buzan - timeless wisdom of realism

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International Theory

Positivism and Beyond

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2 - The timeless wisdom of realism? pp. 47-65

Chapter DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511660054.004

Cambridge University Press

The timeless wisdom of realism?

Barry Buzan

Realism is widely thought of as both the orthodoxy and the classicaltradition of thinking about international relations. It is often contrastedto idealism, or more specifically to other so-called paradigms such asliberalism and Marxism. Unfortunately, there is no precise consensus onwhere the boundaries between these bodies of thought should be drawn.In this chapter I will try to provide an answer to those who havequestioned why, given the nature of my writings, I continue to call myselfa realist. Doing so will mean that I push the boundaries of realismfurther out than some people think appropriate. What follows is thereforea rather liberal interpretation. It will emphasise three qualities of realism:its continued relevance, its flexibility in coming to terms with many ideasfrom other approaches, and its value as a starting point for enquiry. Thechapter attempts to provide a compact summary and evaluation ofrealism as an approach to the study of international relations. It starts bygiving a brief overview of the intellectual history, and then sets out themain distinguishing features of realism. Next it looks at the place ofrealism within the discipline of International Relations, particularly howit relates to other paradigms. It concludes with an evaluation of realism,arguing that it remains the essential core of the subject even though itdoes not and cannot provide a full understanding of it.

A very brief intellectual history of realism

Realism claims a long intellectual pedigree going back to Thucydides,Machiavelli, Hobbes and Rousseau. This claim rests on the apparentdurability of power politics as a feature of human civilisation, thoughWalker rightly questions whether this can be said to represent a coherentintellectual tradition (Walker, 1987). Realism dominated the study ofinternational relations in the decades following the Second World War.It did not, however, dominate American policy which was driven byliberalism into an ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union. Theseliberals sometimes presented themselves as realists, but many leading

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48 Barry Buzan

realists such as Morgenthau, Waltz and Kissinger were critical of thecrusading and paranoia that dominated the Cold War containment andarms racing policies of the United States, not to mention the Vietnamwar (McKinlay and Little, 1986, chs. 8, 10). Despite numerouschallenges, realism is arguably still the prevailing orthodoxy in thediscipline. Like International Relations itself, realism is largely an Anglo-American theory (with substantial inputs from Central Europeanimmigrants). But realism was not the orthodoxy during the founding twodecades of the 1920s and 1930s. When International Relations firstemerged as a distinct field of study, it was in reaction to the carnage ofthe First World War, to the apparent casualness with which that war hadbeen allowed to occur, and to the loss of control over the development ofcivilisation that it seemed to represent. The field was driven by the searchfor causes of war, and for prescriptions to prevent its recurrence. Thisfirst round ended with the catastrophes of the 1930s and 1940s, and thefailure of the collective security mechanisms embodied in the League ofNations.

Post-war realism (confusingly referred to as 'classical') developed inreaction to both the practical and the intellectual failures of the inter-warperiod, and the experiences of the Second World War and the Cold War.It was concerned to rebalance the approaches of the inter-war idealistsby giving priority to the need to study the international system as itwas, rather than as one might like it to be. During the 1940s, 1950s and1960s it was dominated by the writings of E. H. Carr (1946), HansMorgenthau (1978) and John Herz (1951), all of whom gave primacy topower politics among states as the key to understanding the operation ofthe international system. The contrast between realists and idealists,though real, should not be overdrawn. Morgenthau looked forward to aworld government, and there are strong idealist elements in the thinkingof both Carr and Herz. Realism was accompanied in tandem by strategicstudies, which concentrated on developing theories of nuclear deter-rence. Driven by rapid changes in military technology, strategic studiesquickly developed an analytical life of its own (Buzan, 1987), anddominated debates during much of the 1960s and 1970s. Strategicstudies can be seen as continuing a Clausewitzian tradition of focusingon the military dimension ('other means') of power politics. During thelater 1960s and 1970s the hold of classical realism on the study ofInternational Relations looked like being broken. From the late 1960sonwards it began to be argued and accepted that the methodology andthe theoretical and policy agendas associated with classical realismwere anachronistic. Networks rather than billiard balls appeared tobe the appropriate metaphor for an international system increasingly



The timeless wisdom of realism? 49

dominated by transnational relations, economic concerns, and anexpanding web of international norms, rules and institutions (Burton,1972; Keohane and Nye, 1977).

On the methodological front, behaviouralists were arguing that thework of classical realists did not satisfy the canons of scientific investi-gation. On the agenda front there were two lines of attack. One was afrontal assault coming from those concerned with interdependence,political economy and transnational relations. This included not onlyfundamental questioning about the centrality of the state and militarypower in realist thinking, but also an accusation that realism was unableto deal with either the issues or the character of international politicsin an interdependent world, and a denunciation of the logic and themorality of realism's normative bias towards conflictual assumptions.The other came from the English school, whose main writers wereMartin Wright (1977) and Hedley Bull (1977). It did not question theprimacy of the state or power politics, but developed the concept ofinternational society as a way of introducing both historical range, and asignificant role for norm-based order, into the understanding of inter-national relations. This latter idea was developed along narrower andmore specific lines later in the United States by regime theorists (albeitwith little reference to English school ideas).

A realist revival under the label neo-realism started in the late 1970sled by the work of Kenneth Waltz (1979). The term structural realism ispreferred by those who seek to widen Waltz's analysis so that it can becombined with work in the liberal tradition that focuses on economicrelations, regimes and international society (Buzan, Jones and Little,1993), though the lines of identity here are not yet settled at the time ofwriting. Neo-realism was the counter-attack in this intellectual joust. Itabandoned the conservative assumptions about human nature thatunderpinned classical realism, and reasserted the logic of power politicson the firmer foundation of anarchic structure. It defended the centralityof the state, and especially of great powers, exposing the partiality ofsome interdependence views of international relations, and reaffirmingthe primacy of American power in the international system. Its successwas much aided by the onset of the so-called 'Second Cold War' in 1979,which caught off balance many of the advocates of interdependence andtransnationalism, especially those who were still confidently generatingexplanations premised on the progressive redundancy of force ininternational relations and the fragmentation of state power. Workemerging from those perspectives during the 1980s in many instancesbore more than traces of theoretical and methodological reassessmentderiving from Waltz's critique (Gilpin, 1987; Keohane, 1984).



50 Barry Buzan

With the ending of the Cold War one might have expected anothercrisis for realism. Just as it had fed off the supporting realities of theSecond World War and the Cold War, so realism might have beenvulnerable to the ending of ideological and military rivalry between thesuperpowers. But although strategic studies has been hard hit, and hashad to scramble to find a new and broader security agenda, realism is inpretty good shape, and remains the cornerstone of much theoreticaldebate within the discipline. It has largely come to terms with Inter-national Political Economy (IPE) (Gilpin, 1981, 1987), and has madepartial common cause with neo-liberal institutionalism in pursuit bothof a narrow rationalist agenda about the causes and conditions ofco-operation under anarchy (Waever in this volume; Niou andOrdeshook, 1994), and in the study of hegemony theory (Keohane,1984; Grunberg, 1990). Of course important differences still remain:liberals see co-operation as potentially transforming of both states andthe international system, whereas realists have a more restricted view ofco-operation, and a much more restricted one of progress. As the darkside of the demise of communist power comes to the surface, much inthe realist canon is being reaffirmed, though liberals can also point toimpressive levels of institution-building. One new challenge comes fromradical reflectivism, much of which takes its cue from post-modern formsof analysis, which eschew positivist logic and focus on language as themedium through which reality is constructed (Wasver, this volume).Another comes from global environmental concern whose very naturetranscends the framework of state action and power politics.

The distinguishing features of realism

Realism in all of its forms emphasises the continuities of the humancondition, particularly at the international level. Classical realists, mostnotably Morgenthau, tended to find the source of these continuities inthe permanence of human nature as reflected in the political construc-tion of states. Neo-realists find them in the anarchic structure of theinternational system, which they see as a vital and historically enduringforce that shapes the behaviour and construction of states. On the basisof these continuities, realists see insecurity, and particularly militaryinsecurity, as the central problem, and power as the prime motivation ordriving force of all political life. Their analytical focus is on the politicalgroup rather than on the individual, and because it commands power,especially military power, most effectively, the key human political groupis the state, whether understood as tribe, city-state, or national state.Because relations between states are insecurity-driven, and because the




anarchic structure provides few constraints on states pursuing powerto the best of their ability, realism emphasises the competitive andconflictual side of international relations. This is reflected in its coreideas, like the balance of power, which is one of the most long-standinganalytical tools of realism, and the security dilemma, which provides theessential link between realism and strategic studies.

This focus on power politics provides the apparent continuity of therealist tradition, but continuity is not necessarily accompanied byintellectual coherence. Walker's critique exposes both static, structural,and dynamic, historical lines within the realist discourse (Walker, 1987).In addition, the concept of power lacks any agreed definition, andtherefore encompasses a very wide range of quite different under-standings of what 'power politics' might mean (Nye, 1990; Stoll andWard, 1989; Guzzini, 1993). Indeed, it is perhaps not going too far to saythat the debate about power in international relations is the core of whatrealism is about. Its emphasis on the state derives from the sense thatthe state is the dominant wielder of power in the international system.Realism thus has not been, and may never be, either a single scientificapproach or a single coherent theory. Power in its political sense willprobably never be measurable, and consequently the idea of balance ofpower cannot be operationalised. Realism is not the only body of thoughtthat focuses on power: Marxism and feminism also do, and they too haveto deal with having an amorphous idea at their core. Having a debaterather than a hard concept at the core of one's analysis is offensive topositivists, but not difficult to live with for those of less rigorous (or lessnarrow) epistemological persuasion. Different conceptualisations ofpower will continue to lead to different explanations of events. Beneaththe apparently smooth surface of realism lies not a single linear theoryhanded down from ancient times, but an ever-changing discourse aboutthe nature, application and effect of power in an ever-changing historicalenvironment.

It is clear that realism as a whole does not privilege any one level ofanalysis. Classical realists, most notably Morgenthau, emphasise theroots of power politics in human nature. Neo-realists focus on structureat the system level, but even Waltz freely acknowledges that this mode ofanalysis has to be accompanied by a unit level theory in order to get acomplete explanation of events (Waltz, 1979, pp. 48-9, 78, 87, 126;1986, pp. 328, 343). At the unit level, realists of all sorts give primacy tothe state as opposed to other units, but it is not a characteristic of realismto treat the unit level itself as prime. Realism operates on all three levels- system, unit and individual (and on the sub-levels between them -sub-systemic/regional, bureaucratic), though it does favour the top



52 Barry Buzan

and bottom ones. It should not be forgotten that the arch neo-realistWaltz is the author of a study in comparative foreign policy making(1967). One of the bitterest arguments within the discipline of Inter-national Relations has been between those stressing the importance ofthe system level as the key generator of behaviour (mostly neo-realists,but also varieties of liberals and Marxists), and those arguing in favour ofthe unit level (mostly foreign policy analysts) (Buzan, 1994; Rosenberg,1990).

This eclectic attitude towards levels is not paralleled when it comes tosectors. Here realists of nearly all stripes privilege the military/politicalsector as opposed to the economic, societal or environmental ones. Mostrealists, both classical and neo (and with the notable exception of E. H.Carr), explicitly conceive(d) of themselves as political theorists. Notethe titles of realism's two most famous texts: Politics Among Nations, andTheory of International Politics. Yet paradoxically, realists have borrowedmethodology from economics in order to try to establish a distinctivelypolitical domain of theory, either explicitly, as Waltz (1979, pp. 89-94),or implicitly, as in the striking parallel between Morgenthau's rationalactor pursuing 'interest defined as power' (1978, p. 5) and the assump-tions about utility maximising individuals in economic theory. BothMorgenthau (1978, pp. 12-14) and Waltz (1979, p. 79) insist on thedistinctiveness and separateness of the political realm. This obsession isboth a cause and an effect of their preoccupation with the state and thedynamics of power, though one has also to read into this the peculiareffects of academic politics, and the fragmentation of the social sciencesinto organisationally distinct disciplines. Whether this obsession with thedistinctiveness of politics is a necessary feature of realism, or merely ahistorical one, is an important question for understanding the potentialscope of realism (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993, esp. ch. 1). Theborrowing of methodology from economics already opens a breach inthe political dyke. I see no reason why the logic of power, self-interest andconflict cannot run in other sectors, nor, indeed, why the state should beseen as exclusively political. In my view, International Relations is amulti-disciplinary enterprise, and so is realism. The post-Cold War fateof realism's companion field, strategic studies, is perhaps suggestive ofthe possibilities. Having lost its military/nuclear focus, strategic studies isnow busy metamorphosing into Security Studies, in the process pickingup a multi-sectoral agenda that ranges from economic theory, throughidentity and society, to the environment. In this perspective, the moreopen, multi-sectoral, part of the realist tradition represented by Carr hasmore to offer to the future than that represented by either Morgenthauor Waltz.




Partly because of its political obsessions realism has, as brilliantlyargued by Walker, constructed an 'inside/outside' view of the humancondition (Walker, 1993). Inside the state there is relative order andpeace. Change is expected in the form of development and progress,and because of this time is a meaningful measure of difference. Outside,in the realm between states, anarchy, disorder and war reign. Thisstructure reproduces itself endlessly so that there is no progress, andtime does not signify change. The inside and outside realms are eachconstructed by the other, making the whole assemblage extremelydifficult to undo or escape from, both intellectually and practically(Hansen, 1996). The power of this separation practically defines thediscipline of International Relations, and goes a long way towardsexplaining the durability of realism as its dominant orthodoxy. It alsoexplains a persistent and potent two-pronged critique of realism. Firstly,critics argue that many states are too weak and ill-formed to sustain theinside-outside distinction. Somalia and Rwanda are only the latest in along line of examples where the inside looks more like the outside issupposed to be. Secondly, critics argue that the state is now so penetratedby transnational actors and forces that the inside-outside distinction hasbecome a meaningless blur. The question here is not whether thesearguments are empirically sound: they are. Rather it is whether or notthey undermine the realist model of world politics as an anarchic systemof states. As any economist knows, simplifying models can tolerate a lotof deviance before they become useless as a way of understanding acomplex reality. Walker's analysis also clarifies what otherwise seemsa paradoxical view of history in realism. On the one hand, realists look tohistory, both intellectual and actual, to justify the permanence of powerpolitics. But on the other hand, most strongly in the neo-realist tradition,they seem to deny history any autonomy, replacing it with the omni-present operation of structural forces that are said to work identically inall times and places throughout history.

The focus on insecurity, power, the state and conflictual relations hasfor long made realism the target of a normative critique. Where realistssee themselves as rationally pursuing the goal of studying what is (nomatter how nasty it may be), both traditional idealists (mostly peaceresearchers and liberals) and various post-modernists see them as beingan active part of the processes they describe. One way of seeing this issueis through Cox's distinction between 'problem-solving' theories, such asrealism, which seek to work within the existing framework, and 'critical'theories which seek opportunities to change the existing framework(Cox, 1986). This means that far from being objective observers, realistsin general, and the practitioners of strategic studies in particular, are



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accused of helping to legitimise and reproduce the hierarchical structuresand conflictual relations that they talk about. By sanctifying in theorystates, conflict and power politics, realists help to create self-fulfillingprophecies. If people believe that power is the key to human relations,then they will tend to behave in ways that make it so. This tensionbetween the need to study what is, and the danger of reproducing it bydoing so, is unresolvable. Although learning does occur, the essentialdilemma is reproduced in each successive generation of people studyinginternational relations. It is perhaps the main key to understanding thepersistence not only of realism, but also of the dialectic betweenconservatives and radicals within the discipline (whatever their method-ology) in each generation.

In mediodological terms, realist analysis tends to model the state asa unitary rational actor operating under conditions of insecurity andimperfect information. In this both classical realism and neo-realismborrow consciously from microeconomic theory, seeing states asanalogous to firms, anarchic structure as analogous to market structure,and power as analogous to utility. This analogy suggests a commitmentto positivism, and there is indeed a strong thread of positivism in realism.But on this as on other methodological issues, realism, like most ofInternational Relations, is divided and frequently confused. Because hisconcept of power was unamenable to measurement, Morgenthau didnot conceive of realism as reducible to positivist science (Gellman, 1988,pp. 262-3). Waltz appears to want to go down the positivist route, but asJones argues, is unable to complete the journey that he starts (Buzan,Jones and Little, 1993, part III).

Because the concept of power lacks a broad, quantifiable (if crude)indicator of the type that money is for wealth, it has so far provedimpervious to quantification. Realism has therefore not had muchopportunity to follow economics down the mathematical road. Butinability to quantify key concepts has not much affected realism'scommitment to the rationality assumption that it shares with economics.The assumption that actors are rational has been as prominent in realismas in economics, and for the same reason: without it there is no obviousway to model the behaviour of actors, and without models there is noobvious path towards coherent theory. Rational actor assumptions havebeen (notoriously) conspicuous in deterrence theory. They are alsoessential to the so-called 'neo-neo' synthesis (Waiver, this volume), andits use of game theory to investigate the logic of co-operation underanarchy. More broadly, the whole logic of power politics rests on therationality assumption, albeit much tempered by imperfect informationand the competing demands of domestic and international realms on the




agents of the state. At bottom, the logic of power politics requires thatstatesmen (or more fashionably 'the agents of the state') do three things:observe and monitor the changing distribution of power; assess thatdistribution in terms of the threats it generates to their own interests andsurvival; and make policy within the limits of their resources and optionsso as to minimise their vulnerabilities and maximise their opportunities.Agents of the state who do not behave in this way risk elimination andreplacement both of themselves and of their state by those that do.Rationality is thus not seen so much as a human attribute, but as abehaviourally engineered quality of actors within an anarchic politicalsystem.

The place of realism in the discipline ofInternational Relations

Because realism has been seen as the dominant orthodoxy in Inter-national Relations since the Second World War, it has been, andremains, the favoured target of dissenters and radicals within thediscourses of the discipline. But it is not wholly accurate to characteriserealism in this way. In fact, the discipline is divided into a number ofcontending theoretical orientations, or paradigms, each of whichrepresents an orthodoxy in its own right. There is some disagreementabout how to classify and label these paradigms (see Wsever in thisvolume). All agree that realism is one, and most agree that liberalism isanother (though it may be labelled 'pluralism', 'functionalism' or'Kantianism'), and Marxism (or 'socialism') a third. The so-called'English school' offers Grotianism (or 'international society') as apossible fourth, and their view is distinct enough from both realism andliberalism to warrant separate status. These paradigms are distinguishedfrom each other mostly by what they choose to place at the centre ofattention. They are distinct from the methodological debates abouttraditionalism, behaviouralism and post-modernism: it is possible tofollow any one of these methodologies and still be a realist (or a liberalor whatever). All of the paradigms involve different normative predis-positions, and in some cases (most notably liberalism and Marxism)reflect explicit ideological positions. Realism is not an ideologicalposition as such (i.e. it does not necessarily represent a value preference),but it is the natural home of those disposed towards conservativeideology. Paradigms are schools of thought that have been built up byapproaching the study of international relations in ways that favoursome levels, sectors and norms over others. Each paradigm is a kind ofcomposite lens, giving a selective view of international relations. Like any



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lens, looking through it makes some features stand out more stronglywhile pushing others into the background. This division has its uses, butlike all academic specialisation, also leads to a certain amount ofwasteful argument about boundaries, and unhelpful breaking up ofsubjects. Table 2.1 offers a crude suggestion as to what comes clearlyinto view, and what normative and political preferences shape that view,when one looks through these lenses.

Most of the work in International Relations can be located withinone or another of these paradigms, though individuals often crossboundaries. Although all of the paradigms see the state as a unit, somedo so much more clearly or exclusively than others. There is moredisagreement on structure and process, and a very strong normativedifferentiation. Realism and Grotianism are located largely in themilitary and political sectors, though Grotianism has more overlaps intothe economic and societal ones. Liberalism is centred in the economicsector with overlaps into political and societal, and Marxism covers boththe societal and economic sectors. The paradigms are not mutuallyexclusive in any total way, though the core of each is distinct. Somerealists and some liberals claim to include Grotianism as part of theirparadigm. Marxism can be seen as a response to the logic andnormative assertions of liberalism, which in return can be seen as aresponse to die logic and values of realism. International PoliticalEconomy (IPE) is a conscious attempt to fuse together major elementsof all four paradigms, though this has succumbed to rifts among liberals,realists and Marxists (Gilpin, 1987, ch. 2).

One of die reasons why realism has remained central within thediscipline, despite the numerous attacks upon it, is its relative successnot only in revising and reinventing itself, but also in establishing anindispensable relevance for its perspective within the other paradigms.The liberal assault of the 1970s quite quickly had to abandon its'sovereignty at bay' thesis in the face of the robustness of the state.Interdependence became not a substitute for power politics but a newframework for it. The idea that force was losing its relevance in inter-national relations proved to be an insight of Western rather than of globalsignificance. Liberals increasingly accepted that the realist/neo-realistframework was an essential part of the picture. The whole field of IPE isan example of this synthesis, and even the neo-liberal institutionalistdebate about co-operation under anarchy is being conducted largelywithin neo-realist assumptions about states and international systemstructure. At die risk of some exaggeration, it could be said that since die1970s, liberalism has shifted its position from being an assault onrealism, to being an extension of the realist framework into odier sectors.




Table 2.1 The inter-paradigm debate in International Relations

57

Paradigm

realism

Grotianism

liberalism

Marxism

What one sees

Units

- states- nations- (IGOs)

- states— civilisations-IGOs

- individuals-firms-IGOs- (states)- (nations)- (NGOs)

— classes- (states)- social

movements- firms (MNCs)

Systemstructure

- anarchy

- anarchy

- market- (anarchy)

- capitalism

Process

- struggle for power- security dilemma

- internationalsociety and regimes

- balance of power

- world society- interdependence

- class struggle- language/discourse

Leadingnorms

- autonomy- security- balance of power- rationality- national interest

- internationalorder and law

- sovereignty- national self-

determination

- freedom- human rights- cosmopolitanism- co-operation— prosperity

- justice- equality- progress

Nothing could symbolise this more sharply than the title of Keohane andNye's seminal 1977 book Power and Interdependence. The two mainexceptions to this are: first the argument about the relative significanceof units, with most liberals still much more inclined than realists togive more weight to multi-national firms and banks vis-d-vis the state(Stopford and Strange, 1991); and second, the assumptions about war,with liberals being much more confident that the regular recurrence ofwar can be broken.

Idealism more generally has lost some of its critical force againstrealism. Major schisms, such as the revolt of peace research during the1950s, 1960s and 1970s against both realism and strategic studies havelargely been healed. The peace research agenda has steadily merged intoSecurity Studies, along the way adopting many aspects of neo-realistanalysis. Although it remains organisationally, and to some extentnormatively and philosophically, distinct, the merger of agendas means



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that there is not now much sense that it is primarily an oppositionalexercise to realism.

Marxism, which along with liberalism provides the main underpinningfor idealist thinking about international relations, has also accommo-dated with realism in a variety of important ways. Although remainingnormatively and philosophically distinct, Marxist thinking now acceptssome key aspects of the realist agenda. It has steadily accepted therelative autonomy of the state vis-d-vis class analysis, and in somebranches of Marxian-inspired work (most notably historical sociology)the state has become the central object of enquiry. Because of itsemphasis on hierarchy, power and struggle, Marxism was always open tomany aspects of realist analysis despite its hostility to the state. Lenin'swork on Imperialism is nothing if not a monument to the idea of thestruggle for power as the driving force of international relations. Carrstands as an early testimony to compatibilities in realist and Marxistanalysis.

The Grotian paradigm never had the quality of direct opposition torealism. As Little (1994) makes clear, its methodological assumption wasthat any system of states would display three qualities or elements:Hobbesian (realist) power politics; Grotian (English school) inter-national society; and Kantian (liberal) world society. These qualitiesexist simultaneously, side-by-side, the question being what the relativestrength among them was for any given time and place. Grotianism thusincorporates both the realist and the liberal positions, but seeks tointerpose between them a third position based on the idea that states doconstruct orders amongst themselves. It is possible to link the idea ofinternational society to neo-realist theory, seeing it in the same way asthe balance of power, as a structurally generated consequence of bothanarchic and hierarchic relations (Buzan, 1993).

In the same way that it has been able to accommodate, penetrate orabsorb other paradigms, or at least create common ground with them,so also has realism been able to come to terms with, or outlast, method-ological challenges. Neo-realism was in part a response to thebehavioural challenge for more scientific method in InternationalRelations. It can be argued (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993, part III) thatWaltz's response to this challenge was flawed. But it did suffice to holdthe line, and in the meantime, the challenge from behaviouralism wanedas the problems of applying positivist methods to social science began tobe exposed. Traditionalists mounted an effective opposition, and nowthe behaviouralist project itself is under attack from post-modernism.

Post-modernists have adopted a 'tous azimuts' offensive against mostaspects of International Relations (and much else), which also brings




realism within their sights. But in principle, there is no reason why muchof the post-modern discourse cannot eventually be merged into realism.There are traditions within realism that are receptive to the idea oflanguage as power, and discourse as a major key to politics (Carr, 1946;Manning, 1962), and much of the post-modern debate is preciselyconcerned with issues of power, hierarchy and domination that arecongenial to the realist tradition. Post-modernists such as Ashley andDer Derian have flirted with realism, registering a preference for theclassical versus the neo version (Ashley, 1986; Der Derian, 1987).Waever has gone further, actually constructing himself as a post-structuralist realist (Waever, 1989a and b). As shown by Weaver's work,and by Jones's critique and reformulation of Waltz's analogy ofinternational relations with economics (Buzan, Jones and Little, 1993,part III), post-modern approaches can be constructively at home right inthe heart of realist theory. Because most methodologies can be applied tothe realist agenda, realism has an inbuilt methodological eclecticism thatkeeps it relatively safe from epistemological attack.


In sum, the insights of realism are substantial, though they are not astimeless or as uniformly distributed as some neo-realists would like tothink. The common realist assumption that the basic structure anddynamics of international relations has remained unchanged throughhistory survives mainly because almost nobody in the field has done thehistorical research which might put it to the test. At best there is acertain amount of selective raiding, looking for cases such as classicalGreece, the 'Warring States' period in China, and Renaissance Italy,which do reproduce the anarchic quality of modern European inter-national relations. But a longer and more coherent historical perspectiveraises many questions about this image of the past (Buzan and Little,1994; Watson, 1992). For most of history anarchic structure is not theprevailing organisation of international relations, balance of power isnot the dominant behaviour, and units are neither structurally norfunctionally alike within the system. Much of history is populated byinternational systems in which units are both structurally unlike (city-states, empires, barbarian tribes, national states) and functionally unlike(the unequal relations between suzerain and vassal units). Withinthese systems, balance of power behaviour is regularly overridden bysuccessful empires that unify whole systems for extended periods (Rome,China, Persia, Ottomans), in the process creating structures that havestrong hierarchic elements. Any attempt to understand this history



60 Barry Buzan

cannot avoid the fact that when units are functionally and structurallydifferentiated, domestic structure plays at least as big a role as inter-national structure in shaping state behaviour. If one takes the troubleto look at it, history is considerably more diverse than many realistssuppose. At best it says that an anarchic, balance of power systempopulated by sovereign 'states' is one of the models for internationalrelations that recurs in many different times and places.

With that qualification in mind, it also has to be said that other aspectsof the realist canon do seem to have a timeless quality. No matter whatthe structure, or how differentiated the units, power politics, the logic ofsurvival, and the dynamics of (in) security do seem to be universallyrelevant to international relations. At any period of history it is very hardto escape from the fact that the major powers do play the central role indefining international political and economic order. When great empirescontrolled the territory stretching from the Mediterranean to China,trade flourished. When those empires collapsed, trade was largelydestroyed by the ensuing disorder. This tale can be told for dozens ofdifferent times and locations. Thus while the particular circumstancesand conditions of history change from era to era, there does seem to be acertain continuity to some aspects of political life.

This aspect of realism's claim to timeless wisdom has been affirmedover the last couple of decades by the work done in historical sociology.In what amounts almost to an unintentional thought experiment, severalhistorical sociologists writing macro-historical studies (Giddens, 1985;Mann, 1986; Tilly, 1990; Anderson, 1974a, 1974b; Gellner, 1988; andHall and Ikenberry, 1989), have come to analytical conclusionsremarkably similar to a rather crude view of classical realism. Few ofthese writers had much awareness of the realist tradition in internationalrelations, yet all focus on war as crucial to the evolution of the modernstate. One of their common themes is that the state makes war, and warmakes the state (Tilly, 1990). Once centralised, mostly city-based, formsof political and economic order were invented, war became a regularfeature of the human condition. War not only built empires and extendedtrade routes, it also shaped the internal development of states right downto the present day. Units that could not play successfully in this viciousgame were steadily driven out of existence by those that could, with moreprimitive forms surviving only by dint of being located well outside themain arenas of civilisation. The question that animated most of thesehistorical sociologists was the nature of the state. The result of theirenquiries has been to support a harsh, social Darwinistic, interpretationof international history that shares much with the main assumptions ofrealism.




One even finds powerful echoes of this understanding in the writing ofthat most determined of liberal polemicists, Francis Fukuyama (1992,pp. 73-4):

The possibility of war is a great force for the rationalization of societies, and forthe creation of uniform social structures across cultures. Any state that hopes tomaintain its political autonomy is forced to adopt the technology of its enemiesand rivals. More than that, however, the threat of war forces states to restructuretheir social systems along lines most conducive to producing and deployingtechnology. For example, states must be of a certain size in order to compete withtheir neighbors, which creates powerful incentives for national unity; they mustbe able to mobilize resources on a national level which requires the creation of astrong centralized state authority with the power of taxation and regulation; theymust break down various forms of regional, religious, and kinship ties whichpotentially obstruct national unity; they must increase educational levels in orderto produce an elite capable of disposing of technology; they must maintaincontact with and awareness of developments taking place beyond their borders;and, with the introduction of mass armies during the Napoleonic Wars, theymust at least open the door to the enfranchisement of the poorer classes of theirsocieties if they are to be capable of total mobilization. All of these developmentscould occur for other motives - for example, economic ones - but war framesthe need for social mobilization in a particularly acute way and provides anunambiguous test of its success.

Realism also finds seemingly endless affirmation in current events.One of its attractions, for some, is that it gives an odds on advantage tothose who make gloomy predictions (i.e. more power politics, moreconflict) about die future. Much of realism can be read as a sophisticatedform of fatalism, and as Fukuyama (1992, p. 70) notes: 'a naive optimistwhose expectations are belied appears foolish, while a pessimist provenwrong maintains an aura of profundity and seriousness'. The dialecticsof order and conflict in the three world wars (two hot, one cold) of thetwentieth century provide a good illustration of how current eventsreinforce realist pessimism. The wars themselves of course supported therealist view, as did their outcomes. Even the unusual Cold War can beseen as a classic demonstration of neo-realist power politics, with theunsuccessful challenger imploding, and its successors desperately tryingto reform themselves on the model of the victors. The short-lived periodsof euphoria following each war nourished more optimistic projections,but in each case the fairly rapid reassertion of power politics - thechallenge of the fascist powers, the Cold War, the 'new world disorder' -reinforced realist views. This argument raises again the normativecritique of realism: is it a rational response to observation, or does it blockthe path by which hope might triumph over experience? Even within thetwentieth century, some learning has taken place, and significant



62 Barry Buzan

restraints on the resort to force have developed for at least some of thestates in the international system (James, 1992; Zacher, 1992). But thereis still a very long way to go before power politics is expunged fromhuman affairs. Although some of its old forms become less important, itsbasic logic seems to recur in a wide variety of historical conditions. Thethree tiers of the English school provide a useful way of looking at thisdialectic. The Hobbesian, Grotian and Kantian dynamics all coexist buttheir proportions change. Grotius and Kant may have made someprogress, but Hobbes still stands solidly in the background, and in manyparts of the world indeed in the foreground.

In addition to the affirmations of realism by both past and presentevidence, it also retains a powerful, and often neglected, normativeattraction of its own. Realism can be taken as standing for an anarchicordering of world politics. It can therefore be read as being in favour ofsuch values as ideological and cultural diversity, political independenceand self-reliance, and economic decentralisation. It can be seen assupporting political fragmentation (between states, but not within them)as the preferred expression of a human historical legacy of geographic,ethnic and cultural diversity. It can be taken as being against central-isation, whether imperial or federative, and political or economic;against cultural cosmopolitanism; and against homogenisation of thehuman race, both ethnic and cultural. In its normative clothes, realismreflects a preference for 'inside/outside' constructions of human liferather than attempts to construct some form of universalist 'inside'.It worries more about the costs and dangers of insecurity withinhierarchy (tyranny, struggles over control, bureaucratisation), thanabout those under anarchy (security dilemma, war) (Waltz, 1979,pp. 111-14).

I also find realism intellectually attractive. As I hope is demonstratedin The Logic of Anarchy, realism possesses a relative (not absolute) intel-lectual coherence. It provides a solid starting point for the constructionof grand theory, and as far as I can tell, allows sufficient flexibility tointegrate main lines of argument from most other paradigms. Realism isa broad church. Its core ideas about power, struggle, domination andinsecurity cross cultural boundaries more easily than those of its mainrival, liberalism. Note how easily these ideas fit into the analysis ofconcerns as diverse as gender (see Enloe, this volume) and class (Marxand Engels, 1848). By contrast, many of the core ideas of liberalism,diough unquestionably powerful and pertinent, seem more specifically tobe bound into the Western cultural tradition. Although the markethas now come close to achieving universal cross-cultural status,individualism, human rights and co-operation seem much more




contested, much more like a new imperial 'standard of civilisation' thanlike a universal truth.

So why do I call myself a realist? Three reasons, not in order ofpriority. First, to provoke. I hope to make those both inside and outsiderealism reconsider the meaning and validity of their own labels. Second,to reduce fruitless conflicts within the discipline by working towardsmore unified theoretical frameworks. By expanding the logic of realismfrom within I hope both to broaden the perceptions of those withinrealist orthodoxy, and build bridges to those who, it seems to me, areunnecessarily outside it. Realism seems to me to be the most promisingframework for this campaign, though I freely confess a bias in favour oftop-down approaches to understanding that may not be shared byothers. Third, is a matter of being consistent with my own feelings andbeliefs. I remain firmly convinced that realism is the soundest startingplace for constructing an understanding of international relations, andfor building grand theory. Like it or not, it does reveal the foundationson which we have to build if we want to construct anything durable. I do,however, believe, both for theory and for practice, in the possibility ofbuilding something that rises well above the primitive and permanentnastiness of raw power politics. My sense is that for all its limitations anddifficulties, this rather bleak and rocky terrain is firmer ground than siteswhich may initially look more attractive, but which will not support theambitious structures that some want to construct on them. But perhapsI am just a fatalist with an unrequited streak of idealism.

NOTE

I am grateful to Lene Hansen, Richard Little, B. A. Roberson, Ole Waever, Jaapde Wilde, Mark Zacher and the editors for comments on an earlier draft of thischapter

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buzan - timeless wisdom of realism

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