1

Bully Pulpit or Bull in a China Shop? Climate Change and the UN Security Council

Ken Conca, Joe Thwaites, and Goueun Lee1

Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academic Council of the United Nations

System, New York, June 18, 2016 Introduction Concerns that climate change will affect international peace and security have gained traction in academic, activist, and policy circles, even as claims about climate impacts on conflict remain contested among scholars. The EU flagged climate change as a core strategic challenge in 2008 (Youngs 2014). In the US, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review identified climate change as a threat multiplier for political instability, resource competition, and food and water insecurity, and anticipates significant impacts on overseas military and humanitarian operations (US DOD 2014). Malaysia, which co-chaired an informal UN Security Council meeting on the issue in June 2015, has identified climate change as a “threat multiplier for Global Security” (Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations 2015).

Given such concerns, it is no surprise that the climate issue has emerged within the UN Security Council. Some member-states have seen discussion in Council sessions as a way to generate momentum for global action on climate change; others have argued that the climate impacts impinge on current Council operations or require conflict-prevention measures. The issue has also cropped up in campaigning for elected seats on the Council, with Australia, Bhutan, Cambodia, Luxembourg and Ukraine identifying climate in recent campaigns as an issue the Council should address.

As analyzed elsewhere (Conway 2010; Cousins 2013; Detraz and Betsill 2009; Kurtz 2012; Scott and Andrade 2012; Sindico 2007), the Council’s climate discussions have been highly politicized, revealing sharp disagreements on the scope of the Council’s mandate and the appropriate division of labor among UN organs. India captured such concerns succinctly during the Council’s first climate debate in 2007: “To make an uncertain long-term prospect a security threat amounts to an informal amendment of the [UN] Charter” (UNSC 2007b, 23). Widespread mistrust of the Council’s hierarchical procedures, objections to its unrepresentative composition, and concerns that Council action might undermine the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have also shaped the debate. Lost in these political controversies, however, is a more fundamental question—what exactly could or should the Council do on climate? Sifting through the scholarly

1CONCA: Professor of International Relations, School of International Service, American University; conca@american.edu. THWAITES: Research analyst, Sustainable Finance Center, World Resources Institute; jthwaites@wri.org. LEE: Doctoral candidate, School of International Service, American University; goueunlee@gmail.com. All interpretations and findings set forth in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of their respective institutions or affiliations. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2016 annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta, March 19, 2016.

2

literature, member-state positions and statements, and proposals from climate advocates, we have identified seven specific proposals for a Security Council role:

(1) Using the Council’s agenda-setting power to draw attention and catalyze action;

(2) Improving the Council’s understanding about climate risks and incorporating that understanding into existing peacekeeping operations;

(3) Developing an early-warning system on climate and conflict; (4) Engaging in preventive diplomacy on emergent threats, such as enhanced

geopolitical competition for energy resources or water challenges in international river basins;

(5) Managing the existential threat to small-island states from sea-level rise; (6) Addressing the problem of climate refugees; and (7) Developing a climate-related “responsibility to protect.”

These ideas range from modest add-ons within existing Council operations to much bolder, proactive measures that would stretch the body’s mandate, tax its capacity, and change its ways of doing business. The seven also vary substantially in the breadth and depth of support they have been able to, or plausibly could, garner. There are good reasons to question whether the Council is an appropriate or desirable venue on climate change, including the risk of politicization, a lack of expertise, the danger of institutional gridlock, and the Council’s questionable track record. Nevertheless, calls for Council action on climate seem unlikely to abate. It is now widely accepted that a significant degree of disruptive social dislocation due to climate change is probably inevitable. The 2015 Paris Agreement under the UNFCCC, while a significant milestone, does not address issues of climate security directly. There is no obvious forum for addressing challenges such as the existential plight of small-island states, widespread damage and displacement from extreme weather events, or growing stresses on water supplies in internationally shared river basins. To the extent that such effects create political crises, trigger humanitarian emergencies, or increase state fragility, the issue seems likely to recur within the Council. In this article we examine what it would mean—operationally, institutionally, and politically—for the Council to act in each of these seven proposed ways. Our assessment draws upon the relevant scholarly literature, case analyses of past Council forays into new domains of activity, and a series of conversations with more than 20 experts in and around the UN (including individuals from relevant UN organs, staff from member-state missions, and longtime Council watchers). We begin with a brief history of the Council’s engagements on climate and security and the political controversies therein. We then assess the seven proposals. We find that there is a poor fit between the climate challenge and the Council as it currently operates—reactively, hierarchically, often poorly informed, and with weak monitoring and follow-through. However, this poor fit, combined with the scope and urgency of climate challenges, also affords an opportunity to use climate change to begin to build the type of Security Council the world needs—better informed; more capable of legitimate, preventive action; proactive in its approach to peacebuilding; and

3

better able to take the long view. We identify opportunities to take steps in that direction, through better reporting and information flows; support for regional-scale initiatives that enjoy broad backing by the most affected states; pressing Council aspirants to explain how they would lead the Council toward an appropriate climate role; and creating pressure for symbolic, coordinated action by the five permanent Council members (P5). Background: The Rise of Debate within the Security Council As the monthly Security Council president in April 2007, the UK engineered the first thematic debate on climate and security, which attracted a record fifty-five member-state participants. (“Debate” here refers to a sequence of scripted monologues rather than give-and-take exchanges). As is customary, the UK circulated a short concept paper in advance, identifying several potential consequences of climate change for peace and security: including border disputes, instabilities around migration, impacts on energy supplies, food and water shortages, social stresses in weak states, and humanitarian crises from drought and flooding (UNSC 2007c). The paper justified the session by noting Resolution 1625 (2005), which committed the Council to prevent conflict and address its root causes. Many member-state remarks during the session focused on the (in)appropriateness of discussing the issue in the Council, and the session yielded no formal outcome. Pacific island states then turned to the General Assembly. Following a compromise brokered by Indonesia, Resolution 63/281 invited “the relevant organs of the United Nations, as appropriate and within their respective mandates, to intensify their efforts in considering and addressing climate change, including its possible security implications,” and requested that the Secretary-General report on the security implications of climate change “based on the views of member states” (A/Res/63/281, 2). The resolution was careful to reiterate the division of labor between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and underscored the UNFCCC as the “key instrument” for addressing climate change. Still, it created some political space for the Council by calling upon all relevant UN organs to act. The Secretary-General’s report did not mention the Council specifically, but stressed “threat-minimizing actions” that fall within the Council’s purview, including preventive diplomacy, mediation, and dispute resolution (UNGA 2009). Germany brought the issue back to the Council for a second thematic debate in 2011, again drawing a record number (64) of participating states. The session occurred against the backdrop of stalled talks within the UNFCCC. Opposition from China, India and Russia nearly blocked the session, triggering an unusually strong rebuke from the United States: “Because of the refusal of a few to accept our responsibility, by its silence the Council is saying in effect ‘tough luck’. That is more than disappointing; it is pathetic, short-sighted and, frankly, a dereliction of duty” (UNSC 2011a, 7). Despite the tensions, the session proceeded; a carefully worded presidential statement was negotiated behind the scenes (and presented while several member-states were still waiting to speak). It expressed the Council’s concern that “possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain existing threats to international peace and security,” flagging in particular the threat of loss of territory for small-island

4

states due to sea-level rise, and requested that the Secretary-General include “conflict analysis and contextual information” on possible security implications of climate change in his reporting to the Council (UNSC 2011e). Since 2011, the Council has not attempted another thematic debate, holding instead two “Arria-formula” sessions (Table 1). Occurring outside of the chamber, the Arria format allows Council members to engage in informal dialogue. It also bypasses the norm that only member-states and UN officials may speak in Council proceedings, allowing for expert briefings from a wider set of actors. Table 1: Security Council sessions on climate change Year: Type of session: Chair(s): 2007 Thematic debate UK 2011 Thematic debate Germany 2013 Arria-formula session Pakistan, UK 2015 Arria-formula session Malaysia, Spain The Council’s engagements to date reveal multiple layers of contention. One controversy is whether it makes sense to think of climate change in security terms. Russia questioned the causal logic during the 2011 session, arguing that the General Assembly’s 2009 report on the issue “refers only to hypothetical impacts of climate change on security and is not able to precisely predict them. It fails to provide empirical data establishing any correlations between these phenomena” (UNSC 2011a, 13). Namibia, in contrast, likened climate change to “low-intensity biological or chemical warfare….Indeed, as developing countries, we are facing what I dare to call an unprovoked war being waged on us by developed countries” (UNSC 2007a, 31). Similarly, Pacific-island nation Tuvalu suggested that “Our conflict is not being fought with guns and missiles but with weapons from everyday life — chimney stacks and exhaust pipes. We are confronted with a chemical war of immense proportions” (UNSC 2007b, 8). A second controversy involves the scope of the Council’s mandate. Proponents have argued that engaging the climate issue falls within the Council’s mandate by taking a preventive approach to conflict risks. When the 2007 debate was announced, however, the G-77 warned that “the ever-increasing encroachment by the Security Council on the roles and responsibilities of other principal organs of the United Nations represents a distortion of the principles and purposes of the Charter, infringes on their authority and compromises the rights of the general membership of the United Nations” (UNSC 2007d). Egypt noted that “It is a clear challenge to the general membership of the United Nations to leave the way open for every President of the Security Council to decide a theme for an open debate, even if it lies totally beyond the Council’s mandate” (UNSC 2007a, 4). Not all G-77 members agreed: the Republic of Congo urged that “over and above the issue of the competence of the various bodies, we must recognize the seriousness of what is at stake—namely, the need for and the urgency of appropriate responses to a major risk to international peace and security” (UNSC 2007a, 8).

5

Venue preference is closely tied to the mandate question. Many developing countries prefer ECOSOC and the UNFCCC to the hierarchical and often opaque realm of the Council. Many also see the push for a Council role as a political maneuver, repackaging development problems as a security issue—and thereby threatening the G-77’s struggle, more than twenty years in the making, to ensure that environmental issues are addressed as “sustainable development” rather than simply green preservation. More powerful countries have instrumental interests, too: major emitters may prefer a security framework on climate to, say, human rights or development financing. Finally, the issue taps controversy around the Council’s composition and procedures. China noted that discussion should take place “within a framework accessible to all parties”, and Sudan opposed “attempts to shift matters of interest of all Member States to a body where a few members of the United Nations have been vested with the power to take final decisions” (UNSC 2007a, 13; 2007b, 12). Within this landscape of controversy, there have also been notable shifts since 2007. The US position has evolved with the change of administration from Bush to Obama. Several G-77 members have broken ranks and endorsed an explicit Council voice or role. Indonesia brokered the key compromise allowing for the aforementioned 2009 General Assembly resolution, and Pakistan and Malaysia co-hosted the Arria-formula sessions. Possible Roles Any proposed role for the Security Council must answer three questions. First, can it make an effective contribution to managing or reducing conflict risks around climate change? Second, what capabilities would it take for the Council to play that role effectively? Third, can such a role fit legitimately within the bounded political space available to the Council, given the widespread concerns about mandate expansion, fears of encroachment on the UNFCCC, polarization among members, and mistrust of the Council itself? 1. Using the Council’s Agenda-setting Power The idea that the Council could play a useful agenda-setting role on environmental issues dates to the early post-Cold War era. The UK stated in 1989 that “the existing Security Council could be used to discuss environmental matters with security implications, such as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster” (French 1992, 36). In 1992, the Council recognized that “the non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security” (Tinker 1992, 787). Elliott (2002) noted the importance of Council actions short of military intervention, including investigation and the establishment of general principles. Several scholars and Council observers (e.g., Gupta 2009; Scott and Andrade 2012) have suggested that engagement on climate change would generate attention and create political pressure for action. Member-states, too, flag the Council’s agenda-setting power. During the 2007

6

session, the UK argued that the Council “can make a unique contribution to the building of a shared understanding of what an unstable climate will mean for our individual and collective security” (UNSC 2007a, 18). Tuvalu linked its call for action to the Council’s widely perceived success in drawing attention to the issue of HIV/AIDS (UNSC 2007b, 16). In the 2011 session, Singapore flagged the Council’s ability to “build greater awareness of the catastrophic long-term consequences of climate change, including the possible security consequences” as well as to “inject political momentum into the UNFCCC negotiating process for a successful outcome” (UNSC 2011b, 16). Angola made a similar point during the 2015 Arria-formula meeting, arguing that the Council could help with “the mobilization of political momentum” (Angolan Statement 2015). Among our interview subjects, there was general consensus on the importance of the Council’s agenda-setting power. One flagged the Council’s ability to “bless” an issue as one of its most significant powers; another suggested that the Council keeping climate change on its agenda would add weight to other processes within the UN. An interview within the secretariat indicated that Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon viewed the media attention it could draw to the issue as the Council’s “highest value”. Indeed, during the 2011 session, Ban referred to “the Council’s “unique responsibility” in this regard (UNSC 2011a, 3). The same respondent also noted, however, that overly broadening the Council’s mandate can dull it, and that specific ties to the Council’s core focus on conflict are essential. Analysis of the oft-cited precedent of the Council’s engagement on HIV/AIDS in 2000, however, raises questions about agenda-setting influence. That session sought to offer a security rationale for global efforts to combat the disease. There is some evidence that security thinking shaped the Bush administration’s increase in international funding, but the source seems to have been the domestic intelligence community (NIC 2000; Prins 2004). Scholarly assessments of the global AIDS advocacy campaign have found that “security” has not been the most useful mobilizing frame (McInnes 2006; Rushton 2010). Scholarship on policy “securitization” remains unsettled on its efficacy (Floyd 2007; Trombetta 2008). Another issue invoked as a precedent on agenda-setting involves women, peace and security; several member-states, including Iceland and Papua New Guinea, noted the Council’s experience with the issue as a positive example for climate change (UNSC 2011b). Security Council Report undertook a series of in-depth analyses of three thematic issues on which the Council has sought to sustain attention and action, including women, peace and security as well as the protection of civilians and the problem of children and armed conflict. They found that the Council has been able to keep these three issues alive on its agenda for sustained consideration and multiple resolutions. However, as we unpack below, they also found limited success with monitoring, implementation, and sustaining initiatives. Of course, a much stronger agenda-setting move would be some sort of coordinated action by the leading greenhouse gas emitters, several of whom occupy permanent seats on the Council, and several more of whom are among the leading aspirants for seats on any expanded, restructured Council. Nigeria pointed out during the 2011 session that “Seated around the table are those who could encourage developed countries to implement their commitments to reducing emissions and

7

supporting developing countries with the requisite technological and financial assistance to address climate change effectively” (UNSC 2011a, 11). The US-China climate deal of November 2014 avoided any links to a conflict-prevention rationale, however, and such action seems unlikely in the current political climate around the Council. 2. Incorporating an Understanding of Climate into Current Operations Beyond merely calling attention, the proposal that falls most clearly within a consensual understanding of the Council’s mandate is that it incorporate a better understanding of climate impacts into current Council operations. Elliott (2002) noted the need to incorporate understanding of environmental implications into peacekeeping operations. Kjellen and Wallensteen (2012, 689) note that, in Darfur, “the UN/[African Union] mission may have benefited from including environmental expertise, preparing for post-conflict activities that would involve long-term action.” A 2015 report for the G-7 suggested that “insights from practitioners working in the DRC, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone demonstrate that it is critical to integrate climate change into peacebuilding interventions”, with particular attention to peacebuilding initiatives that could have long-term consequences for climate adaptation, such as the climate resilience of new infrastructure (Rüttinger et al. 2015, 101). Several member-states have endorsed this line of reasoning. In the 2007 thematic debate, France called for climate considerations to be incorporated into the “risk analysis” conducted by the Secretariat. Prior to the 2011 session, Council chair Germany circulated a concept note stressing that climate change “presents a particular challenge to fragile countries”, with particular attention to impacts in post-conflict or failing states already on the Council’s agenda (UNSC 2011d). Ireland, Hungary, and France endorsed this reasoning during the debate, with the latter noting the added obligation of the Council to consider the climate footprint of its actions (UNSC 2011a and 2011b). The Presidential Statement agreed upon during the Council’s 2011 climate session requested that the Secretary-General include contextual information on possible security implications of climate change as part of his reporting to the Council. Since then, of 446 reports to the Council through January 2016, we identified twenty-five that mention climate change, and only twelve that reference climate in the specific context of conflict or security. Eleven focused on Africa, including country-specific reporting on Mali, Somalia and Sudan; regional reports on West Africa, the Sahel, and Central Africa; and two Africa-wide reports on causes of conflict and prospects for peace. Much of this material is highly general: reports note trends thought to bear a climate-change signature and that create or worsen conflict risks (drought, urbanization, land tenure conflicts, farmer-pastoralist tensions). A few reports flag link between climate and specific Council engagements—as in a report on the role of fragile resource-based livelihoods in the deteriorating situation in Mali (UNSC 2012), and an analysis of risk that land degradation and shrinking water levels may heighten inter-communal tensions around Lake Chad (UNSC 2011c). Even the most specific reporting instances lack the sub-national and temporal detail to be considered an example of

8

climate ‘early warning’ (discussed below). Reporting has also been sporadic, with only one climate-security linkage in 2012 and none in 2013. One interview subject reported that “the ball was dropped” on this opportunity to raise the Council’s awareness. One key question is whether this reporting function develops to include information that supports operations, objectives, or both. If the goal is to inform Council objectives, then information reporting melds into the discussions, below, of preventive action and early warning. If the goal is to inform current operations, then the wider problem is that the UN system lacks a means to ensure its component parts—country missions, the High Commissioners’ offices, Special Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs), the political missions run by the Department of Political Affairs, and others—receive information in a coordinated, timely manner. The Council lacks the staff to aggregate and systematize such information, and powerful member-states often lean on their own national mechanisms (without necessarily sharing the results). One interview subject noted the Council “is not structured well” for getting, processing and integrating information, lagging the humanitarian side of the UN in this regard. Our interviews suggest that climate information would be most impactful on Council thinking when evidence of high quality (e.g., backed by peer-reviewed academic work) is disseminated through a channel that can effectively reach the Council (for example, the SRSGs) and demonstrates a specific, actionable link to peace and security. The Council’s experience in the aforementioned cases of women, children, and civilians reinforce these themes. In each domain, the Council’s sustained engagement has set in motion a mechanism to inform current operations, with the topic of monitoring, reporting, and the quality of information revisited frequently. A formal monitoring and reporting mechanism on children and armed conflict has been established. It identifies six grave violations that should guide field data collection, and includes a Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict, regular reporting by the Secretary-General, and a task force of relevant UN agencies. For women, peace, and security, the Council established a monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangement on conflict-related sexual violence, which is utilized in the Secretary-General’s reporting, and it hears from the Executive Director of UN Women and other relevant UN officials. For civilians and conflict, reporting includes a periodic Secretary-General’s report and an informal expert group briefed on country-specific situations by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). Despite such tools, monitoring and reporting in each area has faced problems of implementation due to lack of capacity and resources (SCR 2015a, 3). Another problem has been the tendency to view the issue as an add-on to the Council’s work, rather than “one of the central tenets which support conflict prevention and underpin long-term stability” (SCR 2014b, 41). In the case of women and conflict, clashing positions have also emerged, with countries such as China and Russia preferring to “narrow the scope of the Secretary-General’s reporting…particularly on situations that in their view do not constitute threats to international peace and security” (SCR 2014b, 40). Consultation mechanisms are limited by non-participation, as has been the case with China and Russia for the expert group on civilians (SCR 2012, 3).

9

A more positive example is the Council’s movement over the past two decades—haltingly, incompletely, and sometimes reluctantly—toward a de facto regulatory regime on “conflict resources”, including sanctions regimes, the use of investigative expert panels, chain-of-custody initiatives such as the Kimberly process on diamonds, and the mandates for some peacekeeping missions (Conca 2015; Global Witness 2010). Use of expert panels has been a central part of mobilizing far more specific and actionable information than the sort that comes from the Secretary-General’s routine reporting. Coordinated reporting can also yield useful information, as when UNEP and other organs produced a long-term assessment of climate trends and social responses across the Sahel (UNEP 2011). Our interviews indicated that the report was widely received as useful within the Council, in part because it had the backing of and participation from member-states across the region. 3. Developing a Climate Early-warning System A more ambitious informational proposal is the development of a climate/conflict “early warning” system. Levy and Meier (2004) recommended that existing assessments and early warning systems integrate environmental variables more completely and effectively. Cousins (2013) suggested that early warning on climate drivers of conflict “could provide an ‘urgency factor’ necessary to push wider multilateral action forward” (192) and proposed “regular reporting by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on climate change insecurity” which would include “climate change-related factors relevant to each of the country or thematic reports” the Council currently receives (208-9). Scott and Andrade proposed a scientific advisory committee for the Council, one function of which would be “progress reporting” (2012, 221). During the 2007 thematic debate, Belgium called for the UN to “intensify its early warning efforts” (UNSC 2007a, 6). Several member-states, including Portugal, the US, Ghana and Costa Rica, reiterated this theme in 2011 (UNSC 2007a and 2007b). In the 2015 Arria session, Germany noted the failure to use risk assessments and early warning systems effectively (Statement by Ambassador Harald Braun 2015). Early warning, however, taxes the Council in several ways. As one interview subject noted, the problem is “half empirical and half intuitive,” requiring not just high-quality information but also the capacities to distribute and interpret it. In 2013 the UN launched an Operations and Crisis Centre, coordinating among ten organs to produce daily operational reports and briefings, issue alerts, and communication links for senior leaders. Again, the Council’s experience with the thematic issues of women, children, and civilians in conflict demonstrates the difficulty of translating such mechanisms into early warning. In 2010 the Council resolved to standardize monitoring, analysis, and reporting arrangements on conflict-related sexual violence. But “the focus has been only on monitoring known perpetrators from committing further acts of sexual violence” rather than on “intervening variables that may prevent as well as predict” (Davies et al. 2015, 14). There has also been member-state pushback on even this limited approach. Many, including Azerbaijan, China, Pakistan, and Russia, opposed requiring the UN Special Representative to consult with non-state actors without requiring the consent or

10

request of the concerned government, while others felt such autonomy essential (SCR 2014b). Even if the Council agrees on the scope of information and improves on its timely use, there are significant barriers to developing early warning around climate and conflict. There is no scholarly consensus on how climate drivers may trigger or enhance risk of conflict. Levy and Meier (2004) noted disincentives to conduct high-quality assessment, the lack of necessary data, and inadequate methodological development. A recent report to the G-7 identified several challenges: the tendency to produce fragmented assessments that fail to make connections across the development, adaptation, and peacebuilding sectors; the proliferation of conflict assessment tools, most of which fail to integrate climate change, environment, and natural resources; and the inaccessibility of information to decision makers (Rüttinger et al. 2015). There are also challenging questions about who has access to information: the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction has argued that disaster early-warning systems work best when they not only assess and monitor but also disseminate information to vulnerable communities (Rüttinger et al. 2015). Asking what a climate-conflict early warning system might have been able to say about, say, Syria four or five years ago illustrates many of the aforementioned challenges. Some have argued that the Syrian civil war bears a clear climate-change signature in the role played by sustained drought (e.g., Kelley et al. 2015). But careful assessment shows the importance of complex linkages between any climatic drivers and the economic and political facts on the ground (de Châtel 2014). In this case, “early warning” would have required timely, accurate information not simply on drought, but also about the state’s water management practices, farmer livelihoods, and the content and timing of policy changes around rural subsidies. More broadly, research on climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction shows that risks to human security derive not just from hazards, but from a complex mix of capacities and vulnerabilities that reside in the affected community (UNISDR 2011; Adger at al. 2014). A good deal of conceptual and empirical work remains before such analysis could be mapped onto the crisis-oriented, interventionist, victim-protecting logic that shapes conflict early-warning. 4. Engaging in Preventive Diplomacy Resolution 2171 (2014) expressed the Council’s “determination to pursue the objective of prevention of armed conflict as an integral part of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security” (S/RES/2171, 3). Article 99 of the UN Charter, which empowers the Secretary-General to bring to the Council’s attention “any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security”, provides a mechanism for forward-looking efforts, as do thematic sessions on conflict prevention. The latter have been held on topics ranging from genocide to natural resources. The British and German concept notes for the Council’s two thematic sessions on climate both stressed the importance of conflict prevention, a theme reiterated by several member-states in each session. Belgium urged the Council to shift from conflict management to conflict prevention and to move beyond “obsolete” threat assessments

11

(UNSC 2007a, 5). During the 2015 Arria-formula session, the Pacific Island states reiterated their call for a Special Representative on Climate and Security, in part to enable preventive diplomacy (Statement by Papua New Guinea 2015). Lithuania suggested peacekeeping missions could play a role in “climate change induced local disputes mediation”, with the aim to “prevent the conflict at its grassroots” (Statement by Lithuania 2015). Conflict prevention remains a contentious topic around the Council, however. As the International Peace Institute (2011, 2) notes, preventive efforts “are hindered by the council’s formal working methods and the political inequalities inherent in its design” including the dominance of the P5. Russia in particular has expressed wariness about conflict prevention as an inappropriate expansion of the Council’s mandate. A countervailing consideration that helps to drive the growing focus on prevention is the high cost of peacekeeping operations. One interview subject flagged the activities of OHCHR in Nepal as an example of successful prevention, largely because it forestalled the need for a costly peacekeeping operation, and pointed to Sri Lanka as a parallel case of failure. As one interview subject put it, “When refugees start arriving, that’s when the [Security Council] comes in. It’s hard to know what it can do before that point.” An important distinction, then, is between case-specific, “operational” preventive measures (including dispute mediation, conflict resolution, and confidence-building) and the broader management of risk factors for conflict, also referred to as “systemic” prevention (Romita 2011, 3). For the former, the Secretary-General’s office has arguably been a more effective tool than the Council. There may be instances in which the Council can play an anticipatory role in operational prevention, for example by exerting political pressure for negotiated solutions on emerging geopolitical competition for resources in regional seas or shared river basins. This would be analogous to, for example, the Council’s urging Djibouti and Eritrea to resolve their border issues peacefully, as it did in Resolution 1862 (2009). Weighing in on intrastate matters is much trickier, given many member-states’ anxieties about a slippery slope toward the preventive use of force. A limiting factor is that many states resist being on the Council’s agenda for monitoring as “fragile” due to the stigma that attaches. Such concerns emerged when the Council began to institutionalize forward-looking, “horizon scan” briefings from the Secretariat’s Department of Political Affairs on risks of political instability and emergent conflict (SCR 2016). There are historical examples, however, such as Council’s role (played in concert with several UN organs) in Guinea-Bissau in the early 2000s. Systemic prevention arguably affords more space politically for the Council to operate, along the lines of what it has done on the small-arms trade as a global risk factor for local and regional conflict. The Secretary-General’s 2009 report on climate and security noted that “The international community must anticipate and prepare itself to address a number of largely unprecedented challenges posed by climate change for which the existing mechanisms may prove inadequate”, including large numbers of displaced people, statelessness of submerged island nations, drastic reductions in water availability, and enhanced competition for resources (UNGA 2009).

12

Again, however, the experience with other cross-cutting issues raises cautions about the Council’s ability to translate discourse into action. On children and armed conflict, a 2013 Presidential statement recognized the importance of a comprehensive, preventive approach (SCR 2014a, 22). Much of the subsequent discussion on preventive action has been highly dispersed, ranging from preventing recruitment of child combatants and sexual violence in specific countries to prevention of violations against children by non-state armed groups. On the theme of women, peace and security, the discussion has centered on women’s role and participation in prevention and conflict resolution, and has not referred to specific actions (SCR 2014b, 43). A development that bears watching is the UN Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, launched in 2013. The initiative was reactive rather than preventive in origin, coming as a response to the crisis in Mali. However, the goal is to take a long-term, forward-looking approach to regional challenges, with resource, environmental, and population dynamics figuring prominently. Its strategic goals are effective governance, addressing cross-border threats (including arms trafficking, terrorism, and organized crime), and building long-term resilience. One interview subject characterized it as a “rare” instance of Council unity, and noted the peacebuilding potential of regional environmental cooperation. 5. Addressing the Threat to Small-island States A domain of possible action that links several of the proposals reviewed herein would be for the Council to address the threat of territorial loss and “statelessness” facing Pacific small-island states. Barnett and Campbell note the range of perils they face, including sea-level rise, intensified tropical storms, changed rainfall patterns that risk increased drought, and background conditions of poverty and low adaptive capacity (Barnett and Campbell 2010). As Honig (2011) and others have noted, the prospect of statelessness raises complex legal and political questions: about sovereignty, the economic and political rights of states and individuals, the forms of possible redress (through resettlement, territorial purchase, or other means), and the possibility of trusteeship arrangements (see also Columbia Law School 2011). The path through this thorny problem need not involve the Council: a longstanding body of treaty law exists on refugees and statelessness, and in 1966 the General Assembly tasked the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees with preventing and reducing statelessness. Neither of these developments envisioned a threat to a nation’s entire territory and population, however. The 2009 Secretary-General’s report notes that “multilateral comprehensive agreements would be the ideal preventive mechanism, providing where, and on what legal basis, affected populations would be permitted to move elsewhere, as well as their status” (UNGA 2009, 20). Although these legal tools could be developed under the UNFCCC process or as part of a separate convention, many observers have noted that the climate regime is poorly adapted to address the problem (Biermann and Boas 2008; Hodgkinson et al. 2010). Moreover, territories are likely to become uninhabitable long before they are submerged--and quite possibly before an adequate legal framework is in place. Thus, a Council role in this area seems likely to be shaped by accumulating facts on the ground

13

and the failures of institutional development elsewhere. If facts move quickly and institutions, slowly, the Council will feel increasing pressure to fill the gap. The principal advocates for Council action on the problem have been the small-island developing states (SIDS) themselves, taking advantage of their numerical presence within the UN system. The Alliance of Small Island States, an ad-hoc group within the UN system, has thirty-nine members. Pacific Island states in particular have been at the forefront in framing the problem in security terms. As expressed by Papua New Guinea in the 2007 thematic session, “The dangers that small islands and their populations face are no less serious than those faced by nations and peoples threatened by guns and bombs” (UNSC 2007a, 25). Kurtz (2012) argues that growing acceptance of the SIDS dilemma has played a significant role in changing the tone around climate change as a peace and security issue. India, a consistent opponent of a Council role on climate, affirmed the “existential threat” facing small-island states during the 2011 Council session (UNSC 2011a, 19). The presidential statement from that session noted “The Security Council expresses its concern that possible security implications of loss of territory of some States caused by sea-level-rise may arise, in particular in small low-lying island States” (UNSC 2011e). The question is whether the Council can conceive specific, useful tasks to perform without provoking member-states wary of an expansive or vaguely defined role. One political complication is that island nations are not unified on whether the Council is the correct venue. While the Pacific small-island states have pressed aggressively for a Council role, the Caribbean Community has endorsed the G-77 position, arguing that “the possible security implications of climate change must be addressed at the multilateral level by bodies which are inclusive, representative and transparent and that allow for the full and effective participation of all Member States….[T]he Security Council should refrain from encroaching on the functions and powers that the Charter and tradition have placed within the purview of the General Assembly” (UNSC 2011b, 28). Addressing statelessness is also contentious in its link to the question of responsibility for “loss and damage”—something powerful members are unwilling to see the UN system assume or even define. Beyond the SIDS lies the far broader problem of uninhabitable territory in the coastal zones of many nations. Loss and damage has been contentious in recent years within the UNFCCC regime. Previously bundled with adaptation, loss and damage received its own article in the Paris Agreement. Developed countries ensured that this article “does not involve or provide a basis for any liability or compensation” (UNFCCC 2015, Paragraph 51), although countries are not precluded from pursuing remedies in other spheres of international law. While this may block off an avenue for climate justice for those facing statelessness, it also arguably removes (or at least sidelines for now) one barrier to moving forward on addressing the statelessness problem. The Paris outcomes identify a variety of potential areas for cooperation and facilitation, which the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage is to explore in coming years. Several of these overlap with areas suggested for a Council role, including early warning, emergency preparedness, slow onset events, comprehensive risk assessment and management, and the resilience of

14

communities, livelihoods and ecosystems. In the near term, these mandates are likely to reduce the space for Council action. 6. Addressing the Problem of Climate Refugees A large body of literature in environmental policy warns about climate refugees. The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change suggested that “climate change will lead to hundreds of millions more people without sufficient water or food to survive or threatened by dangerous floods and increased disease” (Biermann and Boas 2008, 77). Biermann and Boas (2008, 72) identify sea-level rise, extreme weather events, and droughts and water scarcity as the three principal drivers, and provide a rough estimate that “the total number of people at risk of becoming climate refugees by 2050 could well be around or over 200 million”, or twenty times the number protected by UNHCR. Scholarship on mobility paints a more complex picture. The human security chapter of the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) cautions that migration is driven by multiple causes; that extreme weather events can disrupt as well as stimulate migration; and that movement is often an adaptation of last resort, particularly for those with limited resources. Barnett and Campbell (2010) note that the principal impact of climate change may be deteriorated health and standards of living that are suffered in place, rather than out-migration. Such cautions notwithstanding, many member-states have invoked climate refugees in Council discussions. The UK’s concept note for the 2007 debate flagged climate-driven migration as a leading risk factor for instability and conflict (UNSC 2007c), and more than half the participating member-states noted climate migration and displacement as an issue of concern. In the 2011 session, the Secretary-General argued that “environmental refugees” are “reshaping the human geography of the planet, a trend that will only increase as deserts advance, forests are felled and sea-levels rise” (UNSC 2011a, 2). Colombia identified humanitarian response as an acceptable exception to the G-77’s objection to putting climate change on the Council’s agenda. It remains far from clear, however, that the Council would move to address the climate refugee issue, in either an anticipatory or reactive manner. One complicating factor is the narrowly circumscribed definition of refugees in international law as individuals who have crossed a border for fear of persecution (UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Article I.A(2)). The legal definition, thus, is rooted in persecution and political insecurity rather than environmental vulnerability; assigns responsibility to actions of or related to the home state; makes status determinations on an individualized basis; and recognizes only cross-border displacement. Given this poor fit, there have been several proposals for an international agreement on climate-displaced people, as a protocol to the UNFCCC, a stand-alone convention, or via regional agreements (Biermann and Boas 2008, 2010; Docherty and Giannini 2009; Hodgkinson et al. 2010; Williams 2008). The mandate from COP 21 of the UNFCCC to establish a task force to develop recommendations on how to address climate-induced displacement of people seems likely to channel any such efforts in the near term (UNFCCC 2015, paragraph 49).

15

Thus, the legal status of climate-displaced people is akin to that of internally displaced people (IDPs), for whom there is also no treaty defining roles and rules. The Council and other UN bodies are regularly engaged in substantial ad-hoc work on IDPs, and have built up a large body of soft-law guidance including resolutions, institutions, routine practices, and guiding principles. Several of our interview subjects suggested that it was, as one put it, “too early…unless Bangladesh gets hit” for a systematic Council response, and that there would be a strong preference to “duck the issue” by leaving matters to the humanitarian side of UN operations or the UNFCCC. Our review of the cross-cutting experience on women, children, and civilians in conflict also casts doubt on the viability of climate refugees as a durable entry point for Council engagement. Displaced people have become a central element on the Council’s agenda for none of these three issues; the topic has been addressed in those contexts only rarely, and in a narrowly episodic way. 7. Developing a Climate-related “Responsibility to Protect” Lurking behind several of the specific risks linking climate change, conflict, and human suffering are larger questions about the responsibility to protect people from such consequences, and to whom that responsibility attaches. Given that the most widely recognized human rights are those codified in treaty law, responsibilities therein have attached primarily to the nation-state vis-à-vis its citizens. With climate change, a key consideration is the limited capacity of many states to protect and fulfill the rights of their citizens. This in turn raises questions about the moral and legal responsibilities of the international system, and the proper balance of responsibility between state and system. In the specific context of systematic, organized violence, the result of grappling with these questions is the evolving norm on “responsibility to protect” (R2P in UN parlance). In 2005, the General Assembly passed Resolution 60/1 identifying responsibilities for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. While stressing the primary responsibility of national governments to protect their citizens, 60/1 notes the international community’s responsibilities when a government is unable or unwilling. If this norm has an implicit enforcer, it is clearly the Council, which has now referenced R2P in more than two dozen resolutions (GCRP 2016). Some refer to specific armed conflicts; others involve cross-cutting issues such as conflict prevention, policing during peacekeeping, and the small-arms trade. However, R2P raises controversial questions about sovereignty, intervention, and the legitimacy of the Security Council itself, leading it to step cautiously (Bajoria 2011; Oman 2009). Nonetheless, in a few instances, including resolutions on Sudan and the small-arms trade, the Council has explicitly referenced international responsibilities in the context of R2P. Some argue in favor of applying R2P more expansively. Cohen (2010) notes the “reckless indifference” of the government of Myanmar in the wake of Cyclone Nargis in 2008, as well as the Sudanese government’s failure to declare a state of emergency or request international aid in the context of drought-related famines (see also Haacke 2009, 169). She argues that even if mobilizing R2P would not have helped in these

16

specific instances, it would be a mistake to peremptorily exclude disasters from its domain of applicability. Knight (2005) notes Kofi Annan’s High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which recast preventive action as an expression of the responsibility to protect and framed environmental degradation as one a trigger for instability. Others have cautioned against stretching the meaning of R2P beyond recognition. Harrington (2012), in a discussion of R2P and natural disasters, warns that expansive applications to disaster vulnerability, “even when well intentioned, risk draining the R2P concept of its vitality and strength, while also lending an air of unreality to the principle’s practical aspirations.” Evans (2009, 32) makes a similar point: “If anything else is bundled under the ‘‘responsibility to protect’’ banner—be it conflict generally, human rights generally, human security generally, environmental emergencies specifically, or anything else—we run a serious risk of diluting its capacity to mobilize international consensus in the cases where it is really needed.” Most of our interview subjects shared this reluctance, arguing some combination of the following: that there is no need for new concepts in this space (as one said, “human security gets it done”); that the proposal to link R2P to climate is a non-starter politically; that there is a poor fit between R2P and climate regime’s core norm of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR); and that the Sustainable Development Goals—arguably the leading edge of UN environmental efforts at this point—are much more closely aligned with CBDR than R2P. Review of the cases on children in armed conflict, protection of civilians, and women, peace, and security also suggests challenges in linking R2P to thematic domains. Resolution 1674 on civilians reaffirms R2P, but in the case of children, China and Russia in particular have emphasized the primary responsibility of national governments, while in the case of women, the linkage to R2P has not been made (SCR 2015a). No member-state has explicitly called for the R2P concept to incorporate climate-related risks. During the Council’s 2007 thematic session on climate, however, Papua New Guinea, speaking for the Pacific Islands Forum, noted that both the Security Council and General Assembly “have accepted the principle of the responsibility to protect”, suggesting it could be an avenue for addressing small-island challenges (UNSC 2007a, 28). However, efforts to broaden R2P beyond organized violence, and specifically to link the norm to state response to natural disasters, have met very strong resistance. In 2008, the government of Myanmar banned international aid operations in the immediate aftermath of cyclone Nargis, prompting France to urge (unsuccessfully) that the Security Council invoke R2P. The Secretary-General later affirmed that the norm applied only to the crimes of organized violence identified specifically in Resolution 60/1, and that trying to extend it further would “stretch the concept beyond recognition or operational utility” (A/63/677, para 10b). In doing so, he specifically noted climate change as an example of inappropriate stretching. The International Law Commission also endorsed this narrow interpretation when it took up the question of protecting people in the context of disaster vulnerability (ILC 2012). Even if it were feasible politically to link R2P directly to climate change, and even if doing so did not destabilize the fragile consensus on the concept in its core domain of

17

political violence, there are ways in which climate and R2P mesh poorly. As Conca (2015, 197) noted, R2P frames the international community as a bystander driven by moral compulsion to help, whereas climate change has been driven by the same states that sit astride and wield the power of the Council: “Thus, we must speak of layered responsibilities: a state’s responsibility to protect, the international community’s responsibility not to neglect, and the leading emitters’ responsibility for the effects.” Another key difference is in the types of action (disaster preparedness, poverty reduction) that are most strongly indicated. Using these tools in the context of climate-related “protection” would require significant progress in the Secretary-General’s efforts to reposition R2P as a norm stressing prevention rather than just reactive intervention (UNGA 2013). In this context, the small-arms trade, which the Council has already linked to R2P, provides a useful analogy, in that it constitutes a systemic risk factor for conflict best addressed in system-wide terms, rather than through place-specific, reactive intervention. Of course, repositioning protection in this manner takes us back to the prior discussion of the Council’s struggles with conflict prevention in general. Conclusion We draw four concluding observations from this juxtaposition of climate-security proposals with Security Council-related politics, practice, and experience. First, the proposed roles vary in terms of both political consensus and the extent to which they stretch the Council’s mandate. Figure 1 presents our interpretation of how they plot along these dimensions. While there is a rough correlation between mandate stretching and lack of support, the relationship is not strictly linear, in our view. Figure 1: Security Council roles on climate change, by mandate fit and political consensus

18

Second, proponents of a Council role on climate change must articulate how their proposals mesh with the Council dynamics discussed in this paper—and the prospects for effective action—much more specifically and carefully than they have done to date. Bringing the issue into the Council may have had its place in the effort to inject a sense of urgency into climate politics. But there are legitimate reasons for opposition and skepticism, and there is always a cost to using the Council’s bully pulpit instrumentally, particularly on issues that do not sit near the core of consensus regarding the Council’s mandate. Member-states that have pushed Council action are presumably well versed in these realities, but have often failed to articulate a clear-minded view of what the Council would actually do. Third, for more than one reason, the climate challenge fits poorly with the way the Council currently operates. In general, the Council’s modus operandi is reactive, hierarchical, often poorly informed, and with weak monitoring and follow-through. These are non-trivial obstacles to any Council role that goes beyond jawboning. However, our fourth conclusion is the importance of standing this observation on its head. Neither the Council nor the UN are static institutions; witness the evolution of largely symbolic peacekeeping missions into today’s complex peacebuilding operations, or the increasingly public campaigning we are witnessing, as of this writing, for the next

19

Secretary-General. Climate change could play a part in the process of transforming the Council into the better organ the world requires—better informed; more capable of legitimate, preventive action; proactive in its approach to peacebuilding; and better able to take the long view of risks and responses. Toward this end, we note five possible elements of a pragmatic but transformative agenda:

• Improve the Secretary-General’s reporting function on “contextual information” about climate-conflict links. Malaysia’s concept note for the 2015 Arria-formula meeting, for example, suggested the Secretary-General update his 2009 report on climate and security to incorporate “information on how climate change impacts are threatening peacekeeping missions” (Permanent Mission of Malaysia 2015, 3). Such information is most useful when it sits between crisis operations briefings and IPCC-style scenarios—that is, regional in scale and medium-term in temporal focus.

• Encourage forward-looking initiatives that enjoy broad support from the most affected member-states. An example is the Integrated Strategy for the Sahel, again stressing regional scale and medium term. The most obvious focal point is on the plight of small-island developing states and their unprecedented challenge of statelessness and permanent displacement. Assessing and encouraging the institutionalization of conflict-resolution capabilities in shared river basins, in the context of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention, may be another such opportunity.

• Use experience to evaluate capabilities. The Pacific island states have called for “an assessment of the capacity of the United Nations system to respond” to security-related impacts of climate change “so that vulnerable countries can be assured that it is up to the task” (UNSC 2011a, 23). Such an assessment would be most useful if it worked through lessons from past episodes, as in the aforementioned example of Syria, and sharpened the role that expert groups might play in reporting, advising, and curating information.

• Challenge aspirants to a seat on the Council to explain how they understand the Council’s role on climate. This concept could be applied both to campaigns for elected seats and to the aspirants for a permanent spot on an expanded, reformed Council. In both cases, aspirants should speak specifically to their vision of where and how climate meshes with the Council’s mandate, with particular attention to preventive diplomacy, human security, and disaster vulnerability.

• Work for a symbolic, cooperative gesture among the P5 on climate. Here the goal is to frame action explicitly as preventive and peacebuilding, in both its purpose and effects. Two obvious opportunities are joint initiatives to deliver climate-related elements of the Sustainable Development Goals and to enhance

20

implementation of Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement.

21

References Adger, W. Neil, Juan Pulhin, Jon. Barnett, Geoffrey D. Dabelko, Grete Hovelsrud, Marc

Levy, Úrsula.Oswald Spring, and Coleen H. Vogel. 2014. Human Security. In Climate Change 2014: Impacts. Adaptation. and Vulnerability. Part A: Global and Sectoral Aspects, edited by C.B. Field et al., 755-791. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Angolan Statement at the Security Council Arria-formula Meeting on Climate Change. June 30. 2015.

Bajoria, Jayshree. 2011. The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention. Council on Foreign Relations Background Report, June 12, 2013.

Barnett, Jon and John Campbell. 2010. Climate Change and Small Island States. London: Earthscan.

Biermann, Frank and Ingrid Boas. 2008. Protecting Climate Refugees. Environment 50 (5): 8-16.

Biermann, Frank and Ingrid Boas. 2010. Preparing for a Warmer World. Global Environmental Politics 10 (1): 60-88.

Cohen, Roberta. 2010. Reconciling R2P with IDP Protection. Global Responsibility to Protect 2 (1): 15-37.

Columbia Law School. 2011. Threatened Island Nations: Legal Implications of Rising Seas and a Changing Climate. May 23- 25.

Conca, Ken. 2015. An Unfinished Foundation. New York: Oxford University Press. Conway, Darragh. 2010. The United Nations Security Council and Climate Change.

Climate Law 1 (3): 357-407. Cousins, Stephanie. 2013. UN Security Council: Playing a Role in the International

Climate Change Regime? Global Change. Peace & Security 25 (2): 191–210. Davies, Sara E., Zim Nwokora, and Sarah Teitt. 2015. Bridging the Gap. Cooperation

and Conflict 50 (2): 228-249. de Châtel, Francesca. 2014. The Role of Drought and Climate Change in the Syrian

Uprising. Middle Eastern Studies 50 (4): 521-535. Detraz, Nicole and Michele M. Betsill. 2009. Climate Change and Environmental

Security. International Studies Perspectives 10 (3): 303–320. Docherty, Bonnie and Tyler Giannini. 2009. Confronting a Rising Tide. Harvard

Environmental Law Review 33 (2): 349-403 Elliott, Lorraine. 2002. Expanding the Mandate of the UN Security Council to Account

for Environmental Issues. Working Paper. United Nations University. Evans, Gareth. 2009. The Responsibility to Protect in Environmental Emergencies.

Proceedings of the Annual Meeting. American Society of International Law 103: 27-32.

Floyd, Rita. 2007. Towards a Consequentialist Evaluation of Security. Review of International Studies 33 (2): 327-350.

French, Hillary F. 1992. After the Earth Summit. Washington: Worldwatch Institute. Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. 2016. UN Security Council Resolutions

Referencing R2P. Global Witness. 2010. Lessons UNLearned. London: Global Witness

22

Gupta, Sonia. 2009. Environmental Law and Policy: Climate Change as a Threat to International Peace and Security. Perspectives on Global Issues 4 (1): 7-17.

Haacke, Jürgen. 2009. Myanmar, the Responsibility to Protect, and the Need for Practical Assistance. Global Responsibility to Protect 1 (2):156-184.

Harrington, Joanna. 2012. R2P and Natural Disasters. In The Routledge Handbook of the Responsibility to Protect, edited by W. Andy Knight and Frazer Egerton, 141-151. New York: Routledge.

Hodgkinson, David, Tess Burton, Heather Anderson, and Lucy Young. 2010. The Hour When the Ship Comes In. Monash University Law Review 36 (1): 1-45.

Honig, Shira. 2011. Climate Change and Statelessness. Climatico. June 15. International Law Commission. 2012. Fifth Report on the Protection of Persons in the

Event of Disasters. A/CN.4/652. International Peace Institute. 2011. The UN Security Council and Conflict Prevention.

New York and Vienna: IPI. Kelley, Colin P., Shahrzad Mohtadi, Mark A. Cane, Richard Seager, and Yochanan

Kushnir. 2015. Climate Change in the Fertile Crescent and Implications of the Recent Syrian Drought. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (11): 3241–3246.

Kjellén, Bo and Peter Wallensteen. 2012. Climate Change, Peacekeeping, and Perspectives for UN Reform. In Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict, edited by Jürgen Scheffran, Michael Brzoska, Hans Günter Brauch, Peter Michael Link, and Janpeter Schilling, 685-694. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Knight, Alexandra. 2005. Global Environmental Threats. NYU Law Review 80 (5): 1549-1585.

Kurtz, Gerrit. 2012. Securitization of Climate Change in the United Nations 2007-2010. In Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict: Challenges for Societal Stability, edited by Jürgen Scheffran, Michael Brzoska, Hans Günter Brauch, Peter Michael Link, and Janpeter Schilling, 669-684. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.

Levy, Marc A. and Patrick Philippe Meier. 2004 Early Warning and Assessment of Environment, Conflict, and Cooperation. In Understanding Environment, Conflict and Cooperation, by UNEP and Woodrow Wilson Center, 38-47. Nairobi: UNEP.

McInnes, Colin. 2006. HIV/AIDS and Security. International Affairs 82 (2): 315-326. National Intelligence Council. 2000. The Global Infectious Disease Threat and its

Implications for the United States. NIE 99-17D. Oman, Natalie. 2009. The Responsibility to Prevent. Canadian Journal of Law and

Jurisprudence 22 (2): 335-380. Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

2015. Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations. 2015. Open Arria-formula

Meeting on the Role of Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier for Global Security: Concept Note.

Piguet, Etienne. 2013. From Primitive Migration to Climate Refugees. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 103 (1): 148-162.

Prins, Gwyn. 2004. AIDS and Global Security. International Affairs 80 (5): 931-952. Rushton, Simon. 2010. Framing AIDS. Global Health Governance 4 (1): 1-17.

23

Rüttinger. Lukas, Dan Smith, Gerald Stang, Dennis Tänzler, and Janani Vivekananda. 2015. A New Climate for Peace. An Independent Report Commissioned by the G7 Members.

Scott, Shirley V. 2012. The Securitization of Climate Change in World Politics. Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 21 (3): 220-230.

Scott, Shirley V. and Roberta C.D. Andrade. 2012. The Global Response to Climate Change. Brown Journal of World Affairs 18 (2): 215-226.

Security Council Report. 2012. Cross-cutting Report: Protection of Civilians and Armed Conflict. No. 2. New York: SCR.

Security Council Report. 2013. Cross-cutting Report: Protection of Civilians and Armed Conflict. No. 3. New York: SCR.

Security Council Report. 2014a. Cross-cutting Report: Children and Armed Conflict. No. 1. New York: SCR.

Security Council Report. 2014b. Cross-cutting Report: Women. Peace and Security. No. 2. New York: SCR.

Security Council Report. 2015a. Cross-cutting Report: Children and Armed Conflict. No. 2. New York: SCR.

Security Council Report. 2015b. Monthly Forecast for November 2015. Security Council Report. 2016. “UN Security Council Working Methods: Horizon-

Scanning Briefings.” Sindico, Francesco. 2007. Climate Change: A Security Council Issue? Carbon and

Climate Law Review 1 (3): 26-31. Statement by Ambassador Harald Braun. 2015. Permanent Representative of Germany

at the Security Council Meeting on ‘The Role of Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier for Global Security.’ June 30, 2015.

Statement by Lithuania. 2015. ‘Arria Formula’ Meeting on the Role of the Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier for Global Security.

Statement by Papua New Guinea. 2015. Statement for Security Council. Open Arria-formula Meeting on the Role of Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier for Global Security.

Tinker, Catherine. 1992. ‘Environmental Security’ in the United Nations. Tennessee Law Review 59: 787-801.

Trombetta, Maria Julia. 2008. Environmental Security and Climate Change. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 21 (4): 585-602.

United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. 1951. Article I.A.(2) (as amended by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Article I.2.).

United Nations Environment Programme. 2011. Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel. Nairobi: UNEP.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 2015. Adoption of the Paris Agreement. Decision 1/CP.21, December 12, 2015.

United Nations General Assembly. 2009. Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications: Report of the Secretary-General. A/64/350.

United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction. 2011. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction. Geneva: UNISDR.

24

United Nations General Assembly. 2013. Responsibility to Protect: State Responsibility and Prevention. Report of the Secretary-General. A/67/929–S/2013/399.

United Nations Security Council. 2007a. 5663rd Meeting. S/PV.5663. United Nations Security Council. 2007b. 5663rd Meeting. S/PV.5663 (Resumption 1). United Nations Security Council. 2007c. Letter dated 5 April 2007 from the Permanent

Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2007/186.

United Nations Security Council. 2007d. Letter dated 16 April 2007 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/2007/211.

United Nations Security Council. 2011a. 6587th Meeting. S/PV.6587. United Nations Security Council. 2011b. 6587th Meeting. S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1). United Nations Security Council. 2011c. First Report of the Secretary-General on the

Activities of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa. S/2011/704. United Nations Security Council. 2011d. Letter dated 1 July 2011 from the Permanent

Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. S/2011/408.

United Nations Security Council. 2011e. Statement by the President of the Security Council, July 20.

United Nations Security Council. 2012. Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali. S/2012/894.

US Department of Defense. 2014. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014. Washington: Department of Defense. March.

Williams, Angela. 2008. Turning the Tide. Law and Policy 30 (4): 502-529. Youngs, Richard. 2014. Climate Change and EU Security Policy. Brussels: Carnegie

Europe.