By Hooshang Amirahmadinothing significant to actually disruptthe peace process.

Even if Iran's argument was to beaccepted, the blame for the distortioncannot just be directed toward its ene-mies. One major problem with Iran'sPalestine policy is its largely ad hocnature and confused direction. A coher-ent policy never been spelled out andthe changing phases of Iran's policyhave made a bad situation look worse.The only constant theme in Iran'sapproach to the Palestine question hasbeen the rejection of Israel as a legiti-mate entity.

This lack of policy is also reflectedin Iran's current approach to theDeclaration of Principles (DOP).While Iranian officials generally wish asuccessful outcome to the DOP, theyvoice a largely rhetorical opposition toit. The Iranian government finds itselftrapped by its ideology and a confusedpolicy that has taken many twists andturns over the years.

O f the many problems that

trouble Iran's regional poli-

cy in the Middle East and itsrelations with the United States, thePalestine question occupies a centralplace. Being ostensibly anti-Israel, thepolicy is naturally disliked by theIsraelis and by the United States-whois making a significant investment oftime, money, and prestige to resolvethe Arab-Israeli conflict. Ironically,Iran's supposedly pro-Arab Palestinepolicy is also disapproved of by manyArab states including the PalestineLiberation Organization (PLO).Significantly, US-Iran differences overthe Palestine question have caused aprogressive deterioration of relationsbetween the two states, feeding into analready dangerous conflict.

From the American perspective,!ran's opposition to the peace negotia-tions between the Israelis and the Arabsis designed to promote radical politicalIslam and destabilize the pro-Americanregimes in the region. Some Israelileaders have even gone so far as toequate Islam with communism and theIslamic Republic with the formerUSSR. From the perspective of theIslamic Republic, however, its positionon the matter is distorted by its foes fortheir own narrow selfish gajns. Whilethe Republic has taken a principled ide-ological stand against "Israeli oppres-sion," say Iranian officials, it has done

Shift Toward the Arab SideIn the aftermath of the Iranian

Revolution, the Palestinian embassywas one of the fIrst to open its doors.The significance was that it replaced,both symbolically and physically, theIsraeli embassy in Iran. The streetwhere the embassy was located wassubsequently renamed "Palestine."Yasser Arafat was the fIrst foreign dig-nitary that visited the Islamic Republicand its founder, the late AyatollahKhomeini. Arguably, this was the firstformal foreign policy initiative of theIslamic Republic of Iran. From dayone, the anti-Israeli position of theIranian state vis-a-vis the Palestinianquestion was evident. Indeed, immedi-ately after the victory of the revolution-ary forces, Ayatollah Khomeinideclared the liberation of Palestine a

Hooshang Amirahmadi is Professor ofUrban Planning and InternationalDevelopment at Rutgers University.He chairs the Department of UrbanPlanning and Policy Development andis director of Middle Eastern Studies.Dr. Amirahmadi has published numer-ous journal articles and books, lec-tured in over 20 countries, and servesas a consultant to several multination-al agencies, governments, and privatecompanies.

principal goal of the new regime's for-eign policy.

This was a major development.Under the Shah, there was noPalestinian embassy in Iran. It is wide-ly accepted that the Shah was muchmore interested in maintaining goodrelations with Israel and its primaryprotector, the United States, than in theplight of the Palestinians or peacebetween Arabs and Israelis.Domestically, this policy led to a sig-nificant erosion of the Shah's popularbase. The fact that the policy was dis-liked by many Iranians became evidentduring the revolution when anti-Israelislogans began to be increasinglyvoiced. Regionally, the Shah's Israelpolicy created a perception of hisregime as Persian-nationalist and anti-Arab. After all, three Arab-Israeli warsand the Israeli occupation of Arablands had corresponded with growingtrade relations between Iran and Israel.In 1973, when the Arabs announced theoil embargo against Israeli supportersin the West, Iran did not join and filledthe gap by increasing its production.This anti-Arab perception was particu-larly strong among the Palestinianswho viewed the Shah as a principalenemy of their movement. SomePalestinian groups even took an activepart in the subversion of the Shah'sregime, including the training of cer-tain Iranian groups for urban guerrillawarfare. Therefore, the Shah's ousterwas seen as a significant victory for thePalestinian movement and the Arabstates.

The fundamental shift toward theArab side of the equation should haveproduced closer relations betweenArab countries and Iran. But this sce-nario, as hindsight tells us, did notmaterialize. With the exception ofSyria, South Yemen, Libya, andAlgeria, no other Arab state took steps

DOUBLE isSUE MmOLE EAST INSIGHT50

Palestine policy, became increasinglyIslamized. This shift also coincidedwith the Israeli invasion of Lebanon,the intensification of conflict betweenthe PLO and the Islamic forces inLebanon, and the ensuing relocation ofthe Palestinian bases from Lebanon toTunisia. Distance from Palestine andoutside pressures forced Arafat and hisFatah faction of the PLO to adopt amoderate position towards Israel, sym-bolized by their recognition of theJewish state. Thus, while the Iranianleadership was becoming more radicaland anti-secular, the Palestinian leader-ship increasingly drifted toward mod-eration and emphasizing the non-Islamic nature of the Palestinian move-ment. This gap, along with the abridg-ment of a main pillar of the IslamicRepublic's regional policy-that is therecognition of Israel by the PLO-<:on-vinced Tehran to develop a newPalestine policy.

The new Islamized Palestine policystressed fostering and generously sup-porting groups in and around Palestinewhose commitment to the ideals ofIslam and rejection of Israel wasbeyond doubt. Iran found reliable alliesin the Hezbollah of Lebanon and theHamas of the occupied territories. The

to improve relations with the newlyestablished Republic. With the passageof time, even some of these Arabfriends, Algeria in particular, devel-oped difficulties in their relations withIran. While the reasons for Arab-Irantensions are complex, the Islamic-pop-ular nature of the new regime and itsalleged attempts to export its revolutionscared many Arab leaders to the pointof supporting the Iraqi regime in its waragainst Iran. Persian Gulf Arab statesprovided money while others likeJordan, Egypt, Sudan, and Moroccoprovided equipment and soldiers.

Presently, Iran-Arab relations are attheir lowest level since the revolution,this time because of Iran's alleged sup-port for radical Islamic movements andits opposition to the peace process.Some like Egypt, Algeria, and the PLOare openly hostile toward the IslamicRepublic, while others, like SaudiArabia and the UAE, remain uncooper-ative.

The Islamization of Foreign PolicyEven though the Islamic Republic

had remained ideologically committedto the Palestinian cause, the initial inti-mate relations between the IslamicRepublic and the Palestinian Liberation

Organization (PLO) proved to be short-lived. A major factor was the Iran-Iraqwar. Initially, the PLO was against thewar and did not wish to take sides. ThePalestinians argued that the war bene-fited foreign powers and Israel whileweakening the two "revolutionarystates." They also feared that it woulddeflect attention from their struggle forindependence. Iran, on the other hand,expected the PLO to reciprocate itsposition on the Palestinian question bytaking a principled stand in acknowl-edging Iraq as an aggressor, a positionthe PLO leadership refused to take.While this refusal did not sit well withTehran, the PLO leadership becamefrustrated by its failure to end the war.Also faced with pressure from the anti-Iranian rich Arab states-the PLO'sprimary financial supporters- Y asserArafat eventually took a pro-Arabstand in the Iran-Iraq war. When differ-ences grew between Arafat and SyrianPresident Hafez Assad, Palestinian-Iranian relations further sufferedbecause of Iran's alliance with Syria,the only openly anti-Iraq Arab countryin the region.

Meanwhile the "Islamic Radicals"prevailed over the "liberals" in Tehranand Iran's foreign policy, including the

Tehran found ready allies in the Hezbollah when they Islamized their policy on Israel; above, Hezbollah funeral

DOUBLE isSUE 51MAY-AUGUST

to its withdrawal from Kuwait, a posi-tion that reflected Iran's national secu-rity interests. Moreover, Iran refused tobecome a center for Islamic radicalmovements who supported the Iraqiposition, and characterized the conflictas one between two evil forces. Thisposition angered the Islamic radicalswho have subsequently held their gath-erings in Baghdad and portray theIslamic Republic as essentially oppor-tunist, Persian-nationalist, and anti-Arab.

While Rafsanjani's program for amoderate foreign policy ran into sometrouble with hardline elements in thegovernment, nowhere was the resis-tance so fierce as over the Palestinianquestion. Ayatollah Khomeini's unwa-vering anti-Zionist and anti-US standhas set a legacy from which the IslamicRepublic is finding difficult to extractitself. Compounding this legacy, thepreviously pragmatist president AliKhamenei became increasingly ideo-logical when he succeeded the lateKhomeini as the Supreme SpiritualLeader of the Islamic Republic.Meanwhile a number of initiatives bythe Rafsanjani government were notreciprocated by the United States, mak-ing it increasingly difficult for the prag-matists to show goodwill.

Iran-contra affair. Caught between therhetoric of their anti-Israeli policy andthe need for American-made spareparts and equipment, the so-called rad-icals in power chose the latter. This wasnot to be the last time the regime wasforced to choose between pragmatismand the interests of the Palestinians,either. Following the invasion ofKuwait, the Islamic Republic rejectedIraq's efforts to link a solution to thecrisis to the Palestinian question.

Post-Khomeini Reevaluation

In the post-Khomeini era, as theIslamic Republic focused on economicgrowth, the Rafsanjani governmentdeemed it necessary to re-evaluate thedeterminants of its foreign policy. As aresult, the ideological orientation wascomplemented by a renewed emphasison Iran's national interests. The newpolicy was set in motion during thePersian Gulf crisis when Iran cooperat-ed with the United Nations and theinternational coalition against Iraq.Viewing the Persian Gulf as its "back-yard," the Islamic Republic was one ofthe first states to oppose the invasionand warn Iraq of the consequences ofany changes in the political geographyof the region. Iran also rejected Iraq'sproposal to link the Palestine question

Islamic Republic has used these forcesto exert sustained pressure on Israeland on more moderate Palestinians. Onthe symbolic front, Iran also embarkedon a propaganda campaign that sensi-tizes Muslims against the Jewish stateand the Arab-Israeli peace negotia-tions. Quds (Jerusalem) Day, the lastFriday of the Iranian calendar whichbegins on March 21, for example, ischarged with religious and anti-Zionistslogans. Similarly, the so-called Bara'a(disassociation from enemies of Islam)demonstrations during the annual Hajjritual in Mecca provide another occa-sion for the Islamic Republic to engagein anti-Zionist and anti-American pro-paganda.

Ironically, it was during this phasein Iran's Palestine policy that theIslamic Republic is said to havebecome engaged in a series of dealswith the Israelis. It is at first difficult tounderstand this rather contradictoryapproach of Iran to Israel, until onerecalls that the Islamization of thePalestine policy occurred at the heightof the Iran-Iraq war when the Republicwas badly in need of military equip-ment and spare parts. It was during thiscritical period that the Israelis andAmericans appeared on the sceneresulting in what became known as the

Iran approved of the growing religious component of the intifada; above prayer at the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem

MIDDLE EAST INSIGHTDOUBLE ISSUE52

Rafsanjani OnO n June 7, Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani held

a news conference in Tehran where he outlinedmajor foreign and domestic policy positions for the IslamicRepublic.

Rafsanjani stated that while Iran does not approve of theArab-Israeli peace process, "we do not wish to intervene inpractice and physically disrupt the process." Rafsanjanideclared that Iranian objection to the process stemmed fromthe fact that Palestinian rights "were being denied," and hedoubted an equitable outcome would be the result: "To givesome self rule in only part of the Occupied Territories doesnot seem to be a suitable process."

Rafsanjani stated that it was doubtful that the Syrianswould make the same mistakes as the Palestinians and he feltconfident that they would "not sacrifice their own interests orthose of the Palestinians." He did admit, however, that whileIran would not cut relations with Arab countries makingpeace with Israel, they would "necessarily be weaker."

Rafsanjani also discussed relations with the Gulf monar-chies and especially the -" ~-- -,dispute with the United fArab Emirates (UAE)over the islands of AbuMusa and the Greater andLesser Tunbs in thePersian Gulf. WhileRafsanjani stated that"the UAE will gain noth-ing from such claims andthey have to cross a sea ofblood in order to reachthese islands," he did sayIran was willing to nego-

~,t~IV.l::,

~

the government still pushing for a mod-erate line. In a major press conferencein January 1993, President HashemiRafsanjani, while denouncing Israel as"illegitimate," did not call for itsdestruction. He even went so far as tosuggest that the Islamic countries mightestablish relations with Israel if thePalestinian question was to be resolvedin a manner that would ensure the legit-imate rights of the Palestinian people.In a subsequent interview with Timemagazine, the president indicated thatan interim autonomy solution to thePalestinian problem would be consid-ered a welcome development. In June1994, President Rafsanjani under-scored the main thrust of the govern-ment's Palestine policy, namely that itdoes not intend to interfere in practicein the peace process and will not take

strengthen this faction although itsposition remains largely inconsequen-tial to the official policy of the govern-ment which takes an alternative view.In particular, the government considersthe Israeli question within the domainof Iran's foreign policy establishmentand argues that a more reasonableapproach to it should be based on Iran'snational security interests in a changingworld. The official policy, however,remains ambivalent toward UNResolutions 242 and 338 and lacksclarity in its direction and focus. As aresult, the moderate position has beenweakened to a significant degree

The moderate leadership in Tehranalso sees the peace process as a greatdeal less than comprehensive and findsit difficult to accept a two-state solutionthat does not include the majority ofPalestinians. Israel's image in Iran asan "oppressive occupier" and a "lackeyof the United States" is another factorthat makes it difficult for the leadershipto contemplate a compromise.Consequently, the moderate leadershipin Tehran feels compelled to rhetorical-ly reject Israel and the peace process.

Exacerbating this situation is thepolitical discord in Tehran among thetwo main factions in the government.One group considers rejection of theJewish state a fundamental principle ofthe Islamic revolution and, as such,uncompromisable. The growingIslamization of the intifada tended to

After the DOPIran's Palestine policy after the

DOP continues to be the same old adhoc approach, with the pragmatists in

53DOUBLE ISSUEMAy-AUGUST

Foreign Policytiate with UAE over the islands. He said he was convincedthat Iran's legal evidence backing up its ownership of theislands was indisputable.

In an important conciliatory statement to the Arab world,however, Rafsanjani said the Islamic Republic would notmake any efforts to export the revolution, but would ratherconcentrate on internal development: "We have said that wewould elucidate our ideology and those interested couldaccept it. We will employ all our potentials for the develop-ment of our country."

On relations with the United States, Rafsanjani said therewas a "need for a goodwill gesture from the US" such asunfreezing Iranian assets-which are calculated at $10 bil-lion by the Iranians and $4 billion by the US. "We showedour goodwill by helping secure the release of Americanhostages in Lebanon but the Washington government didnot keep its promise of releasing our frozen assets."

Another important issue addressed was Iran's allegedattempts to develop nuclear weapons. Rafsanjani denied

this and said that "Iran isI: against proliferation of, nuclear weapons and in

favor of global nuclearI disarmament. Each and

every country shouldstrive for global elimi-nation of atomicweapons." He stressedthe consistent goodevaluations given Iranby representatives of the

I International AtomicEnergy Agency. Q

In a major press conference in January1993, President Hashemi Rafsanjani,

while denouncing Israel as"illegitimate," did not call for its

destruction. He even went so far as tosuggest that the Islamic countries might

establish relations with Israel if thePalestinian question was to be resolved

any action that will cause a disruptionof the Arab-Israeli negotiations.

This more pragmatic position standsin sharp contrast to the view expressedin the mainstream media in the West,which tends to reflect the ideologicalposture of the radical faction. Even thislopsided portrayal is usually based onlargely unsubstantiated reports comingfrom anonymous sources and is pub-lished without a balanced explanation.Iran, however, is also partly to blamefor the lack of clarity in its policy andits misrepresentation by the media andforeign policy pundits in the West. Forexample, while the Madrid Conferencewas underway, Iran organized theInternational Conference in Support ofthe Islamic Revolution in Palestine.The conference voiced support for thePalestinian uprising, criticized the US-sponsored Madrid Peace Conference,and called on the leaders of the Islamiccountries to join forces in guaranteeingthe rights of the Palestinians. The con-ference failed, however, to institute anyconcrete measures to implement thepronounced ideals, thus rendering ituseless beyond its propaganda value.

Iran's policy toward the Palestinianquestion, intentional or otherwise,remains largely rhetorical and, accord-ing to a high-level Iranian official, hasnot even outlined any concrete steps forthe regime to take. This policy has ledto significant confusion among Iran'sfriends and foes in the region and glob-

scriptions that are accepted by the IMFand the World Bank. There is no plau-sible reason to believe that a similarapproach would not encourage Iran toadopt a more embracing attitudetowards Arab-Israeli peace negotia-tions.

Finally, the key to an effective poli-cy remains better US-Iran relations.These relations are currently at theirlowest point in years. Each side hasdeveloped a laundry list of accusationsagainst the other and neither seemsready to separate fact from fiction. TheUS charges against Iran include inter-national terrorism, support for radicalIslamic groups, non-conventional mili-tary build-up, and opposition to theDOP. Iran, on the other hand, chargesthe US with unlawfully freezing itsassets, supporting the Iranian opposi-tion in exile, downing an Iranian pas-senger jet, and supporting Iraq duringthe Iran-Iraq war. The two govern-ments have let procedural issues forresolving disputes become fixed intoinflexible negotiating positions. As aresult, neither side seems ready to takethe courageous step of initiating a dia-logue to resolve the conflict. Yet, nei-ther side benefits from a continuationof the hostilities given their commoninterests in a stable oil market, regionalcalm, and economic relations. One canonly hope that, like the Arab-Israelidispute, the two sides will find a way totalk to each other. .

ally. Taking advantage of the situation,a majority of the Arab states and Israelare using their wealth and influence topromote anti-Iranian sentiment inWestern public opinion, resulting inburdening pressures and sanctions onIran. These efforts have to a largeextent contributed to the recent deterio-ration of US-Iran relations. Accordingto certain Iranian officials, under theseconditions, if the Arabs and Israeliswere to resolve their differences, theycould devote the full thrust of their neg-ative campaign towards Iran, in whichcase the country's national securitycould be jeopardized. No wonder Iran'sPalestine policy has recently becomeincreasingly predicated upon itsregional security concerns.

The future of Iran's policy towardArab-Israeli conflict and thePalestinian question hinges upon rec-ognizing Iran's security interests andassisting the Palestinians regain theirlegitimate rights. This implies that Iranmight be positively influenced ifregional states and global powers wereto include it in all negotiating regimesthat involve regional security mattersand the Arab-Israeli conflict. Being afull-fledged member of such interna-tional regimes creates interdependen-cies and responsibilities which regular-ly forces states towards cooperation.For example, membership in variousinternational financial regimes hasobliged Iran to adopt economic pre-

MmOLE EAST INSIGHTDOUBLE ISSUE54