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Julgamento da Corte Constitucional AlemãTRANSCRIPT
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>Homepage >Decisions >Orderof14January20142BvR2728/13
ECLI:DE:BVerfG:2014:rs20140114.2bvr272813
FEDERALCONSTITUTIONALCOURT
INTHENAMEOFTHEPEOPLE
Intheproceedings
I. ontheconstitutionalcomplaintofDr.G,
authorisedrepresentatives:
RechtsanwaltProf.Dr.WolfRdigerBub,Promenadeplatz9,80333Munich,
Prof.Dr.DietrichMurswiek,
against1.
theDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT)andthecontinuedpurchasesofgovernmentbondsonthebasisofthisDecisionandofthepredecessorprogrammeforSecuritiesMarkets(SMP),
2. theFederalGovernmentsomissiontobringanactionagainsttheEuropeanCentralBankbeforetheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUniononaccountoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT)andonaccountofthepurchasesofgovernmentbonds.
2BvR2728/13,
II. ontheconstitutionalcomplaint
1. ofDr.B,
2. ofProf.Dr.H,
3. ofProf.Dr.N,
4. ofProf.Dr.S,
5. ofProf.Dr.Dr.h.c.S,
authorisedrepresentativefor1.to3.and5.:
Prof.Dr.KarlAlbrechtSchachtschneider,Treiberpfad28,13469Berlin
against1.
theactsbytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBankstosavetheeuro,inparticularthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsoftheMemberStatesoftheeuroareaforthepurposeofindirectfinancingofstatesonthesecondarymarket,
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2. theFederalGovernmentsomissiontobringproceedingsforannulmentpursuanttoArt.263sec.1andsec.2TFEUbeforetheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionagainstthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsofMemberStatesoftheeuroareabytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandtheEuropeanCentralBank,andagainsttheacceptanceofgovernmentbondsascollateralforCentralBankloansifthoseactsservethefinancingofstates.
2BvR2729/13,
III. ontheconstitutionalcomplaintofMrH,
andofanother11,692complainants,
authorisedrepresentatives:
Prof.Dr.ChristophDegenhart,Burgstrae27,04109Leipzig,
RechtsanwltinProf.Dr.HertaDublerGmelin,ofthelawfirmSchweglerRechtsanwlte,UnterdenLinden12,10117Berlin
Prof.Dr.BernhardKempenRheinblick1,53424Remagen/Oberwinter
against1.
theFederalGovernmentsomissiontoworktowardsarepealoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningtheunlimitedpurchaseofbondsofindividualMemberStatesoftheeuroareaonthesecondarymarketbytheEuropeanCentralBank,
2. theFederalGovernmentsomissiontotakeeffectiveprecautionstoensurethattheFederalRepublicofGermanysliabilityarisingfromthepurchaseofbondsasaconsequenceoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningtheunlimitedpurchaseofbondsofindividualMemberStatesoftheeuroareaonthesecondarymarketbytheEuropeanCentralBank,anditsliabilityarisingfromtheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,willnotexceedthesumofitspaymentobligationsunderArticle8section5sentence1oftheTreatyasstipulatedinitsAnnexII,
3. theGermanBundestagsrefusaltoexerciseitsoverallbudgetaryresponsibilitybyonlyconsentingtothemacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammesestablishedwithintheframeworkoftheEuropeanStabilityMechanismasarequirementforthepurchaseofbondsbytheEuropeanCentralBankifithadpreviouslybeencomprehensivelyinformedaboutthenatureandscopeoftheEuropeanCentralBanksbondpurchases.
2BvR2730/13,
IV. ontheconstitutionalcomplaintofProf.Dr.vonS,
andofanother17complainants,
authorisedrepresentativefor1.to6.and8.to18.:
RechtsanwaltProf.Dr.MarkusC.Kerber,HackescherMarkt4,10178Berlin
against theDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012.
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2BvR2731/13,
and
V.. ontheapplicationforarulinginOrganstreitproceedingsthattherespondent
1. isobliged,inordertoprotectitsoverallbudgetaryresponsibility,toworktowardsarepealoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012concerningtheunlimitedpurchaseofbondsofindividualMemberStatesoftheEurosystemonthesecondarymarketbytheEuropeanCentralBank,becauseitcircumventstheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingpursuanttoArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,andthattherespondentmustrefrainfromallactsordecisionswhichservetoimplementthisDecision
2. maygrantitsapprovaltotheadjustmentprogrammeswhichwereestablishedasconditionsforthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsbytheEuropeanCentralBankonthesecondarymarketwithintheframeworkoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,anapprovalintheformofaconstitutiveparliamentarydecision,whichisrequiredunderArticle38section1sentence2,Article20section1andsection2,andArticle79section3oftheBasicLawtoprotectitsoverallbudgetaryresponsibility,onlyifitreceivessufficientinformationaboutthenature,scopeanddurationoftheEuropeanCentralBanksbondpurchases,aswellasabouttheirassociatedliabilityrisks,andifitisguaranteedthrougheffectiveprecautionsthattheFederalRepublicofGermanysliabilityarisingfromthesebondpurchaseswillnotexceedtheamountofitspaymentobligationsunderArticle8section5sentence1oftheTreatyestablishingtheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(TESM)asstipulatedinitsAnnexII.
Applicant: ParliamentarygroupDIELINKEintheGermanBundestag,representedbyitsChairmanDr.GregorGysi,MdB,PlatzderRepublik1,11011Berlin,
authorisedrepresentatives:
Prof.Dr.Dr.h.c.HansPeterSchneider,Drosselweg4,30559Hanover,
Prof.Dr.AndreasFisahn,GrnerWeg83,32130Enger
Respondent: GermanBundestag,representedbyitsPresidentProf.Dr.NorbertLammert,MdB,PlatzderRepublik1,11011Berlin,
authorisedrepresentatives:
Prof.Dr.ChristianCalliess,
Prof.Dr.ChristophMllers,Adalbertstrae84,10997Berlin,
Prof.Dr.MartinNettesheim,Horemer13,72076Tbingen,
2BvE13/13
joinedtheproceedingsItoV:
GermanBundestag,representedbyitsPresidentProf.Dr.NorbertLammert,MdB,PlatzderRepublik1,11011Berlin,
authorisedrepresentatives:
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Prof.Dr.ChristianCalliess,
Prof.Dr.ChristophMllers,Adalbertstrae84,10997Berlin,
Prof.Dr.MartinNettesheim,Horemer13,72076Tbingen,
joinedtheproceedingsItoIV,inproceedingsVonthesideoftheGermanBundestag:
FederalGovernment,representedbytheFederalChancellorDr.AngelaMerkel,Bundeskanzleramt,WillyBrandtStrae1,10557Berlin,
authorisedrepresentative:
Prof.Dr.UlrichHde,Lennstrae15,15234Frankfurt(Oder)
theFederalConstitutionalCourtSecondSenatewiththeparticipationofJustices
PresidentVokuhle,LbbeWolff,Gerhardt,Landau,Huber,Hermanns,Mller,KessalWulf
heldon14January2014asfollows:
I.Theproceedingsaresuspended.
II.PursuanttoArticle19section3letterboftheTreatyonEuropeanUnionandArticle267section1lettersaandboftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,thefollowingquestionsarereferredtotheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUnionforapreliminaryruling:
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a)IstheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactionsincompatiblewithArticle119andArticle127sections1and2oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion,andwithArticles17to24oftheProtocolontheStatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandoftheEuropeanCentralBank,becauseitexceedstheEuropeanCentralBanksmonetarypolicymandate,whichisregulatedintheabovementionedprovisions,andinfringesthepowersoftheMemberStates?
DoesatransgressionoftheEuropeanCentralBanksmandatefollowinparticularfromthefactthattheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012
aa)islinkedtoeconomicassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(conditionality)?
bb)envisagesthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonlyofselectedMemberStates(selectivity)?
cc)envisagesthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsofMemberStatesinadditiontoassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(parallelism)?dd)mightunderminethetermsandconditionsoftheassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(bypassing)?
b)IstheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactionsincompatiblewiththeprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingenshrinedinArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion?
IsthecompatibilitywithArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionprecludedinparticularbythefactthattheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012
aa)doesnotenvisagequantitativelimitsforthepurchaseofgovernmentbonds(volume)?
bb)doesnotenvisageacertaintimelagbetweentheemissionofgovernmentbondsontheprimarymarketandtheirpurchasebytheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksonthesecondarymarket(marketpricing)
cc)allowsthatallpurchasedgovernmentbondsmaybeheldtomaturity(interferencewithmarketlogic)?
dd)containsnospecificrequirementsforthecreditratingofthegovernmentbondsthataretobepurchased(defaultrisk)?
ee)envisagesequaltreatmentoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandprivateaswellasothergovernmentbondholders(debtcut)?
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InthealternativethattheCourtofJusticeoftheEuropeanUniondoesnotconsidertheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactionstobeanactofaninstitutionoftheEuropeanUnionandthusnotaqualifiedobjectforareferencepursuanttoArticle267section1letterboftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion:
a)AreArticle119andArticle127oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnionandArticles17to24oftheProtocolontheStatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandoftheEuropeanCentralBanktobeinterpretedinsuchawaythattheyalternativelyorcumulativelyallowtheEurosystem
aa)tomakethepurchaseofgovernmentbondscontingentontheexistenceandadherencetoeconomicassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(conditionality)?
bb)topurchasegovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStatesonly(selectivity)?
cc)topurchasegovernmentbondsofMemberStatesinadditiontoassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(parallelism)?dd)tounderminethetermsandconditionsoftheassistanceprogrammesoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism(bypassing)?b)Regardingtheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing:IsArticle123oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUniontobeinterpretedinsuchawaythattheEurosystemisallowedalternativelyorcumulativelyaa)topurchasegovernmentbondswithoutquantitativelimits(volume)?
bb)topurchasegovernmentbondswithoutaminimumtimelagaftertheiremissionontheprimarymarket(marketpricing)?
cc)toholdallpurchasedgovernmentbondstomaturity(interferencewithmarketlogic)?
dd)topurchasegovernmentbondswithoutminimumcreditratingrequirements(defaultrisk)?
ee)toacceptequaltreatmentoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandprivateaswellasothergovernmentbondholders(debtcut)?
ff)toinfluencepricingbycommunicatingtheintenttobuyorinotherways,coincidingwiththeemissionofgovernmentbondsbyMemberStatesoftheeurocurrencyarea(encouragementtopurchasenewlyissuedsecurities)?
Reasons:
A.FactsoftheCase
Inareasonableassessmentoftheirapplications,thecomplainantsandtheapplicantchallenge,complainantsItoIVviaconstitutionalcomplaintspursuanttoArt.93sec.1no.4aoftheBasicLaw(GrundgesetzGG),13no.8a,90etseq.oftheFederalConstitutionalCourtAct(BundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetzBVerfGG),andapplicantVviaOrganstreitproceedings[proceedingsrelatingtodisputesbetweenconstitutionalorgans]pursuanttoArt.93sec.1no.1GG,13no.5,63etseq.BVerfGG,first,interalia,theparticipationoftheGermanBundesbankintheimplementationoftheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactions,andsecondly,thattheGermanFederalGovernmentandtheGermanBundestagfailedtoactregardingtheDecisionoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankof6September2012onTechnicalFeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactions(hereinafter:OMTDecision).
I.SubjectMatteroftheProceedings
TheOMTDecisionenvisagesthatgovernmentbondsofselectedMemberStatescanbepurchaseduptoanunlimitedamountif,andaslongas,theseMemberStates,atthesametime,participateinareformprogrammeasagreeduponwiththeEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanism.ThestatedaimoftheOutrightMonetaryTransactionsistosafeguardanappropriatemonetarypolicytransmissionandtheconsistencyorsinglenessofthemonetarypolicy.TheMinutesofthe340thmeetingoftheGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBankon5and6September2012inFrankfurt/Mainreadinthisrespectasfollows:
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WithregardtoOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT),onaproposalfromthePresident,theGoverningCouncil:
(b)approvedthemainparametersoftheOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMT),whichwouldbesetoutinapressreleasetobepublishedafterthemeeting(Thursday,6September2012)
Thepressreleasewhichwaspublishedonthissubjecton6September2012hasthefollowingwording:
6September2012TechnicalfeaturesofOutrightMonetaryTransactions
Asannouncedon2August2012,theGoverningCounciloftheEuropeanCentralBank(ECB)hastodaytakendecisionsonanumberoftechnicalfeaturesregardingtheEurosystemsoutrighttransactionsinsecondarysovereignbondmarketsthataimatsafeguardinganappropriatemonetarypolicytransmissionandthesinglenessofthemonetarypolicy.ThesewillbeknownasOutrightMonetaryTransactions(OMTs)andwillbeconductedwithinthefollowingframework:
Conditionality
AnecessaryconditionforOutrightMonetaryTransactionsisstrictandeffectiveconditionalityattachedtoanappropriateEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacility/EuropeanStabilityMechanism(EFSF/ESM)programme.SuchprogrammescantaketheformofafullEFSF/ESMmacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammeoraprecautionaryprogramme(EnhancedConditionsCreditLine),providedthattheyincludethepossibilityofEFSF/ESMprimarymarketpurchases.TheinvolvementoftheIMFshallalsobesoughtforthedesignofthecountryspecificconditionalityandthemonitoringofsuchaprogramme.
TheGoverningCouncilwillconsiderOutrightMonetaryTransactionstotheextentthattheyarewarrantedfromamonetarypolicyperspectiveaslongasprogrammeconditionalityisfullyrespected,andterminatethemoncetheirobjectivesareachievedorwhenthereisnoncompliancewiththemacroeconomicadjustmentorprecautionaryprogramme.
Followingathoroughassessment,theGoverningCouncilwilldecideonthestart,continuationandsuspensionofOutrightMonetaryTransactionsinfulldiscretionandactinginaccordancewithitsmonetarypolicymandate.
Coverage
OutrightMonetaryTransactionswillbeconsideredforfuturecasesofEFSF/ESMmacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammesorprecautionaryprogrammesasspecifiedabove.TheymayalsobeconsideredforMemberStatescurrentlyunderamacroeconomicadjustmentprogrammewhentheywillberegainingbondmarketaccess.
Transactionswillbefocusedontheshorterpartoftheyieldcurve,andinparticularonsovereignbondswithamaturityofbetweenoneandthreeyears.
NoexantequantitativelimitsaresetonthesizeofOutrightMonetaryTransactions.
Creditortreatment
TheEurosystemintendstoclarifyinthelegalactconcerningOutrightMonetaryTransactionsthatitacceptsthesame(paripassu)treatmentasprivateorothercreditorswithrespecttobondsissuedbyeuroareacountriesandpurchasedbytheEurosystemthroughOutrightMonetaryTransactions,inaccordancewiththetermsofsuchbonds.
Sterilisation
TheliquiditycreatedthroughOutrightMonetaryTransactionswillbefullysterilised.
Transparency
AggregateOutrightMonetaryTransactionholdingsandtheirmarketvalueswillbepublishedonaweeklybasis.PublicationoftheaveragedurationofOutrightMonetaryTransactionholdingsandthebreakdownbycountrywilltakeplaceonamonthlybasis.
SecuritiesMarketsProgramme
FollowingtodaysdecisiononOutrightMonetaryTransactions,theSecuritiesMarketsProgramme(SMP)isherewithterminated.TheliquidityinjectedthroughtheSMPwillcontinuetobeabsorbedasinthepast,andtheexistingsecuritiesintheSMPportfoliowillbeheldtomaturity.
TheOMTDecisionhasnotyetbeenputintoeffect.
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II.HistoryoftheProceedings
1.SubmissionsoftheComplainantsandtheApplicant
ThecomplainantsandtheapplicantarguethattheFederalGovernmentandtheGermanBundestagareobligedtoworktowardsarepealoftheOMTDecision,oratleasttopreventitsimplementation,andthattheGermanBundesbankmaynottakepartiftheDecisionisputintoeffect.Theygivethefollowingreasonsforthisview:TheOMTDecisionisasocalledultraviresact.ItisnotcoveredbythemandateoftheEuropeanCentralBankpursuanttoArt.119,127etseq.oftheTreatyontheFunctioningoftheEuropeanUnion(TFEU)apartfromthis,itviolatestheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing(Art.123TFEU)andtheindependenceoftheEuropeanCentralBank.Thepurchaseofgovernmentbondsisonlypermittedwithintheframeworkofmonetarypolicy.Foranumberofreasons,however,theOMTDecisionisnotanactofmonetarypolicy.IttransgressestheboundariesofmonetarypolicyandviolatestheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancingofthebudgetbytheEuropeanCentralBankbyenvisagingthatonlybondsofselectedstateswillbepurchased,thatgovernmentbondswillbepurchasedforwhichnobuyersexistonthemarket,andthatthepurchaseofgovernmentbondswillbemadecontingentonpoliticalconditions,specificallyontheparticipationoftheMemberStatethatbenefitsinaprogrammeoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism.MonetarypolicymustrelatetotheentireeurocurrencyareaandmustbefreefromdiscriminationwithregardtoindividualMemberStatesoftheEurosystem.Atthesametime,linkingOMTpurchasestodecisionsoftheEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityoroftheEuropeanStabilityMechanismandtotheconditionalitiesagreedtothereincollideswiththeindependenceoftheEuropeanCentralBank.Thereareinfactnoupheavalsonthegovernmentbondmarkets,whicharerequiredforaninterventionoftheEuropeanCentralBank.TheOMTDecisionamountstoasuspensionofthemarketmechanismswhichviolatestheTreaties.TheEuropeanCentralBankdoesnothaveamandatetodefendtheeurobyanymeans,includingthosethatleadtolargescaleredistributionsbetweenbanksandtaxpayersandbetweentaxpayersofdifferentMemberStatesinthisrespect,itdoesnotenjoysufficientdemocraticlegitimation.ThetransferofsovereignpowerstotheindependentEuropeanCentralBankhasonlybeenpoliticallyauthorisedandconstitutionallyapprovedundertheconditionthatitwouldbelimitedtotheareaofmonetarypolicy.SincetheOMTDecisioncancreateliabilityandpaymentrisksaffectingthefederalbudgettosuchanextentthattheoverallbudgetaryresponsibilityoftheGermanBundestag,andthusalsoitsbudgetaryrights,canbeimpaired,thedecisionalsoviolatestheprincipleofdemocracyenshrinedinArt.20sec.1and2GG,andimpairstheconstitutionalidentityoftheBasicLaw,whichtheeternityclauseofArt.79sec.3GGprotectsnotonlyagainstamendmentsoftheConstitutionbutalsoagainstanerosionintheprocessofEuropeanintegration.
2.StatementsSubmittedbytheEuropeanCentralBankandtheGermanBundesbank
IntheproceedingsbeforetheFederalConstitutionalCourt,theEuropeanCentralBankandtheGermanBundesbankhavesubmittedstatements.
a)AccordingtotheEuropeanCentralBank,theOMTDecisioniscoveredbyitsmandateanddoesnotviolatetheprohibitionofmonetaryfinancing.ItsmonetarypolicyisnolongerappropriatelyimplementedintheMemberStatesoftheeurocurrencyareabecausethesocalledmonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismisdisrupted.Inparticular,thelinkbetweenthekeyinterestrateandthebankinterestratesisimpaired.Unfoundedfearsofinvestorswithregardtothereversibilityoftheeurohaveresultedinunjustifiedinterestspreads.TheOutrightMonetaryTransactionswereintendedtoneutralisethesespreads.TherequirementforthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonthebasisoftheOMTDecisionisthatthebenefittingMemberStatehasenteredintoagreementswiththeEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityorwiththeEuropeanStabilityMechanismonmacroeconomic,structural,budgetaryandfinancialpolicyreforms,andcomplieswiththeagreements.TheOutrightMonetaryTransactionsareonlyintendedtocutoffunjustifiedinterestratehikes.IfaMemberStatedoesnotcomplywithitsobligations,thepurchasesweretobestopped,evenifthiswillresultinmajoreconomicdifficultiesfortheMemberStateconcerned.AnotherconditionisthattheMemberStatehas,orregains,accesstothebondmarketsothatthefiscallydiscipliningeffectoftheinterestratemechanismisupheld.
TheEuropeanCentralBankfurtherstatesthattheEurosystemwillnotclaimpreferredcreditorstatuswithregardtothegovernmentbondspurchasedonthebasisoftheOMTDecision.WhiletheEuropeanCentralBankobjectstoagreeingtoadebtcutandtocompletelyorpartiallywaivingclaimsagainsttheMemberStatesconcerned,itwouldacceptequaltreatmentwithotherownersif,inameetingofcreditors,amajorityvotedinfavourofadebtcut.
TheEuropeanCentralBankarguesthatconsideringtheSpanish,Italian,IrishandPortuguesebondsonthemarket,thepotentialvolumeofpurchasesonthebasisoftheOMTDecisionwouldcurrentlyamounttoapproximatelyEUR524000000000(statusof7December2012).TheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksdoesnot,however,intendtopurchasethemaximumpossibleamountofthesebonds,butcannotpublishtheenvisagedamountfortacticalreasons.
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TheEuropeanCentralBankfurtherstatesthatimmediatelybeforeandaftertheemissionofgovernmentbonds,thereshallbenopurchasesonthesecondarymarketsothatamarketpricecanbeformedanappropriatetimelagofsomedayswillbeobservedforthis.Theexactlockingperiodwillbedeterminedinaguideline,butnotbepublished.
TheEuropeanCentralBankfurtherarguesthattheOMTDecisioncanbebasedonArt.18.1.oftheProtocolontheStatuteoftheEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksandoftheEuropeanCentralBank(hereinafter:ESCBStatute).ThepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonthesecondarymarketdoesnotservetofinancethebudgetsoftherespectiveMemberStatesindependentfromthefinancialmarkets,anditisnotaimedatrenderingmarketincentivesineffectiveitisaimedatadaptinginterestratelevelstonormalmarketactivities.Moreover,theEuropeanSystemofCentralBanksiscalledupontosupportthegeneraleconomicpoliciesintheEuropeanUniontotheextentthatthisdoesnotconflictwithmaintainingpricestability.However,theEuropeanCentralBankisindependentinthisrespect(Art.130TFEU,Art.7ESCBStatute)andwillalwaysundertakeanautonomousanalysisoftheoverallsituation.
AccordingtotheEuropeanCentralBank,thereisnoliabilityriskforthenationalbudgetsbecausetheEuropeanSystemofCentralBankshasensuredsufficientriskprevention,mostlythroughprovisionsandreserves.Iflossesoccurnevertheless,theycanbecarriedforwardandbalancedwithrevenuesinthefollowingyears.
b)IntheviewoftheGermanBundesbank,theassumptionofadisruptiontothemonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismisquestionableanddoesnotjustifytheOMTDecision.AccordingtotheGermanBundesbank,interestspreadsongovernmentbondscannotbesplitintoeitherjustifiedorirrationalcomponents.ApoorereconomicdevelopmentinaMemberStatejustifiesahigherinterestspread.ThefactthatadisruptiontothemonetarypolicytransmissionmechanismshallbetoleratedifaMemberStatedoesnotcomplywithitsobligationsunderagreementswiththeEuropeanFinancialStabilityFacilityortheEuropeanStabilityMechanismshowsthattheOMTDecisionisinfactnotabouttheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicy.
TheGermanBundesbankarguesthatthepurchaseofgovernmentbondsonthesecondarymarketcanalsodisconnectthebenefittingstatesfinancingtermsfromthefinancialmarketifthemarketparticipantscanrelyonbeingabletoselltheirgovernmentbondstotheEurosystematanytime.Thesoonersuchpurchasesaremadeafterissuing,andthehigherthepurchasevolume,thelowertherisk.Moreover,alargescalepurchaseofgovernmentbondscarriesconsiderableriskandcanleadtoaneverincreasingamountofaMemberStatesdebtsbeingassumedbytheEurosystem.
TheGermanBundesbankfurtheraddsthateverylossitincursburdenstheGermanfederalbudget,sothattherisksensuingfrompurchasesofgovernmentbondsbytheEurosystemarenodifferent,ineconomicterms,fromthoseoftheEuropeanStabilityMechanism.UnliketheEuropeanStabilityMechanism,theEurosystem,however,lacksparliamentarymonitoring.
III.RelevantLegalProvisionsandJurisprudence
1.LegalProvisions
TherelevantArticlesoftheBasicLawfortheFederalRepublicofGermanyof23May1949,mostrecentlyamendedbythe59thActAmendingtheBasicLaw(59.GesetzzurnderungdesGrundgesetzes)of11July2012(FederalLawGazette,BundesgesetzblattBGBlIp.1478)readasfollows:(AtranslationoftheBasicLawprovidedbytheFederalMinistryofJusticeandConsumerProtectioncanbefoundonline:
http://www.gesetzeiminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html[http://www.gesetzeiminternet.de/englisch_gg/index.html]
.)
Art.20
(1)TheFederalRepublicofGermanyisademocraticandsocialfederalstate.
(2)Allstateauthorityisderivedfromthepeople.Itshallbeexercisedbythepeoplethroughelectionsandothervotesandthroughspecificlegislative,executiveandjudicialbodies.
(3)Thelegislatureshallbeboundbytheconstitutionalorder,theexecutiveandthejudiciarybylawandjustice.
(4)