#1-ART.17

Cabal vs. Kapunan

G.R. No. L-19052, December 29, 1962MANUEL F. CABAL, petitioner, vs. HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., and THE CITY FISCAL OF MANILA, respondents. 

Concepcion, J.: 

FACTS: 1. Col. Jose C. Maristela filed with the Secretary of National Defense a letter-complaint charging petitioner Manuel Cabal, then Chief of Staff of the AFP, with "graft, corrupt practices, unexplained wealth, and other equally reprehensible acts". The President of the Philippines created a committee to investigate the charge of unexplained wealth. The Committee ordered petitioner herein to take the witness stand in the administrative proceeding and be sworn to as witness for Maristela, in support of his aforementioned charge of unexplained wealth.

2. Petitioner objected to the order of the Committee, invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The Committee insisted that petitioner take the witness stand and be sworn to, subject to his right to refuse to answer such questions as may be incriminatory. This notwithstanding, petitioner respectfully refused to be sworn to as a witness to take the witness stand.

3. The Committee referred the matter to the Fiscal of Manila, for such action as he may deem proper. The City Fiscal filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a "charge" of contempt for failing to obey the order of the Committee to take the witness stand. The "charge" was assigned to the sala of respondent judge Kapunan.

4. Petitioner filed with respondent Judge a motion to quash, which was denied. Hence this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Committee's order requiring petitioner to take the witness stand violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination.

HELD:Yes.Although the said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge of unexplained wealth, it seems that the purpose of the charge against petitioner is to apply the

provisions of the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the

State of property of a public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property. However, such forfeiture has been held to partake of the nature of a penalty. As a consequence, proceedings for forfeiture of property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against themselves are applicable thereto. 

No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature. 

The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. A question is not improper merely because the answer may tend to incriminate but, where a witness exercises his constitutional right not to answer, a question by counsel as to whether the reason for refusing to answer is because the answer may tend to incriminate the witness is improper.

The possibility that the examination of the witness will be pursued to the extent of requiring self-incrimination will not justify the refusal to answer questions. However, where the position of the witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions.

Note: It is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand.

#2. Article 17

Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners 28 SCRA 344 (1969)

Doctrine: The privilege against self-incrimination extends to administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect. In this case, it was held that a doctor who was being investigated by a medical board for alleged malpractice and would lose his license if found guilty, could not be compelled to take the witness stand without his consent.

Fernado, J.:

FACTS: 1. On February 1, 1965, Arsenio Pascual, Jr., petitioner-appellee, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners, now respondent-appellant. It was alleged therein that at the initial hearing of an administrative case for alleged immorality, counsel for complainants announced that he would present as his first witness herein petitioner- appellee, who was the respondent in such malpractice charge.

2. Thereupon, petitioner-appellee, through counsel, made of record his objection, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself. Respondent-appellant, the Board of Examiners, took note of such a plea, at the same time stating that at the next scheduled hearing, on February 12, 1965, petitioner-appellee would be called upon to testify as such witness, unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a competent authority.

3. The answer of respondent Board, while admitting the facts stressed that it could call petitioner to the witness stand and interrogate him, the right against self-incrimination being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self-incrimination cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.

4. Petitioner was sustained by the lower court in his plea that he could not be compelled to be the first witness of the complainants, he being the party

proceeded against in an administrative charge for malpractice. Hence, this appeal by respondent Board.

ISSUE: Whether or not compelling petitioner to be the first witness of the complainants violates the Self-Incrimination Clause.

HELD: YES. The Supreme Court held that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness stand without his consent.

The Court found for the petitioner in accordance with the well-settled principle that "the accused in a criminal case may refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness stand." If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as a medical practitioner. The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence: "The accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as apresumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free genuine will."

The reason for this constitutional guarantee, along with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most heinous crimes is given due weight. The constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government ... must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.

#3. Article 17

Beltran vs. Samson53 P 570, GR 32025, Sept. 23, 2929

Romualdez, J.:

FACTS: 1. Petitioner Francisco Beltran, as a defendant for the crime of Falsification, refused to write a sample of his handwriting as ordered by the respondent Judge Felix Samson. This order was given upon petition of the provincial fiscal for the purpose of comparing his handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified.2. He contended that such order would be a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination because such examination would give the prosecution evidence against him, which the latter should have gotten in the first place. He also argued that such an act will make him furnish evidence against himself. 3. Respondents contend that petitioner is not entitled to the remedy applied for based on the provisions of 1687 of the Administrative Code where the fiscal under the same, and the proper judge, upon motion of the fiscal, may compel witnesses to be present at the investigation of any crime of misdemeanor. But this power must be exercised without prejudice to the constitutional rights of persons cited to appear.4. Petitioner, on the other hand, refused to perform what the fiscal demanded and sought refuge under the constitutional provision contained in the Jones Law which reads as follows: “Nor shall he be compelled to in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself within the scope and meaning of the constitutional provision under examination.

Held: Yes.The court ordered the respondents and those under their orders to desist and abstain absolutely and

forever from compelling the petitioner to take down dictation in his handwriting for the purpose of submitting the latter for comparison.

Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.

Except that it is more serious, we believe the present case is similar to that of producing documents or chattels in one's possession. We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to furnish evidence against himself.

It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d'etre of the privilege. This constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.