bunge - critica a dialectica

About Mario Bunge's 'A Critical Examination of Dialectics'Author(s): Pavel ApostolSource: Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Feb., 1985), pp. 89-136Published by: SpringerStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20099996Accessed: 31/10/2010 15:41

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fPAVEL AP?STOL

ABOUT MARIO BUNGE'S 'A CRITICAL EXAMINATION

OF DIALECTICS'

We submit to analysis Mario Bunge's 4A Critical Examination of Dialectics', which sums up and develops objections, some of which appeared previously in his Method, Model and Matter (1973).

Our comments have to do with this text.1 The admissibility of some of

Bunge's theses and the rejection of some others seems to us to be justifiable from the point of view of a theoretical horizon which cannot be described, now and in this context in all of its logical articulations, but which represents a tacit supposition of our argumentation. This theoretical horizon, equivalent to thinking through and constructing a new version of Marxian dialectics,

will be briefly outlined at the end of our study.

0. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

0.1 The fact that we have chosen Bunge in this context is no mere whim. As

a matter of fact, he himself seems to await such a retort, when he writes:

"Should anyone feel dissatisfied with this version, he is welcome to produce a

more satisfactory formulation. In fact it is high time that somebody did it."

(p. 64). Confrontation with Bunge in this matter presents two advantages:

(a) his argumentation is formulated with sufficient precision to permit a

profitable discussion, and

(b) his position is representative of some more recent orientations which

have assimilated acquisitions of the research on foundations of science and

those of analytic philosophy (in the large sense given to the term by W.

Stegm?ller).2 0.2 The discussion evolves in extremely difficult conditions which add to

the usual difficulties which accompany philosophic rhetoric.

Without agreeing in many other respects with Jean-Fran?ois Revel, we will

acknowledge that "philosophy is the last domain to perpetuate two strong illusions: religion and rhetoric - from which modern thinking in other

intellectual fields has tended and partially succeeded in liberating the human

spirit."3 We have to recognize openly that as regards dialectics we often

Studies in Soviet Thought 29 (1985) 89-136. 0039-3797/85/0292-0089 $04.80. ? 1985 by D. Reidel Publishing Company.

90 PAVEL AP?STOL

witness some unpleasant outbursts of religious dogmatism or of rhetorical

excesses. While Bunge's discourse is undogmatic it avoids the pitfalls of idle

rhetoric.

0.3 As a rule - and the author of these lines was no exception to this in

the past4 ? the Marxist and the Marxist-Leninist or Hegelian dialectics are

approached as if we possessed elaborated theories of Hegel, Marx, Engels or Lenin about dialectics. But, on the contrary, as Dieter Henrich notes

in his exegeses on Hegel's work: even in Hegel's monumental Science of

Logic, published 170 years ago, we find a logical practice', but neither an

'elaborated concept of the dialectical method', nor 'the law of unfolding' of

its operations, or even the statement of 'the peculiar conditions of then

application'.5 Similar remarks are to be made also with respect to Marx,

Engels, or Lenin. Certainly, we find also in their works isolated propositions about dialectics - with really remarkable differences concerning how they are understood. There are no elaborated theories on it. Yet we find in their

works a 'logical practice' of dialectics, embodied in the social research they did. This 'logical practice' can be considered as so many interpretations of some abstract patterns of dialectics; but, since the latter have not been

explicitly formulated, the detecting of these patterns within the framework

of their interpretation is such a difficult task that it is often equivalent to

an invention.

0.4 On the contrary, we retain a didactically operational concept of

dialectics ?

elaborated, of course, with reference to some theses of Marx,

Engels, and Lenin ? as a substitute for a theoretical concept of dialectics.

That 'didactic-operational concept of dialectics' represents a mere narrative

texture, in which are integrated quotations isolated from contexts and

expressed through different terminologies and in various languages. This didactically operational pattern of dialectics - which is to be found

in a great number of current handbooks and treatises - is largely indebted

to the exposition attributed to J. V. Stalin (in which can be easily discovered

elements from Adorackij and Rozenthal's lectures of the 1930s).6 The

Stalinian pattern is undoubtedly indebted to the mechanical-deterministic

interpretation of historical materialism, as formulated by K. Kautsky.7 0.50 Should then the discussion about dialectics be a mere scholastic

dispute about a pseudo-concept? Of course, not! Due to the ruse of 'historical'

reason {die List der Vernunft), present-day practice and theory-construction demand a discussion about the elaboration or re-elaboration of the concept of

MARIO BUNGE ON DIALECTICS 91

dialectics in order to meet both practical and theoretical needs. We will

enumerate these requirements. 0.51 One finds the acceleration and increasing complexity of today's

social processes and, especially, the need to invent new strategies of radical

transformation, without which there will be no democratic and socialist

issue from the present planetary crisis of civilization. These new revolutionary

strategies are asking for a conceptual and methodological framework which

actually means a new quest for a more flexible, more articulated, more open

dialectics, than the old didactical concept that somehow had been canonized.

The fact is that even the very complicated, troubled situations which

confront management and planning in democratic and socialist super-in dustrialized countries also require a new thinking oriented on dialectics.

There are, for example, the achievements of C. West Churchman's school of

operational research which brings about, in practice, a validation of the idea

of dialectically programmed "inquiry systems", of a dialectical theory of

decision, management and planning.8 Present-day practice and the actual solu

tions of its problems leads one to rethink dialectics anew, in an operational sense. No less relevant seems to me the recent trend in American political science and international studies to resort to dialectical epistemologies and

methodologies for capturing in concepts the diverging and/or converging

asymetrical interdependencies that prevail on the global scene.9

0.52 This social need is normal. Practice demands programs of efficient

(or good) action even if these do not provide analytic problem-solving algo rithms since social problems which accumulate at a very rapid rate and

exert an ever-rising and sometimes overwhelming pressure for their solution

are, in a mathematical sense, "ill-formulated" or "ill-raised" problems.10

Coping with these presupposes a continuous reflexive return to the problem's

wording,11 because the most infinitesmal variation in the initial data can pro voke excessive variations at the level of approximated solutions. Mathematics

approaches the matter of ill-formulated problems (that deny linearization) in two ways which seem to be productive: the logic of fuzzy theory12, the

logic of exact operations with terms that designate by definition inexact

(i.e. fuzzy) concepts: and the mathematical theory of morphogenesis, T.

Thorn's13 theory of "catastrophes", an exact (i.e. topological) theory of

"qualitative leaps" (structure-building and structure-demolishing, stabilizing and destabilizing change).

This confluence of some practical requirements with the elaboration of

92 PAVEL AP?STOL

some suitable mathematical instruments necessarily leads, of course, to a

new defining of the essential concepts of dialectics.

0.53 Scientists' thinking about the foundations of their disciplines has

flowed in two directions: (a) an analytic one, deeply rooted in epistemic prob lems for which solutions are found through adequately applied algorithms or

arithmomorphic formulae (after the terminology of N. Georgescu-Roegen)14 and (b) a dialectical one, in the large sense attributed to the term by F.

Gonseth and his review, Dial?ctica15, especially interested in epistemic

problems that resist a purely analytic approach: problems belonging to the

domain of scientific theory-construction, to that of foundations, and basic

concepts of science in interaction with experiment and practice.

Looking at the problem more deeply, the very evolution of the analytic

approach has also been characterized by a drift towards dialectics (Popper, the latter Wittgenstein)16, and by the relativization of the synchronie per

spectives because of the search for the diachronicity of scientific theories.17

0.54 Philosophic thought itself has led to ever new discoveries and inven

tions in dialectics.

First of all, the Hegelian and the more recent Marxian exegeses have funda

mentally changed the earlier naive images of dialectics. Today we are aware of

the extreme difficulties in interpreting these texts and especially in explaining in an acceptable manner "the logical practice' characteristic of Hegel, Marx

or others.18

On the other hand, there are the attempts to formalize the Hegelian dialectics ? I mean, especially, the works of G. G?nther, L. S. Rogowski,

M. Kosok and D. Dubarle.19 Even if they have not led so far to generally

accepted results, they have succeeded in pointing out: (a) the possibility of describing in a precise language a certain 'logical practice' belonging to

dialectics, and (b) the existence of some specific dialectical approaches (what we actually defined in 1964 as "dialectically operating with 'formal' logical structures and operations", valid or productive from an epistemic point of view, but unfounded from the point of view of conventional logical

formalism).

Third, the very process of proliferation of conceiving different visions or

perspectives about dialectics constitutes the practical proof that several

dialectics are possible, differentiated enough so that they not be totally and

directly derived one from the other 20, and creates a space ? or a "theoretical

topos", as Althusser calls it ? for a reflection on dialectics. I mean by this an


approach in philosophic theory-building similar to that for creating in science

a metatheory with regard to certain theories. In some previous works, I defined

such an approach as a quasi-meta-theoretical one. In the interpretation I gave to Marx' position versus Hegel's dialectics I discovered elements of such a

meta-approach; namely Marx does not merely oppose his dialectics to that

of Hegel, but considers that in his own conception about dialectics that of

Hegel can be meaningfully interpreted. Such an approach seems to me to

offer the further possibility of constructing other dialectics.21

Finally, the very confrontation between Marxist philosophy and anti

Marxist thought ? where the latter raises the question of the responsibility

of Marxian theory for any social practice that claims to derive from it -

presupposes dialectics.22

These are some practical grounds ?

including the contemporary ideo

logical practice ? which justify the present discussion. I assert this in the

name of the concept of dialectics which I draw from Marx' work compared to that of Hegel, and not in the name of a definitive 'Marxist' or 'Leninist'

dialectics.

1. THE GENERAL THESES OF MARIO BUNGE

1.1 Dialectics is an ontological theory. 1.21 This dialectical ontology has a 'plausible kernel' constituted by two

hypotheses: 1.211 Everything is in some process of change or other, and

1.212 New qualities emerge at certain moments of any process. But,

1.22 this 'plausible kernel' is surrounded by a 'mystic fog\ consisting

mainly in the assertion of the following three theses:

1.221 In rapport with every object (thing) there is an anti-object (anti

thing). 1.222 All opposites are in continuous conflict with each other, this

"conflict resulting either in the annihilation of one of them, or in some new

object synthesizing both contradictories".

1.223 Every stage in a development negates the previous one and, fur

thermore, two successive negations of this kind lead to a stage similar, but

somehow superior, to the original one (p. 63).

94 PAVEL AP?STOL

2. THE GENERAL CRITICISM OF DIALECTICS BY MARIO BUNGE

As concerns 'the plausible kernel' of dialectics taken as ontology, in the

formulation that it was given, 2.1 it is

? as Bunge states ? a common thesis for every process meta

physics (as a theory of existence, or ontology). 2.2 In order to delimit dialectics against any process metaphysics, it has

to be expanded into "a general (and consistent) theory" (ontology). As to 'the mystic fog' that wraps dialectics, it proceeds from

2.3 the use of ambiguous expressions, such as "dialectical negation" and

"dialectical opposition".

Bunge thinks that by reducing somewhat the ambiguity of the terms

(indicated in 2.3) we can obtain "an intelligible doctrine", which is not

dialectics in its present form, but

2.41 this would be a "weaker dialectics" which could not claim univer

sality, necessity, essentiality; and would be

2.42 "at best", a limit-case of a richer theory of transformation.

3. FIRST CRITICAL REMARK WITH A VIEW TO MARIO BUNGE'S

CRITICISM

3.10 In discussing dialectics, Bunge has in view some formulations of it given

by Hegel, Engels, and Lenin, as well as by I. Narski, G. Pawelzig, and G.

Stiehler.23

3.11 Dialectics is examined by Bunge as ontology (i.e. as universal),

although 3.12 in the intellectual constructs defining themselves as dialectics, it

appears explicitly in this sense only among certain authors; 3.13 others understand it as ontology and epistemology and methodology,

and even as logic (but not formal logic); other authors, 3.14 once again, dispute precisely its status as a universal ontology,

accepting only the other senses of dialectics (enumerated at 3.13.). Some

admit

3.15 dialectics only as social (historical) ontology, or

3.16 as social ontology, epistemology, methodology and logic of social

research, or

3.17 only as epistemology and/or methodology (or logic with a special

meaning) of social cognition. Finally, it is understood


3.18 as epistemology and or methodology and/or logic of philosophic

thinking.24 3.2 The result is that 'the critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge

concerns neither dialectics as such nor dialecticsas a generic term, designating the ensemble of dialectics explicitly formulated in the literature, but

3.3 a pattern of dialectics built up by Bunge and relying on his free inter

pretation of a rather arbitrary selection of texts and authors with a quite

unequal degree of representativity. 3.4 Without any exaggeration, one can assert that 'the critical examina

tion of dialectics' by Mario Bunge concerns rather what we called (0.4.) 'the

didactic-operational concept of dialectics' ? often met with in treatises,

handbooks or monographs ? but even this one has been considered by him

only in a very narrow sense, in the light of the restriction introduced ad hoc

through which dialectics is identified with universal ontology ? a restriction

which is not applied, as a rule, in the writings consulted.

Since 'the critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge operates with this

restriction, it does not relate to any possible dialectics, and, therefore, cannot

be considered a criticism of the actual or possible pattern of 'logical practice'

incorporated in Hegel's work, on the one hand, or in that of Marx, Engels, or

Lenin, on the other hand, and still less of that incorporated or developed in

the writings of Gramsci, Luk?cs, Bloch, Raphael, Adorno, Gurvitch, Sartre, Delia Volpe, De George, Bahm, Althusser, Markovic, etc.

3.5 This does not yet mean that the objections mentioned by Bunge do

not deserve our attention, although they cannot aspire to the generality which they suggest.

4. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FIRST CRITICAL REMARK

We have seen (0.54.) that, in fact, there are

4.11 many possible interpretations of some of the intellectual constructs

that present themselves and/or are defined by the scientific and philosophic

community as 'dialectical' and, at the same time, that there is

4.12 a diversity of concepts about dialectics.

4.13 We will designate this situation: 'the diversity of dialectics'.

4.20 The diversity of dialectics can be put in order:

4.21 in accordance with, either the author of a discourse about dialectics, or of a work in which one can decipher a certain 'logical practice' of dialectics.

96 PAVEL AP?STOL

Thus, we will speak about various types of dialectics: Heraclitian, Platonic,

Aristotelian, . . . Hegelian, Fichtean, . . .

Marxian, Engelsian, Leninist, . . .

Gramscian, Sartrean, Luk?csian, etc., etc.;

4.22 in accordance with the philosophic domain where a certain dialectics

is found. We distinguish different levels of dialectics: dialectical ontology,

epistemology and, in a wider sense, methodology as well as "logic".25 4.23 Finally, admitting the possibility of some regional dialectical onto

logies, without accepting thereby the legitimacy of a general or fundamental

ontology, from which these could be derived, one can differentiate among diverse dialectical fields: dialectics of history, of society, of communication, etc.

4.30 A certain theoretical construct can refer to

4.31 either a certain type, 4.32 or a certain level,

4.33 or a certain dialectical field, 4.34 or different possible combinations of these.

4.4 The generic term 'dialectics' designates the set of the sets enumerated

at 4.31-4.34.

4.5 We postulate, as an assumption which is to be checked, the possibility of building one or more meta-dialectics

? quasi-meta-theories in the sense

shown at 0.54 ? within which different dialectics could be meaningfully

interpreted and reformulated with relatively satisfactory precision.

5. A SHORT HISTORICAL EXCURSUS: THE PROBLEM OF

DIALECTICS AS GENERAL (FUNDAMENTAL) ONTOLOGY

5.1 The understanding of dialectics as a general ontology and its identity, as such, with the process and theory of knowledge, method and logic, is

constitutive for the absolute idealism of G. W. F. Hegel: Absolute Spirit is the ground and the fulfillment of its own self-development, this 'develop

ment' is for Hegel the essence of dialectics.26

5.2 But even in Hegelian philosophy, dialectics, understood as ontology, cannot be dealt with, as is done in the paper of Bunge, independently from dialectics conceived as method, logic, process and theory of cognition.

5.30 Marx critically examined Hegel's dialectics of the Absolute21. His

criticism includes some elements of a possible (quasi-meta-theoretical) inter

pretation of the Hegelian dialectics, as part of which the Hegelian dialectics


is relativized (it is ascribed a definite domain of validity: the philosophy of

absolute idealism), but, at the same time,

5.31 I consider the Marxian approach to be asserting the possibility of

some other dialectics than what Marx calls the real one.

S32 This assertion can be bolstered by outlining a meta-approach (meta

dialectics, quasi-meta-theory of dialectics), in which can be meaningfully

interpreted not only the Hegelian version, but also any other possible dia

lectics.28 One can then identify, in Marx,

5.33 'the logical practice' of a dialectics of the real ? the dialectical

theory of the classical capitalistic economy's development, 5.34 the outlining of a dialectical theory of social development, 'the

materialistic view of history', and

5.35 the elements of an epistemology, methodology, and logic of social

sciences, from among which 'the critique of ideologies' represents a major contribution.29

5.36 But we do not find, in Marx, any explicit reference to dialectics as

universal ontology. It seems that such an intellectual enterprise appeared to

him both useless and impracticable. 5.37 This last supposition can be argued indirectly, namely, 5.38 when Marx makes up the regional ontology of a social-economic

structure (i.e. capitalism) in its development, he resorts in an authentically critical way30 to a tridimensional approach:

(a) the study of the economic (and social) phenomenon as human

activity = das Ding-fiir-uns,

(b) its confrontation with the intellectual constructions which different

authors and 'theoreticians' (ideologists) of the economic process elaborate

with reference to this activity (= authentic or inauthentic; ideological, in a

negative sense) of knowledge and

(c) the study of the practice under both of its aspects, material (a) and

ideal (b) in order to reveal whether das Ding, as it showed itself to the actors, is independent of their will or wish; and, therefore, that the relevant action

programs are feasible or not.

5.39 It seems, therefore, plausible to suggest that Marx did not allow for

the dogmatic construction of an ontology, separated from the relevant

epistemologies and practices, in which both of them are found and in which

alone they could be captured. 5.40 The position of Engels is somewhat different. On the one hand,

98 PAVEL AP?STOL

5.41 he contests even the possibility as well as the utility of universal

ontology31, but admits of three correlated regional ontologies: nature,

society, thinking (knowledge). On the other hand, 5.42 he still speaks about dialectics in the sense of universal ontology of

developmental processes (the 'objective' dialectics) but only in interdepen dence with an epistemology and a methodology (the 'subjective' dialectics), both of which are continuously correlated with social-historical practice.

5.43 Anyhow, when Engels writes about dialectics as a universal theory of development, from his point of view this is not a universal ontology of the traditional type, but can actually be interpreted rather as a theory,

comparing descriptions and scientific theories dealing with peculiar devel

opments. Therefore, it is universal but conditioned; namely comparing

particular theories or case-descriptions of some developmental processes.

5.50 As concerns Lenin's outlook, this has to be drawn especially from

his Philosophic Notebooks as well as from the study of the 'logical practice' of dialectics in his social (economic, sociological, politological) research.

But the formulations from the Philosophic Notebooks cannot be taken

into account as such: they are reading notes, within which formulations

from the text cited often interfere. That is why their interpretation increases

the difficulties. We will mention the meanings that seem principal to us:

5.51 Lenin defines dialectics, in his well-known article about Karl Marx,

published in the Granat Encyclopaedia, as the "formulation of the prin

ciple of development", in nature and society, in the theory of cognition

(of cognition's development), as well as in methodology.32 In the Philo

sophic Notebooks dialectics is also defined as logic (different from formal

logic33). 5.52 Sometimes, Lenin seems to admit the Hegelian position of identity

(in a sense typical of dialectics: concrete, 'contradictory identity') of logic, dialectics and theory of cognition.34

5.6 On the contrary, many authors, acknowledged as dialecticians of

Marxian expression ? as A. Gramsci35, G. Luk?cs36, L. Goldmann37 and

H. Lef?bvre38, et al. ? interpret dialectics mainly as social (human) method

and ontology. 5.7 In the above examples, dialectics cannot be interpreted as universal

ontology, as Bunge seems to think.


6. COUNTER-ARGUMENT

6.11 Although Bunge's thesis about dialectics as universal ontology is not

consistent with the examples and interpretations above, it is abusive only because of its claim to characterize any dialectics at all.

6.12 The thesis mentioned at 6.11 above is legitimate ? with some

restrictions as shown above (5.1?5.2) ? for Hegelian philosophy and others

that are similar (absolute idealism, objective idealism, etc.) 6.13 It is also compatible with some formulations found in Engels' and

Lenin's writings (and in those of some others who have taken over such an

interpretation), although, as has been shown (5.4 and 5.5), the general spirit of these works does not admit

6.131 the equivalence between dialectics and universal ontology nor

6.132 the interpretation of (universal) ontology without its connection

with cognition (epistemology, methodology, logic) and practice. 6.20 Even if the definition of dialectics as universal ontology is extremely

problematic, sometimes (with Hegel, for instance) this thesis is consistent

with an idealist, objective philosophic standpoint. Sometimes (in some of

Engels' and Lenin's formulations) it is necessary to specify the meaning of

the interpretation of some formulae. For example, dialectics is the general view on the development of nature, society, knowledge (thinking), i.e.

dialectics = the theory of development. 6.21 Considering Marx' and Lenin's or Engels' general conception, one

interpretation has to be excluded from the very beginning; namely that

proposed by Bunge: dialectics as universal ontology (theory of any possible and actual, past, present and future existent [das Seiende] ?. Like the pre vious speculative metaphysics out of which could be derived any particular kind of existence or existent, this will not hold. Against such an interpre tation one can quote unambiguous texts.

6.22 The texts which do not leave out the understanding of dialectics

as ontology do not refer to any existent or any existence, but to and only to existents in development and destruction, or to the development and

destruction of existents, or, in other words, it refers to existents in so far as

these represent constituent moments in some processes of development (and

destruction), and therefore could be intelligible only as such.

[Here and in what follows, I differentiate change (any observable variation

of state, properties, relations) from transformation (any observable variation

100 PAVEL AP?STOL

of structural i.e. qualitative determinations) and from development (a series

of oriented transformations, for instance from simple to complex, from the

embryo to the grown-up individual, etc.)] 6.231 Postulating that 'all that exists' is, finally, a moment of a devel

opment (and destruction) process, a hypothesis can be formulated that it

is possible to build up a general substantive theory of development (and

destruction)..

6.232 In this case, it has to be demonstrated that such a general theory is also necessary, from a certain point of view, in comparison to particular theories of development (and destruction) regarding certain ontological

regions.

6.24 Independently of the way in which we specify the meaning assigned to the expression "general theory of development (and destruction)", at least

in the works of Engels or Lenin, this theoretical position is not constructed

by replying only on direct observations of development (of some processes of development and destruction), but by confronting such observations with

valid (verified or verifiable, tested or testable, confirmed or confirmable,

etc.) scientific descriptions or theories, as parts of a certain social-historical

praxis.

6.25 Such an intellectual construct (as that shown in 6.24) is logically and

historically subsequent to the particular scientific theories about development and destruction and to the social-historical practices within which these have

been formulated.

6.26 The situation presented at 6.25 evinces (as shown also in 5.32) remarkable analogies with the function of meta-mathematics vis-?-vis mathe

matics, and of a meta-theory vis-?-vis a theory (or theories). That is why, 6.27 we can specify dialectics (in the sense of 6.24) as a construct be

longing to the foundations of any conceptualization of development and

destruction as such, carrying out toward them a function similar to that of

a meta-theory toward a theory.

6.28 Thus, dialectics is concerned with the conditions for making develop ment and destruction intelligible and, as such, underlies any conception or

intellectual construct that refers to these.

6.29 Taking into account the considerations mentioned above, it turns

out that dialectics ? even when interpreted as an ontology ? does not refer

to 'things' ('phenomena', 'complexes', 'systems' are preferable terms) but to

the development and destruction of these and, consequently, it cannot be


well-formulated in an objectifying (verdinglichende, chosifiant) language, as done by Bunge.

6.30 Dialectics can be interpreted as an ontology (of development and

destruction of complexes, of systems, etc.) in the manner of the logic of

science and contemporary epistemology which associate with each theory the respective ontology not as a description of the object as such, but as

a description of the object of a certain theory (or an intellectual construct) within the framework of an approach that leaves out the practical (existential,

pragmatic) relationship among the theory, the object of the theory, and the

object of the praxis, with which the object of the theory and the respective

theory ought to be associated.

6.31 In this sense, which is not yet to be explicitly found in texts of

some authors dealing with dialectics, one can assert that dialectics is also

an ontology of development and destruction.

6.32 But, even on this hypothesis, its principles cannot be formulated in

the language used by Bunge (and described at 6.29). 6.40 Since the dialectics of Marx, Engels or Lenin have been formulated

within the Weltanschauung of a revolutionary movement, one may ask

6.41 whether the 'materialist dialectics' or 'dialectical materialism', understood as universal ontology, is necessary for its legitimation?

6.420 There are at least three reasons for not answering 6.41 in the

affirmative.

6.421 First of all, there is a historical reason. The elaboration of Marx'

(and Engels') conception proceeds from the study of social praxis (the con

dition of the working-class in capitalist society and its fights for the improve ment of its own status) and not from a purely revealed dialectics of the

development and implicitly of the destruction of some social 'systems' (the materialist conception of history), as well as the dialectics of the cognitive

process about these. This dialectics of development and destruction of the

forms of human societies and of the adequate scientific and ideological constructs grounded the option for revolutionary action. Only after drawing this conclusion did the analysis of some scientific theories ?

especially in

Engels' work - bring out, in connection with these, a dialectics inherent in

the scientific image of the world (= nature), meaning a reconstitution of 'a

dialectics of nature' (in the sense of 6.3). With the help of a reflection about

scientific issues, therefore, from a historical standpoint, the revolutionary

conception and action could be unfounded ? and was argued as such by

102 PAVEL AP?STOL

Marx and Engels ?

before the elaboration of a 'dialectics of nature' The

latter, subsequently supported, in their eyes, the plausibility of the former.

6.422 Secondly, the validity of revolutionary conclusions emerge for

them from the social dialectics, the development and destruction of some

social realia and from the mental reproduction of these (theories, quasi

theories, ideologies) and do not result and cannot result from some charac

teristics of nature (non-society). With respect to this, from a logical point of

view, revolutionary conclusions are free from the admission or non-admission

of a dialectics of nature or from that of a dialectics understood as universal

ontology. 6.423 Finally, one could construct a (idealistic-objective, for instance)

dialectics of nature and of the Universe, as Teilhard de Chardin did, which

does not come to social-revolutionary consequences.

7. BUNGE'S FORMULATION OF 'THE PRINCIPLES OF

DIALECTICAL ONTOLOGY'

7.1. The principles of dialectical ontology are formulated by Bunge in a

language which I designated as being (6.29) objectifying and which I charac

terized as improper for meaningfully expressing any other interpretation of

dialectics than that of their author.

7.2 Bunge formulates five principles of dialectical ontology in as many

definitions (p. 64), to which he also adds some derived definitions (pp. 64,

67, 69, 70) and some corollaries. These five definitions and the corresponding derivatives are:

Dl : "Everything has an opposite." Dla: "For every thing (concrete object) there is an anti-thing." Dlb: "For every property of concrete objects there is an anti-property."

This definition has also a Sveaker' form (p. 67):

Die: "For some properties there are others (called their anti-properties) that counteract or neutralize the former."

D2: "Every object is inherently contradictory, i.e. constituted by

mutually opposing components and aspects."


Here also there is a Veaker' formulation (p. 69):

D2a: "Some systems have components that oppose one aspect in some

other system."

D3 : "Every change is the outcome of the tension of struggle of oppo

sites, whether within the system of interest or among different

systems."

Once more, the statement of the principle will be proposed in a 'weaker'

variant (p. 70):

D3a: "Some changes are brought about by the opposition (in some

respects) of different things or different components of one and

the same thing."

D4: "Development is a helix, every level of which contains, and at

the same time negates, the previous rung."

D5: "Every quantitative change ends up in some qualitative change and every new quality has its own new mode of quantitative

change."

7.3 It is obvious that Dl, D2, and D3 reproduce the content of textbooks

of dialectics, and treatises of dialectical materialism call them the principle or the law of "dialectical contradiction", of "unity and fight of contraries"

(or of opposites, as Anglo-Saxon authors would rather say).39 D4 corre

sponds to the principle or law of 'negation of the negation', while D5 is

the principle or law of 'the leap from quantitative changes to qualitative transformations'.

7.4 For Bunge only Dl, D2, and D3 are 'typical' of dialectics.

8. BUNGE'S ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF HIS CRITICISM OF

DIALECTICS

8.10 As regards each of the suggested definitions of dialectics and, especially,

Dl, D2, and D3, Bunge brings arguments aimed to prove 8.11 the groundless claim to universality.

Let us examine these arguments.

8.20 As regards Dl, (and Dla and Dlb), Bunge shows, and he is per

fectly right, that the definitions formulated in propositions using the terms

104 PAVEL AP?STOL

"anti-object" and "anti-property" (pp. 64?65, respectively 65?68) are

meaningless (are inconsistent, bring about formal contradictions). He adds,

again correctly, that this deficiency manifests itself differently 8.21 in idealist dialectics, which is possible though scarcely plausible

(p. 68), and

8.22 in materialist ones, which would be implausible and inconsistent

within an interpretation of knowledge as reflection.

[The argument used in connection with Dlb is as follows (p. 68): the

set of predicates of a certain order (arity) and a common reference (as in the

case of the totality of unitary predicates concerning mammals) is a Boolean

function, while the corresponding set of properties of the same individuals

(the mammals in the given example) is a semi-group, where the concatenation

is interpreted as the conjunction of properties. Bunge says that in

a materialist dialectics, which does not admit the real existence of negative

properties, one cannot state that the "structure of predicates mirrors the

structure of properties" (ibidem). In this respect, we will note that in most

dialectical-materialist epistemologies 'reflection' is not understood as an

'exact ideal copy' of an objectively real original, as Bunge supposes, but

rather as an equivalence relationship between the two terms and I have

specified that it is a congruence relationship (see my paper in Dial?ctica,

1972). Compared to these interpretations of 'reflection', the argument of

Bunge has probatory strength only if the impossibility of establishing any

possible relationship of equivalence between the set of predicates and the set

of properties could be demonstrated. But such a relationship of equivalence is not conditioned by any homomorphism of the structures considered.]

8.23 This argumentation relies on the supposition that dialectics and its

principles would refer to things and properties of these, because it is in this

case and only in this case, that the rejection of the existence of dialectics

on the ground of the impossibility of anti-things and anti-properties can

effectively be asserted.

8.24 But is this supposition really confirmed by the texts in which are

formulated ? even without sufficient clarity and precision ? different views

on dialectics?

8.30 We will answer this question, after the examination of the arguments used to show the inconsistency of the definitions D2, D2a, and D3.

8.310 Bunge formulates D2 in this way: "every thing is an unity of its

opposites".40


8.311 considering that this "essential thesis of dialectics" could also be

interpreted with the help of the definition: "Property (or relation) P2 if

PI tends to check (neutralize, balance, or dim) P2 and conversely", while, later.

8.312 he reformulates it in the statement: "all systems are contradictory". 8.213 All these formulations are meaningless, according to Bunge, who

admits only 8.314 "the weaker thesis" stated in D2a. More than this.

8.315 the idea of dialectical 'opposition' (contradiction or contrariety) seems to him an "oversimplifying" one, belonging to a pre-scientific ("ar

chaic") mentality, unable to cope with "intermediate states" in whose

description and explanation there is no room for polarity (p. 69). 8.40 It should be stressed that here too dialectics is related to 'things'

(replaced, at a given moment (pp. 68 and 69), without an explicit justifica

tion, by the term 'system'), manifesting itself exclusively as opposition 8.41 between polar properties of things or

8.42 between components of systems.

8.5 We recall the question at 8.24 and we strengthen it with another:

is it true that in all the texts of some dialecticians or in most of these "the

unity of opposites" and similar expressions refer really to polar properties of things, to polarized components of systems, or to something others

8.6 But there is one specific question raised: does dialectics mean a

conceptualization of change, as has been postulated by Bunge for instance, or of development (which, as we have shown before, is not the same)?

8.7 This question is legitimate because Bunge rejects dialectics (pp. 70?

71) with the argument that it represents an unsatisfactory conceptualization of change, which can be more adequately described through a series of

unpolarized states!

8.80 The principle stated in D4 is very superficially dealt with (p. 71) in

two sentences:

8.81 the terms "dialectical negation" and "sublation" are foggy, that is

why 8.82 D4 is also dim, confused, unintelligible ('misty'). The same for

8.90 the principle formulated in D5, called this time "the quality-quantity thesis". It is superficially dealt with, showing that

8.91 the thesis about "the conversion of quality into quantity and con

versely" is unintelligible and

106 PAVEL AP?STOL

8.92 that it cannot be obtained as "a theorem within a general theory of change".

8.931 We also note here that the argumentation refers to sentences

formulated in object terms and

8.932 that dialectics is considered as a particular case of a theory of

change.

8.94 The study contains a chapter dealing with the relation between

"dialectics and formal logic" (pp. 73-76) which forms a special topic. Critical

examination of Bunge's opinions in this respect occurs below.

9. BUNGE'S CONCLUSIONS

9.11 The formulation of the principles of dialectics in the 'extant' literature

(rather, Bunge's arbitrary selection therefrom) is 'ambiguous and imprecise'. Whence

9.12 the necessity of their reformulation.

91.3 Obviously, Bunge's study tries to offer the pattern for such a clearer

formulation:

9.21 Formulated more carefully, the principles of dialectics lose their

universality, get a 'weaker form', through the application of particularizers,

whereby 9.22 they become mere 'platitudes'.

9.3 Even more clearly formulated and without any claim to universality, the principles of dialectics do not offer a ground for a "modern theory of

change" which has to be "more precise, explicit and complete than that"

(p. 76). 9.41 Dialectics does not embrace formal logic, and

9.42 it is "incompatible with any realistic epistemology" (p. 77; about

this matter, see 8.94) 9.5 Yet Bunge concedes that one could designate a field proper to dia

lectics (see, especially 18.1-18.8), but,

9.6 a dialectical ontology relies obligatorily upon modern logic, mathe

matics, and science.


10. THE SECOND OBJECTION AGAINST BUNGE'S CRITICISM:

REJECTION OF THE FORMULATION GIVEN TO 'PRINCIPLES

OF DIALECTICAL ONTOLOGY'

10.01 I refused above the groundless restriction of the meaning of dialectics

to that of a 'universal ontology', underlying the 'critical examination' under

taken by Bunge, who neglects the most frequent meanings attributed to the

term.

10.02 That is why I concluded that the criticism calls for an ad hoc

concept of dialectics, which is far from being generally admitted. Now we

must go on presenting arguments.

10.11 Since the 'strongest' meaning of dialectics ? according to its

system-building (systembildende) function and its frequency in very represen tative texts

? refers to 'development'.

10.12 the formulation of dialectics, of its field and principles in terms of

'objects' and 'properties of objects' ? to which it is hereafter added, from

outside, as a dynamic principle ? is illicit, and as such,

10.13 can generate only meaningless and inconsistent statements. Relative

to the referent of dialectical discourse (development), one has to operate not

with objects and properties (and relations among these), but

10.14 with terms suitable for constructing meaningful statements about

development (and destruction). 10.15 The ontic referent of all materialist dialectics and also of some

non-materialist ones) is development (and destruction as mode of existence

of the 'things' (= phenomena, finite processes, systems, etc.) and by no means

the 'things' as such (and/or their properties and relations) seen separately from their mode of existence.

10.16 In a materialist perspective, dialectics is not that 'universal ontology' which Bunge presents, but a theoretical reflecting (of a quasi-meta-theoretical

type) upon some particular theories of development, aiming 10.17 not at discovering a priori principles out of which could be infered

any development, but

10.18 at establishing some firm criteria of intelligibility of development, which could be retrieved, as they are applied, in any valid scientific theory

of the development (and destruction) of a certain peculiar ontological region. These criteria of intelligibility work as principles of construction in particular scientific theories of development (and destruction), and dialectics ? even

108 PAVEL AP?STOL

taken as ontology, with the restrictions specified in our 'first objection' ?

is no substitute for them.

10.19 Dialectics is not ontology. On the contrary, any ontology or intel

lectual construct with the function of an ontology ('the scientific image of

the Universe', Weltanschauung, etc.) has to be a dialectical one if it wants

itself compatible with particular scientific theories of development (and

destruction). 10.21 That is why we hold that the principles of dialectics ? as clearly

formulated as possible ? refer to the process of development (and destruction)

and not to 'things' (properties and relations) cut off from their 'natural' mode

of existence, which is 'dialectical'.

10.22 Observing this linguistic convention (compatible with the literature), confused and meaningless expressions or terms, like 'opposition within the

things', 'opposition between thing and anti-thing'\ 'opposition between

property and anti-property (of the things)', 'negation' and 'sublation' in the

senses defined by Bunge, transform themselves into meaningful expressions:

'divergently polarized tendencies in and through which the development (or

destruction) constitutes itself, 'opposition (here taken as equivalent to con

tradiction and contrariety) between these (tensorially) divergent tendencies

specific to development, 'opposition between the determinations, moments, etc. of development' (and destruction), 'negation' and 'sublation' not in the

formal logic sense (as operators), but as 'establishment and/or discarding of a

certain moment, determination, etc., of development (and destruction)', etc.

10.23 That which appears meaningless with respect to 'object' under

stood out of its mode of existence designated by the term 'development', becomes intelligible and can be conceptualized with reference to this mode

of existence.

10.24 From a logical point of view, therefore purely formally, 'develop ment' can be considered as a particular case of 'change', or 'transformation'

(but only in the sense of the distinctions introduced before); but dialectics

understood as a philosophic (quasi-meta-)theory of development (and de

struction) cannot be built up this way.

10.25 It can be elaborated only starting from the theories of development

(and destruction) actually accepted in science, with respect to determined

ontological regions (or fields), as they can be grasped at the level of a deter

mined practice, within the framework of the interaction between the con

structor of the theory and the object of the latter.


10.26 The way suggested by Bunge (cf. 10.24) refers to the logical re

construction of a theory of change (development), leading to an axiomatic

formulation, as meta-theory of any possible substantive theory of change; but

10.27 that these substantive theories are or can be brought forth in an

exact form, is to be proved. 10.28 Or, such a 'general theory of change', fulfilling in fact a meta

theoretical function vis-?-vis the particular theories, cannot be 'stronger',

of course, than the referenced theories. If this is the state of things, then

10.29 the condition formulated by Bunge with respect to a future dia

lectics seems to be an excessive one, having, especially, a contentious role.

10.30 Bunge is certainly right, when he says that discourse about dialectics

suffers from obscure and often confused and vague terms: but, 10.31 the reformulations of the principles of dialectics suggested by

him do take account of the inconsistency of the theses (the Hegelian one, the 'Marxist-Leninist', the didactic interpretation), as such, but only the

inconsistency of these against the theoretical horizon adopted by Bunge: the Verdinglichung of an ontology claiming, at the same time, a dialectical

character.

10.32 Through this method has been expelled the effective ontic referent which any materialist dialectics and many non-materialist ones known to us

had in view ?

development and destruction.

10.33 From a logical point of view, the method used by Bunge is the

interchange of the significance of the terms (meaning change), without

any other justification except the appeal to 'evidence'.

The criticism of the 'critical examination of dialectics' by Bunge has obliged us to formulate some objections. The refutation (elenchus) did not result

only in negative aspects; proceeding self-critically we tried to evince some

landmarks for a positive reconstruction of the dialectics. Before starting to

examine in detail Bunge's opinions concerning the relation between dialectics

and formal logic, we would like to present concisely some consequences of

the previous critical confrontation.

As was obvious, Bunge contests in particular the intelligibility of the

Hegelian concept of Aufhebung, 'dialectical negation' and 'negation of

the negation'. Without doubting the intelligibility of these Hegelian con

cepts, as Bunge actually does, there is no question that with Hegel, with

110 PAVEL AP?STOL

his interpreters as well as with some dialecticians who claim themselves to

be Marxists but who do not want to pay the appropriate attention to the

criticism of the Hegelian dialectics, as dialectics, conceived by Marx (much more developed in Kritik des Hegeischen Staatsrechts of 184341 and in the

?konomisch-philosophische Manuskripte of 184442), it is exactly on these

concepts that the 'fog' (the term belongs to Bunge) or the mystification of

dialectics concentrates itself. Let us proceed, then, with a problem largely discussed in the Hegelian exegesis.

11. THE 'TERNARY STRUCTURE' OF THE DIALECTICAL LOGIC

IN HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY

11.1 The kernel of Hegel's dialectics, its constitutive principle is a ternary

schema.44

11.2 The triad is evident in the architecture of the system and not only as

an exterior cover but, on the contrary, it is blended with the very substance

of the Hegelian philosophy of the Absolute Idea's and of the Absolute Spirit's

self-development. This ternary structure, the 'triad', defined by Hegel's dis

ciples in its three moments ? thesis, antithesis and synthesis, is to overcome

the philosophic presuppositions of Absolute Idealism45

11.3 This determined Marx to concentrate his criticism of Hegel's dia

lectics on the category of the Aufhebung, even in his youth, and to take it

up again in Das Kapital, where he writes: "Die Entwicklung (der Ware) hebt

diese Widerspr?che nicht auf, schafft aber die Form, worin sie sich bewegen k?nnen. Dies ist ?berhaupt die Methode, wodurch sich wirkliche Widerspr?che l?sen."46

11.4 The philosophic and consequently the ideological over-saturation (in the sense of L. Althusser's 'sur-d?termination') of the Hegelian triad47 does

not justify its simple rejection; we have to ask ourselves whether this ternary structure aims to be more than the mere manifestation of the dialectics of the Absolute1.

11.5 Our answer is in the affirmative. Within the framework of his exposi tion of the 'divine logic', the logic of 'God's thinking', Hegel states quite

frequently theses of a 'human logic'.48 Taking into account this perspective, we have to ask ourselves which is the real meaning of this ternary structure.

11.6 It is not the first time49 that I state that by the identification of

a ternary structure Hegel defines the necessary condition of the intelligibility


of development and destruction and for conceptualization of them (of

'becoming' in its Aristotelian acceptance: change, generation and corruption,

growth and diminution, alteration). In other words, this ternary structure

allows and only it allows one to make meaningful statements about 'develop ment' and/or 'destruction', constituting the 'minimum for conceptualizing'

development and destruction, a 'cognitive minimum', the 'minimum of

intelligibility' for coherent discourse on development and destruction.

11.7 Development and/or destruction are interpreted as a series of

oriented transformations;

TlfT2, T3,...,Tn,

which can be in fact the conceptual threshold for distinguishing an oriented

transformation from whatever transformation is occuring. The first two

transformations (taking only them) warrant the conclusion that a transfor

mation occurred without any reference to its positive or negative orientation.

Only the third transformation allows us to specify if and to what extent the

respective series of transformations represent a development and/or destruc

tion (the maintaining, improving ? under a certain explicitly formulated

respect ?

structuring, or, on the contrary, the destruction, degeneration,

destructuring of the complex dynamic totality in view). This ternary struc

ture consisting of three asymetrically interdependent terms (determinations =

Bestimmungen) (three transformations, three 'moments', thesis?antithesis

synthesis. . . .

) permits and it is only this structure that permits us to estab

lish a conceptual limit between an indefinite series of any transformations

(which does not affect the complex and dynamic totality from a qualitative and structural point of view), and a series of oriented transformations:

development and/or destruction.50

11.8 Thus the ternary structure identified by Hegel represents the neces

sary condition but obviously not also the sufficient one for the intelligibility and the conceptualization of development and destruction; consequently for any theory of development and/or destruction.

12. THE 'LAWS' OF DIALECTICS

12.11 In the literature, especially in that of 'Marxist' orientation, the 'laws

of dialectics' are often referred to. This way of speaking is derived from the

112 PAVEL AP?STOL

classic German philosophic tradition, in which 'law' is used in its larger sense

of order, norm or rule, specific to a series of events.

12.12 By no means does 'law', in this context, claim to be equivalent to

'law' in the experimental or exact sciences, as the term is used in French and

Anglo-Saxon linguistic areas.

12.13 It would be much better to say that it represents the Aristotelian

arche (ta prot?) through which anything can be known ? a presupposition which cannot be demonstrated but which represents in fact the starting point of any cognition and rational argumentation.51

12.21 The laws or principles of dialectics revealed by the Hegelian and

Marxian exegesis represent a system of conceptual determinations according to which 'development' and 'destruction', identified through the ternary structure (presented at 11)

? identification which represents the necessary condition of their intelligibility

? become understood or conceptually determined and this is the sufficient condition of their intelligibility.

12.22 The principles are, therefore, criteria of the logical validation of the

correct use of the terms 'development' and 'destruction'.

12.23 Understood as such they designate the logical field in which any

theory of development and/or destruction can be conceived with a sufficient

degree of consistency.

12.31 If we admit of dialectics as a theory of development and destruc

tion, we have to specify from the very beginning that we are actually dealing with a philosophic theory (in the large meaning of the word, not in the

mathematical one), 12.32 in a position to formulate the conditions of intelligibility of devel

opment and destruction (as shown in 11.1?12.23), 12.33 as well as their significance for understanding and transforming the

human condition.52

12.34 Within this context a legitimate question arises as to whether or not

a 'philosophic theory of development and destruction', distinct from theories

of development and destruction belonging to other sciences (astronomy-cos

mogony, biology, history, sociology . . . ) has any justification when it is not

conceived in the exact language of a (formalized) meta-theory of those special theories ? a meta-theory with the help of which some other such particular scientific theories of development and destruction could be provided.

12.35 The problem requires a discussion which cannot be engaged in

here.53 Nevertheless,


12.36 there is a pragmatic argument in favour of the legitimacy of such

a philosophic theory of development and destruction (Ph.T.D.D.) with a

quasi-meta-theoretical function; namely, even in their vague form such

Ph.T.D.D.'s have allowed one ? as if they were the very meta-theories ?

to

elaborate dialectical inquiry systems5*, dialectical planning patterns55, dialectical decision theories56, dialectical methodologies in economics and

social sciences57 Certainly these are only examples of possible positive answers to the question reformulated in proposition 12.34, and not a demon

stration of an answer.58

12.40 I promised a reformulation of the principles of dialectics as a

system of the conceptual determinations of 'development' and/or 'destruc

tion'. Here and now, such a task cannot be carried out. We can only point

out the direction in which its achievement appears possible: 12.41 one can make meaningful statements with reference to develop

ment and destruction if and only if it can be detected empirically or if it can

be presupposed in accordance with the scientific data available:

12.42 the presence of an ontic field made up by a series of asymmetrically

interdependent quantitative changes (growth) which, reaching a certain limit

specific to each category of 'object', (here meaning the bearer of a develop ment process), complex totalities, dynamic systems etc., generate necessarily

a qualitative-structural transformation (or transformations), namely,

12.431 that a new quality and/or structure emerges from the preceding one, representing, at least, either

12.432 an enlarged, but selective and/or (at least under a certain perspec

tive) optimized reproduction of the 'object' (complex totality, system or

quasi-system) being considered59, or

12.433 a production of a new complex totality, other than the preceding one (i.e. a significant part of the former goes directly into the structure

obtained by its transformation), or, contrariwise,

12.434 a disaggregation, disintegration, destruction, decomposing, destruc

turing, destabilization ... of this one, (I observe that 'destruction' (and its

synonyms) do not mean complete annihilation, but 'destruction' of a given

complex totality (complexity), understood as mode of existence and, at the

same time, 'liberation' of its components which become in this way possible

components of other complex totalities). 12.5 These asymmetrically interdependent and oriented transformations

signify development and/or destruction // and only if they are the result of

114 PAVEL AP?STOL

a collision (clashing, opposing) of at least two (in a vectorial sense) divergent

tendencies, immanent to the process considered ? diverging tendencies which

presuppose each other (at least for a lapse of time) and, simultaneously, exclude each other reciprocally in the series of transformations taken into

consideration.

12.6 The system of these conceptual determinations designates the ontic

referent one has in view in the various formulations of the 'laws of dialectics'

or, as is preferable, of the system of the principles of dialectics.

12.71 The formulation proposed above does not resort to terms ex

traneous to the language of science and

12.72 does not neglect or reject the rules of formal logic. 12.8 Dialectics, understood like Ph.T.D.D. and relying on the study of

the theories of development and destruction belonging to different sciences, establishes the conditions of intelligibility (the ternary structure) and the

criteria of intelligibility (the conceptual determinations, called principles of

dialectics), which are absolutely necessary to conceptualize (to describe

in rational terms, to explain . . .

) the referents that one has in mind.

12.9 We cannot examine here the relations between the Ph.T.D.D. and the

human condition.

13. A SHORT ASIDE ON THE POSSIBILITIES OF FORMULATING

DIALECTICS MORE PRECISELY

13.1 There are several attempts to formalize dialectics (or at least the logic of dialectics used by Hegel).60

13.2 Except for Dubarle, these attempts ignored von Neumann's critical

remarks on the one-sidedness of formal (mathematical) logic. He wrote in

1948: "Everybody who has worked in formal logic will confirm that

it is one of the technically most refractory parts of mathematics. The reason

for this is that it deals with rigid, all-or-none concepts, and has very little

contact with the continuous concept of the real or of the complex number, that is, with mathematical analysis. Yet analysis is the technically most

successful and best-elaborated part of mathematics. Thus formal logic is, by the nature of its approach, cut off from the best cultivated portions of mathe

matics, and forced onto the most difficult part of mathematical terrain, into

combinatorics."61

13.3 It is not our purpose to examine here the consequences of these


objections directed against logical-mathematical reductionism, but we will

mention Ren? Thorn's recent attempt to capture in a mathematical formalism

'the origin and the end of the systems'62, and mathematical morphogenesis

understood as an exact study of any creative or destructive process.63

13.41 So we are confronted with an approach based upon non-conven

tional mathematical means (different from the Boolean ones of mathematical

logic), which make possible a topological description of genesis and of the

destructive processes, which present remarkable analogies with the concepts of 'development-destruction', and of 'dialecticity' that we have used above.

13.42 This analogy is revealed once more by the concept of 'generalized

catastrophe' introduced by Thorn to designate the emergence of something new which is also aimed at by the so-called 'dialectical leap': "D'une mani?re

g?n?rale, l'apparition d'une nouvelle 'phase' dans un milieu initialement

homog?ne conduit ? ce genre d'apparence, que nous appelons 'catastrophe

g?n?ralis?e'; tout processus dans lequel il y a rupture d'une sym?trie initiale

est de ce fait, structurellement instable, et conduit ? une catastrophe g?n

?ralis?e, de tels processus ne sont pas formalisables: mais ... [l'] issue

finale [du processus], elle, peut-?tre bien d?termin?e ... La mort d'un

?tre vivant se manifeste par le fait que la dynamique de son m?tabolisme local

passe d'une configuration r?currente a une configuration de gradient; c'est,

typiquement, une catastrophe g?n?ralis?e."64

13.5 The above-mentioned analogy becomes more convincing as the

'generalized catastrophe' is understood as the result of a 'conflict', of a

'competition', or of a 'struggle'65: "Dans la mesure o? l'on fait du 'conflit'

un terme exprimant une situation g?om?trique bien d?finie dans un syst?me

dynamique, il n'y a aucune objection ? user de ce terme pour d?crire rapide ment et qualitativement un syst?me dynamique."66

13.6 Consequently, a Ph.T.D.D. can be thought again and reformulated

in the language and within the conceptual framework of the mathematical

theory of morphogenesis.67 But that is not the purpose of this study.

14. DIALECTICS VERSUS FORMAL LOGIC IN MARIO BUNGE'S

VIEW

14.1 Bunge attributes to the dialecticians the claim that "logic is a special case of dialectics", which is, in fact, he states, a "false claim" (p. 73), because

116 PAVEL AP?STOL

14.21 "formal logic . .. cannot be a particular case of dialectical ontology: for the very reason that

14.22 logic does not arise from an ontology and

14.23 any rational non-logic theory presupposes a logic." 14.24 To put it in another way: "formal logic refers to everything but

describes or represents nothing but its own basic concepts" (p. 74). So, 14.25 the logical concepts refer or can be applied to propositions and not

to material objects. 14.261 The argumentation is based, Bunge pursues, on the disjunction

between physical objects and conceptual ones (p. 75). 14.262 Of course, this hypothesis cannot be proved but it can be made

plausible. On the contrary, 14.263 "the thesis of the oneness of logic and ontology is possible, nay

necessary, in an idealist system" (p. 75). He considers then that

14.3 "The idea that the understanding of change requires a logic of its

own, be it dialectical logic or some version of temporal logic, because formal

logic is incapable of dealing with change, is a relic from ancient philosophy"

(pp. 75-76). 14.4 From the perspective of contemporary science, says Bunge, we

would not think any longer in opposites, but in degrees, meaning that "we

no longer think dialectically, i.e. in opposites and without distinguishing

logic from the disciplines dealing with facts" (p. 76). 14.51 Consequently, "dialectics does not embrace formal logic" (p. 76),

and

14.52 "the claim that dialectics generalizes logic can be upheld only within

a Platonistic ontology and is incompatible with any realistic epistemology, in particular with naive realism (the reflection theory of knowledge)" (pp.

76-77). In conclusion, and I want to say from the very beginning that I completely

agree with these theses, although my reasons are different from Bunge's: 14.60 "the legitimate concerns of dialectics" consist in

14.61 "the analysis and codification of the patterns (both valid and merely

plausible) (cf. Polyain 1958 on plausible reasoning) of actual argumentation", 14.62 "theory invention and problem solving" and, especially, 14.63 "the patterns of rational dialogue" and

14.64 those of "inductive inference" (p. 77).


15. A FIRST ARGUMENT AGAINST BUNGE'S THESES ON

DIALECTICS VERSUS FORMAL LOGICS

15.10 I. Narski68 is among the first to have responded to Bunge's conception of the adepts of Hegelian or non-Hegelian dialectics.

15.11 We can only partly agree with his retort, for reasons that have

become evident through our discussion. It must be recalled that Bunge's remarks with respect to the relationship between dialectics as ontology and

formal logic refer again rather

15.121 to the concept of dialectics which we have called the didactically

operational one,

15.122 to the opinions of a small number of authors, in some cases of

a very doubtful representativity, 15.123 ignoring completely the positions that could not be subordinated

to the model built up by Bunge, claiming, without sufficient reason to be

very characteristic of the position of the Hegelian or Marxian dialecticians, of the Marxist-Leninist or the non-Hegelian ones, and

15.124 neglecting especially many well-elaborated positions regarding the relationship between formal and dialectical logic.

Remark No. I (to the proposition 15.11) In my books and studies published up to 1965, I made regrettable concessions, adopting the didactically opera tional concept of dialectics but, replying on the texts, I largely argued that

Marx' dialectics is not a mere transposition of the Hegelian one onto a

material bearer but, on the contrary, it is radically different from it, as

dialectics, being in fact another dialectics in comparison with that expounded in Hegel's works. The main difference lies in the fact that Marx rejected the speculative identity between the Absolute Subject and the Absolute

Object69, the identity of ontology and dialectical logics70, the identification

of the name (designating logical objects) with the real referent (the physical

object).71 The 'materialist reversal' of the Hegelian dialectics does not refer

only to the bearer of the dialectical process and to its 'causes' ? as it is often

taken to be ? but it affects the most intimate structure of dialectics. This

obliged us to introduce the distinction between Hegelian dialectical structures

and non-Hegelian ones. The differences between those two types of structures

can be shown up through the "dialectical cell" which I call 'ternary structure'

(set up for identifying a definite process of development). In the event of

118 PAVEL AP?STOL

the Hegelian ternary structure the transition from the initial moment to

the other ones is achieved with the help of an operator of necessity (this

conception is quite legitimate within the framework of Absolute Idealism, in

which all these moments represent determinations of the Absolute Spirit and

consequently they can 'move' only with absolute necessity); whence the uni

queness of the third moment. On the contrary, in the case of a non-Hegelian

ternary structure (e.g., that found in the economic analyses made by Marx) the transition is achieved with the help of an operator of probability, hence, the plurality of third moments. Marx' text is fully conclusive in this respect if we remember that for Marx, the commodity is not a 'thing', but a dynamic

relationship: "Der der Ware immanente Gegensatz von Gebrauchswert und

Wert, von Privatarbeit, die sich zugleich als unmittelbar gesellschaftliche Arbeit darstellen muss, von besonderer konkreter Arbeit, die zugleich nur

als abstrakt allgemeine Arbeit gilt, von Personifizierung der Sache und Ver

dinglichung der Personen ? dieser immanente Widerspruch erh?lt in der

Gegens?tzen der Warenmetamorphose seine entwickelten Bewegungsformen. Die Formen schliessen daher die M?glichkeit, aber auch nur die M?glichkeit der Krisen ein. Die Entwicklung dieser M?glichkeit erfordert einen ganzen

Umkreis von Verh?ltnissen, die vom Standpunkt der einfachen Warenzirkula

tion noch gar nicht existieren".72 Thus, let us take Tfor dialectical 'transition'

or transformation, Ml, Ml, M3 for the significant moments of a process identified as dialectical (a process of development or destruction), v for an

operator of necessity, and m for an operator of probability and -> for implica

tion, and then: in a Hegelian ternary structure we will have

Tv(Ml,M2)^Tv(M2,M3)

For each sequence Ml, Ml, M3 there is only one M3, which occurs with

necessity.

On the contrary, a non-Hegelian ternary structure,

Tv (Ml,M2) -> Tm (M2, {M3})

for each sequence Ml, Ml, M3 there is a determined set of {M3}'s which are

not necessarily equiprobable.

Or, admitting the linguistic convention of designating the three moments

by thesis (T), antithesis (AT), and synthesis (S), in the first case we will have:


v(T->AT-+S)

and, in the second,

v(T-*AT)->m {S1,S2,S3...}

I have mentioned some possibilities of interpretation to make clear the

arbitrary character of the simplification of Bunge's problem: dialectics or

logic? His arguments are justified only against the conceptions which operate with the model of dialectics built up by himself.

Remark No. II Bunge's argumentation establishes (14.1 and 14.21) a direct

relation between dialectics (understood as ontology or the theory of the

physical object) and formal logic. Both the authors quoted by him and

many others tackle the problem differently; namely, mediating terms are

introduced between dialectics as ontology and formal logic; i.e., (a) dialectics

as method or methodology; and (b) dialectics as dialectical logic.

16. TERMINOLOGICAL EXPLANATIONS

16.0 To avoid misunderstandings of a terminological nature, we want to

specify the meaning with which we use the terms: "(process of) cognition",

"knowledge", "epistemology", "methodology", "formal logic", and then

"dialectical logic".73

16.1 Thus we understand by cognition the processing of information

being input by some privileged material systems (e.g. human beings), with

cybernetic properties, which are able to develop some psychic (ideal) ?

partly conscious, partly unconscious, spontaneous and/or deliberately provoked

?

internal models, always formulated in an interindividual communicative

language, of any other discernible real or ideal system and even of itself, func

tioning as 'referent' or 'object' (of the cognitive process under consideration). 16.2 By knowledge we understand the set of results of the process shown

in 16.1.

16.3 In this context, epistemology appears to be the sole discipline whose subject-matter is cognition and knowledge in all their complexity and dynamics, in all their aspects and dimensions, as a dialectical unity of their formal and informal components. Epistemology is a philosophic

discipline, too, since the finitist reduction of the potentially infinite set of

120 PAVEL AP?STOL

dynamic relations which constitute the field of the cognitive process has only a pragmatic validity with reference to human existence. In the philosophy of knowledge (or philosophic epistemology)

? or metaphysics, or philosophic

anthropology ?

cognition and knowledge are considered in their explicitly formulated connection with human existence (individuals

? interacting

among themselves ? and grouped in societies ? interacting in their turn ?

with specific parts of the explored universe), a connection only implicitly involved in the properly epistemological approach.

16.4 The object of synchronie logic (formal and symbolic) is the structure

(elements, components) of and the possible relations among meaningful

statements, their properties, laws of combination and/or transformation

into logical complexes, following explicit rules. In addition to formalism,

mathematical logic studies abstract structures, some of which may be inter

preted as able to convey 'products' (results) of human cognition. As such,

mathematical logic explores not only the effectively used demonstrative

structures (texts), but also the possible ones.

16.5 Diachronie logic deals with the temporal status of the logical con

structs described by synchronie logic. 16.6 The logic of science (synchronie and/or diachronic), in its turn,

studies the effectively utilized logical structures which convey actually, in

interhuman communicative languages, the results of scientific cognition

(knowledge), verified, confirmed, and conforming to explicit rules admitted

in the 'world of science'. Therefore, the logic of science concerns only a

subset of the structures described in symbolic logic. 16.7 Paraphrasing Rosser's and Turquette's expressive metaphorical term,

logic - in general

- is dealing with the 'conduct' of propositions (their

combinations, and transformations), whereas the methodology of cognition or knowledge (and applying certain restrictive instances, that of scientific

research) deals with the conduct (behaviour) of determined cognitive subjects

(actors, agents) in making use of logical complexes (syntactic structures, in corresponding semantic interpretations) for solving problems in some

epistemic situations (by means of acquisition, handling, transformation,

etc., of data).

Broadly speaking, methodology is a strategy or an operational program to apply noetically relevant logical and exological structures to cognitive

(epistemic) actions.

16.8 By dialectical logic we will understand, at least for the time being,


the study of a non-conventional, but epistemologically productive (providing valid knowledge which could be validated in science) use (functioning) of the logical structures, complexes, operations and proceedings described

and codified in formal logic; it is, in fact, what Bunge designates as actual

argumentation.

17. A SECOND ARGUMENT AGAINST BUNGE'S THESES

CONCERNING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORMAL

LOGIC AND DIALECTICAL LOGIC

17.10 As we have noticed so far (14.1), Bunge considers it erroneous to

look on formal logic or on another logic, were it possible, as a particular case of dialectics, understood exclusively as ontology.

17.111 We have also observed (Remark No. II) that if there is a permanent

quest for establishing a relation between formal logic and dialectics, the latter

is not understood as just an ontology but rather as a method or logic, i.e. as a

dialectical logic. 17.112 There have been a couple of attempts to present dialectical logic

like a (quasi-) meta-theory of the theory of the formal logic, where the latter is a particular case of the former, which is generating the second one.74

17.113 But in such interpretations ontology is not correlated directly with formal logic, but only through the above-mentioned intermediaries.

17.114 Bunge refers in fact to the frequently quoted thesis from G. V.

Plekhanov's Fundamental Problems of Marxism (1908): "De m?me que Vinertie est un cas particulier du mouvement, de m?me la pens?e conforme aux r?gles de la logique formelle . . . est un cas particulier de la pens?e dia

lectique" (G.V.P.'s italics).75 It stands to reason that even in this extreme

formulation, it was specified that "la dialectique ne supprime pas la logique formelle".76 We will concentrate our attention on this theme.

17.115 Consequently, we will not discuss Bunge's arguments regarding the relationship between substantive sciences (including ontology) and formal logic (14.22-14.25), nor the thesis, admitted even in the Middle

Ages (the theory of supposition), that a distinction must be made between ideal and physical objects (14.261?14.262), nor the judicious assertion that

represents also, as I have already pointed out, the kernel of Marx's criticism of the Hegelian dialectics (Remark No. I to the proposition 15.11), namely that the identity of ontology and logic can be thought only in objective

122 PAVEL AP?STOL

idealism, in a Platonic or Hegelian philosophy. The discussion of these prob lems would lead us to epistemological considerations which are not strictly connected with our main concern.

Another of Bunge's opinions deserves nevertheless some comments.

17.116 As to the total rejection of the legitimacy of any temporal logic

(formalized ones), we have to observe that such an attitude is far from being

convincing with regard to the presumed futility of some research dealing with "the logic of change"77 or with "productive logic".78 On the contrary.

17.20 we consider quite useful the discussion about the relationship between formal logic and 'dialectical logic' which refers to the problem raised by Bunge.

17.21 From this point of view, Dubarle's remarks, at the end of his

attempt to provide a description in mathematical language of the 'logic' at work in Hegelian philosophy (its 'logical practice'), namely "d'?tudier

du point de vue math?matique la pens?e h?g?lienne et son organisation

dialectique", represents a very productive approach. Dubarle agrees with

Hegel and stresses (a) "ce traitement . . . fort original, du point de vue

m?me de la logique" of the proposition and of the deductive inference

both relate to the concept79 (even if he cannot leave unnoticed the

illegitimacy of Hegel's passionate attacks against formal logic);80 and (b) his contribution not only to dialectical logic but to the development of

formal logic, confirmed, in his opinion, by the logical study of the Hegelian dialectics. Synthesizing his own results, Dubarle writes in the conclusion

of his book: "l'agir du logicien doit s'expliquer distinctement au sujet d'une

question que les perspectives les plus classiques de la logique, des math?mat

iques et de la science en g?n?ral, permettent encore de ne pas poser, mais

que, face ? la dialectique h?g?lienne et aux intentions propres de l'?conomie

rationelle qu'elle a en vue, il est d?sormais impossible d'?viter celle des

r?gimes de l'intelligibilit? que le langage se propose de v?hiculer et, du m?me

coup, des r?gimes de la fonctionnalit? rationnelle dont le langage com

porte organiquement en lui ces virtualit?s que la logique am?ne au jour. Dans son ?tat de rationalit? explicit?e et telle que la pens?e la prend de

la fa?on qui lui est la plus spontan?e et la plus coutumi?re, l'intelligibilit? se

pr?sente suivant un r?gime d'ext?riorit? en principe directement homologue au r?gime d'ext?riorit? qui est celui du langage pris comme l'ensemble des

ressources linguistiques expressives de la pens?e . . . Or, la pens?e de Hegel veut constituer la logique d'une raison capable de . . . d?velopper le discours


de cette intelligibilit? (discursive, P.A.) dont tous les divers moments, loin

d'?tre ext?rieurs les uns aux autres, sont mutuellememt immanents les uns

aux autres, s'envelloppant dans leur int?riorit? r?ciproque . . .81 Comment

ces deux r?gimes, a pr?sent oppos?s, de la pens?e et de son objet m?me d'une

part, de son expression discursive d'autre part, peuvent-ils bien se conjuguer et se concilier dans une action intellectuelle viable et efficace? La r?ponse

que la logique peut apporter a cette question est simple dans son principe, mais grosse de cons?quences. Elle consiste dans la diff?renciation encore

plus pouss?e que de coutume, entre la mat?rialit? des schemes ou des for

malismes logico-math?matiques, ceux-ci ?tant pris avec toute leur constitu

tion structurale ou toute leur organisation syntaxique, et l'acte intellectuel

interpr?tatif de ces mat?rialit?s. Schemes et formalismes avec leurs structures

et organicit?s syntaxiques propres sont ce qu'ils sont, mat?riellement vou?s au

r?gime de l'ext?riorit? ... La science logique appara?t ainsi a de multiples

?gards command?e par un principe d'articulation analogue ? celui que l'on

voit para?tre dans les autres sciences de l'expression parl?e de la pens?e, entre

la constitution d'une syntaxe et l'affectation d'une s?mantique. Ceci n'est

pas nouveau. Ce que l'?tude logicienne de la dialectique h?g?lienne oblige

cependant de percevoir, c'est l'entr?e en sc?ne d'alternatives nouvelles au

niveau des possibilit?s de l'affectation s?mantique: r?gime d'int?riorit? ou

r?gime d'ext?riorit? d'intelligibilit? . . . C'est par cette richesse toute nouvelle

de th?mes offerts ? l'?tude logicienne et de perspectives originales ouvertes

? son essai m?thodique que l'oeuvre philosophique h?g?lienne garde de fa?on durable son importance immense pour le pr?sent et pour l'avenir de la science

logique".82

17.22 We wanted to present briefly, but in his own formulation, Dubarle's

position, since the author is beyond any suspicion of doctrinaire Hegelianism or Marxism. His conclusions (1972) present some significant analogies with

the conception about the relationship between formal logic and dialectical

logic developed earlier by G. Klaus (1957, 1985) and by myself (1958, 1964). 17.30 G. Klaus pointed out as early as 1957 that the relation between

formal logic and dialectical logic has to be examined at a contemporary level, i.e. at the level of mathematical (symbolic) logic.83 That is why he examined

it in connection with the propositional calculus, the theory of the concept, the logic of classes, of predicates, and of relations.84 In a less rigorous man

ner, G. Klaus provides an interpretation of the relationship between formal

logic and dialectical logic somewhat similar to Dubarle's exegesis which

124 PAVEL AP?STOL

differentiated, as we have seen, between the two "r?gimes" of intelligibility: that of "exteriority" and that of "interiority". According to Klaus, formal

logic is governed by the principle of "extensionality", while dialectical logic is ruled by that of "intensionality". His argumentation is as follows:

17.31 In the propositional calculus,85 the inter-propositional connections

have a common characteristic: the truth values of a compound proposition

depend only on the truth values of the constitutive elementary propositions

"h?ngt also nicht vom Inhalt der Aussagen bzw. von ihrem Sinn (der Inten

sion) ab, sondern nur von ihrer 'Extension' ". This way of proceeding will

be called "Extensionalit?tsthese".86 Examining different epistemologically valid propositions, Klaus concludes that not all propositional connections

are "extensional". There are also "intensional" ones. The characteristic trait

of such connections lies in the fact that their truth values do not depend

only on the truth value of their members but also on their internal relations.

Of course, any inter-propositional connection has an extensional aspect which

belongs to the domain of formal logic, but what cannot be extensionally

captured, enters into the domain of dialectical logic. For Klaus, "Die formale

Logik ist die Theorie der extensionalen Denkbestimmungen und Beziehungen, die dialektische Logik aber die Theorie der intensionalen Denkbestimmungen und Beziehungen".87

17.32 Concerning the theory of concept presented by Klaus,88 we will

limit ourselves to a few observations: "die formale Logik nimmt die Begriffe, die im Prozess der Abstraktion gewonnen wurden, als gegeben hin. Sie un

tersucht nicht ihre Entstehung, Ver?nderung und Entwicklung".89 These

represent the domain of dialectical logic (and epistemology). Therefore, the

classification of the concepts is based, in fact, on an intensional criterion90

and in the intensional domain the rule of inverse proportion between exten

sion and intension asserted in formal logic is not valid.91

17.33 Understanding by extension the class of objects to which a concept

refers, in the logic of classes92 Klaus draws the conclusion that the extensional

approach to classes is conditioned by a previous intensional treatemnt93:

'Damit ?berhaupt eine Klasse entsteht bzw. vorliegt, ist es notwendig, dass die Elemente dieser Klasse irgendetwas Gemeinsames haben, irgendein

Moment, in dem sie miteinander identisch sind .. . Sollen die Elemente der

Klasse nicht absolut willk?rlich sein, so muss es irgendeine Bestimmung

geben, die festlegt, wie die Elemente, die dieser Klasse angeh?ren, ausgew?hlt werden sollen. Diese Bestimmung hat intensionalen Charakter".94


17.34 Concerning the calculus of predicates . Klaus thinks it enough to

refer to the consequences of the fact that to each predicate belonging to the

logic of predicates corresponds a class within the logic of classes; so, any theses stated in connection with the logic of classes cover this calculus, too.

17.40 We have not been overly critical towards some older studies pre

cisely on dialectical logic, but we will not hide the fact that some of our

research concerning the structure of the concept (1956) and the inductive

inference (1958) led us to the conclusion ? still formulated as a hypothesis ? that there is a difference with respect to the modalities and ways in which

the unique (same) logical structures function (proceed), in different epistemic situations:

(a) one, regarding epistemic situations in which the necessary extensional

grounding (Begr?ndung) of logical operations and inferences is also sufficient

for producing new, non-trivial knowledge, by observing just the formal

rules ensuring the correct transfer of the truth-values from one proposition

to another;

(b) another, regarding epistemic situations in which the necessary exten

sional grounding of logical operations and inferences is no longer sufficient

for producing new, non-trivial knowledge; in order to obtain them (to achieve

a certain epistemic project), one cannot avoid an intensional (i.e. exterior

to formal logic) grounding of the logical procedure applied. This intensional

grounding (intensionale Begr?ndung) plays the role of a logical operator of

intensional nature. Let us be more explicit.

17.41 The amplifying96 inductive inference ? and all the logical opera tions of the type called ampliatio in scholastic logic

? are not set up and are

not grounded extensionally: the validity of the conclusion is not obtained

by applying an extensional generalizer but by an intensional one, introducing a reference to experiment (experience, practice) as an intensional grounding of the inferential process. This procedure could be described as follows:

as the experiment (experience, practice) considered confirms the essential

character of the generalizing proposition, the statement of the generalized

property or relation is valid because any element of the class and the class

itself are set up by definition, with the help of such essential characteristics.

[We, therefore, called this logical operator' essentializer'.] The operational schema described in detail in the quoted work presents remarkable analogies

with the functioning of neuronal automata as described by R. Tarjan

('Automates neuronaux', in Recherches Internationales ? la Lumi?re du

126 PAVEL AP?STOL

Marxisme, 1962, No. 29, p. 165). Otherwise, Kant himself, too (Kritik der

reinen Vernunft, ed. A, pp. 7?8) was close to understanding experience as

a logic operator: "... bei synthetischen Urteilen ich ausser dem Begriffe des

Subjekts noch etwas anderes (X) haben m?sse, worauf sich der Verstand

st?tzt . . . Es ist, . .. die Erfahrung jenes X, was ausser dem Begriffen liegt, und worauf die M?glichkeit der Synthesis des Pr?dikats . . . B mit dem

Begriffe A gr?ndet" (my italics). In early Indian logic we can find inferences

with ten components (Dasavaikalika -

niryuti) and also others with five

parts (Nyava -

Sutra) could be found (cf. I. M. Boche?ski. Formale Logik,

1956, pp. 486?509). The exological foundation works also here like a logical

operator. Of course, to admit the epistemic validity of the conclusion of

amplifying inductive inference with an intensional foundation (meaning

formally undecidable, i.e. allowing a formal decision, by application of an

algorithm) does not exhaust some other aspects of the same nature belonging to the structure of the inductive inference.97

Comment (on 17.41)

There are analogies between our position and that of Dubarle (17.21) and

Klaus (17.30?17.35) concerning the existence of two different modalities

of the same logical structures (inferential ones). [The interpretation given by D. Henrich to the "logical practice" of "meaning change" in Hegel's logic of

essence can also be understood as a validation through intensional grounding of an approach which cannot be validated extensionally.] Our position is

different from that of the latter from a point of view which is far from being

unimportant: Klaus refers to extensional and intensional relations and opera

tions, while we have in view two different modalities of the functioning of

the same logical structures. Only the grounding of this functioning (and not

the relation or the operation as such) can be extensional or intensional,

according to different epistemic situations. Thus, at least concerning this

problem, our point of view is in fact closer to that of Dubarle: "r?gime" of

exterixrity: extensionally founded interconceptual operations; and "r?gime" of interiority: intensionally founded intra-conceptual operating.98

17.42 There is a complete and satisfying agreement between Bunge's

position and ours with respect to the domains which de jure pertain to the

study which we call dialectical logic (14.62-14.65). 17.50 Finally, let us now take up a problem on which Bunge's attitude is


quite strict: the impossibility of correlating the principles of dialectics (as

ontology) and the laws of logic (as laws and rules of the correctness of the

discourse about the ontic).

17.51 We have shown that Bunge operates with a sui generis concept of

dialectics (3.10-3.5; 10.01-10.33), and

17.52 that dialectics can be interpreted (11.1?17.42) and its relation with

formal logic can be conceived rationally, admitting several complementary dialectical logics which are not in competition with formal logic.

17.53 This hypothesis cannot claim, at least for the time being, to have

been demonstrated: on the contrary, however,

17.54 its plausibility can be argued in a satisfying manner. Namely, 17.61 there is no logical principle ignored, 17.62 if the logical-mathematical formalisms are interpreted in the

epistemic field (that means like forms which can acquire certain cognitive functions or values related to determined epistemic projects),

17.63 distinguishing, as we have mentioned above, two modalities of

functioning of the same logical structures already interpreted in the epistemic field (17.40).

17.640 Dialectical'logic' 17.641 is 'logic' because it refers to certain modalities of the functioning

of the structures set up in accordance with the laws of formal logic (stricto

sensu) and

17.642 is 'logic' because it refers to the epistemic field only to the extent

to which this field is captured in logical forms, functioning also as noetic

forms. It stands to reason, that

17.71 dialectical 'logic' does not claim and cannot claim to modify the

laws and rules which formal logic has the full right to formulate, but

17.72 it examines the validity of the formal structures in epistemic

processes different from the point of view of the possibility or impossibility of the rational foundation of these,

17.73 aiming to identify the logical modalities of the intensional ground

ing of the validity, the epistemic function and value of different modalities of

functioning (the "r?gimes", according to Dubarle) of some logical structures

and operations (stricto sensu) as to the storage of information, the progress of knowledge and cognition, seen in their development and destruction.

17.8 Taking into account this perspective, in which the logical structures

and the operations are related to the development of knowledge (and more

128 PAVEL AP?STOL

generally to the development of intellectual constructs), it does not appear

meaningless to ask ourselves if the principles (conditions and criteria) of

the intelligibility of development and destruction in general (formulated in

Ph.T.D.D.) can have a regulating function as to relationships between the

logical structures and operations, on the one hand, and the intelligibility of

development and destruction, on the other.

18. FINAL REMARKS

18.1 Our exercise in refuting some of the critical objections formulated by

Bunge against a certain manner of understanding dialectics and dialectical

logic is, of course, lacking a fully elaborated, systematically developed, solid

theoretical basis, but the hypothesis that such an epistemic project is not

deprived of sense and its achievement is possible can be made plausible. 18.20 This situation itself demands a critical and, of course, a self-critical

attitude toward research on dialectics or dialectical logic. 18.21 The first and most important aspect regards the absence of a

common effort to synthesize the partial results of such research.

18.22 Concerning the research claiming to be Marxist, it was blocked and

is blocked nowadays too by what we called (0.4) the didactically operational

concept of "Marxist-Leninist dialectics".99

18.3 We entered a philosophic dispute because we were dissatisfied

with the way Bunge presented dialectics and its relationship with formal

logic.

18.4 There is no question that there is a social need for globalizing or

'totalizing' thought. 18.5 As an epistemological project, dialectics claims itself to be, as I have

already shown, and could be built up as, an answer to this need, comple

mentary to other answers.

18.6 Given the 'stakes' of the dispute, I think that it is high time to give

up the strategy borrowed from the Sophists ? these 'ideologists' of ancient

Athens ? of trying to understand only the real or apparent errors of our

fellow dialoguers; and to attend to their truth as well. Ferdinand Gonseth, this master of a dialectics different from the one we have in view, used to say that any closed ideological construct hides at least one nucleus of truth, with

the help of which it can be opened and obliged to communicate.

18.7 The main objection which I consider justified against Bunge's attitude


is that in his confrontation with the adepts of different dialectics, no doubt

too poorly formulated, he did not try to thematize the elements of ration

ality belonging to these positions, preferring to shut himself up within the

limits of his own ideological construct. Is this attitude not the analogon of a dogmatism ? l'envers!

18.8 In our approach we have tried to free ourselves of the dogmatism characteristic of our own point of view. Rejecting some of Bunge's theses

regarding dialectics and its relation with formal logic, we admitted some

others; and so, we expounded the following:

(1) there are many possible dialectics - Hegelian and non-Hegelian;

(2) their formulation in propositions consistent from a logical point of

view is necessary and possible;

(3) it is possible to describe some aspects of dialectics (namely of the

Hegelian one) in formalized languages, and this has actually been done;

(4) it is possible to put these dialectics into relations of compatibility and complementarity with intellectual constructs validated within scientific

practice;

(5) it is possible and meaningful to elaborate such dialectics as philosophic theories (in the broad sense) of development and destruction;

(6) it is plausible - and supported by the recent de facto emergence of

social technologies (planning, management) which draw their inspiration from

some variants of dialectics ?

that such a Ph.T.D.D. if it is not able to generate

particular theories of development and destruction, can at least contribute

to the amelioration thereof by stating explicitly the conditions and the

criteria of intelligibility of the development and destruction, as well as by

generating some social technologies;

(7) it is not meaningless and impossible to elaborate dialectical logics,

complementary to formal logic, in order to analyse the logical structures and

operations interpreted and effectively used with intensional grounding in the

epistemic field;

(8) it is plausible that the approach to knowledge and to cognition from

the perspective of a (or some) dialectical logic(s) can be relevant and even

productive for philosophy, epistemology, methodology and the logic of

science and, maybe, even for the formal logic as well (especially for the

philosophy of logic 10? in the sense assigned to this term by Quine).

130 PAVEL AP?STOL

NOTES

1 Published in Ch. Perelman (ed.), Dialectics - Dialectique. Nijhof, 1975. References

to this study will be made within the text by indicating the page, between brackets. 2 W. Stegm?ller, Hauptstr?mungen der Gegenwartsphilosophie, Illrd ed., Stuttgart,

1965, pp. 429 sqq. 3 J. -F. Revel, Pourquoi des philosophes!, Pauvert, Paris, 1957, p. 182. 4

Especially in the two volumes of my work, Probleme de l?gica dial?ctica in filosof?a lui G. W. F. Hegel (Problems of Dialectical Logic in G. W. F. Hegel's Philosophy), Ed.

Academiei, Bucuresti, 1st vol. 1957, 2nd vol. 1964. 5 D. Henrich, Hegel im Kontext, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt A. M. 1971, p. 104. 6 'On Dialectical Materialism and Historical Materialism', included in The History of the

CPSU (b) (Short Course), in its various editions. 7 K. Kautsky, Materialistische Geschichtsauffassung, 2 vols. 1927. 8 C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems, Basic Books, New York/Lon

don, 1971, and our objections in Theory and Decision 5 (1974); I. I. Mitroff, M. Turoff,

'Technological Forecasting: Science and/or Mythology', in Technological Forecasting and Social Change 5 (1973), and the literature cited. 9 Even if I cannot give an inventory of the numerous contributions published in Telos,

Politics and Society, Review of Radical Political Economics, Marxist Perspectives, Science

and Society, Journal of Radical History, etc., it is quite sufficient to mention Professor

Aitken's work and the space devoted to these topics at the XXIth Annual Convention

of the International Studies Association, (Los Angeles, March 29-22, 1980) and at the

upcoming world conference of politologists. 10 A. Tikhonov, V. Arsenine, M?thodes de r?solution de probl?mes mal pos?s (1974),

Mir, Moscou, 1976. 11 P. Ap?stol, Viitorul (The Future), Ed. stiintifica si enciclop?dica, Bucuresti, 1977,

pp. 123 sqq. 12 Cf. L. A. Zadeh, in M. Bossel, S. Klaczko, N. M?ller (eds.), Systems Theory in the

Social Sciences, Birkhauser, Basel/Stuttgart, 1976 (and the literature quoted there), as well as J. A. Goguen, 'The Logic of Inexact Concepts', Syntheses, 19 (1969) and,

especially, G. C. Moisil, Lectii despre l?gica rationamentului nuantat (Lectures on Logics of Shaded Reasoning), Ed. Stiintifica si enciclop?dica, Bucuresti, 1975. 13 R. Thorn, Modeles math?matiques de morphogen?se, 10/18 Paris, 1974. 14 N. Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, Harvard Univ.

Press, Cambridge, Mass., particularly Chapter III. 15 Since 1947. 16 A. -G Ap?stol, Subiectual epistemic colectiv (The Collective Epistemic Subject).

Thesis for obtaining the D.Ph. degree, mimeogr., 1977. 17 Ibid. 18 It is practically impossible in a few words to give a general view on the immense

bibliography of exegeses, no matter how summary. For the Hegelian ones, an almost

complete inventory is offered by Hegelstudien. Unfortunately, for the Marxian exegeses there does not exist such a bibliographic instrument. As to the more recent analyses

of the Hegelian dialectics, A. Sarlemijn's, Hegelsche Dialektik, Berlin/New York, 1971

(English: 1975 by D. Reidel Publ. Co., Dordrecht-Holland) stands out for its conscien

tiousness and relevance. 19 Cf. G. G?nther, 'Formatierung der transzendentaldialektischen Logik', Hegelstudien,


Beiheft 1, Bouvier, Bonn 1964; L. S. Rogowski, Logika kierunkowa o tesa o spreczosci

smiani, Torun 1964; M. Kosok, 'The Formalization of Hegel's Dialectical Logic', Inter

national Philosophical Quarterly 6 (1966); D. Dubarle, A. Doz, Logique et Dialectique,

Larousse, Paris 1972. One of the interpretations given by us, in 1958, to Hegel's "dia

lectical logic" (see Problem de l?gica dial?ctica . . . , vol. II, p. 164 and pp. 188 sqq.) is

confirmed by the thorough analysis of the Hegelian 'Logic of the Essence' by D. Henrich

(op. cit., pp. 95-156). He points out the procedure -

unfounded from a formal-logical

point of view - but necessary in certain situations from an epistemic one, that of "mean

ing shift" (Bedeutungsverschiebung, similar, within certain limits, to A. Fine's notion

of meaning change in Journal of Philosophy. 64, pp. 231 sqq.). 20 If we do not agree with what we called "the didactically operational concept" of

dialectics that selects from Marx' but especially Engels' and Lenin's works some iso

lated quotations that can be put together in a text, we cannot neglect the remarkable

differences that exist between the respective authors, and then between these and other

Marxist or non-Marxist thinkers. The divergences of a political nature cannot justify the well-known dogmatic practices: "the conspiracy of silence" around some works on

dialectics owed to 'undesirable' authors or the hidden making one's own of some theses

belonging to these authors, whose works turn up somehow in anonymous folkloric

productions. 21 I proposed this prospect also in my work quoted at no. 4 as well as in two papers: one at the Chantilly session of the International Society for Hegelian Studies (October

1971); the other at the Congress of the International Hegel Association in Moscow

(1974). 22 B.-H. Levy invites us in La Barbarie ? visage humaine (Grosset, Paris, 1977) "?o

forget dialectics" identified with power and domination (la Ma?trise, p. 10). 23 The references to Hegel concern The Science of Logic and the Little Logic (En

cyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences). Engels is quoted with Anti-Duhring and The

Dialectics of Nature in mind, while Lenin is present with his Philosophical Notebooks.

The other papers are: I. S. Narski, Dialektischer Widerspruch und Erkenntnislogik, Deutscher Verlag der W., Berlin, 1973, G. Pawelzig, Dialektik der Entwicklung objektiver

Systeme, DV. W. Berlin, 1970 and G. Stiehler, Der dialektische Widerspruch, 2nd ed.

Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 1967. 24 The enumeration, even incomplete, of the representatives of each position shown

above and of the relevant literature cannot be made here. I am obliged to refer to the

bibliography quoted in my books (footnote 4) and in that of Sarlemijn (footnote 18). 25 Since it involves a special discussion, I do not deal here with the so-called "dialectical

theology" of K. Barth (E. Theuneysen, E. Brunner, R. Bultmann, F. Gogarten) or with

the more recent "theology of hope" (J. Moltman). 26 See our Probleme de l?gica dial?ctica . . . , both volumes. 27 We take into consideration especially the criticism of the Hegelian philosophy

of law (1843), the economic-philosophic manuscripts (1844), the methodological introduction to Marx' Contributions to the Critique of Political Economy (1859); elements of epistemology and methodology of social-economic sciences are to be found

in Capital (1867 and sqq.), and in Theories of Surplus-Value and The Fundamentals of the Critique of Political Economy (Grundrisse). 28 I presented, at the Hegel-Congress in 1974, a preparatory thesis for the elaboration

of such a m eta-approach, distinguishing a ternary structure, which I consider constitutive

for any dialectics (in the sense to be shown further on), the Hegelian structure, in which

132 PAVEL AP?STOL

the movement from one moment to another is realized by a necessity-functor, from that

non-Hegelian one, in which the same movement is realized through different functions, i.e. modalizors, from among which Marx, in his "logical practice", uses frequently that

of probability. 29 In my Inconsistenta argumentara idealist-subiective (Ed. stiintifica, Bucuresti, 1964), I presented in detail Marx' approach to logical-methodological analysis of ideological constructs. 30 The critical reception of Hegel by Marx proves a prior critical assimilation of the

Kantian epistemology, which explains - within the framework of the history of ideas -

the differences between Marx and Engels, but especially between Marx and, for example, G. V. Plekhanov who belonged to a social-cultural milieu, in which the reception of

Hegel had not been preceded by a reception of a comparable weight of Kantian critical

thought. 31 We recall some important texts. In Anti-Duhring (1878) one can read in this respect: "Was von der ganzen bisherigen Philosophie dann noch selbst?ndig bestehen bleibt, ist die Lehre vom Denken und seinen Gesetzen - die formelle Logik und die Dialektik.

Alles andere geht auf die positive Wissenschaft von Natur und Geschichte" (K. Marx, F. Engels, Werke, Dietz, Berlin, Vol. 20, p. 24, my italics); or, speaking about modern

materialism, he specifies that this "ist ?berhaupt keine Philosophie mehr, sondern eine

einfache Weltanschauung, die sich nicht in einer aparten Wissenschaftswissenschaft, sondern in den wirklichen Wissenschaften zu bew?hren und zu best?tigen hat", (ibidem,

p. 129). 32 W. I. Lenin, Werke, Dietz, Berlin, 1972, Vol. 21, p. 41. 33 W. I. Lenin, Werke, Dietz, Berlin, 1970, Vol. 38, pp. 182, 315, 316. 34

Ibid.,p. 315. 35 See our introduction to Gramsci's Selected works (in Romanian), Bucuresti, 1969

and our study in Lupta de clasa, Darmstadt/Neuwied, 1972 sqq. 36 G. Luk?cs, Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein (1923), de Munter, Amsterdam 1967,

especially, ?sthetik (1963) and Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins, Luchterhand,

Darmstadt/Neuwied, 1972 sqq. 37 L. Goldmann, Recherches dialectiques, N.R.F., Paris, 1959. 38 H. Lef?bvre, Logique formelle et logique dialectique, 2nd edition with a new preface,

Anthropos, Paris, 1969. 39 See V. J. McGill and W. T. Perry, 'The unity of opposites: a dialectical principle', in Science and Society, XV (1948), no. 4. 40

Relating to the use in Hegel of terms such as "contradiction", "contrariety", "opposi

tion", see Probleme de l?gica dial?ctica .. ., 2nd vol., pp. 302 sqq. 41 K. Marx, F. Engels, Werke, 1st Vol., Dietz, Berlin, 1972. 42 K. Marx, F. Engels, Erg?nzungsband, I. Teil, Berlin 1973, pp. 464-588, especially

pp. 568-588. 43 P. Ap?stol, Probleme de l?gica dial?ctica . . . , Vol. II, pp. 48 sqq. 44 Some authors, like Henrich (op. cit., pp. 105 sqq.) or Dubarle (op. cit., p. 155) tend to identify a quaternary structure in Hegel, taking into account the division of the

second term, that of antithesis. We have emphasized in our review of the second author

above that the ternary characteristic does not disappear because of this (cf. Revista de

ref?rate, recenzii si rez?mate, seria filosofie si l?gica, No. 4.1973). 45 P. Ap?stol, op. cit., Vol. I. p. 82 and especially pp. 213-229. The position of

Th.W. Adorno also deserves attention: "En tant qu'id?aliste, la dialectique ?tait aussi


philosophie de l'origine. Hegel la compara?t au cercle. Le retour du r?sultat du mouve

ment ? son commencement annule mortellement le r?sultat . .. L'instrument de sa

th?orie de la connaissance s'appelait la synth?se. Ce n'est pas comme acte isol? de penser,

qui rassemble dans leur relation des moments s?par?s, mais comme id?e directrice et

supr?me qu'elle est criticable." (Dialectique n?gative, (1966), French transi., Paris, 1978,

p. 126-127). 46 K. Marx, Das Kapital, Marx -

Engels, Werke, Vol. 23, Dietz, Berlin, p. 118 and 127

sqq. (my italics). 47 Which I have analysed in its logical mechanics, especially in op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 23

sqq. 48 The basic idea of the report presented at the International Seminar about Hegel's

logic of Essence (Chantilly, 1971) was the suggestion for an interpretation of Marx'

criticism of the Hegelian dialectics as an outlining of a meta-perspective. I argued for

conceiving a plurality of 'free syntheses', instead of the 'necessary and unique synthesis' of Hegel. 49 'Abordare sistemica, interdisciplinaritate, dial?ctica' (Systems-approach, interdisci

plinarity, dialectics) in Interdisciplinaritatea in stiinta contemporana, Bucuresti, 1980,

pp. 18-36. 50 This explains the central place of the logical mechanism of presupposition (Vor

aussetzung) in Hegelian logic and especially in the Logic of Essence (das Einholen

notwendiger Voraussetzungen, says R. Bubner, Dialektik und Wissenschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M., 1973, p. 65). As to the importance of the oriented character of the

dialectical transformation, cf. M. Cornforth, The Open Philosophy and the Open Society, London, 1968, p. 102. 51

Aristotle, Metaphysica 2 982b2; Anal, post., I 1 71al, I 2 71b26, I 10 76a31, II 9

93b, II 19 99b; Physica, 184a cf. P. Ap?stol, 'Fizica lui AristoteF (Aristotle's Physics), in Aristotle, Fizica, Bucuresti, 1966, pp. LXVI-LXXI; P. Aubenque, Le probl?me de

l'?tre chez Aristote, Paris, 1962, pp. 54 sqq; W. Wieland, Die aristotelische Physik,

G?ttingen, 1962, pp. 55 sqq. 52 This sentence, which is only stated here, is relevant for the conception we have about

philosophy as an explicitly formulated relationship between knowledge, ideology, and

action, on one hand, and the human condition, on the other. Cf. ' "Stiintele omului"

si conceptual filosofic de "conditie umana" '

(The 'Sciences de l'Homme' and the Philo

sophic Concept of the 'Human Condition') in Revista de filoso fie, 1978, No. 3. 53 See our study 'Contributii o metateorie a teoriei filosofice' (Contributions to a Meta-Theory of Philosophical Theory) in the vol., Ce este filosof?a! (What does

Philosophy Mean?), Bucuresti, 1970. 54 Cf. C. West Churchman, The Design of Inquiring Systems, Basic Books, New York/

London, 1971, cf. and our criticism in Theory and Decision 5 (1974). 55 I. I. Mitroff, 'A communication model of dialectical inquiring systems: a strategy for strategic planning', Management Science 17 (1971); I. I. Mitroff, M. Turoff, 'Tech

nological Forecasting: Science and/or Mythology', Technological Forecasting and Social

Change, 5 (1973). 56 I.I. Mitroff, F. Betz, 'Dialectical decision theory; a meta-theory of decision making',

Management Science, 20 (1974). 57

Georgescu-Roegen, The Entropy Law and the Economic Process, Cambridge, Mass. 1971. 58 In the study quoted in note 49 it is stated: "Being the sine qua non condition for

134 PAVEL AP?STOL

elaborating the concepts of 'development', 'becoming', 'destruction', the three 'laws'

of dialectics actually represent the necessary condition of intelligibility preceding the

elaboration of any theory or concept of development, becoming, destruction, in any

scientific domain in which they can be verified. The confirmation of the 'laws' of dia

lectics, their function of compulsory condition for any theory of this kind reveals itself

in fact just through the impossibility of conceiving development, becoming and destruc

tion without these determinations. That is why the criterion of confirmation of the

dialectics is its consistency with various particular scientific theories of development which are based upon laws verified by facts; see the scheme":

confirmation

verification

Ph.T.D.D. = Philosophical Theory of Development and Destruction

P.T D.(D.) = Particular Theory of Development (and/or Destruction)

L = (Scientific) Law

F = Facts (i.e. propositions about facts) C =

Compatibility

Gi = Generalization (from facts to laws)

G^ = Generalization (from laws to theories)

59 The definition of quasi-system is in our book, Viitorul (The Future), Bucuresti,

1977, p. 126. In our view, 'development' is characteristic of complex totalities (systems

and quasi-systems.. . ), which means that it presupposes a systemic ontology. We cannot

go into this problem here. 60 See the bibliography quoted in note 19. 61 J. von Neumann. Collected Works, ed. D. Taub, 5.303. He notes the tendency to

a closer relationship between formal logic's analytic approach and thermodynamics. 62 R. Thorn, op. cit., p. 97. 63

Ibid., p. 252. Earlier (pp. 129-130) he defined the "real system" in the same terms:

"Un syst?me r?el est toujours d?fini dans une morphologie scientifiquement catalogu?e d'une discipline de la taxonomie des sciences. C'est en principe, un domaine connexe

de points r?guliers de la morphologie dont la fermeture est le support d'une chr?ode

conditionnelle . . . L'exigence de connexit? que nous imposons aux syst?mes r?els est

celle-l? m?me qu'intuitivement nous imposons aux objects de la langue usuelle. Dans ce

cas, la plupart des objets sont topologiquement des boules ... Un syst?me r?el ?tant

ainsi d?fini, on pourra proc?der ? l'analyse de la chr?ode conditionnelle qu'il supporte en chr?odes ?l?mentaires. Ce mod?le abstrait constitute par le groupement de ces

chr?odes constitue ce qu'on appellera la structure du syst?me."


64 Ibid., pp. 262-263.

65 The idea was quite clearly stated by R. Thorn, with reference to biology (ibidem,

p. 271): " ... en r?alit? la stabilit? de l'individu, ou de l'esp?ce, repose elle-m?me sur

une comp?tition entre 'champs', entre 'arch?types' de caract?re plus ?l?mentaire, dont

la lutte engendre la configuration g?om?trique structurellement stable qui assure la

r?gulation, l'hom?ostasie du m?tabolisme, et la stabilit? de la reproduction." 66 Loc. cit. 67 The examination of the possible consequences of R. Thorn's typology of the product of two spaces can be an interesting direction of reflection (Ibid., pp. 220 sqq.). The

dimensions of this study do not allow us to discuss more in detail the problem of "dia

lectical contradiction", considered by Bunge to be an inconsistent term. We want only to mention that the terms "contradiction" or "opposition" in any dialectics acquire a different meaning from that admitted in formal logic. Cf. V. J. McGill, W. T. Perry, 'The unity of opposites: a dialectical principle', Science and Society 15 (1948), No. 4;

A. Schaff, '?ber einige Fragen der Logik', Deutsche Zeitschrift f?r Philosophie 1956, No. 3 pp. 338-352; Sarlejmin's (note 18). Buhner's (note 50) previously quoted books.

The Hegelian proposition "What is contrary has to be determined also as contradictory" -

apparently absurd from a formal-logical standpoint - can be interpreted in logical

terms in a satisfactory manner, (Probleme de l?gica dial?ctica . . . , Vol. II. p. 330). 68 I. Narski, 'Bemerkungen ?ber den Vortrag von Prof. Bunge' in Dialectics, pp. 78-86.

The debates of the Seminar organized in 1973 by the International Institute of Phi

losophy were not yet to be found in that collection at press time. 69 P. Ap?stol, Probleme de l?gica dial?ctica .. . , Vol. I, pp. 85 sqq.; Vol. II, pp. 38 sqq. 70 K. Marx, Introduction to Zur Kritik der politische ?konomie (1857) and Das Kapital, loc. cit. 71 K. Marx, Das Kapital, op. cit., p. 115 "Der Name einer Sache ist ihrer Natur ganz ?usserlich". 72 K. Marx, Das Kapital p. 128 (my italics). Marx' theory of crisis also operates with

a non-Hegelian dialectical structure, where the 'solution' of the crisis means, in fact, a

plurality of possible solutions. 73 P. Ap?stol, 'Definitia si domeniul m?todologiei' (The definition and the domain

of methodology), Revista de filosofie, 1965, No. 2; '"L?gica cercetarii' si dezvoltarea

cunoasterii stiintifiece" (The "Logic of Research' and the Development of Scientific

Knowledge) ibidem, 1965, No. 8: 'Definition and Gegenstandsbereich der Methodologie', Deutsche Zeitschrift f?r Philosophie, 1966. No. 6: 'Noi orientan in l?gica si metodolog?a

stiintei (New Orientations in the Logic and Methodology of Science), Progressle stiintei,

1967, No. 9; Cibern?tica, cunoastere, actinue. Bucuresti, 1969, pp. 88-96, 196-204; 'An operational demarcation of the domain of methodology versus epistemology and

logic', Dial?ctica (26), 1972, No. 2. 74 The conception belongs to Ath. Joja who also influenced to a certain extent our

works until 1965. Studii de l?gica (Studies in Logics); I, II, HI, Bucuresti, since 1960. 75 G. Plekhanov, Les questions fondamentales du marxisme, Paris, 1974, p. 141. 76

Ibid., p. 143. 77 For instance B. V. Sesic, Logic of Change, Bologna, 1972. 78 R. Spisani, 'Fundamenti di l?gica produttiva', International Logic Review, begin

ning with 1970. 79 D. Dubarle, op. cit., p. 193. 80

Ibid., p. 194, cf. especially pp. 49-82.

136 PAVEL AP?STOL

81 A more detailed analysis in Dubarle, op. cit., pp. 73-78. 82

Ibid., pp. 197-200. 83 G. Klaus, contribution to the debate about logic in Deutsche Zeitschrift f?r Philo

sophie 1957, No. 6 and 1958, No. 5. 84 After the article mentioned above, Klaus expounded his point of view in Einf?hrung in die formale Logik (1958 and many other issues) entitled, afterwards, in a revised

version: Moderne Logik, Abriss der formalen Logik, Berlin, 1964. 85 G. Klaus, op. cit., pp. 120-129. 86

Ibid., p. 120. 87

Ibid., pp. 126-127. 88

Ibid., pp. 152 sqq. 89

Ibid., pp. 166-167. 90

Ibid., p. 180. 91

Ibid., pp. 191 sqq. 92

Ibid., pp. 192 sqq. 93 Intensional reformulations with G. Klaus of the principles of 'non-contradiction'

and of the tertium non datur govern what follows. 94

Ibid., pp. 199-200. 95

Ibid., pp. 226 sqq. 96 P. Ap?stol, Experiment si cunoastere (Experiment and Knowledge), Bucuresti, 1958. 97 P. Ap?stol, op. cit., pp. 82 sqq.: intensionally founded finitist reduction; substitution

of the advancement 'step-by-step' by an amplifying 'sublation', etc. 98 Cf. P. Ap?stol, Probleme de l?gica dial?ctica . .., Vol. II, especially pp. 145 sqq. 99 Th.W. Adorno: "D'un certain point de vue la logique dialectique est plus positiviste

que le positivisme qui le proscrit." (op. cit., p. 115). 100 w y. O. Quine, The Philosophy of Logic, Prentice-Hall, New Jersey, 1970.

Academy of Sciences,

Rumania.

bunge - critica a dialectica

Education