
stationed
n
Constantinople, and Andrew
Ryan,
a member of the
British
High
Commission staff.
In
a
report
on the Effects of Bolshevism
on the British
Empire, composed in December 1919, Commander Luke argued that in
order to inflict
injury
on the British
Empire,
the Bolsheviks were
prepared
to
disavow their own
principles
and seek
allies in
their
struggle
in all
parts
of the Muslim
world, including
Turkey,Transcaucasia,Persia,
Afghanistan,
India,
Arabia and
Egypt. Skilfully making
use of
every
circumstance
lending
itself
to
misinterpretation
or
distortion, they
had
succeeded in
making large numbers
of
Muslims
throughout the Near and Middle East
honestly
believe
that Great Britain was the
enemy
of
Islam. The dispatchof
a Greek Army of Occupation to the Muslim province of Aydin, with its
'deplorable' results,
had been a
useful and
much
used
argument.
The
delay
in
concluding
peace, resulting
in
the
rise
of
the nationalmovement and
the
resurrection
of
the
CUP,
had provided
'valuable
allies',
or more
correctly
'tools'. Another successful
argument
used had been the
'injudicious'
policy
of Britain's
ally,
Denikin,
towards
Muslim
Daghistan
and
Azerbaijan.'7
Very skilfully,
Luke
continued,
the Bolsheviks were
contriving
to turn
the
'somewhat
vague and unframed'
aims
of
the
pan-Islamic
movement,
such as it was, into anti-British channels; while Mustafa Kemal was
reported
to be
summoning
a
pan-Islamic conference
in
Sivas, attended
by
delegations
from
Persia,
India and
Afghanistan.'
Andrew
Ryan,
in
a memorandum
attached
to
the above
report,expressed
more
or
less
complete agreement with
Luke.
The
principal object of the
Bolsheviks,
he
wrote,
was to
wield
all
Muslims into
one
whole,
to be used
as an
instrument
against
the
West,
especially
the British.
Constantinople
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34
MIDDLE
EASTERN
STUDIES
was the natural
pivot
of this movement
on the
Muslim side.
How
far all
the
converging activities
had
a common
instigation
in
Germany
remained
in
doubt; but therewas
no doubt that Constantinople
andTurkey
were now
the
'creatures'
and
'instruments' of the CUP
and the nationalists. While some
of the forces
in
play,
such
as
Bolshevism,
an
essentially
anarchical
movement,
might
exhaust
themselves
or be
crushed, others,
such as
Islam,
especially dangerous
for the
British, might
continue
to
grow.'9
The view
put forward by
the
British
intelligence
services,
that the
Turkish national movement
was part of an
international conspiracy,
organized
in Berlin and
Moscow,
found
support
n
the
assumption,
held
by
virtually all of the British officials
involved,
at least
in
the early stages,
that
the national movement was organized by the CUP, in particularthe CUP
leaders
in
exile.
In
a note
on Local
Opposition
to Mustafa Kemal Pasha,
written
in
October 1919,
a British naval intelligence
officer remarkedthat
the national movement
was
merely
a 'recrudescence of the Committee
of
Union
and
Progress', presented
under a
'new,
high sounding
name'.
In
a
report presented
to de Robeck
in
the same
month, Captain
Perring,
the
British
representative
in
Samsun,
remarked
that in his view the
whole
national movement originated
with
Enver,
whose
presence
in the Caucasus
was not to be doubted.2' In a petition presented to the British High
Commissioner
by
the notables of
27
villages
in the
Bozgir region,
it was
asserted
that the national
forces
in
the area had been set
up by
the
Union and
Progress
Committee.22
n November Captain Hadkinson,
who had just
completed
a two-month tour of
the
province
of Bursa, reported hat
n
recent
weeks
the
western national
movement, which originated with
the Greek
occupation
of
Smyrna,
had now amalgamated
with Mustafa Kemal's eastern
movement
and Ali Fuad's central movement. The movement was spreading
all over
the
country, though
not
as fast as the ringleadershad expected.
Having
had
the
opportunity
of
watching
the
proceedings
of the
late
congress,
held at
Balikessir,
he, Hadkinson,was more than ever
convinced
that the CUP
was
'at
the
bottom of all
this national
movement', whatever
may be said to the contrary.23
s de Robeck remarked,
n a telegramto Lord
Curzon,
the
British
Foreign
Secretary,dispatchedin October:
Whether the
organizers
of the national movement can properly
be
called Committeemenor not is a question of labels. They may differ
from the Committee
to some extent in personality.
Indeed, they are
just
now at
pains
to
advertise
their
past differences with, and
present
horror
of, people
like
Enver and Talaat.They may differ
in minor
points
of
sentiment. They may differ even more in method.
Their
fundamental character
s, however,
the same. They want
Turkey for
the
Turks.
They
want
no
foreign
interference or
foreign protection.
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BRITISH
VIEWS OF TURKISH
NATIONAL MOVEMENT 35
Ottoman
Christiansare their cattle and
they
want to do with
their own
what they will.
They
want to
fight Europe,
and above
all, England,
with the weapons
of
pan-Islamism
and
pan-Turanianism.They aspire
to sign,
not the
death
warrant
of
the
Empire,
but a lease of new
life.24
Recognition of
the
importantpartplayed by
the CUP
in the
organization
of the
national movement
did not lead British officials to
ignore
the
part
played by
the
military,generally
seen
as decisive.
As
Calthorpe
remarked n
a letter
to Curzon
in
August 1919,
the
Congress
of Erzerum
appeared
o
be
dominated
by dashing
young soldiers,
who are
willing
'to stake
everything
on a
gambler's throw'.25
And as
Captain Perring
remarked n a note on
the
Nationalist Movement in the Samsun Area, where the CentralGovernment
pinned
its
hopes
on the
goodwill
of
the Allies and the influence
of
the
'mass
of the
Muslin
world',
the
Military Party (most
of whom were
in
any
case
CUP) hoped
to
save
Turkey by
its
own activities:
'The Turks
were
excited.
They
had
been caught
napping
at
Smyrna.
There was
good
reason
for
believing
that an Armenian state was
to be
formed,
and
many
talked
of a
Greek
Pontus
state.
The
military
were
prepared
o
prevent
another
coup.'26
In
other words, as de Robeck remarked
n
a telegramto Curzondispatched
in December, the movement was not so much a 'national' as a 'military
political' organization.27
To
the British officials
on
the spot, Mustafa Kemal,
the
leader of the
Turkish national movement, remained for some time an enigma. He was
known
as
a leading member
of
the CUP (ordershad been issued
in
February
1919
for his
dismissal)
and
a
hero
of the
Gallipoli campaign, but otherwise
little was known
about
him.
According to GHQ Constantinople, which in
January
1921
compiled
a
character sketch of
Mustafa Kemal, based on
informationprovided by his former commanding officer, school and college
companions,
the nationalist
agent
in
Constantinopleand others, he had been
born in
humble circumstances
in Salonika, and educated at the military
college, Salonika, the
cadet school, Monastir, and the War College,
Constantinople.
At an
early age,
it
was said, he had become a passionate
nationalist.
After graduating from the General Staff College, as a Staff
Captain,
he
had been
posted
in
1905 to Syria, and in 1907 to the General
Staff,
Salonika. In
1913 he had
been appointed TurkishMilitary
Attache
at
Sofia, where he is said to have indulged in 'dissipation' and contracted
'venereal'. This had
imbued him with a 'contempt and disgust for life',
prohibited marriage and driven him to 'homosexual vice'. Careless of his
life
in
action, he had
deliberately disobeyed Liman von Sanders at Gallipoli,
and
quarrelled
with Enver.
In
the fighting he had 'lost an
eye'.28
Mustafa
Kemal's
quarrels with Enver
and the German commander had
induced the present Sultan
(then Prince Vahideddin)on the occasion of the
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36
MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
coronation
of Karl
of
Austria-Hungary
to invite Mustafa
Kemal
to
accompany
him to
Vienna,
with the
intentionof
using
him as
a
counterpoise
to
Enver and
the CUP.
It was
the
present
Sultan,
Vahideddin,
who had
sent
Mustafa
Kemal
to
Anatolia
in
May 1919,
with instructions
to thwart
Greek
aspirations
to a Pontus
republic.
In
spite
of the fact that Mustafa
Kemal
was
probably
a comparatively
wealthy
man there was no reason
to
suppose
that
he had
resorted
to dishonest
methods.
On the
contrary,
almost alone among
unionist
leaders,
he
had
never been accused
of
peculation.
Finally,
he
was
known as
a fluent speaker,
but he
was
probably
too
egotistical
to envisage
wider issues
and ultimate consequences.29
The discrepancy
between
the
two
explanations
offered
by
British
officials on the spot and the intelligence services was never fully resolved.
But as British Foreign
Office and
other comments
on
a secret
intelligence
report,
received
in
August 1920,
from a
'well educated
and
intelligent
Turkish
gentleman',
recently
returned
from
Ankara, show,
they eventually
concluded
that there
must
in fact be two
parties
atwork in
Anatolia,
one
that
of
Mustafa Kemal
and the nationalists
and the other
that of
Enver,
Talaat
and the CUP.3
As D.G.
Osborne,
a
Foreign
Office
official,
remarked:
This shows that there are two parties
in Anatolia and
not only one.
The
weaker
is that of
Mustafa Kemal
and the Nationalists,
who,
induced
by
patriotic and
religious
motives, have
been,
and are,
endeavouring
to resist the Peace
terms and
the resultant
dismemberment
of
Turkey
and the
reduction
of the prestige
of the
Ottoman Khalifate.
They
have failed:their adherents
are going over to
the
other and far more
dangerousparty,
that
of Enver and Talaat
and
the
CUP-Jew-German-Bolshevik
combination.
The latter
are not
concerned with the defence
of Turkey but
with
the Pan-Islamic
offensive
of Bolshevism throughout the
East, primarily
directed
against
Great Britain. The plans
for
this
offensive have
recently
been
discussed
at Baku. Enver andhis associates
have
sacrificedTurkey
to
the Bolshevik conception
of
Pan-Islam,have
accepted
the principles
of
Lenin
and are disseminating
them
by
means of the
Green
propagandist
Army.
Mustafa Kemal
on the
other hand has
rejected
Lenin's principlesand
is consequently
about to
be discarded
n favour
of Enver
and
Talaat.3
In his
report the
'well
educated and
intelligent
Turkish gentlemen',
recently
returnedfrom Ankara,
pointed
out
that opinion in
the nationalist
camp regarding
relations
with the Bolsheviks was
divided.
Where the
'Unionist'
wing,
led
by Eyub
Sabri,argued
that
in order to secure
effective
Bolshevik supportit was
necessary
to adopt the Bolshevik
system
with all
its
consequences,
the 'genuine'
nationalists
who were devoted
to
Mustafa
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BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH NATIONAL
MOVEMENT
37
Kemal argued that,
whilst Bolshevik
support might be accepted,
their
system
should not be introduced.
In
the national
assembly,
about 100
deputies
had been won over to the Bolshevik
cause,
and their
party,
which
was
in
a constant touch
with
Talaat
Pasha,
the
'principal
protagonist
of
Islamic Bolshevism
in
Europe',
was
steadily gaining strength. Recently
they
had
formed the Green
Army
organization,
'a vehicle for the
fulfilment
of
the
Soviet Government's
campaign
to arouse the
whole
Islamic
world
againstEurope
in
general and
Great
Britain
in
particular'.Supporters
of the
Green
Army argued
that
the principal
tenets of Islam
could
easily
be
reconciled with Bolshevik
doctrine.Differences between the Unionists
and
the
'genuine'
nationalists were
exacerbated
by
the
personal
rivalry
that
existed between Mustafa Kemal and Enver.32
In
an introductionto the above
report,
the
British
intelligence
service
in
Constantinople
concluded that the
development
of
Bolshevism
in
Anatolia
should
be
seen as
a
product,
not of
nationalist,
but of
Unionist
co-operation:
It is scarcely
open to doubt that the introduction of
Bolshevism into
Turkey, as the foremost of the
Eastern Muslim
countries, was
in
accordance with
the
plan
of
campaign formulated
by
the
Unionist
leaders, when the defeat of Germany ruined their former schemes.
The rise of the
Nationalist
movement in Turkey merely provided a
practical vehicle for the progress
of this later
Unionist programme,
which included the spread of
Bolshevism. The
Soviet Government
had directedits
attentionto the
possibilities of Islam as early as 1917.
But, in spite of
constant efforts, no
progress has been made, in Turkey
at
least. After the Armistice we
saw from
reports from Geneva, Rome
and
London,
the
development of Unionist
activities working
in
Germany, Switzerland, Italy and
Russia.
These
same Germans and
Turks who
had
been working togetherduring the
war again came to
notice
in
association, and as early
as February 1919 it became evident
that the Unionist
chiefs were
actively preparing a
Pan-Islamic
movement
in
connection with Bolshevism and with
the assistance of
the
very
efficient,
but
so far
unsuccessful, Germanorganizationwhich
had been
co-operating for five years against British
prestige in the
East. After the
Armistice, too, the
purely
Russian efforts of the
Bolsheviks
to
develop
Bolshevism as
an Eastern world movement
were assisted
by many Indians and other
Pan-Islamists, who had
gravitated to
Berlin
and Moscow on
the final
defeat
of
Turkey. As
soon as
the
Nationalist
movement underMustafa
Kemalshowed signs
of
reaching
serious
proportions, the
Unionist made an
immediate
attempt
to
gain control
of so
potentially powerful an
instrument.
In
spite, however,
of the
expenditure
of a
certain
amount
of
money,
the
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38
MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES
attempt
then
failed, partly owing
to
personal jealousies, as for
example
that between
Mustapha
Kemal and
Enver,
and
partly owing
to
the
Nationalist
dislike
of
the Jewish Free-Masonic
elements
dominating the Unionists. More oblique methods were then adopted
and advantagewas taken of the circumstance that
Mustapha Kemal,
having realised
the
impracticability
of
rousing
the Muslim
world
by
such
poor
instrumentsas the Mouvahiddin
Society
and
ordinary
Pan-
Islamic propaganda,
was
turning
n
despair
to the
Soviet Government.
The
reluctance to accept Bolshevism
in
principle may
be seen
from
the
little we know of the earlier
stages
of
Mustapha
Kemal's
dealings
with the Soviet
Government.
In
the
first
proposals
for an
agreement
t
was stipulated that the Nationalists should place no obstacle in the
way of Bolshevik propaganda
n
Anatolia,
but
only
in so far as
it was
not
in
conflict with
the tenets of Islam.
This
agreement
was
reported
to
have been concluded
in
the autumn of
1919 and it was
shortly
afterwardsthat
the
activities of Bolshevik
propagandists
n
Anatolia
were
first
reported.
It has
since become
evident that an
energetic
campaign
has been
in
progress
in Anatolia
assisted
in
some cases,
as
at Eski
Shehir, by
the
Nationalist authorities
but we cannot
be
sure,
and it still seems unlikely that Mustapha Kemal had any cordial
sympathy
with that
campaign.
It is to be observed that the National
Assembly has
never
officially declared
its
adherence to Bolshevism
and it has
never been
very
clear
by
what means or under what
auspices
the movement was
gaining ground.33
Thereafter
he
assumption
that
two
parties
existed in
Turkey,
a
Unionist
party
headed
by
Enver
and
Talaat,
and a
nationalist party,
headed
by
Mustafa
Kemal,
became a
regular
component
of British
reportson the issue.
In
a set
of
notes on Relations
between the Bolsheviks and
the Turkish
Nationalists,
drawn
up by
D.G.
Osborne, a Foreign Office official, in
November
1920, for instance, a clear
distinction was drawnbetween the two
parties. 4
And in
a War
Office
Report
on the Situation in
Mesopotamia,
drawn
up
about
the same
time,
it
was
pointed
out that
two militant parties
existed
in
Anatolia,
the
CUP led
by
Enver and
Talaat, which had decided to
throw
in its
lot with the
Bolsheviks,
and
the
nationalistparty, ed by Mustafa
Kemal, which,
while
anxious to secure Russian arms
and ammunition and
the recovery of the western provinces, had decided to oppose a Bolshevik
penetration
of
Anatolia.
In
dealing
with
the
Turks
it would be well to
remember that Mustafa Kemal and
Enver were rivals. Enver's influence
was
greatest
with
the Russians,
but
in
the West he was discredited. Any
arrangement made with
the
Turks
would have to be made with a
'representativegovernment', and
this would of necessity have to include
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BRITISH
VIEWS
OF
TURKISH NATIONAL MOVEMENT
39
both 'Old
Turks' and 'Young Turks'.
Any such 'representativegovernment'
would
require a leader and
it
seemed probable
that Mustafa Kemal would
emerge as the most suitable condidate.
His
recognition
should have the
effect of driving Enver and Djemal into obscurity.35
British
intelligence
in this
period
appeared
well
informed
about the
nature
of
the struggle taking place
between Mustafa Kemal and Enver.
According
to
a note
on
the
Soviet
Government's
Intrigues
with
Mustafa
Kemal and Enver
Pasha, composed
in
June
1922,
Enver
had
initially
been
prepared o co-operate with Mustafa Kemal. But Mustafa
Kemal,
driven
by
'indescribablemegalomania and
lust for
power',
had brusquelyrejected the
offer. As a result
Enver,
with Soviet
backing
-
the Soviets feared that
MustafaKemal would open the way to capitalistand imperialistintriguein
the area
-
had
attempted
to build
up
his
position
in
Anatolia, preparatory
o
a take-over
of
power.
To
this end he
had
attempted
to
win
over the Defence
of
Rights
associations
in
the
eastern
provinces,
the
labour
guilds (artisans,
porters,
lightermen)
and the
officer
corps
of a number of
regiments,
stationed
in
the area.
Mustafa Kemal had
then
taken
fright
and reached a
secret
agreement
with the
Bolsheviks, promising
them
support,
with the
result that the
Soviets had
taken
steps
to undermine Enver's
position,
leaving him thoroughly puzzled and unable to cope. Meanwhile Mustafa
Kemal
had taken steps to secure
his
hold on the Defence of
Rights
associations;
and he had had
Yahya Kahya,
the Unionist
strong
man in
Trabzon,
arrested,
and
untrustworthy
officers
posted
or
otherwise dealt
with.
It
was at this
point
that
Enver, discovering
the true nature and
extent
of Soviet
duplicity,
had decided to withdraw to
Turkestan and
join
the
Basmachi
insurgents.36
The
different
appreciations
of the
natureand
significance
of the
national
movement in Anatolia, offered by British officials and the intelligence
services were
not
merely
of academic
interest,
for
it
can be
argued
that
they
implied
different
policy responses.
Policy responses
to
an
essentially locally
based national
movement, seeking
to achieve limited
aims and
objectives,
might
include Allied
support
for the sultan's
government
in
Constantinople
(the
policy adopted by
the Entente Powers
in
November 1918), the use of
the
Greek forces
in
western
Anatolia
to
bolster the
Allied position on the
Straits,
support
for
the sultan's efforts to
suppress
the national
movement
by
force (attempted in 1920), and when these efforts failed, as they did,
attempts
at conciliation and
the conclusion of a
negotiated
settlement,
satisfying
some
but
by
no means all of
the aims
of
the
national
movement,
as set out in
the National Pact of
January
1920
(the
policy
later
pursued).
Policy
responses
to
an
internationallyorganizednational
movement, aimed
at the
destruction
of
the British
Empire
in
Asia, might include the dispatch
of British forces to secure the defeat of the
movement
(neverattempted),
he
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40
MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
exploitation
of
the full potential
of the Greek expeditionary force,
stationed
in western
Anatolia (never
fully attempted),
he
expulsion
of the Turks
from
their capital
city (considered
by
the
Allies
in
December
1919
and
January
1920 but never
implemented),
vigorous support
for the minorities,
a
determination o
secure the
neutralisation
and demilitarisationof the
Straits
(secured
in
the
treaty
of Lausanne of 24 July 1923) and vigorous steps
to
secure the defeat
of the
forces
of
revolution
in other
parts
of the world,
in
particular
Russia and
Germany.
One of
the
strongest
cases
put
forward n favour of a policy
based on
the
assumption
that
the national
movement
was
essentially
a
locally
based
movement with
limited aims
and
objectives,
was
surprisingly
that
put
forward by CommanderLuke, in a note on the FuturePeace with Turkey,
composed
in March 1920.37
n his
paper
CommanderLuke
suggested that,
as the
policy
of suppression
so
far
pursued by
the Entente Powers
appeared
likely to
fail, they might now
consider
a
substantial
modification of the
proposed
peace treaty,
involving
the
possible
return
of
Izmir,
western
Thrace
and the so-called
Armenianprovinces
to
Turkish
rule. The
Entente
Powers
might then seek to rallier
the Turksby giving them
a
peace,
which,
while
conforming
to the principle
of
self-determination
and sufficiently
severe to satisfy the claims of justice, would not be vindictive:
The Turk, and
indeed, the
Muslim in general,
is
by
instinct opposed
to
the theory
of Bolshevism,
which is
wholly
incompatible
with
the
principles
of
Islam. Only necessity, as
he understands
it, will drive
him to this unnaturalalliance.
Cannot
the necessity be avoided?
I
submit
that it
is
worth avoiding, even
if
the avoiding
involves the non-
acquisition by Greece of
Smyrna
and Thrace and the reduction
of the
area to be ceded
by Turkey
to Armenia.
A
stolid conservative
people
such
as the Turks should
prove
a
valuable
buffer against the ferment
of Bolshevism
in
the
Middle
East.38
One
of the
strongest
cases
put
forward
n
favour
of
a
policy
based on the
assumption
that the national movement
was
essentially
part of
an
international
conspiracy,organized
in Berlin
and Moscow, and aimed
at the
destruction
of
the
British
Empire
in Asia, was that put forward
by the author
of
the War
Office
memorandum
on the Cause
of Unrest
in Mesopotamia,
composed, in October 1920.39At an importantmeeting of representativesof
the Third International
held at
the Foreign Office in Moscow,
the author
declared, Lenin,
the
Bolshevik
leader, had personallyexpounded
his design
for
attacking
British
imperialism
n the East, strikinghardest
at India,
where
the national movement was to be encouraged
and assisted.
A secret treaty
had then been signed between
Soviet Russia
and the Islamic
countries,
including the government
of Mustafa
Kemal;and the Bolshevik
advance
on
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BRITISH VIEWS OF TURKISH
NATIONAL MOVEMENT 41
Enzeli (on the
Caspian Sea),
the Arab outbreak
n
Mesopotamia,
the Turkish
advance on the Armenian
provinces,
and
the
Arab
uprising
in
Syria
had
followed. These
developments
indicated the
inception
of a
'generalstrategic
plan', directedostensibly from Moscow, againstFrance and England,more
particularly the latter. The Moscow Direction had
a
gap
in their
line
of
attack
against the British
Empire,
which
they
were
prepared
to fill with
a
combined movement of
Turks,Arabs,
and Kurds.
Enver,
it
may
be
assumed,
controlled the
'connecting
lever'.
This
he would
pull
as soon
as,
but
not
before,
British
policy
towards
Turkey
was
definitely
determined.
The sinister influence of
Moscow,
in other
words,
could be discovered
behind
every
form of
political
unrest
in
the Middle East. There could be
no
doubt what the British response should be:
As long as the
Moscow Direction survives to absorb into
its
organization,
thrive on and
exploit
agencies
of
local
discontent,
Nationalism will be the
instrumentof
Internationalism,and until the
International
Monster has been
starved,
or severed at the
neck,
its
various heads will
have to be dealt with
in
detail
when and where
they
arise.4
Paradoxically the War Office, which in the above memorandum at least
appeared
to
advocate a
vigorous
response
to the
problem
of
international
conspiracy, opposed
the
expulsion
of the
Sultan
from
Constantinople.
In
a
report
on the
StrategicPosition
on
the
Straits, composed
in
December
1919,
they
argued that,
if
the
sultan were
removed from his
capital the whole
military position
in
the area would be
altered to
Britain'sdisadvantage. In
peacetime she
would lose both
knowledge
of the
Sultan's plans and power
to
check his
preparations.The
powerful deterrentof
having the
sultan and
the whole of his government under her guns would have disappeared.If the
sultan
were
removed a
much
larger garrison
would
be required,
and
a
more
elaborate
system
of
defence, especially
on the
Asia Minor
side, where a
'veritable frontier'
with 'all
its disadvantages and
bickerings
and constant
aggravations',
would
have
to
be set
up.41
The
case for the
expulsion
of
the sultan
from
Constantinople was put
forward
most
effectively by Curzon.
In a
memorandum on
the Future of
Constantinople, presented
in
January 1920,
he
argued
that,
if
they had to
face, as he thoughtthey probablywould, a new formof Turkishnationalism,
founded on
either
religion
or
race,
and
exploiting
pan-Islamism or pan-
Turanism,would
it not be a
moreformidablefactor if
its 'rallying
point' and
'inspiration'
were
the
sultan at
Constantinoplerather han a
sultan at Bursa?
Would not the
retention of
the old
capital
give a prestige and an
impetus to
the
movement,
which
would add
immensely to its
potentiality
for harm. A
nationalist
party
in
Anatolia
under
Mustafa Kemal
may be a 'hard nut to
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42
MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
crack'. But a nationalist
party
with its
sovereign
in
Constantinople
would
be
a 'muchmore anxious
problem'.
Were the
sultan
to remain
in his
capital,
the
Turk
would be ideally placed to
'set the Powers
by
the
ears,
to
embroil
Governments and
nations,
and to inoculate the West with the worst vices
of
Eastern
intrigue'.42
Ryan
and Forbes Adam,
a
member
of the Eastern
Department
at
the
Foreign
Office, supported Curzon, emphasising
the
dangers
to
Britain
inherent in the
forces
of
pan-Islamism
and
pan-Turanism, orces, according
to Forbes
Adam, dependent
on the maintenance
of
the
prestige
of
Turkey,
a
thing
itself dependent
on the retention
of the
Sultan-Caliph
at
Constantinople.43
The problems caused to British policy makersby what they perceived,
rightly or
wrongly,
to be the existence of a divided
leadership
in
Anatolia
were for the most part resolved
in
the autumn of 1921
when, following
the
battle of Sakarya(August-September
1921),
Mustafa Kemal
emerged
as the
supreme leader of the
Turkish
people.
As
a
British
General
Staff
memorandum
on the Position in
Anatolia, composed
following
the
victory
put it:
There
is no doubt that the
prestige of Mustapha Kemal himself has
been
greatly
enhanced as a result of these
operations.
Formerly
in the
position
of a Prime Minister
answerable
to a
Government,
he now
appears to be almost
in
the
position of a Dictator. We
may, therefore,
assume that the
Moderate
Party
in
the
Angora Government s, for the
time
being, firmly
in
power,
and this
assumption,
if
correct,
would
seem
to
remove
any
immediate
danger
of
the return of
Enver
Pasha,
or of
a
military
alliance between the
nationalists and
Bolshevik
Russia, especially as the Nationalists
will
shortly
be no
longer wholly
dependent upon Russia for the supply of war material. At the same
time, Mustapha Kemal
is in
such
a strong military
position, that there
appears
to be no reason why he should
moderate his political
demands,
in
the
event
of
peace
negotiations being
re-opened.4
But
in
the
period following the battle of Sakarya
British concern
regarding
the
true nature of the Turkishnational
movement remained. As
Sir Horace
Rumbold,
who
replaced
de Robeck
as
British High
Commissioner in
Constantinople
in
November 1920, remarked, in a
telegram to Curzon, dispatched following the expulsion of the Greek
expeditionary
force from
Anatolia,
in
October 1922, it was
possible that for
the
Kemalists
the
realisation
of
the National
Pact, now
virtually assured,
was
merely
an
'immediate
objective', a 'first step':
It is
a
step at which they will
pause, and there will
not be the same
union
afterwards
regarding
a
completely revolutionary
policy at home
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BRITISH VIEWS OF
TURKISH
NATIONAL MOVEMENT
43
and a
policy
of
expansion abroad.
Many
of the
leaders and
the
majority
of
ordinary
Turks
will wish them to
preserve
traditional
institutions and 'cultivate their
garden'
in
peaceful
conditions. It
would, however, be
folly
to
forget
that others
among
the leaders
cherish
the
dream
of
reconstructing
the Turkish
Empire,
if
only
on
a
federal basis and
establishing Turkey
in
a
position
of
hegemony
in
a
grand Islamic combine. For
these Great Britain not
only
is but also
will
remain
the
enemy.
They
desire
nothing
less than the
collapse
of
our
position,
first
in
Mesopotamia,
then
in
the
East
generally.
The
real
vital
issue at the
Peace Conference
will
not be
any
of the
questions
enumerated
above, important
as
they
are
[Smyrna,
the
Straits,
Thrace,
the Caucasus,the capitulations],but whetherTurkeyis to be placed in
such a
position
as to enable these men to
dominate her
internally
and
so
carry
forward their
plan.45
Thus to the
end
of
the period of Turkish
national
struggle
the British
remaineduncertain how far the Turkish
nationalists
intended
to 'cultivate
their garden' in
Anatolia,
and how far
they intended to become
embroiled
in some
kind of great
pan-Islamist
conspiracy,
aimed at the destruction
of
the British
Empire
in
Asia.
Just
how far
the different views of the
Turkish national
movement, put
forward
by
British
officials, the
'men on
the
spot',
and the various
intelligence services,
actually
affected the
formulation of
British policy in
the
period
of Turkish
national
struggle
must remain
a subject for future
investigation.
It has
been the intention
of this
article merely to draw
attention
to
what may be considered
real or
apparentdifferences in
British
views of
the Turkish
national movement in
Anatolia, and to point to
some
of the
possible
consequences.
Incidentally,
in the
process,
much evidence
has been adduced, which would seem to supportthe view, put forwardby
E.J.
Zurcher and
others,
that the
national
movement,
in
its
early stages at
least, was
organized by elements within
the Ottoman
government,
in
particular
the
Ministry of
War; that CUP
leaders
in
exile, acting
in
conjunction
with German
right
wing
elements in
Berlin and
the Bolshevik
leadership
in
Moscow,
struggled
to gain,
or keep, control of
the
movement;
and that
Mustafa
Kemal
Pasha,
the
'man-on-the-spot'
in
Anatolia,
eventually
succeeded
in
undermining their
influence and
taking over
the
leadership of the movement. This he succeeded in doing because the
national
movement, as it
emerged,
particularly
following the
Allied
occupation
of
Constantinople
in
March
1920, was
despite all its
numerous
international
connections,
essentially a
'locally based'
movement,
seeking
for the
most
part
to
achieve
merely local
aims and
objectives.
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44
MIDDLE EASTERN
STUDIES
NOTES
1. British
Public Record Office, WO
32/5733
History
of the National Movement in Turkey,
Nov. 1919. See
also
FO 371/4158/105780
Milne to
Calthorpe,
Constantinople,
0 June
1919;
FO
406/41
No.126
de Robeck
to
Curzon,
10 Oct.
1919;
FO 371/4158/118411 Calthorpe o
Curzon,
30
July 1919,
enclosure;
FO 371/4158/96979
Calthorpe
o
Curzon,
21 June
1919,
enclosure; K. Bourne,
D.
Cameron
Watt
(eds.),
British Documents
on
Foreign
Affairs
(BDFA) (University
Publications of America), PartII, Series B, Vol.1, Doc.68,
enclosure.
The histories
and accounts
drawn
up by Milne, Calthorpe,
Heathcote-Smith
and
their
colleagues,
the
'men on the
spot', appear
n
retrospect
remarkably
ccurate.That is
because
they
were, for the most part,
based
on information
provided
by
British control
officers,
posted
to
strategic points
in Anatolia
(until
their arrest
or
expulsion
in
the
spring
of
1920),
membersof the Levant Consular
Service,
membersof the Ottoman
government,
oyal
to the
Sultan,
members
of the Greek Orthodox
church,
resident
in
Anatolia,
and
even members
of
the Turkishnationalmovement itself. Surprisingly he Historyof the National Movement
in
Turkey
makes no mention of
the
declaration,
ssued
by
the leadersof the
nationalmovement
at
Amasya
in
June
1919,
seen
by
some
as the
founding
document
of
the national
movement.
The
Congress
of Erzerumwas
organized,
not
by
Mustafa Kemal
Pasha,
but
by
the
Society
for
the Defence
of
the National
Rights
of the EasternProvinces.
2. FO
371/5230/E
12339 Mesopotamia,
PreliminaryReport
on Causes
of
Unrest, by Major
N.N.E. Bray,
14
Sept. 1920;
FO
371/5231/7765
Mesopotamia,
Causes
of Unrest
-
Report
No.2, by Major
N.N.E. Bray, Oct. 1920;
WO33/969 Causeof
the
Outbreak
n
Mesopotamia,
General
Staff,
War
Office,
Oct. 1920.
The materialused
by
the Political
Department,
ndia
Office,
and
the War
Office,
in
the above
reports,
was assembled from information
ent in
by
the various British
intelligence
services
in
Europe,
the
GOC, Army
of the Black
Sea,
Constantinople, British Military Intelligence, Cairo, the Arab Bureau, the GOC,
Mesopotamia,Embassy
and legation
staff throughoutEuropeand Asia,
Russian and other
government
publications
andbroadcasts,
and
German,French,
Italian,
Russian and Turkish
telegraph
and wireless
intercepts.
Turkish
elegraph
and
wireless
signals
were
interceptedby
Cable
and
Wireless,
from 1919.
They
were
decrypted,
where
necessary, by
the
Admiralty
(Room 40 OB)
and
by MI.
For an account of this work, see
Robin Denniston, Churchill
Secret
War
(Stroud: Sutton,
1997).
Evidence available elsewhere would suggest
that the information provided in the
above
reportswas,
with one or two
exceptions,
not referred o
in
this article,factually
correct.
But it
can be argued
that the interpretationplaced on the evidence
was to some
extent
misconceived.
For
an analysis
of this
aspect
of
the question,
see A.L. Macfie, 'British
Intelligence and the Causesof Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919-21', Middle EasternStudies,
Vol.35,
No.
1
(1999).
In their various
reports
the British recognizedthat Emir Feisal, though
apparently
duplicitous,
may have
been forcedby the extremists o 'acquiesce
in action distasteful
o him
personally'.
In
the
first
of
his
reports
on the
Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia,
Bray noted
that the Mouvahiddin
Society,
which had
representatives in Moscow, had
definitely
proclaimed
itself
pro-Bolshevik,
and that it had converted 105 members of the
Grand
National
Assembly
in Ankara
o
Bolshevik
principles.
Enver,
Talaatand Djemal Pashas,
who
fled
the Ottoman
Empire
in
the last days
of the First WorldWar, all remained
politically
active for some
years,
Enver
mainly
in Russia and Central Asia, Talaat in Germany
and
Djemal
in
Afghanistan.
3. B.N. $imrnired.), British Documents on Atatuirk BDA) (Ankara:Turk TarihKurumu,
1973-84),
Vol.
1, No.96,
enclosure.
4.
Ibid.,
No.101,
enclosures.
5.
Ibid.,No.112,
enclosure.
6.
Ibid.,Vol.2, No.73,
enclosure.
7.
Ibid.,No.96,
enclosure.
8.
Mesopotamia,
PreliminaryReport
on
Causes
of Unrest, pp.6-7.
9.
Ibid., p.6.
10. Ibid.
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BRITISH VIEWS OF
TURKISH NATIONAL
MOVEMENT
45
11.
E.L.
Woodward
and R. Butler
(eds.),
Documentson British
Foreign
Policy
(London:HMSO)
First Series, Vol.4, No.660.
12. Mesopotamia,
Causes of Unrest
-
Report No.2, p.3.
The War Office
report
concluded
that
the Soviet connection
with the
Arab
situation was
by way
of
the
channel
'Arslan-Talaat-Enver'.
13. Ibid.
14.
Ibid.,
p.4.
15. Ibid.,p.6. According
to
Mesopotamia,
Causes
of Unrest -
Report
No.2,
TalaatPasha
would
be
charged
with the direction
of the
revolutionary
movement in
Syria, Egypt
and
Arabia;
Djavid with the direction
in
Greece, Italy
and
France;
Enver
with the direction in
the
Caucasus, Djemal
with
the
direction
in
Afghanistan,
and Khalil
[sic]
with the direction
in
Persia.
16. Ibid.,
p.14.
In
August 1920
British
intelligence acquired
a
copy
of a
proclamation,
supposedly
issued
by
Mustafa
Kemal,
as 'President
of the Turkish
Republic'.
In
Bray's view
this
designation signified
a Turkish national
acceptance
of
Bolshevik
policy
and an
abandonmentof the Sultan as Caliph. It signified in other words the detachmentof the
national
movement from the body of Islam.
17. BDA,
Vol.l, No.109,
enclosure 1.
18. Ibid.
19.
Ibid., enclosure 2.
20.
BDFA,
Part
II,
Series
B,
Vol.
1,
Doc.96.
21. Ibid., Doc.69.
22. FO 406/41
No.186, 1,
de Robeck to
Curzon,
2
Dec.
1919.
23.
BDA,
Vol.1,No.86,
enclosure.
24.
FO 406/41
No.126,
de Robeck to
Curzon,
10 Oct. 1919.
25. BDFA, Part