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John Bussanich

Ethics in Ancient India

Ancient India is richwith reflection onperennial ethical questions: How ought Ito live? What kind of person should I be? What are the sources of goodconduct? What is the purpose of human existence? However, access to Indianethical thought for western philosophers is complicated by the fact that much ofit does not fit within familiar disciplinary and cognitive categories. In ancientIndia philosophy was not conceived as a discipline separate from religion orother arts and sciences, nor were rational argument considered to be at oddswith tradition, faith, or imagination. With their biases against tradition andextra-rational sources of authority, contemporary western philosophers haveoften dismissed Indian ethical ideas because of their connections with the so-teriological commitments of various religious communities. At the same time,progress has been made in the critical analysis of Indian metaphysics, epis-temology, and philosophy of language. Yet beyond the particular interests ofcontemporary analytic philosophers it is also to be noted that the principles anddoctrines of Indian ethical thought display striking affinities to those found inpre-modernwestern philosophy. Ancient andmedieval philosophers also vestedauthority in tradition, including scriptures in Jewish, Christian, and Islamicphilosophy. Greek ethical thought, with its emphasis on community values,virtue-ethics, and philosophy as a way of life, offers many parallels to classicalHindu thought. Of course, cross-cultural comparisons present unique chal-lenges to philosophers, with their penchant for abstraction and analytical pre-cision. Moreover, as Alasdair MacIntyre has pointed out, each tradition has itsown standards and measures of interpretation, explanation, and justificationinternal to itself and there are no shared standards and measures, external toboth systems and neutral between them to which appeal might be made toadjudicate between [them].1 Contemporary western philosophers in particularshould be wary of applying a post-Enlightenment, secularized notion of ra-tionality and of the autonomous individual to understanding ethical thought in

1 MacIntyre 1991, 109.

Grundlagen der Antiken Ethik / Foundations of Ancient Ethics, ed. J. Hardy and G. Rudebusch, Vandenhoek & Ruprecht (V & R Unipress Gmbh, 2010)Accessed Dec 02, 2013 https://www.academia.edu/attachments/1008372/download_file

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ancient India. This essay is written in the conviction that debate and dialoguebetween Indian and western ethical philosophies is possible and can be fruitfuleven if, ultimately, they are incommensurable.

Hindus, Buddhists, and Jainas were engaged in ethical reflection beginningfrom the late Vedic period (ca. 8th c. BCE). The present essay focuses on Hinduphilosophy through the classical period, i. e. , up to the Muslim conquest at theend of the first millenium CE. Hindu philosophers accepted the authoritativetestimony (sabda) of the Veda (scriptures and other traditionas) as a validmeansof knowledge (pramana) in the areas of ritual praxis, religious wisdom, cos-mology, and social ethics, whereas Buddhists and Jainas rejected the Vedasauthority. While detailed discussion of Buddhist and Jaina thought is not pos-sible here, it should be noted that debate (andmutual influence) among thinkersin the three traditions was continuous throughout the classical period. The sixsystems or schools (darsanas) of Hindu philosophy are conventionally arrangedinto three pairs Nyaya-Vaisesika, Samkhya-Yoga, and Purva Mmamsa-UttaraMmamsa (i. e. Vedanta). Each schools philosophers wrote commentaries onfoundational sutra texts or sub-commentaries on commentaries whichcritically explored standard topics and problems: Nyaya / logic and epistemol-ogy ; Vaisesika / realist physical ontology ; Samkhya / dualistic cosmology &metaphysics; Yoga / spiritual practice; Purva Mmamsa / Vedic exegesis; andVedanta / mystical teachings of the Upanisads.

Roots of ethical thought in the Veda : Sacrifice, Order andDharmaThe sources of Indian thought and religious practice were roughly divided intotwo categories : (1) sruti (heard), the Vedic texts revealed to ancient seers (rsi);and (2) smrti (remembered), later sutra and sastra texts compiled by sages andwisemen (Dharma books, Epics, and Puranas). Originally considered secondaryrevelations, smrti texts appropriated authority in a variety of ways through thecenturies into the first millenium CE, which significatly impacted the develop-ment of ethical thought. The early Veda, a remarkably complex web of scriptureswritten down by four schools (Rg, Sama, Yajur, and Atharva), was the author-itative source of Vedic theology, ritual, and magic. Each school progressivelycompiled texts with distinct concerns: verse Samhita (collections of mantrasand liturgical formulas for sacrifical use, roughly dating from ca. 1500 900BCE) and the subsequent commentaries on them, viz. the Brahmanas, Ara-nyakas, and Upanisads (ca. 800 200 BCE). These three, mostly prose, compi-lations contain increasingly elaborate speculations on the meaning of ritualactions and their hidden connections with parts of the cosmos, of divinities, andof persons.

John Bussanich2

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Vedic religionists, drawing on the magical efficacy of primordial word andsound, praised and supplicated the gods in the pursuit of prosperity and, ulti-mately, of heaven.2 At the center of a life-affirming ethos was the Vedic firesacrifice: fire both element & god (Agni) connected the domain of sacrifice tothe divine and cosmic realms. Another divine-human exchange was conductedin the potent juice from the soma plant (perhaps ephedra or amagicmushroom).Soma, a priestly god, was also the drink in the bowl that inspired the seer,producing visions which transmitted the wisdom of the Vedic hymns. Theregular performance of these and other sacrifical actions (karma) ensured thatall members of the community received tangible benefits in the form of food,sons, wealth, victory in war, etc. On a personal level, the human self was rituallyconstructed and its life-phases clearly demarcated through sacrifice and ini-tiatory rites.

Reciprocity between gods and humans depended on the correct performanceof ordinances and rituals (dharma) in the sacrifice, which maintained order(rta) in the universe. Closely linked to truth (satya), rta symbolized the entirecosmic order the laws of nature, the regulative principles of divine rule of thecosmos, and the moral principles governing human life which humans sup-ported through sacrifice and recitation of revealed mantras and hymns: Oguardians of order (rta), you whose ordinances are true (satya-dharman), youascend your chariot in the highest heavens. . . .WiseMitra andVaruna, bymeansof dharman and your divine power you guard the ordinances. You govern theentire world by means of rta. You placed the sun in the heaven as an effulgentchariot.3

Correlations of nature and law are prominent in the late Rg Veda hymn 10.90,the Purusa-sukta (Hymn to the Cosmic Man), which recounts how the godscreated parts of the universe and the substances employed in sacrificial ritual. Inthe primordial disintegration of the cosmic man (purusa), the three regions ofhis body corresponded to the three cosmic regions and individual parts of hisbody to the elements and, notably, with the four social classes (varna). From hismouth came the priests (brahmans), from his arms kings and warriors (rajanya,ksatriya), from his thighs the common people, i. e. merchants, craftsmen,farmers (vaisyas), and from his feet servants (sudras). The hymn concludes:with the sacrifice the gods sacrified to the sacrifice: these were the first rituallaws (dharmas) (RV 90.16). Epitomizing the vertical and horizontal corre-spondences between the cosmic totality and individual entities (gods, humans,animals, and substances), the hymn concretely depicts the interdependence ofmetaphysical realities and moral principles and provides a mytho-poetic

2 On Indian conceptions of heaven see F.M. Smith 1998a.3 RV 5.63.1, 7, tr. Holdrege 2004, 216.

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stimulus to philosophical reflection. The concept of dharma embraced bothdivine upholding of the cosmos and human support of its order through correctperformance of Vedic ritual. Themetaphysical and normative aspects of dharmacomprise the inherent connections (bandhu) and distinctions among gods,humans, and nature. All subsequent human dharma is perpetuation and re-newal of the primeval upholdingof those primordial cosmic and social divi-sions and polarizations which are the very condition of ritual and ethics(Halbfass 1988, 318).

The principle of reciprocity was applied in the commentary literature(Brahmanas and Aranyakas) to explicate the hidden meanings of the rituals andtrace their resonances deep within the self. Key concepts like dharma, karma,and duty (vidhi) assumed more explicitly ethical meanings. In the early Upa-nisads, dharma began to be conceived as general moral and religious law:Brahman (the Absolute) created the Law (dharma), a form superior to andsurpassing itself. And the Law is there the ruling power standing above the rulingpower. Hence there is nothing higher than the Law. Therefore, a weaker manmakes demands of a stronger man by appealing to the Law, just as one does byapppealing to a king. Now, the Law is nothing but the truth (satyam). Therefore,when aman speaks the truth, people say that he speaks the LawThey are reallythe same thing (BU 1.4.14). Similarly, a teacher advises his pupil : speak thetruth. Follow the Law (TU 1.11.11). This admonition to righteous Brahminsincludes duties and obligations to gods, ancestors, the guru, and family ; pro-ducing offspring, preserving health and wealth, and cultivating common vir-tues: This is the secret teaching of the Veda. As the linchpin of the Aryanreligious and socio-cultural system, dharma was the universal principle ofgoodness and justice as well as an umbrella concept covering customs and dutiescalibrated by class, country, and circumstance. This sacrificial discourse waspromulgated by priests to legitimate the Brahmanical hierarchical social order.

The widely accepted doctrine of karma also originated in the earlyUpanisads.Comprising a non-fatalistic nexus of causal relations between actions and resultsin the wheel of births and deaths (samsara), it suffused ethical theories of allIndian schools, including those of Buddhists and Jainas. The impact of the law ofkarma, with its stress on just deserts, on Indian ethical thought cannot beexaggerated. Max Weber considered it the most consistent theodicy ever pro-duced.4

4 Matilal 2002, 39.

John Bussanich4

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From Ritual to Socio-cultural practicesIn post-Vedic literature (roughly, after 500 BCE) the meanings of dharma andkarma extended beyond correct performance of sacrifice (karma = ritual ac-tion) to embrace a wide range of ethical and social practices. The emergence of acomprehensive dharma-ethics was fueled by social and cultural changes toocomplex to discuss here, but they include urbanization and the rise of mer-cantilism and individualism, the appearance of Buddhism, and the spread ofascetic ideals and practices. In the present context three developments arenoteworthy. First, the number and type of sources of dharma increased. Second,the Purva or Early Mmamsa school explicated Vedic dharma as the symbol ofBrahmanical identity. Third, the Dharmasutras and Dharmasastras wove anintricate fabric of social, political, and legal morality.

Vedic legitimacy extended beyond revealed texts (sruti) to other traditional(smrti) texts, viz. the Dharma Sutras and Dharmasastras (dating, roughly, fromthe third-first c. BCE), Epics, and Puranas. Two justifications were given forascribing authority to these post-Vedic texts: (a) they were believed to containmaterial remembered from lost or forgotten Vedic texts; (b) those learned inthe Veda themselves became living authorities. The second factor is particularlyinteresting. For Apastamba Dharmasutra

The Righteous (dharma) and the Unrighteous (adharma) do not go aroundsaying, Here we are! Nor do gods, Gandharvas, or ancestors declare, This isrighteous and that is unrighteous.An activity that Aryas praise is righteous, andwhat they deplore is unrighteous. He should model his conduct after that whichis unanimously approved in all regions by Aryas who have been properly trained,who are elderly and self-possessed, and who are neither greedy nor deceitful. Inthis way he will win both worlds. (A 1.20).

The same view was promoted in the most celebrated of the dharma books, theManu Smrti or Manava Dharmasastra (compiled from the 2nd c. BCE to 3rd c.CE). Learn the Law always adhered to by people who are erudite, virtuous, andfree from love and hate, the Law assented to by the heart (2.1).

The root of the Law (dharma) is the entire Veda; the tradition (smrti) andpractice (sla) of those who know the Veda, the conduct (acara) of good people,and what is pleasing to oneself (Manu 2.6).

But in the Dharmasastras the conduct of the good was not an independentsource of knowledge of dharma because the Veda remained the ultimate sourceof ethical princples. And, what is pleasing to oneself is not, despite appear-ances, an appeal to subjective inclination. The objectivity of Vedic principlesremained unchallenged, while increasing prominence was given to state of mind

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and intention inmoral evaluation, a trend encouraged, perhaps, by the silence ofVedic texts on many issues and because of the inward turn of renouncers. Manucites the dharmic persons assent to right action in terms which recall both Kantand Aristotle. What a man seeks to know with all his heart and is not ashamedto perform, at which his inner being rejoices that is the mark of Goodness(sattva-guna) (12.37). Pleasure should not be construed here as sensual oraesthetic satisfaction, but rather as joy in fulfilling Vedic duties. Manus pointrecalls Kants claim that people feel self-contentment, which is distinct fromtheir happiness, when they do their duty for its own sake not for their ownsatisfaction.5

Affinities with Greek virtue-ethics are also noteworthy. Manus dharmicBrahmin can be compared to Aristotles man of practical wisdom, who exercisesmoral authority because he feels the proper emotions and judges difficult sit-uations correctly, when moral rules and maxims are unavailable. For Aristotlethe right course of action is determined by reason and in the way the man ofpractical wisdom would determine it (NE 1107a1 2). He knows the good,chooses good actions for their own sakes, has an unshakeable character(1105a30 33), and takes pleasure in just actions (1099a10 20).6 That Aristotle,and Plato too, embed the individuals pursuit of the good within the broadercontext of communitarian ethics also recommends comparing these traditions.7

Justification of Dharma in Purva or Early MmamsaThe great Indologist Wilhelm Halbfass observed that although the Hinduphilosophical systems show a lackof critical reflection upon the specific contentsof dharma; yet the concept of dharma has been taken up in a variety of ways intheoretical and philosophical discourse (1988, 324). While the six systemsshared many views the authority of the Veda, the Brahmanical scheme ofvalues, liberation as the goal of human existence they usually addressed dis-tinct problems. Each schools primary works were commentaries on founda-tional sutra texts, which possessed an almost revelatory status. Because sutratexts are notoriously terse and ambiguous, interpreting them generated con-siderable disagreement. The Purva Mmamsa school was preeminent in its de-fence of the Brahmanical system of dharma, partially in response to the wide

5 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 6:377 378.6 The moral ideal of developing ones ethos or character by cultivation of the virtues is also

central to Buddhist ethics. See Harvey 2000, 50 51.7 Mohantys comparison ofGreek andHindu dharma ethics argues, unconvincingly inmy view,

that neither grounds ethical theory in their respective metaphysics. Cf. Mohanty 1997, 295 296.

John Bussanich6

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dispersion of Buddhist teachings about dharma under the emperor Asoka in thethird century BCE. Taking enlightened beings rather than scriptures as au-thoritative, the non-orthodox Buddhists (and Jainas) rejected the validity of theVedas, Brahmanical claims to authority, and the linkage of heredity and ethicalgoodness.

The Purva Mmamsasutra attributed to Jaimini (c. 300 200 BCE) beginswith the definition of dharma as a beneficial end (artha) indicated by an in-junction (codana). For Mmamsa the Veda was eternal and authorless. Thus, itsprescriptive statements were considered instrinsically true without verificationand could be relied upon as authoritative guides to happiness and salvation.However, the two great 7th century CE Mmamsa philosophers differed on thecharacter of an injunction. Kumarila argued that Vedic injunctions served asmeans towards desired ends and so motivated agents in conjunction with de-sired results, while Prabhakara saw them as unconditional obligations, as endsin themselves; for him, hearing an imperative was sufficient motivation to act.8The latter formulation resembles Kants categorial imperative, but the com-parison shouldnt be pressed too far. First, Vedic injunctions differ fromKantianimperatives in not being universally applicable: Vedic dharma applied only toAryans who lived in the Brahmanical homeland (roughly, north-central India)and who were conversant with the Sanskrit text of the Vedas. Non-Aryan bar-barians were excluded. Morever, even within Brahmanical society, duties andproper conduct varied considerably by class and birth. Second, neither Mm-amsa nor the other systems sought theoretical, rational grounds independent ofrevealed truth for concepts of the good or principles of conduct. Kants notionsof human dignity, moral freedom, and the goodwill, by contrast, are groundedin rational agency. Certainly, for most Hindu philosophers, reason (yukti) andargument (nyaya) could be employed to defend Vedic injunctions and tradi-tional norms. The Vaisesika Sutra even claimed that Vedic injunctions werebased on logical inference (anumana). But, generally, without reliance on Vedictruth the power of logical reasoning was limited. Manus perspective is typical :The Veda is the eternal eyesight for ancestors, gods, and humans; for vedicteaching is beyond the powers of logic or cognition (12.94). Perception, in-ference, and treatises coming from diverse sources a man who seeks accuracywith respect to the Law must have a complete understanding of these three. Theman who scrutinizes the record of the seers and the teachings of the Law bymeans of logical reasoning (tarka) not inconsistent with the vedic treatise healone knows the law (12.105 106).

A more universalist attitude to moral principles emerged in Buddhism andamong Hindu renouncers, though the latter continued to accept the truth of the

8 See further J.A. Taber 1998.

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Veda. Compare Mmamsa and the Buddhists on the principle of non-violence(ahimsa). For Kumarila the truth of ahimsa did not depend on rational justifi-cation or social acceptance but solely on the authority of the Veda. Hence,Buddhist critiques of sacrificial violence towards animals sanctioned by theVedas were refuted byMmamsa thinkers, on the grounds that Buddhist relianceon reason and conscience blinded them to the axiomatic religious truths taughtby theVeda. Kumarila also criticized the Buddhas compassion because it did notpertain to the class-duty (varna-dharma) of the princely class (ksatriya). In-terestingly, the tendency to universalize principles like non-violence to all re-gardless of caste and birth, so prominent in Buddhism, also appeared in popularHindu literature like the Mahabharata and Pancatantra.9

Individual and Social EthicsThe Dharmasastras, which embodied emerging cultural patterns, worked outthe varnasrama-dharma, the new ethics of class (varna) and stages of life (as-rama). Echoing the Hymn to the Cosmic Man cited earlier, Manu endorsed theVedas divine-cosmic legitimation of the four classes (varna): For the pro-tection of the whole creation, that One of dazzling brilliance assigned separateactivities for those born from the mouth, arms, thighs, and feet (1.87); Thefour social classes, the three worlds, and the four orders of life, the past, thepresent and the future all these are individually established by the Veda(12.97). The classes, with their respective characteristics, duties, and virtues,were not contingent social constructions, but rather were rooted in the nature ofthings. Commencing at age five with the rite of initiation, twice-born males ofthe three highest classes entered the four stages of life: (a) the celibate life of theVedic student (brahmacarya); (b) the householder married life (grhastha),which included performance of sacrifices and household duties; (c) withdrawalfrom society to live as a forest-dweller (vanaprastha); and, finally, (d) the life of acomplete renouncer (samnyasa). The fourth stage involved total renunciation ofhousehold, fire, and thus of sacrifice and cooking.

The present context does not permit a detailed consideration of the originsand complexities of the asrama system.10 Classical Hindu social ethics organizednormatively the increasing variety of choices in life. The earliest texts conceivedthe latter three asramas as distinct ways of life, each one of which a twice-bornmale could enter after completion of the initial student-phase. ApastambaDharmasutra 2.21.1 5, for example, recognized that each of the alternatives

9 Cf. Halbfass 1988, 330.10 See Olivelle 1993, the definitive work on the subject.

John Bussanich8

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could lead to peace (ksema). But by the beginning of the common era, theDharmasastras (see Manu chs. 2 6) canonized the four as successive phases inan idealized sequence for the high-caste man. Yet, Manu valorized householdersbecause they supported the others (Manu 3.77 78, 6.87 90). The house-holders life was the best for anyone who desires undecaying heaven (svarga)and happiness (sukha) on earth (3.78), a view shared by the influential Ma-habharata.11

In ancient Brahmanical society class-duties and life-stages did not answer allaspects of the question how should I live? Also significant was the cosmic lawof karma, according to which each individual is propelled from one life to thenext, determining both the objective circumstances of ones life, i. e. birth andclass, and the internal constituents of ones own nature, a unique mixture ofqualities and dispositional tendencies (samskara) accumulated over countlessincarnations. The early Upanisads state the principle clearly, echoed later by theGta :

People say: A person here consists simply of desire. A man resolves in ac-cordance with his desire, acts in accordance with his resolve, and turns out to bein accordance with his action:A man whos attached goes with his action,to that very place to which his mind and character cling.Reaching the end of his action, of whatever he has done in this world From that world he returns back to this world, back to action. (BU 4.4.5 6)

As a man discards worn-out clothes to put on new and different ones,so the embodied self discards its worn-out bodies to take on other new ones.(BG 2.22)

Reliance on the invisible, causal law of karma and on the human and cosmicparticipation in dharma enabled Indian thinkers to connect non-moral facts andmoral goods, the metaphysical and normative, shunning the fact-value dis-tinction enshrined in western philosophy since Hume. But a pre-modern anal-ogy can be found in Platonic ethics: wise men claim that partnership andfriendship, order, self-control, and justice hold together heaven and earth, andgods and men, and that is why they call this universe a world-order (kosmos)(Gorgias 508a).

Individual and social ethics depend on the Indian metaphysics of the self.According to Hindu cosmological doctrine the reincarnating self is composed ofthree qualities (literally strands = gunas) of nature or matter (prakrti): (1)pure being, light, or truth (sattva); (2) energy, activity, or passion (rajas); and

11 Cf. Olivelle 1993, 148 51.

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(3) darkness or inertia (tamas). This tri-guna scheme had wide applicationsfrom medicine to metaphysics, e. g. , the divine realm is purely sattvic whereasrajas permeates the human world.

One should understand Goodness (sattva), Vigor (rajas), and Darkness(tamas) as the three attributes of the embodied self (atman), attributes by whichMahat, the Great, remains pervading all these existences completely. Whenone of these attributes thoroughly suffuses the body, it makes the embodied selfdominant in that attribute. Goodness is knowledge, tradition tells us; Darknessis ignorance; and Vigor is passion and hatred. These are their pervasive formsthat inhere in all beings. (Manu 12.24 26)

In Manus scheme, the three qualities had links to the three basic values inancient Indian society : wealth or worldly success (artha), sensual or aestheticpleasure (kama), and righteousness (dharma). Pleasure is said to be themarkofDarkness; Profit, of Vigor ; and Law, of Goodness (12.38). The one-to-onecorrespondence among the three qualities and three goals was complicated bythe addition of the fourth goal, moksa, discussed below.

When combined with the three qualities, varna (literally color) symbolicallyrepresented the social classes: Brahmans white for purity, Ksatriyas red forpassion and energy, Vaisyas yellow, for earth, and Sudras black, for darknessand inertia. General dharma applied to all members of society in the form ofuniversal virtues such as non-violence, truthfulness, abstention from anger,purification, self-control, not stealing, hospitality, gift-giving, and freedom fromenvy (Manu 10.63). Distinctive virtues, occupations, rituals, and obligationswere specified for each class and caste (jati, literally birth) and even for dif-ferent regions, clans, guilds, and ones historical age. These latter stipulationasfall under the rubric of particular dharma (svadharma), which is relative to thepsychological mixture produced by ones class and ones nature. The entirescheme is summarized in the Gta :

There is no being on earth or among the gods in heavenfree from the triad of qualities that are born of nature.The actions of priests, warriors, commoners and servantsare apportioned by qualities born of their intrinsic being.Tranquility, control, penance, purity, patience, and honesty,knowledge, judgment, and piety are intrinsic to the action of a priest (Brahmin).Heroism, fiery energy resolve, skill, refusal to retreat in battle,charity, and majesty in conduct are intrinsic to the action of a warrior (ksatriya).Farming, herding cattle, and commerce are intrinsic to the action of a commoner(vaisya):action that is essentially service is intrinsic to the servant (sudra).Each one achieves success by focusing on his own action (svakarma);hear how one finds success by focusing on his own action.

John Bussanich10

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By his own action a man finds success, worshiping the sourceof all creatures activity, the presence pervading all that is.Better to do ones own duty (svadharma) imperfectly than to do another manswell ;doing action intrinsic to his being (svabhava) aman avoids guilt. (BG 18.40 48)

One notices immediately in this famous passage that distinctive virtues andproper behavior are ascribed only to the two highest classes (priests and war-riors), whereas the two lower classes are characterized exclusively by their socialactivities. The ethical pyramid had rather steep sides, even more so for womenand sudras. They also were subject to svadharma, but since the stages of lifestrictly applied only to twice-born males, women and sudras occupied the pe-riphery of the classical varnasrama-dharma system: neither could study theVedas, offer sacrifices, or become renouncers, though of course they couldmarry. The Dharmasastras were quite explicit about criminal penalties for vi-olations: If a sudra has sex with an Arya woman, his penis should be cut off andall his property confiscated[I]f he listens in on a vedic recitation, his ears shallbe filled with molten tin (G 12.2, 4). Womens svadharma required deference toand service of males, e. g. , procreation in marriage and assisting husbands inmeeting family obligations. When a wife fulfilled her dharma by serving herhusband as a god (Manu 9.31 55), she was deemed an embodiment of Sri, thegoddess of prosperity, and thus was to be venerated in turn as the source of goodfortune for the family. For high-caste women the paragon of female virtue wasSta, the loyal, modest, and devoted wife of Lord Rama.12

Lest it be thought that classical Indian social ethics was an exotic Orientalgrowth without western parallels, recall Platos account of justice in RepublicBook 4. Having divided the states citizenry into three classes guardians/philosophers, auxiliaries/warriors, and producers (slaves dont comprise adistinct class) Socrates argues that the top two classes should have distinctvirtues and that the lowest has none just as the Gta does. Similarly, Platosconcept of justice links hereditary endowment withmoral excellence to promotevirtue and happiness in the whole society : everyone must practice one of the

12 Stephanie Jamison summarizes a complex situation: woman plays a crucial role in knittingtogether her community. By producing sons, she insures the linkage of generations and thecontinued veneration of the ancestors. By dispensing food and hospitality, she forges har-monious links between different segments of secular Aryan society. By her role in the srautaritual (and by making such ritual possible), she links gods and men and allows the religiouslife of the community to proceed. But, she continues, this is a very rosy picture of the life ofan ancient Indianwife, which puts a deceptively positive spin on the conceptual position ofthe wife. [A]ll the linkages just mentioned are perilous and anxiety producing. Allottingthe woman important roles there essentially makes her into cannon fodder (Jamison 1996,254).

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occupations in the city for which it is naturally best suited (433a5 6); the cityis just because each of the three classes in it is doing its own work (441d8 10).Note also the Platonic counterpart to Hindu svadharma. Manu: Far better tocarry out ones own Law (svadharma) imperfectly than that of someone elsesperfectly, for amanwho lives according to someones elses Law falls immediatelyfrom his caste (10.97). Plato: each one of us in whom each part [of the soul] isdoing its own work will himself be just and do his own (441d12-e2). TheRepublic also echoes Manus strictures against mixing classes: meddling andexchange between the three classes is the greatest harm that can happen to thecity (434b9-c1). The parallels are compelling despite the fact that Platos theoryof justice reflected contemporary social realities less than did Hindu class-dharma.

Well-being and the goals of lifeLiving a dharmic life was not simply a matter of fulfilling Vedic duties andobligations. Both philosophical and non-theoretical texts also analyzed the roleplayed in a happy or successful life by intrinsic and instrumental goods, whichmotivated by attraction. Traditionally, the four values or ends of human life(purusarthas) were: wealth or worldly success (artha), sensual and aestheticpleasure (kama), righteousness (dharma), and liberation (moksa). Apart fromliberation, the first three goals circumscribed an embodied persons active en-gagement (pravrtti) in everyday life.13

The conception of happiness (sukha) as artha and kama is generally de-scriptive, things as they are, but since one was expected to pursue them rightly,that is, in accordance with varnasrama-dharma and ones svadharma, thescheme is also prescriptive, things as they should be. Manu is inclusivist: Somesay that Law (dharma) and Wealth (artha) are conducive to welfare (sreyas),others Pleasure and Wealth; and still others, Law alone or Wealth alone. But thesettled rule is this: the entire triple set is conducive to welfare (2.224). Prag-matically, dharma, both as excellence in ritual performance and as correct be-havior, probably functioned for many primarily as the means to obtain pleasureand prosperity. And while each of the three arthas is intrinsically good, Manuand other authorities also saw them as instrumental for the attainment of thechief good, viz. heaven or equality with the gods (12.90). As cited earlier :

13 Deviating from the consensus, the threefold scheme was rejected by the Carvaka philoso-phers, atheistic materialists, who repudiated dharma and championed artha and kama, thuspromoting a form of sophisticated hedonism not unlike Epicureanism, with the notabledifference that Epicureans defined the highest pleasure as simply the absence of pain, whichis superior to the episodic kinetic pleasures championed by the Carvakas.

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Pleasure is said to be the mark of Darkness; Profit, of Vigour ; and Law, ofGoodness. Each later one is superior to each preceding (12.38). Ideally, Law andGoodness were best exemplified by Brahmins, whose Vedic knowledge, priestlyvirtues, and exemplary conduct are the highest means of securing the supremegood. (12.83). Lending further support to the analogies drawn earlier betweenHindu and Greek ethics, I suggest that the virtuous Brahmin is not unlike thePlatonic-Aristotelian philosopher, allowing for the fact that the latter is not asacerdotal type.

With respect to the teleological dimension of Hindu ethics, Nyaya-Vaisesikaphilosophers analyzed the concepts of desire, pleasure, and happiness moreprecisely than Manu. Prasastapada (c. 550 CE) employed the general term forpleasure, sukha, to designate both ordinary sensual gratification and thehappiness of the wise. Here sukhawas a dispositional happiness based on theinner resources of a person. Its condition is not the gratification of desires, buttheir transformation and transcendence.14 Another Nyaya thinker, Uddyotkara(6th c. CE), argued that the four goals were not independent motivational ends,but rather were reducible to the pursuit of happiness and avoidance of pain.15Thus dharma, an instrinsic good, was also the means to generate good karmaand heavenly reward.

The three types of good artha, kama, and dharma and the general conceptof happiness depend on the prudential principle that everyone desires the good.Aristotles eudaimonism presents an analogous teleological ordering of thegoods of pleasure/wealth, honor, and rational virtue directed to the final end, i. e.the highest good (cf.Nicomachean Ethics I.4 7). Like Aristotle, Manu andmanyphilosophers thought dharma and cultivation of the virtues to be constitutive ofwell-being. It would be amistake to conclude, however, thatHindu eudaimonismwas egoist, that is to say, that all reasons for action were to maximize the agentsown good. As we have seen, altruistic values were deeply embedded in the socialfabric and in the individuals conscience (if the term is not anachronistic)through class-duties : care for others (e. g. , the virtue of compassion), activepromotion of the well-being of others, as well as respect for gods, gurus, andother superiors. Thus, the scope of agency inHindu ethics lacks the individualistframework of modern western philosophical morality, whether it be Kantsdeontology, Mills consequentialsm, or Nietzsches romantic perfectionism, toname a few well-known alternatives.

14 Halbfass 1997, 152.15 Nyayavartikka 1.1.1, cited in Halbfass 1997, 158 59.

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Dharma and MoksaWhile dharma literature regulated samsaric, embodied existence by stipulatingimperatives, goals, and virtues, renouncer traditions focused intensely on thefourth goal of liberation from the wheel of births and deaths, i. e. from allsuffering and all worldy goods as well as from afterlife rewards and punishments.Though conceived differently by Hindus, Buddhists, and Jainas,moksa ormuktirepresented an extreme perfectionist ideal incapable of attainment by thepractice of dharma ethics. Since a superhuman effort was required to completelydeconstruct ones nature, renouncers invariably pursued the virtues of celibacy,nonviolence, poverty, truthfulness, and nonstealing as means towards the ulti-mate end. The attenuation of self-interest and the pursuit of altruism are familiarin western moral theories, but the complete annihilation of the individual self orits total absorption in a personal divinity as ends in themselves are found only ina few western mystics, e. g. Meister Eckhart. In India, conceptions ofmoksa andits relationship to dharma differed in important respects. I shall considerManusDharmasastra, the renunciant traditions, exemplified by Samkhya-Yoga andVedanta, and the Bhagavad Gta, which synthesized several competing ideals.

Manu acknowledged the renunciants way of life and liberation as the fourthgoal of human life, but marginalized its importance: it counselled that oneshould pursue moksa only after he has studied the Vedas according to rule,fathered sons in keeping with the Law, and offered sacrifices according to hisability, otherwise he will proceed downward (6.36 37). Householders en-gagement (pravrtti) with sacrificial duties and the pursuit of prosperity wascontrasted with the detachment (nivrtti) of renunciants (samnyasins) whopursued liberation:

Acts prescribed by the Veda are of two kinds: advancing (pravrtta), whichprocures the enhancement of happiness (sukha); and arresting (nivrtta), whichprocures the supreme good. An action performed to obtain a desire or in thehereafter is called an advancing act, whereas an action performed withoutdesire and prompted by knowledge is said to be an arresting act. By engaging inadvancing acts, a man attains equality with the gods, by engaging in arrestingacts, on the other hand, he transcends the five elements (12.88 90).

Manu accomodated within dharma ethics the quest to transcend it by limitingyogic practice to the last phase of life. Still, it acknowledged that through sup-pression of the senses, practice of austerity and meditation (dhyana-yoga)(6.79), freed from all the pairs of opposites, he comes to rest in Brahman alone(6.81). For a Brahmin, ascetic toil and knowledge are the highest means ofsecuring the supreme good; by ascetic toil he destroys impurity and by

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knowledge he attains immortality (12.104); When a man thus sees by the selfall beings as the self, he becomes equal towards all and reaches Brahman, thehighest state (12.125). Even in Manu, not an explicitly Vedantic text, themonistic metaphysics of the self shapes the conception of the highest good.

The Upanisads and post-Vedic ascetic movements generally promoted re-nunciation of the householders life, external values, and the life-affirming ethicswhich ordered them. Aspiring tomoksa as quickly as possible, rather than onlyin the final stage of life, renunciants sought to realize the absolute:

Ours is this self, and it is our world.What then is the use of offspring for us? Sothey gave up the desire for sons, the desire for wealth, and the desire for worlds,and undertook themendicant life. From this perspective,moksa is the state ofbeing in which the individual realizes identity of the self (atman) with the ab-solute reality (Brahman), having transcended the illusions of duality, e. g. birthand death, ordinary goals, and egotism. This immense, unborn selfthere, inthat space within the heart, he lies the controller of all, the lord of all, the ruler ofall ! He does not becomemore by good actions or in any way less by bad actions.(BU 4.4.22)

Other Hindu philosophical schools disagreed with Vedanta on the metaphysicsof the self and thus conceived of liberation in different terms. Committed to aplurality of selves, Samkhya-Yoga, for example, defined liberation as isolation(kaivalya) of the individual self or pure consciousness (purusa) from the suf-fering (duhkha) caused by association with matter or nature (prakrti), whichincludes the mind, faculties, the three qualities (guna), and all their trans-formations. Liberation was conceived in negative terms by Samkhya-Yoga,Mmamsa, and Nyaya. The individual self must be freed from both pain andpleasure, because pain (duhkha) and pleasure (sukha) are inextricably linked:both are transient and produce anxiety. Buddhists too located the roots of suf-fering in desire and impermanence. Some western interpreters have attackedthis ideal of liberation of the individual self as a form of extreme egoism.16

In the classical Advaita-Vedanta of Samkara (8th c. CE), absolute reality(brahman) was non-dual, without attributes, infinite, unmanifest, inactive, andconceived as being, consciousness, and bliss. The realization of ones essentialnature as the absolute could only be achieved through knowledge (jnana) and byabandoning all action. Besides moksa all other values (artha, kama, and dhar-ma) were the product of ignorance (avidya). However, Samkara agreed with thePurvaMmamsa school in accepting the validity of Vedic injunctions and duties:knowledge of virtue and vice is derived from the scripturesVedic rites arepure since they are practiced by good people (BSBh iii.1.25). Indeed, far from

16 A notable example is Danto 1972.

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rejecting the varnasrama-dharma, Vedantins, as Halbfass has pointed out,considered it the precondition for the possibility of liberating oneself from it.Only a person who is entitled to study the Vedas and to carry out the Vedicsacrifices can be entitled to liberate himself from these. The samnyasin [re-nouncer] continues to draw his legitimation from that very dharma from whichhe is liberating himself.17 Advaita-Vedantas twofold concept of the truth, whichdistinguished the absolute (paramartha) and the conventional (vyavahara),enabled the school to ascribe legitimacy to dharmawith respect to the goals andactivities of samsaric existence. Viewed from the absolute perspective of the trueSelf, rites and duties enjoined by the Vedas are meant only for one who isunenlightened and is possessed of desire; The Lord Himselfsaw that thecoexistence of knowledge and rites and duties (karma) is not possible in thesame person, they being based on the convictions of nonagentship and agent-ship, unity and diversity (respectively).18 Strikingly, Samkara asserts that evendharma is injurious or harmful to a seeker of liberation as it causes bondage.19Action does not constitute the means to the highest good. Nor do knowledgeand action in combination. Further, knowledge, which has liberation as itsresult, can have no dependence on the assistance of action, because, being theremover of ignorance, it is opposed to action.20 From the absolute perspective,therefore, responding to Vedic injunctions and pursuing goals are functions ofignorance (avidya), which superimposes duality, ego, and agency on the real selfwhich is itself devoid of all qualities and activities. Nevertheless, a limited pre-paratory role can be ascribed to the performance of Vedic rites and duties sincethey can create the tendency to turn towards the in-dwelling Self. Although themeans be unreal, still it may bemeaningful in relation to the truth of the purposeit serves.21

Samkaras paradoxical formulation did not go unchallenged by later Ve-dantins, many of whom conceived dharma and moksa in more complementaryterms. Ramanuja (11th c. CE) claimed that brahman with attributes as personalGod and supreme Person was superior to Samkaras notion of brahmanwithoutattributes. Having also rejected his predecessors view that the world and in-dividual selves are illusions, he argued that dharma can lead to moksa. SinceGods nature is morally perfect and liberation is the realization of the self as apart of the absolute (but not identical, as Samkara held), those seeking moksashould act in accord with dharma in order to attain the final goal. Nevertheless,he agreed with Samkara that action is not the cause of moksa. But righteous

17 Halbfass 1991, 384.18 Samkara on BG 2.11, tr. p. 39.19 Samkara on BG 4.21, tr. p. 143.20 Samkara on the BG 18.66, tr. p. 743.21 Samkara on the BG 18.66, tr. p. 759.

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action is effective for works enjoined by Scripture have the power of pleasingthe Supreme Person, and hence, through his grace, to cause the destruction of allmental impressions obstructive of calmness and concentration of mind. Hencecalmness of mind and the rest are to be aimed at and practised by householdersalso.22 In his commentary on the Gta Ramanuja asserted that karma-yoga issuperior to jnana-yoga because it is easier.23 Meditation (dhyana) also con-tributes to the quest for freedom by eliciting divine favor : Meditation is or-iginated in the mind through the grace of the Supreme Person, who is pleasedand conciliated by the different kinds of acts of sacrifice and worship dulyperformed by the devoteeso knowledge, although itself the means of release,demands the cooperation of the different works.24 Ramanujas position,therefore, lies between Samkara and the Gta, whose devotional orientationinfluenced him greatly.

The state of liberation itself was described in very different terms amongHindu thinkers. Contrary to Samkhya-Yoga,Mmamsa, andNyaya philosophersnegative conception of liberation as freedom from pain and suffering, Vedantinsespoused theUpanisadic doctrine that the true self (atman) consists of pure bliss(BU 3.9.28, cf. BG 6.27). Nyaya philosophers raised pragmatic and theoreticalobjections against the Vedantic view. First, if liberation were just a more intenseform of happiness, the extirpation of desire, a necessary precondition for lib-eration on their view, would be impossible. The Naiyayika Vatsyayana stressedthe psychological challenge involved in conceiving liberation as an attractivegoal like pleasure: Unless we abandon our attachment to eternal happiness,final liberation cannot be attained, because attachment itself is known to bebondage.25 Likewise, Udayana raised concerns that the desire for liberation quahappiness would inevitably attach tomore worldly objects of satisfaction.26 Onlyifmoksawere completely devoid of both pleasure and pain could one be assuredof achieving purity and non-attachment. Second, on logical grounds, Vatsyayanaargued that if the bliss of liberation had a beginning it must also have an end.Udayana, echoing Menos paradox, also raised ethical objections to the Vedanticidentification of brahman and atman : Since it is said to be eternal it cannot besought. One does not search for what one already possesses.27 Later Vedantinsresponded sarcastically that the Nyayas notion of liberation was like the un-consciousness of a stone. How, they asked, could such a negative state of lib-eration motivate anyone soteriologically? Which is the more attractive goal:

22 Srbhasya 3.4.27, tr. p. 701.23 Ramanuja, Commentary on BG 18.48, p. 582.24 Srbhasya 3.4.26, tr. pp. 699 700, cited in Perrett 1993, 58.25 Nyayabhasya 1.1.22 quoted in Halbfass 1997, 155.26 Nyayadarsana p. 459 cited and discussed in Chakrabarti 1983, 170 72.27 Atmatattvaviveka p. 442, cited in Chakrabarti 1983, 175.

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absence of pain or complete bliss? It is an old question, and one debated also inwestern thought. Among Greek philosophers the choice would be between Ep-icurus and Plotinus. In some respects the Vedantic position is more appealing,but it is not without difficulties, for it depends simultaneously on rejecting ourgoal-oriented psychology while also insisting that liberation be pursued cease-lessly without hope of results. For Vedanta everything depends on the convictionthat all desires of the embodied self excepting the desire for moksa aredelusional and that only by the removal of ignorance and duality can the un-derlying nature of the true self be revealed. It is also to be noted why the yogicisolation (kaivalya) and dispassion (Vairagya) idealized in the so-called negativeconception of liberation is attractive: Vairagya is a very special feeling orcognitive emotive state which is absolutely central to the Indian religious/spi-ritual attitude towards lifeIt is the quiet and profound recognition of thevaluelessness or emptiness of the transient goods of this finite physicalworldItdoes not consist in any hatred towards this world, or any yearning for a heavenlyor beatific hereafter. It is a state beyond hatred and yearning, a state of col-ourlessness loss of concern for everything transitory.28 Again, Greek ethicsoffers an analogy in the Stoic conception of the highest good as passionlessness(apatheia).

Perhaps the most influential attempt to reconcile dharma andmoksa, at leastin classical Indian theological texts, was the Bhagavad Gta, which is an episodein themassive epic poemMahabharata. Indebted to both theDharmasastras andrenunciant traditions, the Gta proposed a multi-faceted solution to a horriblemoral dilemma. The great warrior Arjuna flinches at the prospect of killing hisown relatives in battle, which he claims would violate family-dharma (BG 1.31 45). In his response, which comprises the rest of the Gta, Krsna, the Lord ofcreation, teaches Arjuna that he can fulfill his warriors svadharma and also winmoksa if he practices internal renunciation and detachment from praise andblame, honor and disgrace (6.7, 12.18 19): a man cannot escape the force ofaction by abstaining from actions; he does not attain success just by renunci-ation (3.4). The only solution, Krsna advises, is to achieve yogic detachmentfrom normal human emotions through identification with the eternal trueself :

You grieve for those beyond grief, and you speak words of insight;but learned men do not grieve for the dead or the living.Never have I not existed nor you, nor these kings;and never in the future shall we cease to exist. (2.11 12)He who thinks this self a killer and he who thinks it killed,

28 Chakrabarti 1988, 333.

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both fail to understand; it does not kill, nor is it killed.It is not born, it does not die;having been, it will never not be;unborn, enduring, constant, and primordial,it is not killed when the body is killed. (2.19 20)Beginningless, without qualities, the supreme self is unchanging;even abiding in a body, Arjuna, it does not act, nor is it defiled. (13.31)

Following the Vedanta, the Gta distinguishes the true self (atman), which aspure consciousness never acts, from the active, embodied self (BG 15.16 17). IfArjuna can realize his identity with the supreme self, which is Krsna himself, hecan act without attachment. What does the killing, then, is the embodied self,which is composed of nature (prakrti) and its transformations.

He remains disinterested, unmoved by qualities of nature;he never wavers, knowing that only qualities are in motion.Self-reliant, impartial to suffering and joythe resolute man is the same to foe and friend, to blame and praise.The same in honor and disgrace, to ally and enemy, a manwho abandons involvements transcends the qualities of nature. (14. 23 25)

This state of being praised by Krsna would strike philosophical moralists likeKant or Mill as schizophrenic or morally incoherent. It may be so. But the Gtaand Vedanta respond that the liberated agent has achieved a unity of self farbeyond that assumed by Enlightenment individualism. The Gtas insistence ondoing ones duty without considering results certainly has Kantian overtones,but the similarity is limited. Kantian morality appeals to the autonomous ra-tional self of the moral agent, whereas the devotee of Krsna abandons in-dividuality and rationality through devotion.

A man who sees inaction in action and action in inactionhas understanding among men, disciplined in all actions he performs.The wise say a man is learned when his plans lack constructs of desire,when his actions are burned by the fire of knowledge.Abandoning attachment to fruits of action, always content, independent,he does nothing at all, even when he engages in action.and performs actions with his body only.impartial to failure and success, he is not bound even when he acts. (4.18 22)

Krsna, combining knowledge and action, a possibility rejected by Samkara,identifies a path to liberation open to all seekers which leads through Himself.When one gives up the delusion that I am the doer (3.5), the devotee can see thetrue Self in the supreme Person of Krsna:

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Whatever you do what you take, what you offer, what you give,what penances you perform do as an offering to me, Arjuna!You will be freed from the bonds of action, from the fruit of fortune and mis-fortune;armed with the discipline of renunciation, your self liberated, you will come tome. (9.27 28)If they rely on me, Arjuna, women, commoners, men of low rank,even men born in the womb of evil, reach the highest way. (9.32)

In pursuit of moksa as the ultimate goal of human existence, the Gtas bhakti-yoga meets the ethical requirements both of karma-yoga in the Dharmasastrasand of jnana-yoga (knowledge) in the renunciant traditions. The Gtas ethicaluniversalism prepared the way for new developments in the medieval periodwith the spread of tantra and bhakti of various types (devotion to Visnu, Siva, orthe Goddess). Especially prominent was the Bhagavata Purana, which devaluedthe Veda, ritual, and the ascetic demands of the renunciant traditions (11.12.1 2) and identified Krsna-bhakti as the highest dharma, the supreme path toliberation in the Kali Yuga (12.3.52).29 In movements throughout the sub-con-tinent, bhakti achieved liberation from yoga and programmatic practice. Aspopulist religious ideals and practices infiltrated brahmanicalthinking andpractice, a distinction between bhakti and bhakti yoga was directly forged.30This ethics of devotion extends beyond the scope of this essay, but it should berecognized as a prominent religious-ethical factor in modern and contemporarylife in India.

AbbreviationsA Apastamba Dharmasutra, tr. Olivelle 1999.BG Bhagavad Gta, tr. Miller 1986.BU Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, tr. Olivelle 1996.BGBh Bhagavad-gta-bhasyam of Samkara, tr. Gambhirananda 1984.G Gautama Dharmasutra, tr. Olivelle 1999.Manu Manava Dharmasastra, tr. Olivelle 2004.Srbhasya Brahma-Sutras or Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary of Ram-

anuja, tr. Thibaut 1971.TU Taittirya Upanisad, tr. Olivelle 1996.RV The Rig Veda, tr. OFlaherty.

29 See Lorenzen 2004.30 F.M. Smith 1998b, 27.

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