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TRANSCRIPT
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HEARING DAY TWO1
Cameco Corporation: Application by Cameco2
Corporation for the renewal of the McArthur River3
Licence4
THE CHAIRPERSON: The first item5
on the agenda today is Hearing Day Two on the6
matter of the application by Cameco Corporation7
for the renewal of the McArthur River mining8
operating licence.9
MR. LEBLANC: The first day of the10
public hearing on this application was held on11
July 7, 2004. The public was invited to12
participate either by oral presentation or written13
submission on Hearing Day 2.14
August 16, 2004 was the deadline15
set for filing by intervenors. The Commission16
received four requests for intervention.17
The Notice of Public Hearing18
2004-H-10 was published on May 4, 2004.19
Presentations were made on Day 1 by the applicant,20
Cameco Corporation, under Commission Member21
Document 04-H17.1, 04-H17.1A and by Commission22
staff on CMD 04-H17. September 8th was the23
deadline for filing of supplementary information.24
I note that supplementary information has been25
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filed by the applicant, CNSC staff and1
intervenors.2
3
04-H17.1B4
Oral presentation by Cameco Corporation5
THE CHAIRPERSON: With that6
preamble by the Secretary, I would like to start7
the hearing by calling on the presentation by8
Cameco Corporation outlined in CMD document9
04-H-17.1B and I would like to welcome again10
Mr. Terry Rogers, Senior Vice President and Chief11
Operating Officer. Mr. Rogers, you have the12
floor.13
MR. ROGERS: Thank you and good14
morning, Madam Chair, Commission Members,15
Commission Staff, ladies and gentlemen.16
For the record, I am Terry Rogers,17
Chief Operating Officer for Cameco Corporation.18
We are pleased to be here today for the Day 219
hearings on our application for renewal of our20
operating licence for the McArthur River mine.21
First let me introduce team22
Cameco, the people who will be presenting to you23
and fielding your questions here today: John24
Jarrell on my right, Vice President of Safety25
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Health and Environment Department; Wyatt Buck on1
my left, who is the General Manager of Key Lake2
and McArthur River; David Bronkhorst, who is3
McArthur River's Mine Manager; Scott Grant,4
McArthur River/Key Lake, Manager of Quality5
Management System, Environmental Management System6
and Regulatory Compliance; Merlin Seier, Senior7
Coordinator, Radiation Safety at both Key Lake and8
McArthur River operations; Dr. Pat Landine,9
Manager of Hydrology, Civil Engineering in10
Cameco's Safety, Health and Environment11
Department; and Scott Donald, Senior12
Hydrogeologist with Golder Associates, one of our13
long-standing consultants who has assisted us over14
the years.15
Obviously this is a large group of16
people we have assembled here today. We have17
asked them to join us in Ottawa in recognition of18
the importance of this project under consideration19
and in respect of the fairly wide-ranging20
technical nature of some of the information21
requests that came out of the Day 1 hearing.22
In July, shortly after the Day 123
hearing, we did turn off the last groundwater24
pressure relief tap at McArthur River mine. So25
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the physical event is over, but the lessons we1
learned from it remain.2
Firstly, we have grouted and3
sealed the area of the inflow and put in a freeze4
wall to further protect the immediate affected5
area of the mine.6
We have beefed up and are7
continuing to strengthen our technical expertise8
to our staff in areas such as rock mechanics and9
hydrogeology, and we will continue our long-term10
practice of supplementing this in-house technical11
expertise with well-qualified consultants.12
As you would expect, we have made13
changes in the way we operate, the way we plan and14
the way we evaluate our development plans. We see15
these changes to the management system as16
complementing our quality management system and we17
believe they will make our organization stronger.18
One of the most recent lessons19
learned from the event which took place now20
17 months ago, was the need to find ways to21
improve the general level of radiation education22
within our workforce, not just in procedural23
radiation training, but also in terms of the24
general knowledge base amongst our employees for25
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this very important aspect of our business.1
The areas of training and2
education clearly go hand in hand with3
communications within the workforce, another area4
where improvements will continue to be sought.5
We had submitted to the CNSC our6
analysis of the root cause of the event which we7
believe essentially was an over confidence in the8
technology and our mining methods, as stated9
during the Day 1 hearing. In carrying out this10
analysis, we sought a balance between the11
application of formal root cause analytical12
techniques and a desire to involve those people13
most affected by the incident directly in the14
analysis.15
The CNSC staff have recommended16
that we take a second independent analysis of the17
event to ensure that nothing has been overlooked18
in our own analysis. We have agreed to this19
recommendation and have hired an expert in the20
field to perform a follow-up root cause analysis21
beginning next month.22
Further, we decided to carry out23
additional root cause analysis training for our24
workforce to be able to use these corrective25
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action tools more effectively in the future.1
The presentation that was prepared2
for today we hope will address the outstanding3
issues to your satisfaction, and we will attempt4
to answer any other questions that may arise as5
this hearing proceeds.6
I will now turn the microphone7
over to Mr. John Jarrell and the conclusion of his8
presentation will be the end of Cameco's formal9
presentation.10
Thank you.11
MR. JARRELL: Thank you, Terry.12
For the transcript record, my name13
is John Jarrell and I am Cameco's Vice President,14
Safety, Health and Environment.15
This presentation is meant to16
provide supplemental information on the McArthur17
River operation in response to questions raised by18
the Commission during the Day 1 hearing.19
The outstanding issues to be20
addressed in this presentation are:21
additional information on the22
hydrology of the underground McArthur River mine;23
details of the additional water24
pumping capacity installed underground, including25
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an overview of the existing and new water handling1
facilities;2
as well as additional information3
on waste rock pack groundwater monitoring.4
The other outstanding information5
requests arising from Day 1 are:6
the effects of the mine water7
inflow and the concentration of selenium and the8
treated effluent;9
supplemental information on the10
root cause of the mine water inflow; and11
finally, information on corporate12
oversight and coordination of environmental13
management systems at McArthur River.14
The pre-inflow understanding of15
the hydrology at McArthur River was based on16
several studies, as listed on this slide. These17
investigations included numerous bore holes and18
monitoring wells, or piezometers, with hundreds of19
permeability tests for the purpose of20
characterizing the hydraulic behaviour of the21
local environment.22
Data was also collected during the23
sinking of over a kilometre of access shafts24
through the sandstone and during the test mining25
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phase. No large scale, long-term pump test was1
done prior to the start of production mining.2
This decision was based on another early decision,3
namely the decision to rely on the use of passive4
methods to control groundwater in the form of5
grouting and freezing, rather than by active6
control through depressurization.7
The initial developed conceptual8
hydrogeological model has since been updated by9
Golder based on the extensive datasets collected10
since the April 6, 2003 start of the inflow event,11
including water levels, water pressures and inflow12
rates. This data is generated from a number of13
piezometers established at a variety of depths.14
Data from historical studies, as well as15
operational behaviour, have also been taken into16
account.17
The photograph provides a18
perspective of the relative location of the three19
access shafts, shown in red; the main P2 fault20
structure shown as the black line; the approximate21
location of the Drill Bay 12 collapse and the22
surrounding groundwater monitoring network.23
This slide provides a summary of24
groundwater monitoring well or piezometer25
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locations partitioned to show the distribution1
between shallow, intermediate and deep horizons.2
Our written submission provides more detail on3
piezometer locations relative to the point of4
inflow into the mind section view.5
This slide shows the revised6
hydrogeological model for the site, starting with7
the upper Athabasca sandstone aquifer unit8
extending from surface to a depth of about9
330 metres. The permeability of this unit in the10
model is high, at 2x10-6 metres per second.11
There is a previously undefined12
aquitard unit from 330 metres to 350 metres depth13
with a permeability estimate of 1x10-8 cubic14
metres per second.15
The presence of this sandstone16
unit was inferred from piezometric data during and17
after the inflow event, which showed only a minor18
drop in the water levels above 330 metres in19
comparison with a major drop in water levels below20
350 metres.21
The lower aquifer unit extends22
from 350 metres depth to the top of the basement23
rock. The permeability of this unit is also high,24
estimated at 2x10-6 metres per second.25
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The basement rock, which hosts the1
majority of the mine workings, is at the base of2
this model. It is hard competent rock with a low3
permeability estimated at 8x10-8 metres per4
second.5
The model includes an enhanced6
permeability zone representing the intersection of7
the P2 fault in the toe of the unconformity. The8
P2 fault is the main structural geologic feature9
of the mine hosting the main ore zones and10
extending several kilometres north and south of11
the mine.12
This hydrogeological model was13
further refined to take into account the effects14
of the washout associated with the April inflow15
event, thereby reflecting the effects of the16
removal of sand and silt materials immediately17
following the collapse.18
The model was calibrated to the19
observed response data for the first couple of20
months following the inflow event. The calibrated21
model has continued to provide a good fit against22
the response data following the partial shut-in of23
the pressures at the collapsed area beginning in24
July of 2003.25
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A risk assessment of the McArthur1
10-year mine was conducted using this refined2
model beginning in December of 2003. A number of3
the identified hazard scenarios involved inflow of4
water from drill holes, development faces and5
production raised bore holes and an estimate of6
the maximum likely inflow was made for each of7
these scenarios. A value of 100,000 cubic metres8
per hour was chosen for most scenarios, with9
smaller values selected in some cases.10
The sensitivity analysis included11
extending inflow zones from the April 2003 event12
northwards by 50 metres, creating a new inflow13
zone in Zone 4, allowing it to connect to the14
washout zone and assuming higher hydraulic15
conductivity values in the overlying sandstone.16
The reasonable case scenario17
resulted in inflows below 1,200 cubic metres per18
hour that drop below 1,000 cubic metres per hour19
either immediately or within one week.20
An extreme case scenario in which21
the hydraulic conductivity of the Athabasca22
sandstone was increased by a factor of two23
resulted in an inflow of 1,600 cubic metres an24
hour, dropping to 1,200 after one week.25
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This last scenario does not match1
the available extensive aquifer pressure2
monitoring data, but does illustrate that even3
unrealistically large changes in the input4
assumptions result in inflows that are only5
moderately greater than the more probable values.6
We believe our pumping and treatment capacity is7
sufficient based on this field tested and proved8
understanding of the hydrogeological regime.9
The pre-inflow combined10
underground mine water pumping capacity was11
650 cubic metres an hour, which was accomplished12
using four multi-staged high-head Weir pumps and13
two positive displacement Wirth pumps which are14
installed in the lower 640 levels to pump ore15
slurry to surface in their normal mode.16
The mine water pumping capacity17
had to be more than doubled or temporarily18
increased to a total of about 1,500 cubic metres19
an hour. This was accomplished by installing one20
more Weir pump, two Mather & Platt pumps, five21
National pumps and a series of Flyght pumps.22
This slide shows the quantity and23
type of permanently installed pumps underground at24
McArthur River. When complete, these pumping25
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installations will consist of four pumps installed1
in Shaft 3; five pumps installed in the Pollock2
shaft; and five pumps installed in the 640 level3
dewatering station. This combined increase in4
pumping capacity of more than 750 cubic metres per5
hour brings the total to 1,500 cubic metres. In6
other words, we are permanent installing the same7
capacity as exists in the current temporary mode.8
The existing Wirth slurry pumps,9
although not included in the permanent pumping10
inventory, would also be available under11
unforeseen circumstances to provide additional12
emergency pumping capacity of about 175 cubic13
metres an hour.14
This slide shows the existing15
surface water collection and settling ponds. They16
are four contaminated water ponds "A", "B", "C"17
and "D" for treated effluent ponds 1, 2, 3 and 4,18
a south surface run-off collection pond and a19
north surface run-off collection pond. The20
storage capacity for each of the existing21
collection and settling ponds will be presented22
momentarily, but first a photo to show the23
location of the new additions to the surface water24
handling system.25
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In this slide we are showing the1
planned expansion changes to the surface water2
treatment facilities. The existing treated water3
settling pond "C" will be modified with its4
storage capacity increased. Three new monitoring5
ponds used to batch release treated effluent ponds6
numbers 5, 6 and 7 will be constructed next to the7
existing monitoring ponds 1, 2, 3 and 4.8
The most significant element of9
the capacity increase is a new large 50,000 cubic10
metre settling pond "E" and related pump house.11
This slide summarizes the existing12
and expanded capacity of the water treatment plant13
at McArthur River. The overall water management14
capacity at McArthur River will increase from15
about 100,000 cubic metres to 175,000 cubic metres16
once the new ponds are constructed. With larger17
capacity comes additional flexibility to handle18
the process upsets and short-term issues which19
inevitably crop up in operating a large scale20
water treatment facility.21
Overall, this initiative22
represents an increase in water handling capacity23
of over 75 per cent.24
This slide highlights the location25
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of the earth filled contingency dam. The dam was1
constructed as a temporary structure in 2003 to2
provide additional water storage capacity during3
the early weeks of the inflow event. For4
instance, for any excess mine water which could5
not be treated in the existing surface water6
ponds, or to provide additional solid settling7
time or residence time to permit chemical8
reactions to complete. The dam was never used and9
remains a contingency structure.10
The dam contains about11
10,000 cubic metres of earth fill, is about12
6 metres high, has a top width of 4 metres, with13
four to one side slopes and a 0.9 metre diameter14
culvert.15
The maximum water tension capacity16
of the dam structure is 66,000 cubic metres based17
on an area of 5.3 hectares of flooded muskeg.18
The contingency dam was not19
subject to a formal EA process. As such, it is20
not licensed for use. Cameco will decide in the21
near future whether to seek formal approval to22
retain the contingency dam for its intended23
emergency purposes or deconstruct the structure.24
It should also be borne in mind25
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that while it is a temporary structure it was1
built to permanent structure standards.2
This slide shows the location of3
mineralized and potentially acid generating waste4
storage pads.5
Pad 1 is the mineralized waste6
storage pad with a surface area of about7
5,800 cubed square metres.8
Pad 2 is one of three storage9
pads for potentially acid generating or PAG waste10
rock which occupies a surface area of about11
9,500 square metres.12
Pad 3 is also a storage pad for13
PAG rock with a surface area of about 7,200 square14
metres.15
Pad 4 is the most recently16
installed PAG pad, spanning the 2002 to 200317
construction season, with a surface area of about18
10,500 square metres.19
The mineralized waste material is20
temporarily stockpiled on pad No. 1 for eventual21
transport to Key Lake for processing. The PAG22
material is crushed, segregated into aggregate23
piles and used as backfill underground. Material24
unsuitable for backfill will be transported to Key25
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Lake as well.1
This aerial photograph shows the2
location of the 2004 installed waste rock pad3
monitoring piezometers, which are shown in red,4
and some of the older piezometers shown in green.5
In total, about 50 shallow6
monitoring wells have been established, in 1993,7
2000 to 2001, and 2004 campaigns.8
The primary objective of the9
shallow piezometers is to provide leak detection10
monitoring for seepage from surface facilities.11
In the Day 1 hearing we were asked12
why some of these monitoring wells had failed.13
Golder Associates carried out an assessment of14
this groundwater monitoring system in 2002,15
largely to provide advice on where to put16
replacement and supplementary piezometers. They17
looked at 49 wells across the site, 18 of which18
had been destroyed, with 26 functional and five19
dry. The dominant flow path is downward, likely20
induced by mine shaft column inflow leakage.21
Roughly estimated groundwater22
transit times to the closest shaft are 10 to23
100 years. Water quality is good, with periodic24
minor showings of uranium and nickel. The new25
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wells are meant to examine vertical patterns and1
expand the network outside of the footprint of the2
mine surface facilities.3
In the Day 1 hearing we were asked4
to provided up to date information on selenium5
effluent concentrations shown here as the 20046
data. There is no clear trend in this data.7
For reference points, all selenium8
concentrations remain well below the effluent9
quality limit in our provincial permit of10
0.6 milligrams per litre, monthly maximum11
arithmetic mean, and 1.2 milligrams per litre12
grab. These concentrations are also well below13
the Saskatchewan surface water quality objective14
of 0.01 milligrams per litre, but are in the range15
of the Canada-wide equivalent ambient water16
quality objective of 0.001 milligrams per litre.17
However, as stated during the18
Day 1 hearing, the issue is more one of dietary19
uptake rather than water concentration toxicity.20
The next three slides build a larger scale view of21
the selenium effluent performance.22
First, effluent discharge volumes.23
They have increased as the mine has developed,24
more than doubling from 1999 to 2002. Mining25
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started in late 1999. In 2003, due to the mine1
water inflow event, treated effluent discharge2
volumes were just over 5 million cubic metres.3
As points of reference, the total4
effluent flow in Key Lake in 2003 was about5
1.7 million cubic metres and about 4 million cubic6
metres at Rabbit Lake. Key Lake numbers in the7
1990s were typically 12 million cubic metres a8
year when active pump dewatering without9
reflooding was under way.10
The extrapolated effluent11
discharge volumes in 2004 are based on actual flow12
volumes to the end of July and an estimated rate13
of 225 cubic metres an hour for the remaining five14
months.15
Looking at annual selenium16
concentrations, the start up of production mining17
in 2000 generated an increase from about one to18
three or four parts per billion. Concentrations19
dropped in 2003, due at least in part to the20
increased volume of water.21
A surprising development is the22
lack of rebound in 2004 as the volume of inflow23
water has decreased. This will require ongoing24
analysis.25
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The selenium detection levels1
changed from 0.001, or one part per billion prior2
to the inflow, to 0.1 part per billion shortly3
after the inflow event. However, this should not4
have had a major influence given the averages5
involved.6
Other possible explanations7
include changes to McArthur River's water8
treatment process completed in 2003, including9
sand filter upgrades and the use of magnesium10
sulphate reagent in lieu of sole reliance on11
ferric sulphate, or changes in data density over12
time. With the preponderance of data collected in13
conjunction with the McArthur River inflow onward14
with sparser data collected prior to the incident.15
The green line in this plot tracks16
selenium loading rather than concentration.17
Annual loadings to the environment increased from18
about 1 kilogram in 1999 to about 11 kilograms in19
2003. It is too early to tell where loadings will20
end up post-inflow, but the current short-term21
trend is positive.22
As required by Environment23
Canada's Metal Mining Effluent Regulations and our24
licensed programs, Cameco is required to do25
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ongoing environmental effects monitoring at its1
mine sites.2
The McArthur River mine was3
modified in 2003 to include selenium where4
appropriate.5
The research work has been6
completed by the University of Saskatchewan in Key7
Lake to provide some regional insight on8
biological effects associated with uranium9
exposure. The current study is on northern pike.10
Aquatic mammal surveys at McArthur11
River were completed last month and include12
selenium. Additional studies above and beyond the13
regulated program requirements included the14
sampling of metals and sediment water and aquatic15
vegetation to help us understand better the16
transfer path of this metal and other metals in17
the environment.18
At the Day 1 hearing we were asked19
to provide more information on root cause analysis20
of the 2003 inflow event. Subsequently, CNSC21
staff requested an independent root cause22
analysis. This work is scheduled to take place23
this fall and will hopefully bring closure to this24
phase of the incident.25
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CNSC staff, in reviewing our work1
to date, have made the observation that further2
analysis may show causes more closely linked to3
generic management practice rather than over4
confidence in technology.5
If we can briefly summarized key6
findings as follows. As this slide shows, there7
were changes in the management structure which8
have occurred since the inflow event last year,9
the first two creating a more structured design10
authority element and an additional rock mechanic11
technical resource for direct outcomes of the12
internal inflow investigation.13
Changes in the way in which14
corporate oversight is practised in safety, health15
and environment matters is a more recent change16
and is outlined in the next slide.17
The changes which have taken place18
in the corporate oversight of safety, health and19
environment activities at various Cameco operating20
sites are summarized in this slide.21
In essence, we are seeking to22
better distinguish two aspects of corporate23
oversight, namely the aspects of policy setting,24
performance monitoring and program review from the25
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aspects of operational support and program1
delivery.2
The objectives are twofold:3
first, to create a better alignment between4
operations who are responsible for compliance and5
performance; and the corporate Safety, Health and6
Environment Department which provides licensing7
and technical support.8
The second objective is to create9
a separate department independent of operations10
and its associated regulatory requirements which11
can focus on the oversight function.12
These changes should help us13
better address the oversight process issues14
identified by CNSC staff in their March 2004 audit15
of the McArthur River Environmental Protection16
Program.17
This slide summarizes the18
management system changes which have taken place19
since the inflow event. These changes are20
strongly influenced by the developing quality21
management system. There were no strong links to22
QA prior to the incident given the formative23
nature of the QA management system.24
Such management systems can reduce25
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the potential for developing and maintaining over1
confidence in technology, both by using more2
formal review process, involving more people in3
the decision-making process.4
One of the other major lessons5
learned from the inflow event was the need to6
re-look at radiation training and education for7
our employees. This need has been pointed out on8
a number of fronts. Looking forward, a three9
phase program is contemplated.10
The first phase includes a11
consultant supported assessment of our current12
radiation training program. Other aspects include13
an assessment of radiation related knowledge and14
skill requirements for various jobs, and15
assessment of confidence related informational16
needs. This should culminate in recommendations17
to modify the existing program.18
The second phase is to implement19
an enhanced radiation training program which is,20
where appropriate, tailored to target three21
groups, employees, radiation safety personnel and22
supervisors. It is expected that this new23
training initiative will also include training24
delivery coaching, as well as improved program25
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administrative and reporting requirements.1
The third phase is an evaluation2
of training effectiveness against established3
objectives.4
There have been no recorded lost5
time injuries at McArthur River so far this year.6
Similarly, there have been no reportable7
environmental incidents.8
As noted at the beginning of the9
presentation, the last of the Drill Bay 12 inflow10
pressure relief water was such off in mid July.11
While this took considerable time to accomplish,12
the work proved to be very effective.13
Work on two major inflow14
event-related changes, namely installation of the15
additional permanent mine dewatering capacity and16
surface water treatment capacity is well under17
way.18
In conclusion, it is our opinion19
that the McArthur River operation continues to20
demonstrate strong commitment to protecting its21
workers, the public and the environment.22
The McArthur River operation has23
also demonstrated a strong commitment to change,24
particularly in it's management, oversight and25
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processes. As has been pointed out before from1
many viewpoints, continual improvement is a key2
tenet here and meeting the challenges of mining3
this unique, complex ore deposit.4
Thank you for your attention.5
This ends our presentation.6
7
04-H17.A8
Oral presentation by CNSC staff9
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very10
much. I would like to turn to CNSC staff for11
their presentation before I open the floor for12
questions. I will turn to Mr. Barclay Howden, who13
is the DG, for the presentation by the CNSC staff14
which is outlined in CMD Document 04-H17.A.15
Mr. Howden, the floor is yours.16
MR. HOWDEN: Thank you. Good17
morning, Madam Chair and Members of the18
Commission.19
For the record, my name is Barclay20
Howden. I am the Director General of the21
Directorate of Nuclear Cycle and Facilities22
Regulation.23
With me today are Mr. Kevin24
Scissons, Director of the Uranium Mines and Lands25
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Evaluation Division; Mr. Fred Ashley, Project1
Officer within the same division; and the rest of2
the CNSC licensing team for this project.3
Cameco has applied for a renewal4
of the McArthur River uranium mine operating5
licence. For this public hearing Day 2, CNSC6
staff has submitted supplementary CMD 04-H17.A7
which updated information from the public hearing8
Day 1 for the following six items.9
They are: emergency preparedness10
and response program; quality assurance,11
environmental protection and training audit12
follow-up; packaging and transport audit13
follow-up; benthic invertebrate and sediment14
investigations; selenium releases to the15
environment; and the mine water inflow root cause16
analysis.17
The information contained within18
the CMD 04-H17.A does not affect the conclusions19
or recommendations in CMD 04-H17.20
In addition to the information21
supplied in our supplementary CMD, CNSC staff22
wishes to highlight some key points of our23
regulatory program planned for this facility24
should the proposed licence be issued.25
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CNSC staff will continue with our1
comprehensive compliance program, including2
inspections and program evaluations. When3
necessary, progressive enforcement will be used to4
ensure that compliance is fulfilled, including5
orders and requests under section 12 of the6
Nuclear Safety and Control Act. This will include7
routine management meetings between CNSC staff and8
Cameco on priority issues, commitments and9
schedules.10
CNSC staff will continue11
assessment of emerging issues, including12
identifying level of risk and bounding any13
unacceptable risks through the implementation of14
mitigative measures, administrative and15
engineering controls and/or contingency measures.16
Examples of this include: feedback on the root17
cause analysis for the mine water inflow incident;18
further assessment on the molybdenum and selenium19
in the effluent discharges; and results on the20
quality assurance program improvements.21
CNSC staff will continue22
assessment of new projects and modifications that23
are within the scope of the licence, including24
review and approval of engineering designs and25
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controls.1
Finally, reporting to the2
Commission, CNSC staff will continue to report3
significant events via significant development4
reports; a mid-term program review in the latter5
part of 2006 will be provided if this licence is6
issued; and any updates during upcoming7
appearances expected before the Commission in the8
next two years, for example production increase9
proposals will be made as required.10
That concludes our presentation11
and we are available to respond to questions.12
Thank you.13
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very14
much.15
I just would like to clarify16
before we start the rounds of questions that --17
this will be first for the licensee and then for18
the staff -- the difference in requested licence19
length still remains? It is still five years and20
three years and eight months.21
Am I correct? Is it still five22
years, from Cameco?23
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for24
the record.25
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30
Yes, we had requested five years1
but I think we are obviously more than prepared to2
accept the shorter period recommended by staff.3
THE CHAIRPERSON: Staff?4
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons,5
Director of Uranium Mines and Lands Evaluation6
Division.7
We are staying with our proposed8
3.8 years for the facility.9
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.10
Dr. Barnes, would you like to11
start the questioning?12
MEMBER BARNES: Sure. I would13
like to thank Cameco for providing the information14
requested at last days' events. I would like to15
follow-up, though, on some of the information16
provided because I am still trying to understand,17
as I'm sure Cameco is, and hopefully staff, how18
this flooding took place, why there were such19
large flows, and large sustained flows over a long20
period of time, and to understand how that flow21
regime operated within the mine and, to some22
extent, reasonably as to what extent it could have23
been predicted.24
If it is not predictable,25
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31
could there be other events for this mine or1
other mines? Is it possible to predict it by2
understanding the regional groundwater flow or is3
it going to be simply a highly specific sort of4
one-off situation very much tied to the local5
geology?6
So what you have provided is more7
information on the piezometer distribution which8
is one way of giving you an understanding of the9
groundwater flow; you have given us information on10
the hydrogeologic model which is used essentially11
to try to test and provide a sort of theoretical12
basis for it; and you have given us information,13
together with the new information by the Golder14
letter, on maximum water inflows anticipated in15
further events.16
I would like to follow up17
on basically these aspects, at least in the18
first round.19
What you have shown on page 2 is20
that the Athabasca sandstone is 500 metres in21
depth on average. We know from information before22
that the breakout, the water inflow took place at23
the 530 level in the mine. That is very close to24
the sandstone basement interface or the25
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32
unconformity.1
Yet most of your piezometer depths2
are much shallower than that. You break these3
down into shallow, intermediate and deep. Shallow4
less than 50; intermediate 50 to 350; and deep5
greater than 350. In Figure 3 you show the6
various piezometers which give you the packer7
tests from which you base the groundwater flow8
information. Relatively few of these seem to me9
to extend down close to the 530 level which is, in10
a sense, the offending level and likely to be the11
offending level.12
So I would like to ask my initial13
question: Do you really think that the regime of14
piezometer data that you have here can really15
address what seems to be the key issue here, that16
if there are to be large inflows they are likely17
to come from roughly the 530 level? Why would I18
believe that you have enough information around19
the 500-530 level to give you continuing guidance20
of groundwater flow regimes?21
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell.22
I guess my short answer to that23
would be on the basis of the fact that we saw24
fairly strong responses on the piezometers that we25
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33
put in and then were able to correlate those1
responses pretty well with the model we had.2
But I will certainly ask my3
colleagues behind me if they could perhaps give4
you a more complete answer to that.5
MR. DONALD: For the record, Scott6
Donald from Golder Associates.7
I would agree with John, there is8
a clear response through the piezometer network.9
There are six or seven piezometers at more or less10
the same depth interval as the inflows that we saw11
post-April 2003 and the distribution of those12
piezometers is over the footprint of the future13
mining area.14
So the response we did see is not15
just local to zone 2, some of those are installed16
in the zone 4 area as well as further north. So17
we feel we have pretty good coverage at depth at18
roughly the 500 level as well as through the mid19
section of the sandstone.20
MEMBER BARNES: Basically 607 down21
at the 500-530 level?22
MR. DONALD: Yes.23
MEMBER BARNES: On Figure 3 you24
show the P2 fault, which is the one that is25
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34
creating most of the large cavity areas associated1
near the unconformity.2
Could you give me information on3
why you limit the extent of the P2 fault as you do4
on Figure 3?5
Mr. Jarrell, you indicated that I6
think the fault zone, or at least the zone of7
mineralization, extends for many miles outside of8
the particular mine site. Do you really have9
evidence to show that the false stops and starts10
basically where you have shown it?11
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell.12
I think we were just trying to13
show locations at the P2 fault relative to the14
current mining zone. This obviously isn't the15
geological map for exploration.16
You are quite correct, we do not17
have piezometers farther out from this area, it is18
focused on the mine site.19
I don't know whether my colleagues20
behind me have anything to offer as well.21
DR. LANDINE: Pat Landine, for the22
record.23
Certainly I agree with John, the24
Figure is really just to illustrate the fault25
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35
within the mine site. It does extend north and1
south from there.2
MEMBER BARNES: On Figure 8, which3
is the updated conceptual hydrogeologic model.4
Maybe you could click that on, Figure 8.5
What controls the aquitard? That6
is the shaded zone in the middle of the sandstone?7
MR. DONALD: Scott Donald.8
In a geologic sense or in a9
hydrogeologic sense?10
MEMBER BARNES: Both.11
MR. DONALD: I will start with the12
hydrogeology end of it.13
The reason for its location there,14
it is obviously a simplified view of what might be15
the mechanism that is limiting groundwater flow16
from the upper part of the sandstone to the deeper17
part of the sandstone.18
The piezometer distribution that19
we show in a separate figure, the piezometers in20
the sandstone above that aquitard, as shown on21
this slide, show no response to the inflows22
post-April 2003.23
So from a hydrogeologic point of24
view, that is how we have arrived at that aquitard25
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36
at that location.1
In looking at it from a geologic2
point of view, there is no strong correlation or3
obvious correlation with that layer and a specific4
difference in the sandstone structure, whether it5
is clay infills and fractures or solicification.6
So it is more driven from the response we saw7
post-April 3 and the groundwater data than it is8
driven from the geology side.9
MEMBER BARNES: So in the geology10
you show the fault but you show no, in a sense,11
offset of the aquitard, which you might if it was12
a geologic control on the aquitard. That fault is13
post-sandstone deposition.14
DR. LANDINE: Pat Landine, for the15
record.16
Could you perhaps rephrase? I'm17
not really sure what you mean.18
MEMBER BARNES: Well, you have a19
fault in the basement that is affecting the20
sandstone. Correct? That is the P2 fault that21
you have shown in the offset of the blue. Yet the22
aquitard goes straight across without any offset.23
If there was a stratigraphic level in the24
sandstone that was controlling the aquitard you25
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37
would expect an offset in that just as you do in1
the basement sandstone content.2
DR. LANDINE: Okay. I understand3
now. Pat Landine, for the record.4
There are two parts to that.5
Certainly the conceptual model shows a nice flat6
layer. It may not in fact be that flat.7
Certainly some of the sandstone -- there is the8
post-depositional element to this so that there is9
some horizontality above that fault.10
MEMBER BARNES: Just as a small11
detail, on Figures 5 and 6 on which you are12
showing the well distributions, why do the lines13
representing the shafts -- don't they actually14
penetrate deeper than what you show on there? The15
shafts go well below the 530 level.16
MR. BRONKHORST: David Bronkhorst,17
for the record.18
We have three shafts at the19
property, two of them only go to the 530 level and20
the main travelway, the Pollock shaft, goes to the21
bottom of the mine at 660.22
MEMBER BARNES: In section 3.0 on23
page 4 referring to the MODFLOW, that is, as you24
say:25
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38
"A 3-dimensional groundwater1
flow model that was2
constructed to represent the3
above conceptual framework."4
To quote, this:5
"...assumes groundwater flow6
is laminar and can be7
approximated using equivalent8
porous media (i.e., as9
opposed to discrete fracture)10
assumptions."11
Coming to what seems to be the12
more critical aspect of the mine inflow here, why13
do you think that this model of laminar flow --14
and dealing with this strictly in a porous media15
sense -- is that appropriate model when you are16
dealing with this sort of cavity? On the top of17
the page you refer to this as being a void or a18
series of voids.19
Do you really think that this20
model would be applicable for this kind of21
situation or event?22
MR. DONALD: Scott Donald, for the23
record.24
Certainly at the local scale25
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39
around the voids is the collapse, groundwater flow1
will be occurring through fractures near the2
collapse as well as in the sandstone.3
It is certainly the question when4
you begin to try to simulate the response data at5
that time whether you are going to be able to6
reproduce the observed data in the regional7
piezometers with a model such as MODFLOW.8
However, going through that9
process we have provided a good match with six or10
seven of those deep piezometers which are 400 to11
500 metres distant from the collapse and they have12
all provided a good match with the MODFLOW model.13
So that has given us the confidence at that scale14
to continue using MODFLOW as a representative15
model for inflows to the mine.16
MEMBER BARNES: If I may turn to17
the aspect of the maximum water inflows. We have18
the new letter from Golder. In the charts that19
you provide -- and we had similar information last20
time -- we have flows of roughly 1,000 cubic21
metres an hour, maximum going on and gradually22
lowering but flowing over for a year at high23
rates.24
I was intrigued by the fact that25
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40
the Golder letter in reviewing the data and1
essentially providing some new estimates here made2
no comment on the duration of the flow. In a3
sense, they accepted that in their new models they4
might use 1,000 cubic metres an hour, but made no5
comment about the duration of this flow.6
Could you give us some indication7
as to the anticipated duration?8
MR. DONALD: Scott Donald.9
For the risk assessment, when we10
use the model for that purpose, it is essentially11
looking at a similar timeframe as the collapse12
that occurred on April 2003. So the model is not13
designed to run out for years and years, it is14
looking at a timeframe say on the order of a few15
months.16
MEMBER BARNES: Maybe Cameco could17
address, in terms of a response to that type of18
flow, how quickly it could get back on top of the19
issue of returning the flows back to a low level.20
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for21
the record.22
I guess the guidance we would23
seek, the sense I always had in looking at this24
data was that we had reached some equilibrium,25
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41
which I think is what we saw with the existing1
inflow from 2003. As has been pointed out, it2
took quite a period of time to shut the water3
inflow from the event in 2003.4
I always looked at the model5
as really what is the sort of peak flow and what6
is sort of the steady state flow. That is the way7
I have always interpreted this, not really as8
sort of an estimate of how long it would take9
to rectify the next inflow if there happened to10
be one.11
MEMBER BARNES: To Cameco, you12
have indicated in the section on final effluent13
that you have increased the capacity, but my back14
of the envelope calculations indicate that it15
still remains at about -- if I use the new Golder16
figures which are slightly higher -- that you17
still basically just have about five to seven days18
holding capacity at the maximum flow rates.19
Is that correct?20
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for21
the record.22
Yes, the assumption is obviously23
that the water treatment plant would continue to24
operate. Really what we have is a series of water25
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42
treatment plants. We have the existing primary1
and secondary water treatment plants which use the2
existing treatment plant. There is also a second3
treatment system that is focused on this new pond.4
I think my expectation would be not so much5
storage of water but treatment of water.6
Obviously we need sufficient surge7
capacity to handle any upset, but I think at the8
end of the day the issue will be getting the water9
out of the mine. That has certainly been our10
experience in 2003. We were able to effectively11
treat the water when we got it to the surface.12
So what we are trying to create13
with this additional capacity is sort of a second14
treatment system in this pond "E", if you will.15
MEMBER BARNES: If you had a16
similar flood and you were requiring to get this17
water basically out on the surface as opposed to18
holding most of it within the mine itself, you19
would have essentially a five day reservoir in20
order to treat it. So you could treat that volume21
of water on a continuing basis?22
MR. JARRELL: Yes, that is23
correct.24
Maybe I could ask one of my25
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43
colleagues if they would care to sort of maybe1
give a brief summary of how this new water2
treatment system would work. I think it is3
essentially sort of a variation on the one we4
created for the inflow.5
MR. BRONKHORST: Dave Bronkhorst,6
for the record.7
The primary and secondary water8
treatment plans are our mainstay. Our normal9
operating plant has about 750 cubic metres per10
hour. The new pond will have at least that as11
well. The main plant is 750.12
During the initial inflow what we13
found to be most difficult was the managing of the14
water, getting it to the pumps and getting it to15
the surface. We are armed with that knowledge now16
and we see the storage on surface being more than17
adequate.18
MEMBER BARNES: So if I could try19
to summarize and then just ask staff for a20
comment. Again, I appreciate the new information.21
I was not persuaded that the information -- let me22
try to pose it from my concerns.23
We are looking at essentially24
health and safety in this situation. You had a25
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44
rather sort of catastrophic event here, certainly1
unpredicted and difficult to cope with at the2
time. It is not something that one would like to3
see again. However, recognizing why this occurred4
was probably due to the local geological effects5
and the sort of cavernous nature close to the6
unconformity as the contact of the sandstone and7
the basement rock. So there certainly is a8
potential for that sort of geologic situation to9
occur elsewhere within the mine site as you10
develop it.11
So although I have information I12
am still concerned that there is not sufficient13
information on that particular fault zone, as I14
read the new information, that I wondered whether,15
as indicated more specifically in the16
discussions -- half a dozen, six or seven I think17
the number was given -- of the piezometers at18
roughly the 530 level was sufficient to give you19
adequate control on this.20
I question whether the MODFLOW is21
really appropriate to model this sort of event22
situation as opposed to the regional groundwater23
flow within the sandstone.24
I was surprised, I guess given my25
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45
concern whether you have adequate water handling1
capabilities, that you were going to potentially2
deconstruct the contingency dam. It seemed to me3
you were pretty close to sort of capacity of4
handling the volume of water in this situation.5
That was the lines of concern I6
still have in this and I wondered if staff have7
any comments on what they have heard from Cameco8
in reply to my questions.9
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.10
When we look at all the11
information, including the new information12
provided by Cameco in their supplementary CMD, all13
this information would come back to us basically14
to address the proposed new licence condition 2.315
in regards to new mine development.16
In this perspective, the current17
mine operation, the facility and the development18
work that currently stands, the ground control,19
the water handling measures, the treatment20
capacity is all there and is more than sufficient21
to handle the current mine operations.22
The potential risk would be23
incurred when they begin to expand the mine24
workings to access the remainder of the ore body.25
StenoTran
46
The new development is of a critical nature and1
that is where the new information, the information2
that was summarized today by Cameco, would have to3
be coming into us in a report and the information4
required to satisfy Condition 2.3. Under that5
assessment, we would review the ground control6
measures, the new models, the remodelling that is7
being done, the maximum inflow predictions, the8
water-handling treatment capacities.9
We have already seen some improved10
changes to the organization of management, their11
staffing, rock mechanics and other new staff.12
So all those things would have to13
be assessed by staffing in respect to the new14
Licence Condition 2.3. So I really don't have too15
many other comments to provide on the new16
information provided to us other than assurances17
that we would be looking at this in great detail18
and review by our technical experts in reviewing19
it in relation to any new mine development.20
THE CHAIRPERSON: I guess I just21
have a supplementary to that. I think Dr. Barnes22
started out and finished with the issues of the23
broader implications of this situation for mines24
in this area and whatever.25
StenoTran
47
I guess my first question to staff1
is you have talked about going forward in terms of2
analysing this under the condition. I think the3
position that the Commission is in today though is4
that we have this evidence before us.5
Can the staff assure the6
Commission that they have analyzed this7
information in terms of the issues of giving this8
licence and that you can assure us that from your9
point of view, probably with further elaboration10
of your comments, that you have analyzed this in11
terms of assuring the Commission of the health and12
safety of this mine now, not further conditions,13
now, and in the issues of possible implications14
for other mines in this area?15
We have talked about this in terms16
of a very micro level, so first the staff on those17
two things and then back to Cameco on the issue of18
the broader implications for other mines in this19
area.20
MR. HOWDEN: Barclay Howden21
speaking, for the record.22
In terms of today, it is our23
opinion that the past operation, and that includes24
the mine water inflow incident, posed a reasonable25
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48
risk to health, safety and the environment. That1
being said, however, the mine water inflow2
incident and results of other CNSC compliance3
activities has revealed weaknesses in some of4
Cameco's programs.5
In our opinion, since these6
programs are needed to provide confidence for7
operations into the future, these weaknesses must8
be fixed. At the present time, we are satisfied9
that Cameco is in the process of revising these10
programs such that we can make our licensing11
recommendation today.12
In terms of going into the future13
and the details of further mine development, that14
comes back to this Licence Condition 2.3. I just15
want to reiterate what Mr. Scissons said there, is16
that as mine development goes forward, there will17
be information for development presented to us and18
that we have a licence condition, we have a19
process, Cameco has a process that we will walk20
through and make judgments based on health, safety21
and the environment.22
In some cases, the answer may be23
no, unless mitigating measures can be put in24
place, but today, in terms of what is being done25
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49
at this particular mine, we are satisfied that it1
is being operated safely.2
THE CHAIRPERSON: Do you feel that3
you have, over the last 18 months and in4
preparation for this licence, had the oversight5
and, I suppose, the technical expertise that you6
need to assess this in terms of the -- you know,7
obviously, Cameco has put together a pretty8
exhaustive team, both in terms of their own staff9
and hiring Golder and that. I think the10
Commission would just like to be assured that the11
analysis that has been done of this is adequate.12
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.13
Looking at our mandate in relation14
to protection of health, safety, environments and15
security, we can assess the information provided16
by the licensee. We have enough in-house17
expertise to assess their current and proposed18
information that is upcoming to make that19
determination to stay within our mandate of the20
CNSC.21
We recognize the abilities and22
capabilities of the licensee and their consultants23
they are bringing to the table, and basically the24
big bench-scale test, the dewatering test that25
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50
occurred from this incident and what can be1
learned here for both McArthur and other2
underground operations in relation to the health,3
safety and environment.4
We believe we have the staff and5
the expertise to review that and assess it and6
assess the new information we are recommending7
come forward under Licence Condition 2.3 in8
regards to future development.9
THE CHAIRPERSON: To Cameco with10
regards to my -- I suppose my paraphrasing of Dr.11
Barnes' first question, which is to do with not12
just looking at this as an isolated issue but a13
broader question.14
MR. ROGERS: My name is Terry15
Rogers, for the record.16
I think Mr. Scissons said in a17
different manner what Mr. Jarrell just said, this18
was the mother of all pump tests that we just went19
through. So we had this regime, basically a deep20
well that pumped 1,000 cubic metres basically from21
our mine for an extended period of time. The22
flows that we experienced did not exceed what was23
anticipated or at least calculated now as what the24
maximum inflows might be.25
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51
We are in the process of1
installing -- what is a lot different today than2
what was in April of last year is we have3
sufficient, and will soon have, sufficient water4
treatment capacity to deal with the maximum flow.5
We did not have that in April of 2003.6
So as Mr. Bonkhost said, the water7
treatment plant itself, the physical building with8
its normal processes of two stages, will be 7509
cubic metres an hour, and now we are building10
these dedicated ponds solely for the purpose of11
contingency water treatment, which doubles that12
capacity to 1,500 cubic metres.13
We did not have that in April. We14
had to -- well, what we did is retrofit a surface15
collection, a runoff pond for this treatment16
regime, and it was successful in the sense that no17
water left the site untreated. But now we have18
that in place and those ponds are dedicated for19
that purpose. There will be no other purpose for20
those ponds to exist.21
So as far as the five-day storage22
capacity, it won't be the same issue it was in23
April because now it is solely set up for the24
purpose of the treating.25
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52
In regards to -- the second thing1
is that we are not mining right now in a high-risk2
area. Until all these facilities are in place,3
dewatering is in place in the mine, we won't go4
into these areas of higher potential risk.5
The mine development schemes,6
technologies and methods we will be using will be7
scrutinized certainly by us and by the staff with8
a proper risk assessment before we proceed with9
those.10
As far as other mines in the area,11
if you are referring, Madam Chair, to Cigar Lake,12
you know the technology is entirely different.13
There would be a frozen ore body above where we14
are mining and we have discrete sort of15
compartmentalization with these water doors and16
things like that. Well, this would not pose the17
same kind of risk, say, that we experienced in18
April of 2003.19
Secondly, Cigar is also in its --20
its update of its latest design has increased the21
water treatment and water pumping capacity as22
well.23
THE CHAIRPERSON: I think I was24
referring more specifically to the science that25
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53
has been developed, the knowledge that has been1
developed from the hydrogeology, and that you and2
the staff would both be taking this and not3
saying, you know, let's -- not tunnel-visioning4
this and saying, okay, we are going to solve a5
McArthur issue and we are going to solve it now,6
but using it in the broader sense of lookit, you7
know, what does this mean for other mines or for8
other approaches that are taken in the mining9
industry in general.10
Mr. Howden.11
MR. HOWDEN: Barclay Howden12
speaking.13
Yes, I would like to echo what you14
just said in terms of anything we learned from15
this particular facility is applied by our staff16
to other facilities and anything generic health17
and safety is applied to a broader range of18
nuclear facilities.19
I would like to make a general20
comment on risk and it is basically, a major event21
has occurred and could occur again. In our view,22
the assessments plan should reduce the risk but23
the risk will never go to zero.24
Therefore, I think what you are25
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54
going to see from CNSC staff and have seen is we1
still put a heavy amount of emphasis on2
contingency planning in case, you know, something3
like this occurs and that is why we are putting a4
lot of the emphasis on the root causes of this5
event, because this event, is it going to become6
the bounding event for future events, and that7
allows you to do good contingency planning.8
But I think the bottom line is9
that what we are seeing is it all comes down to10
how the mine is being managed and what the culture11
is within the organization.12
I wanted to point out that Cameco13
has been an active industry participant in the14
developmental area of assessing safety culture15
through self-assessment and other means. Over the16
next licensing period, we are going to be looking17
closely at this because what we find is the18
follow-up to the mine water inflow incident has19
been very difficult and, in our opinion, it20
shouldn't have been as difficult as it was.21
This is a concern for us, as well22
as some of the communication issues that we are23
aware of between the licensee and its employees.24
We know there are lots of lessons learned from25
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55
this event and we expect them to be applied to1
their future operations. In addition, we have our2
own lessons learned that we are going to apply on3
the communications side with employees as well.4
Thank you.5
THE CHAIRPERSON: We will move on6
to Dr. McDill.7
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.8
I am going to pick up on the9
numerical model a little bit. I have several10
questions.11
You refer to the model in section12
3 as transient and I am just wondering if you can13
clarify for me whether you can actually -- is it14
actually a transient model or is it more of a15
stepwise quasi-steady state model? Can you16
actually analyze in the transient?17
MR. DONALD: Scott Donald, for the18
record.19
Yes, it is run as a transient20
model.21
MEMBER McDILL: I guess that is22
fairly succinct. All right. That...23
MR. DONALD: I'm sorry, maybe I24
didn't answer -- maybe it is clearer in my mind25
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56
maybe than others.1
In terms of transient, it is run2
in a sense where at time zero or at the given3
event, which occurs at a point in time, it is4
analysing the response in the system from that5
point forward. So it will forecast changes in6
inflows with time and changes in pressure in the7
sandstone and basement formations with time. It8
is not run as a static steady-state simulation.9
MEMBER McDILL: Maybe I should ask10
then: What is the largest or smallest transient11
that you can pick up? What is the biggest sudden12
change -- how is that? Transient models, I mean13
we are talking -- I realize you are talking with14
time. Are you talking time hours, time days, time15
seconds? What is the nature of the transient that16
you can detect?17
MR. DONALD: The simulation is run18
for several months, and after several months, you19
start to see a near steady-state condition.20
Within those months, we look at the results at21
time intervals, probably on the order of minutes22
to hours.23
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you, that is24
helpful.25
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57
My next question is: If you were1
to now take this model -- and I know you have done2
a sensitivity analysis, I read that with3
interest -- can you now re-predict and model the4
event that occurred accurately? Have you tried5
that? I'm not sure -- that wasn't clear.6
MR. DONALD: Yes, we can. I7
believe there is -- if we could put a figure up on8
the screen, Figure 9, I believe, of the9
submission.10
MEMBER McDILL: That is...11
MR. DONALD: Yes, that one there.12
MEMBER McDILL: Yes.13
MR. DONALD: Let's maybe look at14
the lower set of two lines here. There is a green15
line -- let me just step back and set the stage16
here a bit.17
The bottom axis is a date. So it18
starts on the left side with April 6, 2003 --19
MEMBER McDILL: Mm-hmm.20
MR. DONALD: -- and runs through21
on the right side to middle of August this year.22
On the Y scale, we have the23
hydraulic head or pressure, the water pressure in24
metres, head on the Y scale.25
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58
The green line, which starts1
mid-July 2003, shows the pressure in the collapse2
area or in the cavity above the collapse,3
effectively the same. So until July 2003, you are4
at effectively atmospheric pressure. There has5
been no ceiling up of the collapse since the6
inflow occurred.7
Then over the past year, you can8
see the -- you need a longer desk -- there, it is9
slowly repressurizing through different stages10
over the past year.11
The yellow line which follows it12
closely is how the model is representing that13
condition. So in effect, it is an input condition14
to the model. It is approximating what was15
observed at the cavity.16
The upper two pairs of lines --17
there we go. The blue line represents the18
measured -- and this is just one example of the19
six or seven deep piezometers we have to monitor.20
The blue line shows the pressure in the21
piezometer -- this one is about 200-300 metres22
away, south of the collapse area. That is23
measured data in the field.24
The red line which follows it is25
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59
what is being predicted by the actual model.1
It is worth noting -- if I can2
find my cursor again -- by mid-July we had3
essentially come up with the revised conceptual4
model, had fitted the data to that initial5
two-month period. That model has remained the6
same and it has continued to forecast the recovery7
of the system during the different pressure-up8
data.9
So that kind of walks you through10
how we have used it to...11
MEMBER McDILL: So all of the12
recalibration and the match to empirical data is13
in the first flat, sort of horizontal, portion14
between August and a little after October and then15
it is predicted. So you have not changed the16
model since then?17
MR. DONALD: It has matched since18
April 6 to about mid-July 2003. So it has matched19
the early inflows on the order of 800 cubic metres20
per hour to its steady-state condition or near21
steady state of around 600.22
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.23
My other questions are related to24
the pump. What was not clear to me was in terms25
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60
of the new pumps, how are they being fit into1
inspection schedules, maintenance schedules? They2
are there but it is not -- maybe you could expand3
on that and then staff could perhaps comment4
after.5
MR. BONKHOST: Dave Bonkhost, for6
the record.7
Even prior to the inflow, we did8
regular PM checks on our pump pressures and their9
ability for flow. So I think it was just a week10
before the inflow we had tested and that is where11
the 650 cubic metres per hour came from in the12
presentation that Mr. Jarrell did.13
We are in the process of adding14
pumps but there is some development and it has15
been engineered such that these pumps will be16
above any water inflow on the mine. They will be17
the last thing to see water. So they have a very,18
very good design from a protection of them from19
shorting out or things like that.20
I am not clear on your question21
though.22
MEMBER McDILL: How frequently23
will they be tested? Perhaps an example.24
MR. BONKHOST: Okay. The25
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61
contingency pumps at shaft 3, which would be the1
new Mather and Platz(ph), we haven't worked out a2
schedule yet for them but they would be tested.3
Two of the four that will be installed will be in4
operation.5
There is a fair amount of clean6
water that comes down shaft 3 and one of those7
pumps will be used to pump it to surface, as we do8
now, and the other, 1, 2 and 3, which are for9
dirty water pumping, they could be cycled and so10
they could more or less be continuously checked on11
the basis of use.12
MEMBER McDILL: Okay. Staff?13
MR. BONKHOST: I will just add14
quickly to that -- Dave Bonkhost, for the record.15
The PMs are done throughout the16
mine though. These pumps do require maintenance.17
The screens need to be checked to make sure that18
they don't clog and so on and that is actually19
done several times a week.20
MR. ASHLEY: Fred Ashley, for the21
record.22
As far as the staff verification23
of compliance, the first element would be to24
identify that there is a process in place for the25
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62
maintenance scheduled, which will be done as part1
of the review of the insulation, and then2
following that will be tabletop or basically3
record-check to make sure that those checks are4
being done. That is part of our normal compliance5
process.6
MEMBER McDILL: With respect to7
the dam, the contingency dam, is it currently part8
of a regular inspection routine even though it is9
not expected to be used in any kind of contingency10
at this time?11
MR. BONKHOST: Yes. There are12
regular checks done on it and there is a log kept13
of those checks.14
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.15
THE CHAIRPERSON: Would staff just16
like to comment further on that in terms of17
inspection? Do you do any work at all with the18
contingency dam?19
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.20
It is viewed during a normal21
inspection but as it does not retain any water, it22
is a flowthrough culvert system, the dam itself is23
under no risk at all. So it is just a simple24
inspection during the normal site inspection.25
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63
THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Dosman.1
MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you, Madam2
Chair.3
I have a question relating to4
water and I would like to refer to page 10 of the5
visual presentation that we had this morning, if I6
might. It shows the final effluent discharge7
volumes. It is the last one on the right lower8
corner, that is, my right, and I would just like9
to -- it is the bar graph on page 10 of the10
presentation. It is down in the -- yes.11
It seems to me that if you look at12
the trend -- and I am sure Cameco has looked at13
these often -- even accounting for the fact that14
1998 might have been a start-up year with less15
activity, there seems to be a fairly consistent16
increase in final effluent discharge volumes and17
it seems to be quite linear, and indeed, to me, if18
you look at the projected 2004 volume, it starts19
to be more than linear.20
So based on these trends, it would21
seem reasonable to predict that in five or six22
years that the final discharge volumes might be at23
the level of 5 million cubic metres per year,24
which would really have you pumping at your25
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64
maximum levels.1
I guess my questions are: Would2
you have the treatment capacity to, on a3
continuous basis, handle those kinds of volumes4
and then what do you do for the emergency after5
that? So is it likely, based on these trends,6
that you could have that kind of issue in four or7
five years?8
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for9
the record. I would offer three comments.10
First, the results we show for11
2004 include -- are projected, I should say, on12
the basis that the flood continued until July. So13
the numbers are surcharged obviously by the fact14
that the shut-in didn't occur until a couple of15
months ago. So the actual water inflow at present16
is actually -- if I recall correctly, is actually17
less than what it was prior to the inflow. That18
is the first observation I would make.19
Second, I would say that the sort20
of stepwise increase you see, one of the most21
dominating forces has been the number of shafts22
that we sink into the ore body. For example,23
shaft 3 introduced a fair amount of water in24
itself. So there tends to be these very discrete25
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65
events, like creating a new shaft, which tend to1
strongly influence the amount of water that2
inflows into the mine.3
The third thing is obviously as4
the mine develops and we go into new areas, you5
are quite correct, it is something we will have to6
look at in the forecast additional water as we7
continue to mine the asset. So there is an8
expectation, as you correctly point out, that as9
the mine develops there will be additional inflow10
but I think the dominating forces to date have11
been the shafts themselves, not the development12
underground per se.13
MEMBER DOSMAN: Could the14
treatment capability handle on a continuous basis15
the kinds of volumes that you have experienced at16
the level of 1,500 cubic metres per day?17
MR. JARRELL: Yes. As I pointed18
out, the actual inflow at present is actually less19
than it was in 2003.20
I will ask probably Dave Bonkhost.21
Maybe he can give a little insight into how --22
what our thinking is, at least in the near term,23
about additional water inflows to the mine.24
MR. BONKHOST: Dave Bonkhost, for25
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66
the record.1
I agree with what Mr. Jarrell has2
said. We are aware that we will likely have to3
increase our treatment and pumping capacity with4
time. We don't see that necessarily in this5
licence period, but as we move into other zones,6
we will see more water just from natural7
background. So we will have to maintain the8
difference between what our background is and what9
the maximum inflow would be throughout our10
history.11
MEMBER DOSMAN: So I take it that12
the company is confident that it can maintain on a13
continuous basis a treatment capability that is14
equal to the maximum expected event?15
MR. ROGERS: Terry Rogers, for the16
record.17
Yes, Dr. Dosman, that is correct.18
What John Jarrell was talking about, the19
current -- Dave Bonkhost may correct me but it is20
less than 200 cubic metres per hour, the current21
inflow, I think 175 or thereabouts. The capacity22
we will have installed is 1,500 cubic metres. We23
are currently at 175. So that is basically our24
excess at the moment.25
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67
MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you.1
Madam Chair, I have several other2
questions.3
Mr. Jarrell, in your opening4
comments, you referred to what would seem to be a5
changing management system for water. You6
referred to going more from passive to active7
control of water, which, I take it, is freezing8
versus depressurization. I wonder if you might9
explain the difference in approaches to me.10
MR. JARRELL: Yes. John Jarrell,11
for the record.12
I may be accused of using slightly13
wrong terminology. What I had in mind when I said14
"active means" was active dewatering -- for15
instance, the open pit at Key Lake would be an16
example of that -- as opposed to passive controls,17
either freeze walls or grow curtains in order to18
prevent the water from getting into the mine, as19
opposed to just pumping it out at a sufficient20
rate. That is what I was referring to. It is21
maybe a bad analogy because I was really thinking22
in my mind of sort of a Key Lake open pit as an23
example of an active dewatering.24
MEMBER DOSMAN: So do I take it25
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68
that in the future plans for McArthur River that1
there will be greater emphasis on freezing versus2
pumping?3
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for4
the record.5
I think as we venture forth, we6
have to come up with new mining methods. As Kevin7
Scissons has pointed out, we need to -- there are8
licence conditions now to make sure that those9
things are thoroughly technically assessed and10
approved.11
At this stage, I don't think we12
can necessarily conclude that we have developed13
all the mining methods that we will use at14
McArthur River, but I think the process is such15
that there will be a pretty strong review as we go16
forward on new mining methods.17
MEMBER DOSMAN: I see, but I take18
it that this event isn't resulting in any19
immediate enhancement of freezing techniques at20
the mine.21
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for22
the record.23
The only point I would make is it24
is actually part of the remediation for drill bay25
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69
12 West to put in additional freeze curtaining as1
an example, I think, of an adaptive approach.2
Maybe Mr. Bronkhorst has some3
additional insights into this.4
MR. BRONKHORST: Dave Bronkhorst,5
for the record.6
We are preparing a submission for7
mining of lower zone 4, and some of that8
submission will have additional freezing in it.9
So, yes.10
MEMBER DOSMAN: If I may, there11
has been considerable discussion of increased12
pumping capability and, along with the increased13
pumping capability to account for potential14
enhanced water flows, is there enhanced ability to15
control radon gas? We are just thinking of the16
protection and health of the workers.17
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for18
the record.19
Yes, obviously, one of the key20
features to control radon gas is to control water21
inflow to the mine. That will continue obviously.22
We also have in place obviously23
some pretty strong procedural controls on radon24
through a code of practice.25
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70
So, going forward, certainly it is1
not our expectation to modify that code of2
practice.3
We certainly have very clear4
procedures as we go forth to control radon in the5
mine, and you are quite correct, controlling6
groundwater inflow to the mine is certainly one of7
the key components to controlling radon.8
MR. ROGERS: This is Terry Rogers.9
If I may, Dr. Dosman, I am not10
sure that the question you are asking is exactly11
what we are answering.12
The in-place pumping capacity is13
only for the emergency. We never intended to14
dewater the mine above it. So the pumping15
capacity is not for that. It is for unexpected16
in-rush of water.17
We are at less than 200 cubic18
metres an hour. As more drifts get -- as the mine19
develops out into these other zones, there will be20
more openings. There will be some more water.21
But we are not anticipating, I22
believe, ever to get to a steady state of, you23
know, these ranges as we are talking about.24
MEMBER DOSMAN: Madam Chair, if I25
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71
might be allowed an additional question, you1
explained some changes in the corporate management2
structure and reporting systems in the final part3
of your presentation.4
I was just wondering if you might5
then explain a little further how these changes in6
reporting system will enhance the ability of the7
company to deal with health and safety issues.8
MR. ROGERS: This is Terry Rogers.9
One of the aspects of the10
management structure that we saw as part of a11
result of the discussion centering around the12
safety culture is -- and based also on the CNSC's13
assessment of our structure -- that we wanted a14
closer link between the management of health and15
safety and corporate operations level.16
So the Safety, Health and17
Environment department would have previously18
reported through the Compliance Regulatory19
Vice-President has been brought into the20
Operations.21
So now that we have a closer link22
directing the -- the policies are set by the23
Corporate Regulatory bunch under Mr. Chad, but the24
execution of policy for Safety, Health and25
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72
Environment is through the Operations1
organization.2
So that is just a closer link than3
what we had in the past.4
MEMBER DOSMAN: If I might, Madam5
Chair, to CNSC staff.6
Does CNSC staff have a view as to7
the potential effectiveness of this change in8
reporting and management at Cameco?9
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.10
Yes. It is to confirm that11
Cameco -- the changes in the organization and12
management structure has come about for a number13
of reasons, one of them is, as well of that our14
own internal review of the McArthur incident, our15
investigation and review of that incident, plus16
our evaluations and audit on site in the last year17
at the facility which identified some improvements18
in that area.19
So Cameco basically is moving in20
the direction we believe this is the correct way21
to go. It is in support of our findings and they22
are addressing our concerns as we put forward in23
our findings of the investigations and audits on24
site.25
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73
So we will continue to work with1
them on the outcome of that. So the bottom line2
is, yes, these are positive improvements seen by3
staff, and we will stay in communication with them4
as this unfolds.5
MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you.6
THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Graham.7
MEMBER GRAHAM: Thank you.8
Many of my questions were answered9
through Dr. Barnes' and Dr. McDill's questioning,10
but just a couple of questions I have with regard11
to pumping.12
Your pumps are not submersible.13
You said that they were going to be established to14
the higher elevation so that they be the last to15
get water.16
They are not a submersible pump.17
Is that correct?18
MR. BRONKHORST: Dave Bronkhorst,19
for the record.20
We do have the submersible pumps.21
Their main function is to move it to the main pump22
stations. So the answer is, no, they are not23
submersible, the ones you are referring to.24
MEMBER GRAHAM: What is the25
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schedule for inspection of pumps? Is it weekly,1
monthly and so on? You were not really specific2
at giving Dr. McDill the answer.3
MR. BUCK: Wyatt Buck, for the4
record.5
Any pumps, historically, at6
Cameco, such as fire pumps, that are not used on a7
continuous basis are subject to a weekly run test,8
and that has been the case for 15 years.9
MEMBER GRAHAM: A general question10
that concerns me.11
You have a licence now. CNSC12
granted a licence to you based on the information13
we had the last time around, and that didn't take14
in the scenario of the comment of the mother of15
all floods or whatever it might be referred to.16
And that was perhaps jeopardy towards the safety,17
health and environment of workers.18
My question, and I guess you had19
everything based upon a flow of 640 cubic metres20
per hour -- I think that is what we had as a21
scenario last time if I am correct. This22
certainly changed.23
My question to both staff and to24
Cameco is, you have got a worst-case scenario of25
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1,000, 1,200, up to 1,500 metres an hour, there is1
a fault line -- I don't know whether there has2
never been any mention of an earthquake, if there3
has ever been an earthquake scenario built into4
the risk, all of this -- is everyone satisfied5
that, as the mine expands and go out into other6
areas and so on, that -- and this would happen7
within a 3.8, three years, eight months duration8
of this licence, there might be expansion -- that9
we now have sufficient pumping capacity and we10
have got the root cause down and everything else11
down path that we can ensure that the safety of12
workers and the protection of the environment is13
addressed?14
And this is what, as a lay person,15
I am still not really comfortable because we16
seemed comfortable last time when we gave a17
licence and then all of a sudden along came18
something that was not predicted.19
Are our predictions or are your20
predictions sufficient to meet the worst-case21
scenario in the next three years, eight months?22
And that first would be to Cameco23
and then to staff.24
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for25
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76
the record.1
I would draw your attention -- I2
think there is two key things we have done to give3
you some assurance.4
First of all, as we indicated this5
morning, we have done a fair amount a modelling on6
this inflow event, which really is a fairly large7
pump test, as you pointed out.8
So we have done quite a bit of9
modelling, sensitivity analysis, to take a look at10
various inflow scenarios.11
Second thing I would point out, as12
I mentioned in my discussion, was that Golder had13
assisted us in a risk assessment of the mine plan14
going forward where we look at a variety of15
scenarios and take a look at the risks.16
I would like to ask perhaps Dave17
Bronkhorst just to give sort of a little insight18
into that risk assessment process that we have19
undertaken, which I think will give you some of20
the assurance you are looking for.21
MR. BRONKHORST: As Mr. Jarrell22
pointed out, we can never say there is zero risk,23
but we have gone a long ways to reduce that risk.24
Our risk assessment starts with25
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our ten-year plan and an overview of the entire1
development planned during that period. That is2
categorized, and then we do detailed risk3
assessments with it.4
We look at a particular zone. We5
have the geotechnical information on that zone.6
We look at the potential for inflow or for other7
types of problems8
We then put in a mitigating9
requirement, ground control, freezing, bulkheads,10
even waterdoors as a possibility, if we find that11
that is necessary.12
Then, we would have a third-party13
review by a consultant on what we are proposing,14
and only at that point would that be passed on to15
CNSC staff for their evaluation.16
So it is a fairly rigorous process17
where many, many people will have a chance to18
comment, criticized and add value to their19
submission.20
MEMBER GRAHAM: Before CNSC staff21
answers that, just a follow-up question.22
Was this done in the same rigorous23
way when you came and gave us the confidence last24
time around on licensing?25
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78
What happened? You are a really1
large company. You are very large. You are the2
experts in mining uranium in the world. What fell3
through the cracks last time?4
MR. BRONKHORST: Dave Bronkhorst,5
for the record.6
I think that was very well covered7
in some of the inflow reports. What it was, was8
some of our programs were not as formal as they9
should have been or could have been.10
That is probably a large11
contributing factor why some things were not12
analyzed to the full extent of risk assessment13
that might have been.14
So that is where I see the major15
difference.16
MEMBER GRAHAM: Perhaps CNSC staff17
might like to comment on this time around compared18
to last time around.19
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.20
The concern with a high water21
inflow incident is always there at all the mines.22
It was even identified at this facility, even in23
the early stages in the 1990s, during the24
environmental assessment process, about high25
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inflows.1
The licensee had proposed and2
taken measures to minimize those inflows, and it3
was clear though, as they began to develop towards4
this P2 Fault, they were making decisions and5
choices on their mining methods and conventional6
mining methods and ground control, ground support,7
to minimize the inflow or any structural failures8
there that allowed for a large inflow event. We9
now found that that was inadequate.10
The issue though on health and11
safety and environmental protection, even in spite12
of the incident, the environment -- though we are13
going to still do some further assessments on the14
potential impacts downstream for the large15
discharges in volumes -- the environmental impacts16
were not significant.17
In relation to health and safety18
and radiation protection for the worker, yes,19
there were some increased risks to it. But,20
again, they did fall below our requirements, our21
regulatory requirements and limits on that as22
well.23
So this is a very big learning24
experience for everyone. In spite of that though,25
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they did fall within our compliance per se, and we1
have a tremendous amount of information to move2
forward to any new development work that will be3
undertaken, and we put in more stringent measures4
in review on our part and clearly on the licensee5
before any new development occurs at the mine.6
So, with the knowledge we have at7
the table now and with the expertise we see being8
brought forward before any new development takes9
place there, we believe that the potential impacts10
and risks to this facility are better understood11
and better bounded, and there is sufficient12
mitigation and planning, and engineering controls13
will be put forward for this to occur safely.14
In relation to one other comment15
you made regarding that we have earthquake, sir,16
this is identified in Saskatchewan as a zero area.17
There has been no historical evidence of18
earthquakes or anything to exasperate the19
situation, sir.20
MEMBER GRAHAM: Thank you.21
A couple of other questions. In22
CNSC staff's comments today or in the23
presentation, 2.4.1 Selenium Release to the24
Environment, it is mentioned there that, regarding25
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selenium in the fish tissue analyses and the EEM1
Program to be completed by the autumn of 2004 at2
McArthur River site.3
Would you like to comment on that,4
that if there is any various changes and so on5
from what your previous modelling was done, what6
actions would be taken or what would be put in7
licensing conditions or how would that be8
addressed?9
MR. HOWDEN: I am going to request10
Malcolm McKee, Environmental Protection11
Specialist, to respond to your question.12
MR. McKEE: For the record, my13
name is Malcolm McKee.14
Selenium is being added15
essentially as a standard monitoring component16
within fish, within tissues, for all of the17
operating mines now.18
It is being used as a monitoring19
or sentry component to see if selenium is20
developing into an issue at various facilities.21
Prior to this, selenium has22
historically been assessed as a water toxicity23
issue.24
Extensive studies with respect to25
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selenium and its toxicity and its behaviour in the1
environment have now led many regulatory agencies2
to shift away from using water quality monitoring3
as a means of monitoring selenium implications and4
are going directly to tissue and tissue5
benchmarks. That is what we are shifting towards.6
MEMBER GRAHAM: Thank you.7
In the presentation, also in 2.3,8
indications are the packaging and transportation9
audit was a follow up in that it more or less10
indicated that -- I think from Day One we heard11
that -- that there needed to be more training with12
regard to the transportation of dangerous goods13
and so on with regard to quality assurance in the14
maintenance program.15
Can Cameco now advise us what16
follow-ups have been done and what type of17
training has been done to your various employees18
or subcontractors that may be transporting to Key19
Lake?20
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for21
the record.22
Yes, one of the issues that came23
out of the audit, I think, was the way in which we24
carried out what they called the transport index.25
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Training our employees to do it in a consistent1
fashion.2
I will probably ask Scott Grant.3
Maybe he could just give you a brief summary of4
some of the changes we made over the last few5
months to respond to that audit.6
MR. GRANT: Scott Grant, for the7
record.8
Yes, as Mr. Jarrell pointed out,9
the first thing we did was to revise our10
procedures for how we calculate the transport11
index, and then secondly to train the workers and12
the method to do that.13
A few more things that we have14
done in response to that audit have been to look15
at our maintenance program for the slurry16
containers, and we are revising the documentation17
and the methods that we carry out that maintenance18
work.19
Another thing we have been doing20
is, we are providing training on class 7 of21
transportation of dangerous goods, which is the22
nuclear materials. Providing that for our23
radiation protection people at the site to become24
more of the site experts in the requirements of25
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those regulations.1
There might be others, but off the2
top of my head, that is what I can think of.3
MEMBER GRAHAM: How many4
transports loads per day, per week or whatever5
scenario -- how many transports are used to6
transport the ore and what is the frequency?7
MR. GRANT: Scott Grant, for the8
record.9
Normally, we are about 12 slurry10
transports a day from McArthur to Key Lake11
operation.12
MEMBER GRAHAM: And training of13
new employees, if there is a turnover, you have a14
major -- a formulated -- training plan for15
handling hazardous goods, especially uranium16
products and so on, for new drivers?17
MR. GRANT: Yes. That is correct.18
MEMBER GRAHAM: One question I did19
not get an answer for back, when I was questioning20
with regard to water flows and the models that21
were built, is there anything built into the22
possibility of an earthquake or have earthquakes23
ever been considered in that area?24
Maybe that is not a frequent area25
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for earthquakes in the country, but perhaps you1
could give me a better vision of how that has been2
built into a model?3
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for4
the record.5
As Kevin Scissons said, this is a6
low-risk area site. I do not believe the models7
incorporated that.8
MEMBER GRAHAM: Just one other9
thing, Madam Chair, on Cameco's submission, page 410
or 5, it is 4.0, maximum inflow predictions.11
I think you have a typo there.12
You have the flow volume of 1,000 metres per day.13
I think that should be 1,000 metres per hour or14
so.15
MR. GRANT: Correct.16
MEMBER GRAHAM: I just noticed17
that.18
Anyway, that is all for now.19
Thanks.20
THE CHAIRPERSON: I have two areas21
of questioning.22
One is, I noted Mr. Rogers at the23
beginning talked about -- and correct me if I am24
wrong here -- that the staff had requested that25
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Cameco have a second independent analysis or a1
second independent root cause analysis.2
Is that correct, and what was the3
thinking behind the staff's request in that area?4
Am I incorrect? The looks on5
everybody's face is just -- I am correct.6
MR. HOWDEN: Barclay Howden7
speaking.8
What we have requested was, up to9
this point, as much of this work had been done10
internal to Cameco, is that we requested that they11
bring in an outside specialist to do this.12
They have done this, and this is13
planned for October. Part of this was our review14
of their methods that indicated that they could15
do -- they were probably not applying the16
methodology as well as they could.17
Our anticipation is that our18
specialists would actually be monitoring the19
exercise by the independent consultant to confirm20
that it was being done independently and that the21
methodology was satisfactory.22
And I believe they are going to be23
using a standard industry method called Tap Root24
to do that, which is accepted by us. Yes.25
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THE CHAIRPERSON: The timing on1
that, I gather that they are going to be in the2
field now or shortly in terms of that independent3
root cause.4
How long would that analysis take,5
to the report stage?6
MR. JARRELL: John Durell, for the7
record.8
The expectation is from document9
review, essentially one week at site, and then the10
corporate office and then probably four weeks to11
prepare a report.12
So it is basically a five-week, or13
sorry, a five-day effort.14
THE CHAIRPERSON: Because, of15
course, that will be very, very interesting, I16
think, for the company as well.17
My second area of questioning --18
and I am just going to open this a little bit, but19
just to give a sense for the union representatives20
and for the EQC that I will to come back to this21
for their comments -- is with regards to radiation22
training.23
Reading through the information,24
there was certainly questions that we saw on the25
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part of workers in terms of what to do in a1
specific event. So I guess I am not surprised that2
there is a process to improve training.3
First of all, my first question is4
to CNSC staff. Is there guidelines for radiation5
training at all? Is there some either CNSC or6
international approaches to this that are7
acceptable for a framework or --8
DR. THOMPSON: Patsy Thompson, for9
the record. I am Director of the Environmental10
Protection and Audit Division.11
My understanding of the process is12
that the CNSC has radiation protection program13
requirements that include the requirement to train14
the workers.15
Having said that, the CNSC staff16
does audits and evaluations of licensee programs17
to look at whether this training component is18
present, and in doing so, we look at the19
effectiveness of that component.20
The information that has come out21
of the work done on behalf of the workers is that22
this information is not being understood.23
The expectation is that the24
program is effective. So staff will be enhancing25
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its compliance activities in that area.1
There are, to my knowledge, no2
guidelines or standards for communication and3
training in these areas.4
The training methods have to be5
adapted to the audience, and this is the6
expectation, is that the training material will be7
suitable for the people it is intended to serve.8
This is the area we will be looking into.9
My understanding is that, over the10
years, the training programs that Cameco is11
delivering have improved. But there is obviously12
still some deficiencies.13
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons, if14
I can add to that.15
The approach we use on general16
training, not specific just to radiation training,17
but we direct our licensees to what is called a18
systematic approach to training, the SAD approach,19
and it is applied to radiation protection20
training, as in other areas in general.21
But we normally get in there to22
analyze or assess the licensee in how they perform23
and assess the success of their training programs.24
A lessons learned in this incident25
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as well for us is in our follow-up and on1
communication and confirmation on the adequacy of2
the training and "has the message been received to3
workers?".4
So there is a lessons learned for5
the CNSC staff on this, and it will be a follow-up6
for us, not only at this facility, but other7
facilities.8
THE CHAIRPERSON: One of the9
reasons I asked this question is, I note on Day10
One we had a report, a rating, of the program11
areas, and we had radiation protection as B, B,12
and going across.13
Does that mean that that program14
area is not evaluated for training as well as for15
compliance, or -- I just don't see why that was16
not picked up.17
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons18
again.19
I think a very key finding and a20
recent finding, as one of the other CMD is being21
presented later on this morning, is the other22
evaluation performed and confirmation with the23
workers that the message really had not been24
received.25
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So this is in essence a new1
finding, a new lessons learned from us, on the2
communication and understanding, in which we need3
comprehension in the training that was put forward4
to the workers at the facility.5
Our findings, our evaluations, did6
not pick this up. Even our own site audit in7
regards to this incident was performed and8
presented to the Occupational Health and Safety9
Committee -- that was in January of 2004,10
presented by Mr. Sandles with a staff member from11
Saskatoon.12
Again, it was not picked up at13
that point that there was some problems with14
comprehension on the radiation protection,15
radiation training.16
So this is new information to us17
now. It is making us, in our lessons learned, to18
reassess and re-evaluate this program.19
As well as, of course, the20
licensee has already picked up on that and is21
moving forward on it as well.22
DR. THOMPSON: Patsy Thompson, for23
the record.24
CNSC staff conducted a25
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multi-program audit at McArthur River in March.1
It included an assessment or audit of Cameco's2
training program against the expectation of a3
systematic approach to training.4
This audit did cover radiation5
protection training. The findings were that a SAD6
approach was not being applied consistently. The7
audit findings did pick this up, and Cameco has8
been asked to correct this.9
THE CHAIRPERSON: I guess, if come10
back to it -- perhaps I did not clearly pose my11
question -- if one looks at the program areas12
meeting requirements, does that mean that the13
radiation protection program area in terms of14
evaluation of program implementation does not15
include training, or is training, as a broader16
subject, covered in another program area?17
DR. THOMPSON: Training for the18
radiation protection program is covered in the19
assessment of the training program.20
THE CHAIRPERSON: May I suggest21
that that is another lesson learned on that?22
DR. THOMPSON: If you could repeat23
the question, we have --24
THE CHAIRPERSON: I just think25
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then it is not a very holistic approach then,1
because, I mean, in essence -- and correct me if I2
am wrong because I am not a specialist in3
radiation protection, but -- the program of4
radiation protection would have to, in my view, in5
order to be rated, particularly in terms of6
implementation, have to have a component that said7
that it was understood and it was being practised.8
Is that an incorrect assumption9
or --10
DR. THOMPSON: Patsy Thompson, for11
the record.12
One of the reasons for including13
radiation protection, environmental protection and14
other aspects, other program training elements,15
are being covered by training specialists is16
because the radiation protection and environmental17
protection specialists, for example, who conduct18
audits of the radiation protection, environmental19
protection program are not specialists in training20
programs and auditing the effectiveness of21
training programs.22
That was the reason why we brought23
in a training program specialist: to audit and24
verify those programs. But, obviously, it is an25
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important element to the radiation protection1
program.2
THE CHAIRPERSON: Okay, I will3
leave it there. I think we are going to come back4
to this, I think, with the unions and with EQC, so5
we'll come back again.6
I would like to take a break for7
15 --8
MR. ROGERS: Madam Chair.9
THE CHAIRPERSON: Sorry, Mr.10
Rogers.11
MR. ROGERS: I'm sorry to12
interrupt the break, but --13
--- Laughter14
MR. ROGERS: -- I just wanted to15
kind of make a clarification about radiation16
protection and training, from our perspective,17
notwithstanding what the CNCS evaluates our18
program.19
But based on the numbers we see20
coming out of the recent event, you know, we do21
feel that the radiation training and protection22
that we use at our mine sites is adequate --23
generally adequate. I'm not saying it can't be24
improved.25
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95
We are talking more specifically1
about education, and that is because of the number2
of questions our employees had it's clear that,3
although they understand procedurally how to4
protect themselves exposure, what proper equipment5
to us and time/distance shielding and all that6
business, I don't think they internalize it. They7
understand what its effects are or the whys of it.8
So what we are trying to do is9
formulate a new education program, not just for10
workers in the mine, but for all of our Cameco11
employees, as well, so that they understand what12
radiation -- not what it is but what it means and13
have a broader approach to, an understanding of14
not the specifics of the training, how to drive15
the car, but what it means to be able to do that16
and what the exposures could ultimately mean.17
The training and protection,18
generally adequate. What we are trying to do is19
further the understanding of the employees who go20
through the training and take the tests, but may21
not fully comprehend all of those ramifications.22
THE CHAIRPERSON: I just would23
remind, Mr. Rogers, that the reason I used the24
word "training" was because that was the heading25
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that was used on your slides. So I think that if1
there's needs to have a lexicon, we may need to do2
that. But that's why I used that word.3
Okay, were going to take a break,4
and if we could be back at 10:45. Thank you very5
much. Roughly 15.6
--- Upon recessing at 10:32 a.m.7
--- Upon resuming at 10:45 a.m.8
THE CHAIRPERSON: We will have one9
further question from the Commission members to10
staff. Would the staff like to comment before11
further questions?12
MR. SCISSONS: Yes. Kevin13
Scissons.14
I have to correct an error I have15
made and clarify the question raised by President16
Keen on the issue on training.17
The original CMD for this18
facility, CMD 04-H17 -- and we did the rating19
evaluations, under "Quality Assurance" -- is where20
we actually addressed the licensees' radiation21
training program or training programs for the22
workers.23
There is another area where we24
talk about radiation protection of the radiation25
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staff, but in specific question to the radiation1
training for the workers, we actually cover that2
under our quality assurance component.3
Now, because there was a number of4
deficiencies under that -- and that would be page5
21, 20 and 21 of the CMD -- we didn't specifically6
bullet and itemize the training component that Dr.7
Thompson confirmed was identified in the March8
audit and that there was this lack of training,9
understandability and improvements needed.10
So we didn't itemize that as one11
of the areas, but it is confirmed and I was12
incorrect in saying this was new information.13
Maybe it's new information to me, in that sense,14
but the staff clearly understood it. We have15
itemized it, we have identified it with Cameco and16
Cameco recognizes it. There's improvements on17
radiation and training to Cameco staff and workers18
is well along. I was in error in stating that,19
the new information.20
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.21
Dr. Barnes.22
MEMBER BARNES: I just wanted to23
maybe make a statement as to my concerns.24
We are here to renew the uranium25
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mine operating licence for a period of some years,1
whether it be three years and eight months or five2
years, yet to be determined. We have, of course,3
seen the major event.4
So the kind of questions that I5
was asking was really to try and get some comfort6
in my own mind that the applicant, Cameco, a) had7
developed or put systems in place to really try to8
understand the event, understand the geologic9
conditions under which that event occurred and, in10
a sense, in its future development, part of which11
will occur in the next licence period, that was12
reducing, therefore, the risk of this occurring13
again. So that's the logic of my questions.14
But although some of the issues15
that we have talked about are looking at what you16
do if you get this response, in terms of trying to17
improve the holding capacity and the treatment and18
so on, I guess I'm still an advocate of trying to19
prevent the situation in the first place and,20
therefore, having as much information to try to21
help in the development of the mine so that it22
doesn't occur again.23
So if I could ask maybe staff,24
rather than Cameco, and if there was a hydro25
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geologist available to comment on my, if you like,1
understanding of the situation, therefore, how --2
whether it's adequate assistance in place to look3
at trying to prevent it again.4
It seems to me that the rate of5
flow that occurred in that event in April '03 of6
the order, you know, around numbers of a thousand7
cubic metres an hour were totally unpredictable --8
unpredicted and this is not normal flow for the9
Athabaska sandstone aquifer, if you like.10
The rate of flow was sustained for11
a long period of time. That would suggest to me12
that this was a more fracture flow than porous13
media flow. And we know that probably the14
factoring was associated, I assume, with the P215
fault and the cavernousness development16
periodically along that fault.17
No one has, I think, commented in18
any the material I have read where that volume of19
water came from, since it sort of was an20
unexpected high level of flow. I interpret that21
the reduced rate of flow was partly because of the22
grouting; in other words, the prevention, rather23
than the actual reduction of flow and that it24
wasn't sort of a reservoir of water in some of the25
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void spaces essentially got used up and went back1
to normal porous media flow, that it would have2
continued for a long period of time.3
Therefore, if there is potential4
in the future development of the mine of working5
around the P2 fault, and so on, I would have6
thought that -- and so I would welcome a comment7
from staff, either geologists, if those8
assumptions I just made on the groundwater flow9
were incorrect or not, at least in general, not10
necessary in any detail.11
I, therefore, come back to my12
concern whether, in order for Cameco to try and13
understand, and therefore predict, the likelihood14
of intersecting such things again, whether15
half-a-dozen -- six, seven, I think, was the16
number mentioned -- of piezometers at the depth at17
which this situation is likely to occur, that is18
close to the unconformity, is really adequate,19
right, if you are trying to understand the20
situation here.21
Although I understand there's lots22
of piezometers, that gives you the overall23
groundwater flow within the sandstone body, as a24
whole, but the issue is, the real threat is25
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intersecting these voids and intersecting what1
seemed to be unpredicted and very large2
groundwater flows associated with the3
unconformity.4
This is a level which, I think, as5
I read it from day one, is likely to be6
intersected at some point in mine development. I7
don't know precisely where this is going to be in8
the term of this licence.9
So my question is: is the general10
comments I'm making correct? Secondly, do you11
really think that the level of information gained12
by those limited number of piezometers, in13
relation to the likely fracturing along the P214
fault, which may be a zone rather than a single15
plane, is sufficient for the company to monitor16
and predict the threat of future major inflows?17
MR. HOWDEN: Barclay Howden18
speaking.19
I'm going to pass this back to one20
of our geoscientists, Peter Flavelle, but I want21
to make introductory comments.22
One, I'm going to request them to23
make -- to respond to your comments on -- the24
general comments on hydrology -- hydrogeology of25
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the area, about the number of piezometers, but I'm1
not sure we will be able to give you a definitive2
response to that.3
I wanted to indicate that the flow4
model developed by Cameco is one of the tools used5
in the overall risk assessment of whether they go6
into other areas, but certainly it's an important7
piece.8
Having said that, much of the data9
that has been -- the specific data that has been10
put forward today on the model and the results of11
the model have not been presented to CNSC staff to12
be able to give you a definitive comment on it.13
We are in a position to comment on14
how such a model can be used as part of the risk15
assessment and if we have this information16
submitted we are able to assess the information. 17
So with that, I'm just going to18
pass it back to Peter Flavelle for a comment on19
the hydrology -- hydrogeology of the area.20
DR. FLAVELLE: Thank you.21
For the record, my name is Peter22
Flavelle. I'm a senior specialist in the Waste23
and Geoscience Division.24
As Mr. Howden said, we have not25
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had an opportunity to review the recent modelling1
work that Cameco has presented today. In general,2
models such as MODFLOW and other groundwater flow3
models and contaminant transport models give an4
indication of what the consequences are of an5
incident. It will not necessary predict whether6
or not an incident will occur.7
In this particular case, Cameco8
has used this model to determine the extent of the9
contingency that they need to put in place to10
handle such an inflow in the future, but, in11
itself, it would not predict whether or not such12
an inflow will occur. That will have to come from13
the risk assessment on the future development.14
In terms of the number of15
piezometers being able to indicate whether or not16
this would occur, six or seven piezometers in the17
area of the fault intersection gives a reasonably18
good measurement of the response in that fault to19
the inflow, but it's quite limited in its spacial20
extent. It just covers the area of the21
development.22
Further piezometers -- piezometers23
further afield would characterize the far-field24
response to that, but that's not going to help25
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really predict whether or not such an inflow will1
occur in the future.2
I'm hesitant to speculate on the3
overall hydrogeologic response of the system at4
the moment, having seen what Cameco has presented5
today. It certainly looks reasonable. The6
farther-range response in the sandstone to the7
inflow event appears to respond as a porous medium8
equivalent. It's happening at a scale where the9
fracturing tends to smear the results of the10
hydraulic response and it turns out that the11
sandstone appears to be quite porous and have a12
large storativity, which supplies the continued13
flow of the water into the mine.14
Whether or not that was recognized15
previously, it's unclear whether or not that would16
have actually made a difference in the modelling.17
I hope I have addressed everything18
you are concerned with, Dr. Barnes.19
MEMBER BARNES: Okay. I assume if20
they had recognized it, it certainly would have21
affected the capabilities of the pumping system,22
for example, and the holding system on the23
surface, as examples.24
THE CHAIRPERSON: Kevin Scissons,25
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and then back to licensee.1
MR. SCISSONS: Yes, Kevin2
Scissons.3
I would like to -- there was4
another question you had raised about: was this5
ever predicted of potential high inflows in that?6
Mr. Flavelle was addressing some of that, but in7
your original environmental assessment documents8
back in the mid-nineties or in the early nineties,9
it was predicted that if there was no engineering10
controls or other design measures put in place,11
flows of up to a thousand cubic meters now would12
be possible from that sandstone formation.13
So that's why the original design14
of it was to go in through the -- down, and what15
they did, and designed the shafts and the original16
mine insulation in the basement rock, and then the17
freeze curtain and other engineering controls were18
all put in place to avoid that situation.19
I mean, what happened is, the20
bottom line, we find out, in hindsight, is the21
engineering -- the other engineering controls,22
without the freeze curtain, were not adequate and23
the inflow did occur and we did, indeed, have24
flows upwards of that.25
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So those numbers were out there.1
It was known. The porous medium of the Athabaska2
sandstone and its almost unlimited quantities of3
water were -- you know, is a known fact to us and4
to the licensee. They now have a better test case5
to ensure how not to encroach upon that and put in6
these better control measures to avoid any of7
these high inflows.8
THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Jarrell.9
MR. JARRELL: John Jarrell, for10
the record.11
Just to get back to some of the12
questions you had, Dr. Barnes, about the flow13
conditions that we learned from our inflow event,14
I would say what I have learned is that the flow15
alignment, if you look at it, not in section but16
in plan view -- it's in two-dimensional form --17
it's largely elliptical. The results we have,18
albeit, as you have pointed out, there is a19
limited number of piezometers, did so, sort of in20
an elliptical nature, align with the P2 fault.21
The hydraulic resistance, which,22
ultimately, governed the creation to sort of a23
stable flow, I believe, was largely natural, not24
as a result of any grouting that we had done.25
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The way it has been described to1
me is that, in effect, what we did was we dilated2
the flow zone. I say that because in the early3
days of the inflow there was a fair amount of silt4
and clay material, the water was quite turbid, and5
it cleaned up. So that, in effect, we dilated6
this zone.7
We believe the water flow is8
largely horizontal for two reasons: one,9
essentially the model that we have developed10
certainly explains why we saw a difference between11
deep piezometers and shallow piezometers, so,12
hence, the imprints of an aquitard.13
I think the other reason is that14
there continued to be radon inflow in the mine15
water, which, obviously, means the water was in16
close contact with ore. The ore, itself, is17
generally aligned to the P2 fault, so I think18
that's our sort of inferred belief: that there19
was a fair amount of horizontal flow.20
I don't believe it's a case of,21
necessarily, voids in that flow zone, as opposed22
to the fact that there's enough sand and gravel23
that we could open it up, which is what we saw.24
Maybe I would ask Scott Donald.25
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Maybe he could just sort of either confirm or sort1
of add to those observations.2
MR. DONALD: I think the only3
thing I would like to add is to comment on the4
voids issue and the potential misconception.5
Maybe that's there in that.6
Based on the monitoring data we7
have looked at following the April 2003 collapse,8
we don't believe that there's voids of water out9
there ready to be tapped which have unlimited10
inflow potential.11
The delivery mechanism to this12
area of the fault, the fracturing around the P213
fault, looks like it's controlled by the bulk14
characteristics of the sandstone, the bulk15
characteristics of the sandstone having been16
fractured and having a porosity, you know, in the17
range of 2 per cent to 4 per cent, and that's18
providing the inflow over time, which sustained19
the steady inflows for a few-months period.20
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.21
That ends the first round of22
questioning. We are now going to move to the23
intervenors and to the interventions.24
I would like to note -- and25
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perhaps we should have noted this at the1
beginning -- that we do have people in the2
Saskatoon office, intervenors, who have been3
linked by video conference with us throughout the4
proceedings and they will be linked more directly5
as we move to that area.6
I would like to now, then, to move7
to the interventions.8
We have allocated approximately 109
minutes for the oral presentation. We have read10
your more detailed submission with great care and11
interest and we will continue to include the12
written submissions, as we duly consider those13
through the -- for the decision and through for14
the reasons for the decision.15
You will note that some16
intervenors have filed the same submission for17
hearings on the licence renewal of McArthur River18
and Key Lake licences and, again, for the19
environmental assessment on the production20
increase. But we would like, as noted earlier, we21
will try to avoid repetition and we will invite22
intervenors to make their presentations here and23
then we will be asking -- coming back and asking24
if you have anything to add for the other two25
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hearings.1
04-H17.2 / 04-H17.2A2
Oral presentation by the Canadian Nuclear Workers3
Council and the United Steel Workers of America,4
Local 89145
THE CHAIRPERSON: With that I6
would like to move to our first intervention,7
which is the oral presentation by the Canadian8
Nuclear Workers Council and the United Steel9
Workers of America, Local 8914. These are10
outlined in CMDs 04-H17.211
and 04-H17.2A.12
We have the president of the13
Canadian Nuclear Workers Council with us, who has14
appeared with us before.15
And so welcome, sir, and the floor16
is yours.17
MR. SHIER: Good morning, Madam18
Chair and members of the Commission.19
My name is David Shier. I'm20
president of the Canadian Nuclear Workers Council.21
With me today, my colleague on my22
far left is Gordon Telfer. Gord is the local23
union president of the United Steel Workers of24
America for the Cameco sites in Saskatchewan.25
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On my right is Ed Morelli. Ed is1
the vice-president of United Steel Workers of2
America Local for the Cameco operations in3
Saskatchewan.4
Both Gord and Ed work at the5
McArthur River mines and the Key Lake mines and6
are very familiar with the operations, being7
long-term miners.8
On my left is Bob Walker. Bob is9
an executive member of the Canadian Nuclear10
Workers Council and was the key investigator in11
our investigation of the health and safety issues12
that I will be talking about. It was talked about13
in our written presentation and also in our oral14
presentation today.15
Prior to moving on, I would just16
like to talk about one little housekeeping item.17
Our group, when we hit Slater Street this morning,18
was quite concerned when we saw a picket line up19
in front of the building. We just want to assure20
everybody that we did not break any labour21
protocols by coming into the building today, that22
we did talk to the labour representatives out from23
the Public Service Alliance and they assured us24
that we should go into the building. So we didn't25
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cross their line, they actually opened it up. So1
I would like to make that clear.2
Our presentation, as indicated, is3
to cover off the three issues that are going to be4
heard today. What we would like to do is5
basically provide kind of a quick overview of our6
written submission and an update.7
I guess I should just give a8
little background of the Canadian Nuclear Workers9
Council. For anybody who is not familiar, the10
Canadian Nuclear Workers Council is a council, as11
the name implies, of unions that are involved in12
the nuclear industry in Canada. Naturally, the13
steel workers are a very active member of our14
council and the steel workers are the local union15
in regards to the licensee.16
We are going to talk briefly over17
the next few minutes about the safety and union18
involvement in the mine sites, a little update on19
labour relations, an update on our CNWC20
investigation, our view, our view being the view21
of the workers, the benefits to the mines and our22
conclusions.23
In the area of worker safety24
committee representatives, we believe it's a good25
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strong safety culture in the mines. We have about1
eight joint health and safety committees, with the2
shifts at different locations. There is one for3
-- there is always a committee on site and the4
union members on those committees are appointed by5
the United Steel Workers of America6
representatives. Actually, the union appointing7
these people, they work very close with them.8
I think the United Steel Workers9
of America has a very strong safety history. It's10
a major union across North America in which safety11
has a high priority. They have been involved in12
the mining industry, naturally, for many years and13
have been in the forefront, for example, back in14
the days of the Elliott Lake mines. It was15
actually the steel workers that was one of the16
main drivers of our current occupation of health17
and safety legislation in Ontario.18
Looking at our investigation, many19
people ask: why did the Nuclear Workers Council20
do an investigation in regards to the mine21
situation, the flooding that occurred several22
months ago, now? It's no big secret, the media23
reports in May was the main catalyst that got us24
going in that area. The media reports caught our25
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council off guard, caught the local union off1
guard and actually caused a lot of agitation2
amongst the steel worker members in the mining3
community.4
Also, it has been a long-standing5
issue and it's the -- some of the major groups,6
they have always viewed that these areas are not7
as safe as we may say they are, so this gave us8
the opportunity to have an independent look at9
what is happening in this particular situation and10
we were very happy with the results.11
Where we sit today with the12
investigation, as indicated Bob Walker was our key13
investigator on that. We are fortunate to have14
Bob on our executive, as he has some experience in15
the mining community so he knows the culture. He16
actually worked at Key Lake for a period of time17
and, then, his background in health and safety as18
a union representative at the Darlington Nuclear19
Station.20
So the full report is available.21
I have a few copies here which I will share with22
the Commission. What we found is that safety is a23
priority, that the workers were very informed and24
knew their rights.25
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Specifically, the United Steel1
Workers of America members, they had a clause in2
their collective agreement which allows them to3
refuse unsafe work. All the members that were4
interviewed were very well aware of that and had5
indicated they would use and have used it from6
time to time.7
The other issue, which has been8
talked about under Cameco's presentation and the9
staff, the area of lack of understanding of10
radiation, this is not a surprise to us. It's our11
understanding. We know there's kind of a12
two-pronged approach to radiation safety.13
Basically, that is, in Canada, for14
example, in the nuclear generating stations,15
people are trained to basically self-protect and16
they receive a lot of training in that area. The17
other approach, which seems to be outside of the18
generating business, is to give the workers a19
little bit of training and understanding and,20
then, have experts that look after their safety,21
as far as radiation goes.22
Now, this is not unique to Canada.23
For example, there is places in the U.S. and other24
places around the world where, even in the25
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generating stations, people don't receive1
extensive training. They use a model, where they2
have the radiation expert that trains them.3
So this is an area that has got a4
lot of -- had a lot of discussion and I think it5
will continue to be discussed.6
Communication issues: again, I7
think these were identified earlier. There was a8
lot of communication concerns around at the time,9
and, in hindsight, where things could possibly be10
done a little different and they will be11
corrected.12
The safety issues were not as13
reported by the CBC or the media. In this regard,14
I guess some of the factual information was there,15
but just the interpretation, which caused a lot of16
anxiety amongst the United Steel Worker members17
and other workers there, I guess, just from our18
view, it's the way kind of the media come across.19
We did concur with the findings of20
the CNSC and the employer in regards to the dose21
assessments. We had an expert that was involved22
in that area to look at that, so that did provide23
some assurance to the people who had concerns.24
So we were very happy with this25
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independent view. As I indicated, it was strictly1
arm's length from the employer, so we now have a2
good labour perspective of the health and safety3
issues, what happened on site.4
Investigation update: since our5
submission, there has been meetings with the6
employees and they have all been briefed and had7
their questions asked in regards to what had8
happened, what the team found. The employer was9
also briefed on what we found, as well. That's10
where some of the lessons learned are starting to11
be looked at.12
The United Steel Workers of13
America health and safety committees will be14
following up on a lot of these lessons that were15
learned. There was a pamphlet produced for16
workers, which I have one copy here of, which is17
being -- I was told today is being mailed out to18
all the workers' homes, so they will have19
something in hard copy to say what the20
investigation was about, what they found and,21
hopefully, reassure people of their concerns.22
Also in that pamphlet there's a23
whole list of contacts that the workers and other24
members may have concerns in this area can contact25
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people for further information.1
The release of the report: we2
haven't officially released it. We wanted to go3
through our protocols to make sure that our health4
and safety committee people have been updated on5
it.6
The United Steel Workers of7
America representatives at the national office8
were briefed and Gord Telfer was able to do that9
last night, so we will be releasing the report10
officially. It will be posted on our web site11
later this week and, as indicated, there is a -- I12
have a few hard copies here for any of the13
commissioners that may be interested in taking a14
look at them.15
We did send a copy, courtesy copy,16
to the CNSC site representative in Saskatchewan a17
few weeks back.18
Moving onto our view, the19
beneficial aspects of having the licences renewed,20
is, naturally, the local economic impact in the21
area of Saskatchewan. The jobs: this creates22
skilled, good paying jobs in the north and the23
south in Saskatchewan and it kind of goes without24
saying the provincial and federal benefits of25
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having these good jobs, having a good product and1
being the world's largest producer of uranium in2
the world.3
In conclusion, our view being the4
view of the workers at the steel worker locals, as5
well as the rest of the council, a lot of our6
council members have visited the mines over the7
years. We find the workplaces are safe.8
Naturally, there is risk involved, but we feel9
that there is very good safety programs in place.10
There is many benefits to all11
Canadians in having this industry and we provide12
our full support, from the Nuclear Workers Council13
and the United Steel Workers of America, for the14
relicensing of the Key Lake mine and the McArthur15
River, as well as the EA Guidelines.16
With that, to thank the17
opportunity for having our presentation and we18
are, naturally, open for questions.19
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you, Mr.20
Shier.21
Are there questions? Dr. Dosman.22
MEMBER DOSMAN: I would just like23
to ask Mr. Shier, on the issue of training and24
safety, in the first hearing the report card that25
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Cameco got in several areas were Cs, that is the1
below requirements, in operations, quality2
assurance, environmental protection and the3
emergency preparedness.4
Are you satisfied that your5
workers are receiving adequate training? Are you6
satisfied that your workers are open and7
enthusiastic about adequate safety training?8
MR. SHIER: I will give you a9
quick overview comment, and then I will have Gord10
Telfer comment from the local unions' perspective.11
As I indicated in my presentation,12
on the radiation safety aspect there is that13
two-pronged approach. We recognize that they14
don't get this -- the miners don't get the same15
training as the people in the generating stations.16
I think they are going to be17
looking at that, on how much training. That's18
going to be one of the lessons learned, the19
follow-up item. I think the health and safety20
committee people will be looking at that, as well21
as the union.22
So I think Gord will maybe have a23
better comment on that.24
MR. TELFER: Gord Telfer,25
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president of Local 8914.1
I just want to outline that2
through the issues in the influx of water our3
members have concerns common to the training4
aspect that came out of the findings that we had5
here today.6
We recognize that and we have7
approached the company, with our occupational8
health and safety committees, to draft up in years9
where we might have been -- fallen down on and to10
really get the gist of what our members are11
telling us: to provide these areas of training12
and to make sure that they are going to be dealt13
with and make sure that everybody really14
understands.15
I guess with that, you know, from16
that perspective, I look at our occupational17
health and safety committees telling me that, you18
know, they feel comfortable with making their19
recommendations and to talk to each area of the20
facilities, whether it be a Key Lake or McArthur21
River, to make sure that those areas of training22
that we have missed are overlooked or we see23
differences with will be addressed and I feel24
comfortable in that area.25
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MEMBER DOSMAN: Madam Chair, does1
the union actively support the training2
initiatives? Is there a culture in the union of3
saying, "Hey, we are going to be the safest union4
in any company" and really internalize and support5
the workers in their efforts to work safely?6
MR. TELFER: Yes, that's foremost7
in our minds all the time with the unionized work8
force, the bargaining unit members, including the9
contractors that come on site. We are very clear10
in the safety aspect of it, that we want all our11
members to work safely and to understand that the12
training that they are receiving is for the13
betterment of them in the work force.14
Yes, we are very behind the safety15
culture and we push that, again, through our16
occupational health and safety. At our general17
meetings that is always an issue that comes18
forward and we really make a strong, strong19
position, as a union, to make sure that's a20
follow-up and that we do the correct thing.21
MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you.22
THE CHAIRPERSON: Mr. Graham.23
MEMBER GRAHAM: Just as a24
follow-up to Dr. Dosman's question and your25
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answer. The incident of 2003, I think, was a1
wake-up call for everyone: industry, CNSC, the2
unions and everyone else.3
Could you explain or advise or4
confirm that the business will probably have to be5
done in a different way and there's probably going6
to be some major changes required in the way7
Cameco is going to operate that mine?8
Does the union, I guess, first of9
all, endorse those changes? Are they willing to10
address and work with Cameco to make sure that11
those changes are in the best interests of safety12
to the workers?13
MR. TELFER: Clearly, we are. We14
want to work with Cameco, particularly that our15
issues, which will be brought forward by our OT16
committees. We will be working with Cameco to17
make sure that they are addressed. We feel,18
again, as I indicated before, very strongly in19
this area and we are willing to work with Cameco20
to make sure that is done.21
MEMBER GRAHAM: My other question22
would be to Cameco, and that would be: in view of23
the fact, as stated by the union on page 3 of the24
presentation that most of the workers had very25
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little real understanding of the different types1
of radiation exposure, the individual dose2
reports, can Cameco confirm or give us some3
feeling that this is going to change and their4
will be more communication and explanation and5
work with the workers to make sure that they do6
understand the hazards and the benefits of a good7
safety culture and the necessity of a very strong8
safety culture that may not have existed in the9
past?10
MR. ROGERS: Terry Rogers, for the11
record.12
Mr. Graham, yes, that obviously is13
what I was alluding to just before the break,14
about in addition to some increased training, it's15
at least as important that the education part, the16
understanding of the training -- I mean, there's17
rote exercise and prescriptive sorts of remedy to18
reduce exposure.19
It's equally as important now, and20
has been borne out by -- I toured all the21
operating sites at Cameco -- it's called a safety22
culture tour -- and this theme came up: a lack of23
formal or more of an internalized understanding of24
the issues. They know the prescriptive techniques25
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to follow, procedures to follow, but we want to1
broaden the education base so that we have a2
deeper understanding of that. That's the road we3
are embarked upon now.4
THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Barnes.5
MEMBER BARNES: That was going to6
be my question, but I will follow up a little bit7
more because I felt this report was very valuable8
and that those paragraphs in the middle of page 3,9
I think, were quite illuminating and that we10
probably all are exposed to this in our lives in11
different ways, where you get some information and12
you know what the words mean -- you can read the13
words, but you don't necessarily fully appreciate14
the meaning of it, is the implication.15
In the same way we have been16
discussing some other aspects this morning, I17
wonder -- for Comeco -- how are you going to18
actually put this into practice in preparing19
documents which will have a reasonable success of20
achieving those objectives?21
For example, is this just going to22
be left to the health and safety committees or are23
you going to involve other consultants or people24
at the University of Saskatchewan or other25
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academic institutions, that spend their lives1
trying to translate information, to use the groups2
that, in fact, communicate meaning, as well as3
words and data?4
MR. ROGERS: This is Terry Rogers,5
for the record.6
I'm sure just by the nature of the7
question you can appreciate how difficult it is to8
do that, the programs, sort of starting from the9
corporate centre of it, to sort of define it, but10
I would like to ask Scott Grant, who is our -- the11
guy with the long title, Quality Management12
Systems, Environmental and so on, behind us. He13
is actually actively involved in the health and14
safety management system and will be part of this15
ongoing program.16
MR. GRANT: Scott Grant, for the17
record.18
I can give you an update on our19
most immediate plans. Starting next Tuesday, we20
are going to have a consultant up to site from the21
AHz Learning Technologies Company of Regina --22
"AHz" is spelled A-H. It's a group that are very23
familiar with improving training programs for24
companies in Saskatchewan. They come highly25
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recommended to us. Our corporate training group1
in Saskatoon, our Saskatoon office, chose them.2
So what we are going to do, first3
of all, is bring one of their principal members of4
their company up to McArthur River next Tuesday5
and put them through our orientation and our6
training -- basic radiation protection training7
program as if the person is a worker, starting8
work at McArthur River.9
After they go through that10
training, they are going to go underground and11
probably want to interview people, but just see12
what it's like to go underground after you have13
had your radiation protection training.14
After a couple of days of that,15
they are going to present a proposal to Cameco --16
I think we have October 8th as the day for that --17
and I will have -- they should have in that18
proposal details of how they want to go about19
improving our radiation protection training.20
The elements that we know will be21
part of that training will be -- one is revising22
our material to make it simpler for people to23
learn from. Secondly, they are going to work very24
hard with the people who deliver radiation25
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protection training, which are largely what we1
call our radiation protection specialists, to get2
them to improve their delivery and, basically,3
their teaching techniques.4
The third thing that this group5
will do, for sure, is they do follow-up6
assessments. This is one of the things that7
attracted us to them. They claim a retention of8
understanding of material, once they have improved9
your training program, upwards around 80 per cent.10
They say industry standards, based11
on their work, are much lower, down around 20 per12
cent, 30 percent. So they will do some follow-up13
work to find out the retention, the understanding14
of workers, after we have improved the program.15
THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. McDill.16
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.17
I have several questions and,18
Madam Chair, I seek your guidance on several of19
them because my first question is about the20
pamphlet, which is not a matter of the record.21
May I try and dance around it?22
THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes. And just23
because it's important that any evidence is24
available for everyone. So certainly we will25
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proceed, and then I think, in the long-run, one of1
the questions would be: would that be available?2
MEMBER McDILL: My question: I3
think the pamphlet is probably excellent. I have4
two questions concerning it. Is the language in5
the pamphlet simple enough -- and I don't mean to6
demean intelligence. Words like "Becquerel" just7
sort of don't work for many people -- simple8
enough for easy understanding of the workers?9
The second question is: how does10
it, or can it, address questions of aboriginal11
workers who work with an oral tradition?12
MR. SHIER: As I say, I have a13
copy of the pamphlet here and I have a copy of the14
full report which I will pass up to you.15
I would suggest that the pamphlet16
is very straightforward and simple to read and17
that is being distributed to all workers, being18
mailed out to them. They have also had a briefing19
with the investigation team that answered a lot of20
their questions as well.21
I will ask Bob Walker, who was our22
main investigator to maybe comment. He has23
firsthand experience in this area and got the24
feedback from the people.25
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MR. WALKER: For the record, Bob1
Walker.2
That pamphlet was reviewed by3
workers to make sure that it did meet those needs.4
It was specifically tailored to be given to5
workers in language that we all understand.6
Any other issue about workers and7
whether the training is in their language, that is8
something that was passed on to Cameco and they9
are already looking at a more hands-on approach to10
training. That was one of the things that was11
passed on and that is part of what they are12
reviewing right now.13
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.14
My follow-up question was to15
Cameco on that and then finally to staff.16
THE CHAIRPERSON: Any comment from17
Cameco?18
MR. ROGERS: Terry Rogers.19
We have seen the pamphlet but we20
didn't draft it. But it is, at least in our view21
I think, in more common understandable things. It22
is sieverts and becquerels and all those things.23
I just think you need to see it and pass judgment24
on that.25
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MEMBER McDILL: But with respect1
to training and other methodologies other than the2
written word, is that part of the plan that is3
coming down through AHZ you said, A-H-Z?4
MR. GRANT: Scott Grant, for the5
record.6
They have used a number of methods7
and that could be one, but we don't know for8
certain whether that is what they are going to go9
with. We certainly are mostly interested in10
approving the understanding and if that is what11
gets it done, then that is what we will do.12
MR. TELFER: For the record, Gord13
Telfer here.14
In our collective agreement we15
have looked at this particular area on oral16
testing and written testing and we have recognized17
that in our collective agreement as well with the18
contract with Cameco so that the people in this19
area have an opportunity to be tested in both20
frames, oral and written.21
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.22
Staff, would you care to comment?23
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.24
In regards to the information and25
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success of it, we will be doing follow-up on site1
and confirmation with discussions and evaluations2
with the workers. We also realize it is an3
outstanding action item as a result of our audit4
on the whole training component.5
So once Cameco has put in a6
revised program and gone through their steps, we7
will then -- and they have informed us that they8
have implemented it, we will then have an9
opportunity to go back and reassess it and10
determine the success of it and whether it has11
fulfilled our action as a result of our audit. So12
we will be doing the follow-up and it will be part13
of our compliance program.14
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.15
I have one other question and it16
is to the intervenor.17
We have a submission later on from18
unspecified miners. I don't know if you have seen19
it. I just wonder if the group of unspecified20
miners is within your envelope.21
MR. TELFER: There are some miners22
that don't fall under the umbrella of the United23
Steel Workers. There are contractor miners. This24
could be the area. We don't represent them and25
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that could be an area.1
Clearly anything that we do as a2
steel worker reflects on contractor miners as well3
to make sure that they are working in a safe and4
appropriate way, but they don't have the5
collective agreement language to protect them in6
some areas.7
MEMBER McDILL: Will they receive8
your pamphlet?9
MR. TELFER: Yes.10
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.11
MR. SHIER: Dave Shier, for the12
record.13
If could make one comment on that,14
the contract miners were, I believe, interviewed15
as well during this investigation.16
THE CHAIRPERSON: I would just17
like to note that I think that the Commission in18
the long and fulsome of time would appreciate19
receiving copies of the pamphlet. Because it20
isn't generally available it will not be part of21
our record of decision.22
I think the concept of unions23
providing information in -- I don't mean in24
parallel in a negative sense, but in parallel25
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meaning supplementary and complementary to the1
work of a company makes sense.2
I just want to clarify that the3
Commission holds the company responsible for the4
training program and the staff for auditing those5
programs and certainly understand the important6
role that the worker representatives can place in7
both, as Dr. Dosman questioned, encouraging8
people, saying this is important but also9
providing, as you see fit, further information.10
So I think it is a synergistic relationship I11
think one would conclude.12
My question for the intervenor is:13
I should declare that I have been involved in coal14
mines quite a bit in my life, coal mines with a15
lot of water, so I kind of understand this a bit.16
But my sense is that it is one17
thing to prepare for situations, seek to do this,18
but when a problem hits -- like this really hit.19
It isn't a day to day, it isn't the cool and calm20
every day job. This is something that really hits21
and people are expected to respond and do it.22
Do you have thoughts about23
anything in terms of lessons learned about this24
from your interviewing of the workers, et cetera,25
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about when the proverbial hits the fan, is there1
something that needs to be done to communicate2
amongst workers or between representatives and3
workers or whatever that was a lesson learned from4
this?5
MR. TELFER: Gord Telfer, 8914.6
Yes. I just want to say that the7
lesson that was learned was a communications issue8
clearly. That has been kind of reported in all9
our findings that it was a communication thing. I10
guess that is something ourselves, the union, and11
Cameco have to sit down when we do have the12
emergency situations.13
Clearly throughout the influx of14
water the communications improved drastically. We15
had, through the companies, a presentation16
informing the employees day to day in a written17
format to let us know what was going on. We18
didn't do that before. I think that was a19
positive thing.20
Also, with the union correctly21
having updates at our monthly union meetings and22
quarterly meetings to make sure that everybody was23
aware of it.24
Yes, there was a big change from25
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the start to the finish. At the end of it I1
believe that the communications and the updates2
that the employees received and the day to day3
updates on oral presentations that the managers at4
both facilities did and the process, we didn't5
have that before.6
Clearly that is something that we7
will have to look at to make sure that the8
communication aspect is really addressed.9
MR. SHIER: Dave Shier, for the10
record.11
I'm going to get Bob Walker to12
comment on his views from the interviews. Then,13
Ed Morelli works right at the McArthur River site14
so I think it would be worthwhile getting his15
views as well.16
MR. WALKER: For the record,17
Bob Walker.18
Our investigation focused on the19
radiological issues, but the interviews are very20
open to every issue that was associated with the21
inflow. The number one issue people had, except22
for the dose assessments, was: Are we ready for23
when this happens again?24
It is not directly part of the25
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report, but in a summary of the findings at the1
back of the report there is a number of things. A2
lot of them have been talked about here today3
already, such as making sure there is sufficient4
pump capacity, making sure there is adequate5
training, adequate CBA, things like that.6
So people wanted to make sure that7
this was a lesson learned, that everything that8
was learned from this was captured so that next9
time there is an inflow -- if there is another10
inflow -- that they are ready for it. That is in11
the report.12
MR. MORELLI: Ed Morelli, Vice13
President for Local 8914.14
I think over this influx of water15
we had daily meetings and updates which covered16
probably 99 per cent of the workers -- it depends17
if they were on night shift or day shift -- to18
inform them as the inflow come along, how our19
process was on the water. Because there were20
people on surface that never seen the underground21
part or knew what was going on, just the update to22
keep them informed on the communication part.23
So that part was carried on fairly24
good. Maybe not everybody understood the actual25
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138
parts of what was going on in the flood because1
they never even had an aspect of the mine and what2
it even looked like. It didn't matter if the3
person was from Key Lake or McArthur that come4
over and helped, whether they were surface or5
underground when they come, the information6
meetings were there, they updated the employees as7
things went on -- that is everybody, it was the8
contractors, the union and staff there -- to know9
what was going on during the inflow.10
I think it was good. Like the11
report comes back, I think we lack in that and12
that is probably on the union side too. What we13
try to do on our Health and Safety Committee is14
inform our members on it, but we are not in the15
educational aspect on it.16
Cameco's safety department on17
radiation is well versed in their knowledge of it,18
but it is to get it across to the average person.19
I don't understand it and I have been there for20
15 years and probably had every year an update on21
it and whatever.22
To find the person that is going23
to be -- I won't say well educated, but the person24
that the other person can understand it. I think25
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that is where some of the communication problems1
involved where we had trouble with radiation. It2
is such a -- I won't say complicated thing to3
understand, but when you can't see it physically4
you don't understand what the radiation is doing5
to you.6
Our members do the practical7
part of it, you know, bring in all the safety8
procedures. Whatever thing has to be done,9
they follow the procedure in cleaning up and10
getting the radiation as low as possible and11
moving on, but under the education part they12
probably really don't understand it but they can13
do a practical on it.14
THE CHAIRPERSON: I will note back15
to the original CMD 3.6 evaluates emergency16
preparedness in terms of a program and rating for17
program and implementation and then speaks to it.18
One of the things in reading19
this -- this is a question for the staff and20
perhaps Cameco -- it talks about accident21
scenarios. Are there specific requirements for22
exercises in areas, because that is where I think23
we get a feeling of greater comfort when you do24
exercises in certain instances.25
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140
Is that a requirement? Then back1
to Cameco about it.2
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.3
In terms of emergency preparedness4
and exercises, yes, there are requirements and5
expectations for the licensees to carry them on.6
The main concerns for an7
underground mine operation, the first priority8
thing would be for a fire underground and the9
proper personnel to go in there and perform rescue10
operations for that.11
In regards to a high water inflow12
incident, it was never an issue about workers13
being able to safely get out of the mine with this14
inflow, but it is an exercise and I think it will15
be expanded upon for their response to this type16
of incident.17
Also, it requires qualified18
personnel to go back and reassess the safety of19
the mine before workers return to the area to do20
remediation measures, whether the fire -- after21
the fire has been put out, but to handle inflows22
and water flows and groundfall conditions and23
remediation of the ground support system.24
So there are exercises and this25
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141
lesson will be to expand with that with the1
licensee and address that under their emergency2
preparedness.3
THE CHAIRPERSON: Cameco?4
MR. BUCK: L. Wyatt Buck, for the5
record.6
We do several drills in the course7
of a year. A lot of them fall under the mine regs8
so we do stench gas drills, we do fire drills and9
those types of things. I want to assure you that10
that is a part of our program.11
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.12
Dr. Dosman, did you have a13
follow-up question?14
MEMBER DOSMAN: Yes, Madam Chair.15
I have alluded to this issue of safety culture16
from the top down and, if you like, the other way17
around, and I would just like to ask the President18
or Vice President of Local 8914: Do you detect19
any change in safety culture efforts by the20
company, if you like, from the top down?21
We have heard of the Chief22
Operating Officer making a safety culture tour and23
other initiatives. Do you think something real is24
going on here in terms of change?25
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142
MR. TELFER: I guess our response1
from the union is that we look at everything,2
different options that come through to us on3
safety.4
One of the things we like to do,5
if there is a new process on safety being6
developed, we would like to be a part of it. In7
the past they were maybe somewhat reluctant to8
maybe include us in all the issues, but clearly9
that environment has changed. I know that we have10
had an opportunity from the executive and from our11
rank and file on the floor to visit all areas of12
the new safety programs that are being developed.13
So I would answer your question,14
yes, we feel that there are some positive changes15
developing and I think it is because of some of16
the questions that we have had in the past and17
some of the issues of other safety programs that18
were developed.19
They allowed us, as a local and20
the union executive to question these other safety21
programs, and then if they weren't meeting the22
needs of the bargaining unit members from a safety23
aspect, we clearly outlined that to them. And24
they have listened to us.25
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143
So I think that the culture is1
changing from the top down to the bottom and2
reversed. So I really believe that in these areas3
that issue has been addressed and they are4
changing.5
MEMBER DOSMAN: May I ask6
Mr. Rogers: Is this assumption correct? Do I7
take that Cameco really is embarking on a new era8
in safety culture? Is this a new vigorous9
initiative from the top down in the company?10
MR. ROGERS: Terry Rogers, for the11
record.12
Trying to put a more well defined13
understanding of safety culture has made the14
difference in terms of our approach to it. My15
experience with Cameco in about five years -- a16
year and half here in Canada, but overseas -- was17
that the strong safety culture existed but now we18
are starting to understand more the details of19
what I guess is the official definition of it.20
In the context of the question21
about the local and the company, we see everybody22
working at our sites as part of Cameco, whether23
they are union people, contract people, it really24
doesn't matter from the aspects of the safety25
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culture, what our standards are and what is1
expected, and to try to encourage an enthusiastic2
approach and every individual understands the3
ramifications or the implications of what is being4
done and understands their rights as well as the5
safe work practices that we are trained to know.6
So the commitment is from the top7
of the organization, from the Board of Directors8
down, that we will improve the safety culture. We9
understand the safety record of Cameco is10
excellent and is leading in the industry, but we11
can improve on the cultural aspects of safety and12
that is the road we are headed down.13
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very14
much. We would like to thank you very much for15
the union representatives to come here. We are16
very used to this on some of the power plant17
sides, but we do really appreciate your views and18
it is helpful for us in terms of making these19
decisions.20
What we are just going to do is21
give you a chance to shut down your computers22
because we would like to see the EQC people behind23
you. So we would just like to ask you if you24
wouldn't mind moving. We will just give you an25
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opportunity to do that.1
Thank you very much.2
--- Pause3
4
04-H17.3 / 04-H17.3A5
Oral presentation by the Northern Saskatchewan6
Environmental Quality Committee, Athabasca7
Subcommittee8
THE CHAIRPERSON: I would then9
like to move to the next submission, which is an10
oral presentation by the Northern Saskatchewan11
Environmental Quality Committee, the Athabasca12
Subcommittee, which is outlined in CMD 04-H17.313
and 04-H17.3A.14
We are very pleased to see you15
here with us today. I know it has been a long16
trip for you so thank you very much for taking the17
time to be with us today. We did really18
thoroughly find our trip up north in northern19
Saskatchewan great when we did that earlier this20
year, so thank you very much for coming.21
I believe Mr. McDonald is going22
to do the presentation and Mr. Wolverine and23
Mr. Woods are with you. The floor is yours, sir.24
MR. McDONALD: Good morning,25
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President Keen and Members of the Commission. We1
have made this trip from northern Saskatchewan2
today so our voices could be heard on the issue of3
relicensing the McArthur River uranium mine, a4
project that affects our home and our neighbours.5
My name is Felix McDonald. I am a6
member of the Fond du Lac Denesuline First Nation.7
We make our home on the north shore of Lake8
Athabasca in a community of about 800 people, Fond9
du Lac, Saskatchewan. Norman Wolverine, who is10
also here today, and I were some of the original11
representatives of the EQC.12
I am also a nuclear industry13
worker. I have been employed at the Rabbit Lake14
operations for over 20 years where I currently15
work as a mill operator. Over my career I have16
been able to learn a great deal about uranium17
mining, milling and safety.18
The McArthur River mine is located19
in the Athabasca Basin, about 250 kilometres south20
of my home in Fond du Lac. The water from the21
McArthur River site eventually ends up in the Fond22
du Lac River which empties into Lake Athabasca.23
The South Central Subcommittee of24
the EQC visits the McArthur River site at least25
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once per year. On different occasions McArthur1
River has hosted the entire EQC or certain groups2
within the EQC. The events and status of the3
McArthur River operation are also provided to the4
EQC as a whole at various meetings throughout the5
year.6
Cameco visits communities7
throughout the north to provide status reports on8
the activities at the various mine sites and to9
share future plans with the community members.10
In 2003, the McArthur River mine11
experienced a major water inflow. While no one12
wants such a thing to happen, it proved the13
strength and importance of good communication.14
Cameco was in continual contact15
with the EQC via our manager during the water16
inflow incident. At the beginning, our manager17
would write and fax out the information that she18
received. As the incident progressed, Cameco19
would provide the written information in the20
Clarifier.21
Sask Environment, who participated22
in daily conference calls with both Cameco and the23
CNSC, would verify the accuracy of the information24
and the Clarifier would be faxed out to the25
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148
various communities. Each EQC representative was1
responsible for hanging up the faxes in their home2
communities for the people to read. Without daily3
newspapers in the northern towns and villages this4
was the best way to make sure people had current5
and accurate information.6
As soon as possible, three7
representatives went to McArthur River to tour the8
site. This gave us an opportunity to check that9
the information we were receiving was accurate.10
We could not go underground at that time, but we11
were able to follow the water flow through the12
treatment and discharge process. We could report13
back to the EQC representatives and communities14
that the information we had been getting on water15
treatment was true. We also had a chance to talk16
with employees over our lunch break and get their17
understanding of the situation.18
Throughout the incident both the19
CNSC and Sask Environment were in communication20
with the EQC through our manager.21
On September 23, 2003 all of the22
EQC representatives were taken to McArthur River23
and given an underground and surface tour.24
This was an unfortunate thing to25
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happen, but in the end it proved that we could all1
work together to make northern Saskatchewan2
stronger.3
The uranium mining industry has4
provided the north with jobs and with training5
opportunities for over 20 years. McArthur River6
is no different. The operation allows for7
hundreds of northerners to support their families8
independently. It provides educational9
opportunities for upgrading secondary schooling,10
trades, apprenticeships, mining technician and11
technology training through many programs. The12
mining industry also provides scholarships for13
post secondary training in a number of areas.14
Across the north, individuals,15
communities and partnerships have developed16
businesses to provide the contracting services17
required by the mining industry. Many of the jobs18
from these businesses go to northerners. My son19
works for the security contractor at a northern20
mine site. The revenue from these businesses21
helps to strengthen our communities.22
The mining industry also supports23
the north with contributions to community24
infrastructure such as health facilities, schools,25
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150
recreational and cultural facilities.1
In other cases, people bring their2
mining experience back to make a difference in3
their home towns. In my community, one of the men4
who learned his mechanics trade through the mining5
industry has opened a mechanics shop, a business6
we never had before.7
Others who are employed have gone8
back to their communities and invested in small9
business that in turn employs more people. In10
this way, the north can grow and provide a11
healthier community for our families to live in.12
We recognize that things maybe13
could have been done differently during the water14
inflow of 2003. We also recognize that hindsight15
is 20/20.16
In a situation that could have17
shut down the world's richest uranium mine, men18
and women, northern and southern, professional and19
labourer, worked side by side to save the20
environment, to preserve their safety and jobs and21
to save their mine.22
On behalf of the EQC, I would like23
to voice my support for the renewal of the24
operating licence for the McArthur River uranium25
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151
mining operation.1
Thank you.2
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very3
much, Mr. McDonald.4
Are there any questions?5
Dr. Barnes.6
MEMBER BARNES: Yes. Thank you7
for the presentation.8
I was curious on page 4 when you9
said:10
"As soon as possible, three11
representatives went to12
McArthur River to tour the13
site."14
The inflow event occurred on15
April 6th. When did you actually get to the mine?16
MR. McDONALD: We were there on17
the 23rd of that month.18
MEMBER BARNES: Was that by19
invitation or did you press to have a tour?20
MR. McDONALD: Both.21
MEMBER BARNES: Simultaneous.22
Thank you, sir.23
THE CHAIRPERSON: Any questions?24
Dr. Dosman.25
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MEMBER DOSMAN: Thank you,1
Madam Chair.2
I would just like to ask the3
representatives of the committee because it4
doesn't quite come out, were you satisfied during5
the water event that the company was making6
adequate provision for the environment?7
MR. WOODS: Yes, Bobby Woods, for8
the record.9
I was one of the members that went10
up to the site. We were given a float tour and I11
guess we saw exactly what the procedure was and we12
were quite happy with the way things were going.13
They showed us the full treatment process and, I14
guess, the period when they had to take some of15
the employees out until they decommissioned16
everything and got everything back in order. So17
we were quite happy with that.18
MEMBER DOSMAN: And could you19
comment on your view as to the adequacy for the20
environment that the company is making, in terms21
of the extra pumping capability and the new22
treatment facilities and so on? Does your23
committee view -- what view does the committee24
have on these provisions?25
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MR. WOODS: Bobby Woods, again.1
Yes, we are quite happy with that.2
We get our information also, I guess I could say,3
second-hand a lot of times from the company4
because we have to inquire about all these things.5
But, basically, we get a lot of information from6
the employees that are there from our communities.7
I have asked, and I think on-site8
at the time we asked, one of the people who were9
there and working with the water treatment that10
the process that they were operating and following11
is quite sufficient for, you know, what's going on12
there. And, yes, we are, I guess, okay with that.13
MEMBER DOSMAN: To prolonging -- I14
realize we are getting close to our past15
lunchtime -- with regard to information provision,16
not just during the water event but in the normal17
course of events, could you comment on the18
adequacy and regularity of information that the19
committee receives from company representatives20
with regard to events at the McArthur River mine?21
MR. WOODS: I was just trying to22
get some information from Betty here, however,23
yes, in my own experience, we meet, you know,24
approximately six times a year with the company25
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and they give us updates. We do on-site tours and1
we also have a consultation process with them2
through our EQC meetings and, you know, whenever3
we require certain information, we get, of course,4
the experts in the certain fields to come up and5
talk to us.6
So the information is there. And7
as Felix mentioned in his report, when we go back8
to our home communities, we either get9
information, through pamphlets and so on, and we10
distribute it throughout our communities. Many of11
us have local radio-television, so we have a12
scroll, so we get the information, we pass it on.13
We haven't been questioned too14
much about it. Of course, the odd people that do15
come out and ask, but, basically, the employees16
come out and say, "Well, what's happening in this17
area?", whatever the area of concern may be. 18
According to the information that19
we receive, we certainly provide that. And the20
companies also provide, I think, with adequate21
information. So it's quite well -- there's quite22
good communication open there.23
MEMBER DOSMAN: Madam Chair?24
THE CHAIRPERSON: Yes, if you have25
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a further question, go ahead.1
MEMBER DOSMAN: It's very minor.2
I was just wondering, in Mr.3
McDonald's presentation, he spoke of the4
"clarifier". This term, "the clarifier"?5
MR. McDONALD: It's the company6
newsletter.7
MEMBER DOSMAN: Oh, thank you.8
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very9
much. And thank you very much, again, for coming10
all this way to talk to us. We will have an11
opportunity to hear from you again on the other12
hearings. So thank you very much for that.13
14
04-H17.4 / 04-H17.4A15
Oral presentation by Maisie Sheill16
THE CHAIRPERSON: We are going to17
move to the next submission, which is coming to us18
via a video conference from an oral presentation19
by Mrs. Maisie Shiell, as outlined in CMDs H17.420
and H17.4A.21
Mrs. Shiell, are you there?22
MS SHIELL: I am, yes.23
THE CHAIRPERSON: The floor is now24
yours, Madam.25
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--- Technical difficulties1
MS SHIELL: Furthermore, both2
Thorium-230 and Radium-226 are high-LET radiation,3
a high-LET alpha radionuclides, and decay into4
four more short-lived high-LET alpha-emitting5
radionuclides.6
The high-LET alpha radiation7
causes very dense ionization of atoms and8
molecules in genetic and somatic cells of the9
organism.10
As a lay person, my understanding11
of the science of this is that Einstein's famous12
E=mc2, is the perfect analogy for the action of13
alpha particles. And if you look at beta14
particles or gamma ray, this cannot be said.15
The alpha particle is comprised of16
two protons and two neutrons. In subatomic terms,17
a huge mass travelling along its track at a very18
high velocity from the five MvE energy, the 519
million electron volt energy, plus two charges in20
a tiny space of 40 microns, the length of a human21
cell, this particle has been internalized by the22
organisms, and it is the organisms that I am23
concerned about.24
The alpha particle is comprised in25
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Radium-226 and the energy from its1
inevitably-produced, short-lived alpha-emitting2
progeny is included in your calculations. The3
energy produced in an interaction with the cells4
in a genetic or somatic organ has a very high5
relative biological effectiveness compared to the6
gamma or beta. Although this is happening7
internally in the plant or animal and, therefore,8
cannot be observed or measured in populations9
today, making the assumption, as CNSC does appear10
to be doing, that no significant chemical changes11
are taking place may be a serious mistake with12
these long-lived radionuclides.13
This high linear energy transfer14
in this small space knocks off the electrons from15
the neutral atoms in a plant or animal's cells16
causing atoms in the organism to become charged17
ions if the alpha particles have been ingested or18
inhaled by animals or absorbed by the roots of19
plants and these plants are the basis of all our20
energy.21
As the government PSL2 document22
said:23
"genetic effects are the24
major consequence from radio25
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exposure at low and moderate1
dose rates."2
This document cited experiments on3
genetic effects from gamma radiation, as well as4
two experiments with alpha.5
The long-term from the long decay6
time and from the genetic inheritance of this7
high-risk internal damage through the coming8
centuries is the basis for my concern for future9
generations, but I do not find these hearings to10
be very democratic or whether the public is11
invited to comment.12
The commissioners do not address13
their questions to me. Usually, they ask only the14
CNSC staff what they think. And recently I have15
even had difficulty in hearing the staff's16
answers.17
What I am trying to say to you18
commissioners this morning is that I believe19
licensing a renewal of McArthur River mine for20
four years is too risky. Never being licensed for21
four years before, we do not understand well22
enough the long-term consequences for our children23
in the future.24
When in 1997 the joint commission25
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advised that this project be allowed to go ahead1
using extreme caution, the McArthur River2
documents, at that time, had said that the grade3
of ore was only 15 per cent, which was what the4
panel was judging.5
A 15-per-cent ore would bring to6
the surface less than 2,000 becquerels of radium7
with each gram of ore. Now, Cameco, with the8
government's blessing, has raised that to 3,0009
becquerels per gram, after very little public10
participation.11
Section 24(4)(b) of the Canadian12
Nuclear Safety Act says no licence should be13
renewed unless, in the opinion of the14
commissioners, the applicant15
"will, in carrying out activity, make adequate16
provision for the protection17
of the environment".18
In my opinion, it is not possible19
to make adequate provision for the long-term20
protection of the environment with ore from a 24.421
per cent uranium mine at present. The scientific22
community does not understand well enough the23
long-term consequences of alpha radiation.24
I would be very pleased if the25
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commissioners would enter into discussion with me1
about these concerns that I have done a great deal2
of study about or suggest how my perceptions or my3
calculations are in error.4
I note during this hearing, the5
commissioners are going to be discussing CMD6
04-M39 on the problems of the effects of alpha7
radiation. I would very much like this discussion8
to take place in the public.9
Thank you.10
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very11
much, Mrs. Shiell.12
I would like to note that there13
was a few problems at the beginning, but certainly14
we were able to hear her later, although I don't15
see her on the screen. Is she still there?16
MS SHIELL: I thought I was being17
watched all this time.18
THE CHAIRPERSON: Hello. The19
miracles of technology.20
Before I open the floor for21
questions, Mrs. Shiell, I would like to note that22
I will be asking the secretary to make23
arrangements for you to be on teleconference on24
Friday, if you are available, at the time that we25
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are discussing CMD 04-M39. So we will make those1
arrangements for you to participate in that2
discussion.3
I'm just turning to my fellow4
Commission members. Are there any questions from5
the Commission?6
Mrs. Shiell, I just wanted to --7
your recommendation is for a two-year licence. Is8
that correct?9
MS SHIELL: That is correct.10
THE CHAIRPERSON: I would just11
like to --12
MS SHIELL: With the stipulation13
that -- my recommendation in my written paper,14
which was written for McArthur and Key Lake, is a15
two-year licence because we do not know and I16
don't think it's fair to future generations to17
continue to go on, "Oh, we can make it go five18
years, anything". But anyway, that is me.19
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you very20
much. I just wanted to clarify that.21
Mrs. Shiell, I would just like to22
make a comment that the Commission members do have23
your written paper and we do note that you have24
spoken on this subject. We do read your papers25
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very seriously and very diligently and you1
shouldn't regard the lack of questioning. It's2
just that you write the paper is so clearly, we do3
understand your position quite clearly.4
So don't look at the lack of5
questioning as meaning that we are not paying6
attention. We certainly are.7
MS SHIELL: But does this mean8
that you agree with everything I'm saying, is what9
you are saying? I mean, this is what the10
questioning is about, isn't it?11
THE CHAIRPERSON: Well, Mrs.12
Shiell, we have had the opportunity to have13
questions to you in the past with regards to this14
subject. The Commission takes in a great deal of15
evidence on the whole range of issues, including16
yours, and we will certainly take your evidence17
into consideration when we make the decision.18
We treat all the CMDs the same.19
We look at it as objectively as possible, based on20
our knowledge and experience in making those21
decisions. So silence doesn't mean that we do22
accept or we do not accept; silence means that we23
do understand the position that you have put24
forward.25
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MS SHIELL: To put my position a1
little more clearly, I realize the jobs angle to2
it. I realize the industry is very, very3
important to the development of the North, but you4
have got to weigh that, in my opinion, against5
what is the consequence to future generations. Is6
the jobs today more important than the future for7
the human race? Because, I mean, this is not8
going to stay locally, like any chemical might.9
This is going to spread, and spread through the10
decay. So that is why I say we need -- this is11
the question we have to look at: are we and12
who -- I mean, this has got to go further than the13
CNSC, probably. It has to go to the government,14
but people do not understand it and CNSC,15
supposedly, understands it.16
THE CHAIRPERSON: Well, certainly,17
Mrs. Sheill, we do weigh all the evidence. I just18
wish to reassure you that -- you had quoted19
section 24(4)(b) of the Canadian Nuclear Safety20
Act. I can assure that the commissioners take21
very seriously their responsibility, in terms of22
ensuring that the applicant does carry out the23
activity with due concern for the protection of24
the environment and, as we have discussed earlier25
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today, the safety of the workers.1
So thank you very much for your2
input today and thank you for patience, as it has3
been a little longer than we assumed it would be4
this morning. So thank you for that.5
We will take your written6
submission into consideration, as well, and we7
will make provisions to connect you, if you are8
available, on Friday, as well. So thank you very9
much, Madam.10
MS SHIELL: I'm very grateful that11
you will on Friday. Thank you.12
THE CHAIRPERSON: Thank you.13
14
04-H17.515
Written submission from Keewatin Visions16
THE CHAIRPERSON: We will now move17
to the next submission. It's the last submission18
for this hearing today.19
It is a written submission from20
Keewatin Visions, outlined in CMD 04-H17.5.21
The members had an opportunity to22
look at this written submission. Are there any23
questions or comments to the licensee or to the24
staff with regards to this?25
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Mr. Graham.1
MEMBER GRAHAM: Just a question to2
CNSC staff.3
Have you had any dealings or had4
any communications with this group in the past.5
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.6
They have basically come into the7
office -- or a representative has come into our8
office to obtain information. It was the same9
information we provided and the very extensive10
details, under access to information, of all the11
details and monitoring information, exposures, et12
cetera, in incident reports that we actually also13
provided to the media. So we have had a very14
extensive interchange of information and15
background to them.16
MEMBER GRAHAM: A subsequent17
question: how large an organization are they?18
How large an organization are they and how many19
different mine sites do they represent?20
MR. SCISSONS: Kevin Scissons.21
I do not have any more details22
about them whatsoever, other than that's the first23
time they came into the office was to just obtain24
information. This was their first written25
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submission or filing we have had from them, so I1
do not have any other details.2
THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. McDill.3
MEMBER McDILL: Thank you.4
Since the submission is written, I5
would like to ask Cameco to comment on the6
paragraph on the -- the pages are unnumbered. It7
would be the fourth page of text -- one, two,8
three, four -- on the back of the fourth page of9
text, fourth paragraph down. It begins:10
"The miners report that11
during the rush to save the12
mine, dirty water was13
inadvertently pumped into the14
clean water line." (As read)15
Et cetera. I wonder if that could be clarified16
for the record, please.17
MR. BRONKHORST: David Bronkhorst,18
speaking for the record.19
You probably don't know this, but20
all of the water at McArthur River, we don't bring21
any water underground. We recirculate water that22
we have there.23
Part of our water supply during24
the inflow was cut off from the shaft 3 and it was25
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supplemented with water that was coming in from1
one of the piped lines. It was a conscious2
decision. The risk was analyzed. We communicated3
the situation with radon. There was a frequently4
asked question flyer put out to all employees and5
it was discussed at our occupation health and6
safety committee meetings.7
So, yes, there was bay 12 water in8
our process water, but that water is recirculated9
in the best cases.10
MEMBER McDILL: Can I ask staff to11
comment on that because, obviously, it's a concern12
to this group?13
MR. ASHLEY: Fred Ashley, for the14
record.15
We did have some communication.16
We discussed with the occupational health17
committee the aspects of radon concern within the18
lunchrooms. That was one of their areas. As far19
as our understanding, the occupational health20
committee did receive the information and were21
satisfied that as soon as the water source --22
another water source was made available, that was23
switched so that there wasn't a further problem24
with potential radon, but there never was a25
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problem with radon build-up in the lunchroom areas1
because of it.2
MEMBER McDILL: So, if I may, it3
wasn't inadvertent, it was deliberate and it was4
explained at the time, as well. I understand it's5
explained at the occupational health and safety,6
but was it explained at the time? Maybe Cameco7
could address that.8
Mr. ASHLEY: Yes. A number of9
information bulletins were put out in the form of10
frequently asked questions, and employees -- at11
the time, I can't remember exactly the sequence.12
Maybe Scott Grant or --13
MEMBER McDILL: I understand that14
there was discussion. What I'm asking is: when15
the line was switched and the deliberate choice16
was made, was it explained to the workers at that17
time?18
MR. ASHLEY: To the best of my19
recollection, yes.20
THE CHAIRPERSON: The submission21
makes a series of recommendations. Reading these,22
I think it may be more appropriate for CNSC staff23
to particularly address the questions that they24
had with regards to the recommendations.25
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169
So I'm looking at conclusions on1
the last page. Could you specifically address2
those?3
MR. HOWDEN: Yes. Barclay Howden,4
speaking for the record.5
Just going through the conclusion,6
with regard to notification requirements, those7
notification requirements are already in place.8
In terms of the CNSC doing9
independent radiation -- assessment independently10
the radiation exposure level, from our point of11
view we will do independent verification when we12
go to the site, but when we go to the site it13
depends on the nature of the event what we will be14
looking at.15
In terms of the McArthur inflow16
event, we mobilized very quickly, but we didn't17
spend a lot of time on site. I think that gave a18
perception that we weren't in the loop to the19
workers, even though we were.20
But we were being provided21
radiation protection information in detail on a22
regular basis daily, as Mr. Scissons says, and23
there were some changes made to radiation24
protection practices during the event, but no25
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regulatory limits were changed or requirements1
changed.2
So when we actually went to the3
site, we went up there from more of a focus on4
environmental protection because they were in the5
process of constructing the contingency dam.6
That takes us, actually, to the7
next statement in the conclusion, talking about8
the plans. In our view, when plans are prepared9
for contingency, there are various inputs. The10
inputs that do require design and verification11
activities would be required to be reviewed by a12
qualified engineer and we would expect that to be13
the case.14
In the case of the contingency dam15
in the McArthur River case, we explicitly informed16
Cameco that we expected that all the work was done17
under the review of a qualified engineer. So for18
anything that requires a qualified engineer to19
review, we do expect it. There are provincial20
engineering laws that require this.21
That's about it. I think, for the22
most part, we are doing this.23
And the final point is, in terms24
of "that all requirements for implementation, the25
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contingency plan shall be in place prior to any1
development of new mine areas", that ties in with2
licence condition 2.3 that we have proposed to the3
Commission.4
THE CHAIRPERSON: Dr. Barnes.5
MEMBER BARNES: Mr. Howden, could6
you remind me again what date staff first appeared7
on the site after the water inflow incident?8
MR. HOWDEN: I believe it was9
April 12 or 13th after the incident.10
THE CHAIRPERSON: I guess this is11
a question -- this isn't a question to the staff,12
so you don't have to answer this, but one of the13
things that this bring up, when we look at lessons14
learned, is this is almost a focus group for the15
staff, in terms of what miners, at least a certain16
group of miners, know or do not know about what17
the CNSC does.18
There has certainly been other19
instances when the CNSC staff have gone out and20
talked more broadly about their role and whatever21
and answered questions. So I think that perhaps22
the staff may think through the good offices of23
Cameco or EQC or the union, or combinations24
thereof, of providing some information about the25
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role of the CNSC and open the communication1
channels so that the miners, the workers on site,2
if they have any question about what the CNSC is3
or is not doing, has a vehicle for that.4
I think that certainly that has5
been in other facilities that that's been done.6
So there may be vehicles out there, communications7
vehicles, that are available that you can8
piggyback with, or whatever. But that may be9
something: that you want to use this as a bit of10
a focus group for that kind of consideration.11
Are there any further questions?12
Okay, then, this completes the13
record for the public hearing on the matter of the14
application by Cameco Corporation for the renewal15
of the McArthur River mining operating licence. 16
The Commission will deliberate and17
will publish its decision in due course. And it18
will be published on the CNSC web site and will be19
distributed to participants.20