cambodian political parties and their...
TRANSCRIPT
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CHAPTER FOUR
Cambodian Political Parties and their Ideologies
This chapter analyses the ideologies of main political parties and the dynamics of
coalition in Cambodia. The chapter examines the different political parties and difference
in their ideologies and manifestos. The chapter focuses on the main political parties, such
as, Cambodian People's Party (CPP), FUNCINPEC, Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party,
and Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). While the Khmer Rouge remained outside the government, . . - ..
it offered violent opposition. Apart from this, the chapter also considers the issues of
corruption and patron-clientelism in Cambodian politics, and attempts to explore the
reasons for the failure of Coalition Politics in Cambodia, and thus analyze the factors,
which influenced Hun Sen to stage a coup de' etat on 5 June 1997.
Cambodia has three main leading political parties and an opposition party, Sam
Rainsy Party. The main parties are the post-communist Cambodian People's Party (CPP),
led by Hun Sen, and the royalist FUNCINPEC party under Prince Ranariddh. Both the .
CPP and the FUNCINPEC have shared power for over a past decade out of no choice.
The nationalistic Sam Rainsy's Party (SRP), has gained more seats in the recent polls,
and is considered to be growing stronger.
Eleven political parties participated in the 2008 elections. However, the focus of
this chapter would be on the major contestants.
Democracy is the best institutional arrangement that guarantees free participation
of the citizens in the process of possessing ultimate power. In a democracy, the people
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control the government. However, this does not imply rule by all the people or by the
majority. By counting the heads of the adherents, we cannot dIscover the essence of •
democracy. The rule by all the people is a political because unanimous decision is
impossible. Nor is majority rule the essence of democracy. I Democracy", as Maclver
observes, "is not a way of governing, whether by majority or otherwise, but primarily a
way of determining, who shall govern and, broadly to what sends"?
Hence, democracy is traditionally associated with co-existence of ideas, with the
right to differ and with the resolution of ideolo!;ical differences not by bullet but by
ballot. Parties are the vehicle of ideas, plurality of ideas, to which democracy is by its
nature hospitable, involves plurality of parties. Parties are the instruments through which
ideas arising in the arch of society pour into the area of the state. Thus parties act as the
bridge between social thought and political decision in democracy. The necessary
conditions on which the democratic methods of parties relies is, (i) the right to free . .
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discussion, (ii) universal adult-suffrage, and (iii) periodical elections. "A democratic
society is a society of free, equal, active and intelligent citizens, each man choosing his
own way of life for himself and willing that others should choose theirs".3
Democratic ideals may thus be supposed to be a composite of individualism,
socialism, nationalism and pluralism. For, democracy is antithetical to dogmatism .
..
Essential Conditions for Successful Working of Democracy
1. People should possess a spirit of tolerance and cooperation.
I Bryce defined democracy as a government by the majority of the qualified citizens. See Modern Democracies, vol. 1. p. 36.
1 - The Web of Government, p. 198.
3 Amal Ray, Mohit Bhattacharya,political Theory ... Calcutta, 1994, p. 437. 88
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2. People should be educated so that they can fully understand and appreciate the national
and international problems.
3. There must be gross economics inequality in the society. Presence of extremes of
wealth and poverty in the society hampers the proper working of democracy.
4. Democracy upholds the dignity of human personality, and gives various kinds of rights
to the individual.
5. It is built on the foundation of liberty and equality.
In actual practice, democracy mean rule by the majority with full safeguards for
the rights of minorities.
The presence of an independent press, which provides accurate and unbiased
infonuation to the people regarding the various do~estic and international issues.
Successful working of democracy presupposes the existence of peaceful conditions.
The existence of healthy and well organized political parties is also vital for the
successful working of democracy. These political parties should be organized on political
and economic basis rather than religious or communal basis. Certain conditions are
necessary for the formation of political parties: Democracy, keen interest in politics,
common political objectives and aims, individual should have national interests at heart,
common agreement to play the game of politics, decently, ultimate aim of capturing
power.
Classification of Party Systems
Roskin's4 classification of party systems as follows:
~ For more information on political parties, see, Roskin, Medeiros, Cord and Jones, Political Science: An Introduction, New Jersey, 2008, pp. 206-07.
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The One Party System: There is a twentieth century phenomenon, which is
associated with the totalitarian regimes of the left or right. The Soviet Union, China, •
Spain, East Gennany and many African and Asian countries are or were one-party states.
In this system a single party controls all levels of the government and remains the only
legal party that is allowed in that country.
The Dominant- Party System: Contrary to One Party System, in the Dominant-
Party System, the opposition parties are free to contest elections. However, the opposition
rarely wins. India, Japan and Mexico had been the dominant party systems. But this
system did not last long in these countries and some became multiparty systems.
The Two-Party System: In this system. There are two parties, one ofthem fOHns
the government, and the other is the opposition party. In this system two parties have
equal chance of winning. England, Canada and USA are the examples of the Two-Party
System.
The Multiple Party System: Where there are several competing political parties, is
called multiple party system. France and India are the example of multiple party systems.
Cambodia is a mUlti-party democracy under the constitutional monarchy.
Cambodia's cabinet is constitutionally responsible to the National Assembly. The Head
of State is King Norodom Sihamoni, who is selected by the Throne Council. The .'
National Assembly, Lower House, consists of 123-seats with a term of five years. The
Senate, Upper House consists of sixty-one members with a term similar to National
Assembly. In the National Assembly election of 2003, the CPP won 73 seats,
FUNCINPEC won 26 seats and the SRP won 24 seats. A national government was
fonned in mid-July 2004, with the CPP and FUNCINPEC sharing control on a
60/40 basis. The governing administration comprises of 334 senior ministers and 186
cabinet positions. 5
S Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Cambodia, 2008.
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The political parties in Cambodia originally were the umbrella organization of the •
three including FUNCINPEC led by the Prince Ranariddh, KPNLF led by Sonn Sann,
and Cambodian People's Party, led by Hun Sen. The Khmer Rouge remained outside the
government and offered opposition. All these political parties have got different political
ideologies, structures and functioning and their mobilization strategies in pre and post
election period of May 1993 have been different.
The Royalist FUNCINPEC (United National Front for an Independent, Neutral,
Peaceful and co-operative Cambodia) party was founded by Sihanouk, and headed by
Cambodian leader Prince Norodom Sihanouk's son Prince Norodom Ranariddh, followed
the path of national reconciliation and peace laid down by Sihanouk, a central figure in
Cambodia. It believes in liberal democracy and reconciliation with Khmer Rouge and
establishing peace in Cambodia was the prime objective of FUNCINPEC party.6 By .
national reconciliation, Sihanouk and FUNCINPEC meant inclusion of the Khmer Rouge
in Cambodia's future political leadership. Liberal Democracy is a system of power by
which people can be governed, by which power is exerted by the state over individuals
and groups and by which a certain set a relations are enforced between individuals
through their right of property. These relations themselves are relations of powers as they
give different people in different capacities power over others. History shows that liberal
democracy and capitalism go together. .'
FUNCINPEC, although it had won largest number of parliamentary seats in 1993
election, seemed unable to retain sufficient internal unity and sense of purpose to
capitalize on its victory.7 Most of the compromises within the coalition seemed to be
made by Ranariddh. Julio Jeldres remarked that the party had --<>perated since its
inception more a royal court than a political party, a trait that heretofore has worked its
advantage in Cambodian Society, which retains an enduringly feudal character that not
6 "Voice ofthe people", Far Eastern Economic Review. 3 June 1993, p. 10. 7 M. Vickeky, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, "The Cambodian People's Party", South East Asian Affairs, Singapore, 1994, pp. 111-14.
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even the horrendous political experiments of the past 20 years have been able to
eradicate. The courtier's style, however, is not likely to be much help in a power struggle •
against the hard-bitten cadres of CPP. 8
There were also structural barriers to FUNCINPEC translating its electoral and
international support into political power.9 There had been a fonnal 50150 division of
provincial govemorships between FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People's Farty
(CPP) in December 1993.10 Each governor provided by the one party was given two
deputies of the other, with the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) providing third
deputy governorships in two provinces. However, without an established political base in
these provinces, and with corruption, FUNCINPEC appointees faced difficulties in
asserting their authority.
The 1993 election showed that there were narrow margin in the percentage of
. votes that the FUNCINPEC and CPP received. FUNCINPEC obtained 45.47 per cent of .
the votes cast. The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) received 38.23 per cent. The
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP), led by Son Sann, emerged as the country's
third party. I I For an interim period between June and September FUNCINPEC and CPP
jointly held power while a constitution was produced.
This arrangement was confilmed with the approval of Sihanouk and the ,.
Constituent Assembly. Cambodia became a constitutional monarchy in September 1993.
However, there have always been doubts about the stability of the government in view of
the frictions between FUNCINPEC and CPP and divisions within FUNCINPEC itself-
particularly over economic policy -and because of uncertainty because of Sihanouk' s
8 J. Jeldres, "The UN and the Cambodian Transition''. Journal oj Democracy, vol. 4, No.4, October, 1993, p. 113.
9 J. Brown, "FUNCINPEC's evaporating Mandate", Phnom Penh Post, 25 March-7 April, 1994, p. 6.
10 Phnom Penh Post, 31 December 1993 -13 January, 1994, p. 3.
II "Indochina: Vietnam Laos and Cambodia", The Economist Intelligence Unity, London, 1994, p. 93.
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health. The alienation of the Khmer Rouge from the political process, and continuing
fighting, was another source of instability. Cambodian People's Party lost the UN-
sponsored elections to FUNCINPEC (Kheang and Springer).
In 1994 Hun Sen, leader of CPP flatly turned down a proposal by Sihanouk for
the fonnation of a national unity government under the king's control, the first time since
United Nations sponsored elections in 1993 that a member of the ruling party coalition •
had opposed the sovereign wishes. The move laid bare deep divisions between the
government and exposed rifts within the other main coalition partners, the royalist
FUNCINPEC party, which could result in the departure of a number of top party officials
and government ministers. The CPP rejection of the king's offer left FUNCINPEC, and
its leader Norodom Ranariddh, with the difficult choice of either choosing to break
openly with their government partners or opposing the king, on whose name and
reputation the party was feuded and elected (Kheang and Springer). , - , .
,
The CPP had also accused FUNCINPEC members of being bandits and
collaborators of the feared Khmer Rouge in the past. Yet the CPP itself was criticized to
have used violence in an attempt to influence the election result. UNTAC's human-rights
special representative Danis McNamara said his team's investigations showed that the
CPP were responsible for at least 15 politically motivated killings since 1 March and
possibly many more. 12
Bringing Sihanouk back to power was exactly what many Cambodians thought
.'
they were doing when they voted the royalist FUNCINPEC party to victory in the United
Nations - sponsored elections of May 1993. Prince Norodom Ranariddh, Nhan1!Q!!k.l>_, .,-" . ... ' .. . . ,~ ..... "
son, became first prime minister. The new National Assembly changed the-co~~try's
name to the kingdom of Cambodia and elevated Sihanouk from prince to Constitutional
12 "Voice of the People", Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 June, 1993, p. 10.
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monarch. But the reality was different. The fOimally Communist CPP emerged as. a
dominant half of the ruling coalition13.
Since then, amid frustration over the government's inability to defeat the Khmer
Rouge insurgency and bring prosperity to the country, a movement had emerged that
wanted to see the king take the helm. Its members included students and parliamentary
deputies; many of them disaffected FUNCINPEC supporters. That is exactly what CPP
leaders feared the most. Their best weapon was the constitution, which clearly stated that
the King "shall reign but not rule". It also makes the monarch's office elective, rather
than hereditary, leaving the choice of a successor wide open to political interference. 14
The Royal Council to the Throne, which was changed with naming an heir within , ' ' *.,~:---.., '.'''- - " ~ .. "" ~': ... , .. , ...... , ..
seven days of a king's death, was a jumble of rival factions. It was composed of the two
prime ministers, Ranariddh and Hun Sen, ,the National Assembly President, CPF
chainnarr'Chea Sim; the Supreme-monks of two Buddhist orders, and the two National
Assembly vice presidents. As Sihanouk's battle with cancer and other frictions stretched
on, the list of pretenders maneuvered to succeed him. About half-a-dozen princes were
considered serious candidates. 15
The problem, royal observers mentioned was that none of the candidate was ... - , • 1 <-
acceptable to all the political factions. The deep mistrust between FUNCINPEC and CPP
. continued to divide the two parties, and the CPP had successfully maneuvered to retain
real control over the military, state administration, provincial structures and security
services. Senior FUNCINPEC officials, long frustrated by their party's inability to
capitalize on its election victory, refused to continue to support their nominal coalition
pmtners and some had broken with their party leaders like Ranariddh. The move by Hun
13 Ibid.
14 "End of the Line", Far Eastern Economic Review. 2 March, 1995, p. 21.
15 Ibid.
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,
Sen and his CPP threatened a breakup of FUNCINPEC and a reorganization of the
government leadership. 16
A comparison and despite its electoral success, the FUNCINPEC party remained
weak lacking a nation-wide organization or a disciplined mass of followers or access to
significant state patronage, the basis for modem royal largesse and paternalism. Within
the party there were various differences of opinion over how best to resolve party of
Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) problem alongside the urgent problem of hunger,
unemployment, social inequality and rising racial tensions. Although the King indicated
that he would not sign the measure (which was signed into law by Chea Sim as acting
be~d .... of state), it was zealously supported by Prince Ranariddh who appeared by this /' ,. ... ,.... ... ...-
···~~~sture to be assuring both factions of the CPP that he would not challenge their vision of
reconciliation and their system of power and control as others in FUNCINPEC were
detellllined to do. 17 •
The pragmatic alliance of convenience between Ranariddh and Hun Sen was
strengthened in July in the aftermath of an alleged coup staged by Prince Chakkrapong,
who is among Ranariddh's rivals for power, and Gen. Sin Song and allegedly involving
Sar Kheng, who was shortly identified as part of the conspiracy. The alleged coup was
'aborted' by Hun Sen, who, by using generals and forces loyal to Ranariddh, succeeded
in discrediting and existing Prince Chakkrapong, who protested his innocence. Hun Sen
imposed controls on the press and succeeded in embarrassing though not eliminating, Sar
Kheng. 18
Sihanouk's son, Prince Norodom Ranariddh, served as co-prime minister from
1993 to 1997, and led the party until October 2006. CWlent leader Keo Puth Rasmey
succeeded Ranariddh. During the 1980s, Funcinpec participated in the political and
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid. 95
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aImed resistance led by the Khmer Rouge against the Vietnamese-installed People's
Republic of Kampuchea. At the 1998 elections to the National Assembly of Cambodia,
FUNCINPEC secured 43 of 123 seats, establishing the Cambodian People's Party as the
leading party in Cambodia. However, during 2003 National Assembly elections, the
number 0 seats declined from 43 to 26 seats. Ranaridh was dismissed from the party -
leadership, and he formed fOIm the Norodom Ranaridh Party. FUNCINPEC and the ~.j>I"""I"""P'··- " .
Norodom Ranaridh Party suffered a massive defeat in the 2008 National Assembly
elections, receiving only two seats each. The Cambodian People's Party won a landslide
victory, the Sam Rainsy Party became the second largest party and was confinned as the
main opposition party, and even the new Human Rights Party got an edge over
FUNCINPEC.
The Norodom Ranariddh Party (NRP) was created by Prince Norodom Ranariddh. The
party's ideology is to:
1. promote the preservation of Cambodia's "cultural landmarks" while participating
in building a "modem city".
2. preserve the existence of the Khmer race and its culture, religion and language.
3. control increase in the price of goods, reduce the monopoly on foreign good
import
4. introduce the minimum wages for factory workers . •
5. defend democracy and the rule oflaw. 19
NRP recently got into an alliance with the Sam Rainsy Party, FUNCINPEC party and .
the Human Rights Party. Recently Prince Norodom Ranariddh announced his retirement
from politics, the appointment of Siek Leng as the next leader (Cambodian Infonnation Center). = .....:. •.
19 For more information, see, political manifesto ofNRP .
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KPNLP (the Khmer People's National Liberation Front) was founded by the ex-prime
minister, Son Sann (later the leader of the BLDP). An anti-communist republican
movement, the KPNLF embraced many important personalities from the Khmer Republic
Regime and the old Democratic Party.20
Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) was earlier known as the Khmer People's
National Liberation Front, led by Son Sann. The BLDP split in 1995. The Ieng Mouly
faction sided with CPP and unsuccessfully contested the 1998 election as the Buddhist
Liberal Party, and the renamed Son Sann Party joined FUNCINPEC after its defeat in the
1998 election (Downie, 2000:47).
The Khmer Rouge
In 1960s, Prince Norodom Sihanouk labeled Cambodian communist movement as . .
the "Khmer Rouge" (French phrase for "Red Khmers"), which was dominated by a group
of French educated, Cambodian Marxists led by Pol Pot. The movement began armed
resistance in 1970 after the overthrow of Prince Norodom Sihanouk by Lon No\. With the
support from rural peasants and Norodom Sihanouk, who later joined the KR, the Khmer
Rouge defeated the US supported Lon Nol regime in April 1975. Khmer Rouge under Pol
Pot's leadership started its utopian socialist revolution in Cambodia. This revolution
resulted in the death of more than 1.5 million people and fully destructed the nation.21
•
The KR party remained in power during 1975-1978, and was largely responsible
for Cambodian genocide and imbroglio from mid 1970s onwards. It believed in
revolutionary socialism and tried to emulate Chinese model of communism for
Cambodia. It also tried to reserve Cambodia for ethnic Khmers and pursued anti-Vietnam
20 The Far East and Australasia 2003, p.229
21 For more information on Cambodia's recent history, read, Cambodian Recent History and Contemporary Society: An Introductory Course by Dr. Judy Ledgerwood, Department of Anthropology and Center for Southeast Asian Studies Northern Illinois University.
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policies. In its efforts to bring equality in the society, it abolished the currency system,
land ownership arrangements and exhorted urban people to settle in rural areas and vice-
versa. They drove out ethnic Vietnamese from Cambodia and pursued militant and
hostile relations with socialist Republic of Vietnam (Asia Week).
The KR it went into exile to offer resistance against pro Vietnamese regime in l,) tilt: '-.-:::'-.
Cambodia after they were overthrown in 1979. Its political agenda and conditions to join
in the government were based on factors opposed to Vietnam. It remained critical of CPP
and hoped to see them isolated from Cambodian power politics. According to Khmer
Rouge leaders, CPP was closely associated with Vietnam and Hun Sen acted as the
surrogate. Thus, Khmer Rouge would oppose the rule ofCPP (Asia Week).
Recovering lost territory remained a popular theme in Cambodia It was exploited
to the full by the Khmer Rouge. Such irredentism is occasionally mouthed even by
supporteIs of the CPP.22 Cambodia has lost the Mekong deltapennanently to the
Vietnamese, though a Khmer minority survives there. Son Sann, leader of the weakest of
the four factions that attended the Paris peace accords, demanded that "stolen provinces"
be retumed.23 It was no doubt only a vote-getting strategy for his group, contesting the
election as the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party. In Bangkok and Hanoi the reaction
was predictable: just let them try. Though there may be historical justice in adjusting
borders to incorporate Khmer speaking territory into Cambodia, neither neighbour would
concede so much as a silver. It would be tragedy if Phnom Penh became obsessed with
trying to vindicate past wrongs just when it must consolidate recent gains and concentrate
on a strategy for the future.24
In 1982, the Khmer Rouge joined two other non-communist movements,
FUNCINPEC and KPNLF in a Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea
" -- "Welcome Back", Asia Week, vol. 19, December-June 1992-93, p. 22.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid. •
98
(CGDK), CGDK occupied the Cambodian seat at the United Nations. The Khmer Rouge
participated in the peace process that finally led to the signing of the Paris Peace
Agreements (PPA). Fearing its defeat, the Khmer Rouge boycotted the elections. The
1993 elections produced a coalition government. The Khmer Rouge continued to be a
formidable challenge to the new government. Successive campaigns to defeat the Khmer
Rouge militarily faced failure. However, the Khmer Rouge finally disintegrated because
of following internal division: the defection of Ieng Sary and his forces in Pailin to the
government in 1996, the murder of Son Sen on orders from Pol Pot in the 1998, and the
capture and trial of Pol Pot by Ta Mok forces in the same year.25
By 1996, the Khmer Rouge as guerrilla forces lost about half to three quarters of
its strength by losing 3,000-4,000 soldiers in a mass defection. Moreover, factional
fighting within the Khmer Rouge in 1997 led to Pol Pot's ouster, trial, and imprisonment
by the Khmer Rouge. The group continued to disintegrate, and factional fighting resumed
in 1998. Pol Pot died in April, Khieu Samphan surrendered in 1998, and by 1999 most
members had defected, surrendered, or been captured. A tribunal consisting of both
Cambodian and international judges was instituted in 2006 to try former Khmer Rouge
leaders.26
The Cambodian People's Party (CPP)
The dominant political party, Cambodian People's Party was earlier known as
People's Revolutionary Party of Kampuchea that was formed in 1979 with Vietnamese
support. From 1981-1991, CPP remained the single legal party in the country. Even
though the CPP received an outright majority in the National Assembly of Cambodia, it
governs in coalition with the royalist FUNCINPEC party. Hun Sen is the current Prime
Minister, and the vice president of the party.
-----------------------25 Cambodian Recent History and Contemporary Society: An Introductory Course by Dr. Judy Ledgerwood, Department of Anthropology and Center for Southeast Asian Studies Northern Illinois University.
26 The Khmer Rouge, The Columbia Encyclopedia, 2008, Sixth Edition. 99
After the 1993 United Nations sponsored elections, the CPP joined FUNCINPEC
in a coalition government headed by two Prime ministers Prince Ranariddh and Hun Sen
as first and second respectively. Although FUCINPEC won the plurality of votes, CPP
remained in control of the government because of its strong power base not only in the
military and security forces but also in the administration at the local levels. An effort by
FUNCINPEC to challenge the CPP's dominant role led the latter to oust the fonner in a
violent coup in July 1997, forcing many FUNCINPEC and other opposition politicians
into exile.
Under pressure from the international community, especially the donor countries,
the CPP agreed to organize general elections in 1998. The CPP won the plurality of votes
but fell short of a majority necessary to fOlm a government and it fonned a coalition
government with FUNCINPEC. The coalition government had coexisted peacefully,
resulting in the first relative political stability that Cambodian enjoyed in several
decades?7 In the 2003 elections, it won the popUlarity votes, but could not get the
majority to fonn its government. Hence, fonned a coalition government with
FUNCINPEC. In the 2008 general elections, it again won the popularity votes. This
time, due to the constitutional amendment, it did not require the two thirds majority to
fOlln its government. However, it chose to form a coalition government with royal
FUNCINPEC on its conditions.
The Sam Rainsy Party
Sam Rainsy Party is "committed to building roads for a peaceful transition
towards a liberalised democracy and self-sustainable economic development in
Cambodia". It believes "Cambodia can no longer afford to uphold the old order with
feudalistic traits that favour a select few and has caused so much anguish to Cambodian
people for centuries". The Khmer Nation Party (KNP) was fOlmed in 1995 under the
leadership of Sam Rainsy. He was fired from his position as senior Minister for Finance
27 Cambodian Recent History and Contemporary Society: An Introductory Course by Dr. Judy Ledgerwood, Department of Anthropology and Center for Southeast Asian Studies Northern Illinois University.
•
100
and Economy in October 1994, and then removed from his fonner party, FUNCINPEC,
in May 1995 (Official website of SRP).
The KNP was severely damaged by a coup d'etat in July 1997 to end its
opposition. The KNP leadership was forced to hide in provincial areas or to seek refuge
in Thailand. Anned looters with the authority's blessing ransacked the Party headquarters
and Sam Rainsy's residence. After a few months of reluctant exile in protest against the
coup, Sam Rainsy returned to Cambodia at the end of 1997 to regroup the Party.
To participate in 1998 elections, the party adopted the name of its founder, Sam
Rainsy. The SRP accused the CPP for it perpetual intimidation, violence and time
constraint. It secured seven seats in the Senate, which was created to break political
deadlock so that a coalition government could be re-formed between the CPP and
FUNCINPEC, after the 1998 elections.
The SRP has been the main opponent of the CPP, which has· created political and
trade union, and influences political agenda through the media and the international
community. The SRP is known for its progressive activities both at international and
national level that provided a new perspective to the CPP controlled Cambodia.28
At international level, Sam Rainsy influenced the International Monetary Fund,
which suspended loans when the government failed to be accountable. He also influenced
International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia and its successor, the
Consultative Group, which coordinated bilateral and multilateral funding to Cambodia.
He was instrumental in having the UN declare Cambodia's seat vacant after July 1997.
At the national level, Rainsy is known for his open criticism against the ruling coalition
government, media outlets, human rights advocacy as well as trade union movement. 29
28 Sue Downie, Cambodia's 1998 Election: Understanding why it was not a 'Miracle on the Mekong', Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 54, No.1, 2000, p. 58.
29 Ibid. •
101
The party seeks primarily to propagate hope that includes moral integrity,
empowers the poor to improve their own livelihood, promotes a peaceful co-existence, •
and affilms the dignity and worthiness of all people. It believes its mission can be
achieved through "an adherence to the rule of just law, respect for human rights and
democratic process, tight control over corruption, neutral public administration, social
justice, land ref OJ m, and better management of all national resources. The party is gaining
popularity among masses.30 It was the third largest party until 2008 parliamentary
elections, FUNCINPEC being the second. After the 2008 elections, it has become the
second largest opposition party. It won 15 seats in the National Assembly in the 1998
elections, 24 seats in the 2003 elections, and 26 seats in the 2008 elections.31
Political Parties and their commitments towards in Peace Process
Cambodia's four main factions had different agendas in participating in the peace
process and the conduct of elections in 1993.
The Khmer Rouge
The Khmer Rouge's violent activities throughout the history of Cambodia
questioned the legitimacy of their participation in the peace process. Howtwer, being a
major faction who was supported by its neighbor patrons (Thailand and China), the KR
was accepted to attend the Paris Conferences. The KR ·:,:ontrolled approximately ten
percent of Cambodian territory ~ith 30, 000 troops. Pol Pot, who initiated Cambodia's
genocide, retained his position as the KR's leader (Springer, 2006:85). It is argued that
KR did not sign the Paris Peace Accords with good intentions. Instead, they joined the
talks primarily to seek military victory against the SOC through demobilisation and
UNT AC's civil administration, thus regain its lost strength. As soon as, the KR realized
the fact that it's difficult to neutralize the SOC and collapse the Hun Sen's government, it
rejected to be part of peace agreement.
30 InfoJlllation on the party is based the party's official website: www.samrainsyparty.org . .
31 Information is collected from various sources, such as, BBe News, Peoples Daily Online, The Associated Press.
102
Moreover, the l?!amed the UNT AC for failing in their efforts of neutralizing the •
~~--"-'.'
political environment and allowing the presence of Vietnamese troops in the country . •
Thus, they refused to disallu and demobilize. The KR not only decided to withdraw from
the electoral process, but also increased ceasefire violations and decided to disrupt the
campaign and voting process. During the election period, they attacked and kidnapped
the UN personnel. They offered to participate in a coalition government after the
elections. However, they were not accepted to be a part of the coalition for by boycotting
the elections. Although the KR continued military action in the country, they were
marginalized from the politics. Many of its leaders and supporters are in prison or
awaiting trial for genocide (Shaw, 2006:86-87).
The Cambodian People's Party/State of Cambodia
During this period, Hun Sen controlled the bureaucracy, police and military.
Similar to the Khmer Rouge, the CPP/SOC had their political agendas for agreeing to the • -
UN's sponsored and supervised" elections in the country. Despite its control over the
nation since 1978, Hun Sen's government was not recognized internationally. Thus, its
primary concern was to seek international acclamation in order to consolidate its
administrative and political powers. They advocated an electoral system based on single
member constituencies (Doyle, 1995 :21).
The CPP/SOC refused to cooperate UNT AC in its efforts to exert control of the
state bureaucracy, and the bureaucracy was also mobilized in support of the CPP's
electoral efforts. Civil servants made every attempt to campaign for Hun Sen's party. The
judicial branch was biased towards protecting the interests of the CPP rather than the
-.
" citizen's common interest. They kept on exploiting national resources, and intimatin~ .. _.,.."" ........ >:'/, •
-- ~rt'·"··
harassing and killing the members and leaders of opposition parties- the FUNCINPEC,
the KPNLF's political wing, the Buddhist Liberal Democratic Party (BLDP) (statement
made by Boutros-Ghali). Despite its anti social activities and violence, the CPP/SOC
received second largest votes-38.3 percent of the votes. Even though there were enough
evidences of irregularities during the elections, the UN ignored those charges (Shaw,
2006:87 -91).
103
TheKPNLF
The Khmer People's National Liberation Front consisted mainly of the remnants
of Lon Nol's republican government. Under the leadership of Son Sann, it c<;mtrolled a
small area in north-western Cambodia near the Thai border. At the time of the Paris
Conferences, they had only a small and dissipating anny (Doyle 1995: 17) Because of
their lack of material resources, they were eager to accept and favored UNT AC's
presence in the country and participated in the general elections. Due to their lack of
material resources, they were aware of the fact of their inability to obtain political power.
The KPNLF's political party, the BLDP received only 3.8 percent of the vote, and easily
marginalized by Hun Sen.
FUNCINPEC
The National United Front for a United, Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and ..
Cooperative Cambodia was founded in support of Prince Sihanouk and drew upon forces
that supported his government before Lon Nol's coup. Under the leadership of Prince
Ranariddh, it controlled a small territory in the northwest. Its military was weak and
deteriorated during the Paris Conferences and UNT AC's presence in Cambodia. (Doyle,
1995: 17) Like the other two parties, the FUNCINPEC supported the UNT AC organized
elections by participating in the elections. It is argued that people voted for the party to _.
express their support for their monarch. FUNCINPEC won the elections with 45.47
percent of the vote, but was forced to accept a coalition government (Shaw 2006:90-91).
Party politics in the post 1993 elections (1993-2008)
The following section is based on the evaluations of various sources, primarily
focusing on the scholarly work of Un Kbeang.
The royalist FUNCINPEC party, which won U.N.-sponsored election in 1993, has
been weakening because of its internal splits. After his expulsion from the party in 2006, 104
Norodom Ranariddh formed his own self-named (NRP) party and competed in the 2008
elections. FUNCINPE has been experiencing division within the party since 1994, but it •
became worst after the 1997 coup. Many of its members either have left the party or
joined the SRP, or have been engaging in the social work.
The trend of long-term decline of the FUNCINPEC started in 2002 with local
elections for commune councils. In 2003, the local elections results showed eight percent
decline in FUNCINPEC's election results compared to the 1998 election results. Scholars
identify the reasons behind this continuous decline of the FUNCINPEC are: the poor
leadership of Prince Ranariddh, the prince's low popularity among urban and young
voters, widespread corruption, and its alliance with the CPP after the 1998 stand off
(Kheang and Ledgerwood 2003).
Prince Ranariddh's has been criticized for his party's poor management and lack "-'------; .. -~' ....
of coherent political strategy. Moreover, it has been unable to bring policy reforms in the
country. " For this reason, they failed to project them as a better option coinpared to the
CPP in the recent elections. Its campaign focused on the royal achievements during "the
golden era of Sihanouk rule" to attract older population. That strategy is no longer
relevant in contemporary Cambodia.
On the contrary, the CPP's main agenda is to free the country from the KR
atrocities, and invest in infrastructure development plans lQ . .h~t.popular support. CPP has '" ~.--- ---. '. , .....
been appealing support form the grass root organizations and the NGO's as well. Given
the difference in the campaigns and party agendas of the FUNCINPEC and the CPP,
people offer more support to the CPP for its efforts of save them from the KR. In addition
to this, the CPP engaged the government towards common good by building schools,
temples, hospitals, bridges, roads and irrigation networks. During the 2003 election
campaign, FUNCINPEC, in an attempt to oppose the CPP, criticized CPP on immigration
policy and dealing with corruption and poverty related issues.
Where the FUNCINPEC failed to albact urban voters, Sam Rainsy mobilized
urban dwellers. He led the street marches to voice their grievances. FUNCINPEC lost
many of urban voters to the SRP. In the 1998 general election, FUNCINPEC received 105
33.46 percent of total votes in Phnom Penh, where the number dropped to 14.16 percent
in the city in 2003. The SPR, the opposition party experienced a big increase from 27.81
per cent in 1998 general election to 47.22 percent in the 2003 general election. The SRP
held twenty-four seats in the National Assembly, has constantly been accusing Hun Sen's
government of corruption, human rights abuses and mismanagement of
natural resources.32
Sam Rainsy has been praised by the locals and the international community for
expanding political space for the opposition politics. For its party's survival, Sam Rainsy
relied on the technical, diplomatic, and financial support from the US lawmakers, the US-
based International Republican Institute (IRI) and Cambodian diasporas in the United
States.
Many international observers declared the 2003 elections not be truly free and
fair. Despite the reports of violence, intimidation, manipulation, and political violence by
the CPP, the observers accepted the results of the elections. Rather, the CPP's is known
for its well-organized network, financial and human resources, and committed members.
More than thirty political parties participated in the national elections in 1993, and
over twenty in 1998, but during the commune council elections of 2007, the number was
dropped to twelve. During all these elections only the long established and powerful
parties such as the CPP, FUNCINPEC, the SRP were able to actively participate on the
legislative level. All other parties barely managed to receive one percent of total votes.
Where, some obset vers, consider that growing number of political parties is a sign of
consolidation of democracy in the country, others blame the resourceful parties for
dIscouraging and isolating other small parties from entering the negotiations of finding
common ground in coopet ation. 33 •
32 "Cambodian political parties kick off campaign for national election", International Herald Tribune, June 26, 2008. 33 "Movement in and among political parties", The Mirror, July 17, 2007.
106
•
•
Problems within the Coalition Government
Since the beginning of the establishment of democracy in 1993, Cambodia has
been having coalition government. However, Cambodian leaders developed policies to
maneuver around any real sense of coalition work. Instead of working as a healthy
coalition, which is favourable to its citizens, political parties always focused to
maintaining their status quo and took care of own interests. The coalition government
between Prince Norodom Rannariddh (FUNCINPEC) and Hun Sen (CPP) has faced
instability.
According to Roberts, the conflict between the coalition governments first started
with the issue of ousting the current opposition leader Sam Rainsy, who was a Finance
Minister at that time. Rainsy raised strong opposition against the corrupt government. He
became very popular and powerful due to his economic reforms, which stabilized
economy country. 34 The coalition government perceived him as challenge and threat to
them due to his growing popUlarity and appreciation within the country and among the
international community. As a result, Rainsy was removed from his position by the
government. His dismissal from the government posed serious threats to the
FUNCINPEC party, which led to trouble in its leadership. 35
Roberts, further argue ~at the "sacking of the popular Finance Minister, Sam "', .
Rainsy in October 1994 ex~ac:-;;;e~at~d the problem between Ranariddh and FUNCINPEC. •
It also prompted the resignation of the Prince Sirivuth, another well-known figure of the
party." Moreover, many senior members of FUNCINPEC were unsatisfied with the
34 David Roberts." Political Transitional in Cambodia 1991-99." St. Martin's Press, Scholarly and
Reference Division. New York, 2001 P.156. In Tooch Van, 2004, p. 37.
3S Tooch Van, "International Aid and Democracy Building Process: Cambodia", Masters of Arts in Law and Diplomacy Thesis, The Fletcher School, Tufts University, 2004, p. 37.
107
existing governmental policies of Rannariddh and Hun Sen. In their opinion, "the
FUNCINPEC and Prince Rannariddh were heavy influenced by Hun Sen and his CPP. 36
The Human Rights Party (HRP)
The HRP made its debut in 2008 elections. The party is led by Kern Sokha, a
fOimer human rights activist. The formation of Human Rights Party has introduced a new
element in the party structure. The party has established clear statutes and regulations
pertaining to party's structure functioning, responsibilities and accountability. The HRP
provides a detailed and transparent description of its internal structural procedures with a
clear separation of responsibilities that reflects the provision of separation of legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. The party has a clear description of the functioning and
responsibilities of different branches, such as internal decision-making, leadership with
time specific mandates, and a body monitoring the implementation of internal rules of the
party. Moreover, the leadership of the party remains transparent to the public and subject
to changes in case of leaders' poor perfonnance and inappropriate behaviour. The
change in leadership is automatic upon the end of their tenn. This is a striking feature of
the party that is dramatically different from the structures and dynamics of other parties.37
In July 2003, ~e CPP wi~ .. ~.Jnajority of seats in the National Assembly but less : "'--"' .
than the two-thirds required by" Cambodia's constitution to fOim a government.
FUN~INPEC won over the SRP with a narrow margin. Although the Constitution
required the fonnation of new government within sixty days after the elections, its was
formed in July 2004. The reason behind this delay was the political deadlock upon refusal
of alliance between FUNCINPEC and the SRP over the question of fOiming a coalition-
government with Hun Sen. The FUNCINPEC and the SRP demanded that they would
36 David Roberts, p. 158. In Van, p. 38.
37 Ibid.
108
join the coalition if Hun Sen's candidat.<!.J9r Prime Minister position was replaced with . ~
'>. .•. . '.'''I'''"'''~.
another CPP candidate. Hun Sen opposed this proposal strongly, and finally this
condition was traded off with another demand of policy ref 01 m by the CPP. The CPP was
asked to pledge to fight corruption and enter into renegotiation of the border treaty with
Vietnam.
The ruling Cambodia People's Party (CPP) won Cambodia's general election of
2008. The European Union (EU) criticized the elections for irregularities and based on
which the opposition party rejected the results as fraudulent. The CPP's victory and its
resulting landslide margin of victory was a surprise. The CPP's political dominance has
become increasingly entrenched over the past few years, which is believed to have
received a last-minute boost from the recent flare-up of a territorial dispute with
Thailand.38
Thus, Hun Sen has been controlling the nation since 1985, when he was made . . .
prime miniSter of a communist government installed by Vietnam. His party won the1998
elections and he became an elected prime minister. Since then, his party has tightened its
control on power with 73 seats in the National Assembly of 2008. 39
Single-party government
The Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP) remained the single •
ruling party in Cambodia from 1979 to 1991. It was renamed the Cambodian People's
Party (CPP) during UN-sponsored peace and reconciliation process. It came to power
after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978. , It overthrew the murderous
Democratic Kampuchea of the Khmer Rouge and established the People's Republic of
Kampuchea.
38 "Cambodia's Politics", Economist.com, July 29, 2008.
39 "Cambodian political parties kick off campaign for national election", International Herald Tribune, June 26, 2008 .
•
.109
The CPP had an increase in its number of seats in the 123-seat parliament from 73
to around 91. Although the CPP was unable to get a two-thirds majority, the party for the
first time won enough seats to govern without a coalition. According to the recent
changes to the constitution, a party requires to secure a simple majority of members of
the National Assembly (Lower House) to fOlm an independent government. 40
Many local activists remain concerned with this constitution change as may
damage the prospects of consolidating a true democracy. Some scholars argue that this
change is unlike.ly to make much of a difference in practical terms. The reason being, the
CPP asserted full control and governed the country through a power-sharing arrangement
with FUNCINPEC from 2003-2007. Where the CPP has been gaining power, the
FUNCINPEC's political influence has been disintegrating over the past many years.4J
Many opposition leaders and observers alleged that the CPP is able to maintain its
dominance by either intimidation.or corrupting the political opponents. The press remains
very weak and biased towards the CPP. There were several incidents of violence during
the election, including the murder of a journalist working for a newspaper associated with
the opposition Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). 42
Several opposition parties and the international observers such as the National
Election Committee alleged the CPP won the elections by- buying the votes, intimidating
the voters, electoral fraud, and dominating the media coverage. Even though the EU
report declared that the elections 2008 "fell short of key international standards for
democratic elections", it further pointed that that evidence of irregularities was not of
sufficient scale to account for the CPP's large margin of victory. 43 Thus, the CPP has
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Cambodia: Ruling Party Wins, Opposition Rejects Results, Election guide Cambodia - News Archive, July 31, 2008.
•
110
been constantly gaining popular support. Similarly, the SRP is growing steadily.
However, the FUNCINPEC is on the threshold of a long-term decline.
The observers argue that the SRP and other minor political parties would certainly
have perfOimed better if the political environment was ··fully free and fair". From the
economy perspective, the country is perfOiming strongly, and has achieved double-digit
growth annually since 2004. The People vote for Hun Sen for his efforts of bringing
gradual process of economic and political liberalisation in the country. Even though the
political and economic developmelJt is not fully satisfactory, the country has experiencing
a big relief from the Khmer Rouge's atrocities and disastrous misrule. Foreign donors,
investors and the SRP apply pressure on the government to tackle endemic corruption
and ensure the independence of the judiciary. 44
In terms of political developments, scholars argue that country is still very far
away from adopting the concept of consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, the
successful consecutive four elections have reflected an emergence of political stability.
Discussing about' the issue of building human rights nOims in the country, Cambodia
continues face criticism from the UN and Western countries. Moreover, country's
domestic politics remains fragile. Many scholars argue that the authoritarian instincts of
the Hun Sen's government would continue to create tensions on the diplomatic front,
which would continue to prevent the emergence of a fully functioning democracy.45
44 "Cambodia's Politics", Economist.com, July 29.2008.
45 Ibid. •
111
The CPP: The ruling party
According to Kheang, "the consolidation of the ruling party's power and the
disunity of the opposition entrench a fonn of controlled democracy in Cambodia. The
cost of short-tenn stability could be high".
Cambodia held fourth parliamentary elections in July 2008 since the 1993. Eleven
political parties contested the elections, but only the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) and
the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) were credible contestants. According to the preliminary
results, the CPP captured approximately 0 sixty percent of the total votes, and the party
controlled ninety seats in the 123-seat national assembly. This outcome is the clear
projection of ever-growing power of the CPP and Hun Sen.
The critics and opponents of the regime point out that the success of the
Cambodian People's Party is derived from the party's control over the state
machinery and resources - a legacy of its previous monopoly of power
under Vietnamese-backed socialism in the 1980s. The CPP uses these
resources effectively to disenfranchise voters, and curtail opposition
parties' ability to effectively contest the elections. Opposition parties were
quick to denounce the results as non-free and non-fair, and urge the public
and the international community to reject them. Opposition parties'
accusations included political intimidation and violence. They also cited a
biased electoral machinery which in their view was guilty of several
infractions: colluding with pro-CPP local authorities to delete potential
Sam Rainsy Party supporters from voting-lists, relocating polling-stations
shortly before the start of voting to confuse opposition supporters, and
inflating the number of illegitimate voters by issuing fraudulent "1018"
fOllllS that allowed the bearer to vote. 46
46 Kheang Un, Cambodia's 2008 eJection: the end of opposition?, Open Democracy, August 5, 2008.
112
•
Even though the opposition parties accused the CPP for engaging in large-scale
illegal fraudulent practices during the elections, the international community accepted •
election results due to the lack of concrete evidences of fraud against the ruling CPP.
Four Major Political Parties, FUNCINPEC, Human Rights Party, Norodom Ranariddh's
Party and Sam Rainsy Party reject 2008 election results. They accused the CPP for
manipulating and rigging the elections. They called on the public opinion to condemn the
tricks and maneuvers of the National Election Committee, which served as tool for the
CPP to organize a sham election and present a fa9ade of democracy. 47
However, "The CPP's clear advantages are the result of well-calculated planning
to preserve its dominant role. Since the 1993 elections, the ruling CPP has manipulated
the electoral process and politics to prop up its control and legitimacy".48
Finally, since 1993 Cambodia has organized, three periodic parliamentary
elections, in 1998, 2003 and 2008 and two periodic commune elections, in 2002 and
2007. The National Election Committee organizes elections. Despite the innumerable
flaws, the European Union Election Observation Mission and international community
noted that the electoral process of latest elections of July 2008 election was "an
improvement over past Cambodian elections." The EU Mission stated that "has fallen
short of a number of key international standards for democratic elections."
Based on claims of massive fraud, parties had rejected the NEC's preliminary ."
election result. The Cambodian People's Party won 90 out of 123 seats, the Sam Rainsy
Party, 26 seats, Human Rights Party, three seats, and two other parties, two seats each.
Sam Rainsy and the Human Rights Parties claimed that, "if there had been no such fraud,
47 "Four Major Political Parties Reject Election Results", Cambodia Information Center, July 28, 2008.
48 Ibid.
•
113
they would have won respectively up to 41 and 7 seats, and the Cambodian People's
Party's seats would have been down to as low as 67, instead of90".49
•
..
49 "Cambodia: The Cambodian government must address the election flaws", Asian Human Rights Commission, September 3, 2008.
114
Table. 1: Cambodian ParIiamenta9' Election -1998
Party
Cambodian People's Party
FUNCINPEC
SRP
OTHERS
FUNCINPEC
Turnout
Votes
2,030,802
1,554,374
699,653
617,659
303,764
.
. 4,902,488 .
% Seats
41.4 64
31.7 43
14.3 15
12.6 o 5.05 6
122
-.
Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union, http://www.ipu.orglparline-e/reports/arc/2051_98.htm.
115
-. - .
•
Table. 2: Cambodian Parliamentary Election - 2003
Parties
Cambodian People's Party
Sam Rainsy Party
Funcinpec
Khmer Democratic Party
The Rice Party
Indra Buddra City Party
Norodom Chakraping Proloung Khmer Party
Others
Sources:www.nece1ect.org.kh.
116
Votes
2,447,259
1,130,423
1,072,313
95,927
76,086
62,338
56,010
5,168,837
..
%
47.3
21.9
20.9
1.9
1.5
1.2
l.l
Seats
73
24
26
------
----123
Table. 3: Cambodia~ Parliamentary Election - 2008
Party
Cambodian People's Party
Sam Rainsy Party
Human Rights Party
Norodom Ranariddh Party
Funcinpec
League for Democratic Party
Khmer Democratic Party
Hang Dara Democratic Movement Party
••
Society of Justice Party (only in 7 of24 provinces)
Khmer Republican Party (only in 9 of24 provinces)
Khmer Anti-Poverty Party (only in 7 of 24 provinces)
Total (turnout 81.5%)
Sources: Cambodian InfOimation Center: www.necelect.org.kh .
•
117
Votes % Seats
3,492,374 58.11 72
1,316,714 21.91 27
397,816 6.62 8
337,943 5.62 7
303,764
68,909
5.05 6
1.15 1
32,386 0.54 1
25,065 0.42 1
14,112 0.23--
11,693 0.19--
9,501 0.16--
6,010,277 123