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3 THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTVS GOVERNMENT

Printed for the War Cabinet. May 1940.

S E C R E T . Copy No. 43

W.M. (40) 109th Conclusions.

TO B E K E P T U N D E R L O C K A N D K E Y .

I t is requested t h a t special care may be t aken to ensure the secrecy of this document .

W A R C A B I N E T 1 0 9 ( 4 0 ) .

CONCLUSIONS of a Meeting of the War Cabinet held at 10 Downing Street, S.W.1, on Wednesday, May 1, 1940, at 11-30 A.M.

P r e s e n t : The R i g h t Hon. N E V I L L E CHAMBERLAIN, M . P P r i m e Min i s t e r (in the Chair).

T h e R i g h t Hon . S i r J O H N S I M O N , K.C., The R i g h t Hon . V I S C O U N T H A L I F A X , M.P . , Chancellor of the Exchequer . Secre tary of S t a t e for Fore ign

Affairs. The R i g h t Hon . S i r K I N G S L E Y W O O D , The R i g h t H o n . W I N S T O N S.

M.P . , L o r d P r ivy Seal. C H U R C H I L L , M.P . , F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y .

The R i g h t Hon . O L I V E R STANLEY, M.P. , The R i g h t Hon . S i r S A M U E L H O A R E , Secre tary of S ta t e for W a r . Bt., M.P . , Secre tary of S t a t e for A i r .

The R i g h t H o n L O R D H A N K E Y , Min i s te r wi thout Por t fo l io .

T h e following were also p r e s e n t : T h e R i g h t Hon. S i r J O H N ANDERSON, l The R i g h t Hon. A N T H O N Y E D E N , M.P . ,

M.P . , Secretary of S t a t e for the 1 Secre tary of S t a t e for Dominion Home D e p a r t m e n t a n d Min i s te r of ! Affairs. Home Securi ty.

T h e Hon . Si r A L E X A N D E R CADOGAN, j A i r Chief M a r s h a l S i r C Y R I L L. N. P e r m a n e n t Under -Secre ta ry of Sta te ! N E W A L L , Chief of the A i r Staff, for Fore ign Affairs.

A d m i r a l of the Fleet S i r D U D L E Y j Genera l S i r W . E D M U N D I R O N S I D E , P O U N D , F i r s t Sea L o r d a n d Chief of Chief of t h e I m p e r i a l Genera l Staff. Nava l Staff.

Secretariat: Si r E D W A R D B R I D G E S .

Major -Genera l H . L . I S M A Y .

Mr. F. H E M M I N G .

W i n g Commander W . E L L I O T .

Lieutenant-Colonel E . I . C. JACOB, R . E .

M r . L. F . B U R G I S .

[21245]

W A R C A B I N E T 109 (40 ) .

Minute C O N T E N T S .

No.1

2

Subject. T h e A i r S i tua t ion

B.A.E. activity. Stavanger aerodrome. Aalborg aerodrome. Eornebu aerodrome. Coastal Command. Enemy activity. Enemy aircraft crashes at Clacton. Employment of German bomber force in Scandinavia.

The Naval S i tua t ionH.M. submarine Unity.

3 Opera t ions in NorwayNarvik area. Namsos area. Trondhjem area. Andalsnes area.

. . . . . . . . . . . .

4 I t a l yAttitude of Italian press.

5 I t a l yNaval dispositions in the Mediterranean. Italian liner Bex.

6 The Med i t e r r aneanProtection of British

. . . shipping.

7 U.S.S .R.Trade negotiations.

8 SwedenDanger of German invasion.

9 Germany : Possi ble in tent ionsBelgium. Invasion of Great Britain. The Netherlands.

. . . . . .

10 The Ba lkansProbable extent and effectiveness of Allied assistance

Page 3

4

. . . . . . 4

6

6

. . . 6

7

7

. . . . . . 7

8 to Turkey.

The Air Situation. (Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 1.) B.A.F. activity. Stavanger aerodrome.

Aalborg aerodrome.

Fqrnebu aerodrome.

Coastal command.

Enemy activity.

1. The Secretary of State for A ir said t h a t two Blenheims h a d completed a successful reconnaissance of Rye aerodrome (Denmark) a n d h a d re turned . Fif ty a i r c r a f t had been observed on the ae rodrome a n d dispersed in t rees. These fifty a i r c r a f t h a d consisted most ly of J u n k e r s 88 's and He inke l s 111's w i t h w h a t appea red to be four -engined t r anspor t s . There h a d been no opposi t ion.

Six Blenheims h a d left on the previous af te rnoon for a day a t t a c k on Stavanger .

T w o of these h a d ca r r i ed out the i r t a sk successfully, one h a d over-shot the t a rge t a n d its bombs h a d fallen in to the sea, and one h a d been chased by four Messerschmit t s 110's and h a d not succeeded in d r o p p i n g i t s bombs. One of the a i r c r a f t a f te r d ropp ing i t s bombs h a d been a t t acked by a Messerschmit t 109 which had been shot down. A b o u t 150 a i r c r a f t h a d been seen on the runways a n d d i spe rsed round the aerodrome. T w o of our machines were miss ing.

Fou r t een Wel l ing tons h a d a t t acked S t avange r "on t h e previous n i g h t . T e n h a d completed the task, three were missing, a n d one h a d c rashed in Yorksh i re on its r e t u r n . Balloons h a d been observed a t between 6,000 and 7,000 feet, and Messerschmit t 110's and 109's h a d been encountered. One Messerschmit t 109 h a d been shot down in flames.

U n f o r t u n a t e l y the t im ing of th i s opera t ion h a d not worked o u t accord ing to p lan . Fog h a d been forecast, a n d our a i r c r a f t h a d been anxious to r e t u r n before the fog descended. One of the two sections of Wel l ing tons engaged h a d a r r ived a t i t s t a rge t before d a r k w i t h the resul t t h a t i t h a d suffered casual t ies . The section which h a d a r r ived a f t e r d a r k h a d suffered no casual t ies .

A fu r the r n i g h t a t t a ck on S tavanger aerodrome had been ca r r i ed ou t by twelve Whi t l eys , of which eleven h a d re tu rned , a n d one h a d not yet repor ted back. Three machines h a d completed t h e i r t a s k a n d three h a d fai led to a t tack . R e p o r t s from the r e m a i n d e r h a d not yet been received.

A n i g h t a t t ack on A a l b o r g aerodrome h a d been ca r r i ed out by th ree H a m p d e n s , of which one h a d completed i t s task, one h a d fai led to find a ta rge t , a n d one h a d crashed in Norfolk on i t s r e t u r n .

Ten Whi t l eys h a d ca r r i ed out a n igh t a t t a ck on Fornebu. N i n e h a d r e t u r n e d or were repor ted on their w a y home. P r e l i m i n a r y r epo r t s h a d s ta ted t h a t some a i r c ra f t had successfully car r ied ou t t h i s a t t ack , bu t fu r the r de ta i l s were not yet available. One Whi t l ey h a d not yet re turned .

A n a t t a ck h a d also been car r ied out on Fornebu by five H a m p d e n s , al l of which had r e tu rned safely. F o u r h a d car r ied ou t t he i r t a sk successfully but searchl ights h a d prevented observation. F i r e s h a d been s t a r t ed and one h a n g a r had been seen ablaze.

These opera t ions were being very carefully wa tched from the po in t of view of ensur ing t h a t u n d u e r isks were not taken, or losses sus ta ined , in re la t ion to the resul ts likely to be achieved.

B a d vis ibi l i ty h a d seriously in ter fered w i t h flying. A section of Blenheim fighters had flown an offensive pa t ro l of

Romsda le F j o r d . No enemy a i r c r a f t had been seen a n d there h a d been no an t i - a i r c r a f t fire.

A t A a l e s u n d two oil t anks on the island h a d been seen bu rn ing . A t Anda l snes trees h a d been seen bu rn ing on the N o r t h e r n edge of the h i l l a n d a house on fire on the west s ide of t he F j o r d .

One Sunde r l and h a d flown to Namsos w i t h two A r m y Officers t he previous evening.

T h a t morn ing three H u d s o n s had left to bomb S tavanger A e r o d r o m e a n d three Blenheims h a d left for Romsdale F jord .

The re h a d been l i t t le enemy act ivi ty d u r i n g the previous day . T w o plo ts h a d been traced, one off Southwold and one 60 miles out off F lamborough H e a d . D u r i n g the previous n i g h t 18 t racks h a d

[21245] 2B

Enemy aircraft crashes at Clacton.

Employment ofGerman bomberforce inScandinavia.

The NavalSituation.(PreviousEeferenee:W.M. (40) 108thConclusions,Minute 2.) H.M. SubmarineUnity.

Operations in Norway. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 3.) Narvik area.

been plotted, one 40 miles east of Scapa , five in the Tyne area , one in the mouth of t he Plumber and eleven in the Thames E s t u a r y .

These enemy a i r c r a f t had probably been engaged in mine­laying. The Tyne, l l u m b e r a n d Thames E s t u a r y a n t i - a i r c r a f t defences had been in act ion w i t h searchl ights . The police h a d repor ted t h a t an a i r c r a f t h a d a l igh ted on the wa te r off M a r g a t e a n d a Humber g u n s t a t ion h a d repor ted t h a t a n enemy a i r c r a f t h a d opened fire on a searchl ight .

A He inke l 111 h a d crashed in a ga rden a t Clacton, a n d h a d caugh t fire. A s a resul t four houses h a d been demolished a n d fifty damaged . Four of the crew of the a i r c r a f t h a d been kil led. One civi l ian h a d been ki l led a n d 97 in ju red , of whom 49 were in hosp i ta l . The weather h a d prevented fighter act ion. One fighter which h a d taken off from M a r t l e s h a m had crashed near Lowestoft , t he p i lo t being killed.

The Home Secretary said t h a t he feared t h a t there were other casual t ies besides those mentioned by the Secre tary of S t a t e for A i r . I t appea red t h a t there h a d first been a n explosion in the a i r a n d af te r the machine h a d crashed fu r the r explosions had t aken place.

The Secretary of State for Air sa id t h a t he h a d ment ioned to the W a r Cabinet a few days ago t h a t the A i r Staff considered t h a t

10 per cent, of the German bomber force had been engaged in the Norwegian operat ions . The A i r Staff now h a d reason to believe

t h a t about 25 per cent, of the G e r m a n bomber force was being employed.

The W a r Cabinet took note of the above s ta tements .

2. The First Loral of the Admiralty sa id tha t the Minesweeper Dunoon had s t ruck a mine near S m i t h ' s Knoll , N o r th of the Thames

Es tua ry , a t 6-15 the previous day and h a d sunk. There h a d been 42 survivors, of whom 4 h a d been seriously in jured . The Dunoon

n a d previously repor ted t h a t she h a d p a r t e d 3 sweeps and t h a t i t w a s evident t h a t an ant i -sweep device was being used in th i s area .

H . M . Submar ine Unity had been sunk on the 29th A p r i l in collision w i t h a Norweg ian steamer a t 7-15 P . M . off the F a m e

Is lands . One officer and three r a t i n g s were miss ing. T a p p i n g h a d been hea rd a t 3 o'clock t h a t morn ing a n d divers from Scapa were being hur r i ed to the Tyne.

The French destroyer Maille-Breze h a d caugh t fire a t Greenock af ter a big explosion the previous af ternoon and h a d sunk later . Abou t 50 casual t ies had been taken to hosp i ta l .

The W a r Cabine t took note of the above s ta tement .

3. The W a r Cabinet were given the following informat ion :—

(1) The oiler Boardale (8,334 tons) h a d been damaged by g r o u n d i n g off Lango I s l and a n d h a d subsequent ly caugh t fire and sunk.

(2) The F rench Chasseurs A l p i n s h a d expected to make contact w i t h G e r m a n t roops close to B je rkv ik t h a t day. B r i t i s h troops h a d occupied Ankanes .

(3) P a r t i c u l a r s were given of the A.A. gun defences a l ready instal led in the Na rv ik area, of fur ther guns in t r ans i t , a n d of the a r r angemen t s being made for the despatch of still fu r the r guns.

(4) H .M.S . Glasgow was expected a t Tromso a t 8 P . M . t h a t day, h a v i n g on board the K i n g of Norway a n d members

Namsos area.

Trondhjem area.

Andalsnes area.

of h is Government . The F i r s t L o r d of the A d m i r a l t y under took to examine the quest ion of s t r e n g t h e n i n g the A.A. defences of Tromso.

(5) H . M . S . Janus h a d embarked 100 men a n d two A . A . guns the prev ious evening a t Namsos w i t h a v iew to occupying Mosjoen. A company of soldiers w i t h stores were to be landed from Ben My Chree a t Mo, n o r t h of Mosjoen, i n order to p reven t enemy l a n d i n g s there .

(6) The sloop H . M . S . Bittern h a d been bombed cont inuously the previous day. A t 3 P . M . she h a d been dive-bombed by waves of 8 He inke l s a n d h a d been set on fire. A f t e r being abandoned, she h a d sunk in deep water . The news from the fo rward a rea was good.

(7) I t h a d been decided to abandon the fe in t a t t a c k on the forts a t the en t r ance to T r o n d h j e m F jo rd , in order to ease the problems which the Commander - in -Chie f h a d to face in connection w i t h the w i t h d r a w a l from Anda lsnes . The blockade of T r o n d h j e m w a s also be ing raised, a s the destroyers employed in th i s opera t ion were needed elsewhere.

(8) H .M.S . Wanderer h a d gone ashore nea r A nda l sne s a t 11-15 P . M . the previous n igh t . She h a d repor ted t ha t she m i g h t be able to move w i t h the next h i g h t i de , bu t the ex ten t of the d a m a g e was not known.

(9) The re h a d been no d i rec t communica t ion w i t h Anda l snes on the previous day, and no message h a d been received from Genera l P a g e t . I n t e r m i t t e n t bombing of the town had cont inued. T he r e h a d been no sh ip in the p o r t of Anda l snes from the t ime H . M . S . Fleetwood h a d left on the n i g h t of t he 29 th A p r i l u n t i l H . M . S . Auckland h a d a r r ived there on the evening of the 30th A p r i l .

(10) 2,200 t roops had been embarked the previous n i g h t from Anda lsnes , a n d 120 Royal M a r i n e s from Veblunoses.

The Prime Minister gave the W a r Cabine t an account of the r epo r t wh ich had been m a d e personal ly to h i m .by Majo r Jefferis. Ma jo r Jefferis h a d been sent out to Anda l snes w i t h ins t ruc t ions to blow u p the W e s t e r n r a i l w a y in Cen t r a l Norway. H e had accordingly gone down the r a i lway l ine a n d joined B r i g a d i e r M o r g a n ' s B r i g a d e ; but the Norweg ians had categor ical ly refused to a l low h im to ca r ry out any demoli t ions. H e h a d been p resen t when M o r g a n ' s B r i g a d e h a d been engaged by the enemy. The G e r m a n s h a d a t t acked w i t h ar t i l le ry , t anks , a n d a rmoured cars, wh ich our own t roops h a d been wi thou t . F a r more des t ruc t ive morale , however, h a d been the low-flying a t t acks wi th bombs and mach ine guns . A l t h o u g h the casual t ies h a d not been so g r e a t as from shell fire, the mora l effect of seeing the a i r c r a f t coming, of being unable to t a k e cover, of being able to observe the bomb d ropp ing , a n d of the terrific explosion, h a d been overwhelming.

M a j o r Jefferis had eventual ly found himself w i t h the G e r m a n s behind h im. P i c k i n g u p a se rgeant a n d two pr iva tes , he had succeeded in m a k i n g his w a y back to A n d a l s n e s ; a n d on the w a y he had m a n a g e d to blow u p the g i rde r s of two b r idges on the G e r m a n side. H e es t imated t h a t i t would take some th ree weeks to r e p a i r these. A t Anda l snes the condi t ions of a i r a t t a c k h a d been such as to m a k e i t qui te impossible to wa lk down to the j e t ty d u r i n g day l igh t hours. H e h a d spent a day in a sloop in the ha rbour , a t wh ich t h i r t y bombs h a d been aimed. None h a d hi t , b u t the i m m u n i t y of a sh ip u n d e r such condi t ions could only be, in M a j o r Jefferis 's opinion, a m a t t e r of t ime, and he ca lcula ted t h a t i t s life would probably not be more t h a n three days.

T h e general conclusion which he (the P r i m e Min is te r ) drew from Majo r Jefferis 's account w a s t h a t i t was qu i te impossible for l and forces to w i t h s t a n d complete a i r super io r i ty of the k ind which

Italy: probableintentions.(PreviousReference:W.M (40) 108thConclusions,Minute 8.) 'Attitude ofItalian Press.

Italy. Naval dispositions in the Mediterranean. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 10.) Italian liner Rex. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 9.)

The Mediterranean. Protection of British shipping. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 106th Conclusions, Minute 2.)

the Germans h a d enjoyed in Norway. Th i s made i t a l l the more impera t ive to the success of our opera t ions a t N a r v i k t h a t we should establish a i r bases in tha t area, not only for fighters, bu t also for bombers.

The First Lord of the Admiralty said t h a t full account had been t aken by the Service D e p a r t m e n t s of the need for es tabl ishing a i r bases in the N a r v i k area .

Discussion as to the l ine to be taken by the P r i m e Min i s t e r in his for thcoming S ta t emen t in the House of Commons on opera t ions in Norway is conta ined in the Secre ta ry ' s S t a n d a r d F i le of W a r Cabinet Conclusions.

The W a r Cabinet took note of the above s ta tements .

4. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs d r ew a t t en t ion to te legram No. 437 D I P P . da ted 30th A p r i l , 1940, from H i s

Ma jes ty ' s Charge d'Affaires, Rome, r epo r t i ng tha t , in a conversat ion w i th L a d y Abingdon on the 28th Apr i l , Count Ciano had seemed

anxious to know w h a t effect I t a l i a n P ress p r o p a g a n d a was hav ing t n e* n U n i t e d Kingdom, and h a d seemed relieved when he h a d been

told t h a t it was causing annoyance r a t h e r t h a n ange r ; he h a d told Lady Abingdon tha t we should not t ake th is p r o p a g a n d a too

seriously, and had added t h a t he h a d expla ined the posi t ion to Si r Noel Charles a n d hoped t h a t the Br i t i sh Embassy unders tood.

The W a r Cabinet took note of the above s ta tement .

5. The First Lord of the Admiralty sa id t h a t H .M.S . Royal Sovereign and H .M.S . Malaya, w i t h three F rench ba t t l esh ips and a destroyer escort, were now on the i r way to A l e x a n d r i a a n d h a d t h a t morn ing been repor ted well east of M a l t a .

The supply sh ip H .M.S . Resource h a d been ordered from M a l t a to A l e x a n d r i a to assist the French in ce r t a in r epa i r s which were needed to the i r three bat t leships .

The I t a l i a n l iner Rex h a d been repor ted to have sailed for New York.

A number of submarines had a r r ived a t the head of the Suez Canal from the Ch ina S ta t ion .

The W a r Cabinet took note of th i s s ta tement .

6. The Prime Minister read te legram No. 280 from our Ambassador in Cairo . H e presumed t h a t Si r Mi les Lampson ' s s ta tement t h a t the A d m i r a l t y were closing the M e d i t e r r a n e a n to other t h a n ma i l s teamers was not t rue , a n d t h a t the sh ipment of muni t ions to E g y p t h a d not been cancelled.

The Secretary of State for War confirmed tha t all sh ips w i t h mi l i t a ry stores for the Midd le E a s t were cont inuing to proceed through the Medi t e r ranean .

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs suggested t h a t i t might be wise to balance the s ta tement which h a d a p p e a r e d in the Press t h a t morn ing as to diversion of s h i p p i n g from the Medi te r ­ranean, by a fu r the r s ta tement on Nava l d isposi t ions . T h i s s ta te ­ment would say tha t , owing to heavy German nava l losses, the balance of naval s t reng th between the Allies and Germany h a d been

U.S.S.R. Trade negotiations. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

Sweden. Danger of German invasion. (Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 100thConclusions,Minute 4.)

Germany: possible intentions. (Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 8.) Belgium.

Invasion of Great Britain. (Previous Eef erence: W.M. (40) 108th Conclusions, Minute 4.)

g rea t ly al tered, a n d t h a t we were now able to rever t to our no rma l Fleet disposi t ions.

The W a r Cabine t ag reed— T h a t a s t a t emen t on these lines should form p a r t of the s ta tement on the genera l s i tua t ion to be made by the P r i m e Min is te r . [See M i n u t e 3 (Confidential A n n e x ) . ]

7. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t h a t Mr . A t t l ee had asked whe the r he could p u t down a P r i v a t e Notice Quest ion t h a t a f te rnoon on the subject of t r a d e nego t ia t ions w i t h Soviet Russ ia . H e h a d been told t h a t th i s w a s not possible, b u t a r r a n g e m e n t s h a d been m a d e for h im to see Mr . R. A . But le r d u r i n g the af ternoon. T h e Soviet p roposa ls were be ing examined by the D e p a r t m e n t concerned. I f possible, a s t a t emen t would be m a d e i n the House of Commons the following day.

T h e W a r Cab ine t took note of the above s ta tement .

8. The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs sa id t h a t a t an in te rv iew the previous day, M. Colban, the N o r w e g i a n Min i s t e r , h a d h a n d e d him a Note con ta in ing the text of a te legram received from the N o r w e g i a n Min i s t e r in Stockholm, r e p o r t i n g the a r r i v a l of a considerable number of l a rge G e r m a n sh ips in the Oslo F jo rd . M. Colban in te rp re ted t h i s as i nd i ca t i ng the l ikelihood of a G e r m a n

a t t a c k upon Sweden. xhe First Lord of the Admiralty said t h a t h is naval adv i se r s

were opposed to the despa tch of surface w a r sh ips to the S k a g e r r a k , i n view of the r i s k of a i r a t t ack . H e ag reed w i t h t h i s view. Submar ines could be ope ra ted in th i s a rea , b u t w i t h the full moon submar ine act ion h a d h a d to be reduced. Personal ly , he saw no g r e a t objection to the G e r m a n s ty ing u p considerable m i l i t a r y forces i n N o r w a y now t h a t we d id not i n t end to ca r ry ou t a ma jo r campa ign on t h a t f ront , p rov ided t h a t they could be prevented f rom occupying Narv ik .

I n reply to a ques t ion by the P r i m e Min i s t e r , the Chief of the Imperial General Staff sa id t h a t even if t he G e r m a n s forced the Swedes to allow them to t r a n s p o r t t roops n o r t h w a r d by r a i l to a t t a ck N a r v i k or to seize Gal ivare , the r a i lway fac i l i t ies were not sufficient to enable an a rmy of a n y considerable size to be ma in t a ined .

The W a r Cab ine t took note of the above discussion.

9. The Prime Minister d rew a t t en t ion to the fol lowing te legrams, which con ta ined w a r n i n g s as to G e r m a n y ' s in ten t ions :—

(a) Te legram No. 440 D I P P , da ted the 30th A p r i l , 1940, from t l i s M a j e s t y ' s C h a r g e d 'Affaires, Rome :—

Sir Noel Char les repor ted tha t , accord ing to a reliable i n fo rman t jus t r e tu rned from Berl in , the Ge rmans h a d m a d e all p r e p a r a t i o n s for an almost immedia te a t t ack on Belg ium a n d L u x e m b u r g . The dates ment ioned were the 1st and 2nd May, 1940; the in format ion came in the first p lace from the U n i t e d Sta tes M i l i t a r y A t t ache .

(6) Te legram No. 341 D I P P , da ted the 30th A p r i l , 1940, from H i s M a j e s t y ' s Ambassador , A n k a r a :—

Si r H u g h e Kna tchbu l l -Hugessen repor ted hav ing been informed tha t , a t a recent mee t ing in B u d a p e s t of H u n g a r i a n M i l i t a r y At taches , a s t a tement h a d been made t h a t the Germans were p r e p a r i n g a vast number of a i r c r a f t for dive-bombing a n d g r o u n d a t t ack , a n d a

The Netherlands. (Previous Reference: W.M. (40) 96th Conclusions, Minute 7.)

The Balkans. Probable extent and effective­ness of Allied assistance to Turkey. (Previous References: W.M. (40) 61st Conclusions, Minute 8, and W.M. (40) 76th Conclusions, Minute 6.)

large number of small submarines , of which p a r t s were being manufac tu red in different p a r t s of G e r m a n y ; w i t h these the Germans in t ended to make a g r e a t combined a t t ack on the Home F lee t ; af ter th i s a t tack they in t ended to l and 25,000 men in Eng l and .

(c) Te legram No. 178 D I P P , da t ed the 30th A p r i l , 1940, from H i s Majes ty ' s Minis te r , Be lg rade :—

Mr . Campbell r epor ted t h a t the Yugoslav Genera l Staff h a d t h a t day in formed the Ass is tan t to t he Nava l A t t a c h e tha t a reliable source had repor ted t h a t the S.S. Bremen and Europa h a d been s t a n d i n g by under s team since the 23rd A p r i l a t S tade nea r H a m b u r g ; there were also l a rge troop concentra t ions a t S t ade ; and i t was believed t h a t the German object was to seize the Ne the r l and is lands from Texel eas twards .

W i t h these repor ts might also be read the s ta tement in the previous day ' s Da i ly Intel l igence Repor t t h a t between 12 and 18 unidentif ied ships and also 7 large ships h a d been observed a t sea.

A record of the subsequent discussion and the decision of the W a r Cabinet is contained in the Secre ta ry ' s S t a n d a r d Fi le of W a r Cabinet Conclusions.

The W a r Cabinet took note of the s ta tement by t he P r i m e Minis ter .

10. The W a r Cabinet had before them a Memorandum by the Secretary of S ta te for Foreign Affairs ( W . P . (40) 140), in w h i c h he suggested t ha t a German dr ive in to the Balkans , backed u p by irresist ible air forces, migh t cause the B a l k a n front to collapse. H e proposed t h a t the Chiefs of Staff should be asked to consider urgent ly whether , if such a dr ive took place, we should be able effectively to deny the S t ra i t s to Germany .

I n discussion, it was poin ted out t h a t the T u r k i s h res is tance in Thrace could ha rd ly be compared w i t h t h a t of the Norwegians , which had proved so ineffective, but tha t , nevertheless, the effect of uncontested a i r super ior i ty m i g h t aga in prove decisive.

I t was poin ted out, on the other hand , tha t , if the s i tua t ion developed as suggested, we should by tha t t ime be engaged in full­scale ae r i a l opera t ions in the West , a n d i t was unl ikely t h a t Germany could sus ta in a great effort there a t the same t ime as in the Balkans .

The W a r C a b i n e t -Inv i t ed the Chiefs of Staff Commit tee to consider u rgen t ly whether , in the c i rcumstances set out in the M e m o r a n d u m by the Foreign Secretary, a n d on the assumption t h a t I t a l y w a s hostile, we should be able effectively a n d successfully to assist the Turks , w i t h i n t he next few months, to prevent the Germans from reach ing Constant inople a n d the S t r a i t s .

Richmond Terrace, S.W. 1, May 1, 1940.